
REPORT of the Task Force on

A Unified Security Budget

for the **United States, FY 2008**

BY **FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS**
OF THE INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES
APRIL 2007

PRINCIPAL AUTHORS:

Miriam Pemberton, Foreign Policy in Focus, Institute for Policy Studies

Lawrence Korb, Center for American Progress and Center for Defense Information

TASK FORCE MEMBERS:

Robert Alvarez, Institute for Policy Studies

Carl Conetta, Project on Defense Alternatives

Charles Dambach, COLEAD, Alliance for Peacebuilding

Anita Dancs, National Priorities Project

Lt. Gen. Robert Gard (ret.)

William Hartung, World Policy Institute

Christopher Hellman, Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation

William Johnstone, Partnership for a Secure America

Lorelei Kelly, The White House Project

Don Kraus, Citizens for Global Solutions

Anuradha Mittal, Oakland Institute

Stewart Patrick, Center for Global Development

Col. Dan Smith, U.S. Army (ret.), Friends Committee on National Legislation

Leonor Tomero, Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation

Cindy Williams, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

John Zavales, Cuny Center

Organizational affiliations are provided for identification purposes only. The members of the Task Force support the thrust of this report without necessarily endorsing each program proposal within it.

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Executive Summary

If Congress funds the president's \$623 billion FY2008 military budget request, we will spend more on our forces next year than at any time since World War II.¹ As they defend this budget before congressional committees, Defense Department officials are also arguing for a substantial increase above this amount in future years, even as they project that spending on the current wars will decline. A consistent theme of these presentations is that military spending currently represents a relatively low percentage of national Gross Domestic Product.

We should spend more, according to this argument, because we can.

This (arguable) idea that we *can* begs the question of whether we *should*. As our country seeks to extricate itself from a disastrous attempt to remake the Middle East by means of military force, this is the moment for a serious debate on the long-term direction of our foreign policy. The Bush administration's national security doctrine, drawn up before the current wars were launched, prescribes an expansive, global role for the military, one that even current levels of spending don't come close to covering. After five years of testing, it's time to ask: does this doctrine, and its costs make sense? Are we safer as a result?

According to current polling, most Americans beyond the beltway believe that our current aggressive, unilateral foreign policy has eroded our standing around the world and made terrorist attacks more likely. They support a different course—a less militarized, less unilateral approach.² The Iraq Study Group pointed in this direction by recommending a path out of the current war that shifts the emphasis of our strategy from military forces to diplomacy.

Meanwhile the service chiefs and civilian Pentagon leadership are laying the groundwork to fund an expansive, global military role with a permanently expanded budget. It is a debate, to put it mildly, worth having.

One useful, currently missing tool to ground this debate, we argue, would be a Unified Security Budget (USB). It would pull together in one place U.S. spending on all of its security tools: tools of offense (military forces), defense (homeland security) and prevention (non-military international engagement.) This tool would make it easier for Congress to consider overall security spending priorities and the best allocation of them.

It would, for example, enable consideration of security trade-offs like the following: the F-22 fighter jet, one of the most troubled and strategically questionable programs in the arsenal, is set to receive an increase in FY 2008 of \$600 million.

- **FINDING:** Foregoing this increase for the F-22 could allow the U.S. to triple the amount it plans to spend on canceling the debt that is crippling development in the world's poorest countries. Or it could increase by 50% U.S. contributions to international peacekeeping operations. Or it could more than triple the amount allocated in FY 2007 for domestic rail and transit security programs.
- **FINDING:** Canceling the administration's initiative to build offensive space-weapons, which threatens to create a whole new arms race, could provide the \$800 million needed to double the originally requested annual budget for the State Department's Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization. This corps of civilian experts in post-conflict rebuilding, envisioned for Iraq and other locations such as Haiti and Sudan, has been an unfunded political football since it was proposed in 2003. The Pentagon supports it. "If you don't fund this, put more money in the defense budget for ammunition—because I'm going to need it," one Marine general recently said.³ (For more illustrative trade-offs see p. 10)

Since 2004 this task force has produced an annual report sketching the outlines of a Unified Security Budget. Its

1 This figure includes the amounts requested for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The historical comparison is adjusted for inflation. See Steven M. Kosiak, "Both DoD Base and War Budgets Receive Big Boosts, Total Funding at Highest Level Since The End of the World War II," Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 5, 2007. It does not include spending on "Atomic Energy Defense Activities," that is, the nuclear weapons complex, although this account is included in the National Defense (050) budget category.

2 See "Seven in Ten Americans Favor Congressional Candidates Who Will Pursue a Major Change in Foreign Policy: U.S. Public Wants Less Emphasis on Military force, More on Working Through United Nations," <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa>.

3 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "Iraq Rebuilding Short on Qualified Civilians," *The Washington Post*, February 24, 2007, p. A1.


members' expertise spans all three security domains—offense, defense and prevention. Our report lays out the spending levels and relative proportions the President's FY 2008 budget request allocates to each of them.

- **FINDING:** While cutting most of the rest of the discretionary budget, the request would increase real spending in all three security categories. The defense and prevention categories actually get larger increases, as a proportion of their total budgets, than does offense. But in absolute terms, of course, military spending increases the most. And comparatively, defense and prevention remain vastly overshadowed by spending on offense. Foreign policy by military force is underwritten at 21 times the level allocated to all non-military forms of engagement with the world; it receives 14 times the amount devoted to protecting the homeland; it will outspend both defense and prevention put together, that is, all forms of non-military security spending, by a factor of 9 to 1. In other words, **the President's proposed budget would devote 90% of our foreign and security policy resources to engaging the world through military force.**

One of the drivers of this gaping disparity between military and non-military security spending is the federal commitment to a set of dazzlingly complex weapons systems whose capabilities have more to do with pork barrel inertia than strategic sense, and whose future costs are set to grow even larger as many of them move from development to production phases. In making its case for a rebalanced security portfolio, the task force identifies cuts in these programs and explains why they can be made with no sacrifice to our security. And it identifies a nearly equivalent amount for investment in programs that engage the world by non-military means—including diplomacy, non-proliferation, and economic development—and that strengthen our homeland defenses.

- **FINDING:** The shift recommended in this report—\$56 billion in cuts to spending on offense and \$50 billion in additional spending on defense and prevention—would convert a highly militarized 9-to-1 security ratio into a better balance of 5-to-1.

The hard part is getting this done in the real world. A Congressional budget process working through “stovepiped” committees that rarely talk to each other makes this difficult.



Source: OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government, FY2008.

A new feature of this year's report, therefore, is a set of suggestions for how these stovepipes might be transcended.

- **FINDING:** There is new political space this year to examine overall security spending priorities and recommend changes in the budget process that would enable them to be considered as a unified whole. Our proposals include giving this mandate to a Congressionally-appointed Select Committee on Budgeting for National Security and International Affairs.

Rebalancing security spending is not a task that can wait. The latest BBC World Service poll shows that U.S. standing in the world has deteriorated substantially in the last year alone.⁴ And valuable time is being wasted in failing to address key security priorities, such as the one President Bush has identified as his top priority: preventing nuclear terrorism.

- **FINDING:** Among other cuts in spending on nonproliferation, the President's FY2008 budget would again reduce spending for Cooperative Threat Reduction, one of the key programs securing and dismantling international stockpiles of nuclear material and delivery systems to keep them away from terrorists. At the same time, the budget would triple spending on new designs for nuclear weapons, calling into question our commitment to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (giving other countries tacit permission to follow suit.) Meanwhile, the State Department has been reduced to accepting private donations to make up the shortfall on what it views as urgent nonproliferation priorities. Five million dollars of private money, for example, has paid for the removal of two bombs-worth of highly enriched uranium from Serbia. A former State Department official involved in this project said, "It was embarrassing [but] we needed the money."⁵

As Congress works to balance the budget and find a solution to the Iraq crisis it must also focus on a different kind of budget balancing. Our country needs a rebalanced its security budget, one that strengthens a different kind of overall U.S. presence in the world. This budget would emphasize working with international partners to resolve

conflicts and tackle looming human security problems like climate change; preventing the spread of nuclear materials by means other than regime change; and addressing the root causes of terrorism, while protecting the homeland against it. The rhetoric of these intentions must be underwritten by the resources to make them real. The overall priorities set by a Unified Security Budget must both symbolically and substantially guide the United States toward a new, more balanced foreign policy.

4 "World View of US Role Goes From Bad to Worse," http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/incl/printable_version.php?pnt=306.

5 "The Search for a Magic Fuel," *Chicago Tribune*, January 29, 2007, quoting Alan Krass.

Introduction

The case for a rebalanced security budget got stronger in 2006. In August the range of our security strategies against terrorism were juxtaposed in unusually sharp relief.

The limitations of military force to prevail against what the administration calls the centerpiece of the Global War on Terror were painfully evident in Iraq, as the largest and strongest military force in the world was unable to stem the escalating violence. The Pentagon's quarterly assessment reported weekly attacks and civilian casualties in August at the highest levels since the score-keeping began in 2004. (The next assessment was worse, documenting attacks at record levels, and declaring the conflict a civil war.)

Also in August was the news that plans for a multi-pronged terrorist attack, designed to kill hundreds of airline passengers between the U.K. and the U.S., had been thwarted by international British-led police work.

Finally, Israel's military incursion into Lebanon, generally agreed to have weakened the Israeli government and strengthened Hezbollah, was ended when the parties and their allies committed to diplomacy, and an international peacekeeping force was reassembled.

The big picture here is that the military-centered strategy of the declared global war on terror is the one that is not working. And diplomacy, peacekeeping and international police work are the ones that are.

This picture was underscored two months later. The bipartisan Iraq Study Group focused most of its attention on shifting the focal point of Iraq policy from military forces to diplomacy. "Our most important recommendations," the members wrote in their report, "call for new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly." While the Bush administration has so far rejected this course, it did recently adopt a policy of greater flexibility in diplomacy with North Korea, a shift that is credited with the February 2007 agreement laying the groundwork for curtailing North Korea's nuclear program. And it has decided to begin talking, in a multilateral forum, to Iran and Syria.

POLLS SUPPORT REBALANCED SECURITY SPENDING

Recent polling shows that large majorities of Americans support this shift of emphasis toward non-military approaches, both in Iraq and in our broader foreign policy. In an October poll by the University of Maryland's Project on International Public Attitudes, 65% of respondents agreed that the United States has been "too quick to get American military forces involved" in international conflicts. An even higher percentage wants the United States to put more emphasis on diplomatic and economic methods in combating terrorism.¹

The other major change in foreign policy endorsed by overwhelming majorities was a greater emphasis on cooperative and multilateral approaches. The isolationist view, frequently characterized as the alternative to aggressive unilateralism, was favored by a scant 16% who believed that "The United States should withdraw from most efforts to solve international problems." The aggressive unilateralist position—"As the sole remaining superpower, the United States should continue to be the preeminent world leader in solving international problems"—gets even less support: 9%. An overwhelming 72% believes that "The United States should do its share in efforts to solve international problems together with other countries." A large 69% majority supports working through multilateral institutions.

And this majority would put its money where its mouth is. When the poll informed respondents about the overall allocation of resources in the federal budget for foreign policy, a majority recommended investing a greater proportion of resources in non-military security measures. Among their priorities for higher spending were: reducing U.S. dependence on oil; increasing port security; international police and intelligence cooperation to go after terrorist networks, working through the UN to strengthen international laws against terrorism and to ensure the cooperation of UN members in enforcing them; fighting the global spread of HIV/AIDS; and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons by securing nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere.

1 See "Seven in Ten Americans Favor Congressional Candidates Who Will Pursue a Major Change in Foreign Policy: US Public Wants Less Emphasis on Military force, More on Working Through United Nations," <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa>

Supported at lower levels but still by a majority, was increased spending on programs to promote dialogue and intercultural understanding between the United States and the Muslim world. Respondents were least supportive of building new nuclear weapons, helping dissident groups to try to overthrow the government of Iran, using severe interrogation methods to force terrorists to talk, and building new types of naval destroyers or a missile defense system.

BUT HOW TO GET THERE?

The task force that produced this report combines expertise spanning the range of security tools, from military force structure and budgets to diplomacy to nonproliferation, peacekeeping, and homeland security. Each year since 2004 we have reported on the relative balance of funding for military and non-military security tools in the President's budget

CHART 1: TRADE-OFFS

\$118 Million	Fund accelerated development of new nuclear weapons	or	Fund U.S. share of State Department estimated cost of providing fuel oil to North Korea in exchange for dismantling of their nuclear weapons facilities
\$821 Million	Fund the Offensive Space-Based Weapons Program	or	Double the originally-requested annual budget for the State Department's Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, fielding a corps of civilian experts in post-conflict reconstruction
\$370 Million	Purchase five more Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles	or	Double the annual budget of the International Atomic Energy Agency, charged with inspections of nuclear facilities throughout the world
\$494 Million	Fund the planned "bonus payment" to contractors of the Joint Strike Fighter, a project that is \$10 billion over budget and 11 months behind schedule	or	Restore cuts and accelerate DoD and DoE nuclear threat reduction programs securing and dismantling nuclear materials stockpiles to keep them out of terrorists' hands
\$600 Million	Fund the FY2008 increase for the F-22 fighter jet, one of the most troubled and strategically questionable programs in the arsenal	or	Triple the allocation for canceling the debt that is crippling development in the poorest countries in the world or Increase by 50% U.S. contributions to international peacekeeping operations or Triple the amount allocated in FY 2007 for domestic rail and transit security programs.
\$1 Billion	Fund 12 more C-130J transport aircraft, which have 168 deficiencies identified by GAO and the Defense Department Inspector General, and which President Bush proposed canceling in 2005.	or	Fund the Unified Security Budget's recommended increase for security at chemical plants
\$2.5 Billion	Fund Virginia Class Fast Attack Submarine, whose conceivable missions are already well covered by the SSN-688 Los Angeles-class fleet	or	Triple the Department of Energy's budget for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Research and Development
\$13 Billion	Maintain a nuclear arsenal far in excess of what is needed for a credible deterrent	or	Implement 90% of the USB's recommendations for strengthening homeland security (closely aligned to the 9-11 Commission's recommendations, currently unfunded)

request. And we have outlined a way to rebalance this security portfolio. The priorities of the American public, as expressed in the poll results, fit quite well with our recommendations.

The question is how this public mandate for reordered security priorities can be realized. The process by which our budget is created is a major barrier to doing so. Both the way spending is categorized and the way Congress is organized to make decisions about it discourage considerations of the big picture.

Currently separate categories in the budget documents provided by the executive and Congressional budget agencies lay out spending on what Task Force member Cindy Williams calls offense (military spending) defense (homeland security spending) and prevention (spending on non-military international affairs.) Nowhere in the documentation provided to Congress are these categories pulled together so that overall priorities can be examined and compared. And the committees with the power to decide what is spent on each category operate largely in isolation from one another.

A Unified Security Budget, we argue, would make it easier for Congress to consider trade-offs across security categories like those in Figure 1.

FY 2008 REQUEST: THE BIG PICTURE

This year, all three kinds of security tools—offense, defense and prevention—are slated to get more money. The accounts for defense and prevention have actually been assigned larger increases over FY 2007, as a proportion of their total budgets, than has offense, that is, military spending. But in absolute terms, military spending increases the most. And comparatively, the budgets for defense and prevention tools remain vastly overshadowed by the budget for offense.

Military forces are allocated 21 times the money funding non-military international affairs, and 14 times what is budgeted for homeland security.

If war spending is subtracted, the regular military budget is 19 times as large as the budget for non-military international engagement, and 11 times larger than the budget for homeland security.

If Congress approves the President's request, 90% of our security budget will be allocated to the military.

THE MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY BALANCE

Our accounting of the relative balance of security spending on offense (military forces) and prevention (non-military international engagement) corresponds roughly but not exactly to the federal budget categories of National Defense (050) and International Affairs (150). (Homeland security accounts are spread across several budget categories; it is one of our recommendations that these accounts be consolidated in one budget function. See p. 51)

In Chart 2, p. 12 we show the adjustments we have made to these accounts to distinguish more clearly spending on military and non-military measures. We have:

- Moved non-military homeland security and nonproliferation programs from the 050 to the preventive account; and,
- Moved spending underwriting purchases of U.S. weapons and training for foreign military forces from the 150 to the military account.

In addition, the “Analytical Perspectives” supplement to the budget pulls together all the various accounts relevant to homeland security into a “mission area.” There is some overlap. We have calculated the homeland security category to remove its military components.

The categories of military, preventive, and homeland security tools correspond most closely with the federal budgetary categories of national defense, international affairs, and homeland security (as a mission area). While this exercise could be done in finer detail, the principal shifts involve moving spending on nonproliferation programs contained in the national defense budget category to the preventive side of the ledger, and moving military assistance in the international affairs budget category to the military side of the ledger. Energy efficiency and renewable energy spending in the Department of Energy budget (not included in the major categories) was added to the preventive total. Homeland security as a mission area overlaps with national defense and international affairs, so overlap was subtracted as necessary.

Spending on military operations was subtracted in the addendum according to breakdowns presented in Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. Government, FY2008.

CHART 2: MILITARY AND NONMILITARY SECURITY FUNDING

Administration's FY2008
Request (billions)

Military

National defense (050 budget account)*	647.2
Plus 152 International security assistance	+9.5
Less DoD and DoE nonproliferation	-2
Less homeland security overlap	-5.5
Military Total	649.2

Preventive

international affairs (150 budget account)	38.3
Less 152 international security assistance	-9.5
Plus DoD and DoE nonproliferation	+2.0
Energy efficiency & renewable energy	+1.2
Less homeland security overlap	-1.4
Preventive Total	30.6

Homeland Security

Homeland security (mission area)	61.1
Less national defense overlap	-15.9
Homeland Security Total	45.2

Nonmilitary Security Total

75.9

Memorandum:

Ratio of Military to Nonmilitary Security Funding	9:1
Ratio of Military to Preventive Security Funding	21:1
Ratio of Military to Homeland Security Funding	14:1

Addendum:

Proposed War Spending

Total without War Spending

Military	141.9	507.3
Preventive	3.3	27.3

Memorandum:

Ratio of Military to Preventive Security Funding	19:1
Ratio of Military to Homeland Security Funding	11:1

* Includes spending on nuclear weapons complex.

UNNEEDED WEAPONS SYSTEMS PROTECTED

In recent years a familiar ritual has accompanied the release of the President's budget request. Prior to the release, leaked reports surface in the media suggesting that cuts to a few major weapons programs are coming. These don't materialize. The suspicion then takes hold that these leaks were once again part of a successful strategy to generate the necessary lobbying to protect the potentially endangered procurements.

This scenario did not play out this year. Apparently it wasn't necessary. The budget request designated an increase in spending for nearly every major weapons system over allocations in the current fiscal year, for a total of \$20 billion additional dollars. Total weapons spending in the budget, including more than \$75 billion for research and development on new weapons—a \$2 billion increase over the FY 2007 request—amounts to \$176.8 billion. This money allocated for new weapons increased at an even greater rate than did the Defense Department's overall budget.²


2 Greg Jaffe and Jonathan Karp, "The Bush Budget: Defense Spending Is Set for Sharp Rise; Increase May Not Cover Added Personnel Costs, Plans for New Weapons," *Wall Street Journal*, February 6, 2007, p. A13.

HIGHEST MILITARY SPENDING SINCE WORLD WAR II

This year the Administration submitted its requests for the Defense Department's base budget along with its supplemental requests for money to pay for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the broader War on Terror. Congress requested this change so that the budget for overall levels of military spending could be considered in a more transparent and comprehensive way. The result is staggering. The U.S. is now proposing to spend more per year in inflation-adjusted terms than during either the peak years of the Korean War (by \$40 billion) or the Vietnam War (by \$130 billion). That is, we will spend more than at any time since the end of World War II.³

3 Steven Kosiak, "Both DoD Base and War Budgets Receive Big Boosts, Total Funding At Highest Level Since the End of World War II," February 5, 2007.

CHART 3: FEDERAL SPENDING 1940-2012



Source: Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the U.S. Government, FY2008*, Historical Tables, 3.1 and 10.1

BOX: HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?

