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13 February 2008 - Afternoon session

15 (1.35 pm)
16 (Jury present)
17 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Yes, Mr Mansfield.
18 MR MANSFIELD: Yes, good afternoon. Just to continue where
19 we left off. I was dealing with Henri Paul or at least
20 I am dealing with the head of security -- and leave out
21 the name for the moment as you don't recall the name --
22 head of security at a large hotel in a big city would be
23 an obvious target for information. So it is that topic.
24 Who would do the targeting of somebody, in other
25 words, decide it would be worth approaching the head of

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1 security to see if that person was willing? Who would
2 take that decision then?
3 A. The trouble is if I say something that MI6 don't wish me
4 to -- they would see pretty quickly I am trying to be as
5 cautious and measured as I can be and answer your
6 question at the same time.
7 Generally, in an overseas city, the MI6 officers
8 based overseas would be responsible for effectively
9 talent spotting and trying to find people of
10 intelligence value. So it is part of their duty, part
11 of their standard operating procedure, as it were, to
12 try to find people of intelligence value and then try to
13 recruit them to work for MI6.
14 Q. I am treading carefully here. In this instance, taking
15 Paris, would you expect it to have been an MI6 officer
16 working out of the Paris station?
17 A. Yes. That would be fair. If they were having someone
18 like that, normally it would be done from the Paris
19 station, not exclusively, but normally.
20 Q. Just dealing with the not exclusively, as far as
21 the non-exclusive aspect of that, do you mean
22 headquarters in London would also deal with it?
23 A. Yes, they could do. I mean, occasionally officers from
24 London would fly out to deal with something, if there
25 was a particular reason for them to do it, a linguistic

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1 reason or that they had a better understanding of
2 the subject. There would be various reasons, but yes,
3 it could be done from head office in London, yes.
4 Q. Now, again I am going carefully about this. It is
5 necessary, or at least I would submit it is necessary,
6 if we are going to ask sensible questions in future, not
7 to know the name, but what would be the rank or job
8 description of the person who would be doing that so
9 that we know who to ask?
10 MR TAM: Sir, no. With respect -- I know my learned friend
11 is being very careful and we are grateful for that, but
12 this is now moving from the territory of generality,
13 which we could live with, to specificity, which is going
14 to endanger properly sensitive matters.
15 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: I think that is right,
16 Mr Mansfield.
17 MR MANSFIELD: Yes, I appreciate the difficulty. May
18 I explain the problem from our point of view?
19 We have a number of -- and I do not know whether
20 it is the full complement or not -- of officers -- in
21 fact, I do not think we are having all of them -- but,
22 in any event, some of the officers who were working at
23 the Paris station at that time. Now, this witness has
24 just described very clearly a duty beholden to MI6
25 officers in foreign stations. I could ask all the

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1 officers in turn was it there duty, but it would
2 obviously help to know whose duty it was.
3 If I am told on a confidential basis, then obviously
4 that might assist in questioning. That is the only
5 reason that I need to know that. Of course, it is in
6 the context that at the moment there are no documents
7 that have been discovered in relation to this. That is
8 why I ask it. So, sir, if it can be done in that way,
9 I will pass on, as it were.
10 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Shall we pass on and Mr Tam will
11 see what he can do, if anything, in the meantime. I do
12 not know whether he has dealt with the matters that
13 arose before the adjournment.
14 MR MANSFIELD: Yes. We have an ambit. May I come back to
15 them at the end --
16 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Indeed.
17 MR MANSFIELD: -- because I think there may have to be some
18 discussion.
19 Would there be records kept of a contact like this,
20 and if there would be, where would they be kept, in
21 Paris or London?
22 A. In both places normally. Normally any contact that
23 I would have, the details of the contact and the
24 information would all be written up into separate
25 reports. They would all be separated and all that

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1 information would be sent to London and it would
2 normally also be kept in the station.
3 Q. Does it have a name, the file? Did it have a name then?
4 MR MANSFIELD: Sorry, sir, names of files I think is going
5 too far.
6 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Yes.
7 MR MANSFIELD: Could I include this in the last request? If
8 I am told in confidence obviously what the general
9 nature of the file is, it will assist, otherwise I have
10 to ask questions to which there will be objection next
11 week, and it is very difficult when it is said there are
12 not any files to know what files there are not any of,
13 unless we know which one to look for. So I will include
14 that -- and leave it for the moment -- in that last
15 request.
16 Sir, again, I ask the question prefacing it --
17 understandably there may be objection to this, but
18 I hope not.
19 At the time you were working in MI6, would there be
20 an officer concerned with and in a particular division
21 dealing with covert surveillance?
22 There does not seem to be an objection to that one.
23 MR TAM: I am sorry, sir, could I just have a moment? That
24 question, phrased that way, is okay.
25 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: There we are.

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1 MR MANSFIELD: Thank you.
2 Well, there are two others in the same brackets.
3 I will say them now so you know what the next two
4 questions are. One is: is there somebody responsible
5 for agent handling and a department for that? A third
6 one: is there somebody responsible for what are called
7 "cut-offs"?
8 May I amend the last category? It may be "cut-out"
9 as opposed to "cut-off".
10 MR TAM: "Cut-out"?
11 MR MANSFIELD: Yes, printed in two ways.
12 MR TAM: Sir, there are two things to say. One is we don't
13 actually understand the last question. I think
14 "cut-out" is a --
15 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: I am not sure Mr Mansfield does
16 either.
17 MR MANSFIELD: I know the meaning, but not the term.
18 MR TAM: That may require clarification. If the answers
19 that my learned friend is trying to get are simply "yes"
20 or "no" answers, I do not think we could object at this
21 stage.
22 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: No.
23 MR MANSFIELD: Yes. I am sorry, it has been reported in two
24 different ways, but I think it may be "cut-out" and
25 it is a term used to describe, in security service terms

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1 then, the employment of non-security service agents on
2 special operations abroad who are not SAS and not SBS,
3 but, in other words, private people in private agencies
4 abroad.
5 MR TAM: As long as the answer is a "yes" or "no" answer,
6 there is no problem.
7 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Yes.
8 MR MANSFIELD: Mr Tomlinson, were you able to hear
9 the exchange then?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. So the questions are, first of all, in this period, was
12 there an officer and a department concerned with
13 overseeing covert surveillance?
14 A. If I am only permitted to answer "yes" or "no" to that,
15 I cannot answer that because it is not something that
16 I can answer with a "yes" or "no" answer.
17 Q. Well, you had better not then.
18 A. It is very frustrating, I know. If I said "no", it
19 would be construed in one way which was not necessarily
20 the truth and if I said "yes", it would be construed in
21 a way that was not necessarily the truth either, so
22 I can't answer with a "yes" or "no" answer.
23 Q. It may be that the answer to the next question is
24 the same because what I want to suggest is that
25 the departments all have "UK" in front of them with

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1 letters afterwards. Another department, dealing with
2 and overseeing agent handling?
3 A. I see the question that you are driving at there. Yes,
4 the answer to that question is -- you are talking about
5 the departments beginning "UK" is that -- yes. We never
6 use the term "cut-out" or "cut-off", but from the
7 conversations I picked up there, I understand what you
8 are driving at there. Yes, there was a department
9 acting in that way, yes .
10 Q. Thank you. In relation to somebody who might be engaged
11 as acting head of security at a hotel or head of
12 security at a hotel, are you aware of whether they
13 were -- in other words, can you help as to whether they
14 were paid money for that kind of activity?
15 A. I cannot answer to that specific case. I do not know
16 for that specific case, but the answer to that is
17 sometimes and sometimes not. It would depend upon
18 the motivation of that person. If that person was
19 motivated by money, then he would be paid money, but
20 many were motivated by other means. They were motivated
21 by all sorts of other means. So it is not definitely
22 "yes" or "no" and I cannot answer at all to that
23 specific case.
24 Q. I am certainly not asking you about Henri Paul.
25 A. It certainly is the case that a lot of informants and

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1 agents were motivated principally by money. I think
2 it is probably fair to make that point.
3 Q. Would it be right to say that the pattern would be not
4 a one-off payment because, if you made a payment, the
5 informant might disappear and not do the work, so there
6 would be part-payments on a regular basis?
7 A. Yes, effectively a retainer. That would be a perfectly
8 plausible way of having an agent, yes.
9 Q. A final question in relation to this area. Again
10 I pause because there may be objection. In a foreign
11 embassy which is also housing an MI6 station, is it
12 right that there are declared and undeclared operatives
13 at the station?
14 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Don't answer that for the moment.
15 MR TAM: That question is fine as it is.
16 MR MANSFIELD: The question, if I can pose it to you --
17 sorry to do it in this disjointed way -- in a foreign
18 embassy which houses an MI6 or SIS station, is it right
19 that there are declared and undeclared operatives at
20 that station?
21 A. That is correct. That is correct. Depending on the
22 station, but that is, in general, correct.
23 Q. Again I pause. Does that mean that the ones who are
24 undeclared are undeclared to the host nation?
25 That is fine. You can answer that one.

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1 A. That is the case, yes. That is correct.
2 Q. I have a further question.
3 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: You are seeing how far you can
4 push it, are you?
5 MR MANSFIELD: Sorry. You can relax. Don't worry, I am not
6 going to make it difficult for you or anybody else.
7 The question is this: are those responsible for
8 agent-handling amongst the undeclared?
9 MR TAM: That question is okay as it is.
10 MR MANSFIELD: I now put the question to you. There won't
11 be many more of these. Don't worry.
12 Would the people or persons responsible for
13 agent-handling be amongst the declared or the
14 undeclared?
15 A. They could be amongst either.
16 Q. I will ask a specific question. Do you happen to know
17 in relation to the Paris Embassy?
18 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: No, I think you have gone too far
19 now.
20 MR MANSFIELD: Too far.
21 I hope they will let me into France next time I go.
22 I want to move on from that series or area of topics
23 to deal with two or three others that you were asked
24 about this morning.
25 The quickest way to deal with it is if you would not

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1 mind looking at your affidavit, which I think we have
2 established is almost certainly written in 1999 and
3 provided to the French.
4 It is the second page. Last time we looked at
5 the third page. The second page has paragraphs 5, 6 and
6 7 on it. 5 starts later in 1992. Do you have that?
7 That is the fifth paragraph. Then the sixth paragraph,
8 "During my service ...", and then the seventh, "I also
9 learned ..." It is those paragraphs, one or two
10 questions on those paragraphs.
11 Can I take paragraph 6 first? This is the links
12 between MI6 and the Royal Household. You have already
13 been asked about the first half of that paragraph, but
14 I just want to read with you the second half and ask you
15 about it. You are talking there about discreet
16 surveillance being offered for members of the Royal
17 Family and you go on and say, "This was particularly
18 the case for the Princess of Wales who often insisted on
19 doing without overt personal protection, even on
20 overseas trips".
21 You mentioned to my learned friend this morning that
22 that may be something that you read later. Do you
23 remember?
24 A. Yes, I honestly don't think I really read about the
25 Princess of Wales when I worked at MI6.

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1 Q. Well, I want to refresh your memory about something.
2 You were working there between 1991 and 1995. The royal
3 protection was in fact withdrawn right in the middle of
4 that period -- well, towards the end of it but anyway,
5 within that period, 1993/1994. So do you think it is
6 something that you might have gathered while you were
7 working for MI6 because there were ongoing negotiations
8 in that period about no protection?
9 A. I think I knew that that was the case, that she was
10 unhappy with her protection, but I think I probably knew
11 that from the press rather than from within MI6.
12 Q. Very well. I do not pursue it.
13 Then you have this part in this paragraph:
14 "Although contact between MI6 and the Royal
15 Household was officially only via the Foreign Office,
16 I learned while in MI6 that there was unofficial direct
17 contact between certain senior and influential MI6
18 officers and senior members of the Royal Household.
19 I did not see any official papers on this subject, but
20 I am confident that the information is correct.
21 I firmly believe that MI6 documents would yield
22 substantial leads on the nature of their links with
23 the Royal Household and would yield vital information
24 about MI6 surveillance on the Princess of Wales in
25 the days leading to her death."

