



Report on the Status of 9/11 Commission Recommendations
Part III: Foreign Policy, Public Diplomacy, and Nonproliferation

November 14, 2005

Thomas H. Kean, Chair
Lee H. Hamilton, Vice Chair
Richard Ben-Veniste
Fred F. Fielding
Jamie S. Gorelick
Slade Gorton
Bob Kerrey
John F. Lehman
Timothy J. Roemer
James R. Thompson

Report on the Status of 9/11 Commission Recommendations

Part III: Foreign Policy, Public Diplomacy, and Nonproliferation

RECOMMENDATION	STATUS	NEXT STEPS
----------------	--------	------------

NONPROLIFERATION		
Maximum effort by U.S. government to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD	Insufficient Progress	Executive & Congress

FOREIGN POLICY		
Long-term commitment to Afghanistan	Some Progress	Executive & Congress
Support Pakistan against extremists	Some Progress	Executive & Congress
Support reform in Saudi Arabia	Insufficient Progress	Executive
Identify and prioritize terrorist sanctuaries	Some Progress	Executive
Coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism	Minimal Progress	Executive
Coalition standards for terrorist detention	Unfulfilled	Executive & Congress
Economic policies	Good Progress	Executive & Congress
Vigorous effort against terrorist financing	Good Progress	Executive

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY		
Define the U.S. message	Minimal Progress	Executive
International broadcasting	Some Progress	Congress
Scholarship, exchange, and library programs	Unfulfilled	Executive & Congress
Support secular education in Muslim countries	Minimal Progress	Executive & Congress

Nonproliferation

MAXIMUM EFFORT BY U.S. GOVERNMENT TO PREVENT TERRORISTS FROM ACQUIRING WMD

“Our report shows that al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make weapons of mass destruction for at least ten years. There is no doubt the United States would be a prime target. Preventing the proliferation of these weapons warrants a maximum effort – by strengthening counterproliferation efforts, expanding the Proliferation Security Initiative, and supporting the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.” (p. 381)

Grade: **INSUFFICIENT PROGRESS**

What has happened: The agreement reached by Presidents Bush and Putin in February 2005 provided positive movement on programs to secure nuclear warheads and materials. Access has improved: Russia has made several dozen additional nuclear weapons storage sites available for inspection and security upgrades. The U.S. and Russia have mostly resolved liability issues that had long delayed efforts to eliminate plutonium from dismantled weapons. In the past 14 months, with U.S. assistance, four shipments of highly-enriched uranium have been returned from Soviet-supplied research reactors in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics to secure storage in Russia. An amendment by Senator Lugar (adopted by a 78-19 vote) to the Defense Authorization bill pending in the Senate would remove bureaucratic hurdles to the timely expenditure of Cooperative Threat Reduction funds (repealing annual certification requirements imposed by Congress, and delegating from the President to the Secretary of Defense authority to use such funds outside the former Soviet Union).

The Cooperative Threat Reduction program has significant accomplishments over the past 14 years in dismantling former Soviet weaponry (40% of ICBMs, 51% of warheads, 64% of strategic bombers and 58% of missile silos), but much remains to be done to secure weapons-grade nuclear materials. The size of the problem still dwarfs the policy response. Approximately half of former Soviet nuclear materials still lack adequate security protection. While 75% of the buildings in the former Soviet Union that contain nuclear weapons material have completed “rapid upgrades” of security, and 54% have completed “comprehensive upgrades,” the total amount of nuclear material protected inched upward this past year, from 26 to 29% (with comprehensive upgrades) and from 46 to 49% (including rapid upgrades) – at a pace less than half the rate the U.S. had intended, in large part because of access disputes.

Most troubling is that over 100 research facilities worldwide—in some 40 countries—contain enough highly-enriched uranium to fashion a nuclear device. Many of these sites lack even basic security features.

The Administration’s Proliferation Security Initiative, an international effort to disrupt proliferation-related shipments and stop the proliferation trade, has now expanded to over 70 countries, and counts 11 successful interdictions in the past year.

