Blitzkrieg - Definition

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Blitzkrieg, from the German for "lightning war", was an operational-level military doctrine which employed mobile forces attacking with speed and surprise to prevent an enemy from organizing a coherent defense. Originally conceived in the years after the First World War, it was a new tactic developing from existing techniques of maneuver warfare and combined arms warfare. It was first used by the German Wehrmacht during the Second World War.

Methods of blitzkrieg operations centered on using maneuver rather than attrition to defeat an opponent. The blizkrieg thus first and foremost required a concentration of armored assets at a focal point, closely supported by mobile infantry, artillery and close air support assets. This required the development of specialised support vehicles, new methods of communication, new tactics, and the presence of a decentralized command structure. Broadly speaking, blitzkrieg operations required the development of mechanised infantry, artillery and engineering assets that could maintain the rate of advance of the tanks.

German forces avoided direct combat in favour of interrupting an enemy's communications, decision making, logistics, and morale. In combat, blitzkrieg forced slower defending forces into defensive pockets that were encircled and then destroyed by following German infantry.

Operations early in the war--the invasions of Poland, France, and the Soviet Union--were highly effective, owing to surprise, enemy unpreparedness and drastically superior German military doctrines. The Germans faced numerically superior forces and technically superior vehicles in the invasion of France-proving the early effectiveness of their tactics and strategies. From this peak, the Wehrmacht's strength deteriorated, Allied forces learned to counter such tactics, and blitzkrieg operations could no longer be conducted as before. From 1943 on, German blitzkrieg operations were generally defensive counterattacks and a handful of mostly failed offensives.

The term blitzkrieg was coined by Western journalists during the 1939 German invasion of Poland and refered to a distinct form of warfare used primarily by Germany during the Second World War. In this narrow sense it us used by majority of military theorists and writers. However over the past decades its meaning has expanded in popular rhetoric to a more broad, popular definition refering to any quick, massive, and decisive military action.

Development of theories and forces

Blitzkrieg precursors

While blitzkrieg strategy didn't exist until 1920s, the underlying idea of using rapid movement to keep an enemy off-balance is almost as old as war itself. Domestication of the horse, development of cavalry and eventually mechanized transport all led to what would eventually become known as blitzkrieg in the late 1930s.

Reichswehr

Blitzkrieg's immediate development began with Germany's defeat in the First World War. Shortly after the war, the new Reichswehr created committes of veteran officers to evaluate fifty-seven issues of the war.¹ The reports of these committees formed doctrinal and training publications which were standard into the WW II. The Reichswehr was influenced by its analysis of pre-war German military thought, its infiltration tactics of the war, and the maneuver warfare which dominanted the Eastern Front.

German military history had been influenced heavily by von Schlieffen and von Moltke the Elder. Proponents of maneuver, mass, and envelopment, their concepts were employed in the successful Franco-Prussian War and attempted "knock-out blow" of the Schlieffen Plan.

Following the war, these concepts were modified by the Reichswehr. Its Chief of Staff, Hans von Seeckt, moved doctrine away from what he argued was an excessive focus on encirclement. Rather, von Seeckt advocated effecting breakthroughs against the enemy's centre. He additionally rejected the notion of mass which von Schlieffen and von Molkte had advocated. While reserves had comprised up to four-tenths of German forces in pre-war campaigns, von Seeckt sought the creation of a small, professional (volunteer) military backed by a defense-oriented militia. In modern warfare, he argued, such a force was more capable of offensive action, faster to ready, and less expensive to equip with more modern weapons. The Reichswehr was forced to adopting a small and professional army quite aside from any German plans, for the Treaty of Versailles limited it to 100,000 men.

German leadership was also criticized for failing to understand the technical advances of the First World War, having given tank production the lowest priority and having conducted no studies of the machine gun prior to war.² In response, German officers attended technical schools after the war.

Infiltration tactics invented by the German Army during the First World War became the basis for later tactics. German infantry had advanced in small, decentralized groups which bypassed resistance in favor of advancing at weak points and attacking rear-area communications. This was aided by coordinated artillery and air bombardments, and followed by larger infantry forces with heavy guns, which destroyed centres of resistance.