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1 Now I do want to ask you some questions on this.
2 So, first of all, when you say, "I learned while in
3 MI6 ...", what was the source of your information, can
4 you remember?
5 A. No, I cannot remember that at all now. We were
6 constantly talking amongst ourselves. It could be
7 anything.
8 Q. Can you now remember which certain "senior and
9 influential MI6 officers" you were thinking of then,
10 that is in 1999, and of course which senior members of
11 the Royal Household were you meaning?
12 A. I cannot remember names now at this stage. It is too
13 long ago.
14 Q. Very well.
15 Would you have known names then or was it broached
16 to you in the terms that you put in the statement?
17 A. At the time obviously there would have been lots of
18 names that I would have known at the time, people that
19 I was currently working with. I guess that is what
20 I was referring to then. But I have no recollection of
21 names of people at this late stage. I can only remember
22 a tiny number of officers there now.
23 Q. I understand. I am not pressing you on your memory now,
24 rather more the position then.
25 This is another topic, but it is in the next

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1 paragraph, 7:
2 "I also learned, while in MI6, that one of the
3 paparazzi photographers who routinely followed
4 the Princess of Wales was a member ..."
5 I do not think there is objection to me reading that
6 term.
7 MR TAM: No.
8 MR MANSFIELD: "... was a member of UK/N, a small corps of
9 part-time MI6 agents who provide miscellaneous services
10 to MI6, such as surveillance and photography expertise.
11 I do not know the identity of this photographer or
12 whether he was one of the photographers present at
13 the time of the fatal incident. However, I am confident
14 that examination of UK/N records would yield
15 the identity of this photographer and would enable
16 the inquest to eliminate or further investigate that
17 potential line of inquiry."
18 The first question: is that as you remembered it in
19 1999, that paragraph?
20 A. I presume it is, yes. I guess so. I do not remember it
21 at all now.
22 Q. Now, the UK/N records, unless there is an objection to
23 this, where are they held, in Paris or in London?
24 A. Am I allowed to answer that?
25 Q. It is fine. You can, yes.

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1 A. They would normally be held in London.
2 Q. If you were wanting to get these files, do you, as it
3 were, ask for the UK/N records or do you have to ask for
4 something more specific?
5 A. There would be literally so many of them, you would have
6 to have a specific name effectively or you would have to
7 know the code name of the particular agent to ask for
8 it. So you could potentially ask the head of that
9 department whether he has any particular people who meet
10 that description and he might know, but normally you
11 would have to know the actual code name itself.
12 Q. Now on this page, going back one step, paragraph 5, this
13 is where you give a description. Since you have given
14 most of it already, I do not intend to go over it, nor
15 do I intend to read out any names. One aspect of
16 the third scenario, if you go to paragraph 5 -- it is
17 two-thirds of the way into the paragraph, on
18 the right-hand side of the paragraph -- "This third
19 scenario ...", do you see that?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. "... suggested the assassination ...", "limousine" and
22 so on.
23 "A proposed to arrange the crash in a tunnel because
24 the proximity of concrete close to the road would ensure
25 that the crash would be sufficiently violent to cause

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1 death or serious injury and would also reduce
2 the possibility that there might be independent casual
3 witnesses."
4 Is that how you remembered either the conversation
5 with A or the document you saw with A?
6 A. Well I think we have sort of dealt with that. Now,
7 I can no longer distinguish between what I remembered at
8 the time and what I remember from reading these
9 documents. I really cannot shed any more light on that
10 than is already present there. I am sorry.
11 Q. That is all right. Just a couple of questions on
12 Mohamed Al Fayed.
13 I don't think there is objection to this. Is it
14 right that in 1992/1993, when you were serving in MI6,
15 you were aware or saw files or a file relating to
16 Mohamed Al Fayed?
17 A. I was aware of -- at the time I believe it was around
18 that time when he had a great rivalry with Tiny Rowland
19 and there was quite a lot of information about that, and
20 Tiny Rowland had this dispute with Mr Al Fayed,
21 I believe.
22 Q. Now, one other matter relating to Mohamed Al Fayed and
23 that is: you sent to him a letter containing the kind of
24 information that we have just been going through, but he
25 never received it and it was a journalist who alerted

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1 you to the significance. Now what was the significance
2 that the journalist was alerting you to in relation to
3 that?
4 A. Well, I had remembered that it was in a conversation
5 we had when I was in New Zealand, over the telephone,
6 and I said to him, "Look, I sent Mr Al Fayed a letter,
7 but I never heard anything back from him so I assumed
8 whatever information I had was insignificant or not
9 relevant or whatever and I just did not pay any more
10 attention to it after that".
11 Q. But plainly the journalist thought there was more to it.
12 A. Yes. He was sort of -- thought, well, that this was
13 very strange. He said, "That is very odd because I am
14 sure if Mr Al Fayed had got that letter, he would have
15 been very interested in it". It was him that set things
16 in motion from then on.
17 Q. There is a couple of other things before I go back to
18 the earlier questions. Are you able to help about first
19 of all the question of eavesdropping and monitoring
20 telephone conversations? Was that part of your general
21 awareness or remit or training or anything?
22 A. Presumably, if there are any objections to me answering
23 that, someone would have said so. So I will say that,
24 yes, we were briefed in the procedure for obtaining
25 a telephone warrant and the mechanics of roughly how

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1 it was done at the time -- obviously that has changed
2 quite substantially now -- and what would be involved in
3 doing it and the procedures in general. But we were not
4 involved directly in tapping telephones ourselves.
5 Other people did that who were specialists in that
6 subject matter.
7 Q. The other matter on the back of that is this -- again
8 I go slowly. The people who actually did it, were they
9 part of MI6 or MI5 or GCHQ or don't you know?
10 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: I think there is an objection
11 here.
12 MR TAM: There is an objection here. It is actually the
13 statutory problem that I know has been at the forefront
14 of our minds from time to time. That is a question
15 which we would submit simply cannot be put, however much
16 any party might or might not like it to be put.
17 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: The statute is very strong in its
18 terms, isn't it?
19 MR TAM: Very strong indeed.
20 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Some would say too strong.
21 MR TAM: There are many debates going on, but the statute is
22 the statute as it is.
23 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Mansfield, are you content
24 with that answer or do you want to argue the statute?
25 MR MANSFIELD: I am not content with the answer, but I am

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1 not going to argue it. I think there are many
2 observations about the statute, sir. I do not press
3 this witness about that aspect of it.
4 This is the final question of this whole raft of
5 questions. Again there may be objection to this one.
6 Is there a department within MI6 or MI5 that is
7 concerned with the production and dissemination of
8 disinformation?
9 Don't answer for the moment.
10 Of course, if the department is here, probably ...
11 MR TAM: There are actually two problems with that question.
12 One is relevance, which is not apparent to us, but there
13 is also an objection because this is going to -- well,
14 I can see what the allegation is going to be that
15 follows on from it and it would be exploring a part and
16 a mechanism of how the intelligence agencies do their
17 work, and that is crossing the line there.
18 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: I am pretty doubtful about its
19 relevance anyway.
20 You might try it again with Sir John Dearlove next
21 week.
22 MR MANSFIELD: Well, I give due warning. I will want to try
23 it again. I will not deal with it with this witness.
24 Sir, may I finally return to the two issues that
25 arose earlier? One is providing the name of the Serbian

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1 target that is redacted on the document that A says that
2 he showed this witness. There is objection to that.
3 I will come back to it.
4 As far as the role of MI6 in Angola is concerned,
5 there are objections to the questions that I would want
6 to put in the first place, although there is not to one
7 question, so I may ask that in a minute. The question
8 I would like to ask to start with is: his recollections
9 from that period, are they based on documents he saw or
10 conversations or whatever? What is the source --
11 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: As to which there is no
12 objection?
13 MR MANSFIELD: As to which there is no objection, but it
14 would depend upon the answer to that one.
15 So can I go back to the question of the name first
16 of all?
17 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Yes.
18 MR MANSFIELD: Sir, I would ask that he is shown this name.
19 My friend is saying -- and I do not want to pre-empt his
20 argument. His argument is that he was shown the
21 document in the first place and he does not remember
22 the name, but that is begging the question, which is
23 circular. He is saying there was a document and his
24 recollection is that the name "Milosevic" was there. So
25 if there is either the same document or a different

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1 document with a completely different name, it may be
2 important for him to see that other name --
3 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: But he has seen the document
4 once.
5 MR MANSFIELD: Yes, he has seen what he says he was shown
6 then. But the question now is whether that is the same
7 document or there is another document. The question
8 of -- if it is going to be said, "Well, this was the
9 document he was shown, but it was not Milosevic", then,
10 in my submission, he needs to see what it is being
11 claimed is on the document that was shown.
12 Of course the document itself has been shredded, so
13 all we know is what A says, and I do not know what
14 the name is because it is redacted. But I would ask
15 that he is shown it because he may have observations on
16 that name and say, "Yes, yes, I remember that name but
17 that is not right" or whatever.
18 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Is there any objection to him
19 being shown the name that has been redacted?
20 MR TAM: Sir, yes, there is, because whatever one might
21 think of the proposal that was written, the name that is
22 on there is the name of the subject of that proposal.
23 As with all other intelligence matters, your
24 contacts, your targets, your subject matters of any
25 operation, they are all sensitive. What is plain is

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1 that even though the witness has in the past seen this
2 document, he does not recall the name. That name is
3 therefore a name which is as sensitive as any other name
4 which is connected with SIS operations. So to be
5 showing the name to him now --
6 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: If he has seen the document
7 once --
8 MR TAM: He has.
9 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: -- surely the mere fact that he
10 cannot remember the name is not a good reason for not
11 showing him the document again.
12 MR TAM: It would be telling him something that he does not
13 currently know --
14 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: He may remember it in the future,
15 for all we know. He may remember it right or he may
16 remember it wrong, but I think Mr Mansfield has a point.
17 It is not going to come out in the public domain because
18 it will simply be shown to the witness.
19 MR TAM: There are two other observations that we would
20 make. The first is this: it is possible to try to get
21 around this problem if specific questions are put to
22 this witness about how many documents of this type he
23 had seen, because you know the evidence is in
24 the statement of witness A, and if a certain answer is
25 given, there is simply no foundation for the suggestion

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1 that my learned friend is trying to make, that there
2 were two such documents or may have been two such
3 documents.
4 The other problem -- and I alluded to this
5 earlier -- is that if you accept that the name as far as
6 the public domain is concerned is sensitive, even if
7 it is a name that the witness has seen before, we cannot
8 show it to him in the South of France in a secure
9 fashion because of the fact that there is a videolink in
10 place rather than the witness being here. If he was
11 physically in the witness box, of course it would be
12 much easier.
13 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Yes. Well, Mr Mansfield, can you
14 get round it by questions of the nature that Mr Tam is
15 suggesting?
16 MR MANSFIELD: No, partly because I know what the answers
17 are, but it does not solve the problem because he is
18 saying he saw a document. A, is coming along and saying
19 "I did produce a document". There is quite a difference
20 in obviously the target because -- may I just give the
21 example? If the name that A says -- we only have A's
22 statement, as opposed to the document -- if the name
23 that A claims was on the document was never a person who
24 could conceivably be going to a conference in Geneva,
25 then it is obviously a different situation and so

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1 whether there are two documents or not, it is
2 a different situation; whereas if, in fact, the name is
3 equivalent to Milosevic and is somebody in that same
4 echelon, who might well have attended a peace
5 conference, there is some room for confusion, and
6 therefore it is likely that perhaps one is talking about
7 one and the same exercise. Without him seeing the name,
8 he cannot say at this distance in time.
9 The only way round it, and I thought this is -- and
10 it is not a criticism, but I thought that the unredacted
11 statements might be available with Mr Smith in the South
12 of France. But if they are not, that is the only other
13 way of getting round the problem, should you be willing
14 to allow him to see it.
15 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Well, subject to anything that
16 Mr Burnett may wish to assist about, I am provisionally
17 with you on the main point, but I am against you on the
18 difficulty of the lack of security of it going across
19 the videolink.
20 A. I accept that.
21 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Burnett, can you --
22 MR BURNETT: Sir, there is nothing useful that I think I can
23 add to principle debate that has been taking place in
24 front of you.
25 There is, as others have said, a statement from

