The duality of culture and practice: Poverty relief in New York City, 1888–1917

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In 1893, Charles Henderson, a Baptist minister and member of the newly formed Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago, published the first of his several books on the American social-welfare system. In this book, entitled *An Introduction of the Study of the Dependent, Defective and Delinquent Classes and of Their Social Treatment*, Henderson set himself three tasks. First, he sought to differentiate rigorously the classes and sub-classes of the poor. Drawing upon scientific research in medicine, psychiatry, eugenics, and sociology, as well as the accumulated records of numerous charity organizations and state agencies, he constructed a complicated taxonomic system to distinguish among various social types. In a chapter dedicated to "unemployed and homeless dependents," for example, he proposed a hierarchical scale ranging from "those who are temporarily out of employment, but who have some resources and are able to work" down to the "social bottom stratum" where one would find "the vicious wanderers, the semi-criminal vagabonds and the sturdy rogues."[1] In between these poles were two classes – the "partially futile," defined as "men who are willing to work and able to do something, but fall below the average in ability to coöperate in industry," and the "wholly futile," described as "the unemployable ... (who) are not capable of keeping step with the average workman, nor of adapting their slow and uncertain movements to the speed of modern machinery."[2] Henderson's second task was to review the range of alternative relief practices for providing assistance (and punishment) to these various classes of "dependents, defectives and delinquents." Here he compared the advantages and disadvantages of numerous types of employment assistance schemes, social investigations, "work-tests," various sorts of outdoor and indoor relief organizations, and the practice of giving money as compared to the giving of food, coal, and other necessities. His third task was to demonstrate the linkage between these two domains – the classification of the poor and

Theory and Society **26**: 305–356, 1997.

the taxonomy of relief practices – by showing how particular welfare programs were beneficial for some classes of the poor but harmful or destructive to others.

Henderson's efforts were by no means the first attempt to identify the proper relationship between types of poor and types of relief practices, nor would they be the last.[3] Quite the contrary, the analytical problem that Henderson tackled occurs again and again in the writings of social-welfare practitioners, especially during periods of rapid social change. This is because it is precisely through classificatory exercises such as this that the underlying principles of institutional activity can be revealed and thus made accessible for comment and critique. Roger Friedland and Robert Alford describe the sort of work that Henderson was engaged in as an attempt to articulate the essential *logic* of an institutional arena.[4] They offer a precise definition – an institutional logic is a "a set of material practices and symbolic constructions" that provide the governing principles for a given field of organizational activity.[5]

Like Henderson, we are interested in the institutional logic of social relief in American society around the turn of the century. Like Friedland and Alford, we believe that the key to understanding this institution is to focus on the mutually constitutive relation between material practices and symbolic constructions. Thus, in this article we study the public proclamations that were made about the types of work that was being done by New York City's social-welfare agencies, focusing in particular on linkages that were made in these descriptions between types of relief practices and the categories of the poor. Our analysis begins in 1888, a period during which the basic tenets of the nineteenth-century poor law system still held sway. We show that poverty relief during this era was characterized by a strict set of boundaries separating the destitute from a less thoroughly stigmatized class of individuals identified as needy, distressed, or misfortunate and that these cultural distinctions coincided with very clear differences in the kinds of relief practices that were deemed appropriate for each sub-category of the poor. We then proceed to look at how profound changes during the Progressive Era – changes in the professionalization of social work, the delegitimation of the asylum, and the movement away from a strictly punitive and bifurcated vision of poverty – led to a number of significant transformations in the logic of social relief. Henderson's work, published at the start of the severe economic depression of the 1890s, in some ways marks the beginning of this institutional transformation, which had mostly run its course by 1917.

Our analysis relies upon a number of assumptions about the nature of institutional logics and the ways in which they ought to be studied. We begin the article by laying out these assumptions along with our rationales for adopting them. We start with a short discussion of Galois lattices, the methodological technique that we employ to analyze the patterns of linkages between categories and practices. As we explain, lattices are a particularly appropriate tool because they illuminate the structural dualities that inhere within such a relationship. We then turn to a brief discussion of the nature of institutional logics, focusing in particular on those theorists who argue that there is an inherent duality between culture and practice. This is followed by a more precise account of the nature of structural dualities and a brief discussion of how these types of relationships characterize the history of social welfare institutions. Finally, we will turn to the formal models of the social welfare system in New York City as it existed in 1888 and 1917.

Discrete mathematics, Galois lattices, and the logic of social life

Because the goal of our analysis is to understand the logic of social relief, we are mostly interested in the kinds of linkages that were made (and not made) between specific types of relief practices and the various categories of the poor. It is the pattern of combinations – of what things go with what – that we seek to understand. Thus the method that we employ, though based in mathematical theory, is more closely related to formal logic than to the sorts of statistical analyses that have traditionally been employed in the social sciences. In this respect, our approach is similar to that of a number of other social scientists who are increasingly turning to analytic techniques (founded in discrete mathematical theory) as a way of formalizing the study of qualitative social phenomena.[6]

There are several virtues to these types of methods. First, they rely on nominal (or ordinal) forms of data, permitting the analysis of social structures in terms of the presence and absence of discrete social properties, events, or cultural elements without the requirement that these phenomena be rendered in some sort of quantitative (usually linear) metric. Second, by looking for combinatorial properties, these methodologies provide a means of identifying structural properties of social institutions that inhere within the arrangement of their parts (in time, in space, or in cultural patterns) and thus provide an effective means of aproximating the sorts of theoretical questions that tend to be of concern to social scientists. Finally, the recent development and prolifera-

tion of formal theories, applied methods, and software routines have facilitated the analysis of data in ways that allow the structural properties of social phenomena to become visible in ways that would otherwise have remained obscured.[7]

Among these recent developments the emergence of lattice analysis (which applies Galois lattices to social data) is of special interest because of its unique ability to represent and model structured dualities graphically. What is a structural duality? It is a relationship that inheres within and between two classes of social phenomena such that the structural ordering of one is constituted by and through the structural ordering of the other. For example, Thomas Schweizer has used lattice analysis as a means of analyzing the relationship that inheres between the status logic of material possessions and the social ranking of individuals.[8] In this work, the status meaning of possessions is interpreted by understanding which members of the community possess which types of goods. Simultaneously (and dually), Schweizer assesses the ranking of individual community members in the social order by observing which material goods they possess. The structural duality of these two orders (the individual members of the community and the material possessions that they hold) consists in the fact that the ordering of one is simultaneously dependent upon the ordering of the other.

Quite a number of examples can now be cited of the application of lattice analysis to social phenomena.[9] These studies have usefully demonstrated the virtue of modeling structural dualities in social data, but they have all been employed to assess the order of discrete collections of individuals according to some set of social attributes that partitions them (and, dually, which is partitioned by them). We argue here, however, that structural dualities are a generalized social phenomena and that they are an especially important feature of the sorts of cultural logics that organize complex social institutions. More specifically, our argument is that lattice analysis can provide a formal method for representing the kinds of non-determinative, mutually constitutive relationships that social theorists have suggested exist between symbolic orders and material practices.

Structural duality and the theory of practice

Social theorists have long been troubled by the problem of how to understand the connection between symbolic systems and other levels

of social life. Thus, Durkheim was concerned with the relationship between the structure of beliefs and forms of social organization; Marx sought to explain the connection between ideology and the mode of production; and Weber addressed the linkage between cultural forms (types of legitimation, systems of religious beliefs, and forms of rationality) and patterns of social behavior (power relations and modes of economic organization). Indeed, much of the history of social theory has been organized around various debates between "materialists" and "idealists" with the former asserting the primacy of economic factors and the latter countering with arguments about the ultimate priority of culture. Much of the social theoretical work of the last twenty years has been dedicated to overcoming this sort of oppositional dualism in favor of theories that emphasize the mutual constitution of material and cultural domains.[10] A variety of intellectual projects that can be loosely gathered under the rubric of "practice theory" is one result.

The key argument put forward by practice theorists is that neither the material world (the world of action) nor the cultural world (the world of symbols) can exist (or be coherently structured) independently. Rather each is built up through its immediate association with the other. Hence, in contrast to Lévi-Strauss's tendency to locate the logic of cultural symbols in the semi-autonomous structural arrangement of those symbols themselves, practice theorists expect to find the logic of culture to be embedded in the structure of demands of the everyday world.[11] Clifford Geertz was an early and forceful advocate of this perspective. Geertz vigorously denied the validity of analyses of cultural systems that saw them as being divorced from practical action.[12] Rather, for Geertz, the logic of culture was to be located in the patterning of activities that occur in the course of daily life. Any cultural system (be it composed of religious, moral, or ideological beliefs) was structured as an embodiment of the range of activities, social conflicts, and moral dilemmas that individuals were compelled to engage with as they went about negotiating everyday events. But notice that there is a duality here. Even as Geertz saw culture as structured by practice, so too did he understand practical action to be organized by the logic of culture. This is because Geertz saw all action as meaningful. The practical and seemingly simplistic activities of everyday life (from sheep raids to cock fights) were rich with meanings that expressed the broader cultural systems of community existence. Even the most basic elements of seemingly unreflexive (and presumably rational) behavior – what constitutes a "self," what is the nature of the "other," how is "self-interest" or a "calculative advantage" to be determined, etc. – and the various possibilities of what can

count as a course of action, are thoroughly symbolic and built into the deep, taken-for-granted assumptions about the ways that social life can and should be conducted.[13]

The arguments put forward by Freidland and Alford are a good example of this school of thought. They propose that modern societies consist of a number of significant institutional orders (capitalism, the state, democracy, the family, religion, science, etc.) and that each of these institutional orders has a central logic that (once again) they define as "a set of material practices and symbolic constructions – which constitutes its organizing principles..."[14] As with other practice theorists, Friedland and Alford emphasize the structural duality that inheres between these two components. The buying and selling of commodities constitutes a set of practical activities that can only proceed by virtue of a set of shared symbolic constructions that includes the *idea* of private property. And yet the concept of property (as it is understood) is only meaningful in the context of a commodified world where market behavior is regularly conducted. Friedland and Alford make similar arguments about other institutional orders. Marriage consists of symbolic notions of love and material practices that include making love. Religious institutions depend upon ritual practices such as prayer as well as cultural abstractions such as God. In each case their concern is to demonstrate how it is that the material practices and the symbolic constructions are mutually constitutive and, hence, dually structured.

The formal analysis of structural dualities

It is this concept of structural duality that is of interest to us. Specifically, our goal is to demonstrate that what social theorists mean to suggest about the mutually constitutive character of the relationship between cultural symbols and social practices is actually a specific kind of empirical linkage between two orders of social phenomena and that lattice analysis provides an appropriate tool for formally representing the structural properties of such a linkage.

The concept of duality is employed among social scientists to mean a variety of different things. From a formal modeling perspective, however, Ronald Breiger's early work on the duality of individuals and groups provides a conceptual touchstone. Breiger raised the problem with respect to Simmel's discussion of the mutual constitution of individuals and groups.[15] Simmel was concerned with two dimensions of

social structure. On the one hand, he pointed out that a crucial part of the identity of any individual is determined by the social groups of which he or she is a member. Conversely, a defining characteristic of any social group consists of the individuals who are members of that group. For Breiger, the interesting duality of these two propositions led to the investigation of the structural properties according to which a collection of groups are seen to be connected to one another (the intergroup network) on the basis of the members that they share in common, while, at the same time, the individuals who constitute the members of the groups are seen to be tied to one another (the interpersonal network) on the basis of their shared membership within common groups. What makes this problem (and Breiger's analytic tools for representing the problem) so interesting is the ways in which it captures a peculiar kind of structural relationship – a structural duality.

The duality of persons and groups that Breiger identifies consists precisely in the fact that the structure of the intergroup network and the structure of the interpersonal network are distinct but, also, mutually constitutive. As Breiger points out, the two structures are distinct in that they represent entirely different orders of social phenomena (individuals vs. groups), they are not of the same dimension (e.g., they contain different numbers of elements), and their internal structures are different from one another (e.g., the pattern of connections between the elements varies). But, at the same time, the two structures are completely derivable from one another because the linkages of the one are constituted by the elements of the other. This implies several things. First, neither structure has primacy over the other; conceptually, logically and temporally, the two structures are, as it were, co-equals. Second, both structures have an autonomous integrity in the sense that each has a coherent patterning according to which its elements are ordered; simplifying principles may be identifiable such that the complexity of the whole can be treated in a reduced form and these principles can be represented autonomously from one another. Third, there is a higher order of structure that represents the mapping of the two structures onto one another. Breiger described this in terms of a *translation matrix* from which both of the lower order structures were derivable. It is this higher-order structure that fully captures the structural duality of the two orders of social phenomena.

