Love and Hate:
Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World[*]

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Abstract

This paper investigates the perceptions of the United States in the mass publics in eight predominantly Islamic countries. It distinguishes two types of attitudes, namely attitudes towards American culture and society and attitudes towards American policies. Using a Bayesian Multi-Level Item-Response Theory Model, it analyzes the combinations of individual and country factors that account for the patterns of anti-Americanism. It finds that ambivalence is a prominent feature of people's attitude towards America in the Islamic world. It also finds that most of the variation is explained by individual-level variables. It is people who are younger, speak languages, are non-Muslim, and are connected to the global information society through the internet and satellite television who are more likely to appreciate America on its cultural, political, and institutional dimensions, but not necessarily so on the policy dimension. At the country level, few strong systematic relations emerge linking military, economic and cultural engagement with the United States and patterns of anti-American opinion.

1 Introduction

What is the image of the United States of America abroad? What opinion do foreign publics have of America, its citizens and its institutions, its ideals and its culture, its policies and its symbols? What attitudes do they have towards all things American? In the early years of the twenty-first century, anti-Americanism – the popular opposition to the United States, criticism of its policies, and dislike of its symbols – has emerged as one of the political issues of our times: anti-Americanism reached horrendous proportions on the tragic day of September 11, 2001; it surfaces through opinion polls and flares up in the mass demonstrations against the war in Iraq; it manifests itself in the approval that foreign leaders obtain when they stand up against the United States.

Nowhere is popular opposition to the United States perceived to be more widespread than it is in the Islamic world. The question "why do they hate us?" reverberates in the minds of leaders and ordinary citizens with an unspoken reference: "they" stands for the people in the Arab countries of the Middle East and the countries with Muslim majorities in general. Under the shock from the terrorist attacks on the American soil, the belief that Muslim people are ineluctably opposed to the United States has been articulated in editorial commentaries and every-day conversations in a variety of guises, from the virulent to the bewildered.[1]

Recent international surveys have seemingly given empirical validation to these perceptions. Large majorities of respondents hold an unfavorable opinion of the United States in countries with Muslim populations: 70% in Iran, 62% in Jordan, 51% in Morocco, 68% in Pakistan, 64% in Saudi Arabia according to the *2002 Gallup Poll of the Islamic World*. An analogous picture emerges from the *Global Attitudes Survey* commissioned by the Pew Foundation: while the number of respondents manifesting low opinion of the United States has

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[1]The "Religion and Politics: Contention and Consensus" survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in the Summer of 2003 found that large portions of the American public associate Islam with violence and believe that at least half of Muslims worldwide hold anti-American views.

increased worldwide, it has reached its most worrying levels in Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey, and the territories ruled by the Palestinian Authority. Commenting upon these results in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Andrew Kohut (2003), director of the Pew Research Center, reached a gloomy conclusion: "True dislike, if not hatred, of America is concentrated in the Muslim nations of the Middle East and in Central Asia, today's areas of greatest conflict."

For many, this opposition is a vindication of Samuel Huntington's (1996) famous argument about the coming *Clash of Civilizations*. It is the manifestation of a irreconcilable divide between the West and what it stands for, and Islam and what it stands for. In Huntington's perspective, this divide is all the more worrying because it becomes the basis of violent political action.

This paper investigates the patterns of attitudes towards America in the mass public in eight predominantly Islamic countries, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. Thus, this paper avoids cross-cultural comparisons, and focuses instead on the patterns of individual responses. *Who* says *what* of America? Who are the minorities who articulate a positive view of the United States?

The data employed in this study come from the Zogby International's *The Ten Nation Impressions of America Poll*.[2] The survey data from Zogby International elicit respondents' opinions on different features of America: its political and societal system, its technological achievements and its policies. Thus, this data allows researchers to go beyond the litany of statements that America is disliked in the lands of the Prophet Muhammad, and identify what about America attracts or alienates the general public, and under what political circumstances.

Three main findings emerge from this study: first, ambivalence is a prominent feature of people's attitude towards America in the Islamic world. The general public *loves* America,

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[2]The survey was conducted on behalf of Zogby International in 10 countries in the Spring of 2002. The two countries excluded from the analysis in this paper are France and Venezuela.

when America means democracy, movies, education, people, and science, but *hates* America, when America means foreign policies towards Arab nations, the Palestinians, and Iraq. But while this finding generalizes across the eight countries under investigation, differences still exist. Thus, a second finding is that popular opposition to America is greater in Iran and Egypt, and lower in Pakistan, Lebanon, and Indonesia. Nonetheless, there does not appear a set of variables that systematically accounts for these discrepancies across countries: weak relations are found with respect to the friendliness of elite discourse and the similarity in the voting patterns at the United Nations, while the variables measuring military, economic, and cultural relations with the United States are unrelated to what the mass publics think of America. Most of the variation is, instead, explained by individual-level variables. It is people who are younger, speak languages, are non-Muslim, and are connected to the global information society through the internet and satellite television who are more likely to appreciate America on its cultural, political, and institutional dimensions, but not necessarily so on the policy dimension. So, a pattern of differences, distinctions, and nuances informs the image of America as it is portrayed in mass survey data.

This paper proceeds as follows. It first contrasts two alternative accounts of America's image abroad: an account that sees anti-Americanism as a deeply-held, all-encompassing irrational disposition (see for example Hollander, 1995; Krauthammer, 2003; Revel, 2003; D'Souza, 2002); and an alternative account that, borrowing from the theory of mass opinion of Philip Converse (1964), John Zaller (1992) and Alvarez and Brehm (2002), emphasizes ambivalence as the defining feature of the mass publics' attitude towards America. It then offers a description of the survey items in the Zogby International survey, and the measurement of the country-level explanatory variables. In the third section, it presents the statistical model: a Bayesian Multi-level Ordinal Item-Response-Theory (IRT) model. The results are presented next, to be followed by the conclusions.

2 The Nature of Anti-Americanism: Consistency vs. Ambivalence

The main hypothesis that this paper seeks to test is whether attitudes towards America emerge as a consistent mind frame that manifests itself in a systematic patterns of survey responses. Is anti-Americanism an ideational syndrome fostering a rejection of America on all its dimensions? Or is anti-Americanism a multi-faceted phenomenon, remarkable more for its ambivalent nature rather than its virulence?

The starting point to address those questions is Philip Converse's (1964, 207) definition of a belief system as "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence." A highly constrained belief system is one in which a person's opinions form a consistent aggregate, such that it would be possible to infer attitudes on one dimension from knowledge of a person's stances on another dimension.

Seen in this perspective, the study of the image of America in mass publics is an empirical inquiry aimed at identifying whether different aspects of America are evaluated in a consistent manner, be that uniformly positive or uniformly negative, or whether patterns of inconsistencies populate the ideational reaction to America. Two dimensions are put under scrutiny in this study: a polity dimension, and a policy dimension. The first dimension refers to America as a societal, cultural, and political arrangement premised on freedom, opportunity, and individual achievement, while the second dimension is centered on the political actions the United States pursues in the international arena.

In Joseph Nye's (1990, 2002) theoretical formulation, these two dimensions are linked under the concept of "soft power." Soft power is a form of power in the classic sense of Robert Dahl: the ability to get others – other countries, other nations, other societies, other people – to want what America wants. But it is power by cooptation, instead of power

by coercion; it is premised on cultural values and political ideology; it operates through persuasion and example; and it is perpetuated within a network of institutions that defines rules and modes of legitimate behavior. It is a sublime form of power that the American society possesses in profusion above and beyond the power resources – military, economic, and technological – of its government. Movies, media, universities, software, technology, internet, skyscrapers, English, and jeans all define the cultural clout of what Josef Joffe (2002, 173) calls in a felicitous phrase "America the Beguiling."

If current views are of any indication, the nature of the belief systems about America in foreign publics is clearly delineated: the popular perception of anti-Americanism is one of a unified, and undifferentiated, phenomenon striding across the world. Anti-Americanism is seen as an expression of a malevolent ill-disposition that goes beyond the pale of reason. President George W. Bush captured a widespread concern when he said: "Like most Americans, I just cannot believe [the vitriolic hatred of the United States] because I know how good we are" (quoted in Crockatt, 2003, 68). Evidence of how positive and negative opinions of America coexist among many a citizen all over the world is trenchantly dismissed as hypocritical or misguided. Fouad Ajami (2003, 54) puts it most clearly: "The pollsters have flaunted spreadsheets to legitimize a popular legend: It is not the Americans that people abroad hate, but the United States! . . . You can't profess kindness towards Americans while attributing the darkest of motives to their homeland."

Hatred, envy, or prejudice are, in that view, the driving forces behind anti-American sentiment. In the writings of such authors as Charles Krauthammer (2003), Jean-François Revel (2003), and Dinesh D'Souza (2002), opposition to America is the disposition of people who embrace anti-democratic, anti-market, and anti-modern ideologies; it is the psychological refuge of societies who eschew any responsibilities for their shortcomings, or their failures; it is an all-encompassing cultural trait embodying values and beliefs inconsistent with the "American way of life." Such sentiments of opposition and rejection are allegedly rife, more

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than ever, in Islamic countries: "More than anything else," writes William McNeill (1993, 569), "reaffirmation of Islam, whatever its specific sectarian form, means the repudiation of European and American influence upon local society, politics, and morals."

The theme of an irreconcilable separation between Islam and the West permeates Samuel Huntington's (1996) theory on the *Clash of Civilizations*. Again and again, Huntington depicts a history of bloody confrontations and fleeting truces that cannot be accounted for exclusively in terms of power and interests. It is a value, normative, conflict that shapes the interactions between the countries of Muslim religion and the countries of the West. In clear words, Huntington (1996, 217) writes: "The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power." This normative divide affects the political institutions that Muslim societies can sustain and, by extension, molds the belief systems of ordinary people. Thus, from Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* logic, we derive the prediction that Muslim publics would be wary of the Western norms of individualism, pluralism, and relativism, and would be opposed to all America is and does, as America is the most pristine incarnation of the ideals of freedom, democracy, and opportunity.

Thus, we should expect to observe that large majorities in Islamic countries would object to America, regardless of whether we inquiry about their perceptions of American policies, or society, or culture, and that only negligible minorities would approve of how the United States conducts its foreign policy and admire what the United States has to offer as a society. We would also expect that the belief systems of the general public would be similar across countries, despite different political relations with the United States, and different levels of wealth and economic development. Should this be the portrayal of the America's image in the general public, anti-Americanism would indeed be the syndrome depicted by Messrs Krauthammer, Revel, D'Souza, and Huntington.

This paper takes this view to task in a confrontation against the empirical record, and offers an alternative account of how the United States is perceived abroad. The basic theoretical premise of this paper is that survey questions asking what image or what opinion respondents hold of the United States generate summary judgements that conflate the multiple dimensions of America. Multiple considerations are behind the simple answer "I have a somewhat favorable opinion of the United States" or "unfavorable opinion," for that matter. These considerations are likely to be those in the minds of the respondents at the time the survey is taken, either because they have been prompted by the features of the questionnaire, such as question framing or wording, or because such opinions are part of the predominant pattern of elite discourse in their society. Far from representing the empirical manifestation of a cultural trait, survey items reveal the balance of predispositions, cognitive capacity, and levels of information across individuals in the mass public, a balance that is more contingent, more circumstantial, and more context dependent than it is acknowledged in the current discourse on anti-Americanism.