Why this is still important: As the President has stated, “The gravest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates they are doing so with determination.” The consequences of a WMD attack in an American city would be catastrophic.

What needs to be done: Preventing terrorists from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction must be elevated above all other problems of national security because it represents the greatest threat to the American people. The President should develop a comprehensive plan to dramatically accelerate the timetable for securing all nuclear weapons-usable material around the world and request the necessary resources to complete this task. The President should publicly make this goal his top national security priority, and ride herd on the bureaucracy to maintain a sense of urgency.

The Congress should provide the resources needed to secure vulnerable materials at the fastest possible rate, and should complete action on Senator Lugar's amendments to streamline the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.

Finally, the U.S. and Russia must renew the Cooperative Threat Reduction umbrella agreement before it expires next year, to prevent suspension of the program's critical work.

Foreign Policy

LONG-TERM COMMITMENT TO AFGHANISTAN

“Now the United States and the international community should make a long-term commitment to a secure and stable Afghanistan, in order to give the government a reasonable opportunity to improve the life of the Afghan people. Afghanistan must not again become a sanctuary for international crime and terrorism. The United States and the international community should help the Afghan government extend its authority over the country, with a strategy and nation-by-nation commitments to achieve their objectives.” (p. 370)

Grade: **SOME PROGRESS**

What has happened: Afghanistan elected a president in late 2004 and a national assembly in mid-September 2005. Both elections took place with minimal civil disruption. With the installation of the national assembly, Afghanistan will have its first entirely democratically elected government. According to the Afghan constitution, each of the country’s 34 provinces will have at least two women representatives. The international community provided \$160 million to ensure that the elections proceeded smoothly.

As required by law, the administration has submitted to Congress a five-year strategy for Afghanistan, and a report on the implementation of the strategy. NATO forces are playing a bigger role in providing security. Allies have made progress in standing up the Afghan National Army, which now has over 20,000 operational troops and comprises 37 battalions. The ANA deployed in support of the national assembly elections. A total of 50,000 police and 12,000 border police will be initially trained and deployed throughout Afghanistan by the end of the year. Rehabilitation of hydroelectric power plants, dams, and gas turbine plants is underway. Substantial improvements of provincial highways have occurred and capacity building for the ministries of finance, telecommunications, and the central bank is ongoing. Millions of children are being educated and have been vaccinated and have improved access to healthcare. Rural women are being trained as teachers, women’s literacy is increasing, and more girls are going to school.

The challenges facing the country are still formidable: Taliban and other extremist forces stepped up attacks against the Karzai government in spring and summer of 2005, and attacks continue; new fighters are being drawn from Pakistan. More than sixty U.S. military personnel have died in combat in 2005 and the insurgency is not going away. Karzai has not extended his authority throughout the entire country. With U.S. and allied help—the U.S. currently has about 17,900 troops in Afghanistan—he is attempting to strengthen regional governments in the provinces.

The Taliban derive some of their financing from Afghanistan’s drug trafficking. The U.S. and allies are combating opium cultivation and the labs that make Afghanistan the world’s leading supplier of heroin. But last year’s campaign against opium has been characterized by some U.S. officials as a “failure.” Although the amount of land used to grow opium poppies was reduced by 20 percent, rainfall still produced a big crop. A Department of State/Department of Defense report on counter-drug efforts in Afghanistan states that the drug situation in Afghanistan has worsened.

The U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan has requested that Congress double the current \$622 million in aid to build roads and other links between Kabul and the provinces. Some senior coalition military leaders emphasize that the U.S. and its partners must commit to a long-term economic plan for Afghanistan in order to ensure the country’s stability.

Why this is still important: Before 9/11 Afghanistan was a terrorist sanctuary, al Qaeda training center, and launching pad for al Qaeda attacks on U.S. interests. It is imperative that the United States and allies remain focused on Afghanistan, support its democratic government, reinforce its security, and help build its economy to ensure that it never again becomes a haven for terrorists.