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1 witness A that sets out in some detail what he says he
2 did and of course there are statements from others from
3 whom we shall hear about how they reacted to it.
4 The problem that has been identified as the practical
5 one, namely that the only copies that are available of
6 the statement to us in court and I imagine in the South
7 of France --
8 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: I cannot believe that the
9 unredacted ones have been taken to the South of France
10 on the off-chance of something blowing up like this --
11 MR BURNETT: No, it would not have been responsible for
12 the unredacted ones to be taken to the South of France.
13 Sir, there is one way in which the question might be
14 put, which -- can I mention it to my learned friend to
15 see if we can take it one step further, even if
16 we cannot deal with the name now?
17 I will turn my microphone off ...
18 MR MANSFIELD: So it is clear, we are discussing whether
19 there is a route to this.
20 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Yes.
21 MR MANSFIELD: The suggestion is -- and I understand how it
22 could be done, but I am not sure how much success there
23 will be -- that I read him what A says about the person,
24 as opposed to the name, to see whether it helps.
25 The other suggestion I would make -- again, it may

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1 not be possible -- as to whether there is a secure
2 telephone link with Mr Smith in the South so that the
3 name could be telephoned -- and Mr Smith may actually
4 know it, I do not know -- but it may be telephoned to
5 him so that he could then tell the witness the name.
6 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: I am pretty doubtful that we have
7 a secure telephone link because this has just been set
8 up ad hoc for the purposes of the inquest.
9 MR MANSFIELD: Then I will have to do the other route for
10 the moment.
11 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: I do not suppose Mr Tam has
12 a secure telephone link for us.
13 MR TAM: Not that I can rustle up just like that.
14 MR BURNETT: I know that Mr Smith has his mobile at the
15 other end, so that is not very secure, I would imagine.
16 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: I suppose the only other
17 possibility is whether there is any opportunity of
18 getting this document to the witness for some future
19 occasion.
20 MR MANSFIELD: That is the alternative. In fact, may
21 I suggest that? Somebody else can try reading out A's
22 statement. It does not, if I may say so, lead to one
23 conclusion. But if Mr Tam wants to do that or somebody
24 else wants to do that, I think I would prefer for the
25 actual name to be provided at a later date than for him

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1 to deal with it that way. That would only leave one
2 other area.
3 One other area, Mr Tomlinson. Sorry about
4 the intervals again. This is the question of Angola,
5 but I want to be very careful and ask you a preparatory
6 question. This concerns the possibility of a role of
7 MI6 in Angola, and you were about to say something and
8 then stopped. Is your recollection in relation to this
9 issue based on any document or conversation that you had
10 while you were employed at MI6?
11 A. I am sorry, this is regarding the role of MI6 in Angola?
12 Q. Yes.
13 A. Well, MI6 would have several roles in Angola. It would
14 not just be one.
15 MR TAM: Stop, stop, stop. This is the road that I did not
16 want the witness to be going down without some care
17 being taken. My learned friend asked the question that
18 he very kindly agreed to start with, which is simply to
19 try to ascertain from the witness the basis for him
20 talking about the subject matter. Only once that
21 we have that established can we then go on to see what
22 of that it is possible safely to talk about in future.
23 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Did you hear that, Mr Tomlinson?
24 A. Yes, I did. I am not sure I entirely understand how far
25 I am allowed to go.

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1 MR MANSFIELD: Can I put the question again?
2 The preparatory question is this: what is the basis for
3 your recollection about any role that MI6 may have had
4 in Angola in the 1990s? Can I illustrate it, so that
5 it is very clear? Is it the result of a document you
6 saw at the time or conversations or training? What is
7 the source?
8 A. I think I can answer that. There was a possibility of
9 a posting to Angola and I was interested in going myself
10 because I thought it would be an interesting posting and
11 challenging. I do not know whether that is still the
12 case, but in the 1990s we had postings there.
13 MR TAM: Stop, stop.
14 Sir, so that I am not beating about the bush,
15 I understand that my learned friend wants to explore
16 with this witness an allegation that has been made that
17 SIS were in some way involved in the supply of landmines
18 to factions in Angola and I have said that that is an
19 aspect that he can properly ask questions about.
20 Our sensitivities and proper sensitivities, as you
21 will appreciate, lie in protecting the questions of
22 whether there were any requirements from the Government
23 for intelligence relating to Angola, that is to say
24 whether or not there were; whether or not there were any
25 intelligence operations in Angola, and if there were,

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1 how they were carried out. It is that area that we are
2 seeking to protect for sensitivity.
3 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: So you have no objection to
4 the narrow question on landmines?
5 A. The narrow question on landmines is fine. We have no
6 wish to stand in the way of a proper question. What we
7 are concerned about is that the witness does not stray
8 into other areas which do not concern that, but which
9 might adversely affect --
10 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: He has been showing some signs of
11 wanting to stray.
12 Can you ask the narrow question on landmines?
13 MR MANSFIELD: May I make it clear? The suggestion is not
14 that MI6 supplied landmines because they would not do
15 that. The question I want to explore with this witness
16 is the role that MI6 played in the war between two
17 factions and on which side were they playing it and, of
18 course, the indirect connections that may then arise in
19 relation to weaponry and landmines going into Angola.
20 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Unless that is public knowledge,
21 which I suspect it is not, I cannot see that that would
22 be allowed.
23 MR TAM: Sir, that is all going into operational matters --
24 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Indeed.
25 MR TAM: -- in great specificity.

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1 A. If I can say something here please?
2 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Well, I think it is rather
3 dangerous for you to say things without a question
4 because you might be trespassing the wrong side of the
5 line.
6 A. No, but what I do wish to say does not trespass on
7 anything. I am being perfectly responsible. I do not
8 actually know any of the answers to the potential
9 questions on landmines that may be put to me. I just
10 don't know. So perhaps that will answer the question.
11 I just don't know what -- except in broad terms, I do
12 not know -- what MI6 were potentially doing there,
13 I don't know. I can tell you on landmines, I do not
14 know anything about it at all.
15 MR MANSFIELD: Right. That brings the curtain down for
16 the moment. May I also give notice that this has been
17 an area that has been of concern since last November,
18 effectively, so when the witnesses come next week,
19 I would certainly seek clarification on what I can and
20 cannot ask. So subject to the name being given to
21 him -- and I am quite happy that he responds to it on
22 paper at a later stage.
23 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Are you content with that,
24 Mr Tam?
25 MR TAM: Can we return to that issue because we continue to

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1 have concerns about this, but the present time is
2 perhaps not the right time to ventilate those.
3 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Yes, you mean you think you might
4 be able to make out a stronger case to persuade me to
5 change my mind?
6 MR TAM: I have obviously only sketched out what
7 the problems are.
8 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: I think that is probably fair
9 enough, isn't it, Mr Mansfield, to give him a chance of
10 responding?
11 MR MANSFIELD: He can have two bites or three bites at
12 the cherry, I do not mind.
13 MR TAM: Everyone can do that.
14 MR MANSFIELD: Can I just thank the witness? Thank you very
15 much.
16 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Weekes?
17 MR WEEKES: No, thank you, sir.
18 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Croxford?
19 MR CROXFORD: I would be delighted to trouble Mr Tam, sir,
20 but no thank you.
21 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: I think probably I ought to let
22 Mr Tam go next.
23 MR TAM: Thank you very much.
24 Questions from MR TAM
25 MR TAM: Mr Tomlinson, I am going to try not to interrupt

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1 myself when asking questions.
2 Can I put this to you? When you went to see
3 Juge Stephan on 28th October 1998, that was the first
4 time that you had ever publicly drawn a link between
5 the minute you say you were shown while in SIS and a car
6 crash in a tunnel with flashing lights and so on. That
7 is right, isn't it?
8 A. I believe so, yes.
9 Q. As you have explained, that was not a happy time of your
10 life, was it?
11 A. It was a difficult time of my life. "Happy" or
12 "unhappy" is subjective. It was a difficult time of my
13 life.
14 Q. Your problems with your employment with SIS had actually
15 gone back quite a number of years, hadn't they?
16 A. They went back to 1995 when I was dismissed.
17 Q. Didn't they go back a bit further than that, back to at
18 least 1994?
19 A. No, not that I recall.
20 Q. Don't you remember that in 1994 you resigned, in fact,
21 from SIS? You wrote a letter of resignation.
22 A. I do not remember doing that.
23 Q. No? And a letter that you then retracted a few weeks
24 later, saying that you actually wished to stay on?
25 A. I do not remember, but can I ask, if these are

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1 permissible in this court now, why they were not
2 permissible in an employment tribunal ten years ago?
3 Q. Mr Tomlinson, can I preface this by saying that like
4 everybody else, I do not want to debate with you here
5 the merits of who was right and who was wrong in all of
6 that. Do you understand? Otherwise we would be here
7 for days, yes?
8 A. That might be right, but I think it was a valid
9 objection. You are bringing information that is new to
10 me and which would not be new to me if it had been
11 admissible then.
12 Q. Well, will it help you to have a look at that letter?
13 Will it help you to have a look at that letter,
14 Mr Tomlinson?
15 A. Well, it will not greatly help. I do not remember
16 having written it.
17 Q. Give me just a second. We will turn it up.
18 I am sorry, I do not know what the procedure is for
19 getting this shown to the witness. (Handed)
20 Now, the typed one first, please. It has a date of
21 "13th May 1994" written on it.
22 A. Can I please ask why suddenly my personnel records at
23 MI6 are being brought into this when they were regarded
24 as being too sensitive for jeopardising national
25 security when I wished to take MI6 to court?

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1 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Well, this seems to me to be
2 a perfectly proper question and is simply a question of
3 whether you resigned and then withdrew your resignation
4 on a later occasion. That, I think, does have potential
5 relevance to the issues which the jury has to decide.
6 I am not concerned at all about the employment tribunal
7 and that is nothing to do with us at the moment.
8 A. That is fair enough. I have actually answered
9 the question. I do not remember the letter and I cannot
10 see the relevance of bringing it in here.
11 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: It is about to be shown to you,
12 I hope.
13 MR TAM: Thank you, sir.
14 Perhaps if we could go down to the signature. Is
15 that your signature there?
16 A. Yes, it is. I think so. Yes, I believe so.
17 Q. If we go back to the top please -- actually can we have
18 the date there? "13th May 1994" it says there in
19 the top right-hand corner. Can you help us, is that
20 your writing or not?
21 A. It looks a little bit like it, but I find it -- well, it
22 could be.
23 Q. Never mind. The letter:
24 "Dear ...", and it is obviously somebody within SIS.
25 "I have realised I no longer have the motivation and

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1 enthusiasm required for a career in SIS. I would like
2 to leave as soon as I have found an alternative career."
3 I am not going to read out the two middle
4 paragraphs, but you did ask if you could be allowed to
5 stay on until you had found other employment. Do you
6 see that?
7 A. Yes, I do see that.
8 Q. Does that jog your memory, Mr Tomlinson?
9 A. I do not remember writing it at all. If it was 1993,
10 that is 15 years ago and I cannot remember.
11 Q. 1994 actually.
12 A. Yes, 14 years ago.
13 Q. But you accept that you wrote that letter?
14 A. I have no choice but to accept that I wrote it because
15 it is being put to me that I have. I cannot deny that
16 I wrote it. I cannot confirm that I wrote it.
17 Q. Can we have the other letter, the handwritten one? Is
18 that your signature?
19 A. It looks like it, yes.
20 Q. If we go up to the top there, the date there,
21 5th June 1994. Is that your writing?
22 A. It looks like it, yes.
23 Q. So that seems to be consistent, then, with the previous
24 date. Then the text of the letter:
25 "Dear [somebody in SIS], after some further

