SIAM [1]

POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD SIAM

Interest of the United States in question of recognizing a Free Thai movement; [2] attitudes of the United States and the United Kingdom toward the postwar status of Siam; [2] intervention by the United States in negotiations between the United Kingdom and Siam for an agreement terminating their state of war; discussions regarding reversion of Indochinese, Malayan, and Burmese territories acquired by Thailand in 1941 and 1943; question of restoration of diplomatic relations with Siam

892.01/12–3044 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

CHUNGKING, December 30, 1944—8 a. m.
[Received 12 : 30 p. m.]

2086. Foreign Office informs us in strict confidence that two groups of Thai nationals, one civil and one military, have arrived in Kunming secretly from Thailand for talks with Chinese Government officials and that head of civil group bears an autographed letter from Thai Premier.[3] Foreign Office desires to ascertain views of American Government as to how to deal with the delegation and what general lines of policy should be pursued. Foreign Office states arrangements will be made in due course after delegation's arrival in Chungking for us to meet them informally and is making similar approach to British Embassy.

. . . . . .

Foreign Office states no objection to informing Thai Minister.[4] Please instruct.

HURLEY

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[1] On September 10, 1945, the Siamese Chargé (Bhakdi) notified the Secretary of State that the terms "Thailand" and "Thais" had been discarded as of September 7 and replaced by "Siam" and "Siamese"; for text of notification, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 23, 1945, p. 436.

[2] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 1311 ff., *passim*.

[3] Khuang Aphaiwong.

[4] Mom Rajawongse Seni Pramoj.

892.01/12–3044 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Hurley)

WASHINGTON, January 10, 1945—6 p. m.

54. Reurtel 2086, December 30. The Department feels that no action should be taken at this time which might imply support of any particular Thai group as opposed to any other Thai group in connection with any plans for the establishment of a Free Thai Government-in-exile or any similar political movement. For our policy in regard to Thailand see Department's 373, March 23, 1944,[5] to which should be added that this Government does not recognize the lawfulness of transfers under Japanese pressure of territories from Indochina, Malaya and Burma to Thailand,[6] and agrees that they must be restored, without prejudice however to the presentation by any nation of claims for border adjustments or territorial transfers in accordance with orderly and peaceful procedures.

When you meet the Thai officials in question please endeavor to learn their purpose, their authority, and whether any messages they carry are for the Chinese, British or us alone, or for all three powers.

With regard to your reply to the Foreign Office, we rely on your judgment and discretion in the light of the foregoing policy instructions, of the background information below, and of our understanding that OSS [7] is anxious that these groups proceed as promptly as possible to Washington, to which the Department has no objection. For your information only, General Donovan [8] will arrive in Chungking in about 10 days. He is fully familiar with this situation, and the Department desires that you give him such assistance as you deem appropriate.

For your background information: a suggested establishment of a Free Thai Government-in-exile in India was disapproved by the British Foreign Office, and the British in their political warfare have forbidden the use of the term "Free Thai". British attitude toward Thailand is different from ours partly because a state of war exists between Great Britain and Thailand whereas we have not declared

[5] Not printed; it gave the substance of a note handed on March 20, 1944, to the British Ambassador, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 1313.

[6] For French Indochina–Thailand border dispute, see indexes, *ibid.*, 1941, vol. IV, p. 1041, and *ibid.*, vol. v, p. 934; for texts of convention of peace between France and Thailand and its protocol, and French-Japanese and French-Japanese-Thai protocols, all signed at Tokyo, May 9, 1941, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLIV, pp. 800, 802, and 805. The cessions of Indochinese territory comprised parts of Laos and Cambodia. On August 20, 1943, the Japanese Government, by treaty, transferred to Thailand the four Malay states of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu and the Shan States of Kengtung and Mong Pan in Burma.

[7] Office of Strategic Services.

[8] Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services.

war on Thailand.[9] Mr. Eden [10] has indicated that the British want to see the restoration of Thailand after the war as a free, sovereign and independent state, subject only to its acceptance of such special arrangements for security or economic collaboration as may be judged necessary within an international system. In this connection he made special reference to the Kra Isthmus.[11]

It is known that some Thai about 2 years ago desired to establish a Free Thai Government-in-exile in Chungking. It is reported that the Chinese wished to have such a government established which they could dominate, but that the Thai in question left China and other Thai who later were approached by the Chinese refused.

The Regent's [12] half brother, the Thai Minister at Stockholm,[13] has transmitted a communication believed to be authentic from the Regent to the Thai Minister at Washington requesting him to form a Free Thai Government-in-exile in Washington. The Minister at Washington has told us that he disapproves of this move as futile and illegal but is seeking more information.[14]

In your discretion you might inform the Thai officials that the Thai Minister believes that at least the civil group should come to Washington promptly for consultation, and that this Government does not object.

STETTINIUS

892.01/1–1345

Memorandum Prepared in the Division of Southwest Pacific Affairs

WASHINGTON, January 13, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

(for possible use in discussion with Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin)[15]

Subject: Future Status of Thailand.

British policies towards Thailand are divergent from ours. The British regard Thailand as an enemy and it is their view:

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[9] For documentation on these subjects, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, pp. 913 ff.

[10] Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

[11] For Mr. Eden's views on these matters, see airgrams A–1085, September 5, 1944, and A–1404, November 24, 1944, from London, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 1316 and 1319, respectively.

[12] Nai Pridi Phanomyong, also known as Luang Pradist Manudharm.

[13] Arthakitti Phanomyong.

[14] See memorandum of December 12, 1944, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Southwest Pacific Affairs, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 1320.

[15] President Roosevelt conferred at Yalta with British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and Marshal Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union, February 4–11, 1945. For documentation on the Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945. There is no record of discussions on Thailand at Yalta.

1. That Thailand's postwar independence should be conditioned on its acceptance of "special arrangements for security or economic collaboration . . .[16] within an international system".

2. That the peninsula of Thailand from Malaya to about 12° north latitude should be considered a vital strategic area and its defense under international security arrangements be undertaken by a protecting power or by an international consortium. This is reported to be the opinion of Mr. Churchill. Such action might substantially impair Thai administrative rights in the area.

3. That actual military government will not be needed, except perhaps in combat zones. However, they believe that an Allied Control Commission should be established in Thailand, which should be continued for some time.

4. That they should not deal at the present time with any Thai Government.

In contrast, we do not regard Thailand as an enemy but as an enemy-occupied country. We recognize the Thai Minister in Washington as "Minister of Thailand" with a status similar to that of the Danish Minister. We favor a free, independent Thailand, with sovereignty unimpaired, and ruled by a government of its own choosing. Thailand is the one country in Southeast Asia which was still independent before the war. We believe that it would be prejudicial to American interests throughout the Far East if, as the outcome of the war in which we will have had the major part in defeating Japanese aggression, Thailand should be deprived of any of its prewar territory or should have its independent status impaired. The history of European pressure on Thailand and of European acquisition of territory in Southeast Asia is vivid in Asiatic memories. This Government cannot afford to share responsibility in any way for a continuance towards Thailand of prewar imperialism in any guise.

Within Thailand, the administration which first yielded to Japan and which was notoriously collaborationist has been replaced by an administration largely controlled by Pradist, present Regent, most respected of Thai leaders and opponent of Japan from the first. American contact has been established with Pradist who is actively aiding Allied intelligence work and who has expressed his desire that Thailand enter the war against Japan and that the Thai army fight by the side of the Allies.

It is the view of the Department that an effort should be made to persuade the British to alter their plans so that they are not inconsistent with our own. It is believed that if Thailand joins in the war against Japan she should be treated as a liberated country and her government be recognized, at least provisionally. Although there are disadvantages from a political viewpoint in having American troops, except where militarily essential, participate in the recovery

[16] Omission indicated in the original memorandum.

of European colonial areas, there would be advantages from a political viewpoint in having American troops under independent American command responsible for the liberation of Thailand, rather than in having Thailand occupied as enemy territory by British forces. Whether or not American forces should be used in Thailand, however, is a question which would presumably be decided in the light of overall strategic considerations.

Attached is a brief memorandum regarding the Regent Pradist.[17]

892.01/12–3044 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Hurley)

WASHINGTON, January 20, 1945—1 p. m.

104. ReDeptel 54, January 10. British Embassy at Washington informed the Department [18] that the Foreign Office at London has informed the Chungking Embassy to advise the Chinese Government not to give political recognition to Thai officials in China without first consulting Great Britain and the United States on the subject. The Embassy at Washington also asked that if we contemplate taking any action with respect to the Thai in question we keep them informed.

Messages purporting to come from Thai Regent Pradist at Bangkok indicate that the Thai officials now in China were sent out to organize a provisional government or to establish committees in Allied countries, possibly with the Thai Minister at Washington at the head. One of the messages stated that the Thai went to China at the invitation of the Generalissimo [19] and that he is willing to approve Pradist's plans for a provisional government or committees.

Please keep us informed of any developments.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 PW/1–2545

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine) [20]

[WASHINGTON,] January 25, 1945.

BRITISH-AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD THAILAND

I. *The Problem*

To attempt to persuade the British Government to harmonize its policy toward Thailand with our own.

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[17] Not printed.

[18] On January 12.

[19] Chiang Kai-shek, President of the National Government of the Republic of China.

[20] Approved by the Secretary's Staff Committee on January 31 and sent to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on February 9 under a covering memorandum by Mr. Ballantine dated the previous day.

II. *Recommendations*

It is recommended:

A. That the Department inform the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff of the disparity between American and British views in regard to Thailand, request them to use their influence on the Combined Chiefs of Staff in order to prevent the adoption of measures inconsistent with American policy toward Thailand, and ask them to furnish the Department with such pertinent information as they may deem consistent with military security and which might be of value to the Department in its further discussions with the British Government on the subject of Thailand. (There is attached a memorandum [21] for possible use by the Department's representative on the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.)

B. That we make a further approach to the British Government in which we suggest in general that agreements be sought between the Thai Government on the one side and the British, Chinese and United States Governments on the other, which would include at least the following basic considerations:

1. The Thai Government would agree:

a. To render military cooperation at such times and in such manner as may be requested by the appropriate military authorities.

b. To accept the territorial boundaries of Thailand as of January 1941 without prejudice to later peaceful negotiations for possible boundary adjustments and territorial transfers.

c. To assume the responsibilities of a sovereign nation in the pattern of an international security organization.

2. The British, Chinese and United States Governments would agree:

a. To respect the sovereignty and independence of Thailand.

b. To regard Thailand as an Ally, liberated or in process of being liberated from the enemy. (The Thai Regent as head of the state declares that the declaration of war against Great Britain and the United States is unconstitutional and hence null and void.)

c. To restrict military government to combat zones occupied by Allied troops and to restore such areas to the control of the Thai Government as rapidly as military operations permit.

III. *Basic Factors*

A. *The American Position*

The United States has adopted the policy of treating Thailand as an enemy-occupied state, and favors the restoration of prewar Thailand as a sovereign state under an independent government.

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[21] Dated January 25, not printed.

B. *The British Position*

Great Britain regards Thailand as an enemy and favors an extended occupation of the country after liberation from the Japanese, the establishment of an Allied Control Commission, and the imposition of economic and military conditions within an international system which might substantially impair Thai administrative control.

C. *Urgency of the Problem*

The problem is urgent because of the developing military situation in Burma and because daily American contact with the Thai Regent at Bangkok brings the information that the Thai underground (headed by the Regent himself) is well organized, and that the Thai desire to give military cooperation to the United Nations in the war against Japan, to be recognized as an Ally, and to be a sovereign independent nation again. A high Thai official representing the Regent is now in Chungking on the invitation of Chiang Kai-shek to discuss the establishment of a committee or a provisional government at Chungking which, if recognized by China, would seek recognition from Great Britain and the United States. (The Thai Regent is reported to believe that the Japanese are preparing to take over the government in Thailand and for this reason is considering a provisional government-in-exile.) Another representative of the Regent is shortly to be brought to the United States, and it is reported that a third agent is to be sent to London.

D. *Occasion of the Problem*

General Sultan [22] has telegraphed the War Department for a statement of broad United States policies with respect to participation in matters involving Thailand to serve as a basis for the guidance of American officers in their negotiations with the British. (For additional basic factors see Annexes A, B and C.) [23]

892.01/2–245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, February 2, 1945—2 p. m.
[Received February 2—12:47 p. m.]

160. ReEmbstel 159, February 2, 11 a. m.[24] In discussing this matter Soong [25] assured me that China has no territorial ambitions

[22] Lt. Gen. Daniel I. Sultan, Commanding General of United States Army Forces in the India-Burma Theater.

[23] None printed.

[24] Not printed; it gave the text of a letter of September 9, 1944, from the Thai Regent to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in which the Regent stated he was sending a mission to China to seek recognition by the Allied Powers and permission to establish a provisional government or an organ of similar nature on Allied territory.

[25] T. V. Soong, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

in respect to Thailand and desires to see the development of a free Thailand. While indicating that the Chinese Government favors the establishment in Chungking of a "provisional free Thai Government" he also gave me assurances that the Chinese wish to cooperate with us in regard to every aspect of this question and also to seek and follow our advice and suggestions. He also said that his government would be agreeable to the setting up of a Thai Government in exile at Washington.

It is my personal opinion that we should encourage the establishment here of a "provisional free Thai Government". I am not convinced by Eden's statement (reDept's 54 January 10) that the British want to see Thailand after the war restored as an independent, free and solid state. I feel that if we do not move forward in this matter the British will succeed in out-maneuvering us and the Chinese and in gaining some measure of control over Thailand. However, I am of course mindful of the Department's instructions and will endeavor to facilitate the proposed journey to Washington of such a group.[26]

HURLEY

892.01/2–545 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Hurley)

WASHINGTON, February 6, 1945—10 p. m.

202. We believe that before reaching any final decision on the subject contained in your 159 and 160, February 2, and 169 February 5,[27] we should await arrival of a Thai spokesman who is expected daily from Bangkok, and who has been authorized by the Regent to discuss these matters with us.

In the light of the information now available, we believe that it would be inadvisable to encourage the establishment of a provisional government at this time (reDeptel 146, January 27[28]). With reference to the question of the Thai establishing a Free Thai committee at some point or points in the United Nations, at present we perceive no objection if it is clearly established that the Thai leaders desire it. For various reasons, we would prefer the establishment of such a committee at Washington. However, the choice of a location for a Free

[26] In telegram 169, February 5, 2 p. m., the Ambassador in China reported a request by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that President Roosevelt be informed of his view that "it would be advantageous to have formed in Chungking a Free Thai Committee to be headed by the present Thai Minister in Washington". (892.01/2–545)

[27] Telegrams 159 and 169 not printed; but for summaries, see footnotes 24, p. 1246, and 26, above.

[28] Not printed; it gave the substance of a note handed on March 20, 1944, to the British Ambassador (*Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 1313), and repeated texts of telegrams 54, January 10, and 104, January 20, to Chungking, pp. 1241 and 1244, respectively.

Thai committee or committees should await consultation with the Thai who are chiefly concerned. We also feel it would be desirable to consult further with both the Chinese and the British.

We have informally made known to the British Embassy here the fact of the forthcoming arrival of the Thai Regent's representative and have promised to keep the Embassy informed of further developments.

In your discretion, you may inform Soong and the Generalissimo of the substance of the foregoing.

We shall keep you informed of the progress of our discussions with the Regent's representative here.

