Representative democracy gives MPs the power to make decisions for us. In New Zealand, every three years at a national election, voters authorise this grant of power.  We have few other limits on this power. Parliament is sovereign which means it has ultimate legal authority.  It is not limited by an entrenched constitution or Bill of Rights, and its power is not shared with an Upper House – like the Senate in Australia – or with another level of government – like the state governments in America and Australia.

But this grant of power from the voters to MPs is only ‘democratic’ if there is an effective link of accountability between the government and the governed.  This link is achieved through a combination of electoral mandates, responsible government, and media scrutiny. 

Gaining our trust

Candidates inform us of their plans

During an election, political parties seek from the voters the right to govern.  In New Zealand, the appeal to the voters is normally done through the party leader but based on a party manifesto or platform.  Parties are expected to inform the public about what they would do if elected to government.  These policy ideas should spark national debate during an election campaign and educate the public on key issues.

We grant a mandate to govern

In return, the winning party often claims a popular mandate from an election victory.  This is based on the notion that the public bestows on the winning party the right to implement the policies they outlined during their campaign.  But, similarly, the public claims the right to use the party platform as the means to hold the winning party accountable at the next election.  The mandate becomes the contract between the voter and the elected representatives - the parties claim it as providing them with the right to implement policies outlined during the election campaign; the voter claims it provides an obligation on the parties to fulfill election promises.  This is an essential part of the accountability link between the governed and the government – the representatives’ obligation to both tell voters what they plan to do and then to do as they promised.

There is much criticism of this mandate theory.  First, voters make their voting decisions based on more than just policies and platforms, and not always based on particularly rational reasons.  It is hard to assume then that a vote for a party is necessarily an endorsement for the entire party platform, or even for any single policy issue.

Second, when interpreted more broadly, the mandate theory implies that the government is limited to introducing only the policies on which it campaigned.  This is problematic; unexpected events, like September 11 or flooding such as occurred in the Manawatu, may require governments to do the unexpected.

Third, the theory is less applicable to New Zealand.  The last time any one party received a majority of votes was in the 1951 election (even though many received a majority of seats under First Past the Post or FPP).  Since that time then, in theory, no popular mandate has been granted as no party platform has been ‘endorsed’ by a majority of voters.  More voters, by implication, actually vote against the government than for it. Since the introduction of MMP in 1996, no single party has received a majority of votes; and neither has any coalition, not even the 1996 National-New Zealand First ‘majority’ coalition.

A further complication is that coalition governments must seek compromise when policy making – compromise between coalition partners, and if a minority coalition, also compromise with opposition parties.  Since MMP it is therefore more difficult for any party to promise with certainty what they will undertake if part of a coalition government.

The bottom line is that New Zealand voters expect political parties to campaign in good faith: to signal during an election campaign any major policy initiatives they are likely to introduce if elected.  Parties who fail to do this make themselves unpopular.  But to infer a policy mandate from a vote is problematic, especially in New Zealand under MMP.

To whom is the government accountable?

New Zealand operates under a system of responsible government.  This means that government is answerable to Parliament, and through it, to the people.  Accountability in Parliament is frequent – on a daily basis when Parliament is in session; accountability to the public happens every three years at election time.

Our parliament is modeled after Britain’s and is known as a Westminster parliamentary system.  This means that the government – or its executive, cabinet - comes from and operates through the elected assembly, thus fusing the executive and the legislature.  The cabinet is the powerhouse of our parliamentary system.  But its power is reined in by the legislature: the government is responsible to the House of Representatives, and must hold its confidence in order to remain as government.  The government is answerable to many different groups in Parliament:

• the government caucus
• the opposition
• select committees
• Officers of Parliament.

The government caucus

The government’s own backbench MPs must be consulted on a regular basis.  This happens weekly while Parliament is sitting and as needed outside of that time.  At these meetings the cabinet seeks approval for what it will do, and faces questions for what it has done.  For example, the executive now formulates policy, but must still seek caucus approval before the policy is introduced to the House of Representatives.  The executive, including the Prime Minister, is also answerable to caucus for its actions.  Both Labour and National caucuses have the power to select and remove their party leader.  If the party is in government, this means the power to select or remove the Prime Minister; for example the National caucus removed Jim Bolger as party leader in 1998, effectively replacing him as Prime Minister with Jenny Shipley.