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1 reflection and discussion with my family, I have decided
2 that I no longer wish to resign."
3 So, Mr Tomlinson, it was a very simple question: was
4 it right that you resigned and then withdrew your
5 resignation?
6 A. You know, having seen that, it does start to jog my
7 memory a little bit. If I remember correctly, that was
8 shortly after I came back from service -- well, I am
9 probably not allowed to say -- I came back from service
10 overseas in a very, very stressful situation and I think
11 that must have been at about that time. I had seen
12 a number of incidents which were quite upsetting and
13 I think I was a little bit -- it is difficult to say
14 what the word is, but I was a little bit depressed and
15 upset at the time.
16 Q. As I say, Mr Tomlinson, I am going to try not to get
17 into contentious areas about whether your reasons were
18 or were not good. I am trying to look at it from your
19 point of view. Okay?
20 You then continued on with SIS for about another
21 year after that before you finally left. That is right,
22 isn't it?
23 A. I think that is about correctly right, yes.
24 Q. Because you left in May of 1995. The reason that you
25 left was because your probation period had -- first of

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1 all it had been extended so that you remained on
2 probation longer than you were expecting to; yes?
3 A. But that was never told to me.
4 Q. But you now know that is the case, don't you?
5 A. I was told that after I left, but I had never been told
6 at the time. I was never given a reason for extension
7 of it and I was never given any warnings at all.
8 Q. But you were certainly aware, when your employment was
9 terminated, that it was because you were not being
10 confirmed at the end of your probationary period?
11 A. I was not told that at the time. I was told that
12 afterwards.
13 Q. You were told that afterwards?
14 A. I believe so. It is a long time ago now.
15 Q. What do you say you were told when your employment was
16 terminated, Mr Tomlinson?
17 A. I was told essentially a lot of very unreasonable and
18 unsubstantiated arguments that I could not stay.
19 I argued very strongly that I wished to stay, but there
20 were a number of inconsistences/false arguments on
21 the part of personnel department, and for that reason
22 I was justifiably not at all clear as to why I was
23 forced out and I am still not, to be perfectly honest.
24 MR MANSFIELD: Sir I wonder if I might -- I am so sorry to
25 interrupt -- I think I am due at least one interruption!

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1 May I just indicate -- I do not represent this
2 witness, obviously, as it is clear, but on the other
3 hand there is a regime of disclosure which we have all
4 attempted to adhere to. I have done a quick, as it
5 were, census to see if anyone has had this. None of
6 this material that I am aware of has been disclosed,
7 certainly to us, and never mind the witness himself who
8 is saying that he has not had it disclosed in advance.
9 I would submit that this should have been disclosed to
10 you weeks ago, and to suddenly produce it today when
11 none of us have it is, we would say, reprehensible.
12 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Well, we have not had it before,
13 have we, Mr Tam?
14 MR TAM: Sir, no. None of this is directly relevant to the
15 issues in the inquest.
16 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: That is rather what I was
17 beginning to wonder.
18 A. Thank you.
19 MR TAM: Sir, what I am simply trying to do is to establish
20 a chronology, which is the background against which I am
21 going to ask some questions, and I am afraid
22 disappointingly few, once we come to it. But as the
23 witness is giving answers which one can demonstrate to
24 be inconsistent with contemporaneous documents, it seems
25 only fair that I should give him the opportunity to see

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1 them, to see whether or not his recollection can be
2 refreshed. It was not my intention to do this, but I am
3 surprised by the answers that he has given.
4 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Well, Mr Mansfield, I think that
5 is a reasonable answer, but I think we have to keep
6 a close eye on how far this is going.
7 MR MANSFIELD: Sir, it is an answer, but not a reasonable
8 one. It is not based on disclosure -- I am sorry to go
9 back to the issue, which I know has been canvassed many
10 times, even before the inquest began. In the first
11 place, the relevance is a matter for you, not a matter
12 for him, if I may say so. So he is not entitled to
13 decide "This is relevant and this is not and I am not
14 going to disclose it because it is not relevant, but now
15 I decide it is relevant, I am going to ask the witness".
16 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: No, but what he is saying is
17 it is only when the witness has given his evidence that
18 it becomes apparent that there is an issue here that
19 needs to be dealt with with some of the documents.
20 MR MANSFIELD: That, again, is not how the system operates
21 because we don't wait to see what a witness says; we
22 have material in advance of a witness that is relevant
23 to a witness, and if we do have that material, we are
24 supposed to disclose it to you. This should have
25 happened in this case.

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1 In fairness to the witness -- leaving us out of
2 it -- in fairness to this witness, he really should have
3 had this disclosed, particularly if it has never been
4 disclosed before and 15 years on/10 years on it is
5 brought to his attention. So I would submit no more
6 questions on material that he has not been shown in
7 advance and has not been disclosed to the rest of us,
8 because, of course, if there is going to be a
9 credibility -- if it is about credibility, as
10 I understand it, this could have been anticipated by my
11 learned friend that he might just, representing the
12 ex-employer, want to impugn the credibility, then he
13 might just have recognised that this is all material
14 that should have been disclosed.
15 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Documents do happen to come in at
16 the last minute. It is not so many weeks ago that you
17 produced some. I think we will go on for the moment.
18 MR MANSFIELD: This is beyond the last minute.
19 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: While you are on your feet,
20 Mr Tam -- and Mr Mansfield is concerned with this --
21 I have had a note that Mr Smith has called from
22 the South of France and suggests that given the
23 logistical issues and difficulties in dealing with
24 the name in the way we have suggested, it might be
25 satisfactory if the name is phoned through to him and

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1 then the matter dealt with by further questions of the
2 witness. That seems to me to be a relatively secure way
3 of doing it.
4 MR MANSFIELD: Yes. Thank you.
5 MR TAM: Sir, it still involves using an ordinary
6 phone line --
7 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Yes.
8 MR TAM: -- which would cause us concern.
9 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: One name, quite independently of
10 the questions going through from court?
11 MR TAM: Yes. Sir --
12 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: If you are concerned --
13 MR TAM: Can we reflect on that?
14 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Certainly.
15 MR TAM: Sir, as far as this line of questioning is
16 concerned, the credibility issue is in a sense created
17 by the witness, but what I will do is to minimise the
18 documentation that I am going to refer to --
19 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Yes.
20 MR TAM: -- because I hope that I can now get some less
21 controversial areas --
22 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Well, the yellow light is on, but
23 not the red one.
24 MR TAM: I understand.
25 A. Can I ask a question please? On whose authority have

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1 my personnel documents of my former employer been
2 released? My recollection is very strongly that there
3 is a national security certificate which prevented me
4 from obtaining access to my own documents, and that was
5 signed by the Home Secretary at the time and I believe
6 it was Malcolm Rivkind. He signed a national security
7 certificate preventing me from having access to my own
8 personnel documents. So I am very surprised that you
9 now have authority to disclose those in the public
10 domain and I would like to know on whose authority you
11 have them. Has that national security now been revoked?
12 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: I am not going to go into that
13 side issue at the moment. I have made a ruling and
14 Mr Tam can ask these questions.
15 A. Okay.
16 MR TAM: Mr Tomlinson, after your employment came to an end,
17 you did try to take SIS to the employment tribunal,
18 didn't you?
19 A. That is correct.
20 Q. As you have said, that application was terminated
21 because the then Foreign Secretary signed a certificate
22 on the grounds of national security which meant that
23 your application had to be brought to an end.
24 A. That is correct.
25 Q. It is obvious that this is something that you are still

138

1 upset about, isn't it?
2 A. Yes. I put it to you, would you not be upset if you
3 were in a similar situation, you had been struck off by
4 the Law Society and never been allowed any recourse
5 against that?
6 Q. Mr Tomlinson, you were upset about it at the time as
7 well, weren't you?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. You were told that you had a right to go to
10 the Intelligence Services Tribunal, weren't you?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And you exercised that right?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Now, just as an aside, that is a tribunal which was set
15 up by the Act which also put SIS onto a statutory
16 footing; that is right, isn't it?
17 A. I believe so.
18 Q. It is right, isn't it, that the tribunal heard your
19 complaint but dismissed it?
20 A. Yes, and it is also correct that my first question to
21 them was -- they had a lot of documents on me, and
22 I said to them, "It is a basic premise of law that
23 documents are disclosed to both sides of a case", and
24 I asked them "Have I been allowed to see all
25 the documents that you are viewing?", and they

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1 reluctantly answered "No, you have not". Therefore, in
2 the basis of British common law, it was effectively
3 a kangaroo court because I was not allowed to see what
4 MI6's case against me was, even though I was an MI6
5 officer. So I was very frustrated with that process
6 which I did not think was fair or transparent or even
7 legal under British law.
8 Q. So that must have added to your distress about this.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Just to get the date of that, March 1996; does that
11 sound about right?
12 A. About right, yes.
13 Q. You said that you moved to Spain.
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Can you tell us when that was, do you remember?
16 A. No, I cannot remember.
17 Q. Was it sometime during the middle of 1996? Would that
18 sound about right?
19 A. I think it was later than that. I think it was more
20 likely to be 1997, but I cannot remember.
21 Q. So if I suggested to you that by the end of August 1996
22 you had already moved out of the UK, you could not
23 disagree with that, could you?
24 A. Neither would I agree with it. I cannot confirm or deny
25 that. I cannot remember.

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1 Q. Shortly after that, is it not right that you had written
2 at least one draft of your book, then called "I Spy"?
3 A. I cannot remember the chronology.
4 Q. So you could not disagree that you had by, say,
5 the middle of September 1996 already written a draft?
6 A. I would disagree with that because I am a very slow
7 writer and it took about five years to write the whole
8 book, so I could not possibly have written a whole draft
9 in a month. That is out of the question. So I would
10 disagree with that. I might have sketched a chapter or
11 something like that.
12 Q. What about by November of 1996, Mr Tomlinson?
13 A. I am really sorry, with all due respect, it is a long
14 time ago now and I cannot remember these dates.
15 Q. It is right, isn't it, that you had a literary agent in
16 the UK?
17 A. I think that is a little bit of a glorification.
18 I contacted someone who someone suggested to me that
19 I get in contact with, but he never agreed to be my
20 literary agent. I just contacted him.
21 Q. Was there somebody who you gave copies of your draft to
22 with a view to having it published?
23 A. Look, I cannot deny or confirm that. Before I was
24 looking to publish a book at the time, so I imagine
25 I must have tried and I cannot specifically remember

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1 having done so or not. But I would not deny that
2 I perhaps tried. I cannot remember. The whole process
3 of publishing my book was -- I spent many, many attempts
4 and MI6 spent many attempts to stop me, including
5 locking me up in Belmarsh. So I cannot remember all
6 the details of who I spoke to when, et cetera.
7 Q. You see, I am just thinking about November of 1996,
8 Mr Tomlinson, when the Crown obtained an injunction
9 against Mark Lucas and his company to recover copies of
10 the book written by you. Do you remember anything about
11 that?
12 A. I do remember something about that. They raided his
13 offices and took all of his computers and caused him
14 a lot of problems, I believe, yes.
15 Q. Do you remember the date being November of 1996?
16 A. No.
17 Q. But that is a person who you had entrusted a draft of
18 the book to, wasn't it?
19 A. I think that is a correct name. It does ring a bell.
20 Q. Mr Tomlinson, if it was somebody who you entrusted
21 a book to, you would remember, wouldn't you? It would
22 not just ring a bell.
23 A. Not necessarily. If you had not put that name to me,
24 I would not have remembered, but as you put that name to
25 me, I think yes, it probably was something like that.

