THE GUIDE TO THE **ELECTORAL** REFERENDUM

A Message from the Electoral Referendum Panel

On Saturday 19 September 1992, New Zealand voters will have the opportunity to vote in a referendum on New Zealand's electoral system. Few other countries have given voters the right to choose something as vital to the democratic process as a nation's voting system. It also seems fitting that this important event will take place on the same day that, 99 years ago, women received the vote in New Zealand.

This is the first of what may be two referendums on New Zealand's voting system. If a majority of those registered electors who vote on 19 September want a change in the voting system, another referendum will be held at the next general election. This second referendum will offer a choice between the Present First-Past-The-Post system and the reform option which receives the most votes on 19 September 1992.

The path to the 19 September Referendum can be traced back to 1985 when the Government of the day established the Royal Commission on the Electoral System. The Commission reported in December 1986 and made a number of far-reaching recommendations on the shape of New Zealand's electoral system.

Subsequently, at the 1990 General Election, both the Labour and National parties in their election manifestos pledged to hold a referendum on New Zealand's electoral system. In August 1991 the newly elected National Government introduced into Parliament a Bill to hold a referendum. This Bill became law in late 1991 as the Electoral Referendum Act. It is this Act that has made possible the 19 September Referendum.

In January 1992 the Minister of Justice, the Hon. Doug Graham, appointed an Electoral Referendum Panel

headed by the Chief Ombudsman, John Robertson. The other members of the panel are the Education Review Office's Chief Executive, Dr Judith Aitken; Law Commission member, Peter Blanchard; Auckland University professor, Sir Hugh Kawharu; and the Clerk of the House of Representatives, David McGee.

This panel has the responsibility of designing and overseeing a nationwide, publicly-funded information campaign. The campaign's purpose is to ensure that voters are as well-informed as possible about the sometimes complex and difficult issues raised by electoral reform.

The panel is independent of the current Government, other political parties and pressure groups. Its task has been to outline in a fair and unbiased manner the various reform options that will be voted on at the 19 September Referendum.



John Robertson

To this end, the panel has issued a public information brochure on the Referendum which will be delivered to every household. It has also published this extensive background document. The panel is holding seminars for special-interest groups, conducting media briefings, and undertaking public advertising.

It should be noted that the two-part referendum process and the four reform options chosen were specified by Parliament in the Electoral Referendum Act. The order in which the options appear on the voting paper was determined by lot, with the Chief Electoral Officer drawing four numbered balls from a barrel in a properly supervised draw.

On behalf of the Electoral Referendum Panel, I ask all registered voters to consider the issues and options carefully and to take the time to vote on them on Saturday 19 September.

John Robertson CBE Chairperson, Electoral Referendum Panel

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HOW THE REFERENDUM WILL WORK

Later this year - on Saturday 19 September - voters in New Zealand will be given a unique opportunity. They will be given two votes on the type of voting system they want for electing Members of Parliament.

The first vote is on whether or not voters wish to retain New Zealand's Present First-Past-The-Post electoral system.

The second vote is for one of four options that could be used as an alternative to the existing system. Voters who do not want to change our current system of voting can still vote for one of these four options.

The four options are:

- the Supplementary Member system (SM)
- the Single Transferable Vote system (STV)
- the Mixed Member Proportional system (MMP)
- the Preferential Voting system (PV).

It is essential to note that the four options are to be considered in *principle only* in the 19 September Referendum.

If the majority of votes cast in September are in favour of a change to the voting system, then a further referendum will be held at the time of the next general election. This second referendum would offer a choice between our existing system and the reform option which receives the most votes in the 19 September Referendum.

If a second referendum is held, then before it takes place Parliament will pass legislation giving full details of how the alternative system would operate.

THE VOTING PROCEDURE

Vote Here

Every registered voter has two votes at the 19 September Referendum. The voting paper consists of two separate pieces of paper: PART A and PART B.

PART A contains what are called the "voting system proposals".

Voting in PART A of the voting paper is simple. The voter just puts a tick () next to *one* of the following two statements:

PART B contains what are called the "reform options". Voters may vote for one of the four reform options but they do not have to.

A voter can *vote against* changing our Present First-Past-The-Post system in PART A and also cast a *vote for* one of the four reform options in PART B.

Voting in PART B of the voting paper is also simple. The voter just puts a tick () next to *one* of the following four statements:

Vote Here

I VOTE TO RETAIN THE PRESENT FIRST-PAST-THE-POST SYSTEM.

I VOTE FOR A CHANGE TO THE VOTING SYSTEM.

I VOTE FOR THE SUPPLEMENTARY MEMBER SYSTEM (SM).

I VOTE FOR THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE SYSTEM (STV).

I VOTE FOR THE MIXED MEMBER PROPORTIONAL SYSTEM (MMP).

I VOTE FOR THE PREFERENTIAL VOTING SYSTEM (PV).

KEY IDEAS ABOUT THE OPTIONS

Before looking at the various voting systems in more detail, it is important to take note of the following points.

- Voters are not being asked to vote on the size of Parliament. None of the options necessarily involves enlarging Parliament. But some options may require fewer (and so larger) electorates if Parliament is not increased in size.
- The Maori seats do not have to be abolished. All four reform options could still include separate Maori electorates.
- The order of the four reform options in the 19 September Referendum was chosen by lot. The order on the voting paper in no way ranks the voting systems.
- The wording "reform options" does not mean that the four options are necessarily better than the voting system we have now. The wording

"reform options" comes from the Electoral Referendum Act 1991 which made the 19 September Referendum possible.

- It is not possible to say with any certainty what would have happened in past elections if a different voting system had been used. If people are given different opportunities different electoral systems and different ways in which to vote then it is likely they will vote differently.
- National likes and dislikes have to be put aside. Prejudice against or a fondness for other countries should not colour views about voting systems. Whether voters like or dislike the British, Hungarians, Irish, Germans, or Australians, for example, should not influence their views about voting systems.
- The order of the reform options in this guide is the same as that on the voting paper.

