HUSSERL’S CRITICISM OF PSYCHOLOGISM:
genuine spiritual struggles of European humanity as such take the form of
struggles between the philosophies, that is, between the skeptical philosophies
– or non-philosophies, which retain the word but not the task – and the
actual and still vital philosophies. But
the vitality of the latter consists in the fact that they are struggling for
their own true and genuine and thus for the meaning of genuine humanity.
Husserl, “The Crisis of European
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology”
At the dawn of the 20th
century two books of German authors were published: the The Interpretation
of Dreams of Sigmund Freud, which marked the birth of psychoanalysis, and
the Logical Investigations of Edmund
Husserl, which also marked the birth of phenomenology.
The former is under the discipline of psychology or pyschologism while
the latter criticizes the discipline of psychology.
Husserl’s work, Logical
Investigations, was published in order “clarify his own position and
defend himself against Frege’s accusations”[i].
Frege criticized the previous work of Husserl, Philosophy
of Arithmetic (1891). Frege
labeled the work of Husserl as “psychologism, because of the derivation of
mathematical notion from psychological laws”[ii].
In Logical Investigation,
particularly in the first volume, Prolegomena to Pure Logic, Husserl rejected “any notion of logical
rationality that could be explained by individual, contingently subjective
processes, a view which he asserted should rightly be censured as blatant
In Logical Investigations Husserl analyzed and criticized the errors
and limitations of psychology as the foundation of logic and of all sciences.
Because of these errors and limitations, psychology as the foundation of
logic and of the sciences cannot achieve exact and true knowledge.
In other words, the discipline and method of psychology, for Husserl,
cannot provide the Ideal or the Truth, which was the primary concern of Husserl.
That is why he introduced “pure logic” in order to know the ideal and
true knowledge. Later on, he
revised his “pure logic” and called it, “transcendental phenomenology”
or simply “phenomenology” (literally “the study of phenomena”).
He described this as the “science of essence” or “eidetic
science” because it is a discipline, which inquires into the essence of things
themselves. And for Husserl, the human person can only arrive at truth
and certitude if he/she will know the essence of things themselves.
This study deals with the Husserl’s criticism of psychologism in the
first volume of his Logical Investigations.
Aside from that this research work also looks into the nature of
psychologism and the motives of Husserl why he denounced psychologism as the
foundation of logic and of all sciences, an idea that he embraced briefly
because of the influence of his great teacher Franz Brentano.
Husserl’s criticism of psychologism is significant to understand
Husserl’s phenomenology. As what
the researcher said, Husserl’s criticism of psychology led to the birth of his
HUSSERL’S CRITICISM OF PSYCHOLOGISM
“…psychology, because of its naturalism, had to miss entirely the accomplishment, the radical and genuine problem, of the life of the spirit…”
Husserl, The Vienna Lecture
Before the research
discusses Husserl’s criticism of psychologism, he will discuss first the
nature of psychologism. Aside from
that the researcher will discuss the motives why Husserl embraced psychologism
for a short period of time and why he denounced it later on.
The term “psychologism” was first use in “Germany in the first half
of the nineteenth century to designate the philosophical trend defended by Jakob
Friedrich Fries and by Friedrich Eduard Beneke against the dominant
For Fries and Beneke, the different branches of philosophy should be
based entirely on psychology. Hence, psychology becomes the “fundamental philosophical
discipline” of logic, ethics, metaphysics, legal, social and political
philosophies, and philosophies of religion and education.
The rise of psychologism during the 19th century marked also
the influence of the “leading scientific ideas” to philosophy.
And one of these “scientific ideas” was the science of psychology.
According to Farber,
“In the period under consideration the rising
science of psychology had a twofold significance for German philosophy: it
suggested a sure way of solving perplexing problems of logic and the theory of
knowledge, and it afforded either a substitute or supplement to the idealistic
standpoint in philosophy”[v].
Psychology offered a method and a solution in order to answer
philosophical questions and to develop and solidify idealism in philosophy.
According to Fries and Beneke, the only instrument used in philosophical
inquiry is “self-observation” or “introspection”.