On the war's Eastern Front, combat did not bog down into trench warfare. German and Russian armies fought a war of maneuver over hundreds of miles, giving the German leadership unique experience which the trench-bound Western Allies did not have.³ Studies of operations in the East led to the conclusion that small and coordinated forces possessed more combat worth than large and uncoordinated forces.

Foreign influence

Armoured forces were first used in the First World War to break a deadlock of position warfare too lethal to unaided infantry. After many unsuccessful operations, tank forces were employed by the Allied Powers at Hamel in a way that foreshadowed the later use of the blitzkrieg strategy. Some 500 tanks were massed at one point and committed after a coordinated air and artillery bombardment. Light tanks and cavalry achieved a breakthrough to eight miles and caused disruption in the rear areas. Plans were additionally made for a large-scale breakout and exploitation by tank forces, though not implemented because of Germany's surrender.⁴

However, following the end of the First World War the British, French, and Polish armies did not expand upon the idea of independently operating tank forces. These nations adopted a doctrine of tanks as infantry support weapons, used to punch holes in the enemy lines, through which the mass of infantry could move forward. Tanks would be dispersed among infantry units for fire support and anti-tank duties, an aid to breaking frontlines. The general concept remained the same as in First World War, assuming that there would be some sort of frontline that the tanks would breach, followed up with a new front developing at some other point. In this doctrine, the infantry retained its position as 'the queen of battle'.

During the interwar period, other theories of mechanized forces were being developed by British military experts. The writings of J.F.C. Fuller argued that if mechanized divisions were let loose in battle, a frontline would never develop: these units would have advanced hundreds of miles before any defense could form. B. H. Liddell Hart developed the concepts further, calling it the "indirect approach". In this concept the mechanized forces would attack at a point of least resistance, which they could pick because of their high speed of maneuver. The force would then be gathered into a single point (the armored spearhead), punch through the defenses, and then run into the rear areas. This disruption in the rear areas would effectively blindfold and paralyse enemy forces. In order to support this sort of warfare, Liddell Hart advocated the creation of units with plenty of trucks, armored cars, and light, high-speed tanks known as "cruisers".

A number of lightly-armored and armed cruiser tanks were eventually used by the British Army, notably in the German invasion of France. Examples include the Valentine, Crusader, and the final Cromwell. However, the tanks were generally employed in conjunction with infantry, and Montgomery's obsession with logistics and staff control prevented the British from mimicing the high speed and decentralization that marks blitzkrieg.

There were some American proponents of independent American armored units (notably Adna Chaffee, Jr. and George S. Patton, but they were constrained by views of superiors. The Louisiana Maneuvers, about 1940, convinced senior commanders there was a place for massed armor and creation of independent armored divisions began at that time.

Germany and the Soviet Union collaborated on a limited scale, in secret and on largely technical matters, at testing grounds in Kazan and Lipetsk beginning in 1926.⁵

Guderian and the Wehrmacht

General Heinz Guderian, a theorist key to Germany's development of blitzkrieg.

Following Germany's military reforms of the 1920s, Heinz Guderian emerged as a strong proponent of mechanized forces. Within the Inspectorate of Transport Troops, theoretical and field exercise work was done by Guderian and colleagues. There was opposition from many officers who gave primacy to the infantry or simply doubted the usefulness of the tank. Among them was Chief of the General Staff Ludwig Beck, (1935-38) who was skeptical that armored forces could be decisive. Nonetheless, the panzer divisions were established during his tenure.

Guderian argued that the tank was the decisive weapon of war. "If the tanks succeed, then victory follows", he wrote. In an article addressed to critics of tank warfare, he wrote "until our critics can produce some new and better method of making a successful land attack other than self-massacre, we shall continue to maintain our beliefs that tanks--properly employed, needless to say--are today the best means available for a land attack." Addressing the faster rate at which defenders could reinforce an area than attackers could penetrate it during the First World War, Guderian wrote that "since reserve forces will now be motorised, the building up of new defensive fronts is easier than it used to be; the chances of an offensive based on the timetable of artillery and infantry co-operation are, as a result, even slighter today than they were in the last war." He continued, "We believe that by attacking with tanks we can achieve a higher rate of movement than has been hitherto obtainable, and--what is perhaps even more important--that we can keep moving once a breakthrough has been made."⁶ Guderian additionally required that tactical radios be widely used to facilitate coordination and command.