CRITERIA FOR JUDGING VOTING SYSTEMS

All voting systems have advantages and disadvantages. And what one person sees as an advantage, another person will see as a disadvantage. As a result, there's no such thing as a perfect voting system.

There are some generally accepted criteria for judging voting systems - and people may want to ask questions along these lines.

LEGITIMACY

Do people on the losing side accept the results? Does the community as a whole accept the voting system as the best possible basis for running the country?

POLITICAL INTEGRATION

Does a voting system unite a country or divide it? Does it promote respect for different points of view?

EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT

Can a government elected under a particular voting system achieve what it sets out to do? Will the government last, or will it fall because it does not have a majority in Parliament?

EFFECTIVENESS OF PARLIAMENT

Will Cabinet dominate Parliament under a particular voting system? Does the voting system mean that Parliament can challenge and debate government policies in the way it is meant to?

FAIRNESS

Do political parties win a share of the seats that is similar to their share of the votes? Is there a marked difference between the number of seats some parties get and the votes they win?

REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES AND SPECIAL GROUPS

How well are the interests of ethnic minorities and other groups such as business people, workers and women represented in Parliament under various voting systems? How well are such groups themselves represented?

MAORI REPRESENTATION

Will a particular voting system help or hinder representation of Maori people? Are Maori people fairly represented in Parliament? How will different voting systems affect this? How will different systems affect the existing separate representation of Maori people?

REPRESENTATION OF CONSTITUENTS

Does a voting system encourage close links between people and their Members of Parliament? How easy will it be for constituents to get their ideas across to their Members of Parliament under a particular voting system?

VOTER PARTICIPATION

Do voters understand how the system works? Is the method of electing Members of Parliament straightforward or is it difficult to follow?

EFFECTIVE POLITICAL PARTIES

Will a voting system give us political parties that are too strong or too weak? Will a particular voting system help parties listen to and act on voters' views and concerns?

Voters will have to make up their own minds on which criteria are important to them. Different points will be important to different people.

THE PRESENT FIRST-PAST-THE-POST SYSTEM

The current voting system in New Zealand is quite straightforward and easy to understand.

HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS

Under first-past-the-post, one Member of Parliament is elected from each of the country's electorates. There are currently 97 of these "single-member" electorates in New Zealand - but because of the population shifts shown in the last census, their number is likely to rise to 99 by the time the next general election is held.

Voters in each of the single-member electorates have just one vote. They put a tick next to the name of the one candidate for whom they wish to vote.

The successful candidate is the person who receives the *most* votes in the electorate. They do not have to receive a majority - that is, more than half - of the votes cast.


In other words, a candidate who has 62% of the votes cast in an electorate will be elected (because no other candidate could have more votes). But at the same time, a candidate in another electorate could be elected with only 38% of the total votes cast - so long as no other candidate in that electorate receives more votes.

In addition to New Zealand, first-past-the-post voting is used to elect the *lower* houses of Parliament in Britain, Canada and India. It is also used in the United States to elect both the House of Representatives and the Senate.

How The Voting Works

The ballot paper currently used in first-past-thepost elections in New Zealand looks like this:

Sample



HOW THE SEATS WORK OUT

The results of a first-past-the-post election can be illustrated by New Zealand's last general election.

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EFFECTS ON PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT

Under first-past-the-post voting systems, the winning party tends to get a share of the seats in Parliament which is larger than its share of the votes.

For example, in 1972 the Labour Party won 48.4% of the votes and 63.2% of the seats in the House of Representatives. Similarly, the National Party won just under 48% of the votes cast throughout the country as a whole in 1990, and gained 69.0% of the seats.

First-past-the-post systems also tend either to exclude minor parties from Parliament, or to limit the number of seats they are able to win.

In 1981, for example, Social Credit won more than 20% of the votes and won 2 seats - 2.2% of the 92 seats in Parliament at that time. Three years later, in 1984, the New Zealand Party won more than 12% of the votes and gained no seats.

Consequently, the winning party in a first-past-the-post system usually has enough Members of Parliament to form a government on its own - without needing to join in a coalition or agreement with other parties.

This system is not a form of proportional representation.

Note: All candidates and parties used in this example are entirely fictional.

THE SUPPLEMENTARY MEMBER SYSTEM (SM)

This is the first of the options in PART B of the voting paper.

HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS

Most Members of Parliament would still be elected by first-past-the-post voting in single-member electorates.

However, the remaining Members of Parliament - about a fifth or a quarter of the total would be allocated to the political parties in proportion to their overall share of the votes. These Members of Parliament are the supplementary (or additional) members.

For example, if a political party won 12.5% of the votes throughout the whole country but didn't win any of the electorate seats in Parliament, it would still be able to win 12.5% of the supplementary seats. If there were, say, 24 supplementary seats in Parliament, the political party in this example would win 12.5% of the 24 additional seats - that is, 3 seats.

In this way, a minor party which gained few or even no seats at all in the first-past-the-post elections in the country's single-member electorates would still be able to win some representation in Parliament.

The allocation of supplementary seats can be made using one of two methods. Under one method, the supplementary seats are allocated on the basis of each party's share of the total votes cast in the country as a whole. (This is the one-vote method.) Alternatively, a two-vote method could be used. Voters would have a second vote which would involve choosing between lists of candidates put forward by political parties.

Under the two-vote method, whether or not a minor party won supplementary seats would depend on its showing in the second vote.

A Parliamentary Select Committee favoured a one-vote method, while the Royal Commission on the Electoral System preferred a two-vote method. If most people vote for a change to the voting system and if the SM system is the favoured reform option in the 19 September Referendum, then the way in which it will operate will be decided by Parliament before the second referendum.


A model along the lines of the Supplementary Member system was first suggested for New Zealand in 1971 in an article in *Political Science*. Variations on the system are used in elections in Hungary and South Korea.