In this perspective, John Zaller's (1992) and Alvarez and Brehm's (2002) theories of mass opinion loom large. Individuals are immersed in streams of political communication emanating from the elites – be they political, religious, or cultural – and conveyed through media and information channels. Insofar as they are politically attentive, individuals become aware of the elites' messages, acquire them, and filter them through their basic predispositions, orientations, and aspirations. Survey responses emerge, then, as the outcome of a process in which individuals select through a multiplicity of considerations, and summarize the considerations that are immediately salient to their minds into a manifest statement, which is then recorded into an attitudinal scale. Coherent classifications of the political referents in the publics' belief systems need not be the resultant of the process of survey response. Contradictions and ambiguities are, on the contrary, a staple feature of people's opinions, and as such they are reflected in the surveys.

In this model, ambivalence emerges as respondents speak of America with two minds: appreciatively when they are induced to evoke some features, and negatively when they are asked to focus on other aspects. Contradictory perceptions coexist in people's minds, because America is an inherently multidimensional "object" to which individual relate in different manners. Under this alternative hypothesis, perceptions of policies and perceptions of polity are not univocally aligned: thinking highly of the American polity does not preclude individuals from despising American policies, and viceversa. Or, in Converse's (1964) terminology, popular attitudes towards the United States form a loosely constrained belief system.

The alternative hypothesis, then, is that ambivalence surrounds the image of America among the general public in Islamic countries. To this effect, the primary empirical task of this paper, then, is to show how the general public in Islamic societies simultaneously holds positive and negative views of America; how these views coexist in respondents' minds because America is perceived and evaluated on multiple dimensions; and how those multiple dimensions are at most only partially related.

2.1 Dimensions of America: A Causal Relation?

The consideration of two separate dimensions in the perceptions of America spontaneously raises questions about a causal relationship between them. In particular, the ideational appeal of America's culture and ideals, its "soft power" (Nye, 2004), is often credited with the capacity to exert a positive influence on how people perceive America's diplomacy. "It is the policies that people hate, not the people and the ideals" is a common refrain that is often heard in casual conversations as well as more learned analysis. Commenting upon his own variation on the theme of soft power, which he calls "sweet power," Walter Russell Mead (2004, 39–40) explicitly writes that "American sweet power, though limited and variable, clearly plays an important role in winning sympathy and support for American foreign

policy around the world."

But despite the interest in a causal connection between love of America's ideals and opposition to America's policies, the empirical investigations in this study cannot go as far as adjudicating the strong causal claim that the notion of soft power seems to imply. This is not just because Nye (2004, 14) himself admits the possibility that the causal arrow might flow in the opposite direction, from policies to political ideology and all the fixtures of the American dream: in his own words, "Domestic or foreign policies that appear to be hypocritical, arrogant, indifferent to the opinion of others, or based on a narrow approach to national interests can undermine soft power."

More fundamentally, the attribution of causality between two sets of beliefs is impervious in this context because attitudes towards policies and attitudes towards society do not enter into the mental maps of ordinary people as a hierarchical structure where one set of attitudes constitutes a more general ideational posture encompassing the other set of attitudes. As Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) have explained in their classic model of foreign policy beliefs, that is the condition that two sets of beliefs would need to satisfy in order to impute a causal relationship between them. Opinions about policy and opinions about culture and society are, instead, elaborated at the same level of generality. As such, one might cause the other as much as each one could emerge from different dynamics of opinion formation.

If a causal relation between these two alternative dimensions of the attitudes towards America remains indissolubly elusive – a social science variant of the chicken/egg conundrum – their reciprocal relationship remains nonetheless of great relevance. Evidence of how positive opinions of American society and negative opinions of American policies coexist in the aggregate is very often trenchantly dismissed as hypocritical or misguided. Fouad Ajami (2003, 54) exemplifies this line of reasoning when he dismisses the notion that much can be inferred from any findings purporting to differentiate between dimensions of America: "The pollsters," he writes, "have flaunted spreadsheets to legitimize a popular legend: It is

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not the Americans that people abroad hate, but the United States! ... You can't profess kindness towards Americans while attributing the darkest of motives to their homeland." Roger Cohen (2004) sounds a similar chord when he writes in the *New York Times*, with an emphasis worthy of Louis the 14th, that "Bush is America just as Chirac is France. The two nations' highest offices represent every shade of opinion that makes up their democracies."[3]

But if in the process of survey response individuals select through a multiplicity of considerations, and summarize those that are immediately salient to their minds into a manifest statement, as John Zaller's (1992) theoretical construct has cogently explained, then coherent classifications of the political referents in the publics' belief systems need not be the resultant of such a process. Contradictions and ambiguities are, on the contrary, a staple feature of people's opinions, and as such they are reflected in what ordinary people have to say about America.

3   The Sources of Anti-Americanism: Societal and Individual Patterns

Once established whether anti-Americanism is an ambivalent or a totalizing attitude, this paper takes on a second empirical task. Who are the individuals, many or few, who have a positive opinion of America in its societal and policy domains? And where are they located?

Two major sets of factors are brought to bear on the distribution of anti-American opinion: on the one hand, the variation can be accounted for by individual characteristics, from gender to age, from levels of information to religious affiliation; on the other hand, the variation can be accounted for by country-level factors that define the political and economic conditions of a country and its relations with America. It is a combination of factors that this study concentrates on, insofar as country conditions potentially define the

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[3]Cohen's statement is representative of what William Riker (1982) calls the populist interpretation of voting whereby elected officials embody the will of the people.

societal and political context within which individuals with different characteristics elaborate their perceptions of America.

At the individual level, beside standard demographic controls such as gender, marital status and age, the focus of this study is centered on religious affiliation and access to sources of information. While all the countries included in this study, with the exception of Lebanon, are predominantly Islamic, it is worth investigating whether the small fractions of individuals who are non-Muslim articulate more positive views than those who are Muslim. An empirical finding of such nature would replicate, from data measured at the individual level, the aggregate findings on anti-American proneness of Muslim people reported in the Pew's *Global Attitudes Survey*.

The second set of individual factors is information access: respondents were asked whether they had internet access, whether they had satellite television, how many newspapers they read, and how many languages they spoke beyond their mother tongue. All these indicators capture different components of respondents' political awareness, under the assumption that the more one reads or watches television, the more likely one is to be exposed to streams of political communication. But they also distinguish different types of informational access, from the traditional form of the newspaper, to the forms of the globalized information society, satellite television and internet.

In what seems a direct application of Marshall McLuhan's famous dictum, several scholars have started to argue that the medium through which information is diffused affects the dynamics of public opinion formation in the Middle East (Eickelman and Anderson, 2003). Marc Lynch (2003*a*), for example, traces the transformation of Arab public discourse to the emergence of new media outlets that bypass and undermine state control over information. In an analogous way, Fatema Mernissi (2002, ix-xxi) emphasizes how information technology has the potential to revive the notions of personal opinion and innovation, and make them familiar to large portions of the public. Political views previously curtailed receive prime

time often in a style of broadcasting that is American in its inspiration (Ayish, 2001). The political themes that have occupied center place on the satellite television networks, from the issues of democracy and economic reform, to the Palestinian cause and the sanctions and the bombing campaigns in Iraq carry an intense, or outrageous, anti-American rhetoric (Lynch, 2003a). Some remain skeptical of the connection between new media diffusion and the emergence of a public sphere and emphasize how political discourse is shaped more by informal communication in the mosque, the coffeehouses or the marketplace than by the information flows coming out of satellites and internet sites (Fandy, 2000). But it behooves us to see whether the balance between form and content of information translates into different patterns of anti-American sentiment on the polity and policy dimensions.

Differences in individual characteristics can account for part of the variation that might exist across countries: for example, if younger people are more likely to express positive views of the United States, countries with large cohorts of younger people are expected to be more pro-American as well. But country differences can exist beyond the different societal and demographic compositions of their publics, and reflect different processes of opinion formation.

In this study, I investigate the impact of three broad clusters of factors. First, from the venerable tradition of modernization theory comes the conjecture that a sense of "fellow-feeling" between individuals in different societies is more likely to emerge the more two societies interact and have contacts at the economic and cultural level (Dore, 1984, 417). Thus, the more the United States trades, invests, and grants visas for a country's students, the more likely it is that cultural and economic conditions would emerge in which individuals are more prone to express positive views of the United States.

But a second set of relational variables can be considered: the eight countries under investigation differ in terms of their diplomatic and military relationships with the United States. While none shares a formal alliance, the levels of military and diplomatic cooperation

vary sharply, with countries such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait stationing American troops on their territories, countries such as Egypt receiving substantial amounts of military aid, and countries such as Iran that are in an antagonistic relationship. Friendlier relations on the diplomatic/military front might be expected to translate into a closer sense of affinity, primarily at the levels of the political elites, who might see a congruence of interests with the United States. It is more debatable whether these closer connections would necessarily trickle down to the level of the mass publics, and be reflected in mass opinion surveys.

Beyond the political, military, and economic conditions that define the position of a country with respect to the United States, publics' attitudes might be shaped by the patterns of elite discourse. It is not the material relationships that matter in shaping opinion, but it is how political elites frame the discourse about America. Insofar as the public is mostly inattentive about political matters, and matters of foreign relations in particular, its assessment of a political referent such as the United States are likely to hinge upon the predominant set of messages from the elites. Those messages would define what sets of considerations are likely to be salient in people's minds, and thus inform their responses. This expectation primarily derives from Zaller's (1992) thesis on the "elite domination" of public opinion.

4   A Description of the Data

This study distinguishes two sets of frames through which attitudes towards America are structured in the mass publics: the attitude towards American culture, society, and political system, on the one hand, and the attitude towards American foreign policies, on the other. With respect to the first dimension, respondents in the Zogby International survey were asked to express their overall impression on 6 different issues: 1) American science and technology; 2) American freedom and democracy; 3) the American people; 4) American movies and television; 5) American-made products; 6) American education. With respect to

policies, respondents were asked to assess their overall impression of 6 different policies: 1) the policy toward the Arab nations; 2) the policy toward the Palestinians; 3) the American-led effort to stop ethnic cleansing in the Balkans; 4) the American-led effort to free Kuwait; 5) the American-led effort to fight terrorism; 6) the US policy toward Iraq. Responses are coded on a 4-point scale ranging from "Very favorable" (1), to "Somewhat favorable" (2), to "Somewhat unfavorable" (3), and to "Very unfavorable" (4). Table 1 and Table 2 summarize the distribution of responses, distinguishing the percentage of respondents who expressed at least a somewhat favorable opinion of the United States, and the percentage of non-responses.

Insert Table 1 here

As Table 1 shows, attitudes towards the American polity range from supportive to critical, depending upon the dimensions of America under investigation. Thus, large majorities express a very favorable or a somewhat favorable opinion when they think of America in terms of science and technology (82%), of American-made products, of American education, and of American movies and television (about two thirds). But the attitude towards American freedom and democracy and towards the American people is less warm, but hardly hostile: the sample is split about in half, with around 47% expressing a very or somewhat favorable opinion, and 47% thinking otherwise, with respect to opinion of American freedom and democracy, while around 47% have a favorable opinion of the Americans as a people, with a sizeable 12% who holds no opinion.