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1 Q. Mr Tomlinson, it is right, isn't it, that it is those
2 copies of your book which are the first version of the
3 book that the Operation Paget team was asking you about,
4 isn't it? They were asking you about the November 1996
5 version of your book?
6 A. I do not know. They put several versions to me.
7 I cannot remember which version was which. I am really
8 sorry. I am trying to be as precise as I can, but this
9 is a long time ago, it is more than ten years ago, and I
10 can't remember the exact -- we are talking about
11 a period of four or five years between when I first
12 started writing the book and when it was eventually
13 published in 2001 and the whole chronology now is very
14 difficult for me to remember.
15 Q. Can we please have a document which is on the inquest
16 database? It is [INQ0032419].
17 Can you see that, Mr Tomlinson?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Let's try to have the heading and the first paragraph.
20 Can you see that?
21 A. Yes, we have it -- I can just make that out. We have
22 a paper copy here.
23 Q. Is that the beginning of a chapter of a draft of
24 "I Spy"?
25 A. It looks like it, yes.

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1 Q. Mr Tomlinson, is that not the November 1996 version?
2 A. Look, are you can expecting me to remember something?
3 I honestly cannot remember. I have not read my own book
4 since 2001 and I cannot remember every word of every
5 draft. If you are telling me it is, I accept that
6 it is.
7 Q. To be fair to you, if we have a look at [INQ0032427],
8 eight pages on, if you have a hard copy there, do you
9 see, in the middle of the page there, the text that has
10 been referred to and quoted elsewhere?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Perhaps I can put it like this, Mr Tomlinson, and see if
13 you will at least agree to this: this was a draft that
14 was written before the accident in Paris, wasn't it?
15 A. Yes, it could be. I do not know. I do not know the
16 answer to that.
17 Q. You would not disagree with that?
18 A. I would not disagree, no.
19 Q. I want to move on from there now to the following year,
20 1997.
21 In the summer of 1997, do you remember asking for
22 permission to write a book?
23 A. I do remember. I mentioned that earlier. I asked for
24 permission, yes.
25 Q. And you were refused permission, weren't you?

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1 A. Yes, I was refused. Yes.
2 Q. Did that endear SIS to you anymore?
3 A. Well, given that they had given permission to
4 Stella Rimington shortly before to write a book,
5 I thought this was yet another example of their
6 tremendous double standards in their conduct towards
7 employees.
8 Q. You thought you were being picked on, did you?
9 A. Not being picked on, but they did not explain why
10 I could not write a book whereas Stella Rimington could.
11 I thought that I should be allowed an explanation of
12 why one person can and another person cannot. I think
13 that is a very fair question and I have never had an
14 answer to that. I was offering to write a book and they
15 would have a chance to edit it and they still said no,
16 so it did not seem a logical decision to me.
17 Q. In the autumn of that year, in fact on 31st October of
18 that year, you were then arrested on the Official
19 Secrets Act charge, weren't you?
20 A. That is correct, yes.
21 Q. Then you pleaded guilty in December of that year.
22 A. Yes, because I had no choice but to plead guilty.
23 Q. We have heard what you have to say. Again, I am not
24 going to get into the ins and outs of that today. But
25 you must presumably have seen that as another example of

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1 SIS getting at you.
2 A. I think this term "getting at me" is a little bit --
3 that suggests some kind of puerile vendetta on their
4 part. I certainly could not understand why they were
5 demonstrating such intent and malice towards me when --
6 what you are not referring to also here is the many,
7 many occasions that I wrote to SIS personally, saying,
8 "Look, please can we meet and sort out this problem
9 because I feel very unhappy about it, and please can we
10 talk to try to negotiate some kind of closure to this
11 dispute", and you have rather skillfully missed out of
12 all those letters and are trying to portray me as being
13 irrationally embittered, which is not the case.
14 I made every effort to reconcile with MI6 all the
15 way through. Even when I was in prison, I remember
16 writing to them and saying, "When I get out, please can
17 we try to sort this out", and there was no
18 acknowledgement or reply to those letters. You are
19 being a little bit selective in your portrayal here by
20 not referring to those letters.
21 Q. So you wanted closure to this whole thing, did you?
22 A. Yes, I asked on many occasions, "Can we sit down and..."
23 in particular for them to give me some kind of
24 assistance in getting a new career underway because, at
25 that time, I was struggling to get a new career underway

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1 and I had to be back at my house, et cetera, and things
2 like that. So I still thought that they had treated me
3 pretty dismally and I hoped that they would recognise
4 that and try to resolve the situation and help me get
5 back on my feet a little bit, but at no stage did they
6 do that. They seemed absolutely intent on pursuing
7 a very -- a very, very -- rather than using a carrot and
8 a stick, they were only interested in using a stick,
9 basically, against me.
10 Q. When you were released from prison on licence on
11 1st May 1998, did you then still want closure or had
12 your view towards SIS changed?
13 A. Even then -- I believe I did even write to them after
14 I came out of prison, saying, "Please can I have some
15 help getting resettled, finding a job", and I never got
16 a reply. So even then -- and on many occasions since
17 then. In fact, every once a year for the past 11 years
18 I have written to them. I do it on the same date every
19 year, and I write to them and say, "Please can we meet
20 to sort out this issue" and never once have they
21 acknowledged that.
22 Q. Mr Tomlinson, it was not that you did not get a reply to
23 that request; you were told "no", weren't you?
24 A. Possibly. They might just have said "no". I cannot
25 honestly remember. But I certainly got no replies to

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1 a lot of other letters I have written. You have an
2 example of one particular request there where they said
3 "No, we will not help out at all", but certainly I have
4 copies of many, many letters at home that I have written
5 that nobody has acknowledged.
6 Q. When you were released on licence, you were not allowed
7 to travel overseas for a period of three months unless
8 you had permission. That is right, isn't it?
9 A. That is correct, yes.
10 Q. So that period started on 1st May of 1998.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. It is right, isn't it, that you went to France before
13 the period was up?
14 A. I went two days before, yes.
15 Q. So when you were arrested in France on 31st July, that
16 was in fact in breach of your licence?
17 A. Technically, yes. But let me put it to you that any
18 prisoner who comes out of jail, even when they are on
19 licence, one of the first things they often do is go on
20 holiday abroad. It was quite exceptional circumstances.
21 The reason I left two days before the end of my licence
22 was because I was extremely fearful about being
23 re-arrested because I had written to MI6 on several
24 occasions saying "Can we meet and try to sort out
25 something because, if I am going to have a future in the

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1 UK, I need to be assured that there is no mutual
2 grievance on either side and the whole situation is
3 resolved?"
4 The fact that they never wrote back to me led me to
5 believe that they were planning on taking further action
6 against me because, to put it simply, why would they put
7 such strict draconian measures on me until 31st August?
8 Clearly they felt I was some kind of threat to them, and
9 then, from 1st September, I would be free to do what
10 they wanted. So clearly they had prepared something
11 already to take care of that date from 1st September
12 onwards.
13 Having worked in MI6, I know what they can do and
14 I had seen how they treated me before, for example
15 making me a category A prisoner in Belmarsh when I was
16 a white collar non-violent person who has never
17 committed any kind of violent crime at all, but they put
18 me on category A; all these sort of exceptions that were
19 put upon me when I was in Belmarsh. I realised that
20 come 1st September, they had a plan in place for me to
21 keep hold of me, and the only plan that I could see that
22 they could have in place to keep control of me on
23 1st September was to re-arrest me. I feared that I
24 would be re-arrested on some trumped-up charge, for
25 example that they would try and plant drugs on me or

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1 something like that. So I made a conscious decision
2 that I have no more future in the UK, I would have to
3 leave. So I left the UK.
4 Also, because they had confiscated both my passports
5 then -- I had a British and a New Zealand passport and
6 they confiscated both of them and they wouldn't return
7 them to. So I knew that from 1st September they had
8 planned something for me. That is the reason why two
9 days before, I decided, okay, my only chance now is to
10 leave the country and --
11 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: The fact is, Mr Tomlinson, you
12 were sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment, you only had
13 to serve half of it, six months, you were on licence for
14 the other six months and you broke your licence by going
15 to France.
16 A. Technically I was on licence for three months and
17 I broke my licence two days beforehand by going to
18 France. The reason is I feared very strongly for what
19 was going to happen afterwards. I broke it by two days,
20 not by three months, as you said.
21 MR TAM: Just as a matter of correction, you were talking
22 about 1st September; you mean 1st August, don't you,
23 three months from 1st May?
24 A. Yes, three months from 1st May was my licence, yes.
25 Q. When you went to France in breach of your licence, you

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1 did not even have your passports. Is that what you are
2 saying?
3 A. That is correct, yes.
4 Q. Then, on 31st July, so the last day of the three-month
5 period, you were arrested in France; that is right,
6 isn't it?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. I want you to listen carefully to this question because
9 again I am going to try not to get into the rights and
10 wrongs of it, but did you think that that was something
11 to do with SIS?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Did you see that as part of the continuing
14 campaign/vendetta, whatever you want to call it, against
15 you by SIS?
16 A. I was at a loss to understand what they hoped to achieve
17 by doing that to me.
18 Q. Within days of that arrest, you travelled to
19 New Zealand, didn't you?
20 A. Yes, immediately I was released, I thought that I had
21 better leave France and I went to New Zealand, yes.
22 Q. Because New Zealand is actually where you were born?
23 A. That is correct, yes.
24 Q. When you went to New Zealand, were you hoping to get
25 away from all of this?

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1 A. Yes.
2 Q. When you arrived in New Zealand, did you find that you
3 had succeeded in doing that?
4 A. No.
5 Q. What happened?
6 A. I was welcomed -- when I arrived at the airport, they
7 put an injunction on me, and then, a few days later,
8 someone burst into my hotel room and searched me and
9 detained me for a while and made it clear that I should
10 not really stay there either.
11 Q. Did you think that any of that was to do with SIS?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. You have been referred to a passage in your affidavit
14 about an incident when you were trying to fly to
15 Australia and you were taken off the aircraft and you
16 were not permitted to travel.
17 A. Yes, that is correct. That happened, yes.
18 Q. Did you think that was anything to do with SIS?
19 A. When you say "anything to do with SIS", are you saying
20 that SIS have absolutely no influence whatsoever in this
21 decision? It was not SIS that were there, physically on
22 the pavement or on the airport runway, hauling me off,
23 but SIS were, I am sure, involved at the end of
24 the telegraph line saying, "Yes, we have an issue with
25 this person and we won't ..."

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1 There would have been coordination with them, yes,
2 but they were not specifically there doing that to me
3 themselves.
4 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Tam, it is pretty clear,
5 I think, that Mr Tomlinson was extremely cross with SIS,
6 continues to be extremely cross with SIS, but the issue
7 that we have to get his assistance on is what, if any,
8 light he can throw on the cause of the collision in
9 the tunnel.
10 MR TAM: Sir, yes. The very next question is, Mr Tomlinson,
11 it was in those circumstances that you then went before
12 Juge Stephan and publicly linked, for the first time,
13 your account of tunnel, crash, flashing lights with that
14 minute which you say that you saw when you were still in
15 SIS. That is right, isn't it?
16 A. Yes, but you have to bear in mind that when I was living
17 in the UK, who could I have gone to to make those sort
18 of statements? I mean, I was -- I had just been
19 released from prison; I couldn't exactly go and see
20 the police.
21 I had no one who I could go and see, and it was only
22 after I had been booted out of France and New Zealand
23 and suchlike that I happened -- a journalist happened to
24 contact me and it was him that started to give me some
25 advice. It was him that put me in touch with a lawyer

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1 in France, and it was after I contacted the lawyer in
2 France that (indistinct) I was able to try and work out
3 how I could help with this whole inquest, because
4 I could not when I was in the UK. I couldn't go and see
5 the police; in Britain I have a criminal record so the
6 police are not going to entertain me as a witness.
7 Q. Mr Tomlinson, you added that detail because you were
8 really, really upset with SIS, didn't you?
9 A. No, I added it because I realised the significance later
10 on. You are trying to make out that because I didn't
11 put it in my first draft of the book, that is
12 irrelevant. That is not the case. There are many, many
13 things I have left out in my book in both drafts because
14 they are just not relevant to something else. The fact
15 is afterwards, I suddenly realised, "Ah, that could be
16 relevant", but it was not relevant at the time. If
17 I put every single tiny detail of everything I learned
18 in the first drafts of my book, there would be all sorts
19 of things that have no relevance to anything that
20 happens later in life. The fact that I then put it in
21 later is because it was only later on that I realised
22 it was relevant.
23 Q. Mr Tomlinson, can you go to the notes of the May 2005
24 meeting with the Paget team? Go to the bottom of page 3
25 please.