Panzertruppe and Luftwaffe

Blitzkrieg would not have been possible without modifying Germany's current military. Under the Treaty of Versailles its military was limited to 100,000 men, its air force disbanded, and tank development forbidden. After becoming head of state in 1933, Adolf Hitler ignored these provisions. A command for armored troops was created within the German Heer--the Panzertruppe, as it came to be known later. The Luftwaffe, or air force, was reestablished, and development begun on ground-attack aircraft and doctrines. Hitler was a strong supporter of this new strategy. He observed panzer field exercises and read Guderian's book Achtung! Panzer!⁷ (Attention! Tank!), written during 1936-37. Upon seeing exercises at Kummersdorf, he remarked "That is what I want--and that is what I will have."⁸

Spanish Civil War

Aspects of blitzkrieg tactics were tested by German volunteers during the Spanish Civil War of 1936. Panzer commitments consisted of Panzer Battalion 88, a force built around three companies of PzKpfw I's that functioned as a training cadre for Nationalists. The Luftwaffe deployed squadrons of fighters, dive-bombers, and transports as the Condor Legion.⁹ Luftwaffe vastly profited from the Spanish Civil War experience. It developed both tactics and aircraft in combat; it was here that the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka first saw combat. Combat experience was also gained by 18,000 Luftwaffe troops.

Guderian called the panzer employment "on too small a scale to allow accurate assessments to be made."¹⁰ German commanders nevertheless were able to work out some potential problems in the chain of command and communications. One issue that became clear was that the terrain often imposed "choke points" where a well-situated strongpoint would stop the movement of the mechanized forces. Normally artillery would be used to deal with fixed emplacements, but artillery moves so slowly that the momentum would be lost. This led to the development of mobile artillery that could accompany the mechanized forces, and closer cooperation with air units, so that panzer commanders could request fast bombing mission where artillery was not present.

Opposing forces in 1939

Total independent armoured forces among the Western Allies in 1939-40 consisted of approximately six divisions in the French Army (for which Charles de Gaulle is responsible) split in infantry-support roles³, two brigades in the Polish Army, and cruiser forces within the British Expeditionary Force. These forces are generally criticized as being too small for meaningful action against the higher concentrations of armour Germany employed.

On the other hand, by the late 1930s The Germans had re-organized their Army to include a number of Panzergruppen, divisions with unprecedented concentration of tanks, infantry in half-tracks (precursors to modern armored personal carriers) and trucks to supply them. It should be noted that half-tracks were fairly rare, and were not employed principally by infantry until after the Polish campaign. German formations relied on Junkers Ju 87 dive bombers, to complement artillery and allow for "breakthrough" attacks even far behind the lines. Most divisions were, however, still infantry divisions with horses and carriages.

Operations in the Second World War

Poland and France, 1939-40

In Poland, panzer divisions created numerous pockets of Polish forces (blue circles) that were destroyed by following infantry.

Blitzkrieg operations were first conducted by the German Wehrmacht during the Polish September Campaign of 1939. In this, the Panzertruppe were organized into independent divisions and corps of motorized, light, and panzer divisions. In a rapid war of movement, German panzers pursued deep breakthroughs, completing a wide strategic envelopment of Polish forces as well as numerous smaller encirclements. The Luftwaffe gained air superiority early in the campaign. The majority of German infantry units were, however, unmotorised. This would be a consistent problem in Germany's attempts to fight a war of maneuver. The speed of this operation relied as much on the presence of radio communications and on-the-spot command as it did on the Panzergruppen.