GREW

Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Lot 52–M45

Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee [30]

[Extract]

SWNCC 5/2 [WASHINGTON,] 9 February, 1945.

. . . . . .

CONCLUSIONS

13. The British contention that security reasons in the post-war era necessitate the placing of Thailand territory on the Kra Isthmus under some sort of a protectorate status is without merit. The establishment of bases either for the reconquest of Singapore or for the clearance of Thailand from enemy occupation is purely incidental to military operations and should be governed by military operational requirements.

14. In the light of the present military situation, the establishment of an Allied Control Commission in Thailand during the reconstruction period is a matter which in the first instance is political in character.

15. Participation in civil affairs in Thailand should not become a responsibility of the United States unless U. S. forces are employed there. In the event of operations involving the use of U. S. forces, the extent of participation by the U. S. in civil affairs should be the subject of recommendations by the U. S. commander to the Joint

[30] Approved on February 9 by the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee which directed referral of this paper to the Joint Chiefs of Staff "for such action as they might deem appropriate". On March 11, the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee was advised that the Joint Chiefs had taken note of SWNCC 5/2. The Department of Defense has supplied information to the effect that the JCS action also included forwarding a copy of the paper to General Sultan for his information on the same date.

Chiefs of Staff, and should be limited to that necessary to the furtherance of military operations.

16. The United States is opposed to the use of United Nations military operations against the common enemy in the SEAC [31] area as a basis for prejudging in any way the solution of post-war problems, or to the use of such operations as a vehicle to further the economic, political or territorial ambitions of any nation at the expense of any other nation.

17. The United States is opposed to participation in any form of Allied control machinery in Thailand designed to accomplish anything beyond the immediate defeat of the common enemy.

. . . . . .

892.01/2-2145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine)

[WASHINGTON,] February 21, 1945.

Participants: Sir George Sansom, British Minister
Mr. Landon [32]
Mr. Ballantine

Sir George Sansom called at his request and handed me a statement, a copy of which is attached,[33] giving particulars in regard to a Thai mission to Ceylon, concerning which we had previously exchanged information orally. I read the document and commented that I could appreciate that the British Government would not want an agency of its Government other than the Foreign Office to discuss political questions with a Thai delegation. I said that of course we would study the statement and give him later any comments that might occur to us. Sir George said that Dening,[34] a Foreign Office representative, was in Kandy and would probably talk with the Thai in an exploratory way.

Sir George handed me another paper [35] which he said he had intended to communicate to me orally in regard to the British Government's refusal to grant a visa for Mr. Sanasen [36] to proceed to Kandy to confer with the Thai delegate there.

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[31] Southeast Asia Command. For account of its operations, see *Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia, 1943–1945* (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951).

[32] Kenneth P. Landon, Assistant Chief of the Division of Southwest Pacific Affairs.

[33] *Infra.*

[34] M. E. Dening, Chief Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command.

[35] Note for oral communication to Mr. Ballantine, February 21, not printed.

[36] Mani Sanasen, Secretary of the Thai Legation.

I then brought Sir George up to date on our exploratory conversations with the Thai delegation here. I said that we had made no decisions and felt that before making any decisions we should talk matters over with the British and possibly await the arrival in Washington of Ambassador Hurley, who was expected here shortly and who might give us some light on the China angle of the situation. I said that it seemed to us that the situation was moving rapidly and that some agreement should speedily be reached between the Chinese, British, and American Governments in regard to dealing with the Thai situation. I said that we had many evidences from our OSS representatives that the Thai were giving material assistance to our military agencies and that an effective underground was in operation. I said I believed that in order to help our war effort it was highly desirable that we capitalize on the willingness of the Thai to cooperate by giving them as much encouragement as we could. I said that I could not say how far our Government could go at this moment toward meeting the Thai wishes, but I felt that even if we could agree on the establishment of a Free Thai committee and on giving it a certain amount of support and assistance it would contribute toward enlisting Thai military cooperation. I said that perhaps agreement on a Free Thai committee would call for more in the nature of military help to them than commitments of a political character and moreover early action on this point might ease the situation so far as the Chinese Government is concerned, which apparently seemed disposed to go further with the Thai. I said that I was not in position to make any definite proposal as a basis for agreement among us, but thought that we could explore the matter further after he had thought the matter over and had consulted with his Government.

Sir George seemed to be very receptive to the idea of going ahead with this matter and he thought that his Government would be impressed by the thought that agreement on a Free Thai committee might afford a means of obtaining maximum military contribution in exchange for military support with a minimum of political commitment. He also seemed to be impressed with the desirability of avoiding any possibility of the Chinese going ahead on their own. I told him that I could not say how much we would have to agree to as a minimum necessary to satisfy the Thai. That would have to be explored, but I felt that at least some beginning should be made at this time with the idea that we could move forward much more easily after a beginning had been made than if we should await some future time before taking any action at all. It was arranged that Sir George would let me know when he had an opportunity to consider the subject and we could discuss the problem further. I said that the Thai might become restive if we neglected them and it was my thought

that we keep in constant touch with them. He seemed impressed with the importance of moving ahead with this matter.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

892.01/2–2145

The British Embassy to the Department of State

His Majesty's Embassy is directed to transmit to the Department of State for the secret information of the United States Government the following particulars regarding the visit of a Siamese Mission to Ceylon:—

1. Admiral Mountbatten [37] has been instructed by His Majesty's Government in his dealings with this Mission to confine himself, as Supreme Allied Commander, to discussion of purely military matters affecting operations against the Japanese. Should the Siamese Mission express a desire to raise political issues, he is to decline to discuss them, saying that he can only report what is said by the Mission in any political matter for consideration of the Allied Governments.

2. Admiral Mountbatten is however authorized to speak to the leader of the Mission on the lines of the following formula:

"It is the desire of His Majesty's Government to see the restoration of a free sovereign and independent Thailand and a renewal of old friendly relations between Great Britain and Thailand. But the road to be trodden before this goal is reached is not a smooth one. Much will depend on measures which Thailand takes to contribute towards expulsion of Japanese from Thai territory and towards the ultimate defeat of Japan; and on her readiness

(*a*) to make restitution to His Majesty's Government and their Allies for injury done to them in consequence of Thailand's association with Japan

(*b*) to ensure security and good-neighbourly relations for the future. For the time being His Majesty's Government's interest is concentrated upon expulsion of the Japanese. Any proposals going beyond this which the Mission may have to make will of course be reported to His Majesty's Government for consideration but cannot be discussed with present Mission in the absence of express instructions of His Majesty's Government."

WASHINGTON, February 21, 1945.

[37] Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command.

892.01/2–1945

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn)

[WASHINGTON,] February 22, 1945.

There is attached a memorandum of conversation between officers of the Department and the Thai delegation [38] on the subject of the delegation's proposal (contained in a memorandum of February 14 [39]) to establish a government-in-exile and to obtain recognition from the Allied governments.

The conversation was informal and exploratory in nature and was without commitment. We raised questions as to whether a committee might not achieve the Thai objectives as well as a government-in-exile, as to the legality of the acts of a government-in-exile, and as to whether there would not be an anomalous situation created which would be difficult to explain to the Thai and American publics if there were a government-in-exile coexistent with the legally constituted government at Bangkok.

The Thai delegates stated that a government-in-exile would act on the basis of the recognition of its authority by the United Nations and not on the basis of Thai law, that the delegation had not been instructed to propose a committee but a government, that from their point of view it would be easier to explain a government than a committee to the Thai people, and that they desired such a government in order to publicly identify the Thai with the cause of the United Nations. They added that if a government-in-exile seemed impracticable they would have to consult further among themselves and secure further advice from the Regent. They gave us the impression that if need be they would accept a committee instead of a government.

We raised the question of lend-lease aid, which had been referred to in their memorandum, and said that as they sought military supplies to be used against the enemy this was a military matter to be dealt with by the military authorities.

We mentioned Thailand's prewar economic policy of discrimination against aliens, and asked if it would be continued in the postwar period. The Thai delegates said that Thailand's postwar economic policy would be based on the idea of non-discrimination. Nationals of other countries would receive not only favored-nation but national treatment.

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[38] Dated February 19, not printed. The Special Delegation consisted of the Thai Minister, Sanguan Tularak, President of the Committee for Siamese National Liberation, and Suni Theparaksa (also known as Konthi Suphamongkhon) of the Thai Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

[39] From the Thai Legation, not printed.

The Thai said that they had made a courtesy call on Sir George Sansom but would be very glad to leave it to us to talk with Sir George as to the nature of their mission and of our conversations.

After thoroughly considering the arguments put forward by the Thai delegation in support of a government-in-exile, we continue to feel strongly that at present it would be more advantageous to favor the establishment of a committee as an initial step without prejudice to later consideration of the establishment of a government-in-exile.

892.01/2–2245

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine) to the Under Secretary of State (Grew) and the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn)

[WASHINGTON,] February 28, 1945.

There is attached a memorandum dated February 22, 1945, from the Director of OSS for the Secretary of State,[40] containing an interesting description of successful OSS operations and other developments within Thailand, which are of pertinent value in connection with the discussions which we are now having with the Thai Delegation.

In general, the OSS memorandum agrees in substance with statements made by the Thai Delegation to us. On two points, however, the OSS memorandum differs: (1) the Thai Delegation indicates doubt whether the Regent would be satisfied with anything less than a provisional government-in-exile, while the OSS reports that he desires to see established either a provisional government or an executive committee; and (2) the Thai Delegation says that the Regent wants such provisional government to declare war on the Axis powers immediately, while the OSS reports that the Regent proposes that the declaration of war would come when such provisional government is established on Thai soil.

It seems to us that the two points as presented by the OSS would indicate a more reasonable and logical attitude on the part of the Regent to those problems.

In the OSS memorandum it is suggested that some message of encouragement be sent to the Regent and his associates. This seems to be an excellent suggestion in view of the cooperation being given by the Thai in Thailand to OSS officers, the nature of our present discussions with the Thai Delegation, and the growing strength of the Thai Resistance Movement inside Thailand.

[40] Not printed.

It is recommended that a message of encouragement be transmitted by the OSS, both by radio and later orally, from the Secretary to the Regent, along lines as follows:

"Your efforts and those of your associates to liberate your nation from the oppressor are known and appreciated, and will surely not be in vain. I wish you every success in your effort to achieve this goal and extend to you my warmest personal regards." [41]

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

892.01/3–745

The Department of State to the British Embassy [42]

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Reference is made to the British Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of March 7, 1945,[43] in regard to a conversation on February 26 between the Political Adviser to the South East Asia Command and the Thai emissary in Ceylon. It is noted that the Foreign Office observes that there appear to be some discrepancies between the statements made by the Thai emissary in Ceylon and those made, according to the report of the British Embassy at Washington, to the Department of State by the emissaries in Washington.

In the light of the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* a careful review has been made of the record of the conversations which officers of the Department have had with the Thai delegation. In brief, according to the Thai delegation, the Thai Regent desires to declare war on Japan and other Axis states (the Thai state that their own declaration of war on Great Britain and the United States is illegal and not representative of Thai sentiments); to repudiate all treaties and agreements entered into by former Premier Pibul [44] since December 8, 1941 (in this connection the Thai promise the unconditional return to Burma and Malaya of the areas acquired by the aid of Japan but request that in the post-war period a British-American arbitration committee be set up to consider Thai claims to areas in Indochina); to convince the Thai people of Allied good intentions and thereby unite the Thai people solidly in support of Allied military efforts in Thailand against the Japanese; and lastly to establish a

[41] Mr. Dunn concurred with this recommendation on March 3; Mr. Grew concurred on an undisclosed date.

[42] Handed to the Second Secretary of the British Embassy (Everson) by Mr. Ballantine on March 16. A summary of this *aide-mémoire* was sent to the Chargé in China in Department's telegram 453, March 16, 8 p. m., for transmittal to the Chinese Foreign Office (892.01/3–1345). In telegram 471, March 21, 9 a. m., the Chargé reported that this had been done the previous day (892.01/3–2145).

[43] Not printed.

[44] Field Marshal Luang Pibul Songgram resigned as Prime Minister on July 24, 1944.

Free Thai provisional government abroad which would meet temporarily the present needs of the real leaders of the country within Thailand and which would be dissolved as soon as the Regent at Bangkok is in a position (presumably at the time the Allies enter Thailand with military forces) to appoint a new provisional government on Thai soil. (The same time sequence is suggested in the British Embassy's *aide-mémoire* on page two, last sentence.[45]

On the basis of the statements in the British *aide-mémoire* the Department does not consider that there are material differences in the proposals made to HBM's [46] Political Adviser at Kandy and those made to officers of the Department by the Thai delegation in Washington beyond those which might be expected to arise from independent oral presentations of the same instructions.

The Department has noted the statement made by the Political Adviser to the effect that he "judged the desire for collaboration to be undoubtedly genuine". The Department has reached the same conclusion, and has been impressed not only by the desire manifested by the Regent and the members of the Thai resistance movement to collaborate but also by concrete measures taken and contemplated against the Japanese. As a means of further stimulating a movement of substantial potential value to the Allies in connection with operations which may be designed to expel the Japanese from Thailand, it is believed that the British, Chinese, and American Governments might agree, as an initial step, to view with favor the establishment at this time of a Free Thai Liberation Committee abroad as the acknowledged symbol of the Free Thai resistance movement. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has expressed to the American Ambassador at Chungking his willingness to support such a committee with Washington as its venue.[47] Such a committee might well include representatives of the Regent to be stationed at London, Chungking and Washington, the capitals of the three principally interested United Nations. The Department is convinced that the establishment of such a committee, with the support of the three Governments mentioned, would be of definite value in the prosecution of the war in the Far East and in promoting the cause of the United Nations.

WASHINGTON, March 15, 1945.

[45] Of Section 2.

[46] His Britannic Majesty's.

[47] In a memorandum of March 10 Mr. Landon gave General Hurley's view that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek "would probably support the idea of making a public statement on Thailand's sovereignty and independence because the Chinese were fearful lest the British get a grasp on Thailand's affairs during the liberation period", had "no territorial claims" on Indochina, and was "willing to follow the American lead in policy toward Thailand and Indochina in most respects". (892.01/3–1045) For documentation on United States policy regarding Indochina, see pp. 293 ff.

892.01/3–1645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 16, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received March 16—4 : 50 p. m.]

2730. Sterndale Bennett [48] has told an officer of the Embassy that he has received from the British Embassy in Washington a telegraphic summary of conversations between officers of the Department and Sir George Sansom regarding the Free Thai movement. He stated that in this summary was included a brief account of a memorandum [49] given the Department by a Free Thai delegation (this is presumably the memorandum enclosed with the Department's top secret instruction No. 5146 of February 26 [50]), and he inquired whether the Embassy could make available to him a complete copy of the memorandum. Sterndale Bennett was informed that the matter would be taken up with the Department. Please inform us whether we may give a copy of the memorandum to the Foreign Office.