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1 The penultimate line there, can you see:
2 "However, due to the passage of time and my deeply
3 felt anger towards MI6, it may be that I wrongly linked
4 this capacity to the Milosevic minute. When I came out
5 of prison, I was strongly embittered towards MI6.
6 I certainly wanted to cause them embarrassment and
7 difficulty and this may have contributed to my mixing of
8 my knowledge of techniques with my eventual account."
9 That is what you said to the Paget team in May 2005,
10 isn't it?
11 A. Yes, under quite a lot of pressure, yes.
12 Q. That is what you said?
13 A. Under a lot of pressure, yes.
14 Q. It is not that you had left out details in an earlier
15 account, but it was that this account involved a mixing
16 of things because of your animosity towards SIS.
17 A. At the time, I -- you know, I was put under a lot of
18 pressure by the police. I did not realise at the time
19 that there was a perfectly plausible explanation, which
20 was simply the fact that when I first wrote the draft,
21 I thought the details had no relevance. It does not
22 mean the fact that they did not exist; it is just that
23 they had no relevance. It was only later on that
24 I realised that they could have relevance, which is why
25 I put them in the second draft.

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1 Q. Mr Tomlinson, you have said in draft after draft, and in
2 fact in the published version, that when you were shown
3 the minute that you did actually see, that your reaction
4 was one of incredulity.
5 A. The assassination minute?
6 Q. Yes, that is right.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. That reaction, Mr Tomlinson, is a reaction that many
9 people in SIS would have given because it is simply not
10 something that SIS does, is it?
11 A. We have the proof that they do do it because that minute
12 exists and it has now apparently been shredded; I think
13 that Mr A has admitted it existed and, even more
14 outrageously and surprising in my view, it has been
15 shredded, which I think is just extraordinary.
16 I have never known of a minute in SIS being
17 shredded. I think that fact in itself speaks very loud,
18 that they admitted there was not and they have now
19 shredded it shows that there is something quite
20 significant in that minute.
21 Q. Well, we may be hearing more evidence about that. Let
22 me move on then please.
23 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Are you going to be much longer,
24 because we have to have a break at some point very soon?
25 MR TAM: Sir, yes. This would be as convenient a moment as

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1 any.
2 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Thank you.
3 Quarter of an hour then, members of the jury.
4 (3.05 pm)
5 (A short break)
6 (3.18 pm)
7 (Jury present)
8 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Yes, Mr Tam.
9 MR TAM: Thank you, sir.
10 Mr Tomlinson, I only have a few more things to ask
11 you. Before I start, can I convey to you a request that
12 has been made by the shorthand writers? They need to
13 get everything down for the transcript and they have
14 asked if you could please try to speak more slowly so
15 that they can transcribe it properly. Is that okay?
16 Can we try to do that?
17 A. Don't ask any annoying questions.
18 Q. Mr Tomlinson, Henri Paul: you were asked questions about
19 him and there is only a couple of topics that I want to
20 pick up with you please.
21 The first one is this: if you were looking for
22 a file with a P number, as you describe, it is right,
23 isn't it, that you could start by looking for the name
24 of the person, whoever the person was, whatever the name
25 was. You could start with a name and then find a file,

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1 couldn't you?
2 A. I think so, yes, and certainly now I would expect that
3 you can, with computers, yes.
4 Q. Even then, there was an indexing system that allowed you
5 to do that, wasn't there?
6 A. Yes, there was, yes.
7 Q. While you were in SIS, that was already electronic,
8 wasn't it?
9 A. It was semi-electronic, a very basic electronic system,
10 but it certainly was not cutting edge even by the time,
11 the early 1990s, but yes, an (inaudible) electronic
12 system.
13 Q. The other question is this: you have said several times
14 that you would be surprised if a French man were working
15 for British intelligence agencies. That is right, isn't
16 it?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. It would be much less of a surprise to find that
19 a French man was giving information to a French
20 intelligence agency?
21 A. That is logical, yes.
22 Q. And that might include the DST, might it not?
23 A. I believe they run agents, yes.
24 Q. I want to ask you a little bit in general terms, you
25 understand, about working inside SIS.

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1 You would agree, wouldn't you, that SIS officers as
2 a breed are dedicated, hardworking people?
3 A. Yes, a lot of them are, yes.
4 Q. And there are very many talented people there who have
5 been spotted and recruited for those talents?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. You would have liked to have thought of yourself -- in
8 fact you probably still like to think of yourself -- as
9 one of those; yes?
10 A. I do not anymore, no.
11 Q. Okay. It is right, isn't it, that even when you were
12 within SIS, that there was quite a strict system of
13 controls over operations. Now, I am asking you in
14 general terms, you understand, but that is right, isn't
15 it, quite a strict system of control?
16 A. It was becoming stricter. It had not been strict in the
17 1990s when I was there and it was becoming stricter.
18 Q. It was in 1994, was it not, that the Intelligence
19 Services Act came into force? Is that right?
20 A. You know that certainly better than I. I think it was
21 about then.
22 Q. That is a statute which you have already referred to as
23 putting the agency on a statutory basis.
24 A. I thought it was a little earlier, but ...
25 Q. Okay. So during your time there, all those statutory

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1 controls were coming into force and did come into force.
2 A. They were not entirely because I have already given
3 another example of why they did not. As I was saying,
4 the systems were far from perfect at the time, and
5 we have seen a perfect example already this afternoon of
6 where, by the -- if they wished to hide something which
7 was embarrassing for them, they still had the power to
8 do so; for example, they were able to use national
9 security to stop me obtaining access to my own papers to
10 take them to an employment tribunal. So clearly all
11 the systems were not in the place at the time.
12 Q. I am talking about systems of control of operations
13 inside SIS that --
14 A. Yes, I am talking generally about systems of control
15 over SIS. They were far from perfect at the time, as
16 I have already illustrated.
17 Q. By the summer of 1997, those statutory controls had then
18 been in place for some time.
19 A. I would not have been involved in MI6 at that time, so
20 I cannot comment about whether they had been in place or
21 whether they had been in force or what.
22 Q. I want to move on to documents and what you have
23 described as "accountable documents". You have said
24 that nothing was shredded inside SIS. Now, just think
25 for a moment: are you referring to every piece of paper

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1 within SIS?
2 A. When I was in SIS, I never once saw a shredder, ever.
3 We had a waste-paper bin and those were inspected for
4 documents every night by the security guards. If there
5 was a document in there mentioning any aspect of work,
6 we were given what is called a "breach", a breach of
7 security warning. Three breaches and you are out.
8 There were no shredders in any office that I ever saw at
9 SIS.
10 Q. So you would be surprised to hear of another member of
11 SIS talking about 1992/1993, saying that there was
12 a shredder in their office?
13 A. I am absolutely astonished that there is anyone claiming
14 that there was a shredder in their office and, secondly,
15 I am absolutely astonished that any one of these is
16 admitting shredding a document. That is an astonishing
17 admission, that.
18 When I was there, the idea of shredding a document,
19 it was sort of regarded as "a hanging offence". It was
20 a very serious breach of protocol.
21 Q. The last topic then, Mr Tomlinson, is to do with
22 the flashing light or the device for a flagging light
23 that you say that you saw when you were training.
24 Now, it is right, isn't it, that as a piece of
25 equipment -- I think you gave this answer before -- it

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1 would need to be portable and that in fact it should be
2 really ideally small as well, should it not?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Do you now remember anything about this device that you
5 were shown when you were training?
6 A. I remember being in a military hall, as it were. There
7 was a large table at the end of the room, and on that
8 they placed the whole series of gadgets which they used
9 in their operations. There were several rather
10 interesting, you know, hand-guns and hand-arms and
11 underwater breathing apparatus, and I remember there
12 being something along those lines.
13 There was a corporal from the SBS who was explaining
14 what each did, and he just went through and said, "This
15 is what we use this for", et cetera, and explained what
16 they were all for. I do not particularly remember what
17 it looked like, but I remember being explained that this
18 is what various items did.
19 Q. It is the fault of the videolink, you say you can or you
20 cannot remember what it looked like?
21 A. I cannot remember clearly what it looked like.
22 Q. Can you remember what sort of size it was?
23 A. The size -- no, I cannot remember specifically what size
24 it was, but there were several items on the table and
25 they were all portable -- the sort of size of something

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1 that would be portable.
2 Q. Now, if you could just answer this question "yes" or
3 "no": were you told whether or not it had a name?
4 A. I cannot remember. Sorry.
5 Q. Do you think you would now recognise it if you saw it
6 again?
7 A. No.
8 MR TAM: Thank you, Mr Tomlinson. Those are all
9 the questions I have.
10 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Thank you.
11 Mr Horwell?
12 Questions from MR HORWELL
13 MR HORWELL: Mr Tomlinson, a few more annoying questions,
14 I am afraid.
15 This document of witness A, setting out the reasons
16 for the assassination of Milosevic and the proposed
17 method of assassination, it is obvious from what you
18 have said that it came as a significant surprise to you.
19 A. Yes, it was unusual, yes. It is not every day that you
20 see a plan to kill someone.
21 Q. I imagine not. You describe it in this way in your
22 draft, that you were astonished at the audacity and
23 ruthlessness of the plan.
24 A. I think I remember being astonished at the audacity,
25 yes.

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1 Q. This was an important revelation in your book, wasn't
2 it?
3 A. I did not attach enormous importance to it. It was one
4 of several issues. It was principally about what I felt
5 was needed for better control over the personnel
6 department of MI6 and better work conditions for people
7 there. That was the principal objective of my book. So
8 everything else in it was just filler, really.
9 Q. This was more than a filler, Mr Tomlinson. This was one
10 of the more sensational revelations in the book, wasn't
11 it, a plot to kill?
12 A. If you consider that to be the case, yes.
13 Q. It is not what I consider the position to be. You knew
14 perfectly well that this was one of the more sensational
15 revelations in your book, didn't you?
16 A. I did not write my book to be sensational or sensational
17 revelations.
18 Q. You were obviously able to remember the details of
19 witness A's proposal.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. You set out the justification for the assassination,
22 the method of the assassination and even a conversation
23 that you had had with witness A.
24 A. Mm.
25 Q. I know that this has been referred to before. I am

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1 going to refer to it again very briefly.
2 "The first page was a justification for
3 assassinating Milosevic, citing evidence for his
4 destabilising plans for a Nazi-like greater Serbia,
5 encompassing Serbia, Montenegro, most of Bosnia and
6 the Serb-populated parts of Croatia. He is a legal
7 covert support for Radovan Karadzic, the president of
8 the self-styled Serbian Republic in Bosnia, and his
9 genocidal plans against the Albanian population of
10 Kosovo."
11 You could remember that obviously.
12 A. At the time, yes, but again that is political deduction
13 as well. It is quite obvious you could make a case, if
14 you were so minded, to assassinate him on that.
15 Q. "The second page was a brief outline of his
16 assassination plan. He proposed to use RWW in
17 a drive-past ambush during one of Milosevic's visits to
18 Geneva for the ICFY peace talks. The attack would be
19 carefully staged to suggest that it been carried out by
20 elements of the Bosnian emigre population in
21 Switzerland."
22 If there is any truth whatsoever, Mr Tomlinson, in
23 the account that you now give, how on earth was it that
24 you had forgotten at the stage that this draft was made,
25 in 1996, the fact that there were other proposed methods