Recent work by Linton Freeman and Douglas White has linked Breiger's conceptualization of duality to Galois lattices.[16] Generally speaking, a lattice provides a procedure for ordering patterns of information and

for representing them in a line drawing. A Galois lattice has the special property of representing two orders of information in the same drawing such that every point contains information on both logical orders simultaneously (see Appendix). Freeman and White showed that the duality that is inherent in a Galois lattice makes it especially suitable for representing the class of structural relationships identified by Breiger. Using the same data source, they demonstrated how these lattices are able to represent visually (all in one line drawing) the interpersonal network structure, the intergroup structure, and the relationship that links these two structures together that were initially described by Breiger. They argue that lattice analysis should be adopted as a new methodological tool for analyzing and representing these types of social network problems, identified in the literature as two-mode network data. Our interest is different. We are struck at the parallels between Breiger's concerns with the formal properties of the duality between persons and groups and practice theorists' concerns with the dualities between culture and action. Our goal is to bring the technology of lattice analysis to bear upon the more general question of how culture and practice are dually structured in complex institutions.

Poverty relief and the duality of culture and practice

The field of social welfare is one of the core institutional arenas that characterize modern societies. As Friedland and Alford have proposed, it is possible to identify a central logic that serves to organize activity within this institution.[17] At a general level, that logic consists of a set of principles according to which certain classes of individuals are allocated forms of social assistance that are deemed appropriate to their needs and that are seen as being commensurate with prevailing notions of distributive justice. A closer look reveals that, as Friedland and Alford have suggested, this logic is composed of a set of material practices (the various sorts of activities that social-welfare organizations perform in tending to their clients) as well as a set of symbolic constructions (the complex accounts of the causes of poverty, the conceptual distinctions regarding the types of impoverished people that exist and various normative principles regarding how specific classes of the poor ought to be treated).

Moreover, there are good reasons to believe that the relationship that inheres between these two institutional orders (the material practices and the symbolic constructions) is indeed representative of a kind of

structural duality. This seems reasonable because the history of poverty institutions is replete with examples of the ways in which conceptual distinctions have emerged concerning the nature of poverty at or about the same time that new practices have been adopted for attending to the poor. One of the most famous examples of such a development is contained by Karl Polanyi's description of the emergence of the English poorhouse system.[18] Polanyi recounts how the English attempt to establish a population dependent upon wage labor led to the passage of the notorious Poor Law Reform Act of 1834, which abolished outdoor relief (for most categories of the poor) and established the poorhouse as the new modal response to the problem of poverty. As Polanyi makes clear, this shift in the material practice of administering poor relief both presupposed and promoted the establishment of a new and more precise set of symbolic distinctions between "the pauper" and the working poor.[19]

Moreover, as Deborah Stone makes clear, the movement between the symbolic differentiation of the poor and the establishment of new procedures for managing the recently identified categories of poverty accelerated in the years that followed.[20] While noting that distinctions between various classes of "worthiness" were endemic to the history of English poor relief, Stone argues that the 1834 Poor Law provided the impetus to a much more vigorous effort at classification. The question that emerged was how a middle ground could be established. The task was one of "...defining categories of paupers who would be exempt from the principles of 'no outdoor relief'"[21] These categorical exceptions were then usually removed from the poorhouse and treated according to alternative sets of procedures, often through the auspices of newly invented organizations. Thus, the effective result of the 1834 Law was to stimulate a period of practical innovations in poverty treatments as well as a much more complex social classification of the poor.

As this example suggests, most historical accounts of social-welfare institutions suggest that (1) the institutional logic of relief is composed of two elements – a system of differentiated relief practices (outdoor relief, the poorhouse, etc.) and a system of symbolic distinctions consisting of various normatively defined categories of the poor, and that (2) these two systems are mutually constitutive in the sense that changes in one corresponds to and constitutes changes in the other. The point that we want to make is that the linkage between these two institutional systems is rather like the sort of structural duality that Breiger has identified as connecting persons and groups. There is a relatively auton-

omous structure according to which relief practices are differentiated one from another. There is also a relatively autonomous structure according to which categories of the poor are differentiated one from another. And, there is a structural duality that maps one system onto the other in such a way that the two structures can be seen as mutually constitutive. It is the totality of these relationships that we suggest, constitutes the institutional logic according to which social relief is organized.

Source data

To test our idea we employ data collected by the first author on social-welfare organizations operating in New York City in 1888 and 1917. Our information comes from accounts that were given by organizational personnel to the publishers of the New York City Charity Directories.[22] The goal of the Directories was to provide a comprehensive listing of all organizations that were concerned with alleviating the problems of the poor. For each organization the exact linguistic terminology that was used to refer to its clientele was recorded. Because we are interested in the ways that these organizations differentiated among various classes of the poor, we have focused our attention in this article on eleven categorical distinctions that were invoked as a way of identifying the class of poor persons who were receiving assistance. These include: DISTRESSED, DESTITUTE, FALLEN, DESERVING, HOMELESS, INDIGENT, MISFORTUNATE, NEEDY, POOR, STRANGER, and WORTHY.

In selecting these categories for analysis we have restricted ourselves to a relatively small subset of the total classificatory distinctions employed by these organizations. The database that we draw upon contains 246 distinctions.[23] The vast majority of these, however, pertain to either a status designation or to some other (more specific) social problem. Status classifications include references to a person's age, gender, marital or working status, occupational identification, religious affiliation, organizational membership, place of residence, citizenship status, ethnicity, etc. Social-problem designations include references to conditions such as insanity, feeble-mindedness, illness (such as consumption and disabilities resulting from industrial accidents), problems associated with family disruption (widows, orphans, unmarried mothers), and specifically problematic social identities such as ex-convicts, beggars, and tramps.

While it is clear that a full analysis of the institutional logic of relief must take these other sorts of classifications into account, we have sought to focus our attention on the distinctions that most directly served to differentiate the various classes of the poor. Thus, of the eleven categories used here, most are recognizable as synonyms for impoverishment. On the other hand, it is impossible to separate poverty cleanly from the many types of social problems that are associated with it. Because of this, we chose to compromise somewhat on a strict interpretation by including three classifications – FALLEN, STRANGER, and HOMELESS – that indicate something other than simple poverty. We chose to include the FALLEN because this category was occasionally used by relief workers as a generalized description referring to the impoverished and the down-trodden (this usage was in addition to its more distinctive meaning as a reference to women who were prostitutes or unwed mothers). The category STRANGER is included because the New York relief system was founded on the principles of the English Poor Law, according to which one's place of residence was the single most important determinant of one's eligibility for aid. The category of STRANGER then had very specific connotations for this institutional system and we include it here as a way of capturing a crucial qualification in the designation of one's poverty status. We have also retained the category of the HOMELESS because it was a distinction then (as it is now) that indicated a most extreme form of poverty. Two other classifications (DESERVING and WORTHY) are included here because they were frequently invoked as a way of differentiating separate (morally valued) categories of the poor.

Two other restrictions governed our selection of categories for analysis. We excluded all references to impoverished children. We did this because we were concerned that a rather different set of institutional principles may well have been invoked by children's agencies. This seemed a likely hypothesis, especially since a series of state laws in New York had been directed toward the special needs of poor children, beginning with the passage of the 1875 Children's Act, mandating their removal from public poorhouses.[24] Second, to enhance the comparability of our analyses, we excluded terms if they were not employed in both the 1888 and 1917 Charity Directories. This meant excluding the category of "pauper" (present in 1888 but not in 1917) and "dependent," which was restricted in 1888 as a category for designating impoverished children, even though it had begun to be used more broadly to refer to impoverished adults by 1917.[25]

For each separate reference to a category of persons, information was also recorded on the specific sort of procedural remedy that was applied to that class of individuals. There were ten basic remedies for poverty that were employed by these organizations. These included: giving advice (*advise*), giving food (*food*), giving money (*give$*), giving wage-work that could be performed at an individuals' home (*homework*), investigating an individual's living conditions, family relationships, and spending habits (*investigate*), helping the individual to find employment (*findjob*), paying a person to do some specified task such as chopping wood or making rag carpets as a way of testing their willingness to labor (*paidwork*), providing temporary or overnight shelter (*shelter*), offering employment training programs and vocational skill classes (*jobtrain*) and putting a person in the almshouse or other long-term custodial care facility (*asylum*). As before, these represent only a small subset of the full range of organizational practices employed by these organizations. Examples of services that were excluded from these analyses include: many categories of health care, legal aid, temperance work, and educational, religious, and recreational services. While all of these practices are of interest in some broader sense, we have limited ourselves to just those services that were clearly intended to alleviate directly the immediate problem of poverty itself.

In 1888 there were 208 references to classes of people identified by any of these categorical terms who were provided with one of these types of remedies. In 1917 there were 265 references. Tables 1 and 2 present the raw frequencies of these occurrences. Each cell contains the total number of times that a reference was made (by any organization) to providing the remedy designated by the row label to some class of persons who were designated by the categorical term listed in the column label.[26] These frequency distributions are of interest because of what they say about the overall contour of relief services provided during these two moments of time. Notice, for example, that in 1888 the greatest frequency of references (26) was to the provision of homework opportunities to people designated as poor followed by (21) references by organizations to the giving of food to people described as POOR. In contrast, by 1917 the most frequent reference (31) was to the provision of long-term (*asylum*) care for people designated as INDIGENT. The second most frequent reference (20) was to the provision of the same services to people designated as DESTITUTE.

While comparisons of this sort are clearly of interest, our concern is with understanding the underlying principles according to which cate-

gories of poor are matched to forms of relief. Hence, we are less interested in the relative frequency with which *asylum* services were provided for classes of people designated as INDIGENT or DESTITUTE than we are in the fact that *asylum* services were *never* provided to classes of people who were designated as DISTRESSED, MISFORTUNATE, or STRANGERS. Our analytic strategy thus focuses on the occurrence and non-occurrence of specific combinations of poverty categories and relief practices. To facilitate this analytic strategy we have reduced the data to binary matrices in Tables 3 and 4.

We treat any occurrence as evidence that a given combination was logically possible. We treat a non-occurrence as *prima facie* evidence that such a combination was not within the realm of what was considered to be reasonable behavior at that moment in time. We think these empty cells are especially significant. What interests us is that it apparently made "no sense" to social-welfare workers at these historical moments to use, for example, the category DISTRESSED to describe the classes of people that were being placed in the poorhouse or other long-term care facilities. Rather, a number of other institutional categories were available to designate these classes of people. This is not to say that relief workers in 1917 didn't make use of the category DISTRESSED. In fact, they used the classification fairly frequently. But when they did use it, it was with reference to the kinds of people who were receiving other sorts of services – people who were being given money, advice, and job-training and who were being investigated to determine the cause of their distress.

As this example begins to suggest, to decipher the institutional logic of social relief we need to understand three things. First, we want to know how the eleven poverty classifications were distinguished from one another and hence, we seek to understand the relational system of differences that they were embedded in. Second, we want to understand how the ten relief practices were meaningfully differentiated from one another. Third, we want to know how these two systems of distinctions were linked together in a mutually constitutive manner. We present our results in two stages. We begin with this problem of meaning. We ask what the various sub-categories of poverty "meant" in 1888. We then proceed to consider the nature of the institutional logics themselves. Building on our argument about the meanings of poverty, we shift our focus to consider the overall structure of linkages in 1888 and 1917.

Table I. Poverty practices by poverty categories (frequencies) – 1888.

	Deserving	Destitute	Distressed	Fallen	Homeless	Indigent	Misfor-tune	Needy	Poor	Worthy	Stranger	Total
Give$	2	4	3	0	0	1	1	6	13	2	0	32
Food	1	4	1	0	1	1	0	3	21	5	1	38
PaidWk	0	1	0	0	2	1	0	0	3	1	0	8
HomeWk	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	26	0	0	30
FindJob	0	4	0	2	1	1	0	3	1	0	1	13
Advise	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1	0	2	7
Investg	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	4
JbTrain	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	3
Shelter	1	3	0	2	4	1	0	1	7	2	1	22
Asylum	1	18	0	4	1	18	0	3	3	3	0	51
Total	5	38	5	8	10	23	2	21	78	13	5	208

Table 2. Poverty practices by poverty categories (frequencies) – 1917.

