

State of the Insurgency

Trends, Intentions and Objectives

Classification of this briefing:

UNCLASSIFIED

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
U.S. Forces, Afghanistan

AS OF: 22 DEC, 2009

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Provide an overview of the current capacity, capabilities and intentions of the insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan

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PAK STATS (Open Source—as of 15 DEC):
 Suicide Attacks: 66 (793 KIA / 2086 WIA)
 Other IED Attacks: 83 (760 KIA / 875 WIA)
 39 attacks since 17 OCT (~ 30 days)

Militant Groups

- Taliban (TB)
- Haqqani Network (HQN)
- Hezbe-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)
- Hezbe-e Islami Khalis (HIK)
- Mahsud/Tehrik-Taliban PAK (TTP)
- Tehrik-i-Nefaz Shariat Muhammad (TNSM)/TTP
- Nazir
- Lashkar-e Islam (LeI)
- Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (LeT)
- Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
- Key al-Qa'ida concentration

- We face a TB dominated insurgency -- Two groups emerging; Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban
- Overarching strategy and plans remain unclear, but strategic goals are clear and coming into alignment
- Operational level coordination occurs across the country; most frequent observed at the tactical level
- AQ provides facilitation , training and some funding while relying on insurgent safe havens in Pakistan

Overall insurgent strategy going into 2010 (despite increases in ISAF troop strength)

- Increase base of support (continue to expand into West and North)
- Counter ISAF expansion and cause casualties, esp., Coalition partners
- Undermine efforts of good governance
- Consolidate Command and Control, especially in the South
- Strengthen leadership and unity of effort throughout the country
- Maintain momentum in the winter and increase aggressiveness
- Increase influence around urban centers of Kandahar and Kabul



Mid year adjustment of Taliban strategy

- Leverage tribal influence to gain popular support
- Improve command and control and operational security
- Delegitimize participation in GIRoA
- Expand operations in the West and North


Taliban overarching goals:

- Expel foreign forces from Afghanistan
- Undermine GIRoA's authority and perceptions of security
- Establish a Sunni state under Taliban Supreme Leader Mullah Omar


- Insurgency is loosely organized, increasingly effective...but growing more cohesive
- Insurgent strength is enabled by GIRoA weakness
- International support for development has not met population's expectations
- Security force capacity has lagged behind a growing insurgency
- Perceived insurgent success will draw foreign fighters



Kinetic Events 01 Jan 05 – 15 Dec 05



Kinetic Events 01 Jan 07 – 15 Dec 07



Kinetic Events 01 Jan 09 – 15 Dec 09

In COIN, catch up ball does not work

Taliban Code of Conduct published by Taliban leadership, Mid July 2009 (Mullah Omar's COIN guidance – a population centric strategy)

- “This is our mission: to keep people and their property safe. Do not let those people that love money take our local people's property and cause them problems.”
- “Keep good relationships with your friends and the local people, and do not let the enemy divide / separate you.”


Intentions

- We don't have to beat ISAF militarily, just outlast international will to remain in Afghanistan
- Continue population outreach and protection programs
- Continue successful asymmetric operations
- Expand lethal IED and high-profile attacks to deny ISAF freedom of movement
- Emphasize increasing violence in RC North and RC West
- Demonstrate Taliban reach and perceived control of all Afghanistan
- Make the main enemy the United States


Directives

- Reiterated prohibitions on the following:
 - Mistreating population
 - Forcibly taking personal weapons
 - Taking children to conduct jihad
 - Punishment by maiming
 - Forcing people to pay donations
 - Searching homes
 - Kidnapping people for money

Use the winter months to build on perceived successes




- **Inner Shura:** Supreme Ruling body; makes decisions within Omar's guidance
- **Greater Shura / Committees:** Rule on local issues that Shura leaders take to a national-level Shura
- **Local Shura:** Based on functional requirements, meeting needs of the Inner or Central Shura





- **Inner Shura:** Supreme ruling body; decisions based on consensus and within Omar's guidance
- **Regional Shura / Committees:** Direct and oversee policy; limited decision-making authority
- **Provincial Shura:** Enforces and implements directives; represents local concerns



* Decision delays as fighters require guidance from smaller core of TBSL decision-makers