Variation also exists across countries. Iranian respondents, in particular, stand out for their reportedly intense dislike of American freedom and democracy, their skepticism of American education, and their strong admiration of American science and technology, American products, and American movies and television. In general, then, American technology and popular culture are not alien to the belief systems of large portions of the individuals

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surveyed. But even more "political" or "value-laden" dimensions of the American polity do not appear to be systematically rejected.

It is when we shift our focus on attitudes towards American policies that the picture changes: there, we indeed find decidedly negative attitudes. As Table 2 shows, solid majorities have a very unfavorable opinion of American policies towards the Arab nations, the Palestinians, and Iraq, which makes an overall negative assessment of American actions in the Middle East nearly unanimous (around 90%). The interventions in the Balkan conflicts and in Kuwait, and the war on terror policy, on the other hand, receive slightly larger levels of approval, but they also generate substantially large percentages of "don't-know" responses, which indicates how controversial those policies are. In particular, the intervention to stop ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, a pro-Muslim population policy where ulterior motives are not easily found, is not part of the cognitive map of many a respondent. But an analogous interpretation of the non-responses with respect to the war to liberate Kuwait in 1991 is harder to believe, given the widespread commotion that those events generated in the Islamic world. Such a finding more likely indicates areas of unspoken, or unarticulated, support rather than authentic lack of opinion.

Insert Table 2 here

Again, the Iranian respondents stand out as the least keen on what America does in its foreign policy: *no one* of the 700 individuals interviewed in Iran expressed a favorable opinion of the Iraq policy. Analogously, the opposition to America's anti-terrorism policy is overwhelmingly strong in the mass public. But, with about 50% of Iranian respondents who are unwilling or unable to assess the interventions to liberate Kuwait and to protect Muslim populations in the Balkans, the question remains whether even among the Iranians those apparent "non-attitudes" belie a more circumstantial assessment of the United States actions.

5 The Statistical Model

The survey employed in this study offers an array of indicators that tap into a variety of features of the United States. The amount of information that these batteries of indicators contain is synthesized using a statistical model called Bayesian Multi-level Ordinal Item Response Theory (IRT) Model (Fox and Glas, 2001, 2003; Fox, 2003). This class of models measures a respondent's latent propensity to give a pattern of responses to a set of survey items. This modeling approach is appropriate in this context because anti-Americanism is not just the attitude of a respondent who has a strong negative opinion of America on any specific feature, while being moderately supportive or moderately opposed to America on all other counts. IRT models allow for an encompassing measurement of anti-American sentiments, in which clusters of indicators are taken as empirical manifestations of respondents' attitudes. While innovative for a political science audience, the Bayesian Multi-level Ordinal Item Response Theory (IRT) Models bear a family resemblance to factor analysis and Lisrel-type models insofar as they assess how survey items "load" onto the latent propensity, but they go beyond those more traditional approaches by respecting the ordinal measurement of the survey items and by incorporating a hierarchical structural model that measures how respondents' and countries' characteristics explain the latent traits.[4]

Two major clusters of indicators exist in the two surveys: a set of indicators measuring attitudes towards American culture and society, and a set of indicators measuring attitudes towards policies. The statistical model is estimated on each set of indicators separately, thus producing an estimate of each individual's latent propensities of being opposed to America's polity and America's policies. Results on the two dimensions can then be compared to see whether the respondents who articulate a negative view of American policies are also those who articulate a negative view of American culture and society. These comparisons across

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[4]Applications of Bayesian IRT models can be found in the literature on roll-call votes in the U.S. legislature (Clinton, Jackman and Rivers, 2004) and in the General Assembly of the United Nations (Voeten, 2004).

dimensions of anti-Americanism are all the more relevant because by incorporating a set of indicators, IRT models reduce the impact of measurement error in the process of eliciting attitudes from responses to survey questions. This way, IRT models directly address the concerns of an important line of research, starting from a path-breaking article by Christopher Achen (1975), which has argued that respondents' attitudes should be conceptualized in terms of a distribution of opinions, and not as a single fixed point. The estimates generated through the IRT models, then, reflect respondents' opinions above and beyond the vagaries of measurement error, which should give more confidence about the relationships emerging from this modeling approach.

The data comprises two levels of analysis: the individual respondents who express their opinion of the United States, and the countries in which they reside. This data, therefore, is organized in a hierarchical structure in which individual observations are clustered within larger geographical aggregations. The Multi-level IRT model directly takes into account such a hierarchical data structure of individuals within countries. Thus, the structural component of the model neither pools all observations together as if they were collected from a unique source nor does it keep them separate, country by country, as if respondents in different countries would constitute incomparable units. Instead, it assesses how the variation in the propensity to be anti-American is partitioned across levels of analysis, and produces estimates that "borrow strength" from the aggregate informational content that exists across country-level units. That is, it produces estimates that balance the information within and between countries (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002; Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002).

A third feature of the statistical approach is the use of Bayesian inference (Jackman, 2000; Gill, 2002). Thus, inferences about the model parameters are based on the posterior distribution, which is derived via Bayes' theorem from the likelihood and the prior distribution. Estimation proceeds through the Gibbs sampler, an algorithm that decomposes the joint posterior distribution into a series of conditional densities and iteratively samples from each

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of them. Under minimal conditions, the samples from the conditional distributions converge to the posterior densities, and can be used for inferential purposes. Of all the advantages that Bayesian inference entails, two are worth highlighting: the treatment of missing values; and its properties in small samples.

As several scholar have argued (King et al., 2001), survey non-responses potentially bias estimates and inferences. Under the assumption of Missing at Random, the Bayesian setup allows for the imputation of the missing values as additional parameters to be computed in the estimation procedure.

The second advantage of a Bayesian approach pertains to the estimation of hierarchical models with a small number of country-level units. In a data set with either eight country-level units, maximum-likelihood estimation would generate confidence intervals that underestimate the uncertainty in the data, which leads to too liberal tests of statistical significance (Seltzer, Wong and Bryk, 1996, 135-136). Bayesian inference, on the other hand, does not rely upon asymptotic properties and is valid in small samples. Indeed, as Joop Hox (2002, 213) has written, "With small number of groups and especially with non linear models MCMC estimates tend to perform better than maximum likelihood."

The multi-level IRT models consist of two parts: the measurement model, which links the latent propensity of being anti-American to the manifest survey items; and the structural model in which the latent propensities are modeled as a function of a set of explanatory variables. The starting point for an IRT model is a latent propensity, θ_{ij}, for respondent i in country j. This latent propensity θ_{ij} is linked to the data in two ways: first, it is linked to the manifest indicators in the measurement model as a "hidden" factor accounting for the distribution of measured responses; second, it is linked to other variables, measured at the individual level or at the country level, that attempt to explain the variation in the "hidden" factor θ_{ij} itself.

In its measurement part, the IRT model takes each of k 4-point manifest indicators –

the survey items described above for the Zogby poll – and defines the probability that an individual gives a response falling into category c as follows, where k is equal to six in the Zogby data:

$$\Pr(Y_k = 1 \mid \theta_{ij}, \alpha_k, \kappa_k) = \Lambda(\kappa_{k1} - \alpha_k \theta_{ij})$$

$$\Pr(Y_k = c \mid \theta_{ij}, \alpha_k, \kappa_k) = \Lambda(\kappa_{kc} - \alpha_k \theta_{ij}) - \Lambda(\kappa_{kc-1} - \alpha_k \theta_{ij}), \text{for } c = 2, 3$$

$$\Pr(Y_k = 4 \mid \theta_{ij}, \alpha_k, \kappa_k) = 1 - \Lambda(\kappa_{k3} - \alpha_k \theta_{ij}) \tag{1}$$

where Y_k represents each of the k manifest indicators; each α_k is a discrimination parameter indicating how a change in the θ_{ij} propensity is converted into the recorded manifest categories; the κ_{kc} parameters are the threshold parameters governing the order of the responses; and Λ is the cumulative logistic distribution (see Embretson and Reise, 2000, ch. 5).

In order to guarantee identification of the model, the latent propensity θ_{ij} is anchored to the manifest indictors by fixing one of the discrimination parameters (α_k) to 1 and one of the threshold parameters (κ_{k2}) to 0, respectively. This procedure defines the unit and origin of the latent scale such that a score of 0 on the latent variable implies that the probability of selecting at most a 2 on the chosen indicator k is .5.

In the structural part of the IRT model, I distinguish between two types of specification. First, I estimate a two-level one-way random effects Anova model, which measures the mean and variance of the underlying anti-American propensities in each country and across countries. The Anova-type model also serves as a baseline to gauge how variability in responses is located at the level of the individual respondents or at the level of the country units. Then, I estimate a full hierarchical model with individual level explanatory variables and a two-level model for the intercept.

In notation form, the two-level one-way random effects Anova model posits that the latent propensity θ_{ij} follows a Normal distribution, with a country-specific mean, β_j and a

country-specific variance, σ_j^2:

$$\theta_{ij} \sim \mathtt{N}(\beta_j, \sigma_j^2) \tag{2}$$

The hierarchical component of the model comes into play by assuming that each of the country mean levels β_j is in turn sampled from a Normal distribution:

$$\beta_j \sim \mathtt{N}(\gamma_0, \tau^2) \tag{3}$$

where the coefficient γ_0 represents the grand-mean level of policy or societal anti-Americanism in the population, and τ^2 is the overall country-level variation. From these quantities, we can compute the "intraclass correlation coefficient": defined as $\rho = \frac{\tau^2}{\tau^2 + \sigma^2}$, it measures the proportion of the total variance in anti-Americanism that occurs between countries.[5] From the intraclass correlation coefficient ρ, therefore, it is possible to gauge the contribution that country differences give to the variation in anti-American sentiment. When ρ approaches zero, it implies that country-level factors – that is, the political and societal context within which respondents live – have a very limited effect on the formation of anti-American sentiment.

The second specification for the structural model takes the form of an Ancova model with random effects (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002, 25-26). In this case, the latent propensity θ_{ij} is modeled as a function of individual-level variables (x_{pij}) and country-level variables (w_{qj}).

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[5]Given that Equation (2) posits that there are different within country variances (σ_j^2), I take their mean to approximate σ^2.

In notation form:

$$\theta_{ij} \sim \mathrm{N}(\mu_i, \sigma_j^2) \tag{4}$$

$$\mu_i = \beta_{0j} + \sum_{p=1}^{P} \beta_p(x_{pij} - \bar{x}_{p.j}) \tag{5}$$

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \sum_{q=1}^{Q} \gamma_q(w_{qj} - \bar{w}_{q.}) + u_{0j}, \text{ where } u_{0j} \sim \mathrm{N}(0, \tau^2) \tag{6}$$

In this specification, the intercept β_{0j} is modeled as a random variable following a Normal distribution, whose mean is a function of a population-grand mean (γ_{00}) and of the country-level variables (w_{qj}), and whose variance is equal to τ^2, while the effect of the individual-level variables (x_{pij}) is constrained to be the same across countries.