What needs to be done: The U.S. and allies need to press forward on training and standing up the Afghan National Army and Afghan security forces. These forces should be used in consolidating the central government's control over the country. The coalition should help Karzai and his government develop more effective means for eradicating Afghanistan's poppy cultivation, as opium production and criminal drug trafficking threaten to undermine the government and its democratic institutions. The U.S. should exert every effort to implement the five-year Afghanistan strategy the administration has submitted to Congress. In particular, priority should be given to helping the country build a solid economic infrastructure and develop a sound economy. Congress should continue to provide generous economic and development aid to Afghanistan, and provide robust funding to the Afghan National Army, police forces, and border police.

SUPPORT PAKISTAN AGAINST EXTREMISTS

"If Musharraf stands for enlightened moderation in a fight for his life and for the life of his country, the United States should be willing to make hard choices too, and make the difficult long-term commitment to the future of Pakistan. Sustaining the current scale of aid to Pakistan, the United States should support Pakistan's government in its struggle against extremists with a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support for a better education, so long as Pakistan's leaders remain willing to make difficult choices of their own." (p. 369)

Grade: SOME PROGRESS

What has happened: The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (PL 108-458) provided sense of Congress language supportive of the Commission's recommendations. Increases in the FY2006 budget, and a five-year \$3 billion package of assistance, are encouraging signs of a long-term commitment to Pakistan. But there is still little movement beyond security assistance: too much of our assistance is in the form of a cash transfer, and funding to improve education in Pakistan is still far from sufficient.

Musharraf has made real efforts to take on the threat from extremism, yet Pakistan remains a sanctuary and training ground for terrorists. Musharraf does not appear to have lived up to his promises to regulate the madrassas properly or close down all those that are known to have links to extremist groups. Taliban forces still pass freely across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and operate in Pakistani tribal areas. Terrorists from Pakistan carry out operations in Kashmir. Finally, the results of promised democratization efforts are yet to be seen.

Reports indicate that the rapid U.S. aid in response to the devastating October 8th earthquake has enhanced the U.S. standing in Pakistan. Many elements of Pakistani society see such aid as a sign of strong U.S. commitment.

Why this is still important: A politically and economically stable Pakistan that is a committed partner in the war on terror is critical to U.S. counterterrorism efforts. This cannot happen unless Pakistan is wholly committed to practical reform. The United States must be equally committed to helping Pakistan achieve practical economic and political reform.

What still needs to be done: U.S. assistance to Pakistan must move beyond security assistance. \$35 million is not adequate to the task of helping to revive Pakistan's failing basic education system. Funding for education efforts must be increased. The U.S. government should pressure Pakistan to act forcefully to close Taliban-linked madrassas, shut down terrorist training camps, and prevent Taliban forces from operating across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

SUPPORT REFORM IN SAUDI ARABIA

“The problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship must be confronted, openly. The United States and Saudi Arabia must determine if they can build a relationship that political leaders on both sides are prepared to publicly defend—a relationship about more than oil. It should include a shared commitment to political and economic reform, as Saudis make common cause with the outside world. It should include a shared interest in greater tolerance and cultural respect, translating into a commitment to fight the violent extremists who foment hatred.” (p.374)

Grade: **INSUFFICIENT PROGRESS**

What has happened: Administration statements in support of democracy and political reform in the Middle East are more pointed and pronounced than those of previous Administrations. Saudi Arabia held elections in early 2005 for one-half of the seats in municipal councils (the other half to be appointed by the government); however, the councils have yet to meet and their authorities are unclear. On economic reform, Saudi Arabia has completed talks with the U.S. and looks likely to join the World Trade Organization before the end of 2005, accepting greater transparency and openness in its economy.

Saudi security forces have acted forcefully against al Qaeda following the May 2003 bombing in Riyadh. Bilateral counterterrorism cooperation with the U.S. has also greatly improved. Saudi official statements on encouraging tolerance and moderation are good, but positive change in the religious establishment, educational textbooks, or daily life is far less clear. A U.S.-Saudi strategic dialogue to address topics beyond oil and security, including reform and expansion of citizen-to-citizen contacts, is just beginning.