The invasion of France consisted of two phases, Operation Yellow and Operation Red. Yellow was opened by a feint conducted against Holland and Belgium by two panzer corps and paratroopers. Three days later, the main panzer effort of Panzer Group von Kleist attacked through the Ardennes and achieved a breakthrough with Luftwaffe air support. The group raced to the coast of the English channel, dislodging the British Expeditionary Force, Belgian Army, and some divisions of the French Army. Panzer forces were halted at the port city of Dunkirk, being used to evacuate the Allied forces, and it was left to the Luftwaffe; its bombing did not prevent the evacuation of most personnel, some 330,000 troops. Operation Red then began with XV Panzer Corps attacking towards Brest, and XIV Panzer Corps attacking south, east of Paris, towards Lyon, and XIX Panzer Corps completing the encirclement of the Maginot Line. The defending forces were hard pressed to organize any sort of counterattack. The French forces were continually ordered to form new lines along rivers, often arriving to find the German forces had already passed them.

Soviet Union: the Eastern Front: 1941-45

Use of armoured forces was crucial for both sides on the Eastern Front. Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, involved a number of breakthroughs and encirclements by panzer forces. Its stated goal was "to destroy the Russian forces deployed in the West and to prevent their escape into the wide-open spaces of Russia."¹¹ This was generally achieved by four panzer armies which encircled surprised and disorganized Soviet forces, followed by marching infantry which completed the encirclement and defeated the trapped forces. The first year of Eastern Front can generally be considered to have had the last successful major blitzkrieg operations.

After Germany failure to destroy Soviets before the winter of 1941, the limits of blitzkrieg became visible. Although the German attack took huge areas of Russia, the overall strategic effect was more limited. The Red Army was able to regroup far to the rear, and eventually defeat the German forces for the first time in the Battle of Moscow. In the following summer of 1942, when Germany launched another Blitzkrieg offensive in southern Russia against Stalingrad and the Caucasus, the Soviets again lost tremendous amounts of territory, just to counter-attack again when they stopped in front of the city.

The Battle of Stalingrad shows both the good and bad points of the blitzkrieg concept. The battle opened with a German attack in an unexpected location, sending the defending Soviet forces reeling back over hundreds of kilometres in a matter of days. The movement ended when Hitler became increasingly interested in capturing Stalingrad itself, allowing the Soviet forces to regroup and counterattack.

The subsequent Russian victory depended on the application of increasingly sophisticated combined arms units. This coupled with German forces attrition, logistics and production problems eventually resulted in the German defeat.

Western Front, 1944-45

As the war progressed, Allied armies, learning from their earlier defeats, began to more effectively counter German armour and employ their own. Many operations in the Western Desert and on the Eastern Front relied on massive concentrations of firepower to establish breakthroughs by armoured units. These tactics were also decisive in the Normandy operations after Operation Overlord.

After the Allied landings at Normandy, Germany made attempts to overwhelm the landing force with panzer divisions, but this failed for lack of coordination and Allied air superiority. Blitzkrieg was attempted next in counterattack against Operation Cobra, U.S. 12th Army Group's breakout from the Normandy area at St.-Lô. German Seventh Army attacked towards the coast at St.-Lô, attempting to cut-off U.S. Third Army (Patton) in Operation Lüttich. It was unable to achieve a breakthrough against defending infantry and, stalled, was encircled and effectively destroyed by U.S. 12th Army Group.

The advance of Third Army through Central France during 1944 is an example of blitzkreig tactics employed by the Allies. George S. Patton, a former cavarlyman and armored theorist, had read both Guderian and Rommel before the war. He emphasized speed of maneuver, critical mass at the point of attact, decentralized command, relentless pursuit, and the neutralization and bypassing of enemy strongpoints. All this was summarized in a phrase common among his troops "haul ass and bypass".

Germany's last offensive on its Western front, Operation Autumn Mist, was a blitzkrieg offensive towards the vital port of Antwerp during the winter of 1944-45. Launched in poor weather against a weakened Allied sector, it achieved surprise and initial success. Allied air power was obviated by cloud cover. However, defense along the Ardennes few serviceable roads caused delays. Allied forces deployed to the flanks of the German penetration, and Allied aircraft were again able to attack panzer columns. German forces were routed. Notably the leading relief forces were from Patton's Third Army, redeployed from far south in just a couple of days.