The individual-level variables are centered at their respective country means ($\bar{x}_{p.j}$). This modeling choice defines the substantive interpretation of the intercept parameters (β_{0j}) and of the regression coefficients (β_p) themselves. As Raudenbush and Bryk (2002, 135–139) explain, under country-mean centering the β_{0j} intercepts measure the level of the anti-American propensity for the average respondent in each country, while the β_p coefficients measure the impact of an explanatory variable net of any country-membership effect. Analogously, the country-level explanatory variables (w_{qj}) are centered at their grand means ($\bar{w}_{q.}$). Under this parametrization, therefore, the γ_{00} coefficient measures the overall population grand-mean of the anti-American propensity for a country that has average scores on the country level explanatory variables.

Finally, the model requires the specification of prior distributions on the parameters, that is the probability distributions that summarize the extent of the knowledge we have before analyzing the data. Insofar as information on the relationships between the parameters in the model is scarce, the priors are vague and uninformative, with large variances. The exception to this rule are the α_k coefficients in the measurement model, which are – as we

recall – the coefficients that regulate the impact of an increase in the latent propensities θ_{ij} on the probability to express unfavorable views of the United States on the survey items. The α_k parameters are constrained to be positive, on the theoretical assumption that higher values on the propensity to be anti-American cannot be translated into lower probabilities to oppose America on any of its dimensions. The priors on the threshold parameters κ_{kc} are set to follow a Normal distribution, and are subject to the condition that $\kappa_{k1} \leq \kappa_{k2} \leq \kappa_{k3}$. In notation:[6]

$$
\begin{aligned}
\alpha_1 &= 1 \\
\alpha_k &\sim \mathtt{N}(0,100)|(0,+\infty), \ \forall \ k = 2,\dots,\mathrm{K} \\
\kappa_{k1} &\sim \mathtt{N}(-2,100)|(-\infty,\kappa_{k2}) \\
\kappa_{k2} &\sim \mathtt{N}(0,100)|(\kappa_{k1},\kappa_{k3}), \ \forall \ k = 2,\dots,\mathrm{K}-1 \\
\kappa_{K2} &= 0 \\
\kappa_{k3} &\sim \mathtt{N}(2,100)|(\kappa_{k2},+\infty), \ \forall \ k = 1,\dots,\mathrm{K}
\end{aligned}
$$

(7)

(8)

where K – the number of survey items – is equal to either six or seven depending upon which survey is analyzed. In the structural part of the model, the β_p and γ_q coefficients measuring the effects of the individual-level and country-level explanatory variables are given vague Normal priors with 0 mean (i.e., no effect) and large variances. The priors on the variance components of the model, σ_j^2 and τ^2, are modeled by placing a Uniform distribution on the

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[6]The parameters α_1 and κ_{K2} are fixed to 1 and 0, respectively, in line with the identification conditions for the IRT model.

respective standard deviations (see Gelman, 2004). In notation:

$$\beta_p \sim \mathbb{N}(0, 100), \ \forall \ p = 1, \ldots, \mathrm{P} \tag{9}$$

$$\gamma_q \sim \mathbb{N}(0, 100), \ \forall \ q = 1, \ldots, \mathrm{Q} \tag{10}$$

$$\sqrt{\sigma_j^2} \sim \mathbb{U}(0, 100), \ \forall \ j = 1, \ldots, \mathrm{J} \tag{11}$$

$$\sqrt{\tau^2} \sim \mathbb{U}(0, 100) \tag{12}$$

where P and Q are the number of individual-level and country-level variables, respectively, and J is the number of countries in the survey.

6   The Explanatory Variables

The survey data are simultaneously analyzed at two levels of aggregation: the micro-level of individual responses and the macro-level of aggregate country-level data. This modeling strategy speaks to two different aspects of anti-American attitudes. In modeling individual responses, the goal is to identify what kinds of respondents articulate positive or negative views of the United States, whereas questions regarding how political and economic relations with America influence popular attitudes are addressed at the macro level. These two dimensions are not mutually exclusive insofar as the effect of respondents' features – their age or their gender, their religion or their levels of information – on anti-American attitudes might be mediated by their country's levels of development, power resources, or history of political relations with the United States.

Two sets of variables, then, are necessary to explore the empirical patterns in the survey data: individual-level variables and country-level variables. Their measurement is described below.

6.1   Individual Level Variables

The individual-level variables (x_{ij}) measure a cluster of demographic and attitudinal features of the respondents, as they were collected in the surveys. For the Zogby survey of the Islamic countries, these variables are coded as follows:

Marital status is a dichotomous indicator where 1=married and 0=not married;

Male is a dichotomous indicator where 1=male and 0=female;

City is a dichotomous indicator where 1=Respondent lives in city and 0=does not;

Age is a five-point indicator where 1='18-25'; 2='26-35'; 3='36-45'; 4='46-55'; 5='56-65';

Non-muslim is a dichotomous indicator where 1=Respondent is non-Muslim; 0=Muslim;

Internet is a dichotomous indicator where 1=Respondent has internet access; 0=no internet access;

Satellite TV is a dichotomous indicator where 1=Respondent has satellite TV; 0=no satellite TV;

Newspapers is a count variable measuring the number of newspapers read (0-4);

Languages is a count variable measuring the number of languages spoken other than mother tongue (0-4)

Missing values on these variables are modeled as additional parameters to be estimated through the Gibbs sampler by placing a prior distribution on each of them: dichotomous variables follow a Bernoulli distribution; count variables a Poisson distribution truncated at the maximum value possible (4, for the Newspaper and the Languages variables). The means of these distributions are assumed to be different across countries, and are assigned vague conjugate hyper-priors.[7]

The variable measuring whether the respondent is non-Muslim in the Zogby survey is coded for only two countries: Egypt and Lebanon. Therefore, for the remaining countries,

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[7]In notation, the dichotomous variables are modeled as follows: $x_{ij} \sim Bern(\pi_j)$; $\pi_j \sim Beta(1.1, 1.1)$. The count variables are modeled as follows: $x_{ij} \sim Pois(\lambda_j)$; $\lambda_j \sim Gamma(.001, .001)$.

the values are imputed using the same procedure, but placing informative tighter hyper-priors on the mean parameter, reflecting the actual distribution of non-Muslim individuals in those countries.

These variables are then centered at the country mean (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002, 31-35 and 136-139): that is, the explanatory variables are entered into the estimation as $x_{ij} - \bar{x}_{.j}$. The group-mean centering affects the interpretation of the coefficients: the J (i.e., one for each country) intercepts β_{0j} should be interpreted as the average level of the latent propensity to be anti-American (θ_{ij}) for any given country; the β_p coefficients associated with the individual-level explanatory variables represent the relationship between a given variable and the levels of anti-Americanism net of any country-effect.

6.2   Country Level Variables

The hierarchical specification of the Ancova model also includes a series of country-level variables (w_j) to account for the variation in country-means. Given that these variables try to identify whether there is anything systematic in a country's economic and political situation, they are measured as country averages computed over a five-year period (1997-2001) in order to avoid the risk that an idiosyncratic value might occur in a given year. In more detail, the w_j variables are coded as follows:

GDP per capita measures a country's GDP per capita in U.S. dollars at current prices (U.N. estimates). Data are taken from the United Nations Common Database, available at `http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdb/cdb_help/cdb_quick_start.asp`;

Trade dependence measures the level of a country's trade with the United States over the country's GDP. Trade data are taken from the Foreign Trade Statistics of the U.S. Census Bureau, Department of Commerce, available at `http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/index.html`;

U.S. direct investment measures the level of U.S. direct investments over a country's GDP. Data on U.S. direct investments are taken from the *U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on a Historical-Cost Basis* series of the U.S Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, available at `http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/di/`

`di1usdbal.htm`;

U.S. military assistance measures the sum of military sales agreements and military aid from the United States over a country's GDP. Data on military aid and sales are taken from the DSCA's Facts Book, available at `http://www.dsca.osd.mil/programs/Comptroller/2001_FACTS/default.htm` and from the USAID's *Greenbook*, available at `http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/index.html`;

U.S. troop presence measures the number American troops on a country's soil over the number of local troops. Data are taken from the Department of Defense, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Military Personnel Statistics, available at `http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/military/miltop.htm`. Data for the number of local troops in a country are taken from the Correlates of War *National Material Capabilities (v3.01)*, available at `http://cow2.la.psu.edu/datasets.htm`;

U.N. voting congruence measures the coincidence of a country's voting pattern with that of the United States in the General Assembly of the United Nations. Data are taken from the 2001 Annual Report to Congress on the Voting Practices in the United Nations, available at `http://www.state.gov/p/io/conrpt/`;

Student visas measures the number of student (F-1 and M-1) visas granted to a country over the country's population, multiplied by 1000. Data are taken from the immigration statistics of the Department of Homeland Security, available at `http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/index.htm`. Due to data unavailability for 1997, this variable is limited to an average of the 1998-2001;

Pro-U.S. elite discourse measures the difference between the number of positive and negative statements that national elites made in a given year about the United States, as these statements are listed in the Reuters newswires coded by King and Lowe (2003). This measure is normalized as a ratio over the total number of interactions with the United States in a given year, as they were listed in the same Reuters newswires. The list of instances of positive and negative statements was selected using the *IDEA* framework developed by Bond et al. (2003). The selection criterion was to identify the acts that would imply declarations or verbal statements on the parts of the elites, while excluding acts that would imply actions or other forms of behavior. Thus, if a news item saying that a leader accused the United States, it is counted in the number of negative statements coming from the leadership, whereas news items about leaders meeting or about government transactions are excluded. The list of positive statements includes the following *IDEA* categories: agree, assure, discussions, empathize, endorse, optimistic comment, praise, propose, solicit support. The list of negative statements includes the following *IDEA* categories: accuse, blame, complain (formally or informally), denounce or denigrate, deny, pessimistic comment, threaten, warn.

All these variables are, then, centered around their corresponding grand means (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002, 35).

7 Empirical Results

The estimates presented in the Tables below were obtained by letting the Gibbs sampler run for 16000 iterations, discarding the first 2000 iterations as a burn-in phase. Every tenth iteration was retained for inference, which provides 1400 samples from the posterior distribution of the model parameters. Visual inspection of the trace plots and of the within-chain autocorrelation plots indicates good mixing and low autocorrelations, which are indicators of convergence to the posterior distribution. More formal tests of convergence were also conducted using Geweke's and Heidelbeger and Welch's diagnostics (Gill, 2002, 398–399, 405–408). Both diagnostics indicate that the chains have reached the stationary distribution.

To interpret the substantive magnitude of the results, we should recall that these models estimate a latent propensity to express unfavorable attitudes towards the United States on a cluster of survey questions. The latent propensity – i.e., the θ_{ij} parameter from Equations (1) and (2) – was given an arbitrary zero point by fixing one of the threshold parameters κ_{kc} to zero. On the societal/cultural dimension of anti-Americanism, zero is the level of anti-Americanism that leads a respondent to be at most "somewhat favorable" to American education with a probability equal to 50%; on the policy dimension, zero is the level of anti-Americanism that leads a respondent to be at most "somewhat favorable" to the American policy to fight terrorism with a probability equal to 50%.