2007 – 2009
 Increasing use of Homemade Explosives (HME)
 (80 to 90 percent from Ammonium Nitrate)
 Casualties: (07 – 2293), (08 – 3308)




Kinetic Events 01 Jan 05 – 15 Dec 05





Kinetic Events 01 Jan 09 – 15 Dec 09


2003 – 2006
 Predominantly Military Ordnance
 Casualties: (04 – 16), (05 – 279), (06 – 1473)
 * No IED related casualty data available for 2003




- AN based explosives, found in approx 85 percent of all main charge IEDs, are most common form of explosives
- AN fertiliser accounts for as little as five percent of all legitimate fertilizer use in Afghan Theater of Operations; banning would have a minimal effect on Agriculture
- AN is explosive in its raw state, but more powerful when mixed with diesel fuel; aluminium powder, sugar and fuel oil are often used
- Pakistan is the principle source of AN entering ATO; China and Iran are also significant suppliers



**IED Main Charge Weight
May 2008**



**IED Main Charge Weight
Dec 2009**



- Percentage of IEDs with charge weights over 25 lbs has dramatically increased
- Trend of increasing charge size is an effort by INS to provide a low-cost method of attempting to defeat friendly force armor technology
- The IED is the weapon of choice for the Taleban (akin to the surface to air missile system for the mujahideen)

The Afghan insurgency can sustain itself indefinitely

• **Weapons and Ammunition:**

- Small arms weapons and ammunition readily available throughout the region
- Increased availability of IED and HME materials and technology

• **Funding:** External funding is top-down, while internal funding is bottom-up, providing Taliban a consistent stream of money to sufficiently fund operations:

- **Internal:** Significant amount from opiate trade
 - Most reliable, accessible source of funds
 - Taxes; narcotics nexus; corruption
- **External:** Originate in Islamic states
 - Delivered via couriers and hawalas

• **Recruits:**

- Retain the religious high-ground
- Able to recruit from frustrated population
- Exploit poverty, tribal friction, and lack of governance



18 tons + of opiates destroyed during an operation, May 2009

OVERALL TRENDS:

- 2009 perceived as most successful year of the war for INS
- Expanded violence viewed as INS victory
- Elections viewed as INS success; low turnout; fraud

COMMAND AND CONTROL:

- INS attempting to solidify command structure
- Directed leadership replacement causing friction with local elements
- TBSL reestablishing strategic vision; wants TB seen as fair, uncorrupt
- View Al Qaeda as a handicap – view that is increasingly prevalent



POLITICS:

- Renewed focus on becoming a legitimate government
- Expand shadow governance

MOTIVATIONS:

- U.S. seen as desiring permanent presence in Afghanistan
- Promised infrastructure projects incomplete, ineffective
- Karzai government universally seen as corrupt and ineffective
- Crime and corruption pervasive amongst security forces

DIIRS By Category



The Taliban retains required partnerships to sustain support, fuel legitimacy and bolster capacity

• Domestic

- Leverage Omar's Islamic credentials to transcend tribal issues
- Exploit corruption to generate funds, gain access, and secure protection

• Regional / International – State

- Known State relationships create tension
- Current AFG TB vision if they return to power is to re-establish good relations with Islamic and Regional States
- Careful not to antagonize Islamabad or Tehran in order to mitigate against crackdown on safe havens or support systems

• Regional / International – Non-state

- Manage relationship with AQ to avoid alienating Afghan population, but encourage support from global jihad network
- Manage relationship with Pakistani militant groups to encourage reduced attacks in Pakistan, but encourage support for efforts in Afghanistan
- Mutually supportive relationship with Chechen and Central Asian fighters

The insurgency is confident ...