In discussing the general problems raised by the Free Thai request for recognition, Sterndale Bennett referred to the fact, which he had apparently learned from Sir George Sansom, that the Free Thai representatives had made it clear that there was no question about the return to Burma and Malaya of territory taken from them by the Japanese and turned over to the Thais. He also mentioned the Free Thai proposal that the final disposal of the territory which the Thais obtained with Japanese help from French Indo-China be referred to an Anglo-American arbitration committee. Sterndale Bennett said it appeared to him that the Thais were making an attempt at "playing politics" and were trying to play off the British against the French. He gave it as his personal opinion that the British Government would

[48] J. C. Sterndale Bennett, Head of the Far Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office. In a letter of March 5 to Mr. Ballantine, the Second Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Allison) reported a conversation with Mr. Sterndale Bennett "the other day" in which the latter was said to have made the categorical statement that the British Government had no definite plans regarding possible occupation or control of Thailand after the Japanese had left and that he "did not believe it was possible under present conditions to make definite plans and that the question of whether or not there should be Allied occupation or control would depend in large degree upon the manner of the Japanese withdrawal and the conditions obtaining in Thailand at that time". Mr. Allison pointed out that this was contrary to the Department's view of the British position as stated in Mr. Ballantine's memorandum of January 25, p. 1244. Mr. Ballantine replied on March 14, enclosing a memorandum prepared the same day in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs which set forth the basis on which the Department's conclusions had been reached and requesting information "if you discover any reason for believing there has been any recent radical change in the British attitude". (740.00119 P.W./3–545)

[49] Dated February 14, not printed.

[50] Not printed.

not wish to take part in such an arbitration committee and that the whole question of the Thai border should be left for discussion at a future date. In this connection, it is interesting to note that an official of the French Embassy in London, concerned with Far Eastern affairs, stated recently to an officer in this Embassy that as far as France was concerned, there was no question as to the return to Indo-China of the territory taken by Thailand. He said the French would demand it as a right.

WINANT

892.01/3–1645 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, March 20, 1945—midnight.

2165. Reurtel No. 2730, March 16, and previous communications.

1. The close interest manifested by Sterndale Bennett in our discussions with the Thai representatives encourages us to believe that the Foreign Office shares our views as to the urgency of reaching some agreement on common policy toward the Free Thai Movement.

2. With reference to the British request for a copy of the Thai delegation's memorandum, it is desired that you explain that that memorandum was presented as a tentative statement subject to modification during the course of exploratory conversations. We believe that the Thai representatives have already modified their original ideas on the basis of considerations brought out in those conversations and that therefore the contents of that memorandum cannot be taken as accurately reflecting their current views. We have already sent to you on March 19 by airmail [51] a copy of a note delivered to the British Embassy on March 16 containing a statement of the essential points in the Thai representations. If the British Government considers that that statement lacks sufficient detail for its consideration of the problem we would be glad to ask the Thai whether they would wish us to make available to the British Foreign Office a copy of their original memorandum or alternatively a revised memorandum on the basis of their current views.

3. It has been our understanding that the Thai suggestion that the Thai–Indochina border question be referred to an Anglo-American arbitration committee was not intended as a proposal to be carried out at the present time but as a possibility to be considered in the post-war period. We would not favor making a commitment to the Thai on this point at the present time.

GREW

[51] Instruction 5227, not printed.

892.01/3–2145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 21, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received March 21—6 : 45 p. m.]

2908. ReDepts 2031, March 16, 7 p. m.[52] According to Sterndale Bennett, the Foreign Office did not receive the Department's proposal regarding the establishment of a free Thai Liberation Committee until the morning of March 20 and they have, therefore, not been able to study the plan sufficiently to comment upon it. However, Sterndale Bennett said he did wish to make a few general observations without any attempt to prejudge the present suggestion of the Department but merely to give us the benefit of some of his thoughts on the whole problem of British-Thai relations.

Sterndale Bennett again reaffirmed that the objective of the British and American Governments in Thailand was substantially the same. He stated that the Foreign Office desire is that ultimately Thailand should get a "square deal" but that before this could come about it would be necessary for the Thais to give some real evidence of a change of heart. Sterndale Bennett expressed the hope that the American Government would be patient with the British as the position of the latter with respect to Thailand is complicated by past history and is such that the British Government is not in a position to move as fast as the American. The British interest in Thailand was said to be closer than that of the US due not only to the long history of intimate association between the two countries but also due to the fact that Thailand is bounded on two sides by British territory. Sterndale Bennett also mentioned the Non-Aggression Pact concluded in 1940 between Thailand and Great Britain[53] which was ignored by the Thais in December, 1941, when they declared war on this country.

Apparently British SOE[54] reports from Thailand are not as optimistic as our OSS reports regarding the extent and value of the underground resistance movement. Sterndale Bennett states that they have received no evidence as yet that any great steps have been taken by the Thais to remedy the situation caused by the "gratuitous" declaration of war. Sterndale Bennett agrees that such information as the Foreign Office does have indicates that the Regent is and has been

[52] Not printed; it gave the salient points of Department's *aide-mémoire* to the British Embassy of March 15, p. 1254.

[53] Signed at Bangkok, June 12, 1940, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CCIII, p. 421.

[54] Special Operations Executive, British counterpart of the Office of Strategic Services.

completely sincere in his efforts to draw away from the Japanese and it is felt that some effective military help may be forthcoming from the resistance movement in Thailand at a later date, but it is not believed here that too great results should be expected from Thai activities.

Sterndale Bennett referred to the statement made to Sansom that the Chinese Government apparently seemed disposed to go further with the Thais than did Great Britain or the US and said that he would like to speak very informally and unofficially on this point for information which the Foreign Office had led them to expect that ultimately the Chinese might be very hard on the Thais, particularly after the complete withdrawal of the Japanese. Sterndale Bennett said he had in mind the fact that almost one-fifth of the population of Thailand was Chinese or of Sino-Siamese descent, that the Chinese had in the past dominated the manufacturing industry and the internal transport industry and had played a large part in the retail trade of the country. These facts, together with the pre-war history of Sino-Siamese disputes, are such that he believes there are present the seeds of future trouble and that this whole aspect of the problem would require careful consideration.

Sterndale Bennett also believes that we must not lose sight of the possibility of Thailand's becoming a second Indo-China.[55] However, because of the manner in which the Japanese have extended themselves in Indo-China, which is believed to have strained their immediate resources, he does not look for any similar Japanese activity in Thailand in the near future.

As soon as the officials concerned at the Foreign Office have had an opportunity to study the Department's most recent proposal, Sterndale Bennett said he would get in touch with the Embassy and give us a more formal statement of their views. He re-emphasized that his present observations were purely unofficial and informal and were not to be considered in any sense a reply to the Department's proposal.

The Department's 2165 of March 20 arrived after the above talk with Sterndale Bennett. The Thai memorandum has not been shown the Foreign Office and it is believed that under present circumstances they will not desire a copy. An opportunity will be found to bring to the attention of Sterndale Bennett the observations made by the Department in the message under reference.

WINANT

[55] On March 9, 1945, the Japanese envoy served an ultimatum on the French authorities in Indochina to place their military and police forces under the sole control of the Japanese military authorities. When the French demurred, Japanese armed forces overwhelmed the French forces and assumed the administration of Indochina.

892.01/3–2845

The Department of State to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee [56]

WASHINGTON, March 26, 1945.

AMERICAN POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THAILAND

THE PROBLEM

1. Should the Joint Chiefs of Staff be requested to authorize increased OSS action in Thailand? [57]

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The American Consul at Colombo [58] has advised the Department (Colombo's no. 73 of March 22 [59]) that reports from within Thailand indicate that the present situation there is of the utmost urgency; that any action to be taken in regard to Thailand cannot await diplomatic negotiations [between the United States and Great Britain]; [60] that the American position could be seriously affected if the impression were given the Thai that all possible assistance was not being rendered by the United States; that the United Nations' position in the Orient could be greatly strengthened if Thailand were able to resist the Japanese with force of arms [supplied by the United Nations]; [60] and that, therefore, it might be desirable to authorize independent OSS action or to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff to urge the Combined Chiefs of Staff to direct immediate OSS action under the SEAC.

3. A subsequent telegram from Colombo (no. 75, of March 23 [59]) stated that loss of OSS separate identity in SEAC might jeopardize the present favorable American position in connection with the Thai Regent's group.

4. OSS reports which have been made available to the Department indicate that the Thai resistance movement has been well organized and is steadily increasing its activities; that this movement has been of substantial assistance to the OSS which believes it can increase the scope and effectiveness of its operations through the medium of the

[56] Memorandum transmitted to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on March 28.

[57] In a memorandum of March 24 to the Secretary of State, the Director of the Office of Strategic Services (Donovan) requested guidance and instructions as to whether the OSS should extend its operations in Thailand, beyond those concerning intelligence, by supplying the Thai Army and other resistance forces with arms, ammunition, and other supplies and sending personnel to Thailand to help organize and train Thai resistance forces (740.0011 PW/3–2445). The OSS memorandum was not received in time to be considered in the preparation of the Department memorandum of March 26 but was submitted to SWNCC for consideration along with the Department memorandum.

[58] Richard D. Gatewood, Vice Consul at Colombo.

[59] Not printed.

[60] Brackets appear in the original.

Thai resistance movement; that at a recent secret meeting of the Thai Cabinet it was decided that Thai forces would fight if the Japanese took action in Thailand similar to that taken recently in Indochina; that Thai forces with available equipment and resources would be able to hold out against the Japanese for a month; and that with antitank guns and other light equipment dropped to them by air they could hold out for a longer period.

5. The Department delivered a note to the British Embassy on March 16 suggesting that the British, Chinese and American Governments agree to the establishment of a Free Thai Liberation Committee abroad at this time as an initial step to encourage a Free Thai resistance movement. It was also stated in the note that Chiang Kai-shek had expressed his willingness to the American Ambassador at Chungking to support such a committee with its venue at Washington.

Discussion

6. It is the policy of this Government to assist Thailand to re-establish itself as an independent and sovereign nation. This Government has attempted through diplomatic channels to persuade the British to harmonize their policy toward Thailand with our own and as indicated in paragraph 5 recently suggested to the British that they agree to the establishment of a Free Thai Liberation Committee. Although no official answer has been received from the British Foreign Office to the Department's suggestion an unofficial and informal expression of views by an official of the British Foreign Office implies that in all probability the British will not support the idea of the establishment of a Free Thai Liberation Committee abroad and that they are unlikely to agree to the measures we desire to take with respect to Thailand. The failure of the Free Thai to secure any representation abroad and the failure of the British to modify their policy toward Thailand which at present is based on the concept that Thailand is an enemy might well discourage the Free Thai within Thailand and affect the American position there unfavorably. On the military front an important American contribution to the Free Thai in their opposition to the Japanese is being made by the OSS. It seems, therefore, that one point at which American assistance and good will can be demonstrated to the Thai is through the OSS.

Conclusion

7. It may be, therefore, that American goodwill toward Thailand and our desire to be of assistance can only be manifested for the present through the activities of the OSS. Consequently we favor not only a continuation of such activities but an increase in their scope to the extent compatible with military plans. We are of the opinion that the extension of increased aid to the Thai will not only encourage

Thai resistance to the Japanese but will give substantial support to the political objectives of this Government with respect to Thailand: We feel, however, that such assistance should be given only on the basis of a clear understanding on the part of the Regent and of the Free Thai that it would carry no American commitments to provide military assistance as distinguished from incidental supplies necessary for OSS operations. Thus, there would not be involved diversion to Thailand of supplies needed for operation in the Pacific against Japan.

RECOMMENDATION

8. It is, therefore, deemed desirable to request the Joint Chiefs of Staff to authorize the OSS, within the limitation imposed by American military plans and strategy, to increase its activities in Thailand, extended under SEAC or independently, in such a manner as to provide as soon as practicable maximum American assistance to the Free Thai resistance movement.

892.01/4–245

The British Embassy to the Department of State [64]

NOTES FOR ORAL COMMUNICATION TO MR. BALLANTINE

Before a formal reply can be returned to Department of State note of March 15th, 1945, Dominion Governments must be consulted and final Cabinet approval be obtained. This may take some time. Meanwhile, preliminary reactions by Foreign Office are as follows:—

1. It seems clear that ultimate objects of U.S. Government and H.M. Government are much the same. It is hoped, however, that State Department will understand our position during the intervening period and will recognize that the problem of Siam is one which concerns us much more directly and closely than it does the United States. Siam is contiguous with Burma and Malaya, and went to war with us despite a non-aggression treaty, and accepted British territory at the hands of the Japanese, besides doing us other damage. We therefore have to consider our approach very carefully. It is impossible to say now what form the eventual settlement with Japan [*Siam*] [65] will take, but certainly the position created by Siam must be radically altered by Siam before our old friendly relations can be restored. We hope that the United States Government will not misunderstand this attitude of reserve, and in particular will not feel that we are not taking seriously the recent approach by the Regent. On the contrary; we are proceed-

[64] Handed to Mr. Ballantine by Sir George Sansom, the British Minister; memorandum of April 5 covering the ensuing conversation not printed, but for nature of the comments by the British Minister, see memorandum of April 9 by Mr. Ballantine, *infra*.

[65] Correction made by the British Minister on April 10.

ing on the assumption that there is no doubt as to the genuineness of RUTH's [66] desire for collaboration with the Allies.

2. The Secretary of State does however still feel that there are some material differences between the approaches made by the Siamese in Washington and what was said by OMAR [67] in Kandy. Notably the proposal made by the mission to Washington for the establishment of a "Free Thai Provisional Government" or at least a "Free Thai Committee" as acknowledged symbol of a resistance movement was not put forward or suggested by RUTH.

These proposals seem to be of doubtful expediency at the present time and also of doubtful practicality.

In general our experience of "free movements" is not such as to encourage us to expect useful results, especially in such a case as that of Siam, where there are so few persons of influence outside Siam to form the nucleus of a free movement. There is perhaps the additional difficulty that the setting up of a provisional government or liberation committee outside Siam might add to the difficulties of a resistance movement inside the country and precipitate strong Japanese action.

Moreover, now that direct contact has been established with "RUTH", it seems better and more practical to continue to deal with him through existing secret channels rather than through intermediaries.

3. Consequently, since we have already outlined to RUTH the steps which we expect Siam to take in order that our old friendship may be resumed, the Secretary of State suggests that the most hopeful means of stimulating Siamese collaboration with the Allies will be to develop this direct contact until the moment is ripe for setting up a Provisional Government on a portion of liberated Siamese territory as contemplated by "RUTH" himself.

[WASHINGTON,] April 5, 1945.

892.01/4–945

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine)

[WASHINGTON,] April 9, 1945.

Participants: M. R. Seni Pramoj, Thai Minister
Mr. Suni Theparaksa
Mr. Ballantine, FE
Mr. Landon

The Thai Minister and Mr. Suni Theparaksa were invited to call, as Mr. Theparaksa was about to leave Washington for Bangkok and

[66] Code name for the Thai Regent.
[67] Code name for a Thai emissary who arrived in Ceylon late in February 1945 for discussions with the British.

as he might wish to have our suggestions regarding what he might usefully and appropriately say to the Thai Regent concerning our conversations with the British on the subject of Thailand or in regard to other aspects of the situation.

We gave Mr. Theparaksa and the Thai Minister to read a copy of the following transcript of our notes on comments made by Sir George Sansom on our note of March 16 [*15*] in which we had suggested the desirability of supporting the idea of establishing a Free Thai Liberation Committee abroad. The paper read as follows:

1. The British consider that the ultimate objectives of the United States and British Governments are much the same.
2. The British are proceeding on the assumption that there is no doubt as to the genuineness of the Regent's desire for collaboration with the Allies.
3. The British feel that it is better to develop direct contact with the Regent until the time is right for establishing on a portion of liberated Thai territory a provisional government as contemplated by the Regent.