All the remaining threshold parameters κ_{kc} indicate the level in the latent propensity necessary to respond in or below the response category c on the survey item k with probability 50% (Embretson and Reise, 2000, 98-99). For example, from Table 3, the first threshold parameter for the survey item about American products (κ_{51}) measures the level of anti-Americanism that makes a respondent 50% likely to say that he or she has a "very favorable" opinion of American products; the second threshold parameter (κ_{52}) measures the level of anti-Americanism that makes a respondent 50% likely to say that he or she has at most a

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"somewhat favorable' opinion of American products; finally, the third threshold parameter (κ_{53}) measures the level of anti-Americanism that makes a respondent 50% likely to say that he or she has at most a "somewhat unfavorable" opinion of American products. Therefore, the estimates of the means and variances of anti-American sentiment obtained via the IRT Anova modeling do not have an immediate substantive interpretation and should be read to identify the position of the countries relative to the overall mean and relative to each other.

With all this in mind, we can now turn to the empirical results.

7.1   Patterns of Anti-Americanism

The key elements of the Anova IRT and the random-effect Anova models are summarized in the means and variances of the measures of anti-Americanism: that is, the parameters β_j and σ_j^2, γ_0 and τ^2 from Equations (2) and (3). From those parameters, and from the intraclass correlation coefficient ρ, we assess the level and variability of anti-American sentiment within each country and across countries.

Starting from Table 3, where we find the results of the measurement component of the IRT Anova model, we observe that the science and technology aspect is the dimension of America's culture and society that attracts the most support: for example, with a threshold parameter for the third category (κ_{13}) as high as 2.814, it takes a much greater "amount" of anti-Americanism to be strongly opposed to American scientific and technological accomplishments than it takes to be strongly opposed to the American people, where the corresponding third threshold parameter (κ_{33}) is equal to 0.972, or to any of the other five features of American culture and society. In the policy-dimension, on the other hand, we notice how the threshold parameters have negative values on many indicators. In other words, higher probabilities of opposing American policies are generated at fairly low levels of the latent propensity. The widespread opposition to the policies towards the Arab nations, the Palestinians and Iraq is reflected in these findings.

The second set parameters in Table 3 – α_k – indicates how "sensitive" the probabilities are to give favorable or unfavorable answers to the survey items as the latent propensity increases. The larger the α_k coefficient, the larger the increase in the probability that a respondent is strongly opposed to one of the aspects of America for any increase in the latent propensity θ_{ij}. In the societal and cultural dimension, the largest α_k parameters are those associated with the survey item measuring attitudes towards freedom and democracy and towards the American people, while in the policy dimension, the largest are the ones associated with the survey items measuring attitudes towards the policy to fight terrorism and the American-led effort to liberate Kuwait. Thus, smaller changes on the latent propensity have larger impacts in shifting respondents' attitudes towards American freedom and democracy or towards the policy against terrorism than it is the case with respect to attitudes towards movies and television or the policy towards the Arab nations.

The analysis of the coefficients in the measurement model, therefore, offers a first indication of the magnitude of the latent propensity to oppose the American polity or American policies. But in order to have a clearer understanding of how anti-American a respondent is who is attributed a score of, say, 2 on the θ_{ij} parameter, Table 4 shows how given values of θ_{ij} translate into probabilities to observe patterns of responses on the survey items in the model. In other words, Table 4 reports the estimated effects that are associated with some hypothetical values of the latent propensity.

Recalling that a value of 1 on the Zogby survey items means "very favorable" and a value of 4 means "very unfavorable" while 2 and 3 stand for "somewhat favorable" and "somewhat unfavorable" respectively, Table 4 shows that a score of -2 on the latent propensity to oppose American society and culture, for example, makes a respondent say that he or she

has a very favorable opinion of American science and technology with probability equal to 0.544, and a very favorable opinion of American freedom and democracy with probability equal to 0.191. On the other hand, a score of 2 on the same latent propensity implies that a respondent would express a very unfavorable opinion of American science and technology with probability equal to 0.237 and a very unfavorable opinion of American freedom and democracy with probability equal to 0.846. All other estimated probabilities can be read in an analogous manner.

The pattern of probabilities on the policy dimension of anti-American sentiment reflects the Islamic publics' stronger opposition to American policies. Even when the latent propensity reaches values as low as -1 or -2, respondents are unlikely to express very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion of the U.S. policies towards the Arab nations, the Palestinians and Iraq. But the estimates in Table 4 also show that respondents whose estimated score on the latent propensity is -1 or lower are likely to express very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion of the American actions to stop ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, to liberate Kuwait after Iraq's 1990 invasion, and to fight terrorism. Therefore, amidst widespread opposition to the U.S. Middle Eastern policy, areas of potential greater support exist. The question, then, is how many respondents hold such views. This is what we now turn to by investigating the distribution of the latent propensities themselves.

In Table 5, we find the results with regard to the means and variances of the two latent propensities to be anti-American. Starting from the societal/cultural dimension, the overall mean level of the latent propensity is about -1.329, a score that indicates how the perceptions of American culture and society are fairly positive. This result is corroborated by the distribution of the latent propensity: about 56% of all respondents have a level of societal/cultural anti-Americanism smaller than -1, and a sizeable 16% has a score lower than -3. On the other hand, only about 8% of the respondents reach a level greater than 1, and just about 1.5% is above a level of 3 on the latent propensity.

Differences in the diffusions of anti-American sentiment exist across countries. The highest level of societal/cultural anti-Americanism is reached in Iran, where it is estimated at a level of -0.485, while the minimum levels are found in Lebanon and Pakistan. Most of the variation in the latent trait, though, occurs within countries: using the intraclass correlation coefficient ρ, about 13% of the overall variance in the latent propensity (θ_{ij}) occurs between countries. These empirical patterns, therefore, challenge the view of an irreducible incompatibility between Islamic culture and society and America. Contrary to the arguments of Samuel Huntington (1996) or Barry Rubin (2002), but in line the findings of Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2002) and Mark Tessler (2002), the low magnitude of the propensity to dislike American culture and society in this survey data is indicative of the existence of large similarities in the values and aspirations cherished by ordinary citizens in the West and in the Islamic world.

Insert Table 5 here

On the policy dimension, however, the image of America appears much more poorly received. As we see in Table 5, the anti-American trait reaches an overall average level of 0.716, a score that translates into fairly high probabilities to oppose American policies. The distribution of the latent propensity shows that about 38% of the respondents are attributed a score of 1 or higher, and about 5% reach a level at least as high as 3, whereas only about 8.5% of the public is attributed a score of -1 or lower. Again, Iranian respondents are those who manifest the most negative attitude towards American policies, and again the Pakistani respondents are those who manifest the most favorable attitude towards America in this group of countries. The variability of the policy anti-Americanism is less marked than that of its polity counterpart, as we can infer from the sizes of the τ^2 parameters, and it is located between countries more than it is within countries. The intraclass correlation coefficient ρ indicates that about 59% of the variance occurs between countries.

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These results are summarized in Figure 1, where the posterior distributions of countries' means and variances for both types of anti-Americanism are plotted with box-and-whiskers plots. What emerges from Figure 1 is how countries are placed on the latent scales relative to each other, and how distinct their positions are. Thus, on the societal and cultural dimension, Iran reaches the highest levels on the latent scale, to be followed by Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. United Arab Emirates and Indonesia rank third on the scale, while Pakistan and Lebanon are at the bottom. On the policy dimension, Iran is at the top with a mean level of anti-Americanism that is about twice as large as that of the second ranking country, Egypt. Lebanon and Saudi Arabia are ranked third on the scale, with Indonesia, Kuwait, Pakistan, and UAE at the bottom.

<div align="center">Insert Figure 1 here</div>

The comparison of the country variances shows how concentrated the distribution of anti-American sentiment is in these eight countries. On both the polity and policy dimension, Lebanese respondents are those who reveal the largest variability in their attitudes towards the United States. On the other hand, countries such as Iran or Indonesia have much lower variances, which might be taken as an indication of how the mass public in these countries has either reached a societal consensus on America or has coordinated on a common position under some specific political circumstances.

7.2   Policy and Polity in Anti-American Opinion

So far, the patterns in anti-American attitudes have been analyzed in isolation, one dimension at a time. But, a key question about the underlying nature of anti-Americanism is whether the two frames of policy and polity are related. A connection between those two dimensions underlies Joseph Nye's (2004) concept of soft power: the more one is socialized into the American political culture and ideology, the more amenable one is to accept the policy goals pursued by the United States.

The analytical discussion above, however, has also shown how problematic it is to adjudicate whether a causal relation exists between the approval of America's diplomacy and the endorsement of America's societal model, and in which direction it flows. What we can ascertain, instead, is whether attitudes towards culture and society and attitudes towards policies generate a consistent – or constrained, in Converse's (1964) terminology – belief system. Are the individuals who hold a negative view of American policies those who hold a negative view of American society and culture? If that were the case, then, it would then be possible to guess where a person stands on one dimension from knowledge of where he or she stands on the other. And, from that knowledge, we can infer that the mechanisms of soft power contribute to the formation of popular opinion about America, regardless of which attitudinal dimension "causes" the other in the mind of each and every respondent in the surveys.

To this end, Figure 2 plots against each other the latent propensities θ_{ij} to oppose American culture and society and American policies for the group of eight predominantly Islamic countries. As we can observe, the societal/cultural and policy dimensions of anti-Americanism are unsurprisingly related: high levels of anti-Americanism on one dimension "dance together" with high levels of anti-Americanism on the other dimension, and viceversa. This connection is reflected in a Pearson's correlation coefficient as high as 0.424. Nonetheless, there is more to this relationship than a mere correlation.

Insert Figure 2 here

At low levels of societal/cultural anti-Americanism, the range of variation of policy-oriented anti-Americanism spans the entire spectrum, from low levels to high levels. Thus, a good disposition towards American society and culture is not necessarily incompatible with a strongly negative assessment of American policies. On the other hand, at high level of cultural/societal anti-Americanism, the responses are much more concentrated, which indicates the syndrome of outright opposition to America for what it is and for what it

does. Analogously, if we look at the relationship between the two types of anti-Americanism from the perspective of the policy variant, we infer that opposition to American policies is compatible with the entire range of attitudes towards American culture and society. On the other hand, no respondents express a positive view of American policies, while being contemptuous of American society.

In sum, it appears that, as Joseph Nye (2004, 14) has written, "Government policies can reinforce or squander a country's soft power." Yet, the appeal of America's cultural and political ideals does not turn the mass publics into keen supporters of America's diplomacy but makes them at most amenable to hold positive views of American foreign policy. Instead, the triangle-shaped scatterplot of the estimated propensities to societal/cultural and policy anti-Americanism indicates that a large portion of respondents speak of America with two minds: appreciatively when they are induced to evoke aspects of America's polity and negatively when they are asked to focus on America's foreign policy. The pattern of attitudes in Figure 2 exemplifies the structure of a loosely constrained belief system in which ambivalence characterizes the mind frame through which many respondents relate to the United States.

