Amidst all the news items last week, I wanted to flag this brilliant article in the New Yorker by Patrick Radden Keefe on the al-Haramain case and the "state secrets" privilege. Keefe describes the way the case unfolded -- starting with the government's inadvertent disclosure of the fact that it was using its super-secret NSA surveillance program to eavesdrop on conversations between an alleged terrorist charity and its lawyers.

The al-Haramain foundation brought suit in federal court over the NSA surveillance program and the ways that program violated al-Haramain's constitutional rights. So did many other plaintiffs, but al-Haramain was different because it had actual documentary proof of the fact that it had been surveilled. To get this challenge dismissed, the government deployed one of the most potent legal weapons in its arsenal: the "state secrets" privilege. Often described as the neutron bomb of litigation, the government invokes this privilege when it feels that continued litigation will threaten national security.

Justice Department lawyers asserted the privilege in this case, but there was a hiccup: The federal judge hearing the case didn't want to summarily dismiss it. The government appealed to the 9th Circuit, which issued a somewhat disjointed opinion last fall excluding the secret proof of surveillance but allowing the case to proceed.

More than 40 cases are waiting in the 9th Circuit to be resolved, either at the district court or appellate level. To date, the Supreme Court has turned down appeals involving the state secrets privilege, but it's not clear how long it can continue to do so given the monumental constitutional issues involved.

Over the last seven years, military officers and senior political appointees have skirmished on a variety of topics, from pre-Iraq war intelligence to troop levels to the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. But in one area, detention and interrogation policy, military officers have pushed back particularly hard against what they perceive to be fundamentally flawed (and blatantly unlawful) decisions by the Bush administration.

The latest skirmish takes place at Guantanamo Bay. Navy Capt. Keith Allred, a judge presiding over the military commission for Salim Ahmed Hamdan, issued an opinion barring Air Force Brig. Gen. Thomas Hartmann from any further participation in the prosecution, because of his vigorous public advocacy on behalf of the Pentagon and pressure on lawyers handling the cases, among other things.

Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez entered the Army as a new lieutenant in the wake of the Vietnam War, when the terms "hollow force" and "broken Army" meant rampant drug use, race riots, and serious violence in the ranks. Sanchez describes these things on page 29 of his book as he tells of his arrival at Fort Bragg, N.C., as a new lieutenant in October 1973. He also gives us a glimpse into his beliefs about the Army, Vietnam and civil-military relations:

We had discipline problems, leadership problems, racial problems, alcohol problems, and drug addiction problems. It was common for us to hold surprise health and welfare inspections in the barracks and find all kinds of illegal drugs. It was all very disturbing for a young, idealistic officer like me.

I eventually came to realize that I was seeing what we would later refer to as the "broken Army" in the wake of Vietnam. By this time, we had stopped reinforcing our troops in Southeast Asia, which is why I had not been deployed. But the long-term effect of that campaign proved absolutely catastrophic for the military. What caused it? For starters, civilian leaders in the White House micromanaged many aspects of the Vietnam War. They did not allow the U.S. armed forces to utilize the full extent of its resources to achieve victory. Instead, the military was forced to fight incremental battles that led to a never-ending conflict. And the Army itself descended into a dark cloud almost totally focused on Southeast Asia. That, in turn, resulted in it being overextended in virtually every area that one could imagine.

Ah yes, the "stabbed in the back narrative."

On the second page of his autobiography's preface, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez describes his time in Iraq:

From June 14, 2003, to July 1, 2004, the period immediately following major combat during Operation Iraqi Freedom, I was the commander of coalition forces, responsible for all military activity in the Iraq theater of war. I was there when Saddam Hussein was captured. I was there when the prisoner abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib occurred. And I was there when low-level enemy resistance expanded into a massive insurgency that eventually led to full-scale civil war."

Wow, that's pretty passive language for a general.

Jay W. Hood

According to today's New York Times, the Pentagon has quietly canceled its assignment of Maj. Gen. Jay W. Hood to be the U.S. military attache to Pakistan. The move apparently reflects concerns within the U.S. government over Hood's prominent role in commanding the Guantanamo Bay facility from 2004 to 2006. Hood's nomination provoked condemnations from many quarters of Pakistan, a nation with a number of citizens detained at Gitmo and many who have been repatriated from there. Said one: "Guantánamo Bay itself has become a symbol of injustice, torture and abuse of Islam, and sending a commanding officer from there to Islamabad begs the question: What is the message coming out of the Pentagon for Pakistanis by this insensitive act?"

The cancellation of Hood's appointment shows a promising new willingness among senior administration officials to listen to world opinion. It would have been incredibly tone-deaf of us to send an officer with Hood's assignment history to Pakistan -- probably about as smart as using an officer like Lt. Gen. William Boykin, a man with a history of worrisome public comments about Christianity and the war on terrorism, to engage with Arab and Israeli officials. The military attache position in Islamabad deserves a soldier-diplomat par excellence, and unfortunately, that's not Jay Hood.