Mr. Theparaksa took notes on the paper and returned it. We told him that the foregoing represented accurately the sense but not necessarily the actual words of what Sir George had said and that we had his permission to pass on to the Thai the sense of what he had told us. We said that in passing this on we could not assume any responsibility as to British commitments.

After raising a number of questions on the three points the Thai Minister said that he considered that the first two points would be a source of encouragement to the Regent and that Mr. Theparaksa should feel that his trip had been worthwhile. He also expressed his appreciation for the Department's helpfulness.

We said that notwithstanding Mr. Theparaksa's departure we would hope to continue our conversations with the British, and with the Thai.[68]

740.0011 PW/4–2545 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commissioner in India (Merrell)

WASHINGTON, April 28, 1945—7 p. m.

325. For Bishop.[69] Your 334 April 25.[70] 1. Relation between India–Burma command and SEAC is primarily a military problem

[68] In a note of May 9, the Thai Minister expressed the Thai Regent's "deep appreciation of the consideration and courtesy extended by the Department of State to Mr. Suni Theparaksa on the occasion of his recent visit to Washington" and "his sincere gratitude to the Department of State for its understanding and sympathetic attitude towards the aims of the Free Thais". (892.01/5–945)

[69] Max W. Bishop, Secretary of the Commission in India.

[70] Not printed; it transmitted Mr. Bishop's request for guidance and instruction in connection with early discussions with General Sultan on U.S. policy toward Thailand (892.01/4–2545).

but Dept will endeavor to answer any specific questions you may have. You should, of course, be alert to detect and to advise General Sultan against any attempts by SEAC to involve American military in British political propaganda or plans in that area. Dept would strongly resist any effort to have American civil affairs officers participate in governance of any part of Burma.

2. OSS in Burma should do or say nothing which could be interpreted as political promise and should not under any circumstances become associated in Burmese minds with SOE or any British political propaganda organization. If 101 Unit is withdrawn from Burma the foregoing applies to any unit substituted therefor. From political standpoint Dept would not object to withdrawal of OSS from Burma altogether except personnel left there for attainment of our objectives in Thailand.

3. Dept is opposed to OWI [71] operations in Burma prior to reestablishment American consular representation there. Dept has requested agreement of British Government to reopening of Consulate General at Rangoon soon as possible after reoccupation. Even then OWI should refrain from anything savoring of political propaganda and confine itself to newsfile relating to war developments and events of interest in United States. The foregoing does not apply to psychological warfare activities projected by OWI from Burma to enemy occupied territory after clearance with State Department or its representatives as at present.

4. United States political policy towards Thailand unchanged. It is essential that close and friendly relations with RUTH and his colleagues and with individual Thai be maintained. Our political views regarding Thailand have been made known to RUTH. In a recent personal message from the Secretary to RUTH,[72] it was explicitly stated that we hope Thailand will soon be liberated and take its place once more in the family of nations as a free, sovereign and independent country. Mere statements, however, are not sufficient. If not affirmatively implemented, we risk serious impairment of United States influence with the Thai, weaken our efforts to establish Thai independence, and increase the influence of forces not in sympathy with our position.

On April 21, the Joint Chiefs of Staff with Dept concurrence through the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee formally favored provision through OSS of aid to resistance forces in Thailand, consistent with other theatre requirements, and within the resources available to General Sultan. The Joint Chiefs reiterated the vesting in Mountbatten of overall operational control of OSS activities in Thailand.

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[71] Office of War Information.
[72] Sent to the Thai Minister on April 20.

The Dept is advising RUTH [74] that OSS assistance to the Free Thai resistance movement will be extended as indicated, but with the understanding that the contemplated action will carry no United States commitment to provide military assistance as distinguished from incidental supplies and personnel necessary for the operations of OSS.

The Dept considers that the matter of furnishing supplies to Thai resistance forces is of highest political importance, especially as a promise to do so was made to the Thai Minister by a high OSS officer many months ago, and RUTH, we understand, was so advised. This promise may well have been unauthorized, but we believe politically it is of highest importance to honor it as fully as possible under the April 21 decision.

The question of timing of guerrilla activity is entirely for military decision, but for your information it would appear to the Dept desirable not to disrupt military intelligence or sacrifice Thai by premature action, or by such action possibly precipitate the taking over of Thailand by the Japanese. Rather, it would appear to us desirable that OSS (which has authority to do so) undertake the training of guerrilla forces essential to the most effective aid of military operations or resistance to the Japanese if Thailand is taken over. The more effective such aid or resistance, the more valuable it will be politically as evidence to the world that the Thai are "working their passage" as demanded by the British. In any event, we believe not only that OSS clandestine activities in Thailand should be continued as heretofore, but that they should be expanded as far as possible within the limitation of the April 21 decision.

An OSS report was received by the Dept on April 26 [75] that Dening has informed Suni that the British now oppose premature outbreak, desire RUTH to avoid unnecessary provocation of Japanese, and want earliest possible warning when Japanese action appears imminent.

British attitude here appears generally more cooperative with regard to Thailand, and it is hoped we may be able to take advantage of Eden's presence to reach accord.

Recommendations urtel 309, April 17, 1 p. m.,[75] which was much appreciated, are being given urgent consideration.

Sultan has been informed by the War Department of April 21 decision and is being advised, we understand, against any curtailment of 404 detachment. (Urtel 343, April 28, 2 p. m.[75]) If Mountbatten requests cessation of 404 activities, the request should be referred to Washington prior to action in the field.

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[74] Memorandum of May 23 to the Thai Legation, not printed.
[75] Not printed.

Regarding OWI activities relating to Thailand, there should, in our opinion, be no change of policy from earlier directives.

5. Regarding Malaya, we consider it important to continue OSS activities which in any way bear on Thailand, including military and political intelligence affecting especially the peninsula, even though, of necessity, clandestine operations may be essential for securing intelligence. It is important, however, that OSS activities in Malaya not be associated in native opinion with British policies toward Malaya or Southeast Asia.

6. A recent OSS report indicates that British propose the use of Malay dollars throughout the isthmus. We hope to inform you very shortly on United States position relative to military and post-military Thai currency.

GREW

892.01/5–1945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 19, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received 11 : 45 p. m.]

5036. According to Sterndale Bennett, the steps outlined by the British as mentioned in pgh 4 of Sansom's comments given in Department's 2823 of April 11 [76] are merely those which Admiral Mountbatten was authorized to put forward to the leader of the Thai mission to Ceylon. These were given to the Department by Sir George on February 21, 1945 and a copy of them was enclosed in the Department's top secret instruction No. 5146 of February 26 [77] addressed to this Embassy. (ReDept's 3837, May 16).[78]

Sterndale Bennett stated that the Foreign Office is at present engaged in making a more detailed list of steps which they believe Thailand should take before the restoration of normal relations. The rather general statement which Admiral Mountbatten was authorized to give to the Thai mission was in fact made to the mission in Kandy by Dening.

WINANT

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[76] Not printed; it summarized "Notes for Oral Communication to Mr. Ballantine", April 5, p. 1262, and Mr. Ballantine's memorandum of the same date covering his conversation with Sir George Sansom, not printed. The latter is the memorandum referred to in footnote 64, p. 1262. Paragraph numbered 4 of No. 2823 stated: "The British have already outlined to the Regent the steps which they expect Thailand to take in order that the old friendship may be resumed." (892.01/4–1145)

[77] Not printed.

[78] Not printed; it reported the Regent's denial that the British had outlined the steps indicated in paragraph numbered 4 of telegram 2823 (892.01/5–1645).

892.01/5–2145

Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Lockhart) to the Under Secretary of State (Grew)

[WASHINGTON,] May 22, 1945.

On May 3, 1945, the Thai Minister was informed of United States decision to provide, through OSS, aid to resistance forces in Thailand consistent with other theater requirements and within the resources available to General Sultan, and that General Sultan had been so informed.

On May 9, a message for the Minister from RUTH was received,[79] expressing gratitude and stating "that such aid will be invaluable to the Thai in their struggle against the Japanese if it can be rendered soon enough". (Substance transmitted by Thai Minister on May 15.[80])

On May 15, a message was received [81] regarding the Thai plan of operations and stating that "RUTH is anxious that action be taken as soon as possible, as a crisis is developing here".

The attached message [82] would appear to explain the nature of the "crisis". However, it should be noted that no intelligence reports indicate any approaching crisis, and it is interesting, in this connection, that the Japanese raised no objection to the Thai action in taking the German diplomatic and consular officials into protective custody, impounding their records, and taking over German property in Thailand. An inquiry has already been instituted as to the nature of the "crisis", and a report should be received shortly.

It is also noted with interest that this message was not sent through the Thai Minister in Washington, as have other recent messages for the Secretary from RUTH. It is possible that this message is primarily designed to put pressure on the Allies to expedite the furnishing of supplies to resistance forces (the British not yet having reached a decision on this point although it has been recommended by Lord Mountbatten), and to hasten political decisions and action by the United States and Great Britain.

SP is preparing a memorandum of recommended action which will be submitted shortly.[83]

FRANK P. LOCKHART

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[79] OSS message of May 9 not printed.

[80] Message from Thai Minister not found in Department files.

[81] OSS message of May 15 not printed.

[82] See message received by the Department on May 21, quoted in memorandum of May 28, *infra*.

[83] Memorandum of May 26, not printed; it submitted to the Under Secretary of State a proposed reply to the Regent's message quoted in memorandum *infra*. (The name of the Division of Southwest Pacific Affairs (SP) was changed to the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (SEA) on May 26.)

740.0011 P.W./5–2945

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

[WASHINGTON,] May 28, 1945.

The following message for the Secretary of State from RUTH was received by the Department of State on May 21, 1945:

"Thai Resistance Movement, in all its dealings, has continually adhered to the advice of American representatives not to take any premature action against the enemy. But at this time, I believe the Jap desire to fight can be weakened if the Resistance Movement no longer tries to remain under cover. The Japs will be more quickly forced to surrender unconditionally to the Allies because of the fear of the dissolution of the so-called co-prosperity sphere. Nevertheless, we were advised that the Resistance Movement should attempt to block every effort of the Japs for assistance from Thailand. We have followed this line as closely as possible, but you realize the Japs are becoming more suspicious all the time. Not long ago the Thai Government would not accede to a Jap demand for an additional credit of 100,000,000 bahts. I have been informed by the present government that they will not remain in office if the Japs persist in this matter. In that event, a new government would have to be installed and it would have to take action against the Japs by first ordering void all debts and agreements the Pibul regime had contracted with the Japs, including the treaty on the incorporation of four states in Malaya and Shan State[s] into Thailand, as well as declaration of war against England and the United States. The basis of relations between these two nations and Thailand will to us [*have to?*] be set up as they were prior to Pearl Harbor. Before going ahead with this plan I want to keep you advised of the current situation. Although I am positive that the U.S. has good intentions concerning the independence of Thailand and that they have deep regard for the Thais themselves, I believe if the U.S., on the day of the beginning of our action, would declare her respect of Thailand's independence and state that she regards Thailand as a member of the United Nations and not as an enemy, it would greatly encourage the Thai people who are already prepared for any sacrifice. I have also advised the Supreme Commander, SEAC, of this whole matter."

The following reply was sent on May 28, 1945: [84]

"Your message to the Secretary is deeply appreciated.

"We understand your desire that Thailand actively oppose the enemy as soon as possible. We are sure you realize, however, that all opposition to our common enemy must be coordinated with the over-all strategy against Japan and that it would be unfortunate if the Thai prematurely and before reasonably assured of success should commence overt action which was not integrated with the strategic plans of

[84] In a memorandum of May 28 of a conversation with the British Minister (Sansom), the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Moffat) stated that he had handed copies of the messages of May 21 and May 28 to the Minister "to assure full coordination of British and American action". (892.01/5–2845)

SACSEA.[85] We hope, therefore, you will continue your endeavors to prevent premature overt action by resistance movement or action which would precipitate taking over of Thai Government by the Japanese. We are confident you will keep us and the British fully informed should either development become imminent despite your efforts.

"The sincere desire of yourself and the Thai people to repudiate the Pibul declarations of war and agreements is fully understood and appreciated but it is not clear why present government should resign at this time or what compulsion would cause succeeding government to make such repudiation its first act. It would appear that the resistance movement could more effectively accomplish its objectives when emerging from cover by coordinated surprise attack on enemy supplies, communications, forces, and equipment and by seizure of enemy officers, officials, documents and key points. Political acts of repudiation and realignment with the Allies could follow.

"We attach great importance to existence of an effective constitutional Thai Government on Thai soil to work with Allies. We hope that all possible preparations will have been made to forestall seizure or scattering of important pro-Allied personnel so that such government could promptly function in areas free from Japanese, could direct Thai military operations and coordinate them with Allied operations, and could reestablish effective civil governmental machinery as areas are liberated.

"The United States cannot unilaterally declare another nation a member of the United Nations but it will be happy publicly to reiterate at an appropriate time its respect for Thai independence and to declare that it has at no time considered Thailand an enemy. We look forward to the day when both our countries can appropriately make public our common cause against our common enemy.

Grew,
Acting Secretary of State."

740.0011 P.W./6–845

Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Lockhart) to the Under Secretary of State (Grew)

[WASHINGTON,] June 8, 1945.

The attached message addressed to you by "RUTH" in Thailand[86] has just been received. This message is in reply to your message to "RUTH" of May 28, 1945.

This message on the whole appears to be entirely satisfactory. It is to be noted that "RUTH" reaffirms his intention to do all in his power to conform with Allied wishes; that he will keep this Government and the British Government informed of developments; that he explains the need for a change in government as a constitutional proce-

[85] Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia.
[86] Dated June 7, not printed.

dure and a political act designed to facilitate a radical change in the official position of the government from one of apparent cooperation with the Japanese to one of open opposition; that such a change would necessarily follow a major breach between the Japs and the Thai; and that necessary precautionary measures will be taken to assure the existence of a pro-Allied government in Thai territory if and when the clash with the Japanese occurs.

It will be recalled (reference to FE's memorandum to you May 31, 1945 [87] on the British reaction to "RUTH's" recent message) that "RUTH" informed the British of the intention of the Thai Government to loan the Japanese 50,000,000 baht and of the Thai belief that this loan of fifty percent of the amount asked by the Japanese will satisfy the Japs at least for the time being.

The exact meaning of the penultimate sentence of the message is not clear, probably owing to garbles and omissions. However, in the light of "RUTH's" message to Mountbatten and the balance of the attached message, it is not believed necessary to seek clarification of this one sentence.

FRANK P. LOCKHART

[For the Department's estimate of conditions in Thailand at the end of the war and a statement of United States policy in regard to that country, see Policy Paper of June 22, section VI, page 568.]

892.01/6–2545

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Moffat) [88]

[WASHINGTON,] June 25, 1945.

Participants: Mr. J. Balfour,[89] British Embassy
Mr. Ballantine, FE
Mr. Moffat, SEA

Mr. Balfour called by appointment at our request. Mr. Ballantine explained that the United States was anxious to establish a community of views with the British Government with regard to Thailand, and that we appreciated Mr. Balfour's recent comment to Mr. Grew [90] that he hoped that both Governments would work in close collaboration.

[87] Memorandum of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, not printed.
[88] Initialed by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.
[89] British Minister.
[90] Memorandum of conversation of June 15 by the Acting Secretary of State, not printed.