Methods of operations

Motorization and combined arms

Blitzkrieg forces attained much of their advantages through superior speed, which allowed German forces to upset enemy plans and cause uncertainty. This required the motorization of all forces. Accompanying the panzers came infantry mounted on trucks or half-tracks, artillery and anti-tank guns mounted on tank chassis or towed by their own mover, and fully motorized repair shops and logistics services.

Never able to meet its own demands, the panzertruppe would use a wide variety of captured transportation throughout the war. Only with special priority did the panzertruppe possess what mobility it had. Most of Germany's combat forces throughout the war would be unmotorised infantry.

Combined arms tactics was the chief reason for insisting that infantry and support operate with panzers. Guderian believed that "the effectiveness of the tanks would gain in proportion to the ability of the infantry, and other division arms to follow them in advance across country." Different arms of the military were complementary to each other.

Panzers were seen as the decisive weapon, and other arms operated primarily to aid them. Protection against enemy infantry, especially in restricted terrain, was provided by motorized infantry and, in smaller quantities, mechanized infantry (Panzergrenadier). Efforts were made to have armored infantry as mobile and well-protected as panzers to reduce the number of situations which would separate infantry from panzers (e.g., artillery fire on trucks). Jagdpanzers, tank destroyers, were used en masse to destroy enemy tanks, anti-tank guns, and fortifications.

Artillery consisted of self-propelled, indirect-fire howitzers and rocket launchers, and direct-fire Sturmgeschütz (StuG, assault gun). StuGs functioned as infantry support and ad hoc Jagdpanzers. Indirect-fire artillery was used in conjunction with ground-attack aircraft from the Luftwaffe which were usually more substantial. Luftwaffe bombers attacked not only immediate targets, but also infrastructure and staging areas, disrupting potential counterattacks.

Mid-war, the kampfgruppe (Combat group) developed in full as a self-contained tactical force. To a panzer or panzergrenadier battalion command would be attached such self-propelled artillery, engineer, and support units as necessary to attain a specific objective. Partly a tactic to minimize the effects of consistently understrength regular formations, this was nonetheless a significant development in improving combined arms cooperation.

Schwerpunkt

Blitzkrieg sought decisive actions at all times. The theory of a schwerpunkt (heavy point) developed; it was the point of maximum effort. Panzer and Luftwaffe forces massed at this point of maximum effort. By local success at the schwerpunkt, a small force achieved a breakthrough and gained advantages by fighting in the enemy's rear. It is summarized by Guderian as "Don’t tickle, smash!" ("Nicht kleckern, klotzen!").

Attack was executed against the enemy's defensive line by infantry or, less commonly, panzer forces themselves (otherwise preserved for maneuver beyond), supported by artillery fire and Luftwaffe bombing. As these forces created a breach in the enemy's line, the panzer forces passed through, while the breaching force attacked the flanks to increase security through distance. This point of breakout has been labeled a "hinge", as panzer forces manoeuvred forward and developed "leverage" against the defensive forces.

In the opening phase of an operation, the Luftwaffe sought a coup against enemy air forces. It attempted to strafe and bomb landed aircraft and runways, disabling them, or deploy in fighter sweeps to clear the skies in large battles. Air superiority from the beginning was a goal; to operate as designed, the panzer force required that reconnaissance aircraft, ground-attack aircraft, and in some cases transport aircraft all be able to fly. With the Luftwaffe itself driven from the sky in the war's later years, operating under Allied air superiority would be a hindrance (See below).

Paralysis

Having achieved a breakthrough into the enemy's rear areas, German forces attempted to paralyse the enemy's decision-making and reaction. Moving faster than enemy forces, panzer forces exploited weaknesses and acted before opposing forces could formulate a response. Guderian wrote that "Success must be exploited without respite and with every ounce of strength, even by night. The defeated enemy must be given no peace."

Central to this is the decision cycle. Every decision made by German or opposing forces required time to gather information, make a decision, disseminate orders to subordinates, and then implement this decision through action. Through superior mobility and faster decision-making cycles, panzer forces could take action on a situation sooner than forces opposite them.