How The Voting Works

Under the one-vote method, a ballot paper in a Supplementary Member election would be exactly the same as the Present First-Past-The-Post ballot paper in New Zealand (see page 5 and illustration on page 16).

If the two-vote method were to be used, then the ballot papers could look like this:

Sample



Note: All candidates and parties used in this example are entirely fictional.

HOW THE SEATS WORK OUT

No other country uses the Supplementary Member system in precisely the way that has been suggested for New Zealand. So what follows (top of page 7) is a hypothetical example to illustrate how supplementary seats *could* be distributed in New Zealand. It is based on the two-vote method (otherwise the electorate vote and the party vote would be the same), and has an imaginary Parliament with 75 electorate seats and 25 supplementary seats.

HYPOTHETICAL SUPPLEMENTARY MEMBER (SM) ELECTION RESULTS Electorate Electorate Electorate Party Supple Supple Total Total Votes Seats Seats Votes -mentary Seats -mentary Seats (%) (No.) (%)(%) Seats Seats (No.) (%) (No.) (%)Party **Progress** 46.5 41 54.7 47.1 12 48.0 53 53.0 Freedom 42.7 33 44.0 40.2 10 40.0 43 43.0 **Justice** 8.1 1 1.3 11.9 3 12.0 4 4.0 Others 2.7 0 0.0 0.8 0 0.00 0.0 Total 100.0 75 25 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 100.0 Note: All parties used in this example are entirely fictional.

Only the supplementary seats are allocated in proportion to the share of the second vote won by the political parties. So, in this example, the overrepresentation of the Progress Party and the underrepresentation of the Justice Party that has already occurred in the electorate seats is not altered drastically as a result of the allocation of supplementary seats. Consequently, supplementary member systems can be regarded as only partly proportional.

EFFECTS ON PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT

Under the Supplementary Member system, it is unlikely that the overall representation of the major parties in Parliament would be greatly disturbed. One or other of the major parties would usually have enough seats in Parliament to form a single-party majority government - coalitions or agreements between parties should not be necessary.

As noted above, this system is *partly* a form of proportional representation and may help minor parties gain some seats in Parliament.

THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE SYSTEM (STV)

This is the second of the options in PART B of the voting paper. It is the only option with multi-member electorates.

HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS

There are generally 3, 5, or 7 Members of Parliament in each electorate - and the exact number depends on the population that an electorate serves. Rural seats (with a bigger geographical area but fewer people) may have fewer Members of Parliament - say 3 per seat. More densely populated urban seats may have 5 or 7 members.

The Members of Parliament for these multimember electorates would all be elected at the same time.

On election day, people vote by indicating the order of their preferences for the candidates. They write "1" next to their most preferred candidate; "2" next to their second choice; "3" next to their third choice; and so on.

Some STV systems require voters to cast a full slate of preferences - that is, to fill in numbers indicating the order of their preferences for *every* candidate in the electorate.

Other STV systems allow voters to express preferences for only *some* - not necessarily all - of the candidates in an electorate.

Yet another alternative is for voters simply to write "1" alongside the name of a particular political party. Doing this indicates that the voter wants all their preferences to be allocated according to an order decided on by that political party.

A mathematical formula - known as the "Droop Quota" - is used to calculate how many votes a candidate needs to be elected in an STV multi-member seat.

THE DROOP QUOTA

The formula is:

(Number of votes / [Number of vacancies + 1]) + 1 = The number of votes a candidate needs for election

How this formula works can be seen from an example of a hypothetical New Zealand multi-member electorate (of a size likely under an STV system). If a 5-member electorate had 100,710 voters, the number of votes a candidate would need to be elected is:

100,710 +1 $= \frac{100,710}{1}$ = 16,785 + 1 = 16,7865 vacancies +1

To be elected, each of the five successful candidates will need 16,786 votes.

Candidates who receive more votes than the quota requires then have their surplus votes distributed. If a candidate has, say, a thousand votes more than is necessary for election, these

thousand surplus votes will be distributed among the other candidates. That is, they will go to the candidates who were the second preference - the second choice - of voters whose first-preference candidate has already been elected.

There are two ways of doing this. Either a random sample of ballot papers can be drawn from the winning candidate's votes; or, alternatively, the second preferences of everyone who voted "1" for the winning candidate can be examined and the surplus distributed to other candidates on a pro-rata basis

After surplus votes have been distributed, the least successful candidate in the electorate is eliminated from the count. All the votes of the people who voted "1" for that losing candidate are distributed to the candidates to whom they gave their second preferences.

Sometimes no candidate has enough first-preference votes to be elected. When this happens, the lowest-polling candidate is eliminated and the second preferences of people who voted for that candidate are distributed amongst the remaining candidates. If some candidates now have more than the required number of votes, then their surpluses are distributed. However, in cases where no candidate has yet gained enough votes to be elected, then the second-lowest-polling candidate is eliminated and his or her preferences are distributed.

The process of distributing surplus preferences, and of eliminating and distributing the preferences of the lowest-polling candidates, continues until the required number of candidates are elected.

The task of distributing votes is not mathematically hard, but it can be drawn out and time-consuming.

One of the main features of the Single Transferable Vote system is that voters can exercise their discretion and vote for individual candidates.

As an example, imagine a situation where a party - let us call it the Progress Party - is contesting a 7-member seat and fielding seven candidates, three of whom are sitting members. A voter who favours the Progress Party but is - at the same time - unhappy with the performance of the party's current Members of Parliament can still vote for the Progress Party by putting "1" next to the name of a Progress Party candidate who is not a Member of Parliament. The voter's second and third preferences - indicated by the numbers "2" and "3" - can, likewise, go to other Progress Party candidates who are not in Parliament but are on the party's ticket in the electorate.

Similarly, another Progress Party voter could cross party lines by voting "1" for a Progress Party candidate and then casting a second preference for a candidate from another party altogether. The choice is the voter's.