	Deserving	Destitute	Distressed	Fallen	Homeless	Indigent	Misfor-tune	Needy	Poor	Worthy	Stranger	Total
Give$	1	9	2	0	0	0	1	7	19	2	0	41
Food	0	3	0	0	5	0	0	5	14	5	0	32
PaidWk	0	2	0	0	4	0	0	0	1	0	0	7
HomeWk	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	11
FindJob	0	3	0	0	6	0	0	2	7	4	0	22
Advise	0	2	1	0	2	0	0	1	1	0	3	10
Investg	0	8	2	0	2	0	0	1	7	1	0	21
JbTrain	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	5	0	0	9
Shelter	0	2	0	0	7	2	0	1	4	1	0	17
Asylum	0	20	0	6	3	31	0	5	12	18	0	95
Total	2	51	6	6	30	33	1	22	80	31	3	265

Table 3. Poverty practices by poverty categories (binary) – 1888.

	Deserving	Destitute	Distressed	Fallen	Homeless	Indigent	Misfor-tune	Needy	Poor	Worthy	Stranger	Total
Give$	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	8
Food	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	9
PaidWk	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	5
HomeWk	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	4
FindJob	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	7
Advise	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	5
Investg	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	3
JbTrain	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	3
Shelter	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	9
Asylum	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	8
Total	4	9	3	3	6	6	2	9	10	5	4	61

Table 4. Poverty practices by poverty categories (binary) – 1917.

	Deserving	Destitute	Distressed	Fallen	Homeless	Indigent	Misfor-tune	Needy	Poor	Worthy	Stranger	Total
Give$	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	7
Food	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	5
PaidWk	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	3
HomeWk	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2
FindJob	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	5
Advise	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	6
Investg	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	6
JbTrain	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	4
Shelter	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	6
Asylum	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	7
Total	2	9	4	1	8	2	1	7	10	6	1	51

Meanings and use

The underlying assumption of our analysis is quite simple. We presume that the "meaning" of a given poverty classification can be determined by observing how that category was used. Usage, in this case, refers to how social-welfare personnel employed these distinctions in describing the classes of people that were provided with some form of social relief. For example, in 1888, the category DISTRESSED was used to refer to people who were given money, but the classification was also applied to people who were given food and to people who were investigated (see table 3). We thus presume that the meaning of DISTRESSED was captured by this specific constellation of relief practices. To describe someone as DISTRESSED was to imply that their social condition was such that it was considered appropriate to provide them with money, food, and a careful investigation of their lifestyle and economic condition. More than this, to describe someone as distressed was to suggest that it would not have been considered appropriate to test that person's willingness to labor by subjecting them to a requirement that they work at some menial task to receive assistance, nor to provide them with work that they could perform for wages in their homes, job training or assistance in finding a job, overnight shelter or asylum care, or advice. We base this conclusion on the fact that in 1888, not a single relief organization in New York City providing any one of these formal services ever invoked the category DISTRESSED to describe the classes of people who were the recipients of these forms of assistance.

Clearly when we talk about "meaning" we use the concept in a specific and somewhat restricted fashion. We are not talking about the more subjective types of associations that may be brought to mind by the concept of the "distressed." Ours is not the sort of hermeneutic investigation that has the goal of revealing a deep and nuanced web of phenomenological meanings.[27] Rather our interest is in the practical application of these institutional categories. We want to understand how they were used to classify individuals. We know that these kinds of classificatory distinctions mattered a great deal. As Charles Henderson put it midway through his exegesis on the classes of the poor "...there are distinct social classes even in this nether region of humanity. There are ranks and orders that must be punctiliously recognized."[28] Our goal then is to map out this classificatory terrain and to understand how the implicit distinctions that are embodied in these categorical terms provided a meaningful foundation for this organizational field.

This does not mean that we think of the meanings as being identical to their usage. We do, however, expect that we can make interpretive progress by seeking to deduce meaning from use.[29] For example, taking up the category DISTRESSED once again, we find that a close scrutiny of its usage profile can be revealing. Since neither shelter nor asylum services were ever associated with this classification, we can infer that the category DISTRESSED was probably applied to people who had a place to live and that these people were perceived to be capable of maintaining themselves in that home.[30] Since employment was not given, and neither job search nor job training services were offered, we can infer that people designated as DISTRESSED were seen as either not needing assistance in obtaining a job or that they were viewed as occupying a station in life in which it was not considered suitable for them to be working. Since they were not offered advice on how to lead their lives, we can infer that there may have been a smaller social distance between relief workers and the people who were identified as DISTRESSED. Because they were given money we can infer that they were seen as being both moral and responsible. And because they were subject to social investigation we can infer that the causes that brought them into a state of poverty may have been deemed suspicious or, at least, worthy of scrutiny.

If we compare this set of inferences with a broader (and more conventional) historical investigation, we find support for our interpretations. A survey of texts written by sociologists and social reformers of the era suggests that the category DISTRESSED was usually used to describe a condition of economic misfortune, and was often applied to periods of business decline, as in Henderson's admonishment that "we must carefully distinguish between times of general distress and the ordinary times of prosperous commerce."[31] The same usage (though implying a far more critical sentiment) is to be found in the work of William Graham Sumner, who wrote, "In old times, if a man was sick, it was always assumed that somebody had bewitched him. The witch was to be sought." So too, with "economic distress," something has to be found to blame, "gold-bugs, Wall Street, England..."[32] In Sumner, we find both the general meaning of distress as an externally located disruption of economic fortune as well as a sense of the suspicion of that fate, which was so prevalent during these years.

Thus, the category DISTRESSED was often associated with honorable people who had experienced a failure of business fortune, who may even have been relatively successful at one point, but who had become

impoverished. Moreover their impoverishment was not seen as being due to any immorality, though the suspicion of impropriety was always present. A good example of this usage can be found in the Charity Directories themselves. One of the organizations that employed this category in its 1888 Directory listing was the Charity Fund of the Chamber of Commerce. This organization provided monetary assistance to individuals identified as "distressed merchants who were members of the Chamber in good repute in the City of New York and whose misfortunes were not the result of any dishonorable transactions." Here is a perfect example of the concept we have just described. Money was allocated to small-business operators who had become insolvent, so long as there was nothing dishonest about how they came to this fate.

If the first principle of our analysis is that "meanings" are defined by use, the second principle is that similar usage indicates similar meanings. In other words, if two classifications are used to describe people receiving the same type of relief services (e.g., they have the same usage profile) then we treat that as evidence that the categories were effectively synonymous. To put it the other way around, if two classifications are applied to classes of people who receive very different types of relief services we would expect that the "meaning" of the two categories would be quite different. When we compare, for example, the usage profiles of HOMELESS and DISTRESSED in 1888, we see that there is little agreement between them. HOMELESS was a category used to refer to classes of people who were given food, tested for their willingness to labor, assisted in finding a job, advised on how to lead better lives, and provided with overnight shelter as well as longer-term custodial care in asylums. Clearly, based on a comparison of their usage profiles it would appear that in 1888 the meanings of these two classifications were quite different. Much evidence supports this interpretation; for example, according to Henderson, the distinction implied by homelessness was a crucial one:

> All the previous grades are divided by a vertical line of distinction into those who have homes and those who are homeless. Generally speaking, it is safe to say that as we descend the scale of industrial efficiency, homelessness, lack of normal domestic bonds and interests, becomes relatively more frequent, until in the wandering classes all such ties disappear, and their influence is dissolved.[33]

As this quotation suggests, in the minds of social-welfare professionals the homeless were a very different category of the poor. And, as a number of scholars have demonstrated, the difference between them and other

classes of the impoverished went far beyond their need for a place to sleep; theirs was perceived to be a fundamentally moral failing.[34] It is our contention that this deeper difference between the homeless and the distressed is captured by the specific constellation of services that were offered (and not offered) to each class of individuals. Simply put, the distinction between them was not merely about objective differences in need. It was about the meanings that were assigned to each institutionally recognized class of impoverishment. These are precisely the sorts of meanings that we seek to interpret.

As it turns out, no other poverty classification is used in precisely the same way in 1888 as DISTRESSED and so we conclude that none of the other ten categories is exactly synonymous with this category. Actually, this is not at all surprising to us. Indeed, part of our assumption is that there is a certain efficiency in this type of classificatory system, such that new categories are introduced into the institutional vocabulary as a means of describing classes of people who are not adequately covered by existing categorical designations. In other words, the eleven categories were employed because, in the mind of social-welfare practitioners in 1888, there were (at least) eleven different classes of poor people to be attended to.[35]

Not all of the categories, however, are so different from the DISTRESSED as the HOMELESS. This points to our third principle of analysis. We presume that partial similarities in usage translate into partial similarities in meanings. More specifically, we think that these categories are embedded within a classificatory logic such that some classifications can be seen as refinements of others. It is our expectation that the subsetting structure of usages can provide us with the key for identifying these types of distinctions. Before pursuing this idea (which is the real key to our approach) it is useful to turn to the lattice analysis.

Lattices and the duality of categories and practices

We presume that these categories are related to one another by a system of distinctions. By focusing on specificity restrictions (such that some classifications represent conceptual refinements of others) we think it is possible to represent a mapping of this distinction system. This means that we focus on how set and subset relationships effectively differentiate these classifications into more and less specific sub-categories of improverishment. Lattice analysis is an ideal tool for this kind of problem



Figure 1. Partial order of categories – 1888.

because it extracts the order from a binary data matrix and allows these relationships to be graphically displayed in a line diagram. We employ the GLAD (General Lattice Analysis and Designs) software program to extract this logical ordering.[36] A partial ordering can be derived for both the rows and the columns of a binary matrix. The partial orders for the categories and practices employed in 1888 are presented as Figures 1 and 2.

Focusing first on Figure 1, this diagram graphically represents the logical implications of the binary matrix as a system of subsetting containments for the poverty classifications. An arrow from one category to another indicates that the former has a usage profile that is a subset of the latter. Notice that the category POOR is at the top of the diagram. It has the broadest usage profile, which suggests that it conveys the most general concept of poverty. All other classifications can be seen as more specific refinements (sub-categories) of this general and all-embracing notion. One very important conceptual refinement occurs at the very next level in the distinction between the DESTITUTE and the NEEDY. This bifurcation appears to reflect a fundamental class division within the poverty system. The concept of the DESTITUTE is in some ways analogous to the contemporary idea of the underclass. It refers to that category of the poor who were truly desperate and were more likely to have a generational history of poverty.[37] The NEEDY, on the other hand, would appear to represent those members of the poor who have come

from a more affluent class background and who were, consequently, more familiar to relief workers (and more deserving of sympathy). One can see this in the structure of the classification system. Some classifications are sub-categories of the NEEDY, others are not.

That the WORTHY are a sub-category of the DESTITUTE but not of the NEEDY is quite interesting. Although, given our previous interpretation, its location at this point in the classificatory scheme seems counter-intuitive, in fact, the historical roots of this concept do align it more closely with the status of destitution. This is because the designation WORTHY (and its complement, unworthy) had long served as the principal classificatory device for distinguishing between the more and the less incorrigible classes of the poor. This then suggests that in 1888 one would use the category WORTHY as a modifier of the condition of destitution (or indigency) but one would be mis-speaking if one used the category to differentiate among those who were seen as NEEDY. To distinguish sub-classes of the NEEDY one would more properly employ the qualification DESERVING.

The rest of this diagram can be interpreted in the same fashion. The DISTRESSED can be seen to have been a more refined version of the NEEDY. This is because all of the relief practices applied to the DISTRESSED were also applied to the NEEDY. However, DISTRESSED had the more restricted meaning since the category was not used to describe a number of classes of people for which the classification NEEDY was deemed suitable. Four other categories – DESERVING, STRANGER, FALLEN and MISFORTUNATE – were also refinements of the more general classification NEEDY. Each of these, however, was simultaneously a sub-category of another classification as well. DESERVING was both a more restricted version of neediness as well as a more precise sub-specification of the concept of worthiness. STRANGERS were a blend of the HOMELESS and the NEEDY. To be MISFORTUNATE was to be midway between destitution and neediness.