"Directive control" is a fast and flexible method of command. Rather than receiving an explicit order, a commander would be told of his superior's intent and the role which his unit was to fill in this concept. The exact method of execution was then a matter for the low-level commander to determine as best fit the situation. Staff burden was reduced at the top, and spread among commands more knowledgeable about their own situation. In addition, the encouragement of initiative at all levels aided implementation. As a result, significant decisions could be effected quickly and either verbally or with written orders a few pages in length.

Kesselschlacht

An operation's final phase, the Kesselschlacht ("cauldron battle"), was a concentric attack on an encircled force. It was here that most losses were inflicted upon the enemy, primarily through the capture of prisoners and weapons.

Countermeasures and limitations

Terrain

Blitzkrieg was largely dependent upon terrain and weather conditions; where the ability for rapid movement across "tank country" was not possible, blitzkrieg was often avoided or resulted in failure. Terrain would ideally be flat, firm, unobstructed by natural barriers or fortifications, and interspersed with roads and railways. If it was instead hilly, wooded, marshy, or urban, panzers would be vulnerable to infantry in close-quarters combat and unable to breakout at full speed. As well, units could be halted by mud (thawing along the Eastern Front regularly slowed both sides), or extreme snow.

Air superiority

Allied air superiority became a critical hindrance to German operations during the later years of the war. Early German successes enjoyed air superiority with unharassed movement of ground forces, close air support, and aerial reconnaissance. However, the Western Allies' air-to-ground attacks were so great following the lead-up to Operation Overlord that panzer crews deployed from the Western to Eastern Front showed a reluctance to moving en masse during daylight. Indeed, the final German blitzkrieg operation in the west, Operation Autumn Mist, was planned to take place during poor weather which grounded Allied aircraft. Under these conditions, it was difficult for German commanders to employ the panzer arm to its envisioned potential.

Counter-tactics

Stanisław Władysław Maczek, one of the early developers of anti-blitzkrieg tactics

Blitzkrieg was very effective against static defence doctrines, that most countries developed in the aftermath of the First World War. Early attempts to defeat the blitzkrieg can be dated to Polish September Campaign in 1939, where Polish general Stanisław Maczek, commander of 10th Motorized Cavalry Brigade, prepared a detailed report of blitzkrieg tactics, its usage, effectiveness and possible precautions for the French military from his experiences. However, this report was disregarded by French staff, being captured by the German army unopened. Later, Maczek would become one of the most successful Allied armoured forces commanders in the war.

During the Battle of France in 1940, De Gaulle's 4th Armor Division and elements of the British Armor Brigade in the British Expeditionary Force both made probing attacks on the German flank, actually pushing into the rear of the blitzkrieging armored columns at times. This may have been a reason for Hitler to call a halt to the panzers' advance. Those attacks, combined with Maxime Weygand's Hedgehog tactic would become the major basis for responding to blitzkrieg attacks in the future: deploy in depth, roll into a ball and let them slide past you, rely on your anti-tank guns, build strong sides to the blitzkrieg incursion, then cut if off at the base and destroy in detail. However Allied forces in 1940 were unable to successfully develop those tactics before they sustained heavy losses and France capitulated.

By 1944 Allies armies 90mm anti-tank guns and the Germans famous 88mms were very successful in blunting tank attacks, especially those with little infantry support. By that time the Allies have also developed their own version of both offensive and defensive strategies using armoured forces. Among Allied strategist prominent was General George Patton, who had studied the tactics of Guderian and Rommel and developed the haul ass and bypass strategy. Patton's movements included fast pursuit, but in many actions he used an armored spearhead to break through, then cut off and disrupt enemy forces prior to their flight. In his comments of the time, quoted in writings about him, he credits reading Guderian and Rommel for his guidance.