He stated that we had examined the views expressed by both Governments and had embodied in an *aide-mémoire* [91] six points on which a full understanding was not yet established; that he thought this analysis would be very helpful; and that because of conditions generally consideration of these six points was, he felt, urgent.

[Here follows discussion regarding currency for use in Thailand.]

892.01/6–2545

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The United States Government believes that the basic policies and objectives of the British and American Governments in regard to Thailand are substantially similar: both Governments favor the restoration of the freedom, independence, and sovereignty of Thailand; both Governments agree that the territories acquired by Thailand from Malaya, Burma, and Indochina must be restored; neither Government has any territorial ambitions in Thailand; both Governments are apparently confident of the sincerity of RUTH's desire to align Thailand with the Allies, to drive the Japanese out of Thailand, and to aid in the final defeat of Japan; and both Governments are in accord that it would be unwise under present conditions to recognize a Thai Government-in-exile.

There are several matters, however, on which further discussion would appear desirable in order to assure a common understanding. In view of recent military developments in Southeast Asia and of political developments within Thailand, such discussion is regarded as urgent. These matters are:

1. *Postwar International Arrangements in Regard to Thailand.*

Mr. Eden's communications of September 4 and November 22, 1944 [92] referred to postwar international arrangements to which Thailand should agree. This Government believes that at an appropriate time Thailand should be admitted to the United Nations Organization on its pledge to cooperate fully as a sovereign power in all pertinent international arrangements. It believes that it would not be desirable to make acceptance of such arrangements a condition to the restoration of Thailand's independence and sovereignty.

2. *Security Arrangements.*

In his communication of November 22, 1944 Mr. Eden suggested that the military experts of the United States and Great Britain

[91] *Infra.*

[92] See airgrams A–1085, September 5, 1944, and A–1404, November 24, 1944, from London, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 1316 and 1319, respectively.

should recommend what security arrangements affecting the Kra Isthmus may be needed in the light of postwar conditions. This Government agrees that such joint consideration would be highly desirable, and believes that the suggestion should be expanded to provide an understanding that all security arrangements affecting Thailand would be a matter for joint discussion and agreement between the British and American Governments and that neither the British nor the American Governments would seek a postwar base in, or effect other security arrangements with, Thailand without prior consultation with and the approval of the other Government. The United States would welcome the views of the British Government on such an understanding.

While it is considered that such an Anglo-American understanding would in any event be desirable, it is believed that in order to assure future stability in the area and to integrate all security arrangements in the framework of international security it would be helpful if France and China should also participate in such an understanding. The comments of the British Government on inviting France and China to join in such an understanding would also be appreciated.

3. *Commercial Arrangements.*

The United States Government expects as soon as practicable to make operative again the existing commercial treaty with Thailand [93] (without prejudice to later revision) which provides for the economic rights and privileges of American nationals. This Government hopes that the Thai Government will treat the nationals of other United Nations on a similar non-discriminatory basis and that any special concessions or privileges which the Thai may grant will be open to all on equal terms. This Government would welcome assurance by the British Government that its economic and commercial policies in regard to Thailand are in general harmony with these principles which are designed to assure Thailand's economic independence while, at the same time, protecting the nationals of all the United Nations by assuring them fair and equal economic and commercial opportunity.

4. *Thai–Indochina Border.*

The United States Government regards as invalid the transfer in 1941 of certain Indochinese territories to Thailand, but without prejudice to future border adjustments or transfers of territory which may be effected through orderly peaceful procedures. The Thai believe that their claims to these territories have both historic and legal merit. It is feared that unless assurance can be given them

[93] Signed at Bangkok on November 13, 1937, Department of State Treaty Series No. 940; 53 Stat. (pt. 3) 1731; for documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1937, vol. IV, pp. 825–890.

that they will have early opportunity to present these claims by peaceful processes there may be popular Thai resistance to the return of these territories to Indochina and that the potential sources of conflict inherent in the prewar border may be aggravated. This Government believes that although the Thai Government should agree to accept the territorial boundaries of Thailand as of January, 1941, without prejudice to boundary adjustments and territorial transfers by later peaceful negotiations, it would be desirable to seek an agreement by the French and the Thai that they will provide for a prompt and equitable adjustment by peaceful processes of the Thai–Indochina border so as to eliminate sources of conflict and unrest. This Government would welcome the views of the British Government on seeking common action by the United States, British and Chinese Governments to promote and support such an early adjustment.

5. *Future Status of Thai Government.*

The United States ceased to recognize the Bangkok Government after its declaration of war in January, 1942, regarding Thailand as an enemy occupied country and its government as under enemy domination. It continues, however, to recognize the Thai Minister in Washington as the "Minister of Thailand". When the conditions which led to non-recognition are removed, it will be the policy of the United States promptly to accord recognition to the Thai Government and to resume diplomatic relations with Thailand. These conditions will have been met when a lawful Thai Government on Thai soil repudiates the former (Pibul) government's declaration of war (the legality of which is denied by RUTH) and its agreements and treaties with Japan; declares war against Japan; and commences overt resistance to the Japanese. This Government hopes that the British Government will be willing to take concurrent action.

It desires also to seek concurrent action by the Chinese and French Governments, but does not propose to approach those Governments until after learning the views of the British Government when it hopes that such approach might then be jointly made.

In view of its proposed recognition of a Thai Government, this Government expresses its earnest hope that when the Thai meet the conditions outlined, the state of war between Great Britain and Thailand may formally be terminated at an early date. It naturally is anxious that the settlement of the state of war will not conflict with the viewpoint, interests or policies of the United States towards Thailand, but rather that it will contribute to Anglo-American unity of action in the Far East. Because of the strategic disposition of Allied forces in the war against Japan, it would appear probable that the military forces entering Thailand will be British. The British forces, however, will

be under an Allied Command of which the United States is a part. Under such circumstances, embarrassment to both Governments could arise from the fact that a state of war exists between Great Britain and Thailand while the United States regards Thailand as a country to be liberated from the enemy and its lawful Government to be recognized when the conditions which led to non-recognition are removed as already specified.

6. *Civil Affairs Administration and Control.*

In the absence of American military forces in Thailand, this Government does not consider it desirable to participate in any civil administration or control agencies. Because, however, of its political policies towards Thailand and because the Southeast Asia theater is under combined Allied Command, the United States is concerned with the relations which the military forces entering Thailand under that Command may have with the Thai Government and in the nature and extent of any control measures which may be adopted. It would be appreciated, therefore, if the British Government would discuss with this Government contemplated arrangements and measures in order that there may be mutual understanding and agreement on the principles to be followed.

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1945.

[The question of the division of some areas of operational responsibility in Southeast Asia was raised in a communication sent to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Supreme Commander, China Theater, by President Truman on August 1, 1945. The President conveyed his conclusion that the portion of Indochina lying south of 16° north latitude should be the responsibility of the Southeast Asia Command, the area north of that line to be left in the China Theater. The Generalissimo agreed to this apportionment, subject to the stipulation that the 16° line also be considered the southern boundary of the China Theater within Thailand. For text of Truman's message to Chiang Kai-shek, see telegram of August 1, 1945, from the President to the Ambassador in China, *Foreign Relations*, The Conference of Berlin (The Postdam Conference), 1945, volume II, page 1321. Regarding Chiang's reply, see *ibid.*, footnote 2.

Under the terms of General Order No. 1, issued on September 2, 1945, Japanese forces in all of Thailand were called upon to surrender to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia. For text of the General Order, see Report of Government Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers: *Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948*, page 442.]

840.50 UNRRA/8–645

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

No. 1285 WASHINGTON, August 6, 1945.

SIR: Mr. Dean Acheson, as the United States member of the UNRRA [94] Council, sent a communication on May 18, 1945 [95] to each representative of the countries on the Far Eastern Committee of the UNRRA Council, enclosing a draft resolution placed by the United States on the agenda for the next committee meeting which would authorize UNRRA to operate in Korea, Formosa and Thailand [96] on the same terms and conditions as in liberated areas.

On behalf of the French Government, M. Christian Valensi, Financial Counselor of the French Embassy, wrote on July 12 [97] favoring acceptance of the resolution with the clear understanding that the relationship of UNRRA with Siam will in no way entail any political commitment for France. He then added "France is still at war with Siam and does not recognize any validity to the Convention dated May 9, 1941 by which certain portions of the Provinces of Laos and Cambodge [97a] were handed over to Thailand." The Department is not informed whether the statement quoted was authorized by the French Government or represented Mr. Valensi's personal opinion.

On June 12, 1940 Thailand signed a non-aggression pact with France [98] concurrently with the signing of a similar pact with the United Kingdom and a treaty with Japan concerning the preservation of friendly relations and mutual respect of each other's territorial integrity. On the same day the French and Thai Governments by an exchange of letters agreed that the Thailand–Indochina frontier line would be readjusted by a mixed commission comprising Thai and French officials before ratification of the non-aggression pact. Two days later Paris fell into German hands and on June 17 France capitulated.

After the fall of France the French took no steps to appoint French members to the proposed Thai-French commission. In September, 1940 the French Foreign Office, through the Thai Legation in Vichy,

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[94] United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

[95] Vol. II, p. 979.

[96] For opposition by the British Government to granting authority to UNRRA to operate in Thailand and acquiescence by the United States Government, see telegram 7860, August 4, 1 p. m., from London, and footnote 41, vol. II, p. 1003.

[97] Communication not printed.

[97a] French for Cambodia.

[98] At Bangkok. A copy of the treaty in French was forwarded by Bangkok in despatch 755, August 9, 1940; in a memorandum of October 4, 1940, Ruth E. Bacon of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs stated: "The French text in English translation appears to be identical, *mutatis mutandis*, with the English text of the British-Thai treaty of the same date." (751.9211/3) For latter treaty, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CCIII, p. 421.

proposed that the pact of non-aggression be ratified immediately. On September 11, 1940, the Thai replied that before ratifying the pact agreement should be arrived at on the fixing of the frontier. The French replied on September 18 expressing willingness to settle by negotiation various border questions but expressing unwillingness to cede any territories. The Thai replied on September 25, 1940 that they were ready to proceed with the exchange of ratifications and would appreciate the early arrival of French representatives from French Indochina to begin studying the border problems.

On October 14 the Vichy Government informed the Thai Government that it wished the non-aggression pact to be ratified by telegraph and that France would not yield an inch of territory to Thailand. From the end of June, 1940 to the end of the year border incidents occurred in which there was occasional loss of life on both sides. Thai soldiers crossed the border on January 5, 1941 and fighting became sharp for twenty-two days. This included a brief naval battle. On January 31, 1941 a truce pact was signed on the Japanese cruiser *Natori* off Saigon. By that time Thai forces had occupied most of the territories ceded to them later by the French at Tokyo.

On February 4, 1941 the Thai delegation left Bangkok for Tokyo. On March 11, 1941 the protocol for an amicable settlement of border disputes between Thailand and Indochina was signed at the Japanese Foreign Office.[99] There was no doubt that the Japanese acted as "mediators" with a view, *inter alia*, to forcing the French to agree to Thai demands.

On May 9, 1941 a Convention of peace was signed between France and Thailand at Tokyo. The peace convention reiterated the essentials of the agreement of March 11 with some slight alterations and with further details as to procedures in transferring territories and immovable properties. Ratification of the peace convention followed within about a month. For the remainder of 1941 a condition of peace continued while orderly steps were taken by Thai officials to assume the administration of the areas ceded.

At the time of the above agreement and for more than two years thereafter this Government took no action to indicate that the transfers of territory were regarded as invalid. However, in 1944, the Committee on Postwar Programs (PWC–134, March 22, 1944 [1]) stated that "since the transfer to Thailand . . .[2] of the Indochinese territories was made after Japan had started on its course of aggression and France had capitulated to Germany, they [such transfers of terri-

[99] A translation of the exchange of letters between the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs and the French Ambassador in Japan was forwarded by the Ambassador in France in despatch 102, March 22, 1941 (751G.92/410).

[1] Not printed.

[2] Omission indicated in the original instruction.

tory][3] cannot be regarded as valid acts. The *status quo ante* must therefore be recognized by the military authorities, without prejudice, however, to the claims of any of the parties involved in such negotiations as may take place in the future with respect to these issues."

On October 19, 1944 the American Embassy at London was instructed[4] to inform Mr. Eden that: "We do not recognize the lawfulness of such acquisitions [areas obtained by Thailand from Indochina, Malaya and Burma][5] and agree that such territories must in fact be restored to Indochina, Malaya and Burma from whom they were taken. This statement, of course, is without prejudice to the presentation of claims by any nation, including Thailand, and adjustments of boundaries or transfers of territories by orderly, peaceful processes." The French have not been informed of the Department's position.

In view of the above, it would be desirable discreetly to learn: (1) Whether the French Government now considers itself at war with Thailand; (2) if so, when the French Government considers the state of war to have begun; (3) whether the French Government recognizes the validity of the Convention of May 9, 1941; and (4) if not, whether all international agreements effected by the Vichy Government are considered as invalid.

Very truly yours, For the Acting Secretary of State:
J. W. BALLANTINE

740.0011 PW/8–1545 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, August 15, 1945—3 p. m.

6922. British Embassy has informed us[6]

(*a*) that FonOff has authorized Mountbatten[7] personally to advise RUTH to make announcement as soon as possible after final Japanese surrender disavowing Thai declaration of war upon Great Britain and United States and all measures flowing therefrom which may operate to prejudice of Allies, repudiating alliance and all other agreements with Japan, placing Thailand and its armed forces at service of

[3] Brackets appear in the original.
[4] Telegram 8676, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 1318.
[5] Brackets appear in the original instruction.
[6] On August 14.
[7] In telegram 7072, August 21, 1 p. m., to London, the Department stated: "Through error in reading code word Mountbatten was incorrectly referred to in paragraph (*a*) of Deptel 6922, August 15. Instructions were directed to a British officer understood to be in contact with RUTH to offer as his personal advice to RUTH the suggestions outlined. Same error appears in last sentence Deptel 6932, August 16. The Thai Minister has been informed of error. Reference to Mountbatten in paragraph (*b*) of Deptel 6922 is correct." (740.0011-PW/8–2145) For telegram 6932, see *infra*.

Allies, and declaring his readiness to send a representative immediately to Kandy to get in touch with Allies. British suggested that announcement might also state that RUTH had informed British and American Governments at an earlier stage that resistance movement wished to initiate overt action against the enemy and refrained only on express request of Allies for operational reasons.

(*b*) That FonOff also informed Mountbatten if RUTH takes necessary initiative as advised, British are disposed, because of support by Thai resistance movement and of Allied request not to take action last May, to forego pressing for separate act of unconditional surrender which under existing circumstances would be considered normal procedure, and to mold their policy according to Thai readiness to make restitution for the past and to cooperate for the future.

(*c*) That if RUTH follows advice and sends representative to Kandy, British propose to communicate with Dept before commencing negotiations regarding the terms on which they would be prepared to terminate state of war.

BYRNES

892.01/8–1645 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1945—1 p. m.

6932. Dept has been informed through OSS message [8] from RUTH that he has empowered Thai Minister in Washington to initiate formal negotiations with Britain through British Embassy in Washington and to return thereafter to Bangkok to become Premier provisionally. Thai Minister has informed British Embassy of foregoing which has wired FonOff for instructions. He has also informed Embassy that he has sent message to RUTH that he will accept such provisional premiership in national interest but expressing hope that he may be released promptly at conclusion of period of transition. Thai Minister has been made acquainted with substance of advice (Deptel 6922, August 15, 1945) Mountbatten [9] authorized to convey to RUTH.