Why this is still important: Cooperation with Saudi Arabia against violent Islamic extremism is very much in the U.S. national interest; such cooperation is difficult to sustain in the absence of public support and broader ties between the two countries.

What needs to be done: Both governments should accelerate efforts to give life and substance to U.S.-Saudi strategic dialogue, increase exchange programs, and promote pragmatic reform. The Saudi government needs to take additional steps to regulate charities and promote tolerance and moderation.

IDENTIFY AND PRIORITIZE TERRORIST SANCTUARIES

“The U.S. government must identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries. For each, it should have a realistic strategy to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run, using all elements of national power. We should reach out, listen to, and work with other countries that can help.” (p. 367)

Grade: **SOME PROGRESS**

What has happened: The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (PL 108-458) expressed the sense of Congress in support of this recommendation, but did not put in place specific programs to identify and prioritize sanctuaries. In its report to Congress, the State Department described a U.S. strategy to address and eliminate terrorist sanctuaries that includes: coordinating cooperative programs to build ties with foreign partners and build counterterrorism capabilities; increasing impediments to terrorist funding and travel; and diminishing the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit. But this strategy does not include a useful metric for overall progress against terrorist sanctuaries. There is little sign of long-term efforts in place to reduce the conditions that allow the formation of terrorist sanctuaries.

Why this is still important: Even as terrorist groups increasingly make use of technology to establish links with other groups, for raising funds, spreading propaganda, and planning attacks, the 9/11 story tells us that complex operations still require space and resources to recruit, train, and plan. We cannot afford to allow failing or failed states to become home bases for tomorrow's terrorists.

What still needs to be done: The National Security Council Office for Combating Terrorism, the National Counterterrorism Center, the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the CIA should, as a priority matter, agree on which countries are currently terrorist sanctuaries, and which countries have the potential for becoming such sanctuaries. Together these organizations should develop and implement comprehensive strategies for responding to terrorist sanctuaries and potential sanctuaries. These strategies should include metrics for evaluating progress toward making these countries and regions less attractive to terrorists. The State Department should then take the lead in winning the endorsement of key international allies for implementing these strategies.

COALITION STRATEGY AGAINST ISLAMIST TERRORISM

“The United States should engage other nations in developing a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism. There are several multilateral institutions in which such issues should be addressed. But the most important policies should be discussed and coordinated in a flexible contact group of leading coalition governments. This is a good place, for example, to develop joint strategies for targeting terrorist travel, or for hammering out a common strategy for the places where terrorists may be finding sanctuary.” (p. 379)

Grade: MINIMAL PROGRESS

What has happened: The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (PL 108-458) authorized the Secretary of State, in consultation with other U.S. government agencies, to negotiate international agreements on a bilateral or multilateral basis, under which parties work in partnership to address and interdict acts of international terrorists. The Act also authorized the president to establish an international contact group of leading nations to develop common policies and strategies against terrorists. Components of a common counterterrorism strategy have been generated and/or implemented on a bilateral basis. For example, the U.S. has strong cooperative relationships on intelligence sharing and law enforcement with a number of partners. There has also been progress establishing multilateral policies on preventing terrorist travel and combating terrorist financing, addressing the threat to transportation infrastructure, and promoting best practices for transportation security. No permanent international contact group of leading nations has yet been established.

Why this is still important: International cooperation on counterterrorism strategy is not just advantageous to U.S. efforts—as the recent attacks in Bali and London once again demonstrate, it is essential to successfully conducting a global war on terror. The global community needs joint strategies to strengthen its ability to erode the roots of terrorism.

What still needs to be done: Just as the U.S. needs to use all instruments of power against the terrorist threat, we need to forge a comprehensive coalition strategy on all fronts in the war on terror. This must include a broader approach to targeting the roots of terrorism, including joint strategies for encouraging reform efforts in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, improving educational and economic opportunities in the Muslim world, identifying and eliminating terrorist sanctuaries, and making progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process.