Beyond the visual inspection of the scatterplot in Figure 2, patterns in the variability of the latent propensities can be ascertained using formal statistical tests. The hypothesis under investigation is the extent to which the variance in one attitudinal dimension is conditional on the values of the other. Focusing first on the latent propensity to oppose American policies, the statistical test divides the sample of respondents in the Zogby survey in two sections, those who have a high score on the societal/cultural anti-Americanism propensity and those who have a low score on that dimension, and then it computes the ratio of the variances in the two sub-samples. A variance ratio that is probabilistically different from the value 1 gives a statistical validation to the conjecture of non-equal variances.[8] If a high

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[8]Using a non-informative reference prior, the posterior distribution for the ratio of the variances of two Normally distributed random variables, $\eta = \frac{\phi_1}{\phi_2}$, follows a Snedecor's F distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of observations in each sample minus 1. That is, $\eta \sim S_1/S_2 \; F_{n_1-1, \; n_2-1}$, where S_1, and S_2 are the variances in the two samples, and n_1 and n_2 are the sample sizes (Lee, 1997, 149–151).

score is defined as a value on the latent propensity to oppose American culture and society greater than the 80th percentile, and a low score is a value on the latent propensity smaller than the 20th percentile, we obtain a variance ratio η equal to 0.789, with a 95% confidence interval spanning from 0.700 to 0.890. It is then possible to reject the hypothesis of equal variances, as we could conclude from the visual inspection of the data.

Interestingly, though, the statistical test on the ratio of the variances of the societal/cultural anti-Americanism yields a statistics equal to 1.001, with a 95% confidence interval equal to (0.893,1.136), if the thresholds to identify low and high scores on the policy anti-Americanism are set at the 20th and the 80th percentiles, respectively. It would then appear that there is no difference in the dispersion of the propensity to oppose American culture and society at low and high values of the policy attitudinal dimension. This result, however, is primarily driven by the distribution of the two latent propensities among the Iranian respondents (visually, the bright green dots in Figure 2). If Iran is excluded from the sample, then, the ratio of the variances is equal to 0.541, with a 95% confidence interval from 0.476 to 0.616, which again indicates how much less disperse societal and cultural anti-Americanism is among the respondents who are appreciative of American policies.

Figure 3 investigates how the connection between polity and policy anti-Americanism unfolds in each country. The pattern of ambivalence that emerged from the aggregate analysis continues to characterize the opinions of the respondents in most of the eight predominantly Islamic countries in the Zogby survey. This pattern is particularly prominent in Egypt, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, but less so in Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, where opinions about policies and opinions about polity appear to be more consistently aligned.

Insert Figure 3 here

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7.3 Findings on the Individual-level and Country-level Variables

Among many a citizen in the Islamic publics, America is a source of ambivalent feelings, of love and hate, of admiration and disdain, of acceptance and frustration. But, who are the people who articulate these ambivalent views of the United States? In this section, we explore in depth to what extent various individual-level characteristics and country specific features are significantly associated with these divergent strands in anti-American sentiment.

Starting from the model predicting attitudes towards American culture and society in Table 6, we observe that several variables have a significant impact on the levels of polity anti-Americanism. Marital status, Age, non-Muslim identity, Internet, Satellite TV, and Languages have all posterior distributions whose 95% confidence interval do not cross the 0 threshold. The three remaining explanatory variables – Male gender, City dweller, and Newspapers read – fail to attain confidence intervals distinct from 0 even with a 80% probability.

Insert Table 6 here

Thus, respondents who are not-married, young, non-Muslim, who have access to the Internet and satellite TV, and who speak foreign languages are more likely to articulate positive views of American culture and society. These results, therefore, indicate that a generational effect and an information effect underlie the patterns of responses. But, in terms of substantive impact, all these factors are overshadowed by the effects of non-Muslim identity: with a coefficient as large in absolute terms as -2.3, the model shows how the non-Muslim minorities in the sample are overwhelmingly more likely to endorse the political and cultural ideals of the United States. The size of the effect associated with a non-Muslim identity appears in all its prominence if we observe that for a highly informed respondent with Internet access, satellite TV and who speaks one foreign language the latent propensity to oppose American culture and society decreases about half a point, an effect about 80%

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smaller than the one associated with the non-Muslim variable.[9]

Whether this result about the Muslim identity of the respondents is driven by a reduced sense of cultural distance with the United States, or by the very fact that the non-Muslim minorities are different on some other counts, such as wealth or education, that are not explicitly included in the models, is not possible to adjudicate on the basis of the individual characteristics that were measured in the Zogby International survey. Indeed, the findings on the country variances (σ_j^2) show that a considerable part of the individual level variation remains unaccounted for. Overall, the percentage of the variance at the respondent level explained by the nine explanatory variables is about 21%.[10]

When we shift our attention to the policy dimension in Table 7, however, a different pattern emerges. The amount of variation explained in terms of the individual characteristics of the respondents is even smaller, about 7%. Three variables turn out to have a significant impact on policy anti-Americanism, namely non-Muslim, Satellite TV and Newspapers, while the Gender and the Internet variables are only significant at the 90% level. Thus, individuals who are Muslim, keep well informed with satellite television and newspapers, and possibly individuals who are males are more likely to have negative views of American policies. In other words, we still find an informational dynamic underlying attitudes towards America, but with a reversal in its effect. While information, and information from the new media in particular, helps diffuse positive views about America as a society and political system, at the same time information, both through images and written words, leads to the formation of more negative views about American policies. In other words, the combination of the findings in Table 6 and Table 7 indicates that the individuals more likely to experience ambivalent views about America are those who have high levels of information.

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[9]This effect is obtained by computing the sum of the coefficients associated with the Internet, Satellite TV and Languages variables.

[10]The proportion of the variance explained at the unit level – ψ – is defined as $\frac{\sigma_{\text{Anova}}^2 - \sigma_{\text{Ancova}}^2}{\sigma_{\text{Anova}}^2}$, where σ_{Anova}^2 and σ_{Ancova}^2 are approximated by the mean of the country variances σ_j^2 from Table 3 and Table 6, respectively (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002, 79).

Insert Table 7 here

These findings, therefore, show that the non-Muslim minorities in eight countries in the Middle East and South Asia are more likely to form consistently positive views of the United States, regardless of whether the frame of reference is American culture and society or American policies. This result apparently corroborates the claims derived from Samuel Huntington's (1996) clash of civilizations thesis: the normative divide between the America and the West seeps into the perceptions that ordinary people have of the United States and makes those who have a Muslim identity less well disposed towards the United States. But this is as much supporting evidence for the clash of civilizations argument as these findings can muster. For, if non-Muslims are keener on America, it does not follow from the empirical data that Muslims are systematically opposed to it.

Instead, the empirical record shows that anti-Americanism is not a unified and undifferentiated phenomenon. People who are exposed to flows of information – and Muslim people in particular, given that their non-Muslims brethren like America regardless – form contradictory views of the United States: more positive with respect to polity and less so with respect to policies. The relationship between opinions towards America and the respondents' attentiveness to the political and social conditions of their societies challenges the views of all those who have depicted anti-Americanism as a syndrome impervious to any form of outside influence (D'Souza, 2002; Krauthammer, 2003; Revel, 2003). It also challenges the view of those who, like Barry Rubin (2002, 83) and Daniel Pipes (2002), have argued that Arab public opinion responds favorably to America only when confronted with manifestations of sheer power.

The multifaceted nature of opinions towards America shows how the position of the United States is shaped in the public discourse through the communication channels of the new media. As Marc Lynch (2003b, 86) has written speaking of the flourishing market of Arabic satellite television channels, "These new Arab media increasingly construct the

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dominant narrative frames through which people understand events." These frames are far from being unidirectional and predetermined. The results that emerge from this analysis show that the attentive public yearns for freedom and progress as they are manifested in the American polity while shunning the reality of American power as manifested in the course of American foreign policies. It speaks highly of the achievements and symbolism associated with American society and political system to see that they are a source of attraction and not of repulsion even amidst some of the sharpest and most obdurate clashes over interests and policies, such as those existing in the early years of the 21st century between the United States and the countries of the Muslim world.

The models presented in Tables 6 and 7 investigate a second feature of the process of opinion formation: the effects of the political and economic contexts within which the respondents elaborate their views of the United States. In the previous section, we saw how the average levels of anti-American sentiment fluctuate across countries. The Ancova models reach similar conclusions in the estimates of the mean levels of anti-Americanism as they are captured in the intercept parameters β_{0j}.[11] The task of the Ancova models, then, is to uncover the extent to which such across country variation can be accounted for by some systematic factors that differentiate countries from each other. Equation (6) specifies the terms of the relationship estimated in the models: country means are modeled as a function of an overall population intercept and as a linear function of two explanatory variables per model.

The bottom part of Tables 6 and 7 reports the findings for the country level variables. A common element runs through these estimates: the weakness of the relationships. None of the coefficients has a 95% confidence interval that does not include the value of 0. To underscore the lack of any strong evidence about any country effects, only one of those coefficients is distinct from 0 with a 90% probability: that measuring the effects of the congruence in the

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[11]Given the choice to employ country mean centering for the individual level explanatory variables, the β_{0j} parameters represent the unadjusted mean levels of anti-Americanism (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002).

voting patterns at the United Nations on the levels of societal and cultural anti-Americanism among Islamic publics. And only one has a 80% confidence interval distinct from 0: that measuring the effects of pro-American Elite discourse on the policy anti-Americanism of the Islamic publics.

From these findings, then, it would appear that military, economic and cultural engagement with the United States is not by itself sufficient to create a political context within which anti-Americanism does not flourish. Of the two significant relations, the first indicates that ordinary people in the Islamic world are more likely to view American culture and society in a negative light in countries that have more often endorsed the United States' positions in the General Assembly of the United Nations over the five year period from 1997 to 2001 than in countries that have systematically voted against the American positions. The second statistically significant finding is that popular opposition to American policies is less likely in countries where publics are exposed to a pro-American elite discourse. Interestingly, the insignificant coefficient in the model analyzing societal and cultural anti-Americanism indicates that more favorable elite discourse translates into more positive attitudes towards American policies, but it is ineffectual with respect to attitudes towards American culture and society.

Two factors might underlie these weak statistical patterns: the small number of units – eight countries – and the specification of vague priors on the variance components of the models, as specified in Equation (12). In order to have a clearer sense of how country level variables are related to the average level of anti-Americanism, Figures 4 and 5 plot the country mean levels in anti-American sentiment, as they are estimated in the β_{0j} coefficients, against the country level explanatory variables. The dotted lines on the plots represent a bivariate regression line.[12]

Insert Figure 4 here

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[12]The explanatory variables are centered at their mean, as they were in the Ancova models.

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The flat regression lines in most of the panels corroborate the findings from the statistical models: no single relational measure differentiates the patterns of anti-American opinion across countries. On the one hand, Iran stands out as a country with barely no contacts of military, economic or cultural nature with the United States and high levels of anti-Americanism. Indeed, the plots offer a portrayal of the antagonistic relationships that exists between Iran and America. On the other, Lebanon exhibits low levels of anti-Americanism mostly because of the demographic composition of its population, which confounds any possible effects of the relational variables.

Insert Figure 5 here

In right top panel of Figure 4, we can observe how the positive relationship between societal/cultural anti-Americanism and voting congruence at the United Nations is generated by the position of Lebanon and Pakistan, two countries that have not toed the U.S. line at the United Nations. Idiosyncratic factors rather than any systematic mechanism, therefore, can enter into this finding. In Figure 5, we can also notice how the levels of trade dependence with the United States are negatively associated with lower levels of popular opposition to American foreign policies.