The opposition

In New Zealand’s parliamentary system the opposition is the government’s most regular and harshest critic.  The role of the opposition in a Westminster parliamentary system is to: participate in parliamentary debate, oppose objectionable government policies, force the government to alter its policies, create public revulsion against the government, and pose an alternative.  Increasingly, the focus of the opposition is to question the government, and to force it to answer publicly for its actions.  The intent is not only to hold the government to account, but also to enhance the opposition’s chances of defeating the government in the next election.

Select committees

Select committees work on behalf of the House and report their conclusions to the House.  In New Zealand there are up to 13 subject-area select committees, plus any number of ad hoc committees set up from time to time for particular purposes.  These committees are made up of government backbench and opposition MPs – but not cabinet ministers – in numbers roughly proportionate to their number of seats in the House.  Their role is to examine bills in detail, to hear public submissions on proposed laws, to initiate investigations, and to scrutinise government spending.

Officers of Parliament

There are various officers appointed by Parliament whose role it is to help ensure accountability of government officials on behalf of Parliament.  These include the Controller and Auditor General, the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, and the Ombudsmen.  The Officers of Parliament must act independently of the government.  This independence is guaranteed in a variety of ways: they are appointed by the Governor General on the recommendation of the House of Representatives; they report directly to the House; their salaries are fixed by permanent legislative authority; and the Officers of Parliament Committee (a non-partisan committee chaired by the Speaker of the House) reviews requests for funding and takes an active role in the appointment of Officers of Parliament.

How is the government held to account?

Government accountability happens in many different ways, and usually on a daily basis.

Parliament must approve taxes and spending

The ‘power of the purse strings’ was traditionally considered the most potent way to keep the executive in check.  A government cannot impose taxation without the approval of Parliament.  Similarly the government needs Parliament’s approval to spend money and to pass legislation to obtain ‘supply’.  It does this annually with the Budget or Appropriation Bill.  This is a confidence bill because without the supply of funds the government cannot function.  The defeat of the Budget may result in a change of government or a general election.

Questions

The most regular opportunity for the opposition to hold the government to account happens during Question Time, held daily while the House is sitting.  It is a raucous affair with the opposition peppering the government with probing questions about its performance; it tests the performance of individual cabinet ministers and the government as a whole.  The object of the questioning is not to get information per se; rather, it is an attempt to expose and embarrass the government to Parliament, and through media coverage, to the public.  In New Zealand, Question Time usually comprises 12 ‘questions for oral answer’ to Ministers plus numerous supplementary questions.  Questions are allocated on a party proportional basis, and come from all parties.  While the opposition’s questions are designed to embarrass the government, government MPs ask ‘patsy’ questions designed to make the Minister look good.   MPs can also ask Ministers an unlimited number of ‘questions for written answer’.

Debates

Parliament can hold the government to account during any parliamentary debate but this happens most effectively during key debates: about spending and raising government money; the Address in Reply to the Speech from the Throne or the Prime Minister’s annual statement; and the general debate held every Wednesday in the House.  Parliament can also use emergency debates to call the government to account.  It normally takes a minimum number of members and the Speaker’s approval to invoke an emergency debate.  What makes these debates significant is the publicity generated by the debate itself rather than the outcome.

Select committees

Select committees, through their various roles, are regarded as a most effective venue of ongoing government scrutiny.  First, committees are where Parliament best fulfills its role of scrutiny and amendment of government bills and regulations.  In New Zealand virtually every bill, except those under urgency, goes to select committee.  This happens at an influential and early point in the legislation lifecycle – following the first reading. Particularly since MMP – with the advent of government minorities on select committees and the increased number of opposition committee chairs – these committees have displayed a greater degree of independence when reviewing legislation, with amendments now more likely to be accepted.

Second, select committees are charged with reviewing the estimates and financial operation of government.  This role, while potentially overwhelming for a select committee, is also seen as a vital part of Parliament’s ‘control of the purse strings’.

Third, select committees are empowered to initiate inquiries and investigations into any area of the government’s performance. A committee can travel the country hearing from witnesses and experts, and will then report its findings to the House.  The Government is required to respond to the committee’s recommendations but is not obliged to adopt them.

Votes of confidence

These votes are the ultimate test of accountability for a government in a parliamentary system.  If a vote of confidence is lost, the government is expected to resign.  While these votes do take place on a fairly regular basis in New Zealand – for example with every budget – no government in New Zealand has fallen on a confidence vote since 1928, even with MMP and the emergence of minority governments.  Elections in New Zealand are frequent by international standards so, by convention, governments are expected to go full term; early elections should be avoided.  Thus, a vote of confidence in New Zealand’s parliament may not hold the same appeal as elsewhere – it can be used by the opposition to bring a government down, but such a move could be unpopular with the voters.