This philosophical instrument is not enough in order to arrive at the
truth, which is being achieved by philosophers by “reducing it to the
subjective elements of self-observation”.
For Beneke, the laws of psychology supplement this limitation of
philosophical inquiry. That is why
for Beneke if these laws are understood “with certainty and clarity, then a
certain and clear knowledge of those disciplines (branches of philosophy) is
Psychologism is close to empiricism.
For psychologism, like the social and natural sciences, truth and
knowledge can only be achieved through experience. It is impossible to gain knowledge without experience.
For the pro-psychologism, like the empiricists, experience is not only
the “instrument of control” and the “criterion of the truth of
knowledge”. It is also the
“psychological origin of knowledge itself”[vii].
Husserl and Psychologism
The intellectual life of Husserl can be divided into two periods: the
period of psychology and the period of transcendental phenomenology.
These two periods in the intellectual life of Husserl show his
intellectual progress or development. And
the “landmark” of his intellectual growth is his work, the Logical
Investigations. It is a
“breakthrough” work of Husserl[viii].
Franz Brentano converted Husserl to philosophy.
Brentano was an empiricist and pro-psychologism.
Husserl attended the different lectures of Brentano.
Brentano became the mentor of the new convert, Husserl.
According to Velarde-Mayol, through Brentano, Husserl realized that
philosophy is a science, and a “rigorous science that was the basis of the
rest of the sciences”[ix].
But it was Brentano’s “intentionality of mental acts” that interested
Husserl so much. Because of
intentionality, Husserl was involved with psychologism for quiet some time.
According to Farber,
“Husserl was indebted to Brentano for his interest
in the concept of intentionality and the descriptive investigation of inner
perception, and the undoubtedly learned how to become a philosophical
investigator by being shown concrete examples of descriptive analysis and how to
For Brentano, the “method of the natural sciences” is the “true
method of philosophy”. That is
why for Brentano, philosophy is “scientific in character”.
And for him, “basing knowledge upon immediate evidence” would lead to
a “presuppositionless beginning in philosophy”[xi].
The philosophy of Brentano can be summarized into these five
“(1) The basic structure of human existence or of
subjectivity is intentionality. (2) Every intentional act refers to something
real, “real” meaning everything that comes from concrete intuition, or that
can be presented. (3) Every cognition refers to an existing thing. (4) Every
existent is a single of individual thing. (5)
Every cognition apprehends the existent as something general”[xii].
Intentionality is the bond the united Husserl and Brentano.
It is also the reason why the student parted ways with his teacher and
eventually denounced psychologism. Husserl,
in his analysis of meaning, concluded that “to mean, signifies to intend and
that, therefore, a meaning is an intention of the mind”[xiii].
In other words, intention is a “term” which signifies the operation
of the mind when the “mind is related in one way or another to some object”[xiv].
Furthermore, Husserl’s intentionality refers “not only to the
mind’s relationship but also to the term of that relationship, which is as
intramental as is the operation itself”[xv].
At this point Husserl’s idea is less closer to Brentano because,
Brentano’s idea of intentionality signifies little “more than the
relationship which the mind has to some extramental reality”[xvi].
The “meaning” intended by the mind is absolutely different from the
“physical configuration”, which means that it belongs to an “entirely
For Husserl, the “world of the physical configuration” is the
“world of fact” while the “world of meaning” is the “world of
consciousness” or the world of “intentions”.
In other words, the human person can write or speak a word by physical
operation, but it is only through the “operation of consciousness” can one
give meaning or meanings to a word[xviii].
Again at this point, Husserl’s idea of meaning is different from
Brentano’s. Because for Brentano,
the meaning intended by the mind belongs to the real or factual world.
Husserl is the essence of consciousness. That
is why for Husserl consciousness is “consciousness of something”.
Husserl was interested with psychology or pyschologism because of
consciousness. And consciousness is
the second reason why Husserl became an anti-psychologism.
He was not simply satisfied with psycholgism’s explanation of
consciousness. As what he said,
“psychology is concerned with ‘empirical consciousness’, with
consciousness from the empirical point of view, as an empirical being in the
ensemble of nature”[xix].