It should be apparent from our earlier discussion of structural duality that all that has been said about the poverty classifications applies with equal force to the ordering of the relief practices. Figure 2 presents the partial order representing the differential structure of relief practices as determined by the classes of poor who were subjected to each set of procedures. Notice that there were three first-order relief practices – *giving money, giving food,* and *giving shelter.* Below these, are four second-order relief practices – *investigate, home work, find job,* and



Figure 2. Partial order of practices – 1888.

asylum. Finding a job and putting relief applicants in a custodial asylum were practices that were based upon the same principle as the provision of temporary shelter in the sense that they were applied to the same classes of the poor. To put this a different way, if any class of the poor was identified as the recipients of asylum or of job-search services, then so too would they be designated as the recipients of shelter. By this logic we can see that *homework* was a very different sort of relief practice. It was a more restricted form of treatment for a subset of those classes of the poor who were also the recipients of money. *Investigation* was a kind of hybrid practice implying the conjuction of two general practices – *giving money* and *giving food.* Below this are two third-order practices (*advise* and *paid for work*) and so on.

These diagrams fulfill our first two goals by mapping out the system of differences in which the eleven poverty classifications and the ten relief practices were embedded. However, our interpretation of the meaning of these structures is hampered by the fact that the constitutive duality of culture and practice is not yet visible. The lattice diagram (in Figure 3) adds this dimension to our analysis. The lattice preserves the two initial structures. If one focuses on the poverty classifications, for example, it is



Figure 3. Lattice diagram: Duality of categories and practices – 1888.

possible to see (reading from top to bottom) the same order that we observed in Figure 1 – DESTITUTE and the NEEDY are subcategories of the POOR, the DISTRESSED is a subcategory of NEEDY, etc. Similarly, the partial order of relief practices is also preserved here. Reading from the bottom to the top, we see again the three first-order relief practices by tracing the three lines ascending from the lowest point of the lattice – one leading to *give$*, another leading to *food*, and the third leading to *shelter*. The rest of the order for relief practices flows upward from here.

Because both orders are projected onto this same lattice structure (the smallest possible lattice in which these two orders can be embedded), every point in the lattice represents the co-occurrence of the set of relief practices that are below it and the set of poverty categories that are above it. For clarity, the lattice is minimally labeled – a category is labeled at its highest occurrence, a practice is labeled at its lowest occurrence. Hence, the point labeled NEEDY is the highest point to which the category NEEDY applies. All points that fall on the lines descending from that point could also be labeled NEEDY. In a fully labeled lattice, the point marked here as DISTRESSED/*investg* would be labeled ({*give$*, *food*, *investigate*}, {NEEDY, POOR, DISTRESSED}).

By incorporating the orders for both categories and practices in the same lattice, the structural duality of the two orders is made visible. One consequence is that we can more easily see how the distinctive meanings of the various poverty classifications reflect differences in use. Consider again the distinction between the NEEDY and the DESTITUTE. When we saw this bifurcation in the partial-order diagram we suggested that it was a reflection of a fundamental class division within the poverty system. Seeing the same distinction in the lattice allows us to say something more specific. The lattice suggests that a crucial distinction between these two classifications was the way that they marked off those classes of the poor who were subjected to the requirement that they work in order to receive aid (*paidWk*) from those classes of the poor who were never required to do so. (Recall that the practice *paidWk* applies to all those lattice points inclusive of and above the point so labeled – in Figure 3 this includes 1 unlabeled point as well as the points labeled *paidWk,* HOMELESS, WORTHY, INDIGENT, DESTITUTE, and POOR). Clearly, this distinction was important. The demand for labor in exchange for relief was a more punitive approach to social welfare (in 1888 just as it is today) and was traditionally reserved for those classes of aid recipients who were regarded as the more incorrigible cases. The lattice diagram makes it clear that this difference in treatment constituted a fundamental basis of differentiation between the DESTITUTE and the NEEDY.

It was not, however, the only difference. There was also a practice (social investigation) that was applied to the NEEDY but not to the DESTITUTE. The symmetry between these two practices (*paidWk* and *investg*) is quite informative. While it was largely punitive, the requirement that relief applicants perform some labor in exchange for relief was also a mechanism for knowing the poor. Indeed, these programs were generally referred to as "work tests" (or "labor tests") indicating that an important goal was to obtain information about whether applicants for relief were truly in need and also to assess whether they had the proper sort of character and willingness to labor. Social investigations were, in a sense, a more modern (and rationalized) mechanism for accomplishing the same thing.[38] Investigations were conducted to gather two different kinds of information about relief applicants. On the one hand, they were intended to assess whether an applicant was truly in need – to this end homes were inspected to determine whether all assets had been exhausted, neighbors were queried about relatives who might be able to provide support, local grocers were quizzed about applicants' debts, etc. On the other hand, investigators sought to determine the root cause of

impoverishment. In this case, an attempt was made to determine the applicants' character, moral habits, housekeeping, and parenting practices and to gather any other bits of information that could be used to diagnose and treat the root problem.

Thus, the NEEDY and the DESTITUTE was nearly identical social classification with this one very important exception regarding the modality of surveillance they were subjected to.[39] Those classes of the poor that were expected to demonstrate their moral fortitude and economic desperation by passing a "labor test" were classified as DESTITUTE. Those classes of the poor that were subjected to the more modern, less physical (though hardly less demeaning) requirement that they subject themselves to a social investigation were classified as NEEDY.[40]

In the more formal vocabulary of lattice analysis, the consensus (in terms of practices) between the DESTITUTE and the NEEDY is defined as the "practice extension" of their lower bound in the lattice. This includes all the practices that are below both of them: (*jbTrain, asylum, advise, shelter, food, give$*). Their dissensus can be characterized by what is specifically below only one of them (*paidwk, investg*). We can compare pairs of practices with one another in the same manner. In this case, the consensus is defined as the "category intension" of their upper bound in the lattice. Thus, the consensus of *food* and *shelter* is the conjunction (STRANGER, HOMELESS, WORTHY, INDIGENT, DESTITUTE, NEEDY, POOR), but the dissensus between them derives from the fact that *shelter* applies to the FALLEN while *food* is given to the DISTRESSED.

We introduce this formal vocabulary in order to begin to suggest some of the ways in which the properties of the lattice can assist us in the task of interpreting the nature of these institutional distinctions. Especially useful are the "splits" that occur in practice/category pairs. Formally, whenever a pair *category/practice* (*c/p*) is such that both are "irreducible" and that *p* is the lowest practice not below *c*, while *c* is the highest category not above *p* in the lattice, the pair *c/p* is said to be "perspective." The pair *paidWk*/NEEDY is an example of a perspective pair and it is fairly easy to see how it "splits" the lattice (try drawing a line between these two points). The pair *investg*/DESTITUTE is also a split. If we focus just on the distributive interval[41] (that core section of the lattice that consists of the cubed structure between DESTITUTE and *shelter* and that, as we argue shortly, is a key to understanding the institutional logic of relief) we can identify the following other perspective pairs: *food*/FALLEN, *give$*/HOMELESS, *asylum*/STRANGER, *findjob*/WORTHY, and *advise*/INDIGENT.

Just as the split between *paidWk* and NEEDY clued us into an important bifurcation in the lattice, so these other splits can point us toward significant features of the institutional system. Consider, for example, the split *food*/FALLEN. This pair calls our attention to the fact that FALLEN is the only category in the core (distributive) interval that is never associated with any formal services for providing food. Initially this seems rather odd. Why would one class of the poor never be associated with the relief practice of dispensing meals? However, in the logic of the system this actually makes perfect sense. To see this, it is important to recall that what we are studying are the public claims that were made by staff personnel and agency directors about the types of contributions that their organizations were making to the community. In an important sense these were symbolic proclamations of the sort that John Meyer and Brian Rowan described as organizational *myths and ceremonies*.[42] The fact that no organizations claimed to provide food for the FALLEN does not mean that people classified in this fashion were left to starve. Rather, it means that when organizations made public claims about their organizational "missions" they did so in such a way as to conform to existing discursive conventions.[43] Thus, when we see the split between *food* and the FALLEN what we are observing is the fact that in 1888 the category FALLEN was most frequently used to designate that category of women who were viewed as being disconnected from their traditional domestic role as wife and mother. Often these women had been prostitutes or women of the streets.[44] While it seemed perfectly reasonable to provide services for these women that involved removing them from the streets (*shelter* and *asylum*) or offering them an opportunity to move into a legitimate occupation (*findjob*), it simply made no institutional sense for organizations publicly to proclaim themselves as the providers of a very domestic service such as preparing meals for that class of the destitute who were so clearly in violation of the normative domestic order. The "split" *food*/FALLEN is thus another formal property of the lattice structure that calls our attention to a fundamental cultural distinction in this institutional system.

Consider the split *give$* /HOMELESS. Here again, the pairing is informative. The category of the HOMELESS (like the categories FALLEN and STRANGER, which are located on the same side of this split) was distinctive in the sense that these people were never designated as the recipients of cash relief, a fact that appears to be a fundamental marker for the sort of morally charged suspiciousness with which these categories of the poor were regarded. Strangers were further identified by the split STRANGER/*asylum*, which calls our attention to the fact that this was

the only classification within the core interval that is *never* given permanent asylum. Only the more temporary forms of shelter are offered – an institutional dispostion befitting strangers' transitory status. Look also at the split *findjob* /WORTHY. This is a formal distinction that links together the WORTHY and the DESERVING and separates them from all other classes of the poor within the core interval. Here again, we see that it is a relationship to work, in this case the expectation about whether a category of the poor were expected to find a job and support themselves, that marks off a fundamental moral boundary. To be WORTHY or DESERVING was, quite simply, to be exempt from any such expectation.

Outside of the core (distributive) structure the categories DISTRESSED and MISFORTUNATE are especially distinctive because they were never associated with any sort of indoor relief. This suggests that these two categories may have been employed as conceptual place-holders for those classes of the poor that were not deemed appropriate for institutionalization. Moreover, the MISFORTUNATE fall under the heading of the DESTITUTE while the DISTRESSED represent only a more restricted category of the NEEDY. This would seem to provide more evidence that the difference between the NEEDY and the DESTITUTE reflected a fundamental class distinction that was sustained both among those populations that were institutionalized and those that were not. A significant feature of these two classifications is that both have a unique equivalence relationship with a specific relief activity – DISTRESSED with *investigate* and MISFORTUNATE with *homework*.[45] This suggests that all poverty classifications that were outside of the main institutional system had their own signature practice. That is, their identity was tightly coupled with a specific and relatively unique relief activity.

It is worth thinking a bit about these pairings. The DISTRESSED and their association with *investigation* rather clearly captures the sort of ambivalence about economic decline that we described earlier. Any attribution of failure to external forces – forces that are outside the control of the individual – was regarded with suspicion. So it was that relief agencies seemed to be asking of the DISTRESSED, how is it that seemingly good people came to be poor? What is lacking here? Is it a character flaw or some fundamental failing of spirit? The linkage between MISFORTUNE and the practice of *homework* reflects that most basic tenet of nineteenth-century poverty relief, the idea that labor should be performed as a condition for the receipt of assistance. At the same time, however, there was an implicit recognition here that the MISFORTUNATE represented a special kind of exception to the natural

social order. The category was frequently applied to women who were trying to raise a family after a husband had died (or deserted the family). This was a misfortune of the working class that in a sense paralleled the economic misfortune characterizing the DISTRESSED. As with the DISTRESSED, those deemed MISFORTUNATE were never associated with the poorhouse or any other custodial institution. Instead, they were provided with paid work that they could perform in their homes, a peculiar sort of alternative to the core system of relief for an acknowledged and unfortunate exception to normal family life.

Notice that there is one such signature pairing within the core interval – that between the category of STRANGER and the practice of *advise*. In its most formal sense, the provision of advice can mean something as simple as helping a person get oriented to a new place, but implicit here is the admonition to set things in order, to receive an informed opinion on how to proceed. Referring to relief applicants as strangers then was another way of identifying classes of the poor who were out of the natural order of things. Advice was a way of seeking to bring them back into that order.