COALITION STANDARDS FOR TERRORIST DETENTION

“The United States should engage its friends to develop a common coalition approach toward the detention and humane treatment of captured terrorists. New principles might draw upon Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions on the law of armed conflict. That article was specifically designed for those cases in which the usual laws of war did not apply. Its minimum standards are generally accepted throughout the world as customary international law.” (p. 380)

Grade: UNFULFILLED

What has happened: The U.S. government’s treatment of captured terrorists, including the detention and prosecution of suspected terrorists in military prisons and secret detention centers abroad, as well as reports on the

abuse of detainees, have elicited criticism from around the globe. There have also been inquiries into the U.S. government's internment policies and the status of these prisoners under international law both at home and abroad. A new Department of Defense Directive and revised Army interrogation manual, both currently under review, will provide important guidance for the U.S. military on detention and interrogation standards for captured terrorists, reportedly drawing upon Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. An amendment to the defense appropriations bill banning the "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" of any detainee in U.S. custody recently received overwhelming support from the Senate.

Why this is still important: Dissension either at home or abroad on how the United States treats captured terrorists only makes it harder to build the diplomatic, political and military alliances necessary to fight the war on terror effectively. The closer our detention policies can be to international law, the closer can be our cooperation with international partners on other aspects of counterterrorism strategy.

What still needs to be done: Administration policies that provide standards for captured terrorists in accordance with international law should be adopted. These standards should cover the treatment of detainees held by all elements of the U.S. government. The U.S. should work with its allies to develop mutually acceptable standards for terrorist detention.

ECONOMIC POLICIES

"A comprehensive U.S. strategy to counter terrorism should include economic policies that encourage development, more open societies, and opportunities for people to improve the lives of their families and to enhance prospects for their children's future." (p.379)

Grade: **GOOD PROGRESS**

What has happened: The Administration has continued to pursue trade liberalization and the integration of the Arab and Muslim world into the global trading system, in support of the goal of a Middle East Free Trade Area by 2013. The United States has entered into free trade agreements (FTAs) with Jordan, Morocco, and the Palestinian Authority (via the US-Israel FTA), concluded FTA negotiations with Bahrain (September 2004) and Oman (October 2005), and opened FTA talks with the United Arab Emirates (March 2005). The United States is also actively considering an FTA with Egypt, which has reduced tariffs, accelerated privatization, and increased exchange rate flexibility, significantly improving its investment climate. In addition, the Administration has entered into bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreements with 13 Arab states (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen) as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan. It recently concluded bilateral talks with Saudi Arabia in support of its membership in the World Trade Organization, which is likely to occur by the end of 2005. Nine Arab states - Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Tunisia, and UAE - already are members of the World Trade Organization.

Why this is still important: Economic stagnation and social dislocation create a breeding ground for terrorism. Economic reforms foster growth, create jobs and provide hope.

What needs to be done: Continued pursuit of economic liberalization, so that a virtuous cycle of growth can take hold. Growth expands the middle class, creating a constituency for further economic and political reform.

TERRORIST FINANCING

“Vigorous efforts to track terrorist financing must remain front and center in U.S. counterterrorism efforts.” (p.382)

Grade: **GOOD PROGRESS**

What has happened: There is widespread international recognition that terrorist financing cannot be ignored, and growing agreement on standards to combat it. With U.S. support, the 33-member Financial Action Task Force (FATF) agreed this past year to create regional groups in Eurasia (including Russia and China) and in the Middle East and North Africa (including 14 countries) to implement FATF recommendations to fight money laundering and terrorist financing. The U.S. is an observer in both regional groups. The U.S. is providing technical assistance and training to develop and strengthen counterterrorist financing capabilities of front-line states, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Egypt and Pakistan.

Why this is still important: Tracking terrorist funding provides critical intelligence, helping to understand terrorist networks, search them out, and disrupt their operations. While any individual terrorist operation is inexpensive, terrorist organizations need steady funding to train, recruit and pay operatives.