An old argument in support of high levels of military spending has been taking center stage this year: We should spend more, so this argument goes, because in historical terms these expenditures represent a relatively small percentage of our gross domestic product. We can spend it because, as a nation, we can afford it. This case misses several points. As former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan used to say, military spending is like an insurance policy. It safeguards our security but does nothing to advance our country's productivity or well-being, as do investments in, for example, transportation infrastructure, health care or education. We should only buy as much security as we need, because there are opportunity costs to spending more.


How much is enough? Here are the top 10 military spenders. The U.S. spends roughly twice what is spent by its nine closest competitors *combined*.

In FY 2008 our regular military budget, excluding war spending, will equal spending by the rest of the world put together. The total combined budgets of such potential adversaries as North Korea, Iran, Syria, Cuba, Libya, and Sudan will be less than \$50 billion.

The principal strategic justification for this extreme disparity is the national security doctrine that bases U.S. security on its ability to project overwhelming military power to prevent a peer competitor from emerging. Current events pose serious challenges to this strategy. The adversaries we are now facing have prolonged and escalated a war for four years with military tools costing a tiny fraction of the \$500 billion the U.S. has so far devoted to defeating them. As the U.S. military prepares to absorb more money next year than was spent annually at any time since World War II, on such purchases as \$338 million-per-plane fighter aircraft, it is effectively opposed by forces using shoulder-fired missiles, explosives and AK-47s. The weapons procurement budget will grow by 22% in real terms in large part to prolong the lives of overpriced weapons programs that have no relevance to the wars we are waging. This budget is buying the equivalent of what Task Force member William D. Hartung calls "sledgehammers to kill a fly." It is not making us safer.

The lack of a convincing rationale for current levels of military spending, let alone the larger amounts the Pentagon envisions, is one factor underlying efforts to promote China as our next peer competitor. An arms race is the model many military professionals understand best, and the one for which the existing U.S. arsenal is best suited. It is true that China has begun to invest a portion of its booming economic expansion into military improvements, including fighter planes, diesel-electric

CHART 4: TOP TEN MILITARY SPENDERS, 2005



Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook*, 2006.

BOX: HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH? (cont)

submarines and destroyers. Most of its arsenal is severely obsolete, however, and none of its new models compare to the most advanced systems the U.S. currently fields in abundance.¹ And the U.S. now outspends it by a ratio on the order of 6-to-1. (Officially, China devotes about \$39 billion to its military. Independent analysts believe the more accurate figure is closer to \$80 billion.)² The more the U.S. promotes and funds an arms race with China, however, the more likely it is to get one. While this will serve the interests of military contractors and their Congressional sponsors, it will not serve the security interests of the American public.

China's serious competition to the U.S. is economic and diplomatic rather than military. China's record \$233 billion trade surplus with the U.S. has been a major factor in propelling the U.S. trade deficit to its fifth straight record-high year.³ And there is broad agreement that China's ownership of a large portion of the U.S. federal debt makes America's economy vulnerable. In the meantime, the growing amount the U.S. spends to buy its extreme version of military supremacy at the expense of other investments weakens our ability to compete economically.

The projection of overwhelming force, including the presence of military installations in more than 130 countries around the globe, has other costs. As the Iraq War has made painfully clear, the long-term presence of military forces on foreign soil is widely perceived by locals as an occupation, and generates resentment against the country that sent them. This is not in our national interest. The majority of members in Congress who voted in 2005 to bar the U.S. from establishing permanent bases in Iraq recognized this fact.


The argument that we should spend more on the military because the size of our economy permits it needs to be scrutinized and debated, not assumed.

1 Michael Klare, "Revvng Up the China Threat," *The Nation*, October 24, 2005.

2 http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/060626_asia_balance.pdf.

3 Peter S. Goodman and Nell Henderson, "Oil Prices, China Disparity Push Trade Gap to Record," *The Washington Post*, February 14, 2007, p. A1.

CHART 5: U.S. SHARE OF WORLD ECONOMY AND SHARE OF MILITARY SPENDING



Source: Based on Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and International Monetary Fund.

ROLLING OUT THE CASE FOR MORE

Though the Administration's Future Years Defense Plan projects spending on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to diminish, the service chiefs are setting the stage for a campaign to incorporate even higher levels of spending into future military budgets. Their case for this long-term expansion of military spending will lean heavily on the argument that by historical standards this spending absorbs a relatively low percentage of our Gross Domestic Product. The outgoing Army chief of staff has called for a broader national debate on whether that percentage should be significantly increased; his counterparts at the Air Force and Marines, as well as the Secretary of Defense, have been joining him in making this case in their budget hearing presentations to Congress.⁴ Their argument leans heavily on the idea that we should spend more because, theoretically, we can. (See box, *How Much Is Enough?*)

THE MISSING DEBATE

Beneath this argument based on capacity rather than need are several factors propelling the quest for new heights of post-war spending. First and most obvious among them are the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that have overstretched the military's troops and basic equipment. In addition our national security doctrines link our security to an expansive global policing role that current forces and budgets can't carry out. And third, we have made multi-year commitments to high-tech futuristic weapons programs that are largely irrelevant to killing and capturing terrorists. The costs of these weapons are poised to grow, and these higher pricetags will be driven not only by the usual cost overruns, but also by the transition of several of these systems from development to production .

The first of these factors is front and center in the national debate. The other two are not.

Needless to say, they should be. The debate must not focus on whether the size of our economy permits more military spending. As we seek to extricate ourselves from a disastrous military engagement, this is the moment for a re-examination of the long-term direction of our foreign policy, and what role our military forces should play in it. Would a global policing role, even assuming we could afford it, make us, and the world, safer? What other kinds of security tools are needed, in what proportion? A Unified Security Budget would be an essential tool for this debate.

⁴ Peter Spiegel, "Defense Budget: Big as a Tank," *Los Angeles Times*, February 5, 2007, p. A1.

REBALANCED SECURITY

This task force argues that a foreign policy that devotes 90% of its resources to its military forces is out of balance, and sends a message to the world that urgently needs changing. It is hard to remember a time when the crush of competing claims on the foreign policy budget has been as intense as it will be this year. But our argument is simple. It is that rebalancing the priorities in this budget is not a task that can wait. The tools of non-military engagement—diplomacy, nonproliferation, sustainable economic development, supporting and strengthening international institutions—and the money to expand their use, are losing ground to military power projection, at a time when for the sake of our own and the rest of the world's security, these dynamics must be reversed.

The current wars, the centerpieces of our military-led foreign policy, have seriously damaged the U.S.' reputation in the world. "The global view of the United States' role in world affairs has significantly deteriorated over the last year," according to a BBC World Service poll of more than 26,000 people in 25 different countries, conducted between November 2006 and January 2007. In 23 of the 25 countries, the most common view is that "the U.S. military presence in the Middle East provokes more conflict than it prevents." Other U.S. foreign policies viewed negatively in at least 19 of the 25 countries were U.S. policies toward detainees at Guantanamo and other prisons and U.S. obstruction of global action to retard climate change.⁵

Nor has the American public failed to notice these facts, to see that they matter, or to make the link between them and their own security. According to the University of Maryland poll, 78% of Americans believe that these policies have diminished our post-9-11 reserves of global good will. Sixty percent believe that the current approach has increased the likelihood of terrorist attacks against the United States.⁶

The damage done to our international reputation will be hard to repair—there are no quick fixes—but it is not impossible. As Congress debates our Iraq policy, it must also begin now to tackle the urgent task of turning a different face to the world. The administration and members of Congress periodically soften their rhetoric and give lip service to new

⁵ See "World View of U.S. Role Goes From Bad to Worse," <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa>.

⁶ See "Seven in Ten Americans Favor Congressional Candidates Who Will Pursue a Major Change in Foreign Policy: US Public Wants Less Emphasis on Military force, More on Working Through United Nations," <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa>.

attention to non-military forms of engagement. This is not enough. Demonstrating that the U.S. is serious about these other forms of engagement will require a foreign policy budget that underwrites them.

We demonstrate here how this can be done. Much of the spending in the regular military budget (separate from the supplemental budgets funding the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan) has been devoted to developing and buying weapons systems and maintaining forces whose relationship to the amorphous Global War on Terror their champions are hard pressed to explain. A large proportion of the procurement budget, which has doubled in the past 10 years⁷ derives not from the need to replace and upgrade overused military equipment, but from decisions, some made during the Cold War, to embark on technologically complicated weapons programs whose original price tags far exceeded the equipment they were replacing. Because they are so complicated, development of these systems has required years of delay, during which time the cost has mounted. The result is higher amounts of money going to buy fewer weapons. Some of these systems are now being retrofitted to contort them into the procrustean bed of war-on-terror missions they were never designed for. This too increases their cost even more.

In the pages that follow we identify cuts in these programs and explain why they can be made with no sacrifice to our security. And we identify a comparable amount for investment in programs that engage the world by non-military means—including diplomacy, non-proliferation, and economic development—and that strengthen our homeland defenses. The shift recommended in the report—\$56 billion in cuts to spending on offense and \$50 billion in additional spending on defense and prevention—would convert a highly militarized security ratio of 9 to 1 into a better balance of 5 to 1.⁸

These are the kinds of trade-offs that Congress never considers because it's not set up to do so.

7 Kosiak, pp.2-3.

8 Our rebalancing exercise leaves a remainder of \$6 billion. There is no shortage of worthy claims on these funds. They include down payments on any of the following: shaving a ballooning deficit; caring for American soldiers injured in Iraq and Afghanistan; restoring cuts in the FY2008 budget to such investments in America as transportation infrastructure, drinking water safety, and Headstart.

How to Narrow the Gap

Narrowing this gap will require a budget process that allows Congressional decision-makers to consider all forms of security spending, offensive, defensive and preventive, as a whole, putting the national interest before parochial interests, and to bring our efforts in these areas in better balance with each other. This will require some changes in the way Congress is organized to fund security. Here we outline several possible avenues for change toward this end.

BUDGET DOCUMENTATION

The federal budget organizes spending on the military, (primarily the 050 budget) international affairs, (primarily the 150 budget) and homeland security (currently distributed among several categories—see below) in separate budget functions. Nowhere in the materials members of Congress receive to guide their deliberations are these three categories brought together in one place, in a Unified Security Budget, to allow them to consider the overall balance of our security resources. Both the Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office should provide such a consolidated security budget document as part of their responsibilities to inform the budget process.

The section of this report devoted to homeland security (pp. 51-53), discusses the challenges of oversight and unified budgeting for this segment of the security big picture alone. We note that homeland security spending is distributed among all 17 of the major functional divisions of the federal budget. Currently the Office of Management and Budget does present homeland security spending as a unified whole in a “Homeland Security Funding Analysis” section within the supplemental “Analytical Perspectives” volume of the President’s budget request. We argue that homeland security meets the criteria to be considered a budget function unto itself, and that therefore a newly created homeland security function should be added to the budget itself, rather than included in its supplements.

We recommend that OMB add a “Unified Security Funding Analysis” to the “Analytic Perspectives” volume, bringing together military, homeland security and international affairs spending in one place to facilitate congressional consideration of overall security priorities among these categories.

The Congressional Budget Office should incorporate its own version of this analysis into its annual Budget and Economic Outlook report.

THE BUDGET PROCESS

In theory the Budget Resolution should be the place where overall security priorities are examined and set. In practice, this rarely happens. The “priorities” mentioned the last time a Budget Resolution was actually passed, in 2005, were a modest (in both number and vision) grab-bag of items such as a requirement that the DD(X) Destroyer be built in shipyards in at least two different states. In 2006, the Budget Committee failed even to pass a Resolution. In the years when it does, appropriators frequently ignore its recommendations.

Spending decision-making on offensive, defensive and preventive security domains is controlled by separate committees which rarely consult with each other during key moments when budget levels are being set. The words “balkanized” and “stovepiped” are frequently and accurately applied to this process. Defense appropriations are handled by three different subcommittees. Funding for international affairs is set by one major subcommittee in the Senate but two in the House.¹

The flurry of activity during the organization of the new Congress provided an illustration of the problem. The House leadership promised to pass legislation implementing all of the recommendations of the 9-11 Commission. They fulfilled this promise to an admirably large extent (though without funding attached). The notable omission from the list was the one the Commission singled out as most difficult and most important—that is, the one related to the organization of the Congress itself. The Commission recommended a reorganization of the congressional intelligence committees to allow for more unified and effective oversight and reform of the country’s intelligence capabilities. The vested interests of the new chairs taking over the existing committee structure stood in the way.²

The new Congress has shown openness to shaking up, or at least reexamining, organizational structures that have more to do with traditional power bases and power struggles than logic. True, its leadership failed initially to rework and

1 Gordon Adams, “Post-Combat Stabilization and Reconstruction: The Lessons for US Government Organization and National Security Resource Planning,” in *Iraq and America: Choices and Consequences*, eds. Ellen Laipson and Maureen S. Steinbruner, Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006.

2 Jonathan Weisman, “Democrats Reject Key 9/11 Panel Suggestions,” *The Washington Post*, November 30, 2006, p. A7.

consolidate the multiple bodies trying to exercise oversight on intelligence, and to unite this oversight capacity with the budgetary authority to enforce it. But it has demonstrated willingness in other areas to set up temporary select committees to shed light and propel action on key problems that merit extraordinary attention and cross traditional committee jurisdictions. The prime example is the Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming.

This kind of medicine could be applied to the task of devising a way for Congress to take a unified approach to budgeting for security. A Select Committee on National Security and International Affairs could examine our overall security needs, and the best balance of available tools to achieve them. And it could be tasked with recommending possible changes in the committee structure that could build this kind of examination into the budget process.

Select Committees, however, like the regular kind, are made up of members of Congress, all of whom are subjected to the pressures of special interest lobbyists. The most successful effort in recent memory to transcend those forces of parochialism in the service of a high-priority national purpose was the bipartisan 9-11 Commission, made up of a balance of members affiliated with both parties, but excluding current Representatives and Senators. In addition to producing an unusually eloquent report, its virtues included the willingness of many of its members to stay with the process to monitor and advocate for its implementation. The newly elected House of Representatives thought highly enough of the Commission's work to set a goal, fulfilled in large part, of passing all of its recommendations. Congress could authorize a Commission on Budgeting for National Security and International Affairs, made up of similarly committed members, to examine the current balkanized budget process, and recommend a restructuring that would enable decision-making on security that more effectively considers the overall balance of security tools, and puts the national interest over parochial interests.

One other successful model for the functioning of a Commission deserves mention here. Congress authorized the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) in 1990 to manage the process of realigning and downsizing the structure of military bases for the post-Cold War environment. The concern was to devise a process that took politics and narrow economic interests out of the decision-making as much as possible. As with the 9-11 Commission, members have been chosen by Congress and the President to balance party affiliations, but exclude current Senators and Representatives. Members from time to time have recused themselves from decisions on bases in their home states. The Commission operates according to certified data and explicit criteria, foremost among them "current and future mission

capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force."³

Unlike the 9-11 Commission and most others, it has been authorized to reexamine its decisions and make new ones periodically, and has done so successfully three times since its initial convening. This could be a useful additional feature of a Commission on Budgeting for National Security and International Affairs. It could be authorized to reconvene to evaluate how its recommendations for improvements to the budget process have been implemented, how the new processes are functioning in practice, and what further changes might be needed.

A former head of legislative affairs for the National Security Council, William Danvers, recently offered another proposal for an ongoing structure that could help Congress work in a more unified way on overall priorities for security policy and budgeting. To alleviate the problem of "stove-piped" committees operating independently of each other, he recommended that each party set up its own national security council, analogous to the one serving the executive branch. It would be made up of the chairs or ranking members of the armed services, international affairs, intelligence, appropriations and homeland security committees, and coordinated by a party national security advisor. The two councils could also be brought together from time to time to coordinate their work.⁴

Finally, a recent report from the Stanley Foundation recommends that the foreign affairs authorizing and appropriations committees "reassert a role in the program and budget process," by holding joint hearings with their defense counterparts.⁵ A Unified Security Funding Analysis incorporated into the Budget's Analytical Perspectives volume would greatly facilitate their work.

3 "Memorandum for Infrastructure Executive Council Members: 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Selection Criteria," Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, January 4, 2005.

4 "Outside View: Congress Needs National Security Teeth," UPI, December 26, 2006.

5 Gordon Adams, "The Politics of National Security Budgets," February 2007.

Rebalance Security: Military Spending Cuts

Below we outline \$55.9 billion in budget savings, mostly achieved by eliminating weapons systems designed to deal with threats from a bygone era – weapons and programs that are not useful in defending our country from extremists or the other threats we now face.

These savings would be made in the following categories:

- About **\$21 billion** would be saved by reducing the nuclear arsenal to no more than 1,000 warheads, more than enough to maintain nuclear deterrence. And keeping National Missile Defense in a research mode and preventing the weaponization of space;
- About **\$23 billion** would be saved by scaling back or stopping the research, development, and construction of weapons that are useless to combat modern threats. Many of the weapons involved, like the F/A-22 fighter jet and the DDG-1000 Destroyer, were designed to fight threats from a bygone era;
- Another **\$5 billion** would be saved by eliminating forces, including two active Air Force wings and one carrier group, which are not needed in the current geopolitical environment; and,
- About **\$7 billion** would be saved if the giant Pentagon bureaucracy simply functioned in a more efficient manner and eliminated many of the nearly 3,000 earmarks in the defense budget.

If Congress and the President make these cuts, not only would they have more money to spend on other priorities, but they would also make our military stronger, allowing our soldiers to focus on the weapons, training, and tactics they need to do their jobs and defend our nation.

THE FY 2008 DEFENSE BUDGET

The Pentagon is asking Congress for \$481 billion for its regular budget, excluding war spending, for FY 2008, and would like to spend about \$3 trillion over the next five years. However, the \$481 billion excludes \$23 billion sought for nuclear programs and other defense programs managed by non-defense agencies. Thus, the total defense budget request of the Bush administration for FY 2008, excluding spending

on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, is \$504 billion. The fiscal year 2008 budget request is about \$20 billion, or 11 percent, more than was allocated in 2007 and about \$175 billion higher than the budget President Bush inherited from President Clinton.

In the 2008 budget, \$137 billion (about 28%) will be spent on the pay and benefits of 2.1 million active duty and reserve military personnel. (The pay of a reservist who is mobilized or called to active duty, as more than 500,000 have been since September 11, is funded in the supplemental appropriation.) The Pentagon will spend \$165 billion, or 33% of its budget, on routine operating and maintenance costs for its 21 Army and Marine active and reserve ground divisions, 11 Navy Carrier battle groups, and 31 Air Force, Navy and Marine air wings. Included in this O&M budget are pay and benefits for the 700,000 civilians and the more than 100,000 private contractors employed by the Department of Defense. (The operations and maintenance costs of the forces in Iraq are also covered in the supplemental appropriation.)

Another \$198 billion, or 38% of the budget, goes for new investment. This is broken down into \$102 billion for buying new planes and ships and tanks; \$75 billion for doing research and developing and testing new weapons; and \$21 billion for building the facilities for the troops and their equipment.

The vast majority of the final 5% or \$23 billion will be spent by the Department of Energy on maintaining and safeguarding the 10,000 nuclear weapons in our inventory.

As indicated in Chart 6, p. 22, this baseline or regular defense budget can be reduced by about \$56 billion to \$448 billion or by 12 percent without jeopardizing national security. In addition we will show how to save another \$10 billion by having the Pentagon ask Congress for a rescission or a refund on money that has been appropriated but not spent on weapons systems that we are proposing to cancel.

Our reductions will come primarily in four areas: nuclear forces; Cold War-era conventional weapons systems; small reductions in Air Force and Navy force structure; and eliminating some of the waste and inefficiency in the Pentagon. In making these reductions, we will draw on analysis done by the Congressional Budget Office, the General Accounting Office, a report on “Pruning the Defense Budget” done by the Brookings Institution and reports by the Center for Defense Information on the FY 2008 budget.