Core structures and institutional logics

Up until now we have employed the lattice as a kind of logical dictionary – a mechanism for interpreting the meanings associated with various institutional classifications. We have largely neglected the broader question of what the lattice can tell us about the overall logic of social relief. It is to this question that we now turn. First, the structure suggests that the institutional system of social relief was strikingly coherent in 1888. A matrix of this size can generate a lattice containing as many as 2^{10} points. Thus, the 27 points in this lattice represent less than 3 percent of the complexity that could possibly be expressed by such an institutional system. Several factors contribute to the overall complexity of a lattice structure, but one factor stands out – the greater the disagreement on how categories of the poor should be treated, the greater the complexity in the lattice. More precisely, a lack of consensus would manifest itself in one of two ways. Either some subset of organizational agents would use different categories to mean the same thing or they could use the same category to mean different things. In the first case, we would expect to see synonymous usages emerge from the analysis such that two categories would have identical practice profiles.[46] We haven't yet seen this occur though more detailed analyses (e.g., of less common catego-



Figure 4. Core distributive interval: Institutional logic of social relief – 1888.

ries) might well turn up these kinds of patterns. In the second case, where different groups employ the same category to mean somewhat different things, we would anticipate seeing more complex and larger lattice structures emerge because categories would be associated with less regular profiles of practices.[47]

This brings us to a second significant quality of this lattice. Earlier we alluded to the existence of a distributive (core) interval that stretches between the points labeled DESTITUTE and *shelter*. In Figure 4 we have isolated this core interval for easier inspection.[48] The orderliness of this interval is really quite remarkable. Identifying this kind of a structure in the combined discursive claims of more than a hundred relief agencies suggests that there was not only an impressive level of agreement regarding which practices should be applied to which categories of the poor, but that there was also a strikingly coherent set of (implicit) agreements about the hierarchy of classifications and practices. Organizations providing services to the WORTHY refrained from describing these services in any way that contradicted how other (unrelated) organizations were describing the practices employed to manage the INDIGENT (or the FALLEN). Each organization made public claims about poverty categories and services that conformed to this orderliness and not a single organization violated these implicit rules.[49]

It is this sort of complexity – a complexity of the whole that is, in a sense, greater than the sum of the parts – which we think most clearly reveals the existence of what Friedland and Alford described as an institutional logic. Those points lying outside the core interval may also reflect the existence of implicit agreements about how practices and categories should be matched. However, the evidence that such a collective consensus exists is considerably greater in the case of a complexly structured interval demonstrating mathematical properties of distributivity. In such a case, we have clear evidence that "a set of material practices and symbolic constructions" are being employed with consistency and regularity by a large number of organizations. This type of interorganizational consensus is not unfamiliar. Organizational theorists describe these sorts of broad-based agreements as occurring under particular historical conditions in which an organizational field has undergone a process of structuration leading to the institutionalization of fundamental conceptions of action.[50] As Lynn Zucker has argued, once an organizational practice is institutionalized, acting in a contrary manner becomes "unthinkable."[51] It is precisely the unthinkability of alternatives that is likely to produce the sort of consensual usage of categories and practices we see occurring in the distributive core interval of this lattice.

This is why we expect that an analysis of the core interval would provide an especially informative account of the prevailing logic of the organizational field. Because we have already focused much of our attention on this structure, we conclude our analysis of the 1888 lattice by simply noting that it is significant that DESTITUTE represents the highest and *shelter* the lowest elements of the core interval. This means that it is with respect to the category of the DESTITUTE that the logic of social relief was most fully institutionalized at this time. Indeed, viewed from this perspective, all of the other (core) categories of impoverishment can be seen as more precise specifications of this overarching institutional classification.[52] Dually, we see that in 1888, from the perspective of the core institutional system, all relief activities were essentially refinements of the dominant practice – the provision of indoor relief. Indeed, with the exception of the STRANGER, all categories of impoverishment within the institutional core were subjected to the practice of enclosure within one or another type of *asylum*. We thus find support here for Michael Katz's assertion that this period in the history of the American welfare state can best be described as the "poorhouse era." In Katz's words, "although more people received help outside than inside institutions, poorhouses symbolized the spirit and intent of welfare practice."[53] It is precisely this "spirit and intent" – the institutional logic of the poorhouse era – that is captured in Figure 4.

Progressivism and institutional change

Five years after the 1888 Charity Directory was issued, the same year that Henderson's book was published, a major economic depression changed the face of poverty in New York City. This event marked the beginning of a radical shift in the institutional contours of social relief. The changes that ensued, often lumped under the umbrella term Progressivism, had a variety of features. One obvious development was the emergence of more enlightened attitudes toward the poor. During the 1880s relief workers had largely held to the notion that poverty derived from individual moral failings (and genetic incompetence). Throughout the 1890s and on into the first decades of the nineteenth century, there was a clear shift in professional discourse away from the identification of individualistic flaws toward an awareness of how social environments tended to create poverty. While this shift should not be overstated (the core of the social-reform community was still very suspicious of outdoor relief and mightily concerned about the character of the poor), nonetheless it is clear that relief workers developed a much greater appreciation of environmental explanations for poverty.[54]

This ideological trend paralleled a number of important shifts in practice. For example, the "friendly visitors" that had been employed by Charity Organization Societies to investigate relief applicants were replaced by professional social workers who sought to bring increasingly rational and scientific methods to bear on the problem of knowing, diagnosing, and transforming the lives of the poor. At the same time, there was an increase in the level of state involvement in the field as public authorities (especially in state but also to some extent in Federal agencies) began taking a more active role in managing social-welfare practices. Protective labor laws for children and women workers, children's health-care programs and mother's pension laws were all enacted during this period. A number of organizational changes were also obvious. The asylums, poorhouses, and various other custodial institutions that had constituted the backbone of the nineteenth-century social-welfare system increasingly came under attack as outmoded, ineffective, and cruel solutions to the problems of social dependency. At the same time a variety of new organizational forms emerged – settlement houses, boys and girls clubs, half-way houses, juvenile courts, outpatient clinics for the mentally ill, tuberculosis clinics – most of them emphasizing the possibilities of transforming either the habits or the living conditions of the poor (by building parks and playgrounds, regulating housing conditions, managing public sanitation, and establishing community recreation facilities).[55]

Both the significance of these developments and their complexity have led to a variety of interpretive dilemmas for historians. Intellectual debates have erupted over questions such as whether the professionalization of social work was the decisive factor in promoting these changes, as Roy Lubove and other analysts have long maintained, or whether social workers were largely ineffectual, of secondary importance, as Theda Skocpol has recently argued.[56] A similar dispute has emerged over the issue of asylums. Drawing on the writings of crusading reformers, David Rothman documented the professional backlash that emerged around the turn of the century against the poorhouse, the insane asylum, and other custodial organizations. But, as Rothman also shows, rhetoric is one thing, the convenience of organizational inertia is quite another. More recent work by John Sutton has demonstrated that the census counts of some of these types of organizations actually increased during the Progressive Era, calling into question the extent to which the Progressive Era should be identified with the deinstitutionalization of the poor.[57] Even the general question of the extent to which the Progressive Era was really "progressive" has recently been questioned by feminist scholars who have argued that it was during this period that a "two-channel" welfare state was being created. According to this argument, the stigmatizing practices of the nineteenth-century poorhouse system were not so much overthrown as replaced by a system that, for impoverished women, was nearly as demeaning and controlling.[58] This then raises the question of the extent to which Progressivism in American society led toward the sort of egalitarianism Gertrude Himmelfarb has described (with respect to developments in England during these years) in which the moral boundaries between the poor and the rest of society had begun to be erased through the development of a social-welfare system that "was to provide not relief, but services, and not only to the poor or even the working classes but to everyone 'across the board'"?[59] Or was there instead a continuation of the same sort of class-based bifurcation between a thoroughly stigmatized underclass and other more positively regarded "needy" individuals that we saw play such an important role in the institutional logic of social relief in 1888?

These are just some of the questions that have bedeviled historians who study this period. We have highlighted these particular issues because they so clearly involve interpretations about the shifting institutional logic of social welfare. How important was social work – ideology and practice – to the emergent conceptualization of the poor? How enduring was the nineteenth-century vision of the poorhouse as a solution to the

problem of poverty? How significant were the old divisions between the destitute and the needy? And, to this list we can add one other question, how coherent was the institutional logic of the field during the turbulent times of the Progressive Era? Following the arguments of DiMaggio and Powell, we would expect to see the entrance of professionalized social workers and state officials as a stabilizing force, leading to a greater level of structuration within the organizational field and, consequently, an increasingly coherent institutional logic. At the same time, however, as this brief discussion has suggested, there were any number of conflicting trends and influences at work during these years and so we might just as well expect to see a sustained lack of institutional consensus about the nature of poverty and its proper treatment.

The institutional logic of the semiwelfare state

To address these questions we extended our analyses to the 1897, 1907, and 1917 Charity Directories. As expected, the consensual quality we found in the 1888 Directory was soon disrupted and replaced by far less coherent and stable systems of classification and relief. The 1879 data produced a lattice with about 15 percent more points than the 1888 lattice, and the 1907 lattice is even more complex (26 percent larger than in 1888). More importantly, neither lattice contains the sort of structural regularities – splits between categories and practices or distributive intervals – that were such prominent features of the 1888 lattice.[60] All of this suggests that the profound changes that occurred within the social-welfare sector during the Progressive Era left their mark on the institutional logic of the organizational field. In contrast to the remarkable coherence of the 1888 institutional system, these later years were dominated by dissensus and disagreement over which practices were approapriate for which categories of the poor. This changes, however, with the 1917 Charity Directory (see Figure 5). In the ten-year period between 1907 and 1917, a core distributive interval once again emerges at the center of the structure stretching between the category DESTITUTE and the practice *invest* while the overall size of the lattice drops by nearly 80 percent. The resulting structure is even more regular (and about 30 percent smaller) than the 1888 lattice, suggesting that after undergoing a period of intense transformation, the organizational field, as DiMaggio and Powell would have predicted, appears to have stabilized.



Figure 5. Lattice diagram: Duality of categories and practices – 1917.

One indication of the overall coherence of this structure is the preponderance of doubly irreducible blocks outside of the core interval – (DESERVING, *homeWk*), (STRANGER, *advise*), (MISFORTUNE, *give$*), (FALLEN, *asylum*) and (INDIGENT, *shelter*). Once again, the occurrence of these sorts of pairings indicate that each of these categories were tightly coupled to a specific signature practice. The frequency with which these types of pairings occurred in 1917 (fully half of the categories) suggests that there was a notable increase in the specificity of meanings associated with these classifications (and practices). In some cases this reflects the fact that a few categories (DESERVING, MISFORTUNE, STRANGER) had become anachronisms by 1917 and were only very rarely employed (see Table 2). But the specificity also suggests that organizational personnel were able to use increasingly restricted codes to signal their intentions. Such behavior would be most likely to occur when there was greater consensual agreement regarding the meaning of poverty classifications and practices thus implying that more could be taken for granted and less was required to be said.[61] Once again, we can interpret these meanings by considering the category/practice signature pairings. Notice, for example, that the FALLEN are identified with the *asylum* and no other services, suggesting the completion of their conceptual isolation and identification with an alternative domestic arrangement.[62] In the same manner, STRANGERS are now only formally identified with *advise*, indicating that their exclusion from the logic of social relief was also essentially complete.



Figure 6. Core distributive interval: Institutional logic of social relief – 1917.

It is, however, the orderliness of the core distributive interval (isolated for easier inspection in Figure 6) that is the most distinctive feature of this lattice. This structure indicates a very high level of consensual agreement about which practices should be paired with which classifications, an agreement that we interpret as evidence of a highly consensual institutional logic. Several features of this structure are significant. Notice, for example, the pivotal location of social investigations. Instead of a marginal relief practice that, in 1888, was located outside of the core interval, social investigation has emerged in 1917 as *the* central relief technology, encompassing the entire core structure of the social-welfare sector. Recall that it was the practice of giving *shelter* that had occupied this location before, suggesting that one of the most important transformations in this thirty-year period was the shift from an institutional logic founded on the presumption of indoor relief to the emergence of a system founded upon a scientifically managed system of outdoor relief – a change demonstrating the powerful impact of professional social work on the organizational field. In this regard it is interesting to see that the practice of giving *asylum*, while still the most prevalent activity listed in Table 2, has nonetheless fallen out of the core structure of meanings. This appears to be a striking confirmation of the peculiar contradiction noted earlier in which asylum populations were continuing to grow at the same time that the technology of institutionalization was being professionaly repudiated.