What needs to be done: Priorities include the Gulf states and South Asia. The U.S. needs to persuade Saudi Arabia to establish a fully functioning Charities Commission, providing oversight of international Islamic and relief organizations headquartered there. Pakistan needs to enact terrorist finance legislation. U.S. assistance is critical in helping Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait develop Financial Intelligence Units; no country in South Asia yet has one. FIUs are essential for information sharing and maintaining compliance with international standards to combat terrorist financing.

Public Diplomacy

DEFINE THE U.S. MESSAGE

“The U.S. government must define what the message is, what it stands for. We should offer an example of moral leadership in the world, committed to treat people humanely, abide by the rule of law, and be generous and caring to our neighbors. America and Muslim friends can agree on respect for human dignity and opportunity. To Muslim parents, terrorists like Bin Ladin have nothing to offer their children but visions of violence and death. America and its friends have a crucial advantage—we can offer these parents a vision that might give their children a better future. If we heed the views of thoughtful leaders in the Arab and Muslim world, a moderate consensus can be found. That vision of the future should stress life over death: individual educational and economic opportunity. This vision includes widespread political participation and contempt for indiscriminate violence. It includes respect for the rule of law, openness in discussing differences, and tolerance for opposing points of view.” (p.376)

Grade: **MINIMAL PROGRESS**

What has happened: In his second inaugural address, the President offered a vision for American leadership in the world based on the expansion of democratic governance to all countries. The President and the Secretary of State have articulated this message widely, including in the Middle East. The United States has shown moral leadership in support of democratic elections and the rule of law in Muslim countries, and in generous assistance to the victims of the Indian Ocean tsunami and the recent South Asia earthquake. However, mistrust and dislike of America remain high in many areas of the world, especially in Arab and Muslim countries. Detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere undermines America’s reputation as a moral leader, committed to humane treatment and the rule of law. Public opinion approval ratings for the United States throughout the Middle East remain at or near historic lows.

Why this is still important: The generational struggle that began on 9/11 will not be won by military or intelligence operations alone—it will require all elements of national power. In the Cold War the appeal of Western ideals rallied the people of the world, including behind the Iron Curtain, against totalitarian Communism. Similarly, to defeat Bin Ladin and his allies we must defeat their ideology of hate and death.

What needs to be done: The global appeal of our core values and our culture of education, equal opportunity, and tolerance still have powerful appeal around the world. Public diplomacy initiatives should seek to explain the civic principles and system of government contained in our founding documents, and to portray the American way of life factually.

The challenge is to communicate our values, our way of life, and our vision for the world, without lecturing or condescension. That task will fall to President Bush, Secretary Rice, Undersecretary Hughes, and countless other U.S. government officials. The media, the private and nonprofit sectors, and individual citizens should also be encouraged to participate in this effort.

INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

“Recognizing that Arab and Muslim audiences rely on satellite television and radio, the government has begun some promising initiatives in television and radio broadcasting to the Arab world, Iran and Afghanistan. These efforts are beginning to reach large audiences. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has asked for much larger resources. It should get them.” (p.377)

Grade: **SOME PROGRESS**

What has happened: The budgets for international broadcasting to the Arab and Muslim world have increased dramatically since 9/11, from \$45 million in Fiscal Year 2002 to \$152 million in the Fiscal Year 2006 request -- an

overall 237% increase. Arabic-language Radio Sawa began in 2002 and Alhurra TV in 2004. The number of U.S.-sponsored broadcasting hours to the broader Middle East has nearly quadrupled since 2001, from 13,000 hours to over 50,000 hours.

Audience shares are growing. According to an August 2005 ACNielsen survey, Radio Sawa and Alhurra TV are now reaching a total audience of 35 million adults per week. Radio Sawa is the top international broadcaster in the region. Alhurra is making inroads, reaching on average 25% of adult audiences weekly in 11 Arab countries, compared to 65% for al Arabiya and 80% for al Jazeera. According to the survey, 77% of Alhurra's viewers and 73% of Radio Sawa's listeners consider their news reliable.