BYRNES

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[8] August 15, not printed.

[9] See footnote 7, p. 1278.

740.00119 P.W./8–1645

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Moffat)

[WASHINGTON,] August 16, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Seni Pramoj, Thai Legation;
Mr. Luang Dithakar Bhakdi, Thai Legation;
Mr. Abbot Low Moffat, SEA.

The Minister called by appointment at his request and handed me a copy of a telegram from RUTH which he had received from OSS. The message asked him to secure a public statement from the United States along the line promised in Mr. Grew's message of May 28, 1945 as the time now seemed opportune, and if possible, from the British along the lines of Sir George Sansom's statement that British and American ultimate aims are generally similar. The message also included an offer to direct the Thai resistance movement, together with the military and the police, to act with the allies, if desired, in disarming the Japanese, and included a statement of authority to negotiate with the British and American Governments for such statements.

The Minister then said with considerable excitement that they had just received the first message direct from Bangkok—a coded R.C.A. message from the Foreign Minister [10] announcing that Thailand had disavowed the declaration of war against the United States and Great Britain [11] and repudiated the agreements made with Japan by the Pibul administration and all acts flowing therefrom prejudicial to the allies. I indicated my personal view that this should be presented to the Department by note; and that without a particular reason, such as a note, it would be difficult for the Government to issue a statement along the lines desired; that, however, possibly I might be able to arrange for the Minister to hand such note to the Secretary personally and to secure a public statement by the Secretary.[12] I explained, however, that I thought it might be necessary for us to clear any statement with the British so as not to cause any possible difficulties between the countries which might arise from unilateral action by us.

The Minister stated that he proposed to leave a note not only with us but also with the embassy of each government at war with Thailand.

A[BBOT] L[OW] M[OFFAT]

[10] Phya Sisena Sombatsiri, also known as Phya Si Sena.

[11] On August 16.

[12] For texts of note of August 17 by the Thai Minister and the statement by the Secretary of State released August 20, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 19, 1945, p. 261. For Department statement of August 28 on the resistance movement in Thailand during the war, see *ibid.*, September 2, 1945, p. 338.

892.50/8–2145

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State [13]

UNITED STATES ECONOMIC POLICY TOWARD THAILAND

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1945.

1. The United States Government favors the restoration of the freedom, independence and sovereignty of Thailand.

2. It is further the policy of this Government:

a. To support the appropriate efforts of the Thai Government and the Thai people to make their own decisions with respect to entering into agreements or making other commitments on economic matters of international import.

b. To be prepared to provide financial and economic advice upon request and by this and other means to facilitate the development of the Thai economy and its foreign trade on a multilateral basis.

c. To look with favor upon the extension of private credits to the Thai Government and to Thai industry, and to be prepared, in appropriate circumstances, to provide Government or Government-guaranteed loans that promise to be of benefit to the Thai people and that can be supported by the Thai economy without undue strain.

d. To make operative between the United States and Thailand the existing commercial treaty (without prejudice to later revision) which provides for the economic rights and privileges of American nationals; and to seek from the Thai an understanding that nationals of other members of the United Nations will be treated on a similar non-discriminatory basis and that any concessions or other special privileges which the Thai may grant will be open to all on equal terms.

e. To assist Thailand in obtaining imported relief and rehabilitation supplies which may be needed by Thailand during and after liberation; to continue to seek authority for UNRRA to operate in Thailand on the same terms and conditions as in other liberated areas.

f. To stand ready to assist Thailand in carrying out the policies adopted by the United Nations for the liquidation of Japanese investments, leaseholds, and concessions, and to seek to secure participation by Thailand in whatever agreements are entered into by members of the United Nations for the future regulation and control of Japanese economic penetration.

g. To seek to postpone the settlement of questions of reparations and possibly restitution as between Thailand and the United Nations

[13] In a memorandum of August 21 to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs stated "Mr. C. C. Devore, chief of the Southeast Asian Division of F[oreign] E[conomic] A[dministration], Liberated Areas, requested a statement of United States policy toward Thailand for guidance of an *ad hoc* committee on Thai economic problems on which FEA, State, Treasury and War Departments are represented. . . . If you concur I will transmit to Mr. Devore the attached statement of policy on plain, white paper without initials. Point 3 is taken from the *aide-mémoire* handed to the British on July 7, 1945. The rest of the information contained therein was approved by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs August 9, 1945." (892.50/8–2145) The statement was transmitted to Mr. Devore on August 23. The *aide-mémoire* of July 7 is not printed.

and as between Thailand and Japan until the general reparations decisions are made at the conclusion of the war with Japan.

3. This Government further believes that so far as may be possible Thailand should receive credit for commodities sold for export in currencies which will meet the foreign exchange needs of that country.

892.61317/8–1845

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Moffat) of a Conversation With the Secretary of the Thai Legation (Sanasen)

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1945.

In the course of a conversation I expressed as my purely personal view that it might be a wise political step for Thailand to offer a substantial amount of the rice held by the Thai Government free to the Allies. Inasmuch as rice is greatly needed by the Allies for other areas in the Far East and as Thailand in fact did not participate actively against the Japanese or suffer very much from the war, I thought personally that such a gift would be a gesture which might pay dividends to Thailand far in excess of the monetary loss.

740.00119 PW/8–1845

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn)[14]

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1945.

The British have "advised" the Thai Regent that he should disavow the declaration of war; renounce all agreements with Japan; repeal all laws prejudicial to the Allies; place his country and its armed forces at the service of the Allies; pledge compensation for damage done by Thailand to the Allies; and send a representative to Kandy to get in touch with the Allies.

Thailand has taken, in substance, all these steps, except to send a representative to Kandy. The Regent has empowered the Thai Minister in Washington to negotiate with the Allies. Clearly, however, a representative must be sent by the Regent to Kandy to deal on military matters and *ad hoc* arrangements.

Bishop has informed the Department that confusion has arisen because the "advice" sent to RUTH implied that longer-range political discussions should also be discussed by the Regent's representative at Kandy. Mr. Bishop pointed out that the atmosphere at Kandy would

[14] Notation by Mr. Dunn on August 18: "I concur".

be adverse to the Thai, and, more important, Kandy is the headquarters of an Allied Command, and it would be embarrassing to the United States for representatives of that command to negotiate longer-range political policies with the Thai, although entirely appropriate to discuss all military and immediate *ad hoc* problems.

It is recommended, if you approve, that an officer of the Department discuss the situation with an officer of the British Embassy and suggest orally that we consider that immediate military and *ad hoc* relations with the Thai Government must be considered by the Southeast Asia Command, but that it would seem to us inappropriate if longer-range political discussions (such as termination of the state of war) between the British Government and Thailand were carried on by that command or in such manner as to give color to the view that the Command, as such, was concerned therewith; that we have received information that the Regent is confused on this point in as much as he has already empowered the Thai Minister in Washington to initiate formal negotiations with the Allied Governments; and that it would seem helpful if the British Government would advise the Regent that he should immediately send to Kandy a representative to discuss military questions and *ad hoc* arrangements with the Supreme Allied Command and that he will be informed through the Thai Minister in Washington what procedure the British Government desire to follow in discussing longer-range political questions.

At the same time, it is recommended that the Department officer express to the officer of the British Embassy this Government's appreciation for the assurance given that before negotiations are begun the British will communicate with the Department regarding terms on which they would be prepared to terminate the state of war with Thailand.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

741.92/8–2045

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

1. It is intended that there should be negotiated simultaneously at Kandy, Ceylon, (A) a political agreement of purely British interest between His Majesty's Government (represented by Mr. Dening, Chief Political Adviser to Admiral Mountbatten), and a Thai liberation government, and (B) an agreement on military and quasi-military matters of Allied implication between Admiral Mountbatten, (Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia), and the Thai liberation government.

2. Attached is the text of the heads of the above-mentioned political Agreement, together with the text of the military Agreement in the form of an Annex with an Appendix to it. These two Agreements contain the terms which, as soon as the final views of His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions and the Governments of India and Burma have been received, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom propose to present to the Regent of Thailand with a view to liquidating the state of war existing with Thailand and providing a foundation and framework for future cooperation with her.

3. The matters dealt with in the military agreement to be made by Admiral Mountbatten include all those matters which His Majesty's Government think that he can properly negotiate in his capacity as Supreme Allied Commander of a Combined Command, and the terms are being submitted to the Combined Chief of Staff with a view to the issue of a directive to Admiral Mountbatten to conclude an agreement in accordance with them.

4. His Majesty's Government would be grateful if the United States Government would treat these terms as strictly confidential and particularly refrain from divulging them at this stage to the Thais.

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1945.

[Enclosure]

TEXT OF HEADS OF AGREEMENT TO BE PRESENTED BY MR. DENING (CHIEF POLITICAL ADVISER TO ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN) ON BEHALF OF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REGENT OF THAILAND AT KANDY, CEYLON [15]

The attitude of His Majesty's Government towards Thailand will depend on the degree of her cooperation in matters arising out of the termination of hostilities against Japan and on her readiness

(A) to make restitution to His Majesty's Government and their Allies for the injury done them in consequence of Thailand's association with Japan and

(B) to ensure security and good-neighbourly relations for the future.

2. The particular steps which His Majesty's Government would expect a Thai liberation government to take as a condition of recog-

[15] A revised Heads of Agreement was submitted by the British Embassy on August 31. The various modifications excluded references to territorial questions involving Thailand and French Indochina, for it was "assumed that these questions will be dealt with in a separate instrument to be negotiated by the French Provisional Government with the Thai Government". For example, Paragraph A 3 was modified to read: "Renounce all British territory acquired by Thailand later than the 7th December, 1941." (740.00119 P.W./8–3145)

nising it as the Government of Thailand and of collaborating with it, are as follows:—

A. *Measures of Repudiation*

1. Repudiate the declaration of war made on Great Britain on the 25th January, 1942, and all measures pursuant to that declaration which may operate to the prejudice of Great Britain.

2. Repudiate the alliance entered into by Thailand with Japan on the 21st December, 1941,[16] and all other treaties, pacts or agreements concluded between Thailand and Japan.

3. Renounce all territory acquired by Thailand later than the 11th December, 1940, including all territory which was purported to be ceded by the Vichy Government on the 9th May, 1941.

B. *Measures of Restitution and Readjustment*

1. Take the necessary legislative and administrative measures to give effect to Section A above, including in particular—

(*a*) Repeal all legislative and administrative measures relating to the annexation or incorporation in Thailand of territories acquired later than the 11th December, 1940.

(*b*) Withdraw as may be required by the competent civil or military authority all Thai military personnel from all Allied territories annexed by or incorporated in Thailand after the 11th December, 1940; and all Thai officials and nationals who entered these territories after their annexation by or incorporation in Thailand.

(*c*) Restore all property taken away from those territories. This would include currency except to the extent to which it could be established that fair value had been given in exchange.

(*d*) Compensate loss or damage to property rights and interests in those territories arising out of the occupation of those territories by Thailand.

(*e*) Redeem in sterling, out of former sterling reserves, Thai notes collected by the British authorities in British territory occupied by Thailand since 1942.

2. Release all British prisoners of war and internees held in Thailand or in territories annexed by or incorporated in Thailand after the 11th December, 1940, and at Thai expense provide them with adequate food, clothing, medical and hygienic services, and transportation, in consultation with the Allied Military Authorities.

3. Assume responsibility for safeguarding, maintaining and restoring unimpaired, British property rights and interests of all kinds in Thailand and for payment of compensation for losses or damage sustained. The term "property rights and interests" to include, *inter alia*, the official property of His Majesty's Government, property whose ownership has been transferred since the outbreak of war, pensions granted to British nationals, stocks of tin, teak and other commodities, shipping and wharves, and tin, teak and other leases and

[16] Signed at Bangkok, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLIV, p. 838.

concessions granted to British firms and individuals prior to the 7th December, 1941, and still valid at that date.

4. Desequestrate and reinstate British banking and commercial concerns.

5. Accept liability, with the addition of interest at an appropriate percentage in respect of payments in arrears, for the service of loans and for the payment of pensions since the date when regular payments ceased.

6. Undertake to conclude as and when required, with the Supreme Allied Commander, S.E.A.C. or other appropriate authority, an agreement or agreements to cover all or any of the matters specified in the Annex to this document.

C. *Measures for Post-War Strategic Co-operation*

1. Recognise that the course of events in the war with Japan demonstrates the importance of Thailand to the defence of Burma, Malaya and Indo-China and the security of the Indian Ocean and South West Pacific Areas.

2. Agree, until such time as she is admitted to membership of The United Nations, to carry out such measures for the preservation of international peace and security as The United Nations Organisation may require.

3. Undertake that no canal linking the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Thailand shall be cut across Thai territory without the prior formal concurrence of His Majesty's Government.

D. *Measures for Post-War Economic Co-operation*

1. Agree to take all possible measures to reestablish import and export trade between Thailand, on the one hand, and neighbouring British territories on the other, and to adopt and maintain a good-neighbourly policy in regard to coastal shipping.

2. Undertake to negotiate as soon as practicable a new Treaty of Commerce and Navigation and a Consular and Establishment Convention based on the principles in the following paragraph.

3. Pending the conclusion of the Treaty and Convention referred to in paragraph 2 above, undertake to observe the provisions of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed at Bangkok on the 23rd November 1937 [17] and, in addition, not to enforce measures excluding British commercial or industrial interests or British professional men from participation in Thai economy and trade (subject to such exceptions, if any, as may be agreed between His Majesty's Government and the Thai Government) or requiring them to maintain stocks or reserves in excess of normal commercial, shipping, industrial, or business practice, provided that if the Treaty and Convention have not been con-

[17] League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXXVIII, p. 333.

cluded within a period of three years, this undertaking shall lapse unless it is prolonged by agreement.

4. Undertake to negotiate a Civil Aviation Agreement in respect of all British Commonwealth Civil Air Services not less favourable than the Agreement of 1937 with respect to Imperial Airways.[18]

5. Undertake to participate in any international arrangements regarding tin and rubber.

E. *Regularisation of Thai Position in Relation to Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties and Membership of International Organisations.*

(This section has not yet been completed and a blanket formula will be included later in the Agreement in order to bind the Thai Government to take appropriate measures in due course.)

ANNEX

TEXT OF AGREEMENT ON MILITARY AND QUASI-MILITARY MATTERS TO BE PRESENTED BY ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN, S.A.C.S.E.A., TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REGENT OF THAILAND AT KANDY, CEYLON.

The Thai Liberation Government shall agree:

1. To dissolve any military, para-military or political organisation conducting propaganda hostile to the United Nations.

2. To hand over to the Allied Military Authorities all vessels belonging to the United Nations which are in Thai ports.

3. To carry out such measures of disarmament and demobilisation as may be prescribed by the Allies.

4. To take all possible steps to ensure the prompt release of all Allied prisoners of war and internees; and at Thai expense to provide them with adequate food, clothing, medical and hygienic services, and transportation in consultation with the Allied Military Authorities.

5. To assume responsibility for safeguarding, maintaining and restoring unimpaired, Allied property, rights and interests of all kinds in Thailand and for payment of compensation for losses or damage sustained.