Aside from that, for psychologism, consciousness is a “describable
function”, and as such it belongs to a “class of objects, which can all be
gathered under the heading of things or facts”[xx].
Since consciousness, for psychologism, is based on empirical experience,
things or facts, the product of consciousness, which is idea, is also a thing or
a fact. Husserl did not agree with
this because this leads to skepticism, which “wipes out” the very
possibility of knowledge[xxi].
He claimed that consciousness would be a “seat of knowledge” if this
is separated from the empirical reality. The
consciousness must be purified first (pure consciousness) in order for its
“content can truly be called knowledge, then the object of this kind of
consciousness will be a necessary object, which is to say it will be being in
the only completely true sense of the term”[xxii].
In short, Husserl abandoned psychologism simply because he was not
satisfied, and eventually disagreed, with the discipline’s concept and
explanation of intentionality and consciousness, which was influenced a lot by
empiricism. For Husserl, such
concepts will not lead to the knowledge and understanding of essence and being
of things. And such concepts will
not lead to the achievement of apodictic and indubitable knowledge. As what he said,
“…the history of philosophy, seen from within, takes on the character
of a struggle for existence, i.e., a struggle between the philosophy which lives
in the straightforward pursuit of its task – the philosophy of
naïve faith in reason – and the skepticism which negates or
repudiates it in empiricist fashion…skepticism insists on the validity of the
factual experienced [erlebte] world,
that of actual experience [erfahrung],
and finds in it nothing of reason and ideas”[xxiii].
Psychology: The First Criticism
John Stuart Mill, one of the proponents and
defenders of psychologism, said that logic is a “science” and as a science
it cannot be separated from, and is coordinate with, psychology.
He further said,
“To the extent that it is science at all, it is a part or branch of
psychology, distinguished from it n the one hand as the part is from the whole,
and on the other hand as the art is from the science. It owes all its theoretical foundations to psychology, and
includes as much of that science as is necessary to establish the rule of the
a “technology”. It is a
“technology of thinking, judging, inferring, knowing, proving, of courses
followed by the understanding in the pursuit of truth, in evaluation of grounds
of proof, etc.”[xxv].
Psychology provides all “theoretical basis for constructing a logical
technology, and more particularly, the psychology of cognition”[xxvi].
Husserl did not agree with the idea that psychology is the theoretical
foundation of logic and it is a branch of psychology simply because these two
disciplines are distinct, and they are incompatible. The combination of these
disciplines will only lead to skepticism because “psychologism is unable to
ground the absolute necessity of logical laws”.
Hence, what Husserl did first was to analyze and expose the difference
between logic and psychology in order to prove their difference and
The first difference between logic and psychology is the former deals
with “thinking as it should be” (normative laws of thinking) while the
latter deals “with thinking as it is” (natural laws of thinking)[xxvii].
Psychology, which deals with natural laws of thinking,
“investigate the laws governing the real connections of mental events with one
another, as well as with related mental dispositions and corresponding events in
the bodily organism”[xxviii].
Psychological laws are concerned more with “comprehensive formula
covering coexistent and successive connections that are without exception and
“Connection”, for Husserl, means “causal” relationship”.
the other hand, logic, which deals with normative laws of thinking, “does not
inquire into the causal origins or consequences of intellectual activities, but
into their truth-content: it enquires what such activities should be like, or
how they should proceed, in order that the resultant judgments should be true”[xxx].
Husserl further said,
judgments and false ones, evident ones and blind ones, come and go according to
natural laws, they have causal antecedents and consequences like all mental
phenomena. Such natural connections
do not, however, interest the logician; he looks rather for ideal connections
that he does not always find realized…”[xxxi].
Since psychology is concerned with “causal
connections”, the primary aim of a psychologist is “physics”[xxxii].
On the other hand, a logician is concerned with the “ethics of
difference between the two disciplines is that psychology is a “science of
psychic phenomena, of the facts of consciousness, of the facts of internal
experience, of experiences in their dependence on the experiencing individual”[xxxiii].
Hence, psychology is a “factual” and “empirical science”.
On the other hand, logic is “a priori”.