8 Conclusions

In the early years of the 21st century, anti-Americanism has emerged as a powerful cultural force that defines the current international context. By looking at foreign attitudes towards the United States, this paper investigates how a group of predominantly Islamic countries views the United States as a member of the international community, and attempts to understand whether America is "exceptional" in the eyes of the mass general public or whether it is just a country like any other, only more powerful.

The analysis of survey data in the Islamic world has so far generated provocative results: contrary to the claims of several authors who have argued that the values of America are incompatible with those of Islam, I find that America as a cultural and political symbol attracts more than it repels. When America is seen in terms of its freedom and democracy, its movies and its products, its technological achievements and its educational attainments, majorities in the Islamic world are inclined to express their admiration. It is when respondents are asked to assess American policies that opposition emerges.

These results challenge the view of an irreducible incompatibility between Islamic culture and society and America. They are consistent with the findings of scholars such as Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2002) and Mark Tessler (2002), who have shown similarities in the political values cherished in the West and in the Islamic world. But they are also consistent with the notion that respondents of opinion surveys reveal attitudes by averaging over the considerations that happen to be salient at the moment of response, which follows from Zaller's (1992) theory of mass opinion. Thus, my findings show that survey results indicating that respondents hold a low opinion of America should not be taken as a manifestation of hatred or blatant hostility, but they are the resultant of the saliency of policy considerations.

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Table 1: Attitudes Toward American Culture and Society

Country	Science & Technology	Freedom & Democracy	People	Movies & TV	Products	Education
Egypt						
% Favorable	77.86	52.71	34.71	53.29	50.14	67.57
% Don't know	11.57	9.14	18.57	7.14	4.57	15.14
Indonesia						
% Favorable	82.86	36.43	45.71	77.00	71.29	79.00
% Don't know	9.29	10.86	13.43	3.29	13.29	12.43
Iran						
% Favorable	92.57	6.71	33.71	75.29	84.29	19.86
% Don't know	0.29	1.71	18.57	0.57	0.14	13.57
Kuwait						
% Favorable	85.60	58.40	49.60	53.80	57.40	57.00
% Don't know	2.40	2.20	12.40	2.00	4.00	14.20
Lebanon						
% Favorable	82.40	58.40	63.00	63.60	72.40	81.00
% Don't know	2.00	2.00	4.00	1.00	2.20	3.20
Pakistan						
% Favorable	82.58	63.64	62.39	64.02	75.31	79.71
% Don't know	3.44	10.81	10.14	8.42	8.42	4.59
Saudi Arabia						
% Favorable	71.14	52.14	42.57	54.29	52.86	57.71
% Don't know	3.14	3.71	6.71	3.71	3.14	7.57
UAE						
% Favorable	80.60	49.60	42.80	63.80	68.00	79.00
% Don't know	5.40	6.00	14.80	4.60	5.00	4.60
Total						
% Favorable	81.89	47.39	47.26	63.50	67.09	65.24
% Don't know	4.77	6.40	12.40	4.28	5.52	9.34

Table 2: Attitudes Toward American Policies

Country	Arab Nations	Palestinians	Balkans	Free Kuwait	Fight Terror	Iraq
Egypt						
% Favorable	3.86	3.00	16.29	22.71	19.00	3.86
% Don't know	10.14	3.14	50.14	24.86	13.71	12.71
Indonesia						
% Favorable	6.29	5.43	24.71	43.43	47.43	7.29
% Don't know	16.43	17.00	24.14	19.71	7.43	12.43
Iran						
% Favorable	0.86	0.14	0.57	0.57	0.14	0.00
% Don't know	15.00	5.41	47.43	54.86	2.00	5.29
Kuwait						
% Favorable	5.40	1.80	38.60	82.80	29.60	17.20
% Don't know	6.40	4.60	38.40	2.80	8.20	27.60
Lebanon						
% Favorable	8.80	5.60	34.20	35.40	29.80	4.00
% Don't know	5.40	5.40	17.60	12.60	4.80	5.80
Pakistan						
% Favorable	18.09	10.05	34.16	49.38	54.83	13.11
% Don't know	7.37	11.29	27.85	13.49	7.56	9.09
Saudi Arabia						
% Favorable	7.86	5.29	14.00	23.14	30.43	8.57
% Don't know	3.86	5.00	27.29	17.71	12.29	8.29
UAE						
% Favorable	14.80	9.60	27.60	37.60	37.00	11.00
% Don't know	9.40	7.20	33.40	23.00	14.60	14.00
Total						
% Favorable	8.72	5.37	23.35	36.00	32.44	8.16
% Don't know	9.37	7.78	33.32	21.57	8.70	11.28

Table 3: Bayesian Ordinal IRT ANOVA Model of Anti-Americanism among Islamic Publics: Part 1[a]

	Societal/cultural			Policy-oriented		
		Quantiles			Quantiles	
	mean	2.5%	97.5%	mean	2.5%	97.5%
	Science/technology			Arab nations		
α_1	0.821	0.750	0.893	1.000		
κ_{11}	−1.471	−1.602	−1.349	−3.644	−3.838	−3.456
κ_{12}	1.237	1.124	1.346	−2.114	−2.230	−2.004
κ_{13}	2.814	2.652	2.980	−0.043	−0.124	0.040
	Freedom/democracy			Palestinians		
α_2	1.124	1.025	1.222	1.457	1.317	1.611
κ_{21}	−3.709	−3.927	−3.512	−4.593	−4.894	−4.307
κ_{22}	−1.405	−1.560	−1.265	−2.899	−3.062	−2.745
κ_{23}	0.537	0.400	0.664	−0.810	−0.899	−0.716
	People			Balkans		
α_3	1.112	1.018	1.207	1.467	1.298	1.649
κ_{31}	−4.145	−4.376	−3.932	−2.340	−2.485	−2.195
κ_{32}	−1.240	−1.402	−1.100	−0.185	−0.287	−0.080
κ_{33}	0.972	0.833	1.109	1.396	1.273	1.515
	Movies/TV			Free Kuwait		
α_4	0.890	0.825	0.959	1.716	1.506	1.935
κ_{41}	−2.566	−2.725	−2.432	−1.639	−1.763	−1.514
κ_{42}	−0.216	−0.341	−0.108	0.490	0.381	0.608
κ_{43}	1.330	1.211	1.443	2.087	1.926	2.232
	Products			Fight terror		
α_5	1.000			1.925	1.732	2.126
κ_{51}	−2.729	−2.890	−2.570	−1.987	−2.113	−1.861
κ_{52}	0.019	−0.103	0.134	0.000		
κ_{53}	1.608	1.477	1.737	1.504	1.406	1.603
	Education			Iraq		
α_6	1.011	0.931	1.105	1.194	1.068	1.331
κ_{61}	−2.122	−2.229	−2.022	−3.659	−3.859	−3.473
κ_{62}	0.000			−2.227	−2.344	−2.106
κ_{63}	1.657	1.550	1.764	−0.471	−0.564	−0.381

[a] Estimates for the structural model are in Table 5. Iterations: 16000; burn-in: 2000; chain-thinning: 10.

Table 4: Estimated Probabilities of Item Response Patterns among Islamic Publics[a]

	Societal/cultural				Policy-oriented			
	$Pr(Y_{ij})$				$Pr(Y_{ij})$			
θ_{ij}	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
	Science/technology				Arab nations			
−2	0.544	0.404	0.041	0.011	0.162	0.309	0.406	0.123
−1	0.343	0.545	0.087	0.025	0.067	0.180	0.476	0.277
0	0.186	0.590	0.168	0.056	0.026	0.082	0.382	0.510
1	0.091	0.511	0.278	0.120	0.010	0.033	0.219	0.739
2	0.042	0.356	0.364	0.237	0.004	0.013	0.099	0.885
	Freedom/democracy				Palestinians			
−2	0.191	0.509	0.242	0.058	0.155	0.342	0.391	0.112
−1	0.071	0.360	0.409	0.160	0.041	0.148	0.463	0.348
0	0.024	0.174	0.433	0.369	0.010	0.042	0.255	0.693
1	0.008	0.066	0.283	0.642	0.002	0.010	0.082	0.905
2	0.003	0.023	0.128	0.846	0.001	0.003	0.021	0.976
	People				Balkans			
−2	0.129	0.602	0.231	0.038	0.631	0.304	0.050	0.014
−1	0.046	0.423	0.421	0.109	0.289	0.487	0.168	0.056
0	0.015	0.208	0.502	0.274	0.088	0.363	0.348	0.201
1	0.005	0.081	0.377	0.537	0.022	0.141	0.322	0.514
2	0.002	0.028	0.190	0.780	0.005	0.039	0.139	0.816
	Movies/TV				Free Kuwait			
−2	0.316	0.513	0.129	0.042	0.847	0.132	0.017	0.004
−1	0.159	0.506	0.238	0.097	0.510	0.386	0.080	0.023
0	0.072	0.377	0.344	0.208	0.163	0.456	0.269	0.112
1	0.031	0.219	0.359	0.391	0.035	0.197	0.363	0.404
2	0.013	0.107	0.270	0.610	0.007	0.047	0.163	0.783
	Products				Fight terror			
−2	0.328	0.555	0.090	0.026	0.861	0.118	0.017	0.005
−1	0.152	0.584	0.196	0.068	0.480	0.391	0.097	0.032
0	0.062	0.444	0.327	0.166	0.120	0.380	0.319	0.181
1	0.024	0.250	0.374	0.351	0.020	0.109	0.272	0.599
2	0.009	0.113	0.283	0.595	0.003	0.019	0.069	0.909
	Education				Iraq			
−2	0.478	0.405	0.092	0.025	0.216	0.317	0.335	0.132
−1	0.250	0.484	0.201	0.065	0.078	0.182	0.410	0.330
0	0.108	0.392	0.339	0.161	0.025	0.072	0.286	0.616
1	0.042	0.224	0.388	0.346	0.008	0.024	0.128	0.840
2	0.016	0.101	0.291	0.592	0.002	0.008	0.046	0.944

[a] Estimated probabilities were computed using the expressions in Equation (1) from the results reported in Table 3

Table 5: Bayesian Ordinal IRT ANOVA Model of Anti-Americanism among Islamic Publics: Part 2[a]

	Societal/cultural			Policy-oriented		
		Quantiles			Quantiles	
	mean	2.5%	97.5%	mean	2.5%	97.5%
Country means: β_j						
Egypt	−1.033	−1.227	−0.843	1.210	1.072	1.370
Indonesia	−1.521	−1.683	−1.374	0.092	0.004	0.182
Iran	−0.485	−0.629	−0.357	2.576	2.320	2.838
Kuwait	−1.044	−1.268	−0.840	0.007	−0.094	0.110
Lebanon	−2.038	−2.359	−1.721	0.754	0.603	0.918
Pakistan	−2.138	−2.329	−1.959	−0.140	−0.217	−0.061
Saudi Arabia	−0.963	−1.164	−0.758	0.825	0.699	0.961
UAE	−1.349	−1.531	−1.168	0.223	0.107	0.346
Country variances: σ_j^2						
Egypt	3.993	3.302	4.788	1.096	0.843	1.414
Indonesia	1.041	0.836	1.280	0.687	0.540	0.868
Iran	0.739	0.569	0.928	0.474	0.252	0.745
Kuwait	3.735	3.008	4.530	0.714	0.546	0.910
Lebanon	8.930	7.300	10.910	1.829	1.391	2.343
Pakistan	2.922	2.452	3.463	0.854	0.694	1.045
Saudi Arabia	5.197	4.337	6.198	1.431	1.140	1.803
UAE	2.209	1.801	2.728	1.207	0.911	1.551
Population grand-mean: γ_0						
γ_0	−1.329	−1.881	−0.822	0.716	−0.118	1.631
Between-countries variance: τ^2						
τ^2	0.567	0.147	1.704	1.483	0.368	5.277

[a] Estimates for the measurement model are in Tabel 3. Iterations: 16000; burn-in: 2000; chain-thinning: 10.