6. To desequestrate and reinstate Allied banking and commercial concerns.

7. To cooperate with the Allied Military Authorities in:

(*a*) disarming Japanese forces in Thailand and handing them over to the Allies as prisoners of war;

(*b*) interning all Japanese (and other enemy) nationals and holding them at the disposal of the Allies; and

[18] For exchange of notes at Bangkok, December 3, 1937, constituting an agreement for the operation of regular air services over Siam and over India and Burma, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXXVI, p. 293.

(*c*) seizing and delivering to the designated Allied Military Authority all war material belonging to the Japanese, including naval and merchant vessels of all kinds, aircraft, weapons, ammunition, motor and other transport, military stores including aviation and other petrols and fuels, stocks of food and clothing, wireless equipment and any other property whatsoever of the Japanese armed forces.

8. To prohibit trading with the enemies of the Allies.

9. To hold all Japanese (and other enemy) property at the disposal of the Allies.

10. To cooperate in the apprehension and trial of persons accused of war crimes or notable for affording active assistance to Japan or other enemies of the Allies.

11. To hand over to the Allied Military Authorities all renegades of Allied nationality.

12. To maintain and make available to the Allied Military Authorities such of the Thai naval, land and air forces with their ports, airfields, establishments, equipment, communications, weapons and stores of all kinds as may be specified, and in addition such land and buildings as may from time to time be required by the Allied Military Authorities for the accommodation of troops and stores.

13. To place at the disposal of the Allied Military Authorities ports and free traffic facilities in and over Thai territory as required.

14. To provide free of cost all other supplies and services and all Thai currency that may be required by the Allied Military Authorities and pay the cost of production of any Thai currency produced by the Allies for any purpose in Thailand.

15. To arrange in accordance with the wishes of the Allied Military Authorities for press and other censorship and control over radio and telecommunication installations or other forms of inter-communication.

16. To continue civil administration subject to such instructions as may be issued by the competent Allied Military Authority in the pursuance of his task of those areas of Thailand not placed under Allied military administration.

17. In case of need, to arrange for facilities for the recruitment of local labour and for the utilisation in Thai territory of industrial and transport enterprises and of means of communication, power stations, public utility enterprises and other facilities, stocks of fuel and other materials in accordance with the requirements and instructions of the Allied Military Authorities.

18. To make Thai merchant vessels, whether in Thai or foreign waters, subject to the control of the Allies for use as may be required in the general interests of the Allies.

19. To negotiate an agreement granting judicial and other immunities for Allied forces in Thailand.

20. To agree to the setting up of a Military Mission, to be appointed by the appropriate Allied Military Authorities, to advise on the organisation, training and equipment of the Thai armed forces.

21. To control banks and businesses, foreign exchange, foreign commercial and financial transactions and regulate trade and production as required by the Allies.

22. To undertake to prohibit, except in accordance with the directions of the Combined Boards acting on behalf of the Allies or of such other similar authority which replaces these Boards, any exports of rice, tin, rubber and teak for such time as may seem to the Authority concerned necessary in the economic circumstances prevailing at the time.

23. (*a*) To make available free of cost at Bangkok as quickly as may be compatible with the retention of supplies adequate for Thai internal needs 1½ million tons of sound white rice, or if so agreed by the Authorities appointed by the Allies for the purpose the equivalent quantity of paddy.

(*b*) For so long as in the opinion of the Combined Boards or other Authority acting on behalf of the Allies a world shortage of rice continues, to take all possible measures to promote and to maintain the maximum rice production and make available to an Allied Rice Unit the resulting surpluses at prices to be fixed in agreement with the Allied Rice Unit, having regard to the controlled prices of rice in other Asiatic producing areas.

(*c*) To conclude a detailed agreement with the Allied Rice Unit regarding the measures to be taken to give effect to (*a*) and (*b*) above. Such agreement to cover the points detailed in the Appendix [19] to this Annex, and to provide in addition (i) for the Allies to take whatever measures may be required for the fulfilment of these obligations until the Thai Government are themselves, in the view of the Allies, in a position to ensure this; (ii) for the continued cooperation thereafter of the Thai Government with the Rice Unit in the fulfilment of any obligations already incurred.

24. To agree to frame Thai currency policy (including the rates of exchange to be fixed at the outset, which may include different rates for bahts of the pre-war issue and bahts printed by the Japanese) in accordance with the advice of Allied representatives with a view to facilitating the maximum production of rice and of other commodities in short supply and to obviating economic disturbance.

[19] Not printed; it listed 13 measures "considered essential to ensure the export of the maximum quantities of rice from Thailand".

692-141—69——82

25. To arrange the withdrawal and redemption in Thai currency at par, within a specified time limit, of all holdings in Thai territory of currency issued by the Allies if it shall have been found necessary to use such an Allied currency.

26. To agree to pay in full for all relief supplies, such payment to be made in gold until all obligations to supply rice free of charge as the Thai contribution to United Nations requirements have been discharged, and thereafter out of the proceeds of exports of rice and other products.

892.01/8–2045

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department of State is giving careful study to the British Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of August 20, 1945 which was accompanied by a copy of two draft agreements, one of British political interest and one on military and quasi-military matters, which the British Government proposes should be presented to representatives of the Regent of Thailand at Kandy.

In a secret letter to the American Ambassador, London, dated September 4, 1944,[20] Mr. Eden stated: "We, like the United States, want to see the restoration of Siam after the war as a free, sovereign and independent state, subject only to its acceptance of such special arrangements for security or economic collaboration as may be judged necessary within an international system."

On November 22, 1944, in response to a note from the American Embassy requesting a clarification of the British Government's views underlying these reservations, Mr. Eden replied:[21] "The two conditions suggested in my letter of the 4th September, on which you asked further clarification, were in the nature of general reservations to be filled in in detail when the outline of the postwar settlement in the Far East is clearer. I should like to meet your Government's wish for greater precision, but I do not really think that it is practicable to be more precise at this stage when there are so many unknown factors as regards the future. Nor could I in any case attempt a binding definition without prior consultation with experts in this country, with the Dominions, and with the Cabinet. But I shall be happy to review the matter with you from time to time as the situation develops.

"I cannot think that the general reservation which I made in paragraph 5 of my letter of the 4th September will be other than acceptable to the United States Government. It is, I suggest, a matter of

[20] See airgram A–1085, September 5, 1944, from London, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 1316.

[21] See airgram A–1404, November 24, 1944, from London, *ibid.*, p. 1319.

ordinary prudence, even in the case of those who are but the satellites of our main enemies, to stipulate that as a condition of their ultimate freedom, sovereignty and independence they should accept such special arrangements for security or economic collaboration as may be judged necessary to the functioning of the postwar international system."

In its *aide-mémoire* to the British Embassy dated June 25, 1945, the Department referred to the foregoing statements by Mr. Eden and expressed its view that Thailand at an appropriate time should be admitted to the United Nations Organization on its pledge to cooperate fully as a sovereign power in all pertinent international arrangements, but that it would not be desirable to make acceptance of such arrangements a condition to the restoration of Thailand's independence and sovereignty. It was further stated that this Government would welcome assurance by the British Government that its economic and commercial policies in regard to Thailand are in general harmony with the American principles which were set forth in the *aide-mémoire* and which are designed to assure Thailand's economic independence while, at the same time, protecting the nationals of all the United Nations by assuring them fair and equal economic and commercial opportunity.

The Japanese surrender occurred before a reply to that *aide-mémoire* was received and this Government has not, therefore, had a further statement of British economic and commercial policies in regard to Thailand.

Under the circumstances this Government is not clear as to the precise intent of the language employed in paragraph numbered D 5 in the Annex to the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* setting forth the text of the heads of the proposed political agreement which provides that the Thai Government should: "Undertake to participate in any international arrangements regarding tin and rubber." It would be appreciated if the British Government would inform this Government of the intent of this paragraph.

Meanwhile, further study is being given to the proposed agreements, especially to the apparently far-reaching economic controls suggested. The Department will communicate to the British Embassy the views of this Government on the proposed agreements as soon as possible.

WASHINGTON, August 22, 1945.

740.00119 PW/8–2245 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, August 22, 1945—3 p. m.

7123. For your information Dept orally suggested to British Embassy August 18 that they should advise Thai Regent to send repre-

sentatives to Kandy to deal with Lord Mountbatten on military matters and necessary *ad hoc* arrangements; that Dept considers it inappropriate that longer-range political matters between the British and Thai Governments should be dealt with through an Allied Command or through a political adviser attached to an Allied Commander; and that it would be helpful if the British notified the Thai Regent through Thai Minister Seni at Washington as to what procedure they wished to follow in discussing such political problems.

The Thai Minister informed us [22] of the Thai Regent's offer to aid in disarming the Japanese and in caring for Allied POWs.

The British Embassy informed us that Lord Mountbatten was authorized to deal with the Thai military pragmatically depending on the extent of their cooperation.

See Dept's radio bulletin of August 20, statement by the Secretary in regard to Thailand.[23]

BYRNES

851G.014/8–2245

The French Embassy to the Department of State

[Translation]

No. 621 WASHINGTON, August 22, 1945.

The French Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honor to inform it, on instructions of its Government, that the position of the latter concerning the territories belonging to the Indo-Chinese Union which were seized by Siam on the basis of the Franco-Thai Peace Treaty of May 9, 1941, is as follows:

The status of these territories must not be submitted to arbitration. France considers herself as completely justified in law to resume the administration of the Cambodian and Laotian territories which were wrested from her by violence. These territories were annexed by Siam in violation of the treaty which it had concluded with the French Government on June 12, 1940. This annexation, which was entirely unjustified, could be effected only with the support of Japan. The letters exchanged on March 11, 1941, in Tokyo between the French Ambassador to Japan and the Japanese Foreign Minister stipulate that the Imperial Government recommends "the unconditional acceptance by the French Government" of its plan for settling the Franco-Thai dispute. It specifies that "the French Government, in spite of the fact that neither the local situation nor the fortune of arms

[22] On August 18.

[23] Department of State *Bulletin*, August 19, 1945, p. 261.

oblige it to renounce the benefits of the treaty which was freely negotiated and concluded between it and the Bangkok Government, is disposed under present circumstances to accede to the requests of the Japanese Government." The violence dealt the French Government by Japan is thus expressly brought out in the terms of the letters exchanged between their representatives. Under these conditions the Franco-Thai Peace Treaty of May 9, 1941, has no juridical value, even if France should be considered as responsible for the actions of the Government of M. Arsène Henry.[24] Neither the French National Committee of London nor the Provisional Government of the French Republic has ever recognized the validity of this treaty, and the statements of the French National Committee of December 8, 1941,[25] as well as those of the French Committee of National Liberation of December 8, 1943,[26] formally laid claim to the territories of the Indo-Chinese Union occupied by Siam. The French Embassy begs the Department of State to take cognizance of this declaration of the French Government's position concerning the territories in question and takes this occasion to renew the assurances of its highest consideration.

740.00119PW/8–2445

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Moffat)

[WASHINGTON,] August 24, 1945.

Participants: M. R. Seni Pramoj, Thai Minister
Luang Dithakar Bhakdi, Secretary of the Thai Legation
Abbot Low Moffat, SEA
Kenneth P. Landon, SEA

In the course of a conversation with the Thai Minister and Mr. Bhakdi, Secretary of the Thai Legation, the Thai Minister handed Mr. Moffat a copy of a communiqué [27] from the office of the Prime Minister, sanctioned by the Regent.

It was stated in the communiqué in effect that it will be necessary for the Thai to send a mission to meet Allied representatives at the headquarters of the Southeast Asia Command to enter into agreements in regard to the military situation and political questions which may arise

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[24] Charles Arsène-Henry, French Ambassador in Japan, was one of the signers of the treaty on behalf of France.

[25] French Press and Information Service, *Free France*, vol. VI, Nos. 5–6, September 1944, p. 194, footnote 1; for partial text, see telegram 5946, December 8, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. V, p. 380.

[26] *Free France*, vol. V, No. 1, January 1944, p. 9.

[27] Dated August 21, not printed.

therefrom; that the Thai were waiting to hear from the Allies as to the subjects to be considered; and that Thai armed forces are ready to comply with the requirements of the Allies.

It was further stated in the communiqué that the Indochinese territories were acquired by Thailand before the outbreak of war; that Thailand obtained these territories for reasons quite different from those whereby they obtained the Malay and Shan States which the Thai peace proclamation of August 16, 1945 had indicated were to be returned to Great Britain; that Thailand is willing to have the question of the Indochinese areas settled in accordance with the procedure provided by the United Nations Charter agreed to at San Francisco; [28] and that Thailand is willing to accept any decision made in accordance with the principles laid down by the United Nations.

892.01/8–2045 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, August 25, 1945—1 p. m.

7276. 1. Brit Embassy presented *aide-mémoire* August 20 with syllabus of political agreement proposed to be negotiated at Kandy between Dening and "a Thai Liberation Govt" and text of "an agreement on military and quasi-military matters of Allied implication" proposed to be negotiated at Kandy between Mountbatten and the Thai Liberation Govt. Brit have submitted text of latter agreement to CCS [29] for directive to Mountbatten to conclude agreement in accordance with its terms.

[Here follow paragraphs numbered 2 and 3 summarizing the proposed political and military agreements.]

4. Dept has recommended to War and Navy Depts [30] that (*a*) no political objection to Mountbatten concluding military agreement with representatives of the Thai Govt; (*b*) any such agreement must be limited to matters of military concern to the Allies in their war against common enemy; (*c*) no military agreement should be concluded with Thai by either Brit or American authorities separately while Thailand in theater of Combined Command; (*d*) directive should be issued fixing exchange rates for military purposes only applicable equally to all baht issued by Thai Govt unless Thai Govt determines differential between prewar issue and issue during JAP

[28] Adopted June 26, 1945, Department of State Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031.

[29] Combined Chiefs of Staff.

[30] Memorandum of August 23 for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, not printed.

domination; (*e*) SAC should be instructed not to send troops into Thailand in excess of numbers needed in matters of military concern against common enemy and to withdraw troops as rapidly as such matter concluded.

5. Brit Embassy *aide-mémoire*, August 15 [*14*],[31] again pressed for Combined Rice Unit. US position stated in Dept *aide-mémoire* July 7 [31] being restudied. Tentative view is US will agree to some combined organization for brief specified period if negotiated politically with Thailand, but pending such organization US military will make own purchases in Thailand. Sent to London, repeated to Chungking, New Delhi, Colombo.

BYRNES

751.92/8–2745 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Fullerton) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 27, 1945—4 p. m.
[Received 6:30 p. m.]

5178. Department's instruction 1285, August 6, regarding French relations with Thailand was discussed today with De Lageneste [32] of Foreign Office. He stated that while no formal declaration of war has ever been made France considers itself in state of hostilities with Thailand which may be considered to date from November 27, 1940, when Thai Air Force bombed Indo-Chinese territory. Present French Government does not recognize convention of May 1941 and consequently considers state of hostilities arising from Thai aggression never to have been terminated.

Moreover French Government considers note of London Committee December 8, 1941 pledging assistance in Pacific to have applied to Thailand as ally of Japan.

De Lageneste stated categorically that French Government does not recognize any international agreements concluded by Vichy Government, including convention of May 9, 1941, between France and Thailand signed in Tokyo. In addition French Government considers this convention doubly invalid because prior to its signature there was at French insistence exchange of letters between French representative in Japan and Japanese Government recognizing that convention was forced on France by Japan.

De Lageneste considers that recent proclamation of Regent of Thailand [33] (Radio Bulletin 199, August 19) constitutes a renunciation of

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[31] Not printed.