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1 to assassinate Milosevic?
2 A. Well, because quite simply, at the time I was writing
3 the book, it was several threads at a time and I would
4 have gone through that and made a mental note to myself
5 to finish off that passage later on. I was not writing
6 it all in a strict chronological order; I was writing
7 several chapters at once and coming back to them and
8 finishing them off.
9 Q. This is an even more sensational method of murdering the
10 man, is it not, bright lights in a tunnel? It is out of
11 the films, is it not, Mr Tomlinson?
12 A. If it is out of the films, why has MI6 shredded that
13 minute now?
14 Q. You have been told the explanation for that --
15 A. I have been told it has been shredded, but I have never
16 been told why --
17 Q. Mr Tomlinson, you have, on a number of occasions, said
18 that this was MI6's plan. You have been told that this
19 proposal came from witness A alone. It is his
20 responsibility, not that of the service. Now, let's
21 look at the chronology.
22 A. Hang on, hang on. When you write a minute in
23 the service, you are writing on behalf of the service.
24 You don't write minutes to your own personal need. You
25 are writing a minute on behalf of the service. It is

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1 not a personal responsibility; it is a group
2 responsibility.
3 Q. Well, Mr Tomlinson, you have been told and we will hear
4 from witness A, I think it is next week. But let's look
5 at the chronology.
6 1993, when this proposal was reduced to writing by
7 witness A and he accepts that you saw it. 1995, you
8 were dismissed or resigned, as we now can see from that
9 letter.
10 In 1996, drafts of the book "I Spy" were seized from
11 your publisher and I have just read the relevant section
12 from that draft.
13 As we have heard, 1997, you were arrested, you
14 pleaded guilty, you were sentenced to 12 months'
15 imprisonment and, as is obvious from your evidence,
16 Mr Tomlinson, when you came out of prison, you were
17 furious with SIS, weren't you?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Then, in 1998, you see a programme on British television
20 setting out one of the conspiracy theories as to how
21 Diana and Dodi and Henri Paul died, and it is only after
22 your having seen that television programme that, for
23 the first time, Mr Tomlinson, you speak of a plan to
24 assassinate Milosevic through the use of a bright light
25 in a tunnel.

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1 A. There is an explanation because at the time I did not
2 realise that it was relevant. As I have already said,
3 I did not put every tiny item that I learned in my
4 draft. At a later stage it became apparent to me that
5 that was relevant. I remember it happening and it was
6 relevant. It does not mean that it did not happen at
7 the time in 1993.
8 Can I ask you a question, please? I would like to
9 know when in that chronology of events did MI6 decide to
10 shred that document? You admit that they did, and when
11 in that chronology did they decide to shred it?
12 Q. We will hear I think -- I will check, Mr Tomlinson --
13 soon after this proposal had been reduced to writing.
14 Now, I suggest that what you have done is that you
15 have put into the story that you can tell the bright
16 light, the death in the tunnel, Henri Paul being an
17 agent of SIS or potentially an agent of SIS, to take out
18 your frustrations and your irritation concerning SIS.
19 A. Not at all.
20 Q. That is what happened, Mr Tomlinson?
21 A. There are many other examples that I could think of of
22 things that I learned when I was in the service of MI6
23 which I don't mention in my book. For example, if
24 something in the future happens, which those things that
25 I learned at MI6 suddenly become relevant and then

168

1 become an issue, would you then say, "Ah, but you did
2 not mention them in your book so it did not happen"? Of
3 course not. There are many, many things that I learned
4 in MI6 which at the time had no particular relevance.
5 Later on, events can occur where, in retrospect, looking
6 back, "Ah, yes, that had a relevance".
7 Q. Mr Tomlinson, if you had read of a plan by witness A to
8 assassinate Milosevic through the use of a bright light
9 in a tunnel, you would never have forgotten that and you
10 would have included that proposal in your draft of 1996,
11 I suggest.
12 A. Not at all. Not at all. Not necessarily at all. You
13 must remember that that draft -- as I have said on
14 numerous occasions, the point of my book was not to
15 maliciously disclose anything about MI6. It was to
16 disclose the poor and shoddy manner in which they
17 treated me. That was what my book was intending to do.
18 I quite deliberately did not want to disclose things
19 which were sensitive or unnecessarily sensitive.
20 Indeed, that is why I wrote to MI6 and asked them
21 whether I could publish the book and they said no, and
22 I decided, okay, well I'll go ahead and publish anyway.
23 But it was not my intention when I was writing my book
24 to sensationalise anything that I had done in MI6. My
25 intention in writing my book was to show that their

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1 treatment of me was very unfair.
2 Q. You sent a letter to Mr Al Fayed which you say could not
3 have been received and then you contacted a journalist.
4 Who was that journalist?
5 A. It was actually him that contacted me. He rang me up.
6 His first name was Mark. I can probably find out later
7 on because I think I still have a record of that
8 somewhere.
9 Q. He contacted you about what?
10 A. Well at the time I was regularly in the press because
11 I had just been arrested and released in Paris, I had
12 just been arrested in New Zealand, so quite obviously
13 all the press around the world wanted to know what
14 it was that I could properly know which was causing all
15 these people to give me such a hard time in life. So a
16 lot of people from the press were contacting me all the
17 time. He was not the first person to contact me from
18 the press. There were many people from the press
19 contacting me.
20 Q. Now you have been reminded of two important extracts
21 from interviews/discussions that you have had with
22 British police officers. There was one in September of
23 2004, at which you said this:
24 "Tomlinson states that he has only received
25 reimbursement of expenses from Al Fayed, for example

170

1 travel from New Zealand. Although under pressure from
2 Al Fayed to embellish certain aspects of his information
3 to support his own views concerning his murder and
4 conspiracy allegations, Tomlinson has not varied his
5 account and will not do so."
6 You say that you said that under pressure.
7 A. I tried -- you know, I tried to be as consistent as
8 I possibly can within the confines of my memory, but
9 clearly, when I am being asked about something 15 or
10 16 years ago, it is possible to find an inconsistency.
11 I am trying to be as consistent and as truthful as I can
12 be, yes.
13 Q. The extract from the May 2005 interview:
14 "However, due to the passage of time and my deeply
15 felt anger towards MI6, it may be that I wrongly linked
16 this capacity to the Milosevic minute."
17 This is the bright light.
18 "When I came out of prison, I was strongly
19 embittered towards MI6 and certainly wanted to cause
20 them embarrassment and difficulty, and this may have
21 contributed to my mixing of my knowledge of techniques
22 with my eventual account."
23 That, again, as I understand your evidence,
24 Mr Tomlinson, was brought out of you by pressure from
25 the British police officers; is that right?

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1 A. What I meant by saying that is if MI6 have treated me in
2 a more reconciliatory manner, I would have asked them,
3 "Can I give evidence? Can I talk to -- can I give
4 evidence?" I would have asked them, just as I asked if
5 I could write my book. As you have already admitted,
6 I wrote to them and asked them if I could write my book
7 because they said no all the time, certainly I was not
8 so minded to be very helpful towards them.
9 Q. Mr Tomlinson, I do not know if you are wishing to change
10 the evidence that you have given. You have on at least
11 two occasions indicated that you had been placed under
12 pressure by the British police officers. Are you
13 withdrawing that suggestion?
14 A. No, no. I was -- I mean, they were interrogating me in
15 much the same way that you are
16 interrogating/cross-examining -- or whatever you like to
17 call it -- me now. They were putting a lot of things to
18 me, putting a lot of suggestive comments to me, then
19 retracting them, tricking them around. It is difficult
20 for -- I mean, I feel under pressure from you now.
21 It was that sort of style of questioning.
22 Q. But you signed each and every page of the note of this
23 discussion, didn't you?
24 A. It was 11 o'clock at night, yes.
25 Q. I will come to the times in a moment.

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1 You signed each and every page of the note of this
2 discussion, didn't you?
3 A. When I realised that I was going to be there for a very
4 long time if I didn't, yes.
5 Q. So the answer to my question is yes, Mr Tomlinson, is
6 it? You signed each and every page.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. You have initialled each and every correction?
9 A. Yes, I believe so, yes.
10 Q. And Mr Tomlinson, the first interview, if that is
11 the correct word, in September 2004 was in the South of
12 France at a police station and was between the hours of
13 10.30 in the morning and just after midday; 12.30.
14 A. Yes, the first one they were quite friendly. Yes.
15 Q. And the second, in May of 2005, was between 6 pm and
16 just before 10 pm.
17 A. Yes, that is correct. Yes. After a day at work, yes.
18 Q. And there was a French liaison officer outside the room
19 on each occasion.
20 A. I cannot remember that detail.
21 Q. And you are a man, let's not forget, Mr Tomlinson, who
22 has been trained in interrogation techniques, haven't
23 you?
24 A. Yes, I was, a long time ago, when I was very heavily
25 motivated towards that sort of career.

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1 Q. You see, you set out a part of your training in your
2 book, an exercise that was conducted in Italy. And it
3 was an exercise; it was not for real. You knew that.
4 But in the course of this exercise, you were arrested by
5 armed guards in Italy, you were blindfolded, you were
6 placed in a small cell, you were manacled and handcuffed
7 to a bed, treated roughly and you passed that with
8 a mark of "outstanding", didn't you?
9 A. I think that is correct, yes.
10 Q. Now, please, Mr Tomlinson: the police officers did not
11 place you under any pressure at all, did they --
12 A. No, that is not true.
13 Q. They took from you a truthful account?
14 A. No. They were quite -- there was a lot of leading
15 questioning.
16 As I have said to you earlier, when I passed that
17 training course, I was extremely motivated, extremely
18 enthusiastic. By 2004, I am pretty jaded about being
19 questioned by police having been arrested 11 times and
20 been questioned endlessly about various details by
21 various police forces on behalf of SIS.
22 You know, I am not the same sense of -- I just don't
23 have the same resistance to that sort of thing anymore
24 and I felt quite strongly under pressure from the police
25 when I was being questioned by them at the time, as

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1 indeed I feel strongly under pressure from you.
2 Q. I see, Mr Tomlinson. You just signed the record of this
3 interview to get out of the police station, did you?
4 A. I felt that I had given an account of myself which would
5 be helpful to Lord Stevens in the inquiry and I just
6 thought at the time that I had done enough.
7 Q. At the second meeting in 2005, the police officers
8 described to you the large file of the Russian
9 operation, the one that you mention and describe;
10 the file in which the security officer at the
11 Ritz Hotel, you say, was mentioned. The officers
12 described the file that they had found, didn't they?
13 A. They described one file that they had found, yes.
14 Q. And you agreed that it was the file that you had seen?
15 A. I did not agree that it was the file. It could have
16 been because I had seen several files -- it could have
17 been one of the files that I had seen, yes. I agree
18 that it could have been one of the files that I had
19 seen.
20 Q. You set out in one of those extracts that I have read
21 the fact that you had received expenses from the
22 representatives of Mr Al Fayed. How many payments have
23 you received, Mr Tomlinson?
24 A. If I had to travel, he reimbursed me, but I do not know.
25 Q. And travel from where?

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1 A. When I had to travel from New Zealand to see him, he
2 reimbursed my expenses for that, and when I saw him
3 again, he reimbursed my expenses for that.
4 Q. Have there been any other payments?
5 A. No.
6 Q. When was the last meeting that you had with
7 a representative of Mr Al Fayed?
8 A. I cannot remember the exact date now.
9 Q. When? When roughly?
10 A. I do not know.
11 Q. Roughly, Mr Tomlinson. Do your best to help, please.
12 A. A year/a couple of years ago.
13 Q. Now, the light about which you have been asked
14 questions, there is no reference to such a light in
15 either the drafts or the book itself, is there?
16 A. If you say so, I will accept that. I do not remember.
17 Q. The only reference to a light that can be found of any
18 relevance at all is to an exercise that you took part
19 in, in Wales, and you describe how torches were used;
20 torches complete with infrared filters which were used
21 to make a T-shape in the dark in order that a helicopter
22 pilot could land. Do you remember that?
23 A. Yes, I remember that.
24 Q. Lights that were used to orientate a helicopter pilot,
25 not disorientate a helicopter pilot.