Logistics

Although effective in quick campaigns against Poland and France, blitzkrieg could not be sustained by Germany in later years. Blitzkrieg strategy has a constant danger of the attacking force overextending its supply lines, and the strategy as a whole can be defeated by a determined foe who is willing to sacrifice territory for time in which to regroup and rearm, which is exactly what Soviets did on the Eastern Front. Tank and vehicle production was a constant problem; indeed, late-war many panzer "divisions" had no more than a few dozen tanks.¹² Late in the war Germany experienced critical shortages in fuel and ammunition stocks as a result of Allied strategic bombing. Though production of Luftwaffe fighter aircraft continued, they would be unable to fly for lack of fuel. What fuel there was went to panzer divisions, who even still could not operate normally. Of those Tiger tanks lost against the United States Army, nearly half were abandoned for lack of fuel.¹³

Successors

Main article: Maneuver warfare

While the specific term blitzkrieg refers only to the German operations in the Second World War, blitzkrieg and other doctrines emphasising the use of armoured forces had its post-WW II successors. The possibility of a massive Soviet tank attack on Western Europe using modernised blitzkrieg tactics was the focus of NATO planning in the Cold War. The difficulty was that the standard tactic of trading space for time would have lead to Western Europe being overrun. The solution in the 1950s was a rapid escalation to nuclear war. In the 1960s, the existence of Mutual Assured Destruction made this untenable, and the focus of defense was changed to air land doctrine.

The military doctrine of Rapid Dominance or shock and awe is considered by some a modern successor to blitzkrieg. Like blitzkrieg, rapid dominance emphasizes high amounts of communication and rapid strikes using combined arms to create confusion in the enemy. Unlike blitzkrieg, rapid dominance relies heavily on air power, large amounts of central coordination, and focuses on destroying the enemy's command and control structures rather than its supply lines.

See also

• Attrition warfare
• The Blitz, the Luftwaffe terror bombings of London
• Combined arms
• Deep Operation, the Soviet maneuver theory of the Second World War
• Maneuver warfare
• Vernichtungsgedanken

Notes

Note 1: Roots of Blitzkrieg, p. 37

Note 2: Roots of Blitzkrieg, p. 23

Note 3: Roots of Blitzkrieg, p. 7

Note 4: Panzer: A Revolution in Warfare, 1939-1945, p.20

Note 6: Panzer: A Revolution in Warfare, 1939-1945, p. 23

Note 6: Guderian's remarks are from an unnamed article published in the National Union of German Officers, 15 October 1937 as quoted in Panzer Leader, pp. 39-46. Italics removed--the quoted sections are all italics in the original.

Note 7: Panzer Leader, p. 46

Note 8: Panzer: A Revolution in Warfare, 1939-1945, p. 24

Note 9: Panzer: A Revolution in Warfare, 1939-1945, p. 145

Note 10: Panzer: A Revolution in Warfare, 1939-1945, p. 25

Note 11: Barbarossa, p.78

Note 12: Race to the Swift, p.34

Note 13: The Demodernization of the German Army in World War 2

References

• Bradley, Omar N. A Soldier's Story. Modern Library, 1999.
• Clark, Alan. Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-45. New York: Quill, 1965.
• Corum, James S. The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform. University Press of Kansas, 1994.
• Edwards, Roger. Panzer: A Revolution in Warfare, 1939-1945. London: Brockhampton Press, 1998.
• Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. Trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon. De Capo Press, 2002.
• House, Jonathan M. Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization. U.S. Army Command General Staff College, 1984. Available online (http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/House/House.asp) (5 February 2005) or through University Press of the Pacific (2002).
• Lind, William S., Nightengale, Keith, John F. Schmitt, Sutton, Joseph W., Wilson, Gary I. "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation" Marine Corps Gazette. October 1989, 22-26. Available online (http://www.cursor.org/backhome/fourth_gen.htm). Accessed 2 February 2005.
• Silva, John L. "Auftragstaktik–Its Origin and Development". Available online (http://www.baltdefcol.pims.org/documents/bdcol_auftragstaktik.html). Accessed 4 February 2005.
• Simpkin, Richard E. Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare. Brassey's, 2000.
• Winchester, Charles. "The Demodernization of the German Army in World War 2". Osprey Publishing. Available online (http://www.ospreypublishing.com/content2.php/cid=68). Accessed 18 January 2005.

Further reading

• Deighton, Len. Blitzkrieg: From the rise of Hitler to the fall of Dunkirk. 1981.
• Manstein, Erich von. Lost Victories. Trans. Anthony G. Powell. Presidio, 1994.
• Mosier, John. The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Realities of World War II. HarperCollins, 2003.