And as an “a priori” science, its laws do not imply any “factual
reality or any matter of fact whatever, none presupposes the existence of any
imaginations, judgments, or any thought processes in its content”[xxxiv].
Since logic is “a priori”, logical truth is not a “truth about
facts”; it has “no actuality”[xxxv].
Likewise, its laws are “atemporal in their content”[xxxvi].
Because of the influence of science and scientific and empiricism to
psychology, metaphysics, the study of the being of being and of the essence of
being, suffered. As what he said in his essay, “Philosophy as Rigorous Science”,
“What has constantly confused empirical psychology since its beginnings
in the eighteenth century is thus the deceptive image of a scientific method
modeled on that of the physiochemical method….If metaphysics suffered so long
a time from a false imitation – whether of the geometrical or of the physical
method – the same procedure is now being repeated in psychology.
It is not without significance that the fathers of experimentally exact
psychology were physiologists and physicists”[xxxvii].
book, The Crisis of European Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology, he said that the “positivistic concept of
science in our time is…a residual concept.
It has dropped all the questions which had been considered under the now
narrower, now broader concepts of metaphysics, including all questions vaguely
termed ‘ultimate and highest’”[xxxviii].
In short, because of the scientific and empirical characteristics of
psychology, it failed to understand the essence of things and to reach apodictic
knowledge. It was only concern with doxa,
Only logic, which is “a priori”, and whose laws are “atemporal”
and not actual, has the means to know the Truth based on reason.
The laws of psychology, because of the influenced of science and
empiricism, are natural laws. And
since it is a natural law, it cannot be “a priori”.
Husserl futher said,
“No natural laws can be known a priori, nor
established by sheer insight. The
only way in which a natural law can be established and justified, is by
induction from the singular facts of experience”[xxxix].
On the other hand, the laws of logic are “a priori”, they have “a
These “a priori” laws of logic are “established and justified, not
by induction, but, by apodeictic inner evidence”[xli].
And “insight justifies no mere probabilities of their holding, but
their holding or truth itself”[xlii].
The problem with inductive
method used by psychology is that it only established the “holding of law”
by “greater or lesser probability”. As
such, psychology does not have the means to known the truth because
“probability cannot wrestle with truth”.
Only logic can through its “a priori laws”.
Husserl concludes that,
“Psychology certainly does not yield more, and
cannot for this reason yield the apodiectically evident, and so metempirical and
absolutely exact laws which form the core of all logic”[xliii].
Lastly, Husserl pointed out that the laws of psychology are not exact and
genuine laws while the laws of logic are absolutely exact.
Psychological laws lacked exactness and genuineness because they are
“vague generalizations from experience”[xliv].
On the other hand, logical laws have “absolute exactness”.
For Husserl, these disciplines cannot be combined because it would only
lead to confusion. Psychologism
“confuses logic (logical laws) with regulative natural laws.
In this confusion, psychologism talks about logic as ‘laws of
thought’ in such a way that a logical law is a natural law that regulates our
Velarde-Mayo further explained,
“The main confusion that psychologism commits is a ‘metabasis eis allo genus’ (Greek expression meaning a change of
genus)…. The metabasis of psychology consists of: (1) transforming an ideal
law in to a real law (a physical/psychical law); (2) a normative
regulation into a causal regulation; (3) a logical necessity into a real
as Skeptical Relativism: The Second Criticism
According to Husserl, the ancient forms of skepticism means there is
“no truth, no knowledge, no justification of knowledge”[xlvii].
In ordinary sense, skepticism means “doubt about the possibility of
penetrating to a ‘true reality’ behind mere appearance”[xlviii].
Another meaning of skepticism, the “purely epistemic skepticism”, it
means the “limit of knowledge to mental existence, and would deny the
existence or knowability of things in themselves”[xlix].
Or, skepticism is a “doctrine whose very formulation denies what is
subjectively or objectively a condition of its own validity”[l].