CHART 6: MILITARY SPENDING CUTS

	Administration's FY 2008 Request	Task Force's Proposed Change
F/A-22 Raptor	4.6	-3.8
Ballistic Missile Defense	11.0	-6.8
Virginia-Class Submarine	2.7	-2.5
DD(G-1000)	2.8	-2.8
V-22 Osprey	2.6	-2.4
C-130J Airlift Aircraft	1.6	-1.0
F35 Joint Strike Fighter	6.1	-3.0
Offensive Space Weapons	0.8	-0.7
Future Combat Systems	3.7	-2.2
Research & Development	75.0	-5.0
Nuclear Forces	17.5	-14.7
Force Structure	-	-5.0
Waste in Procurement and Business Operations	-	-7.0
Total		-55.91

F/A 22 RAPTOR—Suspend acquisition and divert a percentage of current funding (2.8 billion) into refitting pre-existing aircraft with electronic warfare technology, generating 3.8 billion in savings.

The Raptor is an expensive weapon in search of a mission. At \$339 million per plane for 182 of them it is the most expensive fighter plane ever built. It's particularly wasteful in light of the fact that its original purpose—to contend with a Soviet aircraft that was never built—is irrelevant. Costs per aircraft have more than doubled since its original conception, as the Air Force continues to re-invent the Raptor for missions it was never meant to undertake. The end result is an aircraft too heavy to serve as a next generation fighter plane, too large to be considered stealth and too small to carry more than half the payload of the existing F-117 stealth bomber.

The government should suspend acquisition plans for this

operationally inconsistent aircraft and divert a small percentage of current funding (\$4.6 billion) into refitting the F-16 or A-10 with enhanced electronic warfare (EW) technology, thereby creating \$3.8 billion in savings. This will still leave the Air Force with more than 100 of these planes or about five squadrons, more than enough to deal with a future competitor like China that might develop a significant air combat capability.

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE—Cease further development but retain a basic research program to determine if NMD is technically feasible, generating \$6.8 billion in savings.

The National Missile Defense Program remains one of the least justifiable military programs. According to the Pentagon's own figures the Pentagon has spent well over \$150 billion on the program since Ronald Reagan's 1983 "Star Wars"

speech, with little to show for it. The system has failed in five out of 11 tests since 2004, and none of these tests have been conducted under anything approaching realistic conditions. Despite this poor record, the Bush administration has already placed 25 missile interceptors at launch sites in Alaska and California. Moreover, 12 additional ground-based interceptor missiles are scheduled for deployment through the end of 2007 and the program is forecasted to receive \$8.9 billion in funding during FY 2008 plus another \$2 billion for the space-based infrared system and the Army's Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) program. Instead of deploying these missiles, the government should retain a basic research program to determine if NMD is practically feasible, generating \$6.8 billion in savings.

DD(G-1000) ZUMWALT CLASS DESTROYER—*Cancel second year, split funding for the first two units, advanced procurement for FY2009 and research, development, test, and evaluation, saving 3.5 billion.*

This destroyer, conceived as the Soviet empire crumbled in 1991, is another mismanaged weapon ill suited for today's threats. Cost growth has slashed the original projected procurement goal of 32 ships to just seven. With no primary open ocean mission that a DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class destroyer could not effectively perform, the justification for continuing the DDG-1000 rests on its unproven "precision" Long Range Land Attack Projectile and its use to validate concepts for inclusion in other programs such as the next generation cruiser and the Littoral Combat Ship, the latter a less costly alternative to DDG-1000 for anticipated close-in missions. With the first two ships expected to cost from \$3.6 to \$5 billion each (the original per unit cost was estimated at \$750, the DDG-51 is a better alternative. The last DDG-51 will be launched in 2008.

SSN-744 VIRGINIA CLASS SUBMARINE—*Cancel tenth vessel and advance procurement for eleventh boat, saving \$2.5 billion and close program.¹*

Perhaps even more than the DDG-1000, the Virginia class SSN-774 program is a weapon looking for an enemy. Some administration officials, citing the methodical modernization of Beijing's military, are trying to build-up the People's Republic of China as the new "superpower" that will challenge the U.S. As yet there is no credible, consistent evidence supporting this viewpoint. This mission can be handled quite well and without challenge POSED by the SSN-688 Los Angeles-class fleet. Other missions that have been touted for the SSN-774 such as covert intelligence collection, insertion and recovery of special operations teams, and launch of tactical missiles (Tomahawk) can be better handled by the four SSBN Ohio-class submarines converted to SSGN configuration or

by other surface ships. Should operational requirements for these missions exceed the ability of the current SSGN fleet, as many as four additional SSBNs could be converted to SSGNs, leaving 10 Ohio-class boats as part of the strategic deterrent force, more than enough to provide the recommended 1,000 nuclear weapons.

V-22 OSPREY—*Cancel and buy an equivalent number of H-92 and CH-53 aircraft, generating \$2.4 billion in savings.*

From its inception, the V-22 Osprey has been beset by safety, technical, and cost problems. It was grounded once again in February 2007. The Pentagon began development of the Osprey, which takes off and lands like a helicopter and once airborne, flies like a plane, in the mid-1980s. It was originally supposed to be a joint service program, but the Army dropped support for the program in the late 1980s. In 1991, Dick Cheney (then secretary of defense) canceled the program because of cost concerns and continuing technical problems.

Cheney's decision was overridden by Congress, and with the support of Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush, the program has survived. But in the past 25 years development of the V-22 has resulted in 30 deaths, and despite the expenditure of more than \$20 billion, it is nearly 15 years behind schedule. Finally, the estimated cost of the program has risen from about \$30 billion to over \$50 billion.

Under current plans the Pentagon intends to buy 458 of these aircraft at a cost of over \$110 million for each helicopter; nearly three times more than the original statement. This assumes that the Pentagon can get costs under control and solve the technical problems. Even if this unlikely scenario comes to pass, the Osprey will be only marginally more capable than existing helicopters in terms of speed range and payload, yet cost at least five times as much. Canceling the V-22 and buying an equivalent number of existing helicopters like the H-92 and CH-53 will save \$2.4 billion in 2007 and \$10 billion over the next five years and leave the Marines with more than 50 of the V-22 hybrids. And the Pentagon could save another \$5 billion by asking for a rescission on the funds appropriated but not allocated for the Osprey.

C-130J TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT—*Cancel the remaining 38 aircraft, saving \$1 billion.*

The Pentagon has already spent \$4.2 billion to purchase 62 C-130J transport aircraft. But none of these planes has met commercial contract specifications. The Government Accountability Office, the Department of Defense's Inspector General and Director of Operational Test and Evaluation

have all provided extensive documentation of its numerous deficiencies. It has 168 deficiencies that could cause death, severe injury or illness. Consequently the C-130J cannot perform its intended mission of transporting troops and equipment into combat zones and can be used only for training. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was so concerned about the aircraft that he tried to cancel the program in 2005. And during the 1990s, when Congress had appropriated more funds for the aircraft than the Pentagon requested, the Air Force contended it did not need the planes. And yet in 2008, Bush is requesting \$1 billion to buy 12 more of these aircraft and the Air Force now contends that it needs the plane. If the Air Force has its way, it would purchase 100 planes at a total cost of \$16.4 billion or about \$164 million per plane. Stopping production of the C-130J will save \$1 billion in FY 2008.

F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER—*Slow down the program, cuttin gprocurement from \$6.1 billion to \$3 billion, saving \$3.1 billion.*

The F-35 joint strike fighter (JSF) is an ambitious program to build three related but slightly different aircraft for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. Current plans call for building 2,458 planes at a total cost of \$256 billion, or slightly more than \$100 million per plane.

This aircraft should be built, especially if further production of the F/A 22 is stopped. It is more cost-effective to produce the new JSF platform than to upgrade older systems, which by 2010 will need to be replaced. Moreover, since all of these variants use common parts and are manufactured on a single and large-scale production line, it is more affordable than allowing each of the services to develop its own unique aircraft. Finally, since so many allied countries are willing to purchase the fighter, the joint strike fighter will improve the ability of the U.S. to use military power in conjunction with allied forces and will lower the unit cost of these fighter jets for the U.S. military.

However, given the technological challenges of trying to build three fairly different planes from one design, the program should not be rushed. This country's overwhelming numerical and qualitative advantage in tactical aircraft will not soon be challenged. Therefore, the JSF program can afford to slow down and be reduced from the requested \$6.1 billion in FY 2008 to \$3 billion, especially since the supplemental also contains funding for the F-35.

OFFENSIVE SPACE-BASED WEAPONS—*Cancel this unproven, controversial and ineffective program to yield \$721 million in savings.*

According to a national security directive promulgated on August 21, 2006 the development and deployment of space-based weaponry continues to be a high priority for the current administration. Development of such weaponry significantly expands U.S. military superiority. Our conventional and nuclear weapons are already capable of destroying any of the ground targets that space-based weapons would and can do at a fraction of the cost. Moreover, the development invites escalation of the global arms race to a new level. Offensive military space-based technology should remain in the research and development phase with an estimated \$821 million in funding suggested in FY 2008. We recommend cutting this down to \$100 million.

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM—*Slow the program down and save \$2.2 billion.*

The Future Combat System (FCS) is an Army program to build a family of 18 major systems including eight new types of armored vehicles, four classes of unmanned aerial vehicles, three types of unmanned ground vehicles, and sensors that will be linked together into an integrated and very complex system. The Army intends to begin equipping its brigade combat teams with the future combat system in 2011 and eventually will equip about one-third of its troops at a cost of at about \$160 billion.

The Future Combat System is necessary for the Army because it will make many of its units more deployable, lethal and survivable. However, its current schedule is far too ambitious given the complexity of the program. Of the network of 53 crucial technologies, 52 are unproven. Therefore the \$3.7 billion requested for FY 2008 should be reduced to \$1.5 billion.

NUCLEAR FORCES—*Reduce arsenal to 600 deployed weapons and 400 in reserve and eliminate the Trident II nuclear missile, generating \$14.7 billion in savings.*

For the upcoming fiscal year, the Bush administration proposes to spend nearly \$17.5 billion on operating, maintaining, and modernizing its strategic and tactical nuclear forces. About \$11 billion a year will go to operating, maintaining and modernizing the bombers, submarines, and missiles that

carry the 6,000 operational nuclear weapons in the American arsenal, with the remaining \$6.5 billion going towards maintaining the warheads. During the Cold War, the United States spent less than \$4 billion a year on average on these nuclear weapons activities. Reducing the weapons activities budget to its Cold War level by shifting to a deployed arsenal of 600 warheads with another 400 in reserve--an arsenal fully capable of deterring known threats and hedging against unforeseen contingencies--would generate \$13.5 billion in savings.¹ Eliminating funding in this year's budget for the Trident II nuclear missile--an unnecessary weapon, given the availability of other strategic delivery vehicles--would save an additional \$1.2 billion.

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION—*Reduce from \$75 to \$70 billion, saving \$5 billion.*

In today's dollars, the Pentagon spent \$48 billion on research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) in fiscal year 2001. For FY 2008, this budget has jumped to \$75 billion. In real terms, this is an increase of over 50% and is \$20 billion more than the Department of Defense spent on RDT&E in FY 1985, the peak of the Reagan buildup.

Such a large amount for developing sophisticated futuristic weapons is hard to justify in fighting the global war on terrorism. This amount can easily be reduced by \$5 billion in FY 2008. This is in addition to the cuts in the specific systems listed above.

FORCE STRUCTURE—*Cut two active component air wings and one carrier battle group and its associated air wing for an annual savings of \$5 billion.*

The so-called "war on terrorism" has been waged primarily by the ground forces of the Army and Marines. In the more than four years our military has been in Iraq and the five and a half years in Afghanistan, the Air Force and Navy have played relatively minor roles. There are relatively few fixed targets in Afghanistan and the bombing campaign in Iraq lasted but three weeks.

At the present time, the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps have more than 5,000 tactical combat planes and 1,800 armed helicopters. It is hard to imagine a scenario that would require such large numbers of aircraft. Therefore, two active Air Force wings and one carrier battle group and its

associated air wing can be eliminated without overloading our forces. The annual costs of operating and maintaining the two wings and the carrier battle group amount to at least \$5 billion.

WASTE AND INEFFICIENCY—*Eliminate waste and duplication, saving \$7 billion.*

Former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld estimated that more than \$20 billion a year could be saved by fixing procurement and business operations. The Government Accountability Office and the Congressional Budget Office estimate that \$1 billion a year could be saved by consolidating various activities. Senator John McCain (R-AZ) estimates that there are several billion dollars worth of earmarks (pork) in the annual defense budget. In the FY2007 budget alone, there were 2,822 earmarks totaling \$15 billion,² up from \$11.2 billion the year before. Our realistic budget would ask the Pentagon to save \$7 billion a year by eliminating waste and duplication.

1 See National Academy of Sciences, "The Future of Nuclear Weapons," 1997.

2 Jeffrey M. Tebbs, "Pruning the Defense Budget," Brookings Institution, January 2007.

Rebalanced Security: Neglected Security Tools

The “comprehensive” approach to security promised by our National Security Strategy still lives primarily in the realm of rhetoric, as its non-military dimensions remain severely underfunded. These dimensions fall into two categories: the job of turning a less militarized, less unilateral face to the world, and the unfinished task of strengthening our defenses against terrorist attacks on the homeland.

The first of these is funded primarily through the International Affairs budget, underwriting the programs of diplomacy, development assistance, and contributions to international organizations addressing security problems such as the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons, and forces for international policing and peacekeeping. Funding for the second is not currently consolidated in one budget function, but spread over numerous agencies in addition to the Department of Homeland Security.

The proposed International Affairs budget would receive an 11% increase over FY 2007. Experts applauded the increase, but worry that Congress will, as in previous years, fail to fully fund it, and express concerns about the emphasis of new funding. The most common thread in these concerns is that the increases are concentrated in programs that perpetuate the “our way or the highway” approach to foreign policy, with U.S. designed and managed programs that fail to fully engage the potential for international cooperation.

The largest proposed increases have been applied to the Millennium Challenge Account and the President’s PEPFAR HIV-AIDS initiative, for example, both of which are requiring the creation of new U.S.-led delivery mechanisms that impair policy coherence with international partners. The funding boost for the Economic Support Fund, which focuses on short-term security assistance, will come at the expense of long-term development efforts.

One positive change is the 9% increase for Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs that will emphasize exchanges and programs in the Muslim world and more money for Arabic language training.

Among the negatives is the \$59 million cut to the budget for Migration and Refugee Assistance. The Iraq War is creating a massive refugee crisis. The most common estimate puts the number of Iraqis who have left the country since the war began at two million; the pace of the exodus is accelerating. Meanwhile the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, speaks of a wave of refugees from the Demo-

cratic Republic of the Congo *every six months* that equals the number of victims of the 2004 tsunami in southern Asia.¹

Another inscrutable cut has been made in the budget for International Disaster and Famine Assistance. In recent years the biggest boost in U.S. standing reflected in international polling came from the rapid and efficient concentration of resources and assistance, including from U.S. military personnel, in response to that tsunami.

Funding to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction—identified as the president’s top security priority—remains inadequate. The request for International Nuclear Material Protection & Cooperation, for example, a program securing fissile material, nuclear warheads, and expertise in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union, has been cut by \$50 million. The fund to secure international radiological sources not covered by existing programs—materials for “dirty bombs”—has been cut in half. Though the Department of Energy calls the radiological threat a low priority, a 2005 survey of security experts by Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) estimated the probability of an attack in the United States using a dirty bomb by 2015 at 40%.²

Bush’s Homeland Security budget request falls far short of providing the resources to implement the 9-11 Commission’s recommendations. We have identified the key priorities to achieve that goal. We have also identified investments with multiple, ongoing benefits that extend beyond counterterrorism. For example, rebuilding public health infrastructure in the United States will help us prepare for bioterrorist attacks while also enhancing our ability to cope with other health dangers, such as pandemic flu. Similarly, improving the security of spent nuclear fuel storage would help protect us from terrorist sabotage and all nuclear accidents.

NON-PROLIFERATION

The President’s funding request reflects the Administration’s continued failure to invest enough in programs that will enhance U.S. security by reducing the risk that terrorist groups or countries hostile to the United States will acquire weapons of mass destruction.

1 NPR Weekend Edition, February 17, 2007.

2 The Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses, Office of Senator Richard Lugar, June 2005, available at: <http://lugar.senate.gov/reports/NPSurvey.pdf>

CHART 7: MILITARY SECURITY TOOLS		
	Administration's FY 2008 Request	Task Force's Proposed Change
Nonproliferation	2.29	+5.00
Diplomacy	8.66	+1.90
Peace Corps	0.33	+0.33
Stabilization and Reconstruction	0	+0.50
Economic Development	24.34	+15.00
U.S. Contributions to International Organizations	1.35	+1.23
U.S. Contributions to International Peacekeeping	1.32	+1.30
UN Civilian Police Corps	0	+0.19
UN Peace Building	0	+0.50
Small Arms/Light Weapons Initiative	0.05	+0.05
Alternative Energy	1.24	+8.76
Key Homeland Security Deficits:		
Baggage and Cargo Screening	0.73	+1.25
Port Security	2.14	+0.69
Container Security	0.53	+0.03
Rail and Transit	0.19	+3.36
Security Training	0	+0.10
Spent Fuel	0	+0.70
Chemical Sector Security	0.03	+1.04
DHS Inspector General	0.09	+0.05
Risk Allocation Study	0	+0.01
DHS First Responder Grants	2.27	+2.74
Public Health	1.18	+5.00
Total		+49.73

Meanwhile the administration is diverting resources from real nonproliferation programs to programs that undermine nonproliferation and disarmament commitments. For example, the budget requests over \$500 million for separating plutonium from nuclear waste, under the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), and developing a new type of hydrogen bomb.

Total stated amount for non-proliferation in the FY 2008 budget request is: \$2.29 billion:

- Department of Defense: \$342 million;
- Department of State: \$279.6 million; and,
- Department of Energy: \$1.673 billion.

These numbers, however, are somewhat misleading. The key programs to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism by securing bomb-grade material and chemical weapons in the states of the former Soviet Union and elsewhere lack adequate funding. Progress remains insufficient, even as the window of opportunity to secure this material before some it falls into the wrong hands narrows with each passing year.

Increased funding for these programs is necessary though not sufficient. Increased political will and focus will be needed to convince countries such as Russia to allow U.S. government and U.S. contractors access to sensitive sites to effectively secure vulnerable nuclear warheads and materials. Increased funding should be re-directed and used to secure or remove material at the sites where they are produced or stored, because bomb-grade material is easy to hide and transport once it has been stolen. The best investment remains securing the vulnerable material at the source.

THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS SHORT-CHANGED

The funding for many of these programs has either been only slightly increased (the Global Threat Reduction Initiative), remains relatively constant or has been decreased compared to the FY 2007 funding request and the FY2007 continuing resolution. In fact, the requested funding for non-proliferation programs directly related to minimizing the risk of nuclear terrorism, by securing vulnerable fissile material abroad and contributing to other key international non-proliferation efforts, amounts to \$1.2 billion for FY 2008. This \$1.2 billion includes the Cooperative Threat Reduction funding in the Department of Defense, programs to secure material in the states of the former Soviet Union and in other countries, and threat reduction activities funded in the Department of State.

This funding amount falls far short of the recommended Baker-Cutler report-recommended \$3 billion per year.³

Specifically, the request for International Nuclear Material Protection & Cooperation, a program securing fissile material, nuclear warheads, and expertise in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union, is \$371 million, approximately a \$50 million-decrease from the FY2007 budget request of \$413.2 million. The U.S. should make it a priority to overcome Russia's unwillingness to provide access to several of its sensitive sites, or propose an alternative to secure vulnerable warheads and material. If the access challenges are overcome, current funding should be increased to provide Russia the expertise and means to sustain U.S.-funded upgrades.⁴

Funding for redirecting former nuclear weapon scientists to sustainable civilian work (Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program) has also been reduced, even though the risk that scientists from the former Soviet Union might sell their knowledge and expertise to terrorist groups or countries hostile to the United States persists. The funding is \$20.2 million in FY2008 request, a decrease from the \$28.1 million in FY2007 request. According to *Securing the Bomb 2006*,⁵ by the end of FY2005 85% of key nuclear weapons scientists had been given short-term grants but only 35% had been provided sustainable civilian work. The FY2007 funding should be at least doubled to \$56 million.