Table 6: Bayesian Ordinal IRT ANCOVA Model of Societal/Cultural Anti-Americanism among Islamic Publics[a]

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	mean	2.5%	97.5%	mean	2.5%	97.5%	mean	2.5%	97.5%	mean	2.5%	97.5%
Individual-level coefficients: β_p												
Married	0.172	0.062	0.281	0.172	0.073	0.280	0.176	0.070	0.284	0.174	0.066	0.286
Male	−0.059	−0.154	0.038	−0.059	−0.153	0.037	−0.060	−0.150	0.035	−0.060	−0.149	0.034
Age	0.202	0.144	0.260	0.199	0.144	0.251	0.196	0.140	0.252	0.198	0.142	0.257
City	−0.055	−0.270	0.155	−0.056	−0.268	0.155	−0.062	−0.280	0.152	−0.059	−0.275	0.155
Non-Muslim	−2.286	−2.706	−1.852	−2.304	−2.769	−1.835	−2.268	−2.731	−1.846	−2.313	−2.764	−1.857
Internet	−0.264	−0.381	−0.155	−0.267	−0.373	−0.163	−0.270	−0.380	−0.162	−0.268	−0.370	−0.166
Satellite TV	−0.120	−0.235	−0.005	−0.117	−0.234	0.008	−0.116	−0.242	0.006	−0.118	−0.242	0.002
Newspapers	−0.011	−0.057	0.034	−0.010	−0.055	0.032	−0.012	−0.057	0.036	−0.012	−0.057	0.035
Languages	−0.110	−0.179	−0.042	−0.108	−0.174	−0.043	−0.110	−0.175	−0.046	−0.109	−0.174	−0.041
Country variances: σ_j^2												
Egypt	3.574	2.928	4.317	3.569	2.937	4.312	3.547	2.925	4.309	3.580	2.966	4.306
Indonesia	0.720	0.475	1.016	0.733	0.482	1.019	0.725	0.480	1.023	0.747	0.502	1.044
Iran	0.418	0.261	0.597	0.408	0.244	0.584	0.426	0.286	0.602	0.415	0.265	0.588
Kuwait	3.265	2.585	4.056	3.238	2.558	3.932	3.247	2.579	3.983	3.248	2.612	3.994
Lebanon	7.353	5.880	9.025	7.305	5.929	8.922	7.261	5.924	8.898	7.313	5.904	9.034
Pakistan	2.475	1.803	3.235	2.399	1.741	3.108	2.451	1.768	3.164	2.415	1.800	3.113
Saudi Arabia	4.178	3.158	5.216	4.156	3.115	5.150	4.206	3.166	5.352	4.152	3.143	5.241
UAE	1.872	1.430	2.365	1.853	1.436	2.363	1.846	1.410	2.329	1.858	1.448	2.332
Country means: β_{0j}												
Egypt	−1.040	−1.248	−0.832	−1.036	−1.226	−0.850	−1.034	−1.228	−0.846	−1.039	−1.223	−0.861
Indonesia	−0.954	−1.169	−0.743	−0.959	−1.161	−0.761	−0.970	−1.187	−0.779	−0.964	−1.174	−0.756
Iran	−0.382	−0.509	−0.244	−0.372	−0.495	−0.250	−0.379	−0.518	−0.253	−0.375	−0.508	−0.245
Kuwait	−1.372	−1.612	−1.144	−1.369	−1.609	−1.145	−1.366	−1.585	−1.151	−1.368	−1.594	−1.140
Lebanon	−2.119	−2.437	−1.811	−2.099	−2.430	−1.800	−2.089	−2.402	−1.793	−2.102	−2.425	−1.786
Pakistan	−1.592	−1.818	−1.364	−1.586	−1.804	−1.372	−1.599	−1.820	−1.385	−1.594	−1.817	−1.356
Saudi Arabia	−1.186	−1.398	−0.993	−1.181	−1.394	−0.983	−1.185	−1.398	−0.976	−1.176	−1.395	−0.967
UAE	−1.194	−1.388	−1.002	−1.178	−1.348	−1.010	−1.181	−1.369	−1.000	−1.179	−1.351	−1.004
Country-level coefficients: γ_q												
Constant: γ_0	−1.240	−1.681	−0.842	−1.222	−1.895	−0.479	−1.229	−1.822	−0.661	−1.217	−1.893	−0.567
Student visas	−0.451	−1.127	0.164									
U.N. voting	0.115	−0.013	0.259									
Trade dependence				−0.011	−0.205	0.197						
GDP per capita				−0.008	−0.125	0.102						
Elite discourse							−1.356	−7.172	4.876			
U.S. mil. assistance							0.105	−0.506	0.787			
U.S. troops										−0.004	−0.105	0.097
U.S. direct invest.										0.062	−0.297	0.442
Between-countries variance: τ^2												
τ^2	0.346	0.066	1.274	0.895	0.161	3.859	0.733	0.137	3.152	0.892	0.156	3.806

[a] Iterations: 16000; burn-in: 2000; chain-thinning: 10.

Table 7: Bayesian Ordinal IRT ANCOVA Model of Policy Anti-Americanism among Islamic Publics[a]

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	mean	2.5%	97.5%	mean	2.5%	97.5%	mean	2.5%	97.5%	mean	2.5%	97.5%
Individual-level coefficients: β_p												
Married	0.026	−0.048	0.102	0.030	−0.049	0.110	0.029	−0.050	0.102	0.029	−0.051	0.110
Male	0.068	−0.001	0.139	0.069	−0.002	0.137	0.070	−0.002	0.139	0.069	−0.003	0.140
Age	0.002	−0.036	0.042	0.002	−0.036	0.042	0.001	−0.039	0.039	0.000	−0.037	0.039
City	0.095	−0.028	0.225	0.093	−0.034	0.227	0.093	−0.037	0.223	0.093	−0.032	0.224
Non-Muslim	−1.013	−1.237	−0.801	−1.017	−1.247	−0.804	−1.018	−1.246	−0.797	−1.009	−1.217	−0.811
Internet	−0.070	−0.154	0.009	−0.069	−0.147	0.010	−0.070	−0.146	0.012	−0.070	−0.146	0.013
Satellite TV	0.130	0.035	0.225	0.136	0.049	0.230	0.135	0.035	0.232	0.135	0.042	0.228
Newspapers	0.050	0.009	0.094	0.050	0.013	0.088	0.049	0.009	0.090	0.050	0.011	0.088
Languages	−0.030	−0.075	0.015	−0.030	−0.077	0.017	−0.030	−0.079	0.016	−0.030	−0.077	0.016
Country variances: σ^2_j												
Egypt	1.039	0.771	1.338	1.052	0.808	1.374	1.051	0.815	1.337	1.043	0.791	1.332
Indonesia	0.678	0.510	0.862	0.684	0.523	0.861	0.682	0.525	0.856	0.672	0.507	0.855
Iran	0.450	0.176	0.792	0.486	0.205	0.783	0.447	0.154	0.769	0.436	0.142	0.766
Kuwait	0.689	0.509	0.911	0.686	0.476	0.907	0.691	0.476	0.909	0.686	0.443	0.899
Lebanon	1.452	1.115	1.859	1.480	1.160	1.890	1.473	1.127	1.902	1.469	1.124	1.921
Pakistan	0.843	0.668	1.044	0.846	0.686	1.035	0.843	0.665	1.028	0.837	0.667	1.023
Saudi Arabia	1.416	1.090	1.809	1.430	1.121	1.791	1.434	1.099	1.812	1.417	1.105	1.766
UAE	1.162	0.877	1.513	1.170	0.894	1.496	1.165	0.870	1.497	1.158	0.862	1.484
Country means: β_{0j}												
Egypt	1.216	1.074	1.387	1.226	1.076	1.385	1.224	1.084	1.375	1.221	1.069	1.385
Iran	0.094	−0.041	0.231	0.089	−0.051	0.233	0.089	−0.058	0.229	0.085	−0.050	0.218
Indonesia	2.596	2.341	2.879	2.631	2.412	2.861	2.601	2.338	2.856	2.588	2.356	2.855
Kuwait	−0.004	−0.128	0.112	0.002	−0.115	0.126	0.004	−0.119	0.137	0.004	−0.116	0.118
Lebanon	0.733	0.583	0.897	0.745	0.602	0.906	0.743	0.594	0.895	0.742	0.595	0.908
Pakistan	−0.139	−0.268	−0.007	−0.141	−0.274	−0.008	−0.143	−0.278	−0.009	−0.144	−0.275	−0.018
Saudi Arabia	0.826	0.686	0.968	0.827	0.698	0.963	0.826	0.692	0.973	0.828	0.686	0.979
UAE	0.217	0.091	0.350	0.222	0.099	0.354	0.222	0.099	0.342	0.223	0.097	0.347
Country-level coefficients: γ_q												
Constant: $\gamma 0$	0.693	−0.380	1.730	0.701	−0.167	1.586	0.707	−0.148	1.563	0.698	−0.257	1.752
Student visas	−0.519	−2.060	1.022									
U.N. voting	0.033	−0.305	0.373									
Trade dependence				−0.153	−0.456	0.141						
GDP per capita				−0.008	−0.162	0.149						
Elite discourse							−4.800	−11.551	3.071			
U.S. mil. assistance							0.257	−0.706	1.159			
U.S. troops										−0.051	−0.206	0.106
U.S. direct invest.										−0.200	−0.781	0.414
Between-countries variance: τ_2												
τ^2	2.169	0.384	8.599	1.676	0.315	6.737	1.382	0.291	5.602	2.002	0.377	7.830

[a] Iterations: 16000; burn-in: 2000; chain-thinning: 10.

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Figure 1: Boxplots for the Posterior Distributions of the Country Means (β_j) and Variances (σ_j^2) of Anti-Americanism among Islamic Publics

Figure 2: Scatterplot of the Societal/Cultural vs. Policy Anti-Americanism among Islamic Publics

Figure 3: Scatterplot of the Societal/Cultural vs. Policy Anti-Americanism among Islamic Publics: By Country

Figure 4: Societal/Cultural Anti-Americanism and Country Variables among Islamic Publics

Figure 5: Policy Anti-Americanism and Country Variables among Islamic Publics