Skepticism, which denies the possibility of knowledge beyond the physical
things and limits knowledge to the locus of the mind, had a tremendous effect on
philosophy, particularly to metaphysics. It
also had a tremendous effect on the possibility of “absolute reason” and
“Skepticism about the possibility of metaphysics,
the collapse of the belief in a universal philosophy as the guide for the new
man, actually represents a collapse of the belief in reason which ultimately
gives meaning to everything that is thought to be, all things, values, and ends
– their meaning understood as their normative relatedness to what, since the
beginnings of philosophy, is meant by the word truth – truth-in-itself – and
correlatively the term ‘what is’…. Along with this falls in the meaning of
history, of humanity, the faith in man’s freedom, that is, his capacity to
secure rational meaning for his individual and common human existence”[li].
Relativism, according to Husserl, is based on the Protagorean formula
that “man is the measure of all things”[lii].
For relativism, the human person, or the subject, is the measure of all
truth, judgment, and propositions. Hence,
truth is relative, “relative to the contingently judging subject”, which
means that “for each man that is true which seems to him true, one thing to
one man and the opposite to another, if that is how he sees it”[liii].
There are two types of relativism: individual relativism and specific
relativism or anthropologism. Husserl
described individual relativism as,
“My theory expresses my standpoint, what is true
for me, and need to be true for no one else.
Even the subjective fact of his thinking, he will treat as true for
himself, and not as true in itself”[liv].
The other type of relativism is specific relativism.
For this type of relativism, “truth for a given species of judging
being, by their constitution and laws of thought, must count as true”[lv].
The constitution of a species is nothing but a fact, and from this fact,
only from this fact, is possible to derive other facts.
Or, to put it more concretely, only from these facts the human person can
derived truth and arrived at truth. Hence,
the source of truth is the “human constitution”.
And if there is no “human constitution” there is no truth.
Husserl further said,
“The relativity of truth means that, what we call
truth, depends on the constitution of the species homo and the laws which govern
this species. Such dependence will
and can only be taught of as causal”[lvi].
Husserl criticized the theses of specific relativism.
First, he called it absurd for truth to be based on the species of
judging beings or species homo. It
is absurd for the same proposition and judgment content to be true for a subject
and false for another subject. According
“The same content of judgment cannot, however, be
both true and false: this follows from the mere sense of ‘true’ and
‘false’. If the relativist
gives these words their appropriate meaning, his thesis is in conflict with its
own sense…. What is true is absolutely, intrinsically true: truth is one and
the same, whether men or non-men, angels or gods apprehend and judge it”[lvii].
Hence, for Husserl, in relativism, individual and specific, no one can
achieve “ideal unity”. Only
logical laws can achieved this “ideal unity”.
According to Husserl, there is “only a single truth, in an equivocal
sense there are naturally as many truths as there are equivocal uses”[lviii].
Secondly, facts are “contingent” and they are “individually and
therefore temporally determinate”[lix].
Because of this, it is impossible to arrive at truth based on facts.
Truth about facts is the only possible thing, but not truth as such or
the “truth-in-itself”. Husserl
did not also believe that facts are the causes of truth because facts are
temporal, and they changed.
Relativism is a form of skepticism because it denies the validity of
objectivity. It limits knowledge on
the individual subject alone. It is
also a form of skeptcism because it denies the possibility of truth, objectivity
truth, which can be realized beyond the given facts.
Relativism limits only truth and knowledge on the given facts, or on
empirical experience and not on something that is ideal.
Psychologism is skeptic relativism simply because it denies the
possibility of knowledge beyond the real and factual world.
It limited knowledge only on the material and physical world. As what he said, “…as a psychologist I set myself the
task of knowing myself as the ego already made part of the world, objectified
with a particular real meaning, mundanized…[lx]”
It is also skeptic relativism because it emphasized the individual
subject as the source of truth, the ideal truth or the truth-in-itself.
And beyond the individual subject truth and knowledge is impossible. Husserl had this to say, “the science of bodies has nothing
to say; it abstracts from everything subjective”[lxi].
And psychologism is skeptic relativism because it belongs to the “realm of
what is prescientifically pregiven”[lxii],
which limits knowledge and truth to the psychic.
The Prejudices of Psychologism: The Third Criticism
In order to understand better Husserl’s criticism of psychologism as
skeptical relativism, the last and the third criticism, which are the prejudices
of psychologism, will be discussed. These
prejudices of psychologism, for Husserl, are the essence of psychologism.