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) funding request for FY2008 is \$119.6 million, a small increase from the \$115.5 million appropriated in the continuing resolution by Congress, which itself was an increase compared to the FY06 appropriation of \$97 million and the FY2007 budget request of \$106.8 million. This broad-scope program secures vulnerable nuclear material around the world and its funding should be significantly increased, preferably by several hundred million dollars. At a minimum, doubling the funding for this program (so adding \$120 million) would yield a high return on investment by securing vulnerable fissile material faster.

3 Lloyd Cutler and Howard Baker (Co-Chairs Russia Task Force), A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia, January 10, 2001, Appendix A, available at <http://www.seab.energy.gov/publications/rusrpt.pdf>

4 "Progress Made in Improving Security at Russian Nuclear Sites, but Long-Term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security is Uncertain," GAO, February 2007, p.8, www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/gettrpt?gao-07-404.

5 Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, *Securing the Bomb 2006*, (commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative), Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, July 2006, Figure ES-1, pvii, available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/stb06webfull.pdf

Specifically, GTRI provides for the conversion of research reactor cores using high-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium (\$31.2 million). This subprogram needs significant expansion, since several research reactor cores have never even been considered for conversion or have simply been written off because their conversion proved more difficult than expected. While about sixty research reactors are covered, 41 more research reactors using HEU are not being addressed.⁶

GTRI also provides for the return of US-origin research reactor spent fuel (\$4.2 million) (only 7% of US-spent fuel has been returned to the United States and eighteen tons remain spread worldwide), and for the return to Russia of Russian-origin highly-enriched uranium (\$31 million). It also includes radiological threat reduction which secures US radiological sources in the United States and provides for the return of US-origin radiological sources from overseas to reduce the threat of dirty bomb material being stolen or diverted (\$13.2 million).

GTRI deals with international radiological threat reduction by securing international radiological sources. At \$6 million, this fund has been cut by half since FY 2006. DOE has explained this significant decrease by calling the radiological threat a low priority, relative to the threat of nuclear proliferation. This policy decision is surprising given that the 2005 survey of security experts by Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) estimated the probability of an attack in the United States using a dirty bomb at 40% by 2015.⁷ Clearly the funding for securing international radiological material should be taken much more seriously and funded at an appropriate level, at a minimum of \$25 million (double the FY2006 level of funding).

Another GTRI mission includes providing safe and secure storage of plutonium in spent fuel from a fast breeder reactor in Kazakhstan (\$31.7 million). Lastly, GTRI identifies emerging threats and secures gap material (\$1.7 million). This gap material subprogram includes securing materials not covered by the other programs such as separated plutonium and non-U.S. and non-Russian-origin HEU. Its funding is currently extremely low considering the amount of material that should be taken into account and secured, which is currently not part of the list of sites and material that should be assigned high priority. The funding for this program should also be increased exponentially. Increasing it five-fold would only cost \$10 million.

The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program in the Department of Defense was also decreased, from \$372 million in the FY 2007 funding request to \$348 million in FY2008. The CTR program enabled the removal and shipment of nuclear warheads from former Soviet countries to Russia, and the safe and secure storage of nuclear weapons, and the dismantlement and destruction of nuclear weapon silos and delivery systems. CTR also enables Russia to destroy its chemical weapons. However, the Department of Defense has cut funding for construction of the chemical weapon destruction facility in Schuch'ye, Russia in the last several years even though budget estimates to finish the project have increased from \$750 million to over a \$1 billion. According to Global Green USA, completing the original US scope of work will cost an at least another \$200-400 million. The United States could provide yearly increments of \$100 million over the next two to three years. In addition, unlike the United Kingdom and Canada, the United States has so far refused to assist with funding another site for destruction of chemical weapons at Kizner, Russia, which is another high-risk site for proliferation. If as the Department of Defense states on its website, the "CTR program is an opportunity to enhance our security and invest in our children's security that we cannot afford to miss," then increases in funding are undeniably a wise investment.

Decreasing funding for these threat reduction programs and only slightly increasing the funding of Global Threat Reduction Initiative represents a missed opportunity for minimizing the risk of weapons and materials proliferation and the risk of nuclear terrorism. According to *Securing the Bomb 2006*, by the end of FY2005, security upgrades had been completed on only 54% of buildings containing fissile material in the former Soviet Union, and only 30% of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) research reactors outside the former USSR and outside the United States had either the HEU removed or had security upgrades completed to secure the material.

Moreover, a significant part of the funding in the non-proliferation programs in the Department of Energy is not used for securing vulnerable fissile material abroad, at the sites where this material is stored or produced to minimize the risk of diversion or theft. For example, \$609.5 million in the FY2008 budget request—almost a third of the total defense nuclear nonproliferation budget within the Department of Energy—will fund the construction and operation of a facility at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina to convert U.S. surplus plutonium for use as fuel for two U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. In addition, \$119.3 million in FY2008 is slated for installing fissile material detection technology at major ports worldwide. The Government Accountability Office recommends against this, citing the

6 Sam Roe, "The Search for a Magic Fuel," *Chicago Tribune*, January 29, 2007.

7 The Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses, Office of Senator Richard Lugar, June 2005, available at: <http://lugar.senate.gov/reports/NPSurvey.pdf>

overestimated effectiveness of the technology.⁸ Monitoring borders would be helpful if resources were limitless, but given limited resources, it is preferable to secure vulnerable nuclear weapons-grade materials and warheads at the source to prevent theft by terrorists rather than trying to detect and intercept the material or warhead after it is stolen, since hiding and transporting them is relatively easy.

However, progress on securing converting fissile material has been inadequate. Even as late as 2005, the follow-up report by the 9/11 Commission to assess progress on the recommendations it had made in 2004, gave the U.S. Government a “D” grade for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.⁹ Recently, a January 2007 report revealed that Georgian authorities caught a Russian man who was attempting to smuggle HEU that he had hidden in plastic bags in his pocket. Thus while the risk of nuclear terrorism remains a clear and present danger, the urgency of the problem is still insufficient. For example, 40 tons of HEU remain inadequately secured—enough for 1400 nuclear weapons.¹⁰ A January 2007 article reported that in 2002 the State Department had accepted \$5 million from the private non-profit Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) as a contribution to the cost of removing two bombs-worth of HEU from Serbia. Alan Krass, a former State Department official who had been involved in this project, explained that “It was embarrassing [but] we needed the money.”¹¹

The Department of State funding request for Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs includes \$192.8 million for non-proliferation activities (global threat reduction, export control programs, Comprehensive test Ban Treaty Organization funding) added to the \$136.8 million in voluntary and assessed US contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). U.S. funding to the IAEA falls short of \$5.5 million that is needed to make up for previous arrears. The Department of State FY2008 budget

justification notes that “[t]he U.S. is currently in arrears on part of its calendar year 2006 assessed contribution to IAEA. Substantial arrears or withdrawal from IAEA could force curtailment of core programs, including high priority nuclear safety and security (incident and emergency preparedness and response, protection against malicious acts involving radioactive materials). Curtailing technical assistance could weaken U.S. ability to gain political support for key policy objectives, including addressing Iran, strengthening safeguards, improving nuclear security, and promoting nuclear energy.”¹² Thus, insufficient U.S. funding will not only jeopardize on-going international programs that contribute to U.S. security, but also risks undermining U.S. foreign policy priorities for which we need international cooperation.

Once again, NTI seized the opportunity in September 2006 to buttress U.S. international efforts and support stated non-proliferation goals by offering \$50 million to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This funding is aimed at helping create a low-enriched uranium fuel supply bank intended for countries that forego building indigenous nuclear fuel cycle capabilities (uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing) that could lead to weapons material proliferation. This \$50 million is contingent on a member state contributing at least \$100 million within two years.

U.S. contributions (\$18 million in FY2008) to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Organization (CTBTO), which monitors seismic and nuclear activity to detect potential nuclear tests worldwide, reflect a funding shortfall that places the United States in arrears on its financial commitments. This shortfall could jeopardize U.S. priorities within that organization and is all the more troubling as the assessed U.S. contribution is approximately \$22 million, only a slight increase over the FY2008 funding request.

FUNDING FOR NORTH KOREA AGREEMENT:

A SMALL INVESTMENT WORTH A HIGH RETURN

On February 13, 2007, the Administration announced an agreement with North Korea that resulted from the Six-Party Talks process. The agreement provides for shut-down and eventual dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear facilities at Yongbyon that were producing plutonium for North Korea’s nuclear weapon program. By re-opening these facilities since 2003 and reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods, it is estimated that North Korea has produced enough separated plutonium

8 Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Decision to Procure and Deploy the Next Generation of Radiation Detection Equipment Is Not Supported by Its Cost-Benefit Analysis. GAO-07-581T, March 14, <http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07581T> and <http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d07581thigh.pdf> (highlights).

9 Report on Status of the 9/11 Commission Recommendations (Thomas Kean, Chair and Lee Hamilton, Vice-Chair), November 14, 2005, p. 4, available at http://www.9-11pdp.org/press/2005-12-05_report.pdf and http://www.9-11pdp.org/press/2005-11-14_report.pdf (press statement).

10 Sam Roe, “An Atomic Threat Made in America,” *Chicago Tribune*, January 28, 2007.

11 Sam Roe, “The Search for a Magic Fuel,” *Chicago Tribune*, January 29, 2007.

12 Congressional Budget Justification FY2008, US Department of State, p. 696, available at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/81227.pdf>

for 5-12 nuclear weapons.¹³ In an effort to stop North Korea's plutonium-producing program, the agreement provides for the delivery to North Korea of a total of one million tons of heavy fuel oil, starting within the first sixty days with a first shipment of 50,000 tons, and beginning the process of normalization of relations, in return for North Korea shutting down its reactor at Yongbyon and discussing a list of all North Korea nuclear facilities. The second part of the bargain provides for the delivery of the remaining 950,000 tons of fuel in exchange for North Korea dismantling its plutonium-producing facilities.

U.S. lead negotiator Assistant Secretary of State Chris Hill estimated the cost of providing these 950,000 tons of heavy fuel at \$220 million, with this cost to be divided between the United States, China, Russia, South Korea, and perhaps Japan. This modest investment to dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons program would be money well spent.

TOTAL RECOMMENDED FUNDING FOR NON-PROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

In 2001, the Baker-Cutler Task Force prescribed spending \$30 billion over ten years (FY2002-FY2012), or about \$3 billion a year, to verifiably secure and destroy excess Russian plutonium and highly-enriched uranium, provide for accurate accounting and monitoring of Russian bomb-grade material, and downsize Russia's excess nuclear weapon infrastructure.¹⁴ Only a fraction of this recommended amount of funding has been spent to provide security upgrades and other assistance at sites in Russia and other countries that house nuclear weapons-usable materials and warheads.¹⁵

Assuming resolution of the obstacles to gaining access to relevant sites, and the political will to make securing vulnerable nuclear materials and warheads at the source a priority,

13 David Albright and Paul Brannan, "The North Korea Plutonium Stock," Institute for Science and International Security, February 20, 2007, p. 1, available at: <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/DPRKplutoniumFEB.pdf>

14 Ibid.

15 See "Progress Made in Improving Security at Russian Nuclear Sites, but Long-Term Sustainability of U.S.-funded Security is Uncertain," GAO, p. 11 and 17. Kenneth Luongo and William Hoehn estimate that about \$7 million has been spent on threat reduction between 1991 and 2003 to secure and eliminate WMD and related materials, expertise and technologies at their source in Russia, former Soviet Republics and other locations. See "Reform and Expansion of Cooperative Threat Reduction," *Arms Control Today*, June 2003.

an increase in funding would be appropriate. An increase of \$2 billion this year would bring FY2008 spending in line with the Baker-Cutler recommendation *for Russia alone*. It would do nothing to address the shortfalls from previous years, or the need to expand these programs beyond the former Soviet states and accelerate their pace. An increase of \$5 billion is minimally needed to do so.

ALTERNATIVE ENERGY

The urgency of reducing planetary carbon emissions made a leap forward in public consciousness this year. In January 2007 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change issued its strongest statement to date linking fossil fuel emissions to rising global temperatures. It also projected the consequences of unchecked global warming as "a huge disruption to agriculture, more floods, heatwaves, desertification and melting glaciers," leading to such effects as "hundreds of millions of people [forced] to flee their devastated homelands, particularly in tropical, low-lying areas, while creating waves of immigrants whose movements will strain the economies of even the most affluent countries."

The security implications of these catastrophic effects were spelled out at a January conference in London on "Climate Change: the Global Security Impact." The former UK ambassador to the United Nations cited Rwanda and Darfur as two examples where drought and resource scarcity had helped to fuel deadly conflicts.¹⁶

In the glaring absence of federal action by the United States to restructure its energy policy to focus on reducing emissions, state, local, and nongovernmental actors have begun to take action, by for example setting target caps on emissions and creating new tax incentives for energy efficiency and finding new ways to fund the development and use of renewable technologies. In a potentially ground-breaking private-sector deal struck at the end of February, ownership of the largest energy company in Texas, formerly committed to expansion of its coal-fired power plant network, would be transferred to a group committed to scrapping plans for 8 of the 11 plants, doubling its spending on energy efficiency, and backing federal legislation requiring carbon emissions reductions.¹⁷

Congress is now getting into the act, with a raft of legislative proposals, some of which would set annual reduction tar-

16 Mark Trevelyan, "Climate Change Seen Fanning Conflict and Terrorism," Reuters, January 24, 2007.

17 Steven Mufson and David Cho, "Energy Firm Accepts \$45 Billion Takeover," *The Washington Post*, February 26, 2007, p. A4.

gets for total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. The new House leadership has established a Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming to bring a higher profile and greater urgency to the issue. And it has passed legislation that would cut subsidies for the oil and gas industry and reinvest them in renewable energy.

For the first time President Bush referred in his State of the Union address to “the serious challenge of global climate change.” The budget he submitted a week later revealed the severe limitations of his government’s commitment to addressing this challenge. The Department of Energy’s budget for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy received \$60,000 in additional funding, roughly half of the increase allocated to Fossil Fuel Energy. Both the Solar and Wind Energy accounts were actually cut slightly.¹⁸ The budget for the Environmental Protection Agency’s consolidated “Clean Air and Global Climate Change Program” was reduced from \$934 million in FY 2007 to \$912 million in FY 2008.¹⁹ This obviously is no way to address this “serious challenge.”

A federal program commensurate with the magnitude of the problem will involve regulatory and fiscal measures in addition to the commitment of resources to fund a transition to energy-conserving and renewable, emissions-reducing energy technologies. But federal dollars are an important piece of the puzzle.

The Apollo Alliance, a coalition of public officials, environmental organizations, businesses and labor unions, has proposed investing \$300 billion over 10 years in this technology development. The plan includes an array of possible financing strategies involving states, localities and private entities.²⁰ A one-third annual share contributed by the federal government amounts to \$10 billion, or \$8.8 billion more than Bush’s FY2008 request.

DIPLOMACY

The President’s proposed budget increases funding for Department of State operations by 11% increase over the amount designated by the FY2007 Continuing Resolution. This is among the federal budget’s largest percentage increases. Most of the increase necessarily is applied to war zones in Iraq and Afghanistan, including a \$1.88 billion Global War on Terror Emergency Request devoted to this purpose.

The overall increase is commendable, but deceiving. Overall funding for diplomacy outside the Middle East remains weak at best, since it is added on to a seriously inadequate base. The international affairs budget was slashed dramatically between the mid 1980s and the end of the 1990s. The ability of the United States to provide leadership through diplomatic means was seriously compromised during that period, and it has not recovered. The United States is perceived, rightly or not, as a nation inclined to use brute force rather than diplomacy and cooperation to achieve its objectives. This budget and more will be needed over the next several years to restore America’s capacity for diplomatic leadership.

According to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s “transformational diplomacy” initiative, some 300 diplomats are being reassigned from developed countries to key developing countries. This promising move is useless without adequate resources for implementation.

Nor is it remotely clear that the increases in the President’s request will make it through the budget process. This year for example, under the FY 2007 Continuing Resolution, funding for Diplomatic and Consular Programs fell substantially short of the President’s FY2007 request. The proposal to increase funding in 2008 to \$4.9 billion from \$4.5 billion (in current dollars) appears to be substantial, but that is only because the base is low. And Congress has indicated its inclination to trim nonmilitary foreign affairs expenses this year as well.

According to the Coalition for American Leadership Abroad, the Foreign Service is understaffed by approximately 1,000 positions. Yet, the proposed budget would only add 254 new positions. That barely makes up for the 240 positions that were requested but not funded over the last two fiscal years.

The President’s request should be treated as the minimum upon which to build rather than a maximum from which to trim. At the end of 2002 a bipartisan group of former national security advisors from each administration going back to the Nixon presidency called attention to the chronic understaffing at U.S. embassies around the world, the antiquated information and communications systems used by those who

18 See “DOE Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy FY 2008 Budget: Geothermal, Hydropower Zeroed Out; Many Energy Efficiency Programs Cut,,” Environmental and Energy Study Institute, February 6, 2007, http://www.eesi.org/publications/Press%20Releases/2007/2.06.07_EERE_Budget.htm.

19 See “EPA Clean Air and Global Climate Change FY 2008 Budget: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) budget request cut \$426 million,” Environmental and Energy Study Institute, February 6, 2007, http://www.eesi.org/publications/Press%20Releases/2007/2.6.07_FY08_EPA_Budget.htm.

20 See http://www.apolloalliance.org/strategy_center/model_financing_strategies/index.cfm.

are there, and the urgent need for security upgrades to protect them. The bipartisan group recommended a 30% increase in funding.²¹ The President's proposed budget does add new money for embassy security in a new \$18 million Protection for Missions and Officials account. Progress has been made toward meeting the 30% benchmark, but it remains far from fulfilled. Factoring in an increase in the President's request for State Department operations of 8% since 2002, meeting the benchmark would require an additional \$1.9 billion.

PEACE CORPS

The Peace Corps is widely regarded as the best face America presents to other nations and cultures. Virtually every president from Ronald Reagan through President Bush has proposed large increases in the size of the Peace Corps. President Bush promised to double the number of volunteers serving overseas. Yet, year after year Congress gives lip service to the agency and the volunteers while cutting its appropriations. Growth has been incremental at best, and the President's proposed budget would allow for virtually no growth in 2008. The number of volunteers serving in the field is still half what it was four decades ago. It is time for Congress to fund real growth in the Peace Corps, by doubling its \$334 million budget.

STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

The goal of creating a dedicated civilian capacity to help in the stabilization and reconstruction of war-torn areas continues in fits and starts. The State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was created in 2004; its funding has become a political football, getting appropriated, and then cut, and then re-appropriated from some other source. Particularly debilitating has been Congress' refusal to fund a requested Conflict Response Fund, to help jump-start rapid response to emerging contingencies. Meanwhile, S/CRS has been utilizing \$200 million in transferred Defense Department funds for field operations, indicating both how weak its own funding has been and how strongly the Defense Department supports greater civilian capabilities in this area. "If you don't fund this, put more money in the defense budget for ammunition—because I'm going to need it," one Marine general in Iraq recently told a *Washington Post* reporter.²²

A Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Independent Task Force on "Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities" recommends several key reforms to ensure that the money is well spent. To increase coordination among the several agencies involved, it recommends a "unified command" structure with the State Department's Coordinator of S/CRS elevated to the undersecretary level, giving this role equal importance with arms control and counter-terrorism. To develop dedicated expertise in the various dimensions of this challenge, the CFR task force endorsed the S/CRS goal of establishing a civilian "Active Response Corps" made up of personnel with relevant experience available on a call-up basis. President Bush proposed a "Civilian Reserve" along these lines in his 2007 State of the Union Address but, tellingly, declined to offer any funding for it in his proposed FY2008 budget.

The Administration's original 2003 request for start-up costs for this agency was \$350 million, which it has never come close to receiving. And \$350 million is, parenthetically, the approximate cost of one day's military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, post-conflict operations continue to be approached as they were in the 1990s—as ad hoc initiatives funded by supplemental appropriations. This approach to budgeting has frequently slowed the process so that such operations come too late to prevent new cycles of violence and chaos. The CFR task force therefore recommended the establishment of a replenishing "no year" account of \$500 million—a fund large enough to get such operations off the ground in a timely fashion. They also recommend several mechanisms for coordinating timely multilateral assistance, resolving the chronic problems of convening donor conferences and ensuring follow-through of the commitments made there. These include recommendations for building UN capacity, covered elsewhere in this section (see below) and the creation of a standing multilateral reconstruction trust fund managed under the direction of the G-8.²³

A point the USB task force raised last year is worth repeating: this new entity must not become the civilian component of regime change; that is, it should be focused on serving a constructive role in conflicts not of the United States' own making.