As before, we can identify several category/practice splits that can provide useful interpretive clues about when and where shifts in meaning occurred. For example, the split in 1888 which separated the practice of giving money from those categorized as HOMELESS, occurs again in 1917 indicating that the social meaning of homelessness may not have changed very much during these years. This suggests that there are institutional features of the poorhouse era that have persisted. There is other evidence of this persistence as well. There is a split between the DISTRESSED and *findJob-food* (and their equivalents in the core interval, *asylum-shelter*) that recalls the earlier separation of this category of the poor from the core distributive interval in 1888 (in which *shelter, asylum, findJob,* and *food* were the lowest elements, and in a sense, most fundamental practices). Apparently the category of the DISTRESSED had moved into the core by 1917, but it was still held to be conceptually distinct from those categories and practices that had dominated the earlier period and that remain embedded in this structure. Something similar may be at work in the split between the category WORTHY and the practice of *advise*. While the giving of advice (like the conducting of investigations) had come to fall within the jurisdictional mandate of professional social workers, it is possible that the category of the WORTHY was excluded from this practice because it was a classification which remained very much linked to that older institutional definition of the incorrigible poor. On the other hand, there are other splits that clearly signal changes in meaning. Such a split occurs between the practice of job training (*jbTrain*) and the category NEEDY. This appears to be a fully modern distinction as is evident from the way that the DISTRESSED and the HOMELESS, two categories that previously had been entirely distinct, were both treated in 1917 as appropriate candidates for job training as a way of remedying the disruptions in their lives.

In this regard, notice that the uppermost poverty classification (DESTITUTE) has remained the same as in the 1888 core structure, but there is much less evidence of a class-based bifurcation of the poverty sector in 1917. As Figure 5 demonstrates, the only poverty classification (inside and outside of the core interval) that is not a sub-category of destitution is DESERVING, a category that was already a historical anachronism. Moreover, within the core interval the position occupied by the INDIGENT (in 1888) has been taken by the DISTRESSED in 1917. Thus, with respect to the question of whether the emergence of an environmentalist explanation of poverty led to an increased egalitarianism and lessening of strict class-based conceptions of the poor, the evidence presented here

suggests that it did. While public policies in the United States were still a long way from acknowledging the existence of a universal right to social welfare, it appears as though these agencies had begun making fewer and less sharp procedural distinctions between the underclass and other categories of relief recipients.

All in all, the evidence suggests that in spite of a period of considerable turmoil during the 1890s and 1900s, this organizational field had indeed stabilized and achieved a striking level of consensus by 1917 regarding the fundamental institutional logic of social relief. Once again, Michael Katz's interpretation is borne out. Katz argued that the policy initiatives of Roosevelt's New Deal during the 1930s did not represent a radical break so much as a continuation of a set of institutional principles – what he referred to as the "semiwelfare state" – that had already been established in the first decades of this century.[63] Moreover, by mapping out the contours of this institutional logic we have been able to confirm several important features of this transformation – that it rested in a fundamental way upon the principles of professional social work, that it contained within it an inherently contradictory repudiation and embrace of custodial asylums, and that it was founded upon a de-escalation of the traditional split between the underclass and other segments of society even while it preserved some of the original features of the poorhouse era.

Discussion

These analyses are intended to demonstrate the overall coherence of poverty relief as it existed at two moments in time and to provide an interpretation that links the ideational component of that system (its cultural distinctions) to its practical component (the relief activities employed). In the process, we seek to demonstrate two things. We begin by showing how the meaning of various poverty classifications can be deduced through an examination of the ways in which those categories were used. With lattice analysis we are able not only to map out the classificatory structure but to interpret its structural organization by seeing the duality that linked it to distinctions embedded within the order of practices. In the process we show that there are formal properties of the lattice structure that can lead us to see patterns in the institutional system that we might otherwise miss – the disjunction between the category of the NEEDY and the requirement that labor be performed to receive relief, the separation between the FALLEN and the giving of

food, the split between being classified as WORTHY and the obligation to work for a living.

Second, we demonstrate how the overall pattern of relations between categories and practices can be used as a means of assessing broader changes in the institutional system. We argue that the occurrence of formally distributive dual structures were so unusual that they could only occur under conditions of the structuration and institutionalization of an organizational field. Because we find those structures in the 1888 and 1917 lattices but not in the intervening years we deduce that this organizational field underwent a period of transformation followed by a re-structuration. By focusing on the core (distributive) interval we are able to identify features in the 1888 lattice that closely matched what Michael Katz has described as the "spirit and intent" of the "poorhouse era." The 1917 lattice, on the other hand, appears to approximate features of what Katz has referred to as the "semiwelfare state." Within this structure, we find evidence supporting certain historical interpretations – that social work had a critical impact on the logic of social welfare, that the asylum was both prevalent and also delegitimated, and that the field as a whole experienced a movement toward a more egalitarian model of social assistance.

Throughout, we seek to *interpret* the logic of social relief by understanding how cultural distinctions and forms of action were meaningfully differentiated both internally (e.g., within each separate domain) and in their mutually constitutive relations to one another. To understand these meanings we rely upon a synchronic reading of the distinctions separating both categories and practices at two points in time. This is a strategy reminiscent of the structuralist (e.g., Saussurian) method of interpretation that depended upon the analysis of patterns of differences. Our approach, however, differs in two fundamental ways. First, we employ a more demanding theory of structure by identifying both horizontal and vertical patterns of relations. In other words, in looking at differences, so too have we been interested in orderings that have allowed us to construct hierarchical (e.g., sub-setting) relationships of containment. In this regard, our approach is closer to Carnap's method of "intensions" and "extensions" than it is to Saussure.[64] Second, in a fashion that is quite different from that of Carnap and other language philosophers, we are stepping beyond the bounds of language itself. Just as Geertz took Wittgenstein and Ryle outside of language theory to apply their insights to broader cultural repertoires of meaning,[65] so too we sought the meaning of these linguistic categories not according to their usage as elements

of speech but in their association with distinctive forms of practice. Hence, we identify a type of logic that is quite unlike what Carnap sought to specify, precisely because it it not contained within nor defined by the formal properties of speech. It is rather, as Bourdieu put it, a "fuzzy" or "lazy" logic, built up out of the multiple and repetitive associations of categories and practices.[66] In other words, we identify a type of structural arrangement not derivable from some intrinsic or systemic coherence of culture (or mind, or principle of grammar). Rather we presume that culture is structured through its relation to practice, and that this relationship is dual in that practices are themselves differentiated according to the distinctions of culture.

In pursuing these questions, we are of course forced to focus on some dimensions of the problem and not others. Because of our interest in identifying institutional logics we adopt research tactics that are explicitly intended to help us identify areas of broad consensual agreement. Thus, we chose from the outset to focus on a deep-level classification system about which there was a greater likelihood of a consensus being formed; we include all of the organizations together as if we were describing one large, homogeneous speech community; and we employ a 0/1 cutoff criterion that allows for no margin of error. But clearly agencies, relief workers, and professional, political, religious, racial, and ethnic groups also differ in their approaches to solving the problems of poverty. For example, in other work (not reported here) we have compared state, religious, and non-profit organizations and discovered that state organizations (not surprisingly) had notably simpler and more structured lattices than other types of organizations, suggesting that they relied upon more rationalized systems of practice and classification. Clearly there is a great deal of room to pursue other sorts of variations as well.

Another obvious limitation of our study concerns our single-minded focus on poverty classifications. We suggested earlier that both status distinctions – gender, race, ethnicity, occupation, age – and understandings of other types of social problems – industrial accidents, single-parent housholds, the "tramp problem," widespread unemployment, etc. – shaped the discourse of poverty relief during these years. Indeed, the Directories we employed here as a data source are filled with these types of categorical distinctions. By not taking these kinds of classificatory markers into account, we are necessarily missing important parts of the story. To take just one example, as Nancy Fraser and other feminist scholars have argued, relief agencies have historically treated women

rather differently than men. They have required a more intensive investigation of their lifestyles, they have imposed more intrusive sorts of controls on their behavior, and have been far more reluctant to provide monetary relief to women, preferring instead to award them "services in kind."[67] Even greater differences have been demonstrated with respect to racial distinctions in the organization of relief.[68] This then suggests that our arguments about the apparent move toward greater egalitarianism in the social-welfare sector may need to be reconsidered in light of the way that status-based distinctions may have been leading, simultaneously, toward other types of inequalities of treatment. Future work will have to address the connections among status identities, social problem constructions, and poverty classifications – doing so is beyond the scope of this article.[69]

One of the most important limitations of the method we employ here is its reliance on synchronic analysis.[70] In an important sense, we wring the history out of these institutions by focusing exclusively on these two years (and in modeling them independently of one another). It is this "snapshot" quality of our analyses that renders them in some ways too "thin." In other words, our lattices present us with an image of the poverty system, frozen in time, as a *fait accompli*. How these arrangements came into being, how practices were invented, differentiated, and applied to some categories of the poor and not others, how power and conflict led to the institutionalization of social arrangements that were constitutive of the logic we have identified – these are the questions that add flesh to our skeletal structure. To "thicken" our description we are relying on the work of historians who have been primarily concerned with seeing the diachronic transformation of these practices and cultural distinctions through time.

But, even as there are costs, there are also clear advantages to our approach. We take the seemingly ineffable notion of institutional logic and give it a concrete representation. In doing so we are respecting the idea, so crucial to contemporary social theory, that culture and practice are mutually constituted. In the process, we provide a useful reading of classificatory meanings – a reading that is in some ways more systematic and comprehensive than has previously been provided.[71] And we do so in a way that usefully contributes to our understanding of how this institutional system was being transformed during this important period of historical change. At a more general level, we are demonstrating the utility of thinking about structural duality as a particular type of empirical relationship that may prove to have a wide variety of practical applica-

tions and, in so doing, we concretely demonstrate the utility of Galois lattices as a means of representing these types of empirical linkages.

Acknowledgments

Earlier versions of this article have been presented at the Sunbelt Social Networks Conference in New Orleans and at the Social Science History Association meetings in Atlanta. Helpful comments on earlier drafts were provided by Andrew Abbott, Denise Bielby, Roberto Franzosi, Roger Friedland, Noah Friedkin, John Padgett, Josep Rodriguez, Doug White, and the members of the UCSB Social Networks Faculty Seminar and the UCSB Comparative Institutions Seminar, and the Editors of *Theory and Society*. Francesca Guerra-Pearson provided essential research assistance on this project. Work on this research by the first author has been supported by faculty senate grants from UCSB and by a grant from the American Sociological Association Fund for the Advancement of the Discipline. The second author and the program GLAD have been supported by CNRS, Univ. R. Descartes, LISH and MSH-Paris; travels to the University of California have been made possible by Professors D. Luce and L. Freeman, whom we also thank for interesting discussions on these topics.

Appendix

A lattice is simply an *order* L, in which every pair $x, y \in L$ has a *meet* $x \wedge y$ (the greatest element below them), and dually a *join*: $x \vee y$. For a finite lattice L, M(L), and J(L) are the sets of *meet-irreducible* and *join-irreducible* elements (which have a single *upper cover* for $m \in M(L)$, and a single *lower cover* for $j \in J(L)$). Let $[x, y] := \{z \in L / x \leqslant z \leqslant y\}$ be the *interval* defined by a comparable pair, and finally let $M_x := [x, 1] \cap M(L)$ be the set of meet-irreducibles that are above x and let $J_x := [0, x] \cap J(L)$ dually.

Obviously, the higher x, the larger J_x, while M_x is smaller, a mechanism by which lattices formalize directly the extension/intension duality of "concepts." Join- and meet-irreducible elements will take the place of some subjects (or objects) and attributes, while by identifying a "concept" to be some $x \in L$, J_x and M_x represent its *extension* and *intension*.

This defines the interplay between binary relations and lattices, and the structure of a lattice L is *encoded* into the *reduced relation* $R := (J(L), M(L), \leqslant)$ by the

bijection $\times \rightarrow (J_x, M_x)(x \in L)$, since $\times \leqslant y$ if $J_x \subseteq J_y$ (if $M_x \supseteq M_y$), and $J_{x \wedge y} = J_x \cap J_y$ and $M_{x \vee y} = M_x \cap M_y$ hold in any (arbitrary) lattice, while *only* $J_{x \vee y} \supseteq J_x \cup J_y$ and $M_{x \wedge y} \supseteq M_x \cup M_y$ hold.

The relation R is said to be *reduced* as it corresponds to the property that for each $j \in J(L)$, M_j is not the intersection of other M_k ($k \in J(L)$, and dually for the J_m ($m \in M$).