Wiser in Battle

Retired Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez opens his new autobiography Wiser in Battle with a note of defiance, quoting Lucius Aemilius Paulus's address to the Roman Senate in 169 B.C.:

In every circle, at every table, you will find someone to lead the Army in Macedonia, who knows where the camp should be made, what port held by the territory is best entered, where magazines should be established, how provisions moved; by land or sea, where the enemy should be engaged, and when to hold back. And these people not only tell us how the campaign should be conducted, but what is wrong with the actual campaign, accusing the Consul as though he were on trial . . . If therefore, anyone thinks himself qualified to give me advice, let him come with me to Macedonia.

Today, as it deliberates over the supplemental funding bill for the war, the House of Representatives will consider the new GI Bill legislation proposed by Sen. Jim Webb (D-Va.). The bill has broad bipartisan support from 330 senators and represenatives, along with the support of every veterans' service organization and advocacy group, including mine, the Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America. And yet, the legislation's fate appears uncertain, because of opposition from the White House, the Pentagon and Sen. John McCain.

The Pentagon offers two basic arguments against the Webb bill -- that it would make recruiting more costly and that it would give the smartest troops in the service (i.e. those with the potential to attend college) an incentive to get out. To both arguments, I say balderdash.

It must be a sign of cynicism that my first reaction to this story about a new urban redevelopment plan for the Green Zone was: "Man, I bet they were smoking something green when they dreamed this up." And that my second reaction was "Sweet! They're building a Marriott! I've got tons of Marriott points!"

Seriously though, you've got to wonder when you read about plans like this. For starters, the most successful Iraq reconstruction projects have been the small-scale projects, not the big ones. I understand the need to develop the Iraqi economy and agree that a prosperous neighborhood near the Green Zone would assist with long-term security. But this is a pipe dream, not a plan rooted in reality. Iraq has more immediate needs, and this kind of fantasy exercise insults the Iraqis, Americans and others who are working so hard to address those more pressing issues.

RAND sociologist (and my friend) Laura Miller argues in USA Today that the Army needs to embrace "sabbaticals" for its top performing officers. Year-long breaks would obviously give these officers a much-needed break from back-to-back-to-back deployment pace of the Army. But, more importantly, she writes that it would develop Army leaders with more depth and breadth, and possibly improve civil-military relations as well:

Immersion into a world of diverse civilians -- including current or future intellectual, financial, or political leaders of different nations -- would help prepare officers for future military interactions with coalition partners, relief workers and indigenous populations. These assignments could also promote a more seamless collaboration with American organizations in fields such as intelligence or law enforcement.

Although officers learn quite a bit "on the fly" in Iraq or Afghanistan, corporate or government sabbaticals could enhance skills required to stabilize and rebuild war-torn societies. They could gain expertise in areas such as law, banking, government, management, city planning, transportation, public policy, community policing and business administration.

Organizations with reputations for creativity and innovation would make ideal locations for officer assignments. After all, officers need to develop their cognitive muscles if we are to sustain a flexible, adaptive Army. Exposure to problem-solving frameworks, jargon and strategies of civilian leaders expands the officers' toolkit and counters Army "groupthink."

Civil-military relations could also benefit. Many of America's elite have little or no firsthand knowledge of today's military professional. At the same time, business leaders might appreciate sabbaticals as a means to offer tangible support for those who have served their nation.

It's a good idea. Like most good ideas, it has a cost: To make it work, the Army would have to expand the officer corps to create a manpower surplus. That would be expensive. And it would be difficult. It takes years to grow mid-ranking military officers, and the Army is already short on them.

The long-term return on investment would likely be significant, but also hard to quantify. We're talking about soft things like "a broader perspective" and "contacts in Washington."

That said, this is the kind of innovative thinking we need to strengthen the military officer corps, and I'd like to see something like this adopted. But with one friendly amendment -- we should broaden this to include senior sergeants and warrant officers as well.

Many (including me) have sounded the alarm about Army and Marine Corps captains leaving the service, and the lasting harm this may do to the U.S. military. Some statistics indicated that West Point graduates were leaving the Army at an accelerating rate, and other statistics indicated a massive shortage of captains and majors in the Army's ranks. The captain exodus seemed to be a clear sign of the strain being placed on the Army by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Just one problem: the statistics may tell a different story.

According to Army Capt. Jaron Wharton, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Army captain attrition is not substantially higher than during the past 10 years. Indeed, Wharton argues that today's all-volunteer officer corps is demonstrating significantly more resilience than the officer corps during Vietnam.