21 Letter from Frank Carlucci, et al., to Condoleezza Rice, Dec. 20, 2002, available at: http://www.usgloballeadership.org/archives/2003_03.php.

22 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "Iraq Rebuilding Short on Qualified Civilians," *Washington Post*, February 24, 2007, p. A1.

23 See Brent Scowcroft and Samuel R. Berger, "In the Wake of War: Getting Serious about Nation-Building," *The National Interest*, Fall 2005.

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE²⁴

The Administration's FY2008 international affairs budget continues the modest upward trend of recent years, but it remains far from adequate both in terms of its overall size and composition. Of the \$36.19 billion international affairs budget, foreign aid (the foreign operations account) amounts to some \$24.34 billion, a 12% increase from the previous year. This overall increase conceals significant changes in the trajectory of particular accounts, however. Besides several billion dollars for Afghanistan and Iraq, including emergency supplemental budgets, the big winners in the FY2008 request are the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) the Millennium Challenge Account, and Economic Support Funds (ESF). The big losers are programs aimed at poverty alleviation, Development Assistance (DA) and Child Survival and Health (CSH) accounts.

For FY2008, the administration proposes a 28% increase in HIV/AIDS spending, from an estimated \$3.25 billion in the fiscal 2007 Continuing Resolution to some \$4.15 billion in 2008. This assistance goes to 15 countries, most of which are in sub-Saharan Africa. The administration is also proposing a significant increase in spending for its other signature aid initiative, the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), envisioning a 71% rise from an estimated \$1.75 billion in FY 2007 to \$3 billion in FY 2008. This aid window is intended to target countries that have made a commitment to "governing justly, investing in their people, and encouraging economic freedom." If history is any guide, however, Congress will be unlikely to fund the entire request. One reason for legislative reticence has been the difficulty the administration has faced in actually getting aid funds out the door. By one estimate, the administration has actually spent only 3% of the \$3 billion it committed to this initiative.²⁵

Beyond these two programs, the FY2008 budget underscores the dominance of the geostrategic calculations in Bush administration foreign aid plans. ESF funds, which are directed toward allies and other pivotal countries on largely political (rather than development) grounds, are envisioned to surge by 35%, to \$3.32 billion, with part of this increase coming from transfers from Development Assistance and Andean Counterdrug Initiative accounts. If we include

\$1.1 billion in emergency supplemental budgets for Iraq and Afghanistan, ESF actually increases by 70%. Similarly, the administration envisions a 35% increase in spending on International Narcotics and Law Enforcement from the FY2007 Continuing Resolution, up to \$635 million. The administration also proposes a 21% increase in contribution to international financial institutions, to \$1.5 billion, reflecting the next round of International Development Association grantmaking.

In contrast to these increases, the core poverty focused account, Development Assistance (DA), takes a big hit, being reduced to \$468 million, or 31% below the FY2007 Continuing Resolution, with shifts apparently going to ESF. Child Survival and Health (CSH) funds are down 9% from the FY2007 CR estimate. The cuts in core U.S. foreign assistance devoted to development are particularly disturbing because—contrary to what is often assumed by the public—such spending constitutes a very small fraction of total U.S. aid, as the following pie chart reveals.


What are we to make of these winners and losers? First, the Bush administration continues to request a high level of funding for its two signature aid programs, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the MCA, while giving short shrift to other aspects of development assistance. The point here is not to suggest that U.S. spending on HIV/AIDS should be curtailed. Indeed, while there are legitimate questions about how prepared poor countries are to absorb a huge increase in assistance to fight this disease, studies have shown that programs to combat HIV/AIDS and treat its victims are among the most effective uses of foreign assistance. What is of concern, rather, is the relative inattention to *other* aspects of development, and particularly to assisting poverty alleviation in Africa. Indeed, if the current budget is approved, more than two-thirds of all U.S. development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa will be devoted to HIV/AIDS funding.

Similarly, the proposed increase in MCA will reward poor countries that have a proven record of good governance. But it applies only to a handful of countries and entirely ignores the large number of fragile states that lack the capacity to provide basic goods to their people—and where effective institutions need to be built, often from scratch. From the beginning, the Bush administration has described MCA and PEPFAR as representing U.S. aid above and beyond existing development assistance. But when one looks closely at the administration's much-ballyhooed increase in aid to Africa, one finds that other forms of development aid have remained stagnant or declined, and that many countries are being left behind. While HIV/AIDS assistance is important in its own right, it cannot substitute for critical investments in econom-

24 This section draws from Samuel Bazzi, Sheila Herrling and Stewart Patrick, "Billions for War, Pennies for the Poor: Moving the President's FY2008 Budget from Hard Power to Smart Power," Center for Global Development Analysis, March 16, 2007. (Text used with permission).

25 As of February 28, 2007, the MCC had disbursed \$60.4 million in approved contract funding. Available at: http://www.cgdev.org/doc/MCA/MCC_Compact_disburs_Feb07.pdf

CHART 8: FOREIGN OPERATIONS BREAKDOWN BY SECTOR



ic growth, family planning, agricultural development, health and the environment.

Second, the FY08 request suggests a significant shift of funds away from traditional development assistance accounts to ESF, which has an overall purpose that is primarily strategic. The Bush administration insists that this should not be taken as a lack of commitment to development, as such: by its own calculations, some 84.3% of proposed ESF for FY 2008 is in fact “development-type aid” intended to fulfill the three objectives of “governing justly and democratically,” “investing in people,” and “promoting economic freedom.” The shift to ESF, in this light, simply reflects new book-keeping under recent foreign aid reforms. Nevertheless, there are grounds for concern. First, without detailed breakdowns for the uses of ESF, it remains impossible to judge the appropriateness of development spending in certain countries (i.e., the large amount of development-type aid to Pakistan). Second, the greater flexibility of ESF compared to DA means that there is an even larger pot of money that could in principle be shifted from long-term development to political and security goals related to the “war on terror.”

LACK OF ATTENTION TO WEAK AND FAILING STATES

One of the most glaring problems with the FY2008 foreign assistance request is that it simply does not correspond to the administration’s own analysis of the main threats to U.S. national Security. In his National Security Strategy of September 2002, President Bush memorably declared that the United States was for the first time in its history “now more threatened by weak and failing states than we are by conquering ones.”²⁶ Yet more than five years later, the administration has failed to come up with a serious strategy to bolster the institutional capacities of poorly performing developing countries, so that they can deliver to their inhabitants the fundamental goods of physical security, economic growth, and accountable governance. Although the recent foreign assistance reforms have the potential to improve the strategic coherence of U.S. policy towards weak and failing states, the FY2008 budget request evinces a yawning chasm between the administration’s rhetoric on weak and failing states and the

26 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington: 2002).

actual allocation of federal dollars.²⁷ As figure X shows, more than half of proposed bilateral U.S. foreign aid—some \$10.6 billion—would go to just 10 high-profile countries that are either allies in the wars on terror (or drugs) or beneficiaries of PEPFAR—largely ignoring the remaining 50-odd weak and failing states around the world.

TOWARD A MORE BALANCED BUDGET

Despite a significant up-tick in U.S. development assistance in recent years, the United States continues to lag behind most OECD donors in terms of the share of its gross national income (GNI) devoted to foreign aid, ranking only 19 out of 21 among wealthy donor countries, giving some 0.18% of its GNI (or 19 cents a day per American) in official development assistance.²⁸ While it is often stated that the modest U.S. development aid budget is offset by private donations, this is only partly true, since private giving amounts to no

more than ten cents a day per American.²⁹ To ensure its leadership in global development, it would be appropriate for the United States to match the recent commitment by the European Union to spend 0.56% of its GNI on development assistance. A similar commitment by the United States, which had a \$12.98 trillion economy in 2006, would imply an increase in official U.S. development assistance of \$45 billion dollars over the FY2008 budget of \$24.34 billion. The Task Force does not recommend making up this shortfall all at once, but recommends an increase of \$15 billion this year, showing a serious commitment to achieving the OECD benchmark in the near future.

A RENEWED MULTILATERALISM

Beyond providing more funds, the United States needs to embrace collaboration with other donors in addressing the problems of the world's poorest countries. The recent U.S. penchant for unilateral and bilateral development initiatives increases transaction costs, makes it difficult to leverage contributions from fellow donors, hinders overall policy coher-

27 For a similar analysis of the FY2007 request, see Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, "Fragile States and U.S. Foreign Assistance: Show Me the Money," CGD Working Paper 96 (August 2006).

28 Center for Global Development and *Foreign Policy*, Commitment to Development Index 2006, available at: http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/cdi

29 Center for Global Development Commitment to Development Index, http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/cdi/_country/united_states/

CHART 9: U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE WINNERS

Country	Total	% U.S. Aid	Per Capita
Israel	2.4	9.3	347
Egypt	1.7	6.7	23
Afghanistan	1.4	5.5	45
Iraq	1.3	5.2	50
Pakistan	.785	3.1	5
Sudan	.679	2.6	19
South Africa	.612	2.4	14
Colombia	.590	2.3	13
Kenya	.544	2.1	16
Nigeria	.534	2.1	4

ence within the international community, and places undue burdens on developing countries.

By virtue of their administrative and legislative mandates, both MCA and PEPFAR are required to operate as “lone rangers” at the country level, meaning that the United States must create entirely new in-country mechanisms to coordinate and deliver assistance, taxing the capabilities of already stretched developing countries. Moreover, these parallel aid structures limit the development impact of U.S. aid, inasmuch as assistance channeled through multilateral institutions is typically of higher quality. Greater reliance on cooperation with other donors and especially through existing multilateral channels would better leverage U.S. resources for development, stimulating the contributions of other countries, giving the United States more influence over how the total is spent.³⁰

U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Repairing the nation’s severely damaged relations with the rest of the world requires a strong recommitment to multilateralism and international institutions, in resources as well as rhetoric.

Support for these institutions is funded out of a variety of accounts within the overall International Affairs budget. The Bush administration has proposed reducing International Organizations and Programs account within the Foreign Operations account by 37%. Since 2006, the administration has proposed cuts in nearly every voluntary contribution to United Nations organizations, including the two major international programs addressing poverty elimination and environmental regeneration: the Development Program (UNDP) and the Environment Program (UNEP). In addition, the administration proposed cutting the UN Development Fund for Women by 70%. Remarkably, given the damage to the nation’s international reputation caused by the new policy on torture, the contribution to the UN Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture has been cut by 27%.

Additionally, there is a \$130 million shortfall in the Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) account from FY2007. The FY08 CIO request, despite an 18% increase, only covers current assessments and does not address the ‘07 arrears. The CIO account funds not only the UN regular budget but also 43 other treaty-based organizations that support our national security interests—including the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), NATO, World Health Organization, and Food and Agriculture Organization. Most of the U.S. dues in these organizations are already paid about a year late. If this shortfall isn’t addressed, the U.S. will go into arrears at one or more

Of particular note is the IAEA request: The FY2008 budget request would allocate \$86.8 million in assessed contributions, just shy of the administration’s request of last year, which Congress cut by nearly \$6 million. The importance of this agency can be stated in the starkest terms: had the United States abided by its judgment on (the absence of) weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the U.S.-led coalition could have avoided war. The United States has indicated what it is willing to spend on inspections when it thinks they matter: the CIA’s Iraq Survey Group spent \$100 million a *month* in a futile search for those weapons in Iraq. Yet in 2007, the IAEA is pursuing its mandate to conduct inspections across the globe on a budget of \$372.5 million for the *year*.³¹

The Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) account provides money to pay U.S.-assessed dues at 45 international organizations including the World Health Organization, NATO, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the WTO, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations. These organizations help the United States to advance a wide range of foreign policy objectives, including promoting economic growth through market economies; monitoring nuclear proliferation; creating norms for international telecommunications; and fending off global pandemics.

The United States has chosen to belong to each organization and signed treaties committing to pay for our share of their operations. We can choose to drop out of any of these organizations if we find that they do not suit our diplomatic purposes. To date, the U.S. government has made no such finding.

LATE PAYMENTS AND ARREARS

For several years, Congress has reduced the State Department’s request for this (CIO) account. By the end of FY 2006, the CIO account had a \$162 million shortfall, \$90 million of which came from Congressional underfunding. To minimize the impact of the shortfalls, the State Department began paying an increasing number of CIO dues and organizations late.

The FY2007 Continuing Resolution exacerbated this

30 Nancy Birdsall, Stewart Patrick and Nancy Birdsall, “Reforming U.S. Development Policy: Four Critical Fixes,” *CGD Essay* (February 2006).

31 See http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC50Documents/English/gc50-6_en.pdf.

problem and will lead the U.S. to incur \$130 million in arrears in one or more of these treaty-based CIO organizations, as the State Department has exhausted its ability to defer payments in the CIO organizations—now paying 100% of these organizations late—to cover its shortfalls.

This increasing trend of paying late and underfunding international organizations confounds U.S. demands that they be better managed. WHO, for example, reports that U.S. arrears prevent well-managed budgets and result in programs reaching full staff and technical capacity a year or more after they were planned to be fully operational. Similarly, the Organization for Cooperation and Economic Development has been forced to withhold staff pay because of U.S. arrears.

Paying these international organizations late is counterproductive to U.S. interests. The U.S. pays the IAEA extra to carry out a number of programs critical to U.S. national security, such as strengthening nuclear safeguards to detect secret or undeclared nuclear activities. The IAEA's major contributors, including the U.S., have long required that its core budget maintain zero-growth. Yet the IAEA staff who plan, manage, and account for these critical programs are funded through that core budget. So when the U.S. pays the majority of its IAEA dues more than a year late, as it usually does, the IAEA's ability manage staffing needs is hindered. In the past, the IAEA has run out of money to pay staff salaries, forcing them to borrow from the UN's Working Capital Fund—a very limited funding source.

Further, other dues-paying countries take note when the U.S. fails to honor its commitments in these international organizations. As a result, our influence on making budgetary and policy decisions in them is reduced. For example, the U.S. consistently wants the Food and Agriculture Organization to increase its capacity to set world-wide food and plant standards; such expectations are undermined by the U.S.' chronic record of failing to pay its dues on time.

The Task Force recommends increasing the U.S. contribution to the IAEA by \$100 million, making the administration's identification of nuclear nonproliferation as its highest foreign policy priority more credible. We recommend making up the \$130 million shortfall in FY2007 appropriations for the overall Contributions to International Organizations account. And we recommend increasing the overall FY2008 request by \$1 billion—the cost of about three days of occupation in Iraq—as a start on redressing the bitter legacy of that occupation and projecting a more positive role for the U.S. in the international community.

U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

Through its permanent seat on the Security Council, the United States not only approves all peacekeeping operations but has pressed for more of these missions, sending peacekeepers to conflict zones like Lebanon, Haiti, and Sudan. With nearly 100,000 troops deployed around the world, UN peacekeeping missions “further U.S. objectives by ending conflicts, restoring peace, and strengthening regional stability,” as noted in the budget summary issued by the President. But the Administration's budget request shortchanges the CIPA account in excess of \$500 million—even though we will enter the FY2008 cycle about \$650 million behind. This includes unjustified cuts in funding to UN peacekeeping missions in the Congo and Haiti and zero funding for the proposed hybrid UN/African Union mission in Darfur.

These arrears stem from inadequate budgets, an outdated Congressional peacekeeping cap and past, unilateral, Congressional decisions not to pay for peacekeeping missions that the U.S. voted for at the UN. These debts are preventing the UN from paying the countries that offer up troops for UN peacekeeping missions and likely hit India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh especially hard.

Beyond this current debt, peacekeeping experts conclude that Bush's FY2008 budget will add \$450 million to the U.S. peacekeeping debt at the UN based upon existing UN peacekeeping missions. And if the proposed UN missions in Chad/Central African Republic and Somalia are undertaken, estimates are that the arrears would grow by another \$300 million. Combined past arrears and current shortfalls will leave the United States close to \$1.3 billion dollars short of meeting its UN peacekeeping obligations.

Meanwhile the United States has been pressing and voting for several new and expanded UN peacekeeping missions. For example, within the last year, the United States has voted for:

- A seven-fold expansion of the UN's peacekeeping mission in Lebanon;
- The expansion of Sudan's peacekeeping mission into Darfur;
- Reauthorization of the UN's peacekeeping mission in Haiti;
- A renewed peacekeeping mission for East Timor; and,

- New missions in Chad, the Central African Republic, and Nepal.

Putting our money where our mouth is will require, at a minimum making up the \$1.3 billion budget shortfall.

UN PEACEBUILDING

In one of the rare points of consensus at the UN World Summit in September 2005, member states supported the establishment of a UN Peacebuilding Commission. The idea is to address a critical shortcoming in the international support structures for peace, namely that peacekeeping mandates tend to dry up and resources and attention go elsewhere once the fighting has stopped or been contained. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed a new UN body to devise comprehensive peacebuilding strategies for post-conflict situations, in order to coordinate the work of international actors (such as bilateral donors, peacekeeping troop contributors, regional organizations and international financial institutions, in addition to the relevant UN agencies), and to support the country's own recovery planning. His proposal specified both a commission drawn from representatives of selected member states, and a Peacebuilding Support Office within the Secretariat supported by a standing fund.

On December 20, 2005, the UN General Assembly and Security Council both passed resolutions establishing the commission. It has now begun to operate. Its current shortcomings include a lack of clear coordinating authority, and money.

A 31-member Organizational Committee leads the commission, made up of representatives of the Security, Economic and Social Councils, the General Assembly, and top contributors of UN funds, troops and police to peacekeeping missions. The Commission operates only by consensus, and has no way of assuring the cooperation or coordination of the various international, state and NGO actors involved in a common post-conflict plan. In January 2007, the UN Security Council did elect Panama and South Africa as its two non-permanent Council members to sit on the Organizational Committee.

The Peacebuilding Commission designated Burundi and Sierra Leone as the first post-conflict peacebuilding cases to be brought before the Commission. Coordinated peacebuilding activities began in both countries in Fall 2006. Launched on October 11, 2006, the Peacebuilding Fund draws its funds from voluntary contributions from member states. The Fund has a preliminary target pledge of \$250 million. Sixteen countries—Indonesia, Finland, Sweden, Egypt, United

Kingdom, Turkey, China, Denmark, the Netherlands, Japan, Korea, Ireland, Iceland, Luxembourg, Belgium and Croatia pledged a total of \$144 million toward that total at the time of the Fund's launch. The U.S. was not among them.

Currently, the cases of Burundi and Sierra Leone are the main recipients of the Fund's activities, with \$25 million in grants pledged to each country by the Commission on December 13, 2006. Guinea-Bissau has also been designated by the Economic and Social Council for peacebuilding efforts.

With such meager funds to begin their peacebuilding activities, both Burundi and Sierra Leone will face challenges in fostering sustainable peace. In Sierra Leone, youth unemployment and reform in the criminal justice and security areas remain the greatest challenges to strengthening the democratic process. In Burundi, promoting good governance, strengthening rule of law, and disputes over human rights abuses and land ownership remain obstacles to the success of the Commission's coordinating efforts.

The challenge for the international community is to deliver on its commitment to peacebuilding and pledges to the Peacebuilding Fund. At the Burundi Country-Specific Meeting in December 2006, Commission members expressed concern about a budget shortfall. Though the government of Burundi has made significant strides to strengthen accountability and transparency, there is great concern about the "potential negative consequences on peacebuilding efforts should the Government fail to consistently provide adequate and timely salaries to civil servants and members of the security forces."³² It is essential that the Commission is able to provide adequate funds to both the Burundian and Sierra Leonean government to carry out to peacebuilding activities at hand.

The Bush administration has expressed support for the concept of UN Peacebuilding, but budgeted no money for it. The Unified Security Budget task force last year recommended an initial voluntary (non-assessed) U.S. contribution of \$500 million. This recommendation remains in place.