Conversely to this encoding, any *relation* $R \subseteq S \times A$ describing a set of *subjects* S by a set of *attributes* A (features, events: sRa is read as the subject s "has" the attribute a) gives rise to a lattice. Without loss of generality, R may be supposed to be reduced. For a subset of attributes

$$B \subseteq A, \text{ let } B\downarrow := \{s \in S / sRb \text{ all } b \in B\} \text{ and } B\downarrow\uparrow := \{s \in A / sRa \text{ all } s \in B\downarrow\}.$$

The structure of $R \subseteq S \times A$ is *unfolded* into the *Galois lattice* $L(R) = \{B\downarrow, B\downarrow\uparrow\} / B \subseteq A\}$ defined by:

$$(B\downarrow, B\downarrow\uparrow) \wedge (C\downarrow, C\downarrow\uparrow) = ((B\downarrow \cap C\downarrow), (B\downarrow \cap C\downarrow)\uparrow), \text{ and dually}$$

$$(B\downarrow, B\downarrow\uparrow) \vee (C\downarrow, C\downarrow\uparrow) = ((B\downarrow\uparrow \cap C\downarrow\uparrow)\downarrow, (B\downarrow\uparrow \cap C\downarrow\uparrow)).$$

In words, the meet operation (lower bound) of L(R) is characterized by intersection of extents while the join (upper bound) is characterized by intersection of intents. One goes up in the lattice by $\vee$ and the *sharing of properties*, and down by $\wedge$ and *group intersections*.

Notes

1. This quote is taken from the second expanded edition (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1901): 84–85. This edition has an additional 75 pages of material, most of it devoted to an even greater and more detailed classification of the poor.
2. Henderson's scheme (especially in the second edition) is reminscent of the taxonomic efforts of the English ethnographer Charles Booth, who clearly influenced Henderson. Henderson's taxonomic efforts were more encompassing than Booth's however, in that he included both the "defective" and "delinquent" classes in his analysis. For the former, Henderson drew heavily upon medical and psychiatric taxonomies differentiating, for example, among "microcephalous," "hydrocephalic," "eclampsic," and "sclerotic idiots" (1901, p. 175–176). For the latter he drew upon a variety of sources, paying special attention to the field of "criminal anthropology," which included Lombroso's work on "criminal types" and numerous similar efforts.
3. For a review of the classificatory work of nineteenth-century American social reformers, see chapters 5 and 6 in Mohr's dissertation, "Community, Bureaucracy and Social Relief: An Institutional Analysis of Organizational Forms in New York City, 1888–1917," (Ph.D. disseration, Department of Sociology, Yale University, 1992).
4. Roger Friedland and Robert R. Alford, "Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices and Institutional Contradictions," in Walter W. Powell and Paul DiMaggio,

editors, *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991), 232–263.

5. Ibid., 248.
6. See, for example, Peter Abell, *The Syntax of Social Life: The Theory and Method of Comparative Narratives* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987); Andrew Abbott, "Transcending General Linear Reality," *Sociological Theory* 6 (1988): 169–186; Charles Ragin, "The Logic of the Comparative Method and the Algebra of Logic," *Journal of Quantitative Anthropology* 1 (1989): 373–398; and Larry J. Griffin, "Narrative, Event-Structure Analysis, and Causal Interpretation in Historical Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology* 98 (1993): 1094–1133.
7. For reviews of these approaches, see Larry J. Griffin and Charles C. Ragin, "Some Observations on Formal Methods of Qualitative Analysis," *Sociological Methods and Research* 23 (1994): 4–21; Douglas White and Vincent Duquenne, "Introduction: Social Networks and Discrete Structure Analysis," *Social Networks* 18 (1996) 169–172; and John W. Mohr, "Measuring Meaning Structures," *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 (forthcoming).
8. Schweizer uses data taken from an urban neighborhood in French Polynesia, a group of hunter-gatherers in Zaire and a peasant community in Java. See his article, "The Dual Ordering of People and Possessions," *Current Anthropology*: 34 (1993): 469–483.
9. Vincent Duquenne, "Models of Possessions and Lattice Analysis," *Social Science Information*, (1995): 253–267, provides an additional example of the analysis of status orders and material wealth. Linton C. Freeman and Douglas White, "Using Galois Lattices to Represent Network Data," *Sociological Methodology*, 23 (1993): 127–146, and Vincent Duquenne, "On Lattice Approximations: Syntactic Aspects," *Social Networks* 18 (1996): 189–200, employ lattice analysis to assess the dual linkage between individuals and their membership in sub-groupings within a social network. Duquenne also uses the technique to analyze the structural associations among classes of symptoms and handicapped children, "Lattice Analysis and the Representation of Handicap Associations," *Social Networks* 18 (1996): 217–230, and psychological patients, "Towards an Intensional Logic of Symptoms," *Current Psychology of Cognition* 15/3 (1996): 323–345. And Duquenne and Cherfouh, "A Lattice Analysis of the German Identity," (Unpublished report to the Bosh Foundation, 1994), employ lattice analysis to identify the duality that inheres between the social location of German survey respondents and their opinions about the nature of the German character.
10. See, for example, Zygmunt Bauman, *Culture as Praxis* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973); Marshall Sahlins, *Culture and Practical Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society and Outline of a Theory of Structuration* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); and William H. Sewell, "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency and Transformation," *American Journal of Sociology* 98 (July, 1992): 1–29.
11. See, for example, Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology* (New York: Basic Books, 1963).
12. Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
13. Also see Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) and *The Logic of Practice* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990). For a useful summary of practice theory, see Sherry Ortner, "Theory in Anthropology Since the Sixties," in Nicholas B. Dirks, Geoff Eley, and Sherry B.

Ortner, editors, *Culture/Power/History: A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 372–411.

14. Friedland and Alford, "Bringing Society Back In," 248.
15. See Breiger's classic essay, "The Duality of Persons and Groups," *Social Forces* 53 (1974): 181–190. He draws especially on some of the work of George Simmel collected in *Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations* (New York: Free Press, 1955).
16. See their essay, "Using Galois Lattices to Represent Network Data."
17. Friedland and Alford, "Bringing Society Back In," 248.
18. Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).
19. Polanyi illustrates the emergent sensitivity to symbolic boundaries differentiating classes of the poor with passages such as this quote from the writings of Harriet Martineau, "(e)xcept the distinction between sovereign and subject, there is no social difference in England so wide as that between independent laborer and the pauper; and it is equally ignorant, immoral, and impolitic to confound the two" (ibid., 100).
20. Deborah A. Stone, *The Disabled State* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984).
21. Ibid., 39. Stone argues that "(t)he most striking aspect of nineteenth-century Poor Law is that through it, a formerly undifferentiated mass of paupers came to be understood as comprising several distinct elements. The articulation of categories was in a sense an exercise in mapmaking. The vast unknown territory of paupers was explored and described with increasing detail, so that internal boundaries between types of paupers seemed to appear" (ibid., 39–40).
22. For details concerning the construction of the dataset, see Mohr, "Community, Bureaucracy and Social Relief," and "Soldiers, Mothers, Tramps and Others: Discourse Roles in the 1907 New York City Charity Directory," *Poetics*, 22 (1994): 327–357.
23. Note that the database contains the exact text strings employed by the organizations in describing their clientele. The reference here is to a coding scheme developed by the first author, which associates the textual information to a set of analysis variables. These variables simply indicate the occurrence of a specific word (or word variant) in a text string. Thus, DISTRESSED has a value of 1 whenever "distressed" or "distress" occurs in a given text string, otherwise it has a value of 0. However, a number of the categories in the database (although none that is employed in this analysis) allow multiple designations. For example, the category "Med_Spcf" takes a value of 1 whenever any specific medical condition (cancer, leprosy, small-pox, etc.) is mentioned in a text string. Hence, the actual number of categorical distinctions invoked by these organizations is actually considerably more than the 246 analysis variables currently in use.
24. Michael Katz discusses the impact of this law on the New York poorhouse system in his book, *In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America*, (New York: Basic Books, 1986): 107. Chapter 5 of that book also has a thorough discussion of child-saving and other nineteenth-century and Progressive era programs for managing impoverished children.
25. Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, "A Geneology of *Dependency*: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State," *Signs* 19 (1994): 309–335, provide an especially useful and detailed interpretation of the changing meaning of this term in the American social-welfare sector. They identify the same shift in usage during these years.
26. In some cases, the same organization may have made more than one claim about the classes of people it served. The unit of analysis in these frequency counts is the service claims themselves, not the organizations making the claims.

27. For a very helpful discussion of the distinction between this kind of "phenomenological" endeavor and our more "structuralist" approach to interpreting meanings, see chapter 2 in Robert Withnow, *Meaning and Moral Order: Explorations in Cultural Analysis*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
28. Henderson, *An Introduction to the Study of the Dependent, Defective and Delinquent Classes*, 84.
29. In this respect, we follow in the steps of the pragmatic approach to the philosophy of meaning, generally identified with Ludwig Wittgenstein's later work. See his *Philosophical Investigations* (New York: MacMillan, 1953). Our approach parallels the sentiment of the pragmatists' aphorism, "Don't look for the meaning, look for the use." For a useful discussion of this school, see William P. Alston's essay on "Meaning" in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Volume 5, Paul Edwards, editor (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co, 1967), 233–241.
30. More precisely, we expect that their homelessness or inability to care for themselves at home, if it existed, was not recognized as a salient and differentiating aspect of their identity. We hasten to make this point because we want to emphasize that we are dealing with institutional meanings here, not the objective characteristics of relief recipients. Certainly the two were related, and indeed, the fact that symbolic distinctions have real world (objective) consequences is what makes our topic worthwhile. Nonetheless, in this study we are simply not in a position of being able to assess how tightly or loosely coupled these two dimensions – the symbolic and the objective – really were in practice.
31. Henderson, *An Introduction to the Study of the Dependent, Defective and Delinquent Classes*, 30.
32. From William Graham Sumner's 1896 essay, "Cause and Cure of Hard Times," republished in *The Forgotten Man and Other Essays* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919), 149–153.
33. Henderson, *An Introduction to the Study of the Dependent, Defective and Delinquent Classes*, 85.
34. See, for example, the discussion in Paul T. Ringenbach, *Tramps and Reformers: The Discovery of Unemployment in New York, 1873–1916* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973), and in Michael Katz, *Poverty and Policy in American History*.
35. We say "at least" because we know that our analysis only encompasses one dimension of differentiation. Because we have focused entirely on the linguistic designations of poverty, we are necessarily excluding a large number of other salient distinctions such as those based on gender and other relevant "role" attributes. See Mohr, "Soldiers, Mothers, Tramps and Others," for an analysis that more directly addresses these dimensions of differentiation.
36. GLAD was written and is distributed by Vincent Duquenne.
37. For useful discussions of the continuities between nineteenth-century and contemporary distinctions regarding the "underclass," see Michael Katz, "The Urban 'Underclass' as a Metaphor of Social Transformation," in Michael Katz, editor, *The Underclass Debate: Views From History*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 3–23, and in the same volume, Eric Monkkonen, "Nineteenth–Century Institutions: Dealing with the Urban 'Underclass,'" 334–365.
38. As early social-work texts make clear, the idea of conducting a social investigation of the poor actually dates back at least to the efforts of Thomas Chalmers in Glasgow during the 1820s. The system of social investigation employed in Elberfeld, Germany during the 1850s was also frequently cited as a forerunner of more modern approaches. For discussions of these efforts, see Josephine Shaw Lowell, *Public Relief*

and Private Charity (New York: Arno Press, [1884] 1971); Charles Richmond Henderson, *Modern Methods of Charity: An Account of the Systems of Relief, Public and Private, in the Principal Countries Having Modern Methods* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1904); and Mary Richmond, *Social Diagnosis* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1917). In New York City, a few very early attempts at organizing a system of visitors to the poor (such as the efforts of the New York Society for the Prevention of Pauperism in 1818) were short-lived and unsuccessful. The first serious effort to develop such a system was launched in 1843 with the founding of the New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor. Building on skills and strategies developed by temperance and tract societies, AICP visitors were to visit all of the poor within their district regularly, assess their true needs and moral failings, and report this information back to the main office. By 1860, the AICP had divided the city into 337 districts and had a visitor working in each. See Paul Boyer, *Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820–1920* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978). However, within a few years the AICP had begun to decline and by 1870 its investigative work had largely ceased. Thus, it wasn't until the Charity Organization Society was established (in 1882) that the beginnings of a truly modern and professionalized system of social investigations began to be organized, a task that took many years to complete. For a discussion of this process, see Michael Katz, *In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