Why this is still important: In a region where 40 percent of adult Arabs are illiterate, radio and TV are the most important sources of news and information.

What remains to be done: Building audience share is a first step toward shaping public opinion. With audiences citing Radio Sawa and Alhurra TV as reliable sources of news, the challenge is to see whether these services can make a difference by exposing listeners to new ideas and accurate information about the United States and its policies. Metrics beyond audience size should be developed to measure impact and influence.

SCHOLARSHIP, EXCHANGE, AND LIBRARY PROGRAMS

"The United States should rebuild the scholarship, exchange, and library programs that reach out to young people and offer them knowledge and hope. Where such assistance is provided, it should be identified as coming from the citizens of the United States."
(p.377)

Grade: UNFULFILLED

What has happened: The administration requested \$430.4 million for FY 2006 for Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs, up from \$367.4 million in FY 2005. Congress funded the request.

Overseas American libraries are closing in the regions we want to reach most, largely due to safety concerns. The American Consulate and Library in Istanbul, Turkey was targeted at least six times by terrorists until it was closed in 2003. The United States closed the American Center in Islamabad in 2005. Even the American Center in New Delhi, frequently touted as a model public diplomacy facility, is being closed in 2007 due to security concerns. Over the past two years, the State Department has increased its investment in interactive websites and American reading sections in host country libraries. Neither initiative includes the presence of U.S. personnel for dialogue, reading guidance, and educational counseling, important factors in shaping the attitudes of foreign users.

A Partnerships for Learning youth initiative, funded at \$10 million, is aimed at the Muslim world. While U.S. funded efforts directed at the Muslim world are increasing, the overall level of young people coming to visit or study in the United States from Muslim countries is static or declining.

Why this is still important: Interaction with citizens of target countries is one of the most effective ways to expose them to American values and culture.

What needs to be done: The U.S. needs to make library posts abroad viable, even in the face of security challenges. The U.S. should increase support for scholarship and exchange programs, our most powerful tool to shape attitudes over the course of a generation.

SUPPORT SECULAR EDUCATION IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES

The U.S. government should offer to join with other nations in generously supporting a new International Youth Opportunity Fund. Funds will be spent directly for building and operating primary and secondary schools in those Muslim states that commit to sensibly investing their own money in public education. (pg. 378)

Grade: **MINIMAL PROGRESS**

What has happened: PL 108-458 authorized the creation of the International Youth Opportunity Fund and instructed the Secretary of State to seek international cooperation in funding it. To date Congress has appropriated no funding to establish the program.

The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and USAID have initiated programs across the Arab world to support secular education improvements and the teaching of English. A number of these programs focus on female education. In Fiscal Year 2006 the administration requested \$120 million for MEPI, of which \$30 million is earmarked for education reform programs.

Why this is still important: As Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld wrote in October 2003, the challenge of counterterrorism is “capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us.”

Schools providing exclusively religious education—often the only schools available to the poor in some Muslim countries—leave graduates without marketable skills, creating a large pool of unemployable youth. Some of these schools indoctrinate students with a radical, militant interpretation of Islam. These young graduates form an attractive pool of potential targets for al Qaeda recruiters.

What needs to be done: The International Youth Opportunity Fund would reduce the share of costs borne by U.S. taxpayers for improving international education. Congress should make appropriations to initiate this program, which would allow the Secretary of State to begin seeking international contributions to the Fund.

Secular education programs through MEPI and USAID are a constructive start to answering the challenge of secular education in Muslim countries. These programs should not, however, operate in a vacuum. They should be components of an overarching strategy for educational assistance—itsself one component of an overall U.S. strategy for counterterrorism—targeted where the need and the benefit to U.S. national security are greatest. Once such a strategy exists, this important long-term counterterrorism tool should receive significantly increased funding from the Congress. The current level of education reform funding is not sufficient given the scale of the challenge.