UNITED NATIONS CIVILIAN POLICE CORPS

While the political obstacles to a UN standing military force are daunting, more support exists for a standing UN Civilian Police Corps to restore the rule of law and ensure public safety in post-conflict societies and failed states. Such a force would be designed to address both the short-term need to

³² Chairman's Summary; Burundi Country-Specific Meeting; Peacebuilding Commission, December, 12 2006. <http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/pdf/burundi-chair-12dec2006.pdf>

fill the security gap left by inadequate local capacity, and the long-term goal of rebuilding the indigenous security sector. The 2005 United Nations World Summit Outcome document endorses the creation of an initial operating capacity for a standing UN police force to support its peacekeeping missions. This is the crucial work that national military forces are neither equipped nor inclined to do. Currently the UN General Assembly has budgeted for only 20 UN police officers. But to do this task effectively, the UN would need an estimated one-year start-up budget of \$700 million to establish a brigade-strength force of 5,000 police officers equipped with light-armored transport, protective gear, and weapons. Standing capacity would require a base and an operational headquarters, as well as provisions for a mobile field headquarters. Costs would be substantially lower than those for a military force equipped for robust operations. The 27% U.S. share, of a \$700 million cost estimate, would amount to \$189 million.

SMALL ARMS/LIGHT WEAPONS DESTRUCTION INITIATIVE

One bright spot in the FY2008 request is a large percentage increase in funding to assist other countries in securing and destroying stockpiles of small arms and light weapons, including assault rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers, and mobile anti-aircraft guns. Stockpiles of these weapons are often poorly secured and vulnerable to theft or illegal transfer. These weapons are responsible for the vast majority of violent deaths around the world—an average of 300,000 per year, most of them civilians. This year the request for the small pilot program begun in 2001 has been increased from \$8.6 to \$44.7 million. Given the magnitude of the problem, and the relative ease of implementing this solution (compared to the counterpart programs to destroy stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons) our task force recommends doubling this appropriation.

HOMELAND SECURITY

HOMELAND SECURITY IN 2006

Last year, the FY2007 Unified Security Budget called for increasing the Bush Administration's proposed approximately \$45 billion non-military homeland security budget by \$23.75 billion.³³ Congress added \$2.7 billion to Bush's

DHS request,³⁴ allocating additional resources for some of the priorities the Unified Security Budget identified.

The picture is worse for non-DHS homeland security programs the FY2007 Unified Security Budget supported. In addition to DHS, only the Department of Defense had a regular appropriations bill enacted by the 109th Congress. All other departments were (and are) funded by a series of continuing resolutions, which have generally limited spending to the lesser of the House or Senate-passed appropriations amount, or the FY2006 level. The major non-DHS security program identified as a priority by the FY2007 Unified Security Budget was public health infrastructure within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which includes the Hospital Preparedness and Infrastructure grant program within the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), and the Upgrading State and Local Capacity grants within the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Whereas the Unified Security Budget had called for a \$10 billion increase "to bring the U.S. public health system up to an acceptable level of preparedness," as identified in a Public Health Foundation report,³⁵ these HHS programs were funded at the FY2006 level (\$824 million for the CDC state and local capacity grants and \$474 million for the HRSA hospital preparedness grants). That was not enough but was still \$62 million *above* the Administration budget request.³⁶

The final homeland security priority identified in the FY2007 Unified Security Budget was nuclear plant hardening by the Department of Energy. This proposal would involve placing all spent fuel over five years old from American nuclear power plants into thick-walled dry storage containers. The Unified Security Budget called for spending \$700 million in FY2007. The Administration and Congress left this crucial item out of the budget.

Several relevant homeland security laws were adopted last year. In October, the *Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act* was signed into law. It seeks to expedite the development and deployment of more advanced inspection detectors; codify and revise the CSI and C-TPAT programs; require that port security grants be based on risk assessment;

33 *A Unified Security Budget for the United States, 2007*, (Washington, DC, May 2006), pp. 8, 22.

34 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, *Making Appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2007*, Conference Report, House Report 109-699, 109th Congress, 2d Session.

35 *A Unified Security Budget for the United States, 2007*, p. 42. Also "Public Health: Costs of Complacency," *Governing*, February 2004, available at: <http://www.governing.com/gpp/2004/public.htm>

36 Department of Health and Human Services, "2008 Budget in Brief," p. 109, <http://www.hhs.gov/budget/docbudget.htm>.

CHART 10: FY2007 APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

	Administration	USB vs. Administration	Congress vs. Administration
DHS Appropriations	32.1	+13.1	+2.7
Chemical Site Security	.001	+0.05	0.0
Port Security	2.03	+0.50	+0.21
Transit Security Grants	0.0	+6.0	+1.18
First Responder Grants	1.918	+4.0	+2.24
Container Security	0.38	+2.5	+2.20

- 1 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Making Appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2007, Conference Report, House Report 109-699, 109th Congress, 2d Session.
- 2 Includes Coast Guard programs for Port, Waterways, & Coastal Security plus Port Security Grants.
- 3 Under an Administration plan, rejected by Congress, funding for port, rail and transit and other infrastructure grants was to be made from the Targeted Infrastructure Protection program, which was to determine priorities and projects “based on the National Preparedness Goal and National Infrastructure Protection Plan.” The separate programs that were to have been consolidated (including Port Security, Trucking Security, Intercity Bus Security, Rail and Transit Security, and Buffer Zone Protection) received \$374 million in FY2006 appropriations, whereas the TIPP was budgeted for \$585 million in the Administration’s FY2007 request. Office of Management and Budget, The Budget for Fiscal Year 2007, Appendix, pp. 508-509.
- 4 Includes State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP), Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), Emergency Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG), Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS), Citizen Corps Program (CCP), and Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI).
- 5 Includes Container Security Initiative (CSI), Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), Radiation Portal Monitors, and Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography Systems (CAARS).
- 6 Congressional additions were not for programs specified in Unified Security Budget but for related increase of 450 CBP inspectors and purchase of “critical non-intrusive inspection equipment.”

establish a port security training and exercise program; and require DHS to develop a plan to enhance the security of the maritime supply chain and speed the resumption of trade after a terrorist attack.³⁷ As an authorization bill, the *SAFE Port Act* does nothing to address the resource shortages that continue to plague port and container security efforts. It falls short in other respects as well.³⁸

The *Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act* became law in December. This measure designates the Department of Health and Human Services as the primary federal agency for coordinating the national response to public health and medical emergencies. It authorizes funding for improving the readiness of the public health system to address such emergencies, enhancing the capacity of medical facilities to respond to emergencies, and expanding and training the public health workforce. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that fully funding the provisions of the bill would cost \$6 billion over the next five years.³⁹

37 PL 109-347; and U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, *Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006*, conference report, House Report 109-711, 109th Congress, 2d Session.

38 Center for American Progress, “Who’s Protecting our Ports? Not Homeland Security, Says GAO,” http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2006/10/port_security.htm

39 Congressional Budget Office, “Cost Estimate: S. 3678, Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act,” August 4, 2006.

Legislation to improve chemical facility security was reported out by committees in the House and Senate, and the enacted FY2007 DHS Appropriations bill included a scaled-back version.⁴⁰ This three-year authorization provides for the inspection and sanctioning of non-compliant facilities.⁴¹ However, though many view the new law as a major improvement, it didn't require chemical facilities to use safer technologies where available to reduce the consequences of terrorist attacks, and it did not authorize states to go beyond any federal security requirements in this area.⁴²

Committees in both houses of Congress reported out legislation to provide \$3.5 billion in security grants for public transportation systems. Neither chamber took further action.⁴³

Thus, in 2006 the government continued the post-9/11 pattern of increased funding and increased policy attention to homeland security. While some of these efforts have led to improvements, recent independent assessments agree that glaring deficiencies persist.

For example, the DHS Inspector General's performance report for 2006 highlighted problems in the Department's programs for grants management, information sharing, infrastructure protection, border security, airport checkpoint screening, and surface transportation security.⁴⁴

In a January 2007 report, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) pointed to shortcomings in aviation passenger prescreening programs for both domestic and international flights, air cargo security, general aviation security, immigrant visas, the Visa Waiver Program, implementation of risk management principles, information sharing, DHS departmental management, advanced technology development, conduct of risk assessments, and inspection of seaborne cargo for radioactive materials.⁴⁵

And in January 2007 testimony to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security, former 9/11 Commissioners Lee Hamilton, Slade Gorton and Timothy Roemer reported that, while roughly half of the Commission's 41 recommendations had been enacted into law, not even all of those had been effectively implemented. They called for further action on information sharing, communications among first responders, emergency response plans, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, airline passenger prescreening, risk-based allocation of homeland security funds, and Congressional oversight reform.⁴⁶

It will take more money and not just legislative action and oversight to implement the 9/11 Commission's recommendations and get DHS on the right track.

HOMELAND SECURITY IN 2007

The Bush administration's proposed FY2008 budget includes \$61.1 billion for what it defines as homeland security activities. That represents a \$4.7 billion (8.4%) increase over the current year's total. Excluding mandatory funding and Department of Defense programs, the FY2008 request translates into a net discretionary spending increase of \$3.4 billion (10.3%) over the 2007 level. Of that total, \$29.7 billion is requested for homeland security activities within DHS, which is \$978 million above the FY2007 amount for these programs, including sums provided in FY2007 supplemental and emergency appropriations bills. The major proposed

40 Congressional Budget Office, "Cost Estimate: S. 2145, Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006," July 25, 2006; and, Congressional Budget Office, "Cost Estimate: H.R. 5695, Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006," August 31, 2006.

41 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, *Making Appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2007*, Conference Report, House Report 109-699, 109th Congress, 2d Session, Section 550, p. 178.

42 National Environmental Trust, "Timeline of Bush Administration Action on Chemical Plant Security," <http://www.net.org/proactive/newsroom/release.vtml?id=29115>

43 Congressional Budget Office, "Cost Estimate: S. 2032, Public Transportation Terrorism Prevention Act of 2005," December 3, 2005; and Congressional Budget Office, "Cost Estimate: H.R. 5808: Public Transportation Security Assistance Act of 2006," August 17, 2006.

44 Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, "Major Management Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security (Excerpts from the FY2006 DHS Performance and Accountability Report)," OIG-07-12 (Washington, DC, December 2006).

45 Government Accountability Office, "Homeland Security: Progress Has Been Made to Address the Vulnerabilities Exposed by 9/11, but Continued Federal Action is Needed to Further Mitigate Security Risks," GAO-07-375 (Washington, DC, January 2007).

46 Prepared Statement of Vice Chair Lee H. Hamilton, and Commissioners Slade Gorton and Timothy J. Roemer, former Members of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Hearing on "Full Implementation of the 9/11 Commission's Recommendations," Washington, DC, January 9, 2007.

spending increases for DHS (36%) are for border security programs of the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) division, including the hiring of 3,000 new Border Patrol agents and an expansion of the Secure Border Initiative, which funds investments in technology and border fencing.⁴⁷

The House of Representatives has already taken significant action, by passing HR 1, the *Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007*.⁴⁸

HR 1 seeks to improve upon the federal government's implementation of the 41 recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission in 2004. A group formed by the 9/11 Commissioners to monitor and report on implementation of its recommendations, the 9/11 Public Discourse Project (9/11 PDP), reported that as of December 2005, just one area merited an "A" for implementation (an A- for efforts against terrorist financing), whereas it issued twelve D's, five F's and two incompletes.⁴⁹

HR 1 was designed to address such flaws. It covers most areas mentioned in the 9/11 Commission recommendations (the most notable exception being congressional oversight), including risk-based allocation of homeland security grants (Title I), communications interoperability for first responders (Title II), a unified emergency command structure (Title III), aviation security (Title IV), container security (Title V), prevention of terrorist travel (Title VI), intelligence and law enforcement (Title VII), civil liberties protection (Title VIII), critical infrastructure protection (Title IX), transportation security planning (Title X), private sector preparedness (Title XI), non-proliferation efforts (Titles XII and XIII), and foreign policy and public diplomacy (Title XIV).

HR 1 would increase the proportion of homeland security grants allocated on the basis of risk by reducing the minimum state share of certain such grants from 0.75% to 0.25% (section 101).⁵⁰ It would mandate that within three years of the

bill's enactment all cargo on passenger aircraft be inspected (section 406). Effective three years after enactment in the case of cargo originating from the busiest foreign ports and five years in all other cases, the bill prohibits the entry into the United States of any containers not scanned for radioactive materials and not secured with anti-breach seals (section 501). It would also strengthen the powers and independence of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (sections 803-805).⁵¹

While HR 1 attempts to address critical homeland security challenges via mandates and reporting requirements, as an authorization bill it would not deal with the key issue of inadequate funding. Given that the new House leadership has also reinstated "pay-as-you-go" requirements—whereby new spending proposals must be accompanied by offsets in the form of revenue increases or spending cuts—achieving many of its ambitious objectives (for example, 100% air cargo and maritime container screening) will be difficult, if not impossible.

We applaud the House's intent to both reinstitute fiscal responsibility (in the form of pay-as-you-go) and attend to vital unmet needs in homeland security (via HR 1), but one cannot do both while operating under the current paradigm where "national defense" and "homeland security" are thought of as totally distinct undertakings. The whole purpose of this year's Unified Security Budget, like its predecessors, is to eliminate this artificial division, and thereby allow policymakers to allocate the over half-a-trillion dollars currently budgeted for these programs in aggregate toward the most urgent priorities, whether managed by the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, or one of the many other federal agencies having a role in national security.

HOMELAND SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS

In developing recommendations for this year's Unified Security Budget for homeland security, we looked for investments with multiple, ongoing benefits that extend beyond counterterrorism. For example, rebuilding U.S. public health infrastructure will help prepare for bioterrorist attacks while also enhancing our ability to cope with other health dangers, such as pandemic flu. Similarly, improving spent nuclear fuel storage security would help protect us from terrorist sabotage and all nuclear accidents.

47 Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the United States, Fiscal Year 2008*, "Analytical Perspectives," pp. 19-20, 24.

48 *Congressional Record*, 110th Congress, 1st session, January 9, 2007, pp. H221-222.

49 9/11 Public Discourse Project, "Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations," December 5, 2005, www.9-11pdp.org

50 The provisions of section 101 apply only to DHS' Homeland Security Grant Program, Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), and Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program, and explicitly exclude the DHS Fire Grant Programs, the various emergency management planning and assistance account programs, and all grant programs outside of DHS. Furthermore, the state minimum allocation is not applicable to the UASI program.

51 *Congressional Record*, 110th Congress, 1st session, January 9, 2007, pp. H132-161.

1. Transportation Security

A. Accelerate deployment of optimal, in-line checked baggage and cargo screening equipment for passenger aircraft.

The 9/11 Commission called for expediting the installation of so-called in-line baggage screening systems (in which the screening equipment is integrated into baggage conveyor systems within the baggage handling area) and reducing the threat posed by cargo transported by passenger aircraft.⁵² As of December 2005, the 9/11 PDP gave a “D” for implementing checked bag and cargo screening recommendations, stating, “The main impediment is inadequate funding.”⁵³

A June 2006 GAO report highlighted security and ancillary benefits from in-line screening, including screening more bags per hour, with fewer personnel required to operate the equipment; reducing on-the-job injuries to screener personnel (primarily through a reduction in the need for lifting of baggage); and reducing airport lobby congestion.⁵⁴

Despite these advantages, as of June 26, 2006, only 25 of the nation’s 263 commercial airports (including just eight of the 21 largest) had operational, in-line EDS systems, with construction then underway at 24 more. In May 2006, TSA reported that, under current funding levels, installation of “optimal checked baggage screening systems” (mostly in-line) at all U.S. airports would not be completed until approximately 2024. (A February 2006 TSA report had estimated the total installation and operations costs for such an effort at \$22.4 billion over 20 years.)⁵⁵ The Administration’s FY2008 budget would actually cut funding for the purchase, installation and maintenance of baggage screening devices by \$45

million, to \$729 million.⁵⁶

As noted above, section 406 of HR 1 would require that within three years of the bill’s enactment all air cargo on passenger aircraft be inspected. The CBO has estimated that implementing this provision would cost \$250 million in FY2007 and \$3.5 billion over five years.⁵⁷

Waiting until 23 years after 9/11 is an unacceptable time-frame for deploying an “optimal” baggage screening system. Even if somewhat ambitious, HR 1 imparts the right sense of urgency. Recommendation: fully fund section 406 of HR 1, and accelerate the deployment of in-line screening systems.

B. Increase funding for Coast Guard port security operations and port security grants.

The 2002 *Homeland Security Act* gave the United States Coast Guard (USCG) the lead role in maritime security, but with a large majority of its responsibilities and budget devoted to non-homeland security missions such as search and rescue, aiding navigation, and illegal drug interdiction, it has faced a daunting challenge in balancing its various mandates and adequately funding the port security component.⁵⁸ The December 2006 DHS Inspector General’s report stated, “While overall resources devoted to USCG’s homeland security missions grew steadily from FY 2001 through FY 2005, USCG continues to experience difficulty meeting the performance goals for homeland security missions.”⁵⁹

DHS port security grants assist individual ports in implementing the security requirements imposed by the 2002 *Maritime Transportation Security Act* (MTSA), the cost of which had been estimated by the Coast Guard to be \$7.3 billion over 10 years,⁶⁰ but problems have been noted in the

52 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), *The 9/11 Commission Report: The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, Authorized Edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), p. 393.

53 9/11 Public Discourse Project, “Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations,” December 5, 2005, <http://www.011pdp.org>.

54 Government Accountability Office, “Aviation Security: TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems, but Funding Uncertainties Remain,” GAO-06-875T, June 29, 2006, pp. 9-14.

55 Government Accountability Office, “Aviation Security: TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems, but Funding Uncertainties Remain,” GAO-06-875T, June 29, 2006, p. 4.

56 Office of Management and Budget, *The Budget for Fiscal Year 2008, Analytical Perspectives*, p. 24.

57 Congressional Budget Office, “Cost Estimate for HR 1: Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007,” February 2, 2007, pp. 4-5.

58 R. William Johnstone, *9/11 and the Future of Transportation Security*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), pp. 85-87.

59 Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, “Major Management Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security (Excerpts from the FY2006 DHS Performance and Accountability Report),” OIG-07-12 (Washington, DC, December 2006), p. 21.

60 John Fritelli, Congressional Research Service, “Maritime Security: Overview of Issues,” RS21079 (Washington, DC: December 5, 2003), p. 5.

administration of this program. As former DHS Inspector General Clark Ervin has written,

The results of our examination were shocking. More than a half a billion dollars was awarded to over 1,200 proposed projects throughout the nation that were supposed, in one way or another, to improve the security of ports. But...several hundred projects of dubious security were funded, and some projects that would have enhanced security went unfunded. For example, DHS headquarters overruled the field and funded a \$180,000 project to install lighting in a port visited by fewer than twenty ships a year. At the same time, headquarters rejected a field recommendation to fund a \$250,000-plus project to install gates, fences, cameras, and lighting in a port facility adjacent to a sulfur plant near six other chemical plants, even though evaluators said that they “strongly” recommended approval.⁶¹

The *SAFE Port Act of 2006* (PL 109-347) seeks to strengthen the use of risk management in the port security grant process and increases the authorization for the program to \$400 million a year for FYs 2007-2011.⁶²

Recommendation: Allocate an additional \$500 million a year to the Coast Guard for port security improvements and fund the port security grant program at the \$400 million level authorized by the SAFE Port Act.

C. Expand container security programs, including accelerating plans for scanning containers entering the United States with effective radiation detection equipment.