The first prejudice of psychologism is that it “confuses laws serving
as norms of cognitive activity and laws that themselves contain the idea of such
According to Husserl, “one must always distinguish between laws that
serve as norms for our knowledge activities, and laws which include normativity
in their thought content, and assert its universal obligations”[lxiv].
The laws of logic are used as the norms in thinking at the same time they
are mistaken to contain psychological content simply because they are used as
norms. Husserl pointed out that the
laws of logic are not norms per se; but they can only be used normatively.
Husserl also pointed out that psychologism ignore the difference between
the “norms of pure logic” and the “technical rules of a specifically human
art of thought”. The former is
used normatively in cognitive activity while the latter served as norms for our
knowledge activities. The laws of
logic are “ideal”; “spring from immediately evident axioms”; and
The latter is “real”; “spring from the empirical facts”; and
The second prejudice of psychologism “appeals to the factual content of
Husserl clarified that the laws of logic do not have any factual content
or “empirical extension”. He
“We deny that the theoretical discipline of pure
logic, in the independent separateness proper to it, has any concern with with
mental facts, or with laws that might be styled ‘psychological’.
We saw that the laws of pure logic…totally lose their basic sense, if
one tries to interpret them as psychological.
It is therefore clear from the start that the concepts which constitute
these and similar laws have no empirical range.
They cannot, in other words, have the character of those mere universal
notions whose range is that of individual singulars, but they must be notions
truly generic, whose range is exclusively one ideal singulars, genuine
Husserl also pointed out that it is impossible for logic to have factual
content simply because logic belongs to the “ideal science” while psychology
belongs to the “real science”. The
“ideal science” is a prior and its ultimate objects are “ideal species”. It also set “forth ideal general laws, grounded with
intuitive certainty in certain general concepts”[lxviii].
On the other hand, the “real science” is empirical and its ultimate
objects are empirical facts. It
also established “real general laws, relating to a sphere of fact, with
probabilities into which we have insight”[lxix].
The third and the last prejudice of psychologism is its “theory of
“Evident givenness” is a “peculiar mental character, well-known to
everyone through his inner experience, a peculiar feeling, which guarantees the
truth of the judgment to which it attaches.”
“Evident givenness” is a “psychological fact”.
But for Husserl it is not only a psychological
or real fact. It is also an
“ideal conditions”. It can only
be achieved if and only if it fulfills the “conditions laid down by logical
Husserl said, “every law of pure logic permits of an (inwardly evident)
transformation, possible a priori, which allows one to read off certain
propositions about inward evidence, certain conditions of inward evidence, from
Husserl further said,
“The pure laws of logic say absolutely nothing
about inner evidence (evident givenness) or its conditions.
We can show, we hold, that they only achieve this relation through a
process of application or transformation, the same sort of process, in fact,
through which every purely conceptual law permits application to a generally
conceived realm of empirical cases. The
propostions about inner evidence which arise in this manner keep their a priori
character, and the conditions of inner evidence that they assert bear no trace
of the psychological or the real. They
are purely conceptual propositions, transformable, as in every like case, into
statements about ideal incompatibilities or possibilities”[lxxiii].
Husserl denounced psychologism because it is purely based on experience
and on the factual, real world. It
is not based of Reason itself because it adopted techniques used by the
objective sciences, which are purely empirical.
Hence, psychologism cannot achieve truth-in-itself.
It cannot achieve certitude simply because it is purely based on facts.
Facts are temporal and they changed.
For Husserl, truth cannot be based on facts.
It is an absolute impossibility because truth is atemporal, and truth is
truth it cannot be changed.
The idea produced by psychologism is a factual thing because it is based
on facts. Idea for Husserl belongs
not to the factual world, but to the ideal world, and this ideal world is in the
consciousness of every human person. The
same also with meaning intended by consciousness.
It also belongs to the world of the ideals or to the world of
Any human person can reach true knowledge or the truth as such if its
methods and laws are “a priori”. “A
priori” laws are genuine and exact laws.
They are universal and ideal laws, not abstracted from the particulars
and from the real. These are the
laws of pure logic, which was transformed later on to transcendental
phenomenology. And only through pure logic and transcendental phenomenology
can Truth be achieved or realized.