176

1 A. That is correct, yes. They were just torches.
2 Q. And there is no reference in that book to any other type
3 of light, Mr Tomlinson.
4 A. I fully accept that there is not.
5 Q. Your attendance in 2004 and 2005 at French police
6 stations to see the British police, that was voluntary,
7 wasn't it?
8 A. Yes, it was voluntary, but I -- given that I have had
9 a lot of issues in the past, I felt that if I did not
10 go, that there might be some repercussions for me at
11 a later date, so I felt a little bit that I should go.
12 Q. You were asked about regular payments by SIS to contacts
13 in foreign countries and in particular staff at hotels.
14 Payments of what order did you have in mind,
15 Mr Tomlinson?
16 A. The size of payment would depend entirely upon a number
17 of factors. It can be -- there is no hard and fast
18 rule.
19 Q. But what sort of sums did you have in mind?
20 A. Well, I have heard of people being paid very, very large
21 sums of money, but then other people, if they had
22 a different motivation or -- clearly you cannot just
23 give £50 to someone who is a multi-millionaire and
24 expect him to be motivated by that, whereas £50 to
25 somebody who is very poor is going to be quite

177

1 a substantial help to them. If it is someone in
2 Sub-Saharan Africa, £50 is going to be a very, very
3 large motivation to them. So the size of the payment
4 that you would make to someone would depend upon a lot
5 of issues. It would depend upon their import, it would
6 depend on their personal circumstances, it would depend
7 on their motivation, and all of that would be at the
8 judgment of the handling officer really and his
9 superiors.
10 MR HORWELL: Thank you.
11 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Hilliard?
12 MR MANSFIELD: I am so sorry, it is just that I waited for
13 the end before Mr Tomlinson, as it were, disappears into
14 the ether himself.
15 Three things: as far as the name is concerned, there
16 is an element of agreement. I have certainly indicated
17 that I do not wish to know the name. I think the idea
18 is that he should be provided with the name and then,
19 without repeating it publicly, allowed the opportunity
20 to make observations about it or not. I think that is
21 the agreement so far.
22 MR TAM: Sir, it was an inquiry I have made because
23 it was -- and we are grateful for the indication that my
24 learned friend has given about the extent to which he
25 does and more importantly does not intend the name to be

178

1 used.
2 It is something that has informed our discussions
3 which have been taking place as the afternoon has
4 progressed, but at this stage it is not possible to give
5 you a decision because I do not yet have firm
6 instructions about whether or not this step can be
7 taken.
8 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Yes. It would be much easier if
9 we could do it before we all broke up this afternoon.
10 MR TAM: Sir, yes. There are two options: one, of course,
11 is to leave this over until tomorrow on the assumption
12 that there are ways of getting hold of Mr Tomlinson both
13 to communicate the name to him, if that is what is
14 eventually ordered, and --
15 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: I think over the videolink is
16 going to be very difficult because the videolink is only
17 booked for today and everybody has organised today only.
18 MR TAM: I can see that. The alternative would be for us to
19 have some time now, if we may, to get a resolution of
20 this. I cannot promise that we will get a resolution of
21 this this afternoon, but I could certainly try if we
22 were to have a break.
23 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Shall we do that, members of the
24 jury, and try and get rid of this point? I don't want
25 to leave you with open-ended time until goodness knows

179

1 how long.
2 MR TAM: I entirely understand that, sir.
3 MR MANSFIELD: In the break, perhaps my friend would like to
4 consider one other issue, which is that we would ask
5 that the documents that should have been disclosed
6 before the beginning of the question of this witness by
7 my learned friend should now be disclosed because they
8 have been used. I do not ask for a post mortem on that,
9 other than that we do submit that they are now relevant
10 and that they ought to be disclosed to the interested
11 persons. Secondly, and it is contingent upon that, is
12 whether any of this documentation was disclosed to
13 Lord Stevens. So we would like an answer to that.
14 There is a third matter, but it does not involve
15 a break. Perhaps I should raise it now. That is
16 the witness has quite rightly said that he has not been
17 shown witness A's material in his statement, and in
18 particular he said to my learned friend that he has
19 never been told the reason for the shredding. If I may
20 say so, perhaps your counsel could put witness A's
21 account of the reason, which is on page 2 of his
22 statement, and it also gives a timeframe. So I just
23 mention that now.
24 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Yes.
25 Do you want to do that now or after the break?

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1 MR HILLIARD: I wonder if he might usefully look it at
2 because it is out there.
3 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: We can have a break, he can look
4 at it, it should be out there --
5 MR HILLIARD: If Mr Tomlinson could be provided, I hope,
6 with that statement please?
7 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Perhaps I could be told when we
8 are ready to go on, but I would pretty disappointed, on
9 the jury's behalf, if we are here at 4.30.
10 MR MANSFIELD: I think I would be too.
11 (3.57 pm)
12 (A short break)
13 (4.33 pm)
14 (Jury present)
15 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Yes, Mr Hilliard.
16 Further questions by MR HILLIARD
17 MR HILLIARD: Yes. Mr Tomlinson, as I understand it,
18 we cannot deal with the question of the name, but that
19 will have to be dealt with another way. There are two
20 or three other matters that I wanted to ask you about
21 and then you are finished. All right?
22 First of all, Mr Tomlinson, I hope you have had
23 a chance to see now the statement of witness A, as he is
24 described. Do you have that all right?
25 A. Yes, I have. I have read it, yes.

181

1 Q. I just wanted to ask you about a passage -- if you have
2 the second page of it. Do you have that?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. He has described in that the document that he had
5 prepared, the proposal, all right. Then, do you see,
6 three paragraphs from the bottom he says:
7 "Shortly after the memo was sent out, I was
8 approached by my line manager, witness H, who confronted
9 me about the contents of the memo and why I had sent it
10 out without consultation. He informed me that those
11 above him wanted all copies of the memo destroyed.
12 I believe the chief's policy staff had heard about
13 the memo, probably through witness E, and had made it
14 clear that we cannot even be seen to be considering this
15 proposal. I held my own copy of the memo for a few
16 weeks before shredding it. As far as I am aware,
17 the other copies were shredded as per the instruction.
18 Before shredding my copy of the memo, I showed it to
19 Tomlinson and explained the content and the reaction
20 that it had received."
21 Any comment that you want to make, Mr Tomlinson,
22 about that?
23 A. Yes, absolutely. I find that -- the idea that the memo
24 was destroyed completely unbelievable for two reasons.
25 You must remember that this was in 1992 or 1993, and at

182

1 that time there was absolutely no possibility -- there
2 would be no conceivable reason why anyone in MI6 would
3 be fearful that that document could fall into public
4 hands. At that stage, Special Branch had absolutely no
5 powers to go into MI6 and look at papers. Those papers
6 were very, very strongly controlled.
7 There is simply no way that anybody would have taken
8 the decision to destroy that document at that time.
9 I am really sorry, but I believe that this witness has
10 been very heavily coached on this because there was
11 simply no mechanism in place at that time to destroy
12 documents like that, especially a document that had
13 a minute board on the back. It is just impossible.
14 It is totally implausible.
15 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: So you are really saying that
16 what the witness is apparently going to say is untrue;
17 is that right?
18 A. I do believe that is untrue. I believe the most likely
19 explanation is that -- when the Lord Stevens inquiry
20 began and MI6 realised that they potentially had
21 disclose this minute, that is when the document was
22 destroyed. I find it completely implausible, impossible
23 to believe, that anyone had taken the decision to
24 destroy it voluntarily before that date because they
25 would have no reason to do so at the time.

183

1 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: So witness A's account is simply
2 not true?
3 A. I think he has been coached, yes.
4 MR HILLIARD: But he does at least admit that there was such
5 a document. It might be thought that the easiest thing
6 to do would be to say that there never was such
7 a document.
8 A. He has certainly admitted that there was a document, but
9 we have already seen MI6 being very selective in which
10 documents they make public and which they choose not to
11 make public. As I demonstrated earlier in terms of my
12 personnel record, they suddenly make something public
13 which ten years ago was far too secret to make public,
14 and this again is the case of a document that they have
15 selectively decided to destroy.
16 I am sorry, but I find it -- it is completely out
17 of -- there was just no mechanism in place at that time
18 to destroy documents. It is just outrageous.
19 Q. All right. Mr Tomlinson, nearly finished now, just one
20 other thing that you were telling us about.
21 Do you remember that you said that during
22 the training programme that another trainee, you said,
23 had asked the question about 'do we' meaning SIS, 'act
24 within the law or kill', and you said the person that
25 that question was asked of evaded it and did not answer

184

1 directly. Do you remember telling us that?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Tell me, was that in the new entrants course?
4 A. That is correct, yes.
5 Q. Was the person who was asked a DS; one of the directing
6 staff? Is that what they are called?
7 A. No, it was -- sorry, it was not one of the teaching
8 staff. We had visiting officers from the head office
9 who would come down and give us lectures on all sorts of
10 things, regularly. Look, I cannot remember the name of
11 the person.
12 Q. It is all right.
13 A. I remember more discussing it with colleagues in the bar
14 afterwards and we were sort of mildly uncomfortable with
15 the idea that the question had not been answered
16 directly.
17 Q. As you say, the person evaded it and did not answer it
18 directly. The reason I ask is just that there is
19 a passage in I Spy -- do you remember, the draft that
20 I was asking you about, it must seem like hours ago,
21 this morning --
22 A. Indeed, yes.
23 Q. -- in which you explained that you had been on this new
24 entrants course. I think it must be the one that you
25 are telling me about, and you said that the question was

185

1 "Did SIS ever assassinate a peacetime target."
2 You said, "Nobody quite dared to ask in front of the
3 other students", but that then one evening at the Fort
4 bar -- because you explain in your book this place was
5 called the Fort -- when nobody else was listening, you
6 had asked about it. You said that you were given the
7 answer:
8 "'Absolutely not, never.' [He] replied."
9 I will leave the name out:
10 "His face puckered with sincerity and severity."
11 Now, I do not know, is your memory playing tricks
12 because "Absolutely not, never" is --
13 A. No. I do remember another officer saying quite
14 definitely that they did not, yes. Yes, so there were
15 two conflicting opinions there.
16 Q. Did you put anything in your book about the person who
17 evaded the question?
18 A. I do not think I did, from memory, no.
19 Q. No. All right.
20 Just lastly, so far as payments to agents were
21 concerned, is this right: in September 2004, when you
22 were talking to the Metropolitan Police you explained to
23 them that you thought that a security officer at a hotel
24 would be regarded as quite low level and, I think you
25 said, would be in little danger if discovered and you

186

1 thought might receive in the order of £400 or £500 for
2 each action they carried out. Do you remember saying
3 that?
4 A. I do not remember saying that, but it sounds quite
5 reasonable, yes.
6 Q. All right.
7 A. But to add to that, there would certainly be
8 circumstances when they would pay a lot more, if
9 the information was particularly important or relevant.
10 There is no regular, fixed -- it is not look you have
11 a fixed contract, "I will pay you £500 per meeting".
12 I do know other people that were paid £100,000 at
13 a meeting because had they had provided information
14 which was particularly relevant. So the level of
15 payment can vary according to the access and according
16 to the information. There are no hard and fast rules.
17 MR HILLIARD: Of course. Thank you very much indeed.
18 A. Thank you.
19 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Thank you, Mr Tomlinson. That
20 will be all that is required, we are grateful to you,
21 subject to the one remaining matter about the name in
22 the statement if that can be resolved.
23 A. Okay.
24 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: So, thank you very much.
25 Members of the jury, sorry you have been kept rather

187

1 long today. 10 o'clock tomorrow morning when the next
2 witness will be Lord Stevens.
3 (4.45 pm)
4 (The hearing was adjourned until 10.00 am
5 on Thursday, 14th February 2008)
6
7

188

1 INDEX
2
3
4 MR RICHARD TOMLINSON (sworn) ..................... 1
5
6 Questions from MR HILLIARD ................ 1
7
8 Questions from MR MANSFIELD ............... 47
9
10 Questions from MR TAM ..................... 127
11
12 Questions from MR HORWELL ................. 163
13
14 Further questions by MR HILLIARD .......... 181

189

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