The Container Security Initiative (CSI), started in February 2002, uses an automated system to identify and prescreen high-risk containers bound for the U.S. from the largest foreign ports. The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) began in April 2002 and establishes federal-industry partnerships that offer expedited customs processing for shipping companies that reduce their security

vulnerabilities.⁶³ As of the end of 2006, CSI was operational in 50 foreign ports, which account for almost 82% of all U.S. bound maritime cargo.⁶⁴ However, problems continue with respect to its targeting system, legal authorities, and personnel levels, resulting in 35% of the cargo shipped to the U.S. from CSI ports escaping the targeting process altogether. C-TPAT reported approximately 5,000 participants as of May 2005, but only a tenth of these had been validated as having actually implemented the security measures they pledged to under the program.⁶⁵

The last session of Congress took steps to remedy the problems identified in the CSI and C-TPAT programs. The FY2007 DHS Appropriations bill provided \$181.8 million for hiring an additional 450 customs inspectors and the purchase of non-intrusive inspection equipment.⁶⁶ The *SAFE Port Act* slightly increased the authorization levels for the Automated Tracking System (which targets high-risk cargo for CSI and other programs), CSI and C-TPAT (by \$18 million in FY08, \$42 million over three years).⁶⁷

Furthermore, Section 232 of the *SAFE Port Act* required DHS to ensure that all containers arriving in the United States are scanned for radioactive materials “as soon as possible,” and to assist in that objective, directed the Department to conduct a pilot program for 100% scanning at three foreign ports. DHS is currently carrying this directive out at ports in the United Kingdom, Honduras and Pakistan, with a more limited pilot program at ports in South Korea, Singapore and Oman. HR 1 would go further. CBO estimates that it would cost \$160 million over the next five years to implement these provisions, mostly for hiring an additional 400-500 inspectors to be stationed at the overseas ports.⁶⁸

61 Clark Kent Ervin, *Open Target: Where America Is Vulnerable to Attack*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 134.

62 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, *HR 4954, Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006*, Conference Report, House Report 109-711, pp. 84-85.

63 R. William Johnstone, *9/11 and the Future of Transportation Security*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), p. 87.

64 Department of Homeland Security, “FY 2008 Budget in Brief,” p. 27, available at: <http://www.iaem.com>

65 Clark Kent Ervin, *Open Target: Where America Is Vulnerable to Attack*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 120-122, 131.

66 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, *Making Appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2007*, Conference Report, House Report 109-699, 109th Congress, 2d Session, pp. 126-127.

67 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, *HR 4954, Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006*, Conference Report, House Report 109-711, pp. 90-95.

68 Congressional Budget Office, “Cost Estimate for HR 1: Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007,” February 2, 2007, pp. 5-6.

The Administration's FY2008 budget request provides \$15 million for a new Secure Freight Initiative, which involves hiring nine agents and acquiring and deploying radiological and nuclear screening equipment in foreign ports of departure for U.S. bound cargo.⁶⁹ Otherwise, the container security programs are recommended to receive a slight reduction in funding.⁷⁰

Recommendation: full funding of the provisions in the SAFE Port Act and HR 1 pertaining to container security.

D. Increase rail and transit security funding.

In spite of continuing indications of terrorist interest in attacking this mode, federal funding to protect all forms of land transportation combined – not just rail and transit systems but highways, bridges, tunnels, and pipelines as well – has never exceeded \$340 million in a year (reached in FY2005).⁷¹ Such efforts continue to be small, with the entire TSA budget for surface transportation in FY2007 being only \$37.2 million (which funds 100 rail and transit inspectors and a few dozen canine explosives detection teams), augmented by \$249 million in security grants for land transportation (\$175 million for rail and transit security, \$50 million for buffer zone protection, \$12 million for trucking security, and \$12 million for bus security).⁷² The FY2008 budget proposal calls for a \$3.5 million increase for the National Explosive Detection Canine Team Program to support the addition of 45 teams to be assigned to mass transit and ferry systems.⁷³

To begin to address this resource shortage, committees in both houses of Congress adopted legislation during 2006 that would have significantly boosted federal spending for transit security, though neither measure received further consideration. The Senate bill (S. 2032) would have authorized \$2.37 billion in FY2007 for security grants for capital in-

vestments, and another \$1 billion spread over three years for operational improvements (including training). It would also have authorized \$130 million in FY2007 for research grants on methods to deter or mitigate terrorist attacks on public transportation systems, and required DHS to finance the Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) for Public Transportation (estimated by CBO as costing \$1 million a year).⁷⁴ The comparable figures for the House bill (HR 5808) were \$2.5 billion total for FY07-09 for capital improvement grants, \$900 million FY07-09 for operational improvement grants, and \$1 million per year to cover the costs of the Public Transportation ISAC. In addition, the House bill would have provided \$150 million over the FY07-09 period for bus security grants.⁷⁵

Recommendation: Allocate \$3.5 billion a year for the rail and transit security grant program, and quadruple the TSA program for rail and transit inspectors and canine teams (to \$50 million a year).

E. Improve and expand security training for transportation workers.

After 9/11 the security training of commercial aircraft flight crews was a clear federal priority. However, a September 2005 GAO report on this training found that the TSA “has not established strategic goals and performance measures for assessing the effectiveness of crew member security training, nor required air carriers to do so.” TSA’s advanced voluntary training program for pilots and flight attendants was reported as suffering from “the lack of recurrent training, the lack of a realistic setting in which to conduct the training, and instructors’ lack of knowledge of crew members’ actual work environment.”⁷⁶

Despite growing attention to the need for enhanced security training for all transportation workers, especially with respect to transit, with the exception of the heavily studied training of the federalized airport screeners, and the aforementioned GAO report on flight crew training, little has been done to evaluate the content or the effectiveness of the

69 Department of Homeland Security, “FY 2008 Budget in Brief,” p. 30, available at: <http://www.iaem.com>

70 Office of Management and Budget, “2008 Budget Fact Sheets, Homeland Security,” February 2007.

71 R. William Johnstone, *9/11 and the Future of Transportation Security*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), pp. 65, 92.

72 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, *Making Appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2007*, Conference Report, House Report 109-699, 109th Congress, 2d Session, pp. 188, 191.

73 Department of Homeland Security, “Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2008,” p. 46, available at: <http://www.iaem.com>

74 Congressional Budget Office, “Cost Estimate: S. 2032, Public Transportation Terrorism Prevention Act of 2005,” December 3, 2005, p. 3.

75 Congressional Budget Office, “Cost Estimate: H.R. 5808: Public Transportation Security Assistance Act of 2006,” August 17, 2006, p. 3.

76 Government Accountability Office, “Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed,” GAO-05-781, (Washington, DC: September 2005), pp. 3, 4-5, 7.

security training currently being provided.⁷⁷ In testimony to the House Homeland Security Committee, the head of the AFL-CIO's transportation division indicated that approximately 60% of transit workers had not received security training.⁷⁸

S. 1052, reported out by the Senate Commerce Committee but not acted on by the Senate, would have directed DHS and DOT to issue guidelines to freight and intercity rail operators for the design and carrying out of security training for "front-line workers," who include security personnel, dispatchers, train operators, other onboard employees, maintenance and maintenance support personnel, bridge tenders, and others. The CBO estimated that 190,000 employees would have been covered, with 85% of them coming from the private sector and the remainder being government workers.⁷⁹ In many ways, the rail security training program would have followed the model that has produced uncertain benefits with respect to aviation flight crews.

Providing solid security training to front-line transportation workers, who are already deployed within the transportation systems we seek to protect—training that includes instruction in how to recognize, report on and respond to emergencies, as well as in self-defense—carries perhaps the greatest potential ancillary benefits of all by helping these workers deal with a host of non-terrorist threats, ranging from "air rage" to theft, to smuggling, to disease outbreaks.

Recommendation: Consolidate security training for transportation workers either as an independent office within DHS or as some form of public-private consortium that would develop training standards, select (and fund) trainers, and evaluate training results. The proposed budget begins at \$100 million in FY2008, and would rise in \$100 million increments over the next four years (reaching \$500 million in FY2012).

77 R. William Johnstone, *9/11 and the Future of Transportation Security*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), pp. 119-120.

78 Statement of Edward Wyrkind, Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO, before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Hearing on "Rail and Transit Security Training," Washington, DC, September 28, 2006, p. 3.

79 Congressional Budget Office, "Cost Estimate: S. 1052, Transportation Security Improvement Act of 2005," March 29, 2006, p. 6.

2. Critical infrastructure protection

A. Improve spent fuel storage security at nuclear power plants.

In the aftermath of the attack of September 11th, the nation's 103 commercial nuclear reactors were put on high security alert, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission conceded, "nuclear power plants were not designed to withstand such crashes." However, in late January 2007, the NRC declared that it was infeasible for reactor owners to protect against such crashes—leaving it up to the Federal government to address this problem.⁸⁰

Concerns about attacks against nuclear power plants have focused on spent reactor fuel pools, which, unlike the reactor cores, are not surrounded by heavy structures and thick containment. The largest concentrations of radioactivity in the world are stored in these pools at the nation's commercial reactors.

A loss of water exposing spent fuel could trigger a catastrophic fire. Nearly all U.S. nuclear plants have storage pools with densely compacted spent fuel. Once such fuel is exposed to air and steam, the zirconium fuel cladding would catch fire at about 1,000 degrees Centigrade and release potentially catastrophic amounts of radioactivity into the environment.

Spent fuel pools on the average hold five-to-ten times more long-lived radioactivity than a reactor core. In 2003, an independent study concluded that the NRC should not rule out a terrorist attack and that the potential consequences resulting from pool drainage and a subsequent fuel cladding fire could be severe.⁸¹

Of particular concern is the potential for enormous land contamination from radionuclides such as Cesium-137 resulting from a fuel pool fire. These dangers were underscored by the April 1986 Chernobyl accident, which resulted in the permanent evacuation of more than 100,000 residents and created a radiation control area contaminated by Cs-137 of 10,000 kilometers, nearly half the area of Massachusetts. By contrast a fire involving 10% of the Cs-137 spent reactor fuel

80 Steven Mufson, "Nuclear Agency: Air Defenses Impractical," *Washington Post*, January 30, 2007, p. A4.

81 Alvarez, R, J. Beyea, Jan Janberg, J. Kang, E. Lyman, A. Macfarlane, G. Thompson, F.N. von Hippel, "Reducing the Hazards of Stored Spent-Power Reactor Fuel in the United States, Science and Global Security," Vol. 11, pp. 1-51. (Alvarez et al 2003.)

pool inventory might result in an area of contamination substantially greater than created by the Chernobyl accident.⁸²

To reduce both the consequences and probability of a spent-fuel-pool fire, we propose that all spent fuel be transferred from wet to dry storage within five years of discharge.

The cost of on-site dry-cask storage for an additional 35,000 tons of older spent fuel is estimated at \$3.5-\$7 billion or 0.03-0.06 cents per kilowatt-hour generated from that fuel. The transfer to dry storage could be accomplished within a decade. Nations like Germany have been protecting spent power fuel against terrorist attacks using dry, hardened storage modes for some 20 years.

Nuclear power operators are balking at the extra cost of moving spent fuel out of pools to on-site dry storage because many operators are no longer able to pass such costs through to customers without fear of being undersold by competing power plants. To prevent extended delays in implementing dry storage, the federal government should pay for extra storage casks and any security upgrades that it might require for existing dry storage facilities.

Funds generated under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982 can cover these costs. Under that statute, in exchange for the U.S. government developing a permanent repository for spent reactor fuel, utilities make payments into a national Nuclear Waste Fund at the rate of 0.1 cents per net electrical kilowatt-hour generated by their nuclear plants. As of July 2006, this fund had a balance of more than \$19 billion.⁸³

The Nuclear Waste Fund can also fund dry, hardened storage. However, under some circumstances, all these funds may eventually be required for the Yucca Mountain facility, whose total cost is projected to be \$56 billion.⁸⁴ Most likely, therefore, the NWPA would have to be amended to allow the federal government to assume title to dry-stored spent fuel and responsibility for on-site storage.

Alternatively, a new federal statute could create an additional user fee. A 0.1 cents per nuclear kWh fee on utilities would generate an additional \$750 million per year that

could in five to ten years pay the \$3.5 to \$7 billion needed to transfer 35,000 tons of spent fuel into dry, hardened, on-site storage.

Recommendation: \$700 million be made available each year, starting in FY2008 and continuing for as long thereafter as necessary to transfer all spent fuel held at nuclear power plants from wet to dry storage within five years of the fuel's discharge.

B. Improve safety and security at U.S. Energy Department nuclear facilities

In FY 2006, about two-thirds of DOE's \$23.4 billion budget went for nuclear weapons activities and their environmental legacies. Energy is responsible for maintaining some 10,000 nuclear weapons in active and inactive stockpiles, protection of weapons design and manufacture information and technologies, and the safe and secure storage of nuclear weapons components, materials and related facilities.⁸⁵

DOE spends approximately \$1.5 billion per year on safeguards and security. By fiscal year 2011, DOE projects that it will spend about \$5 billion for this purpose.

However, more money does not necessarily mean better security. The continuing failure of the Energy Department to downsize and close its numerous Cold War nuclear sites, and to stabilize, secure and consolidate nuclear weapons material storage creates burgeoning safeguard and security costs.

A case in point is the Department's Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The Y-12 Complex stores the largest amount of fissile material in the United States—approximately 400 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU)—in deteriorated structures (such as wooden buildings), long recognized as being vulnerable to fires and earthquakes, and terrorist attacks. A large fraction of HEU that accumulated at the Y-12 site for more than 50 years is still in insecure and unstable forms, posing risks of dangerous nuclear reactions, fires and explosions.⁸⁶ Since 1997, the site has experienced 22 fires and explosions involving nuclear materials, chemicals, and aged electrical and cooling systems.⁸⁷ The near doubling of safeguard and security costs at the Y-12

82 Alvarez et al 2003.

83 Nuclear Energy Institute, *Frequently Asked Questions: Yucca Mountain Legislation*, August 2006, <http://www.net.org/proactive/newsroom/release.vtml?id=29115>

84 Mark Holt, "Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal," CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, September 19, 2006.

85 Robert S. Norris, "U.S. Nuclear Stockpile," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, May 2004.

86 Robert Alvarez, *Reducing the Risks of Highly Enriched Uranium at the U.S. Department of Energy's Y-12 National Security Complex, Science and Global Security*, in press, Taylor and Francis Press.

87 Ibid.

site over the past 10 years⁸⁸ has had no impact on these problems, but rather reflects the growing difficulty of protecting a legacy of deterioration.

Congress should require the Department of Energy to provide a detailed inventory of nuclear materials and accelerate the dismantlement of weapons. Until that time, DOE will continue to spend billions of dollars to protect facilities that are no longer needed and for nuclear weapons and materials that should not be there.

C. Expand and improve federal chemical sector security programs.

As mentioned above, the FY2007 DHS Appropriations bill contained a provision (section 550) that authorizes DHS to regulate the security of chemical plants. DHS issued proposed rules to implement the new law on December 22, 2006, with an effective date of April 4, 2007. The American Chemical Council, which represents the largest chemical manufacturers, voiced support for the proposal, which largely tracked previous industry recommendations. However, many in Congress expressed concern, especially about its pre-emption of tougher state policies and its omission of any provisions concerning the pursuit of alternative, safer manufacturing approaches.⁸⁹

Legislation adopted by committees in both the Senate (S. 2145) and House (HR 5695) in 2006 had addressed the issue in the form of language requiring covered chemical facilities to consider the use of “Inherently Safer Technology” (IST), by “reexamining the way chemical operations are carried out in order to reduce the amount of hazardous substances on site, improve the way they are stored or processed, or find safer substitutes for the chemicals themselves.” Attempts to strengthen the legislation in committee were rejected.⁹⁰

Recommendation: Fully fund the new chemical plant security law (which the CBO estimates would cost ap-

proximately \$230 million over five years)⁹¹ but add provisions requiring IST where feasible. To make the newly established regulatory system more effective, significant increases should be provided to the chemical security office within DHS to allow it to establish regional offices, hire an adequate number of security inspectors, and obtain sufficient information technology to expeditiously catalogue, process and evaluate chemical site security plans. Because there are national security benefits from the adoption of IST, the federal government should pay a fair share of these added costs, as is done in aviation security.

3. Accountability

Since its inception in 2003, GAO has regarded the “implementation and transformation” of the Department of Homeland Security as “high risk.”⁹² The problem is hardly confined to the executive branch. Congressional oversight of homeland security has been faulted by the 9/11 Commission, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Business Executives for National Security and others.⁹³ Most recently, in January 2007 former 9/11 Commission Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton testified to the continuing need for Congressional reform.⁹⁴

Readers of last year’s Unified Security Budget will note that this year’s proposal calls for a smaller overall increase than last year’s version. The reason for this is not any lessening of need, but rather our conviction that crippling weaknesses in the management and oversight of homeland security programs—especially the grant programs that were the main targets for the recommended spending boosts last year and again this year in the Unified Security Budget—severely limit the ability of the Department of Homeland Security and others to make effective use of all of the added resources

88 Ibid.

89 Associated Press, “Proposed Rules for Securing Chemical Plants Released,” *Washington Post*, December 23, 2006, p. A22.

90 United States Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “Report to accompany S. 2145, the Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006,” S. Report 109-332, September 11, 2006, Additional Views of Senator Lautenberg.

91 Congressional Budget Office, “Cost Estimate: S. 2145, Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006,” July 25, 2006; and Congressional Budget Office, “Cost Estimate: H.R. 5695, Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006,” August 31, 2006.

92 Government Accountability Office, “High-Risk Series: An Update,” GAO-07-310, January 2007, p. 45.

93 R. William Johnstone, *9/11 and the Future of Transportation Security*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), pp. 134-135.

94 Prepared Statement of Vice Chair Lee H. Hamilton, and Commissioners Slade Gorton and Timothy J. Roemer, former Members of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Hearing on “Full Implementation of the 9/11 Commission’s Recommendations,” Washington, DC, January 9, 2007.

that we continue to believe are actually needed. To remedy this problem for the future, we are calling for a major independent evaluation of all homeland security grants programs (not just those administered by DHS) to be conducted by the National Academies of Sciences. (See below.) We believe that steps need to be taken to increase the accountability of federal homeland security policy-making in both the executive and legislative branches.

A. Significantly increase the budget for the DHS Office of Inspector General

DHS is the third-largest federal agency in terms of number of employees, trailing only DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs.⁹⁵ Its mission is by definition of the utmost importance to the citizens of the United States, and it represents the largest reorganization experiment in recent American history, which continues to cause its operations to be rated as “high-risk.” Especially at this still early point in DHS’s history it is, as former DHS Inspector General Ervin has written, “imperative” that independent oversight of the department be strengthened.⁹⁶

Recommendation: Increase by 50% funding for the DHS IG.

B. Create a separate category within the federal budget for homeland security.

The \$61 billion in the Administration’s FY2008 budget request is spread over 31 different federal agencies. While the Department of Homeland Security accounts for the largest part (\$29.7 billion), this still represents less than half of the total (49%), with the Defense Department accounting for over a fourth (29%) and the remaining portion widely distributed among other departments and agencies. And when looked at by budgetary function, homeland security spending is distributed among all seventeen of the major functional divisions of the federal budget (excluding only Interest, Allowances, and Undistributed Offsetting Receipts), with National Defense having the largest share (35%), followed by Administration of Justice (31%), and Transportation (15%).⁹⁷

Furthermore, as an amalgamation of 22 previously existing federal agencies, many of which (such as the Coast Guard,

FEMA and Customs) had, and continue to have, large missions outside of the homeland security realm, a substantial fraction of the DHS budget goes for non-homeland security purposes. For example, in the President’s FY2007 budget proposal for DHS, over \$15 billion out of the \$38 billion request (or just under 40%) was for non-homeland security purposes.⁹⁸

Under these circumstances, the process of simply *accounting* for homeland security expenditures is challenging, let alone insuring that such spending is held *accountable* within the executive and legislative branches, as well as among the news media and general public.

C. Expand the jurisdiction of the Congressional authorization and appropriations panels for homeland security to include all homeland security activities of the federal government without regard to what agency performs them.

The 9/11 Commission observed, “Of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight may be among the most difficult and important.” The Commission went on to recommend that “Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland security.”⁹⁹

In response, the Senate renamed the Governmental Affairs Committee as the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and assigned it limited legislative and oversight authority over DHS. The House did create a new Homeland Security Committee, but oversight of DHS is still spread among six other House authorizing committees: Energy and Commerce, Financial Services, Oversight and Government Reform, Judiciary, Transportation and Infrastructure, and Ways and Means. Furthermore, the two committees have even less authority with respect to non-DHS homeland security programs.¹⁰⁰

Recommendation: Congress should fulfill the 9/11 Commission’s call for consolidation of oversight of homeland security programs into single authorizing committees in each chamber.

95 Office of Management and Budget, *The Budget for Fiscal Year 2008, Historical Tables*, p. 324.

96 Clark Kent Ervin, *Open Target: Where America Is Vulnerable to Attack*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 230.