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You may		•						
vote in		A	В	C	D	E	F	
one of		Conservation	Freedom Party	Justice Party	Progress Party	Republican Party	United People's Party	Ungrouped
two ways		DOYLE, Mary	RICH, Thomas	PATUWAI, Jane	CLAY, Richard	McGILL Keith	WALTERS, Graham	SINGLETON, Walter (Independent)
Or	By numbering from 1 up to a maximum of 20 in order of your	THOMPSON Rau	CRANE,	HARKNESS David	REREKUR. Rex	A HEALEY,	DAY, Robert	ALLEN, Norman (Independent
,	preference.	IOANE, John	TE KAWA, Koro		ALLEWAY, Leone	BARRY, Malcolm		WOODS, Rae (Disarmamen
.			<u></u>					HOBB, Violet (Apple)

This system is used for elections for the lower house of the Irish Parliament, for the Parliament of Malta, for the House of Assembly (the lower house of Parliament) in Tasmania, and for the Australian Senate (the upper house of the Australian Parliament).

How The Voting Works

Shown above is an illustration of an STV ballot paper for a hypothetical 5-member New Zealand electorate.

The example below illustrates the process of distributing votes in an STV election in a 3-member electorate. It is an example only, and is designed to show a situation where surplus preferences are distributed *before* the lowest-polling candidates are eliminated and before their preferences are given to other candidates still left in the race.

On the first count, Stafford was the only candidate with more than enough votes to be elected. Her surplus 19 votes were distributed to other candidates on the second count, but this still did not allow any of the other candidates to reach 251 votes.

As a result, on the third count, the 151 votes of the lowest-polling candidate - Morrison - were distributed to the remaining candidates (other than to Stafford, since she had already been elected). Harvey received two₇thirds of the Morrison preferences, reached a total of 285 votes, and so was elected on the third count.

The fourth count distributed Harvey's 34 surplus votes. Twenty-six of them went to Wadsworth, which took him over the required 251 votes - and he became the third and final candidate to be elected.

COUN	TING VOTES IN A H	YPOTHETICAL SIN	TETRANSFERARIE VO	TE (STV) ELECTORATE	
		1st Count	2nd Count:	3rd Count:	4th Count:
			Distribution	Distribution	Distribution
			of Stafford's	of Morrison's	of Harvey's
Candidate	Party		Surplus	Votes	Surplus
Harvey	Freedom	175	+10=185	+100 =285	-34 =251
Katene.	Justice	200	+3 =203	+31.=234	+8 =242
Morrison	United People's	150	+1, €151	-151 - =0	0=0
Stafford	Republican	270	-19 =251	=251	÷ ≥ =251
Wadsworth	Conservation :	205	+5*=210	+20 =230	+26 =256
Total		1000	1000	1000	1000
Notes: Number of valid votes = 1000 Number of votes needed for election (using Droop Quota) = $[1000 \ / \ 4] + 1$					
All candidates and parties used in this example are entirely fictional.					

HOW THE SEATS WORK OUT

The example below gives the overall results of the 1989 Tasmanian elections. The Tasmanian Parliament has five 7-member electorates. To be elected, candidates need just over 12.5% of the votes cast in their electorate. In 1989, the Green Independents obtained 17% of the votes in Tasmania and won just over 14% of the seats in the lower house of Parliament. The number of seats won by each of the two larger parties was also roughly proportional to their share of the votes.

The state of the s	Votes	Seats	Seats
and the second of the second o	(%)	(No.)	(%)
Party	n signal (Alduria). Maria	and the second of the second o	
Liberal	46.9	17	48.6
Labor	34.7	13	37.1
Democrat	0.9		. , <u></u>
Green Independer	it 17.1	5 (1)	14.3
Others	0.4	The state of the s	or Grant
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	
Total	100.0	35	100.0

EFFECTS ON PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT

The Single Transferable Vote system is a form of proportional representation. It allows minor parties and candidates with a significant degree of local support to be elected to Parliament. This may mean that coalitions or agreements between parties are needed before a government can be formed.

THE MIXED MEMBER PROPORTIONAL SYSTEM (MMP)

This is the third of the options in PART B of the voting paper.

HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS

Under this system every voter usually has two votes.

One vote is for an electorate Member of Parliament. There would be one Member of Parliament for each electorate, and the first-past-the-post method would be used to elect them. This vote operates in the same way as New Zealand's existing voting system - but it is used to elect only half of the total number of Members of Parliament.

The other vote is a nationwide vote, for a political party. Before an election each party publishes a list of its candidates so that voters can assess the candidates the various parties are putting forward; on election day voters choose between these lists of candidates.

The other half of the total number of Members of Parliament are elected in this way. It is this nationwide party-list vote which determines the overall strength of the different parties in Parliament.

If, for example, in a general election the proportions of party votes throughout the country as a whole were United People's Party (13%), Republican Party (36%), and Conservation Party (51%), then these proportions - 13%, 36%, and 51% - determine the share of the total seats in Parliament that each particular party would get.


This means that a party's share of the partylist Members of Parliament would be adjusted up or down so that its electorate members *and* its partylist members added together represent its share of the nationwide party-list vote.

The Royal Commission on the Electoral System proposed that under MMP, there would be a minimum share of the nationwide vote - a "hurdle" or "threshold" - which parties would have to get past before they would be entitled to any of the party-list seats in Parliament. The question of whether there would be a hurdle in New Zealand has not been determined; nor has a likely size been established. But the Royal Commission on the Electoral System proposed a hurdle of 4%.

A 4% hurdle would mean that political parties which won less than 4% of the nationwide party-list vote would not gain a party-list seat unless they had also won at least one of the single-member electorate seats.

How The Voting Works

The following example shows what an MMP ballot paper could look like in New Zealand. It also helps clarify how the MMP two-vote process would work.



Note: All candidates and parties used in this example are entirely fictional.

HOW THE SEATS WORK OUT

An electoral system based on MMP has been used in West Germany since the late 1940s. It has first-past-the-post voting in single-member electorates, and can be used to show the possible distribution of seats in an MMP system.