These are the arguments of Husserl against psychologism.
And these are the reasons why Husserl developed his transcendental
phenomenology, the science of essence, the science of truth as truth.
Continental Philosophy Reader, Richard Kearney and Mara Rainwater (eds.)
(London and New York : Routledge, 1996), p. 4.
[ii] Victor Velarde-Mayol, On
Husserl (U.S.A.: Wadsworth, 2000), p. 15.
Continental Philosophy Reader, p. 4.
of Philosophy, Paul Edwards (Editor in Chief), Vol. 5 (New York:
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. and the Free Press, 1967), p. 520.
[v] Marvin Farber, The
Foundation of Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous
Science pf Philosophy (New York: State University of New York Press,
1943), pp. 4-5.
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, p. 520.
[viii] Marvin Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous Science pf Philosophy (New York: State University of New York Press, 1943), pp. 16.
[ix] Velarde-Mayol, p. 3.
[x] Farber, p. 11.
[xiii] J. Quentin Lauer, S.J., The
Triumph of Subjectivity: An Introduction to Transcendental Phenomenology
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1958), p. 29.
[xv] Ibid., p. 30.
[xviii] Ibid., pp.30-31.
[xix] Edmund Husserl, “Philosophy
as Rigorous Science” in Phenomenology
and the Crisis of Philosophy (New York: Harper and Row), p. 91.
[xx] J. Quentin Lauer, S.J., p. 23.
[xxi] Ibid., p. 24.
[xxiii] Edmund Husserl, The
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An
Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David Carr
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 13.
[xxiv] Edmund Husser, Logical
Investigations, trans. J.N. Findlay (London: Routledge and KeganPaul,
[xxvii] Edmund Husserl, Logical
Investigations, p. 92.
[xxviii] Ibid., pp. 93-94.
[xxix] Ibid., p. 94.
[xxxii] According to Aron Gurwitch (1974), the problem with modern and contemporary psychology is that it “emulates the example of the exact natural sciences, especially atomistic physics. It dissects or decomposes psychic and mental life into well-defined last elements and, by means of hypotheses and inferences, endeavors to establish causal connections between them and to construct a thoroughgoing causal context which transcends what is given in immediate experience”.
[xxxiii] Edmund Husserl, Logical
Investigations, p. 98.
[xxxiv] Jan Patocka, An
Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology, trans. Erazin Kohak
(Illinois: Carus Publishing Co., 1973), 31.
[xxxv] Ibid., p. 32.
[xxxvii] Edmund Husserl, “Philosophy
as Rigorous Science”, p. 102.
[xxxviii] Edmund Husserl, The
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An
Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, p. 9.
[xxxix] Edmund Husserl, Logical
Investigations, p. 99.
[xliii] Ibid., p. 101.
[xliv] Ibid., p. 98.
[xlv] Velarde-Mayol, p. 17.
[xlvi] Ibid., pp. 17-18.
[xlvii] Edmund Husserl, Logical
Investigations, p. 136.
[xlviii] Jan Patocka, An
Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology, p. 33.
[xlix] Edmund Husserl, Logical
Investigations, p. 137.
[l] Jan Patocka, An
Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology, p. 33.
[li] Edmund Husserl, The
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An
Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, p. 12-13.
[lii] Edmund Husserl, Logical
Investigations, p. 138.
[liv] Ibid., p. 139.
[lv] Ibid., p. 140.
[lviii] Ibid., p. 141.
[lix] Ibid., p. 141.
[lx] Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, p. 206.
[lxi] Ibid., p. 6.
[lxii] Ibid., p. 209.
[lxiii] Jan Patocka, An Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology, p. 34.
[lxiv] Edmund Husserl, Logical
Investigations, p. 168.
[lxv] Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, p. 171.
[lxvi] Jan Patocka, An
Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology, p. 34.
[lxvii] Edmund Husserl, Logical
Investigations, p. 171.
[lxviii] Ibid., 185.
[lxx] Jan Patocka, An Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology, p. 37.
[lxxii] Edmund Husserl, Logical
Investigations, p. 189.