97 Office of Management and Budget, *The Budget for Fiscal Year 2008, Analytical Perspectives*, pp. 19-20, 34.

98 Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Budget in Brief: Fiscal Year 2007,” pp. 115-116.

99 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), *The 9/11 Commission Report: The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, Authorized Edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), pp. 419, 421.

100 Congressional Research Service, “9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status,” RL33742, December 4, 2006, pp. 55-56.

4. Homeland security grant programs for first responders

A Allocate homeland security grant dollars solely based on risk and consequence assessments.

The recommendation to allocate homeland security funds based on risk has been made many times, including by the 9/11 Commission.¹⁰¹ Yet little progress has been made. In December 2005, the 9/11 PDP graded progress here as an “F.”¹⁰² In 2006 DHS came under fire from Congress and elsewhere for changes in its grant allocations that resulted in significant reductions, both in dollar amount and on a per capita basis, for a number of high-risk areas, including New York City and Washington, DC.¹⁰³

101 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), *The 9/11 Commission Report: The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, Authorized Edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), p. 396.

102 9/11 Public Discourse Project, “Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations,” December 5, 2005, available at: <http://www.9-11pdp.org>

103 See, for example, Mary Beth Sheridan and Dan Eggen, “D.C. at Low Risk of Attack, Says Federal Agency,” *Washington Post*, June 2, 2006, p. A2. The most important changes came in the formula for the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), in which the effectiveness of a jurisdiction’s homeland security proposals (as determined by a DHS-conducted peer review process) was taken into account in addition to risk as determined by DHS. For New York City, the result was a 17% reduction in UASI funding compared to FY2005, whereas the figure for Washington, DC was a 23% cut. (Congressional Research Service, “Department of Homeland Security Grants to State and Local Governments: FY2003 to FY2006,” RL33770, December 22, 2006, pp. 10-11, 25-26, 42.) At least partly in response to such criticism, DHS again revised the grant allocation formulas for FY2007, most importantly by establishing a “top tier” of the six most at-risk urban areas (Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles-Long Beach, New York City-New Jersey, and the San Francisco Bay area), which would be given 55% of the total UASI funding, and by increasing those areas’ flexibility in the utilization of the funds. (Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Announces \$1.7 Billion Available for Local Homeland Security Programs,” press release, January 5, 2007, <http://www.net.org/proactive/newsroom/release.vtml?id=29115>) However, as New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg pointed out in recent Congressional testimony, the proportion to be awarded to the “top tier” cities in FY2007 is “virtually the same” as they received in FY2006. (Testimony of Michael R. Bloomberg, before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Hearing on “Full Implementation of the 9/11 Commission’s Recommendations,” Washington, DC, January 9, 2007.)

HR 1 would address some of these problems by decreasing the minimum state allocation from 0.75% to 0.25% of the total funds appropriated for the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) and the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP). However, the bill applies only to three DHS homeland security grant programs (the Urban Area Security Initiative in addition to the SHSGP and LETPP). It does not address other homeland security-related grants,¹⁰⁴ including, for example, the hospital preparedness and state/local capacity counter-terrorism grant programs within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg has said, “New York City is only one of a handful of places in the nation that’s ever experienced a bio-terror attack. Yet in Fiscal Year 2006, we received \$4.34 per capita, putting us an incredible 27th out of 54 eligible states and cities (within the HHS grant programs).”¹⁰⁵

Nonetheless, we urge adoption of section 101 of HR 1. In addition, given the repeated difficulties experienced by both the executive and legislative branches in developing a comprehensive, risk-based approach to the allocation of homeland security grant monies, we propose that \$500,000 be appropriated in FY2008 to finance a study to be organized by the National Academies of Science to: a) evaluate all current federal homeland security grant programs and determine what proportion of each is currently being allocated on a risk assessment basis (as defined by the study group); and b) recommend to Congress and the Administration how such programs should be restructured in order to maximize the use of risk-based allocation.

B. Significantly increase funding for key DHS first responder grant programs.

The State Homeland Security Grant Program and the Urban Area Security Initiative experienced a 40% reduction in funding between FY2003 and FY2006.¹⁰⁶

104 *Congressional Record*, 110th Congress, 1st session, January 9, 2007, pp. H132-161.

105 Testimony of Michael R. Bloomberg, before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Hearing on “Full Implementation of the 9/11 Commission’s Recommendations,” Washington, DC, January 9, 2007.

106 Congressional Research Service, “Department of Homeland Security Grants to State and Local Governments: FY2003 to FY2006,” RL33770, December 22, 2006, p. 56.

For FY 2008, the Administration would cut the State Homeland Security Grant Program by more than half (from \$525 million in FY 2007 to \$250 million). The Urban Area Security Initiative would receive a \$30 million increase (to \$800 million), and \$1 billion is to be provided for a new Public Safety Interoperable Communications (PSIC) grant program, which is to be administered by FEMA and the Department of Commerce.¹⁰⁷

The first responder grants help finance a wide array of state and local efforts in “planning, organization, equipping, training and exercising against the possibility of terrorist attacks.”¹⁰⁸ Improving first responders’ capacity to deal with terrorist attacks enhances readiness for other hazards and emergencies too.

Recommendation: Boost funding for the key first responder grant programs to \$5 billion a year for the next five years. A portion of this increase should fully fund the Interoperable Communications Grants program that would be created by the House-passed HR 1 to assist states and regions to improve the interoperability of first responder emergency communications systems. (The CBO estimates the five-year cost of the program to be \$1.6 billion, beginning in FY2009.¹⁰⁹) Increasing and making resource levels more predictable should significantly enhance the ability of state and local governments to maximize the effectiveness of their first responder programs.

C. Substantially increase funding for key HHS public health infrastructure and workforce capacity programs.

After three consecutive years of significant cutbacks, funding for public health preparedness was unchanged in FY2007, leaving these programs considerably short of the resources provided in FY2003.¹¹⁰ The enactment of the *Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006* sought to bolster them somewhat, but did not authorize significant funding increases.

Thus, no real progress was made toward eliminating the \$10 billion gap estimated as necessary to bring the U.S. public health system up to an acceptable level of preparedness.¹¹¹ Among other key findings, the 2006 public health readiness assessment by the Trust for America’s Health found that “half of states would run out of hospital beds within two weeks of a moderately severe pandemic flu outbreak.”¹¹²

The new law did, however, provide for spending approximately \$40 million more a year for boosting the public health workforce’s capacity.¹¹³

By explicitly adopting an “all-hazards” approach that includes investments in such core areas as communications, epidemiology and lab capacity, the federal bioterrorism preparedness program is consciously aiming for the kind of ongoing, ancillary benefits that should make it sustainable over the long-run.¹¹⁴ However, because of the neglect of the public health system over many years prior to 2001, that system urgently needs a major infusion of resources.

While the FY2008 Administration budget proposal for HHS did request just under \$1.2 billion⁵³⁵³ for pandemic influenza preparedness (most of which is allocated for vaccine and antiviral production), it yet again seeks to *reduce* funding for the key public health preparedness programs, calling for a nearly \$200 million cut from FY2007.¹¹⁵

Recommendation: Add \$5 billion for public health infrastructure and workforce capacity programs in FY2008, with the new spending level maintained for at least the next five years.

107 Department of Homeland Security, “Statement for the Record; Michael Chertoff,” before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, February 9, 2007, p. 16.

108 Department of Homeland Security, “Remarks by Secretary Michael Chertoff at a Press Conference on the Fiscal Year 2007 Homeland Security Grant Program,” January 5, 2007, http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1168039350894.shtm.

109 Congressional Budget Office, “Cost Estimate for HR 1: Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007,” February 2, 2007, pp. 3-4.

110 Trust for America’s Health, “Ready or Not? Protecting the Public Health From Diseases, Disaster and Bioterrorism 2006,” December 2006, pp. 37-38, <http://www.healthyamericans.org>.

111 “Public Health: Costs of Complacency,” *Governing*, February 2004, <http://www.governing.com/gpp/2004/public.htm>.

112 Trust for America’s Health, “Ready or Not? Protecting the Public Health From Diseases, Disaster and Bioterrorism 2006,” December 2006, p. 2, <http://www.healthyamericans.org>.

113 The American Public Health Association reported that, as of 2005, the average age of public health workers was 47 years, or seven years older than the average age of the entire workforce, that vacancy rates in these professions were as high as 20% in some locations, and that states could lose almost half of their experienced public health workforce to retirement in the near future. (American Public Health Association, “Strengthening the Public Health Workforce,” <http://www.apha.org>.)

114 Trust for America’s Health, “Ready or Not? Protecting the Public Health From Diseases, Disaster and Bioterrorism 2006,” December 2006, p. 5, <http://www.healthyamericans.org>.

115 Department of Health and Human Services, “2008 Budget in Brief,” pp 102-103, 109, <http://www.hhs.gov/budget/docbudget.htm>

Conclusion

Strategy documents are one way to comprehend a nation's security priorities. Budget allocations are another. This report quantifies the extent to which our security policy is dominated by its military tools. The answer is: by 90%. The U.S. has a security budget in need of rebalancing. We recommend here a first step toward this end: a Unified Security Budget that allows Congressional decision makers to consider all forms of security spending, offensive, defensive and preventive, as a whole. And we show how the rebalancing among these categories can be done.

The shift of about \$50 billion within a \$725 billion security budget would convert this 9- to 1 ratio into a better-balanced 5-to-1. It would change a 14-to-1 ratio of military to homeland security spending to 10-to-1. And it would change the ratio of military to non-military international affairs spending from 21-to-1 to 9-to-1. With this shift we could begin to shore up our homeland defenses, and turn a different face to the world.

Task Force Members

Robert Alvarez

Senior Scholar, Institute for Policy Studies
301-585-7672
kitbob@erols.com
www.ips-dc.org

Between 1993 and 1999, Alvarez served as a Senior Policy Advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary for National Security and the Environment. In 1994 and 1995, Bob led teams in North Korea to establish control of nuclear weapons materials. He coordinated nuclear material strategic planning for the department. Prior to joining DOE, Alvarez served for five years as a Senior Investigator for the U. S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and as one of the Senate's primary staff experts on the U.S. nuclear weapons program. Alvarez has published articles in publications such as Science Magazine, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Technology Review and the Washington Post. He has been featured in television programs such as NOVA and 60 Minutes.

Carl Conetta

Co-director, Project on Defense Alternatives
617-547-4474
cconetta@comw.org
www.comw.org/pda

Since joining PDA in 1991 Conetta has coauthored 30 PDA reports, testified before the House Armed Services Committee and made presentations at the U.S. Departments of Defense and State, the National Defense University and U.S. Army War College, UNIDIR, and other governmental and nongovernmental organizations. He has been interviewed on CNN, ABC-TV, CBS-TV, CBC, BBC, Voice of America, and NPR, among others.

Charles Dambach

Chair, Coalition for American Leadership Abroad
202-944-5519
colead@afsa.org
www.colead.org

In addition to his work at COLEAD, a coalition affiliated with the American Foreign Service Association, Dambach serves as the President and CEO of the Alliance for Peace-

building, a network of private and public organizations dedicated to build sustainable peace and security worldwide. In 2001, he received the "Global Coalition Peace Award" from the International Platform Association for his work on the treaty ending the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Anita Dancs

Research Director
National Priorities Project
413-584-9556
anita@nationalpriorities.org
www.npp.org

Dancs is Research Director for the National Priorities Project. She researches and writes on the impact of federal policies, and is the primary author of NPP publications. She has a PhD in economics from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst and spent years teaching and researching at universities in Hungary, the UK and the U.S. Dancs also has over 10 years experience teaching popular economics to activists as a staff economist with the Center for Popular Economics, and is a member of the Security Policy Working Group.

Lt. Gen. Robert G. Gard, Jr. (ret.)

Senior Director, Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign
Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation
202-483-9222
rgard@armscontrolcenter.org
www.armscontrolcenter.org

Gard has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the U.S. Army, including Executive Assistant to two Secretaries of Defense, and service in Vietnam, Germany and Korea. He has also served as President of the National Defense University, President of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, and Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He now serves on the board of the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation and is the Senior Director of the Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign. He is also a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Council on Foreign Relations.

William D. Hartung

President's Fellow
World Policy Institute
New School for Social Research.
212-229-5808 x106
hartung@newschool.edu
www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms

Hartung is the president's fellow at the World Policy Institute and director of the institute's Arms Trade Project. He is the author of *And Weapons for All*, a critique of U.S. arms sales policies from the Nixon through Clinton administrations, and *How Much are You Making On the War, Daddy?* His articles on the arms trade and the economics of military spending have appeared in *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *Newsday*, *USA Today*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, *The Nation*, *Harper's*, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, and the *World Policy Journal*. Hartung has also been a featured expert on national security issues on *ABC World News Tonight*; *Now With Bill Moyers*; *CBS's 60 Minutes*; *NBC's Nightly News* and the *Today show*; the *NewsHour* with *Jim Lehrer*; and many other television and radio stations throughout the United States.

Christopher Hellman

Director, Military Spending Oversight Project
Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation
202-546-0795
chellman@armscontrolcenter.org
www.armscontrolcenter.org

Hellman is the Defense Budget and Policy Analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation. His work covers a broad range of issues related to U.S. military spending, including military planning and policy, U.S. military bases and base closures, major Pentagon weapons systems, trends in the defense industry, and global military spending. Prior to his work at the Center, he spent 10 years on Capitol Hill as a staffer working on national security and foreign policy issues. Additionally, Hellman spent over six years as Senior Research Analyst at the Center for Defense Information, covering similar matters related to the military budget. He also worked for two years as a Policy Analyst for Physicians for Social Responsibility as a military budget specialist.

William Johnstone

Consultant, Partnership for a Secure America (PSA)
202-464-6010
Johnstone805@msn.com
www.psaonline.org

Prior to joining PSA, Johnstone served as professional staff member on the 9-11 Commission, co-authoring its report on aviation and transportation security. Before that he served as Legislative Director and Chief of Staff, respectively, for Senators Max Cleland and Wyche Fowler. He is the author of *9-11 and the Future of Transportation Security* (Praeger, 2006) and the forthcoming *Bioterror: Anthrax, Influenza and the Future of Public Health Security*.

Lorelei Kelly

Policy Director, Real Security Initiative
White House Project
212-785-6001
lkelly@thewhitehouseproject.org
www.thewhitehouseproject.org

Kelly is a national security specialist focused on helping elected leaders "reframe" security for the challenges revealed by 9/11. Her organization works to bring more women into national security decision-making. In 2007-07 she will focus on bringing citizens together with Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans to talk about new directions in U.S. policy. Kelly's professional background includes teaching at Stanford University's Center on Conflict and Negotiation, Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center and more than eight years working on bipartisan national security education in Congress, where she continues to advise the Progressive Caucus. She also attended the Air Command and Staff College program of the U.S. Air Force as well as continuing education programs at National Defense University and Army War College.

Lawrence J. Korb

Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress
and Senior Advisor, Center for Defense Information.
202-478-6353; 202-682-1611
lkorb@americanprogress.org
www.americanprogress.org; www.cdi.org

Prior to his current positions, Korb was a Senior Fellow and Director of National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Prior to joining the Council, Korb served as Director of the Center for Public Policy Education and Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution. Korb served as Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Logistics) from 1981 through 1985. In that position, he administered about 70% of the defense budget. Korb served on active duty for four years as Naval Flight Officer, and retired from the Naval Reserve with the rank of Captain. He has written 20 books and more than 100 articles on national security issues.

Don Kraus

Executive Vice President
Citizens for Global Solutions
202-546-3950 ext. 103
dkraus@globalsolutions.org
www.globalsolutions.org

Kraus is the Executive Vice President of Citizens for Global Solutions. He is the director of the organization's Government Relations Department and Political Action Committee. Previously he served as the Executive Director of the Campaign for UN Reform (CUNR) and its affiliated political action committee, CUNR PAC. Additionally, he currently co-chairs the Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping (PEP), an NGO working group.

Anuradha Mittal

Executive Director, Oakland Institute
510-469-5228
amittal@oaklandinstitute.org
www.oaklandinstitute.org

Prior to starting the Oakland Institute, Mittal spent nearly a decade at Food First/ Institute for Food and Development Policy and was the co-director from 2000-2004. A native of India, she serves on boards of several non-profit organizations including ETC group and the Polaris Institute. Her articles and opinion pieces have been published in widely-circulated

newspapers including The Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, Chicago Tribune, Bangkok Post, Economic and Political Weekly, Houston Chronicle, Dollars and Sense, and The Nation. Mittal has also given several hundred keynote addresses including invitational events from governments and universities, and has appeared on television and radio shows around the world.

Stewart Patrick

Research Fellow
Center for Global Development
202-416-0700
spatrick@cgdev.org
www.cgdev.org

Patrick directs the Center's project on Weak States and U.S. National Security and also focuses more broadly on the intersection between security and development. He joined CGD from the Secretary of State's Policy Planning Staff, where he helped formulate U.S. policy on Afghanistan as well as a range of global and transnational challenges, including weak and failing states, humanitarian crises, post-conflict reconstruction, organized crime, global health and sustainable development. Patrick received his D. Phil and M. Phil in International Relations and his M. St. in European history from Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar. He is a former International Affairs Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations and research associate at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, where he also taught U.S. foreign policy. Among other writings, he is co-author and co-editor of Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement and of Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Post-Conflict Recovery.

Miriam Pemberton

Research Fellow
Foreign Policy In Focus
Institute for Policy Studies
202-234-9382 ext. 241
www.fpif.org; www.ips-dc.org

Pemberton is Research Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) and Peace and Security Editor for Foreign Policy In Focus, a project of IPS and the International Relations Center. Previously she was the Director of the National Commission for Economic Conversion and Disarmament. She holds a Ph.D. from the University of Michigan. She has co-authored the Unified Security Budget report since 2004.

Col. Dan Smith, U.S. Army (ret.)

Senior Fellow
Military and Peaceful Prevention Policy
Friends Committee on National Legislation
202-547-6000
dan@fcnl.org
www.fcnl.org

Smith is a graduate of the United States Military Academy of the Army Command and General Staff College, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the Army War College; MA, Cornell University. Has served as Director, Arms Trade Project, Center for Defense Information and Associate Director, Center for Defense Information.

Leonor Tomero

Center for Arms Control and Nuclear Proliferation
202-546-0795 ext. 119
ltomero@armscontrolcenter.org
www.armscontrolcenter.org

Tomero recently joined the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation to work on international security and specifically non-proliferation issues. Prior to joining the Center, she was President of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security (LAWS), where she had also previously served as Director for Western Europe and Latin America, leading programs to enhance international commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. She also worked on the staffs of Senator Harry Reid (D-Nev.) and Congresswoman Shelley Berkley (D-Nev.-1) on nuclear waste, energy, and environmental issues. Tomero is a member of the LAWS Board of Directors and a Senior Fellow at the Institute of International Law and Politics at Georgetown University. She holds a J.D. from American University, an M.A. in national security studies from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, and a B.A. in government from Cornell University.

Dr. Cindy Williams

Principal Research Scientist, Security Studies Program
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
617-253-1825
cindywil@mit.edu
web.mit.edu/ssp

Williams is a principal research scientist in the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Formerly she was Assistant Director for National Security at the Congressional Budget Office, where she led the National Security Division in studies of budgetary and policy choices related to defense and international security. Williams has served as a director and in other capacities at the MITRE Corporation in Bedford, Massachusetts; as a member of the Senior Executive Service in the Office of the Secretary of Defense at the Pentagon; and at Rand in Santa Monica, California. She has published in the areas of command and control and the defense budget.

John Zavales

Research Fellow
Cuny Center
zavalesjg@aol.com
703-549-1261

Zavales is an independent consultant and commentator, specializing principally in civil-military coordination in humanitarian assistance operations, Balkan politics and security, and U.S. defense policy. He served in a variety of assignments in the Defense Department from 1989 to 2001, mainly in the Office of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, where he managed humanitarian relief and demining programs conducted by DOD. His other DoD assignments included European and NATO defense policy, security assistance, and arms control. More recently he has served with the U.S. Agency for International Development in a number of major overseas disaster relief operations.

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