The example (top of page 12) shows the results for the 1980 West German General Election

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Although the Christian Democratic Union (and their Bavarian partners, the Christian Social Union) won 46% of the total electorate vote compared with 44.5% for the Social Democratic Party, the Christian Democrats won fewer electorate seats than their Social Democratic rivals. As the results show, the Christian Democrats won 121 electorate seats to the Social Democrats' 127 seats.

However, the Christian Democrats won more of the party-list vote than did the Social Democrats. As a result, the overall Christian Democrat representation in Parliament would be greater than that of the Social Democrats - no matter how badly, or well, they had fared in the electorate seats. In the crucial party-list vote, the Christian Democratic Union won 44.5%, compared with 42.9% for the Social Democratic Party. Consequently, the Christian Democrats won 45.5% of all the seats in the German Parliament, compared with 43.8% for the Social Democrats.

A third party, the Free Democrats, won 7.2% of the votes cast under a first-past-the-post system in the single-member electorates - and gained no seats in them. At the same time, though, the Free Democrats won 10.6% of the party-list votes in the election, and - as a result - gained 53 seats, 10.7% of the seats in Parliament.

West Germany has inserted a hurdle in its MMP electoral system. Parties must obtain more than 5% of the overall party vote in order to win party-list seats in Parliament. In the 1980 election, illustrated above, all other parties combined won only 2% of the party votes. Therefore, none cleared the 5% hurdle and none gained representation in the German Parliament.

As a result, the shares of the seats won by the three parties with representation in the German Parliament is slightly higher than the proportions of the party-list votes that they received.

EFFECTS ON PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT

Because the MMP system is - as its title suggests - a form of proportional representation, minor parties would be likely to be represented in Parliament. But the existence of a hurdle would prevent very small parties from being elected.

As minor parties are likely to be represented in Parliament, coalitions or agreements between parties may be needed to form governments.

THE PREFERENTIAL VOTING SYSTEM (PV)

This is the fourth of the options in PART B of the voting paper.

HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS

The PV system uses single-member electorates. It is designed so that the candidate who is finally elected has the support of the majority of voters that is, the support of more than half of the electorate.

People vote by indicating the order of their preferences for the candidates. They write "1" next to their most preferred candidate; "2" next to their second choice; "3" next to their third choice; and so on.

Some PV systems may require voters to cast a full slate of preferences - that is, to write a preference number against every candidate on the ballot paper. This is what happens in Australia. To cast a valid vote there, voters are required to indicate the order of their preferences for *all* the candidates.

Other systems may make it optional to declare one's later preferences. In the Irish presidential elections, for example, voters do not have to indicate their second, third, etc. preferences.

If voters decide to indicate their first preference only, this affects the second and later counts in an election - as can be seen in the example of the 1990 Irish Presidential Election (see bottom of page 14). Just under 10% of Currie's first-preference votes had no subsequent preferences listed, and so could not be transferred.

When votes are counted, it frequently happens that no candidate has a majority - more than half - of the votes cast. If this is the case, then the second preferences of the least successful candidate (the candidate with the fewest first-preference votes) are allocated to the higher-polling candidates. The votes are now counted again (this is the second count).

If there are only three candidates, then the process ends here - with one candidate now having a majority of the votes cast.

If there are more than three candidates, then the process may continue.

An electorate may have, for example, 5, 6, or 7 candidates. And at the end of the second count with the lowest-polling candidate already eliminated - none of the remaining candidates may yet have been able to get a majority of the votes cast. So the process is repeated: the second-lowest-polling candidate is dropped off and their preferences are distributed among the remaining candidates.

This process continues until one candidate has a majority of the votes cast in the electorate.

So successful candidates will have majority support in their electorates - even if one has to dig fairly deep to find that majority.

PV systems are used in Australia and Ireland. In Australia, they are used for electing the federal House of Representatives (the lower house of the Australian Parliament), for lower-house elections in five of the six Australian states (excluding Tasmania), for lower-house elections in the Northern Territory, and for upper-house elections in Tasmania. The Republic of Ireland uses a PV system for its presidential elections.

How THE VOTING WORKS

The following is an example of a PV ballot paper for a hypothetical New Zealand electorate.

Sample Preferential Voting **Ballot Paper** Mornington Electorate Election of one member of the House of Representatives DIRECTIONS: Mark your vote on this ballot paper by placing the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 in the squares respectively opposite the names of the candidates so as to indicate the order of your preference for them. **CANDIDATES** CARSON, Michael Progress Party HARVEY, Linda Freedom Party KATENE, Hemi Justice Party MORRISON, Susan United People's Party STAFFORD, Zoe Republican Party WADSWORTH, David Conservation Party

Note: All candidates and parties used in this example are entirely fictional.

HOW THE SEATS WORK OUT

The way in which voters' preferences may be distributed during an election can be seen on the top of page 14:

COUNTING VOTES IN A HYPOTHETICAL PREFERENTIAL VOTING (PV) ELECTORATE 4th Count: 3rd Count: 1st Count 2nd Count: Distribution Distribution Distribution of Harvey's of Stafford's of Wadsworth's Votes Votes Votes Candidate Party +15 =170 -170 =0 150 +5 =155 Harvey Freedom +80 = 460+80 =540 +30 =380 350 Katene Justice +90 =460 +50 = 370+20 =320 Morrison United People's 300 -145 **=**0 +20 = 145125 Stafford Republican -75 =0 Wadsworth Conservation 75 1000 1000 1000 Total

Notes: Number of valid votes = 1000.

Number of votes needed for election (50% +1) = 501.

All candidates and parties used in this example are entirely fictional.

On the first count, none of the five candidates received a majority - at least 50% + 1 - of the votes

As a result, the lowest-polling candidate (Wadsworth) had his 75 votes redistributed on the second count. Still no one obtained the number of votes necessary for election.

Consequently, a third count took place. Stafford's 145 votes were redistributed to the 3 remaining candidates in the race, but again no one received a majority.