39. To borrow a term from Michel Foucault, we might suggest that each represented a different regime of power/knowledge. See, for example, Foucault's development of this concept in *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).
40. In the entire 1888 Directory, there was only a handful of organizations that claimed to be employing investigations. These included the following entries (accompanied here by the categories designated as recipients of this practice) – the Charity Organization Society ("cases needing assistance living within any organized district"), the New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor ("needy and distressed families"), the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children ("children suffering from cruelty"), the Society for the Relief of Poor Widows with Small Children ("any industrious Poor widow of fair character who is not assisted by the Authorities with two Children under the age of 10"), All Souls Protestant Episcopal Church and the Church of the Holy Apostles ("applicants for relief"), and St. James Protestant Episcopal Church ("poor of the neighborhood").
41. When a lattice is distributive, there is an exact *matching* between the join- and meet-irreducible elements (and there is not any other perspective relationship), and each matching pair expresses a *local negation* (p is the complement of c in the interval that they generate) and an *exclusive union*: a block (practices, categories) in the lattice is either above p or below c, but not both.
42. See John Meyer and Brian Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony," *American Journal of Sociology* 83 (1977): 340–363.
43. We conceive of the claims that we study here as highly stylized speech acts that were conducted within a restricted set of cultural codes about the institutional meaning of poverty. It is important to point out that the potentially "ceremonial" character of these reports does not trouble us. Once again, we are interested in understanding the institutional logic of relief, which we see as being constructed out of precisely these sorts of cultural codes and symbolic distinctions. The slippage that occurs between actual organizational activities and claims that are made about organizational activ-

ities are less interesting to us because we think that, ultimately, it is the publicly available (and symbolically visible) discourse about poverty that sets the public-policy agenda. This does not mean, by the way, that we think that change occurs only at this discursive level, through the systematizing efforts of policy intellectuals such as Henderson. On the contrary, it seems more likely that cumulative contradictions occur in the slippage between actual and announced behavior and that these contradictions may be the primary motor driving the shifting contours of the institutional logic. But we expect to be able to identity the effects of those phenomena by studying the details of shifts in (public) claim-making behavior.

44. Based on her study of Cleveland, Marian J. Morton reports that during these years the term "'fallen' referred to women suspected or guilty of sexual delinquence, especially prostitutes. In actual practice, however, the definition often was expanded to include other kinds of deviance from middle-class norms, including poverty, dependence, transience, illness and out-of-wedlock pregnancy," page 447 in "Seduced and Abandoned in an American City: Cleveland and Its Fallen Women, 1869–1936," *Journal of Urban History* 11/4 (1985): 443–469.
45. Formally, these are *doubly irreducible* blocks. The former represents the largest practice conjunction receiving DISTRESSED as well as the greatest categorial conjunction applying to *investigate*. In other words, DISTRESSED and *investigate* are both specific to that block and thus coincide in a simultaneous representation mixing together the two universes of reference–categories and practices.
46. The issue is really more complex because both practices and linguistic terms can vary. We would only encounter synonymous terms if two sets of organizations made use of exactly the same practices but different vocabularies to designate relief recipients.
47. Consider what would happen if even one organization began to advertise that it employed social investigations in its dealings with the WORTHY – a claim that does in fact begin to occur in the 1897 Directory. This simple change would radically transform the lattice. The WORTHY would no longer be a sub-category of the INDIGENT or the DESTITUTE (neither of which were subjected to investigations). Nor would the WORTHY be a sub-category of the NEEDY (since the NEEDY were never subjected to *paidWk*). However, the DESERVING would continue to be a sub-category of both the WORTHY and the INDIGENT. Thus, the resulting lattice would be significantly more complex not only because it would have to accommodate the new location of all points containing WORTHY, but because it would have to adjust also to the resultant disruptions in all of the ordered blocks of which the category WORTHY was a member.
48. Effectively we have removed what is below DISTRESSED and MISFORTUNATE, leaving us with just the distributive interval between *shelter* and DESTITUTE.
49. Note that it is precisely because we have been interested in identifying these types of institutional logics that we have employed a strict 0/1 cutoff criteria in the creation of our binary matrices (tables 3 and 4). Other sorts of investigations (those geared, for example, toward the identification of emergent trends) would more profitably employ less strict (and perhaps other sorts of) inclusion criteria.
50. Structuration depends upon four factors, (1) an increase of organizational interaction, (2) the emergence of a structure of domination and patterns of coalition, (3) an increase in the information load within the field and (4) the development of mutual awareness among participants that they are engaged in a common enterprise. See Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional

Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," *American Sociological Review* 48 (1983): 147–160.

51. Lynne G. Zucker, "Organizations as Institutions." in Samuel B. Bacharach, editor, *Research in the Sociology of Organizations*, vol. 2., (Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press, 1983), 1–47.
52. Note that this does not imply that our earlier assessment of the bifurcation between the NEEDY and the DESTITUTE was incorrect. That interpretation still stands. However, it does mean that within this organizational field the most fully institutionalized cultural/practical logic was embedded within a system in which DESTITUTE was the dominant categorical designation.
53. Katz, *In the Shadow of the Poorhouse*, xii.
54. A number of reformers began moving toward a more institutional explanation of the causes of poverty as early as the mid-1880s. In 1885, various scholars (Richard Ely, Francis Walker, Washington Gladden, et al.) formed the American Economic Association as a forum for liberal thinking on poverty, social problems, the labor question, and the role of the state in correcting social ills. See Dorothy Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Through the 1890s a number of reformers from the "social gospel" movement (including Charles Henderson) adopted increasingly liberal stands on the causes of poverty. For example, William Bliss published the *Encyclopedia of Social Reform* in 1897, taking an aggressively progressive stance, including the assertion that 74 percent of the cause of poverty should be attributed to misfortune while only 21 percent was due to misconduct. Cited in Anthony Oberschall, "The Institutionalization of American Sociology," in Anthony Oberschall, editor, *The Establishment of Empirical Sociology* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 187–251. By the time Charles Cooley publishes *Social Organization* in 1909, he feels free to assert that, "(a)s to the view, still not uncommon, that the laziness, shiftlessness and vice of the poor are the source of their difficulties, it may be said that these traits, so far as they exist, are now generally regarded by competent students as quite as much the effect as the cause of poverty. If a man is undervitalized he will either appear lazy or will exhaust himself in efforts which are beyond his strength – the latter being common with those of a nervous temperament. Shiftlessness, also, is the natural outcome of a confused and discouraging experience, especially if added to poor nutrition. And as to drink and other sensual vices, it is well understood that they are the logical resource of those whose life style does not meet the needs of human nature in the way of variety, pleasantness and hope," *Social Organization* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), 292–293. For general discussions see Paul Boyer, *Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820–1920* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978); Robert H. Bremner, *From the Depths: The Discovery of Poverty in the United States* (New York: New York University Press, 1956) and Ann Shola Orloff, "Gender in Early U.S. Social Policy," *Journal of Policy History* 3 (1991): 249–281.
55. See John Mohr and Francesca Guerra-Pearson, "The Differentiation of Institutional Space: Organizational Forms in the New York Social Welfare Sector, 1888–1907," in Walter Powell and Dan Jones, editors, *Remaking the Iron Cage: Institutional Dynamics and Processes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming).
56. See Lubove's argument in *The Professional Altruist: The Emergence of Social Work as a Career, 1880–1930* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965). Skocpol has emphasized the importance of (non-professional) women's voluntary associations in setting the agenda of social policy during these years and the relative ineffectiveness of professional reform organizations (such as the *American Economic Association*

and the *American Association for Labor Legislation*). See her argument in *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992). Of course, Skocpol was mostly concerned with factors that promoted legislative change while Lubove was concerned with the shifting forms of practice employed by social workers, but both addressed the issue of how the basic contours of the American social-welfare system evolved during this period.

57. David Rothman's work, *Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and Its Alternatives in Progressive America* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980) provides the classic history of the controversy over the asylum during the Progressive Era, including both the delegitimation of institutions and their continued resilience in spite of widespread repudiation. John Sutton, "The Expansion of the Asylum in Progressive America," *American Sociological Review* 56 (1991): 665–678, provides empirical evidence of the increasing inmate populations during the Progressive Era.
58. On the historical foundations of these developments, see Barbara J. Nelson "The Origins of the Two-Channel Welfare State: Workmen's Compensation and Mother's Aid," in Linda Gordon, editor, *Women, the State and Welfare* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 123–151.
59. See Gertrude Himmelfarb, *The Idea of Poverty: England in the Early Industrial Age* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), 531.
60. The 1897 lattice had 31 points, the 1907 had 34. The only notable regularity occurs in the 1897 lattice, which is "gluing decomposable" into four regular blocks. The 1907 lattice is not decomposable at all. These lattice diagrams are available upon request.
61. On the concept of restricted vs. elaborated codes, see Basil Bernstein, *Class, Codes and Control: Theoretical Studies Towards a Sociology of Language* (New York: Schocken Books, 1975). Other evidence also tends to support this conclusion. If we consider the total number of descriptive words used by each organization in its classifications of the poor (excluding the words: a, an, and, any, are, as, at, be, by, for, from, have, in, is, of, on, or, that, the, they, this, to, too, which, while, who, whom, whose, and with) we see a trend towards greater conciseness after the turn of the century in the number of words used per organization: 1888 – 6,730/1,274 = 5.3; 1897 – 11,019/1,766 = 6.2; 1907 – 14,445/3,055 = 4.7 and 1917 – 14,985/3,584 = 4.2. Note, however, that this trend mostly applies to the linguistic specialization of the organizations, rather than to the succinctness with which the organizations described a particular class of relief recipients. By this measure, (the average number of words per referenced identity) the trend was relatively stable: 1888 – 2.92; 1897 – 3.48; 1907 – 3.54; 1917 – 3.51. On the other hand, there was also a shift in the kinds of specifications employed. In the later years a larger percentage of the classificatory designations concerned bureaucratic distinctions. For details, see Mohr, "Community, Bureaucracy and Social Relief."
62. Regina G. Kunzel, *Fallen Women, Problem Girls: Unmarried Mothers and the Professionalization of Social Work, 1890–1945* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993) documents the shifting focus of rescue workers from the task of saving prostitutes to providing homes for unwed mothers. She describes how this shift led to a firming up of the social (and linguistic) boundary between fallen women and problem girls.
63. See Katz, *In the Shadow of the Poorhouse*. For a similar argument, see Theda Skocpol and John Ikenberry, "The Political Formation of the American Welfare State in Historical and Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Social Research* 6 (1983): 87–148.

64. See, for example, Rudolf Carnap, *Meaning and Necessity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).
65. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures.*
66. Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 86–87.
67. See Nancy Fraser, *Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989). Fraser notes that this institutional legacy persists today. Federal relief programs that designate women as their prime beneficiaries are more likely to impose strict, moralizing controls over recipients' behavior (such as AFDC) and to limit individuals' choice of purchases (e.g., Food Stamps). See also Barbara J. Nelson, "The Origins of the Two-Channel Welfare State." John Mohr and Krista Paulsen, "Locating the Origins of America's Two-Channel Welfare State: Evidence from New York City's Relief Organizations, 1888–1917" (unpublished manuscript, 1995) provide an empirical analysis of these trends during the Progressive Era.
68. See, for example, Linda Gordon, "Black and White Visions of Welfare: Women's Welfare Activism, 1890–1945." *The Journal of American History* 78 (1991): 559–590 and Joe William Trotter Jr., "Blacks in the Urban North: The 'Underclass Question' in Historical Perspective." in Michael Katz, editor, *The Underclass Debate: Views From History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 55–81.
69. In other work, the first author has explored the ways in which the institutional logic of relief was associated with the usage of status classifications and social problem designations by these organizations. See John Mohr, "Soldiers, Mothers, Tramps and Others."
70. This is one place in which our methods share some of the limitations of traditional "structuralist" methods of interpretation.
71. Various historians have, of course, provided useful readings of poverty classifications before. Fraser and Gordon's archaeological account of the meaning of "dependence" (in "A Geneology of *Dependency*") is an excellent example. Himmelfarb's discussion (in *The Idea of Poverty*) of the meaning of various poverty distinctions in nineteenth-century England is quite fascinating. And, most historians in this field provide similar sorts of interpretative readings as a matter of course. Bremner (*From the Depths*) and Katz, *In the Shadow of the Poorhouse*, and *Poverty and Policy in American History* (New York: Academic Press, 1983) are particularly astute in this regard. Still, we know of no work that has sought to provide the same level of systematic analysis of such a broad collection of linguistic distinctions.