Most Likely

- Goal: Maintain pressure, enable ISAF withdrawal, population centric approach
- Operations:
 - Contest ISAF presence, create opportunity for ISAF withdrawal of forces
 - Steadily increase violence, sustain high profile attacks in urban areas
 - Contest ISAF / GIRoA in north and west
 - Consolidate influence in areas they dominate, accommodate ISAF supporters who shift sides
- Impact:
 - ISAF/ANSF able to secure population centers
 - Reduced international support for Afghanistan
 - Growing popular apathy toward GIRoA
 - Reduced support for ANSF
 - Ethnic fissures exacerbated, but militia remain focused on the insurgency

Most Dangerous

- Goal: Increase pressure, seek to destroy ISAF, punish population
- Operations:
 - More aggressively contest ISAF, inflict casualties if forces withdraw
 - Significantly increase high profile attacks in urban areas
 - Foster ethnic rivalries in north and west
 - Impose TB Sharia in areas they dominate, punish ISAF supporters
- Impact:
 - Reduced security in population centers
 - Significant loss of international support
 - Open popular frustration with GIRoA
 - Popular enmity toward ANSF
 - Open fighting between ethnic groups, drawing in regional benefactors

... looking toward post-ISAF Afghanistan.

Strengths

- Organizational capabilities and operational reach are qualitatively and geographically expanding
- Strength and ability of shadow governance increasing
- Much greater frequency of attacks and varied locations
- IED use is increasing in numbers and complexity; as much a tactic and process as it is a weapon
- Speed and decisiveness of their information operations and media campaign -- this is their main effort

Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities


- Comprised of multiple locally-based tribal networks
- Persistent fissures among insurgent leadership at local levels
- Dependent on many marginalized / threatened segments of Pashtun population
- Over-reliance on external support

- **Pakistan is as or more complex than Afghanistan**
 - Tribal and religion overtones, yet strong national identity, multiple ethnicities, most desire some form of democracy, a worsening economy but a nuclear weapons state
- **Foreign intervention resented in most of the country**
 - Predominantly an Indian issue, but strong resentment against the US and UK; appears to be growing against Taliban
- **Tribal values and traditional core beliefs still dominate large parts of the country**
 - “Outsiders” trying to impose new ideas and beliefs create tension; nature of tribal traditions can supersede Islam
- **Army is perceived to be more capable (and dependable) than the government**
 - Regarded as a positive influence in the FATA and NWFP because they are locally recruited and able to work within local systems
- **Large numbers of internally displaced people from years of fighting, a poor economy and natural disasters**
 - Potential breeding ground for the Taliban...but offers opportunities for counter-radicalization programs
- **Violations of Pakistan sovereignty may contribute to radicalizing the population and diminishes credibility of the GoP**
 - Demonstrates an inability of the government; perception they cannot protect their own; exacerbates anti-western sentiment


Staying the course in Pakistan as important as staying the course in Afghanistan

- The Taliban-led insurgency has the momentum...but additional effective counterinsurgency forces and operations will challenge them in select districts and provinces


Kinetic Events by Geography



01 Jan 05 – 15 Dec 05




01 Jan 07 – 15 Dec 07




01 Jan 09 – 15 Dec 09

Kinetic Events by Week and Type



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Taliban Shadow Governors




- Taliban influence expanding; contesting and controlling additional areas.
- Kinetic events are up 300% since 2007 and an additional 60% since 2008.
- The Taliban now has “Shadow Governors” in 33 of 34 provinces (as of DEC 09)


The situation is serious -- significant change is required.

- We have a key advantage – Taliban is not a popular movement (yet); population is frustrated by GIRoA, we must make them believe ISAF / GIRoA can succeed
- Taliban represents an existential threat -- only they have sufficient organizational capability and support to pose a threat to GIRoA's viability (they are most coherent in the south)
- Regional instability is rapidly increasing and getting worse
- New strategy will incur risks -- not properly executing the strategy has greater risk
 - Longer war
 - Greater casualties
 - Higher overall costs
 - Loss of political support
- Taliban strength is the perception that its victory is inevitable; reversing momentum requires protecting the population and changing perceptions
- Under-resourcing significantly elevates risk, increases lag time, and is likely to cause failure
- Success requires operating / thinking, in a fundamentally new way


Questions / Discussion

- An IED cell needs the following: financing, access to munitions/explosives, an IED architect/maker, someone to survey an attack site, someone to emplace the IED, and someone to initiate the IED.
- Although no two cells are likely to be the same and one person may fulfill multiple roles in a given cell, below is a potential diagram of an IED cell.





The Population is the Center of Gravity – not the IED



Ultimately, We Win by Doing COIN Better