So a fourth count took place, in which the lowest polling of the 3 remaining candidates (Harvey) had her total of 170 redistributed, and on this count Katene gained more than the 501 votes needed and so was elected.

A real-life example of a PV system at work is the 1990 Irish Presidential Election (see below). The eventual winner, Robinson, was elected despite initially trailing the other main candidate, Lenihan, by more than 80,000 first-preference votes.

It is worth noting that second-placed candidates do not necessarily overtake candidates with the highest number of primary votes. As the first example shows, first-placed candidates are often the main beneficiaries of distributed preferences.

EFFECTS ON PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT

The Preferential Voting system is not a form of proportional representation. However, under a PV system, people who vote for minor-party candidates as their first preference are given a chance to influence the results of the election through their second, third, etc. preferences.


Nevertheless, this system is unlikely to increase minor-party representation in Parliament.

In Australia, for example, the Democratic Labor Party and the Australian Democrats have never won a seat in the House of Representatives, for which the PV system is used. (Both parties have won seats in the Australian Senate, but Senate elections use the STV system.)

Because it is unlikely to increase minor-party representation in Parliament, the Preferential Voting system means that a government can usually be formed without the need for coalitions or agreements between parties.

THE 1990 IRISH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS						
	Primary Votes	Currie's Redistributed	Total			
		Second Preferences				
Candidates	(No.) (%)	(No.) (%)	(No.) (%)			
Currie	267,902 17.0	-267,902				
Lenihan	694,484 44.1	+36,789 13.7	731,273 47.2			
Robinson	612,265 38.9	+205,565 76.7	817,830 52.8			
Non transferable*		+25,548 9.6	25,548			
Total	1,574,651 100.0	100.0	1,574,651 100.0			
Note: *No further preferences indicated on ballot paper.						

The Present First-Past-The-Post System



Total MPs for each party = The number of **electorate** MPs elected for each party in single-member electorates.

Note: To make the examples clearer, each voting system has been given 100 MPs.
In this example there are 100 electorates, each with 1 MP.

Key: This shape represents a "typical" NZ electorate. It is not an actual electorate. The shapes in each of the diagrams are shown as the same size - but in reality they would be larger or smaller, depending on the type of system.




The Supplementary Member System (SM) (one-vote method)

Single-member electorate Your, local MP Supplementary Members x 25

Total MPs for each party = The number of electorate MPs elected for each party in single-member electorates plus the number of supplementary MPs a party receives on the basis of its share of the overall vote.

Note: To make the examples clearer, each voting system has been given 100 MPs.
In this example, there are 75 electorate MPs (one in each electorate) and 25 supplementary MPs.

The Single Transferable Vote System (STV)



Total MPs for each party = The number of electorate MPs elected for each party within each multi-member electorate.


Note: To make the examples clearer, each voting system has been given 100 MPs. In this example there are 20 electorates, each with 5 MPs.

The Mixed Member Proportional System (MMP) (two-vote method)

The Preferential Voting System (PV)

he number of ationwide MPs a arty receives is ecided in 2 steps. irst, its percentage the total ationwide party-list ote is worked out. *hen*, the number of ationwide MPs it ay receive is djusted according the number of ectorate MPs it ready has. This is that its total umber of MPs atches its share of e nationwide

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


otal MPs for each party = The number of **electorate** MPs elected for each party in single-member electorates

plus

the number of **nationwide party-list** MPs elected (adjusted so that a party's total MPs are in proportion to its share of the total nationwide party-list voting).

ote: To make the examples clearer, each voting system has been given 100 MPs. In this example, there are 50 electorate MPs (one in each electorate) and 50 nationwide party-list MPs.



Total MPs for each party = The number of electorate MPs elected for each party in single-member electorates.

Note: To make the examples clearer, each voting system has been given 100 MPs. In this example there are 100 electorates, each with 1 MP.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MAORI ELECTORATES

New Zealand's existing voting system is unique in one important respect: it has two different types of electorates - general and Maori.

Every geographical location throughout the country is both in a general electorate and in a Maori electorate. For example, Oamaru is in the general electorate of Waitaki and in the Southern Maori electorate. Similarly, Otorohanga is in the Waipa general electorate and in the Western Maori electorate. Although every voter lives in two electorates - general and Maori - voters can enrol in only one electorate.

This section of the guide outlines some of the possible effects that each of the four reform options may have on the Maori electorates. It also briefly describes the place of the Maori electorates in our existing system.

Doing this will help to answer questions about the four Maori electorates themselves. It will also illustrate the ways in which the voting options could operate in practice.

However, it is important to remember that Parliament has not finalised the details of any of the four reform options - at best, one can only *speculate* about how they would work in practice. Furthermore, it is impossible to say how voters would behave if they could vote under a different voting system.

THE PRESENT FIRST-PAST-THE-POST SYSTEM

All four Maori electorates have been held by the Labour Party for many years. For example, at the last general election the Labour Party won the Maori electorates with 65.4% of the votes cast in them. The Mana Motuhake Party came second in all four Maori electorates in 1990, with 22.4% of the votes.

These figures from the Maori electorates illustrate an important aspect of first-past-the-post voting systems: winners tend to be over-represented in Parliament, while losers tend to be under-represented. With just under two-thirds of the votes cast in the Maori electorates, Labour won 100% of the seats; with almost one in four of the votes cast, Mana Motuhake won no seats.

THE SUPPLEMENTARY MEMBER SYSTEM (SM)

If the Supplementary Member system was implemented in New Zealand, the Maori electorates could easily be retained, because an SM system would have little or no direct effect on the Maori electorates. Voters in the Maori electorates (as well as in the general electorates) could still cast their votes in exactly the same way as they do now using the first-past-the-post method of voting.

If an SM system using the one-vote method was adopted in New Zealand, then it is likely that the votes in the Maori seats would be added to those in the general seats, so that a party's overall share of the votes would determine its share of the supplementary seats in Parliament.

The results of the last general election can be used to illustrate this.

In 1990, the Labour Party's share of the votes in the 93 general electorates was 34.3%. This figure rose to 35.1% when votes from the Maori electorates were added to those cast in the general electorates. The National Party's share of the votes in the general electorates was 48.8% but dropped to 47.8% when the votes in the Maori seats were taken into account.

On the other hand, Mana Motuhake's share of the overall vote was only 0.6% - compared with 22.4% in the Maori seats. At 0.6%, the party would have been unlikely to win any supplementary seats if the SM system had been used then (and if voters had behaved in the same way as they did in the actual 1990 election).

In brief, voters in the Maori electorates might influence the way in which supplementary seats are allocated between the different political parties, but how voters in Maori electorates elect their own Members of Parliament would remain unchanged.

A further feature of the SM system - one which applies only if a two-vote method of SM is used - is that parties would be able to field additional Maori candidates in the second (nationwide) vote.

THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE SYSTEM (STV)

If STV was adopted in New Zealand, the Maori electorates could be retained. But they would become multi-member electorates - that is, electorates with more than one Member of Parliament.

It cannot be said how people would have voted if, in the past, they had been voting under a different system, but it is known that in 1990 the Labour Party won 65.4% of the votes in the four Maori electorates.

It is also known - using the Droop Quota - that if the four Maori electorates had been combined into one 4-member electorate, then each candidate would have needed just over 20% of the votes to be elected to Parliament.

Given its 65.4% of the votes cast, the Labour Party would have obtained at least three members. Mana Motuhake won more than 22% of the votes - a share of the poll high enough to have won one of the four available seats.

But these figures must be interpreted with caution. Given the chance to vote differently, Maori voters (like other voters) could well cast their votes in very different ways.

A further feature of the STV system is that parties may wish to field Maori candidates in more electorates - since they would have a greater chance of success in multi-member electorates which have significant local support for Maori candidates.

THE MIXED MEMBER PROPORTIONAL SYSTEM (MMP)

Under MMP, a nationwide party-list vote is likely to be used to determine the overall composition of the political parties in Parliament and to elect half the Members of Parliament.

Another vote is usually used to elect electorate Member of Parliament, who account for the other half of the Members of Parliament. There would be one of these members for each electorate and the first-past-the-post method would be used to elect them. So it would be possible for separate Maori electorates to be a part of an MMP system.

However, there would almost certainly be fewer electorate members than at present. There are now 97; under MMP, their number would be reduced to about 50 or 60. (This will depend on decisions yet to be made about the overall size of Parliament.)

As a result, if separate Maori electorates were retained under an MMP system, then they too may be reduced in number.

Fewer electorates mean that each electorate would be larger than it is at present. However, as Southern Maori is already by far the largest electorate in New Zealand (it covers all of the South Island and about a quarter of the North Island), increasing the size of the Maori electorates would not be easy.

An alternative is for Parliament to decide to retain the four Maori electorates at their present size, because the size and number of electorates will not be as important under MMP as they are in the existing system. Under an MMP system, electorate votes will not determine the overall party representation in Parliament - the nationwide partylist vote will. And Maori voters will have the same opportunity as general voters to make their wishes known in the nationwide party-list vote, and so influence the overall representation of parties in Parliament.

A further feature of the MMP system is that parties would be able to field additional Maori candidates through the nationwide party-list vote.

THE PREFERENTIAL VOTING SYSTEM (PV)

If the Preferential Voting system was adopted in New Zealand, the Maori electorates could be retained unchanged. In a PV system, voters indicate the order of their preferences for candidates by writing 1, 2, 3, etc., on their ballot papers next to the names of the candidates. If no candidate receives a majority (that is, at least 50% + 1) of the votes cast, the lowest-polling candidate is eliminated and the second preferences of people who voted first for that candidate are examined and distributed amongst the remaining candidates.

Candidates received absolute majorities in three of the four Maori electorates in 1990, and it is likely that they would also have been elected if a PV system had been used.

Northern Maori was the only Maori electorate in which the candidate who won in 1990 under first-past-the-post rules did not receive half the votes cast. The Labour candidate was elected with 49% of the votes.

If the same thing had occurred under PV, the votes of the lowest-polling candidate (the National candidate) would have been examined. The second preferences of the people who had voted for him would have been distributed to the two remaining candidates.

If just over 10% of people who voted first for the National Party had put "2" next to the name of the Labour Party's candidate, Labour would have retained Northern Maori.

The Mana Motuhake candidate would have won the seat if 91% of the people who voted first for the National Party had put "2" next to the name of the Mana Motuhake candidate.

CONCLUSION

These illustrations of possible outcomes in the Maori electorates show how the different systems work, and they may help voters - both Maori and general voters - to see what they regard as the strengths and weaknesses of the different systems.

Brief History Of New Zealand's Electoral System

The New Zealand Constitution Act established a system of representative 1852 government for New Zealand. This system consisted of: a Legislative Council (appointed by the Crown) and a House of Representatives (to be elected by male property owners with individual freehold or leasehold title). The Act effectively denied Maori the vote, as most Maori owned their lands under communal title. The first 5-yearly election was held for the House of Representatives, using 1853 first-past-the-post voting in multi-member electorates to elect 37 MPs. Some goldminers became able to vote without having to be property owners. 1860 Four Maori seats were created as a temporary measure. This meant that Maori 1867 males received universal suffrage 12 years before European males in New Zealand. Secret ballot introduced for the first time as an option at elections. 1870 The four Maori seats became a permanent part of New Zealand's electoral 1876 system. Frederick Whitaker introduced a Bill to change New Zealand's electoral system to 1878 a form of the single transferable vote system. This marked the beginning of a period of considerable interest by various MPs in proportional-representation voting systems, which lasted until the creation of the modern 2-party system in the mid 1930s. Universal suffrage for non-Maori males was introduced. 1879 Parliamentary elections were now to be held every three years. There was a change to single-member electorates. 1881 The country quota was also introduced: this gave relatively more weighting to the votes of rural voters. The Representation Commission was set up as an independent body to 1887 determine electoral boundaries - a role it still carries out. The four main-centre seats became multi-member electorates again, returning three 1889 members each. Secret ballot became compulsory for the non-Maori seats. 1890




Universal suffrage was granted to women, although women were not legally

1893

The size of Parliament was set at 76 seats - which it was to remain at until 1967.

The residential qualification for all eligible voters was established in what is basically its current form.

The four main-centre seats reverted to single-member electorates. This change created New Zealand's current system of single-member electorates.



1905 Election board above the Trocadero Tearooms, Pahiatua.

1913

1908 A second-ballot voting system was introduced for the general election that year.

This was effectively a form of preference voting, and was interpreted as a move to keep third parties - particularly the rapidly rising Labour Party - out of Parliament.

New Zealand returned to its first-past-the-post voting system with the abolition of the second-ballot system.

1914 A form of single transferable voting was introduced as an option for local body elections. It was used in some Christchurch local body elections up until 1933, and remained available as an option through to the 1960s.

The United Party Government drafted a Bill which was a mixture of the single transferable vote and the mixed member proportional systems. The defeat of this Bill marked the last serious attempt to introduce proportional representation into New Zealand's voting system.

[♥] R.J. Seddon addressing a Liberal Rally near Greytown in the late 1890s. On the platform from left are: A.W. Hogg, M.H.R. for Masterton; J.T.M. Hornsby, M.H.R; J.D. Heagarty, Mayor of Greytown. Behind Richard Seddon are Sir James Carroll (with walking stick) and Sir Joseph Ward.

The United Party was elected and ruled as a minority government.

1931 A coalition government was formed between the United and Reform parties.



27 November 1935 election. 3

1937 Secret ballot was made compulsory for elections contesting the four Maori seats.

The Representation Commission became one body instead of being split into separate North Island and South Island commissions.

The country quota was abolished.



Electoral Representation Commission, 18 March 1946. From left: T.W. Preston, Commissioner of Crown Lands, Canterbury; L.J.Poff, Commissioner of Crown Lands, Auckland; C.L. Grange, Borough Commissioner at Thames; R.G. Dick (Chairman) Surveyor-General; Harman Reeves, Dunedin; A. Blake, milk zoning officer at Auckland; Arthur Rosser, Auckland. 4

- 1950 The Legislative Council was abolished by the National Government of the day.
- 1956 A major revision of New Zealand's electoral law "fine-tuned" the framework which still underpins our current voting system:
 - registration of all voters was made compulsory
 - the impartial membership of the Representation Commission was increased
 - electorates were allowed to vary in size of population by no more than 5%
 - various provisions of the Electoral Act 1956 were especially "entrenched". These entrenched provisions can only be changed if 75% or more of MPs vote

in favour of a change. (The four Maori seats are not an entrenched provision.)

1965 An amendment to the Electoral Act set the number of South Island electorates at 25; the number of North Island electorates would increase whenever the North Island's population increased in relation to that of the South Island.

1974 The voting age was reduced to 18.

1975 Maori could choose whether they wished to be included on the general roll or the Maori roll.



Tallying enrolment numbers for the 1984 General Election.

1985 The Royal Commission on the Electoral System was appointed; it reported in late 1986.

1991 The Electoral Referendum Act was passed by Parliament, to make possible the 19 September 1992 Referendum.

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FURTHER READING

THE PRESENT FIRST-PAST-THE-POST SYSTEM:

Alan McRobie and Nigel S. Roberts, *Election '78: The 1977 Electoral Redistribution and the 1978 General Election in New Zealand* (Dunedin: John McIndoe Ltd., 1978), especially Chapter 2.

Alan McRobie, "The Electoral System and the 1978 Election", in Howard Penniman, ed., *New Zealand at the Polls: The General Election of 1978* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980), pp. 64-98.

THE SUPPLEMENTARY MEMBER SYSTEM (SM):

Rod Alley and Alan Robinson, "A Mechanism for Enlarging the House of Representatives", *Political Science*, volume 23, number 2, October 1971, pp. 2-8.

THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE SYSTEM (STV):

Enid Lakeman, How Democracies Vote: A Study of Majority and Proportional Electoral Systems (London: Faber and Faber, 3rd edition, 1970), especially Chapter 6.

Cornelius O'Leary, "Ireland: The North and the South", in S.E. Finer, ed., *Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform* (London: Anthony Wigram, 1975), pp. 153-183.

THE MIXED MEMBER PROPORTIONAL SYSTEM (MMP):

Geoffrey Roberts, "The Federal Republic of Germany", in S.E. Finer, ed., *Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform* (London: Anthony Wigram, 1975), pp. 203-222.

Peter Pulzer, "Germany", in Vernon Bogdanor and David Butler, eds., *Democracy and Elections: Electoral Systems and their Consequences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 84-109.

THE PREFERENTIAL VOTING SYSTEM (PV):

Joan Rydon, "The Electoral System", in Henry Mayer and Helen Nelson, eds., Australian Politics: A Third Reader (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1973), pp. 276-292.

Laurie Oakes, *How Will I Vote? Your Guide to Politics and Government in Australia* (Melbourne: Drummond Books, 1984), especially pp. 37-61.

(Note: The references given above are available in public and/or university libraries. If necessary, ask your local library to get a copy for you using the interloan system.)

ALL FIVE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS:

Royal Commission on the Electoral System, Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System: Towards a Better Democracy (Wellington: Government Printer, 1986).

Helena Catt, Paul Harris, and Nigel S. Roberts, *Voter's Choice: Electoral Change in New Zealand?* (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1992).

(Note: These two books are available in public and/or university libraries. If necessary, ask your library to get a copy for you using the interloan system. These books are also available from bookshops.)

The listing of the above publications does not mean the views in them are endorsed by the Electoral Referendum Panel - they have been listed simply to help interested voters improve their knowledge of the options.



The Decision's With You

19 SEPTEMBER '92 🗸