[32] Jean Lafon de Lageneste, Chief of the American Affairs Section of the French Foreign Office.

[33] Dated August 16; it was included in note from the Thai Minister, Department of State *Bulletin*, August 19, 1945, p. 261.

territorial gains since January 25, 1942. While admitting that selection of date of declaration of war against United States was natural in proclamation of this type De Lageneste expressed hope that Thai Government would also specifically renounce territorial gains from Indochina acquired before that date.

De Lageneste was asked if French Government had considered taking any steps to regularize its relations with Thailand. He replied that he assumed such steps would be taken in due course but felt that they must be preceded by statement from Thai Government relinquishing territorial gains in Indochina and withdrawal of Thai forces to previous frontier.

FULLERTON

740.00119 PW/8–3145

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The *aide-mémoire* and accompanying annexes, presented by the British Embassy to the Department of State on August 20, 1945, relating to proposed agreements with representatives of the Regent of Thailand, and the *aide-mémoire* presented by the British Embassy on August 14, 1945 on the subject of Thai rice,[34] have been examined with care.

As stated in the Department's *aide-mémoire* of June 25, 1945, the United States Government hopes for an early settlement of the state of war between Great Britain and Thailand and that such settlement will not conflict with the viewpoint, interests or policies of the United States but will, on the other hand, contribute to Anglo-American unity of action in the Far East. In the light of the foregoing, the Department of State offers the following comment on the matters set forth in the Embassy's *aide-mémoire:*

THAI GOVERNMENT

This Government assumes that in using the term "Thai Liberation Government" in the proposed agreements the British Government is referring to the constitutional Thai Government.

PROPOSED POLITICAL AGREEMENT

1. The precise intent of Paragraph D 5 is not clear to this Government. In the light of the statements by Mr. Eden, quoted in the Department's *aide-mémoire* dated August 22, 1945, regarding Thailand's postwar economic collaboration within the international system,

[34] Not printed.

it is assumed that the international arrangements regarding tin and rubber referred to in Paragraph D 5 are those which may be effected under the auspices or with the approval of the United Nations Organization or its Economic and Social Council. Although, as set forth in the Department's *aide-mémoire* of June 25, 1945, this Government would have preferred that such a commitment not be made a condition to British recognition of the sovereignty and independence of Thailand, but rather that Thailand should pledge as a sovereign power at the time of its admission to the United Nations Organization its cooperation in all pertinent international economic and security arrangements, it concurs in the objective of such paragraph as so understood. This Government hopes that in its reply to the Department's *aide-mémoire* of August 22, the British Government will give assurance that the foregoing assumption as to the intent of Paragraph D 5 is correct.

2. This Government has misgivings over the possible implications of Paragraphs D 2 and 3. It will be recalled that Mr. Eden gave assurance that the British Government favors the restoration of the freedom, independence and sovereignty of Thailand, "subject only to its accceptance of such special arrangements for security or economic collaboration as may be judged necessary within an international system" and possibly to some special arrangement in the Kra Isthmus "within the framework of an international security system."

A requirement that Thailand may not reserve for itself or its own nationals certain economic, commercial or professional pursuits without the agreement of the British Government, insofar as British interests or professional men are concerned, would, this Government believes, constitute a definite impairment of Thai sovereignty and independence, would be contrary to the spirit of the international system envisaged by the United Nations Charter, and might result in discrimination against the interests of other United Nations and their nationals.

This Government has consistently disapproved peacetime monopolies and government restrictions which hamper the natural and normal flow of economic and commercial activity throughout the world, which it believes is essential to world prosperity, peace and stability. At the same time it is recognized that, except as may be limited by voluntary international agreement, every sovereign nation has the right to reserve to itself control of its internal economic and commercial opportunities. The right to practice law, for example, or to engage in coastwise or internal river navigation, has been so reserved by many countries.

This Government will be glad to join in representations to the Thai Government opposing measures which exclude the United Nations and their nationals, including industrial and commercial interests, from reasonable participation in Thai economy and trade, and in seeking non-discriminatory treatment for all United Nations and their nationals and agreement that any concessions or other special privileges which the Thai may grant shall be open to all on equal terms. This Government cannot view with favor, however, any proposal whereby the British Government might impose as a condition to a liquidation of the state of war with Thailand and a recognition of the Thai Government, a requirement which would infringe the sovereignty and economic independence of Thailand and grant to British interests special economic, commercial or professional privilege.

This Government earnestly hopes that it may receive assurance that its misgivings as to the implications of Paragraphs D 2 and 3 are unfounded and that the British Government proposes by those paragraphs to seek only non-discriminatory treatment for British industrial and commercial interests and British professional men participating in Thai economy and trade.

3. Further study is being given by this Government to the paragraphs of Section C entitled "Measures for Post-War Strategic Co-operation".

4. This Government concurs in the view that Thailand should assume responsibility for compensating losses or damage to property rights and interests of the Allies and their nationals for which the Thai Government might be deemed directly responsible. It is of the opinion, however, that Thailand should not be required at this time to pay compensation for losses or damages for which the Japanese were responsible, as it believes that consideration of such claims should be postponed until general reparations questions relating to Japan, including possible reparations from Japan to Thailand, are decided.

On December 8, 1941, despite sporadic resistance by Thai elements, the then Thai Government gave Japan, in response to an ultimatum backed by overwhelming force, the right to transport troops across the country.[35] It is understood that immediately upon their entry, the Japanese forces, in violation of the terms of consent which had been given, extended their control over substantial parts of the country and looted the property of British and American concerns; and that such looting took place several weeks before the Pibul Government issued its declaration of war against Great Britain and the United States and before any acts affecting British and American property interests, were taken by the Thai Government pursuant to that declaration.

[35] See telegram 557, December 8, 1941, 5 p. m., from Bangkok, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. v, p. 378.

In offering its views on this point, this Government is actuated not only by a sense of justice but also by the belief that in the interest of future peace and stability in that region of the world it is important that the areas of southeastern Asia be permitted to return to normal economic conditions as rapidly as possible. Thailand will face a very serious financial and economic problem arising from the hundreds of millions of bahts loaned to the Japanese [36] under compulsion on security which will probably prove worthless. A requirement that Thailand make compensation for losses or damages for which the Japanese were responsible might seriously intensify the economic ills of the country, retard Thailand's general fiscal and economic recovery, and thus affect the interests of all nations concerned with the economic welfare and stability of southeastern Asia.

Proposed Military Agreement

The situation facing the Allied Command of the Southeast Asia theater is unique in Anglo-American combined military activities in the war. Thailand is the only country within the theater of a combined Anglo-American Command with which one of the Governments represented in that Command is at war, while the other Government is not. It is important, therefore, that unusual care be exercised by that Command in matters which would involve the relationship of those Governments with Thailand.

This Government has no objection to the conclusion of a military agreement between Admiral Mountbatten, as Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia, and representatives of the Thai Government, but believes that any such agreement should be limited strictly to matters of concern to the British and American Governments in the war against their common enemy. The combined Allied Command was created for that purpose, and this Government believes that the Command should not take any action which would tend to compromise the position of the United States, which has considered Thailand not an enemy but a country to be liberated from the enemy, and with which it expects to resume diplomatic relations in the near future. This Government is confident that the British Government would not desire to embarrass this Government by pressing for such action, especially as the Thai Government has given every indication of its determination to make restitution for the past and to cooperate with the United Nations in the future and so meet the basic objectives of the British Government without necessity for any such action.

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[36] According to a report prepared by the Thai Director of the Bureau of Foreign Trade at the direction of the Thai Regent, a total of 1,310,701,083 bahts had been supplied to the Japanese for military expenditures through July 19, 1945. A copy of this report was received from the Office of Strategic Services on August 25 (892.515/8–2545).

THAI RICE

This Government recognizes the immediate importance of the production and export of the maximum quantity of rice from Thailand to the other areas in need of that commodity. It has given careful study to the British Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of August 15 [*14*], 1945 and is agreeable to the proposal of the British Government that allocations recommended by the Combined Food Board or a successor body should apply to all such surplus rice including that required both for military and for civilian requirements.

This Government recognizes also the advantages which would accrue from combined, instead of competitive, activity in the stimulation of production and the maximum export of rice. It has examined with care the proposals relating to Thai rice which are included in the proposed agreement on military and quasi-military matters annexed to the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of August 20, 1945. As the United States is not at war with Thailand, it is not in a position to give favorable consideration to those proposals. This Government would be willing, however, to join with the British Government in negotiating through political channels with representatives of the Thai Government a tripartite agreement based on the principles set forth in the Annex to this *aide-mémoire*. Pending conclusion of such a tripartite agreement the American military and civilian purchasing authorities will continue to feel free to effect directly the purchase of rice to be procured by them in Thailand in accordance with recommended Combined Food Board allocations, but if and when the proposed unit should be established they would effect procurement through such unit. This Government believes that the objectives of stimulating rice production and of maximizing exports in accordance with United Nations' needs can be achieved by the procedure proposed without embarrassment to either Government.

It will be observed that there are several important differences between that plan and the plan proposed by the British Government. The American proposal would rely primarily on the cooperation and good faith of the Thai Government. It provides that the rice unit would work with the Thai Government in stimulating production and would have sole authority to arrange for the export, directly or under its authority, of all surplus rice. It would eliminate the provision relating to the methods whereby Thailand should pay for relief supplies as that would appear to be a matter for agreement between the Thai Government and the supplying governments or organizations. Because the Thai Government derives essential revenues from moderate export duties on rice, the American proposal would not prohibit their imposition, but would require the approval

of the unit for the imposition of any new duties or any increase in rates above those in effect on August 15, 1945. Finally, the American proposal would omit the imposition of a levy on Thailand of one and a half million tons of rice.

This Government considers that any levy on Thailand would not be just in view of the Thai readiness and desire to join in the war against Japan and their deferment of such action only at the express request of the Supreme Allied Commander and at the express request of this Government that they coordinate their plans with his. Furthermore, the amount of the proposed levy may well be, in the light of the most recent estimates received by this Government, in excess of the total amount of Thai rice, including stocks now on hand, available for export during the coming year, and this Government considers that any levy of Thai rice would be prejudicial to its interests. This Government would not feel free to share in the proceeds of such a levy even though it may find it important to procure Thai rice to meet its rice requirements.

If the principles set forth in the Annex are acceptable to the British Government this Government is prepared immediately to empower a representative to enter into the proposed negotiations on behalf of this Government and to designate its representation on the proposed combined unit as soon as the negotiations are concluded.[37]

WASHINGTON, September 1, 1945.

[Annex]

PROPOSED PRINCIPLES FOR TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON THAI RICE AND OTHER EXPORT COMMODITIES IN SHORT WORLD SUPPLY TO BE NEGOTIATED WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE THAI GOVERNMENT

I

1. The Thai Government would recognize the immediate importance to the United Nations of producing and exporting in accordance with allocations recommended by the appropriate Combined Boards or successor bodies determined by the United States and Great Britain the maximum amounts of rice and certain other commodities in short world supply, and would express its desire to cooperate with and aid the United Nations by cooperating with the United States and Great Britain in achieving this objective.

[37] In telegram 7548, September 3, 11 a. m., to London, the Department summarized the *aide-mémoire* of September 1 and stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had requested the Combined Chiefs of Staff "to inform Mountbatten that any military agreement with Thailand should be with representatives designated by Regent on behalf of his Thai Govt and more strictly limited to matters of Allied concern relative to surrender Japanese forces". (741.92/8–2045)

2. The United States and Great Britain would recognize the immediate importance of such production and the prompt and efficient export of Thai rice and other commodities in accordance with recommended international allocation and would agree to aid in those objectives.

II

3. The Thai Government would undertake to prohibit during the period of the agreement all exports of rice, tin, rubber, and teak (if teak is made subject to recommended international allocation by a Combined Board or a successor body), except in accordance with recommendations of the appropriate Combined Board or any successor body determined by the United States and Great Britain.

4. The Thai Government would be permitted to have a representative on the Committees of the Combined Boards or successor bodies dealing with such commodities.

III

5. The United States and Great Britain would establish a Combined Thai Rice Commission (CTRC) to advise the Thai Government on and promote the production of rice in Thailand and to arrange for the export directly or under its authority of all surplus rice in accordance with allocations recommended by the Combined Food Board or successor body.

6. The Thai Government would agree to cooperate with CTRC in stimulating the maximum economic production of rice in Thailand, to make all surplus rice and paddy in Thailand available for export by CTRC or under its authority, at prices to be determined by agreement between CTRC and the Thai Government, and to prohibit the export of paddy or rice from Thailand except by CTRC or under its authority. More particularly the Thai Government would agree:

a. To require returns from all holders of stocks of paddy and rice;

b. To assess, in agreement with CTRC, the quantity of rice surplus to the internal needs of Thailand;

c. To take all reasonable means, including collection schemes, and, if need be, requisitioning, to make all surplus rice and paddy available for export by or under the authority of CTRC;

d. Not to impose or permit the imposition of any export or other duties on rice or paddy not in effect on August 15, 1945 or any increase in the rate of any such duties in effect on that date except as may be determined by agreement between the Thai Government and CTRC;

e. To license all mills and to restrict all purchases and sales by millers to prices to be determined by agreement between the Thai Government and CTRC;

f. To use all reasonable means, including if need be the required cannibalizing of mill or other machinery, to assure adequate rice milling power;

g. To use all reasonable means to assure transport on adequate scale from paddy fields to mills and from mills to ports;

h. To use all reasonable means to effect prompt restoration of adequate port facilities.

7. CTRC would advise and assist the Thai Government on policies designed to effectuate and expedite the program and would recommend to the British and American Governments such measures of assistance as it might deem essential for such purposes, particularly in regard to:

a. The procurement and importation of items required in connection with rice production and export, including milling, transportation and repair of port facilities;

b. The procurement and importation of needed incentive consumer goods.

8. CTRC would endeavor, in consultation with the Thai Government, to arrange, so far as might be practicable, that payment for all rice exported by it or under its authority would be by the establishment of credits in currencies which would meet Thailand's foreign exchange needs. Rice exported for British or American use would be paid for by the establishment of credits in British and American currency, respectively.

9. The Thai Government would recognize the urgent need of framing a currency policy designed to promote economic stability in the country and maximum economic rice, tin and rubber production. The United States and British Governments would each agree to make available or assist in procuring the services of financial and economic experts as advisers to the Thai Government for such purposes when requested by the Thai Government.

IV

10. The agreement would be in effect until September 1, 1946 and be renewable for a period of six months upon the request of the United States and Great Britain.

11. If during the life of the agreement any of the commodities specified in paragraph 3 should cease to be subject to recommended allocations by a Combined Board or successor body, the agreement would not thereafter apply to such commodity. Should rice cease to be subject to such allocation the provisions of paragraphs 5 through 9 would terminate except as to obligations already incurred.

892.01/9–545

The Thai Legation to the Department of State [38]

The Thai Legation presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honour to transmit the following message addressed to the Secretary of State by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand on September 3rd 1945.

"I have the honour to inform you that His Excellency the Regent, in the name of H. M. the King, has appointed me His Majesty's Prime Minister and concurrently the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and I have already assumed both posts as from the 3rd of September 1945.

On this occasion I hasten to express the solemn assurance that the foreign policy of my Government will be firmly based on cordial friendship and unreserved collaboration with the United States of America and the other United Nations in the establishment of peace, stability, and the prosperity of the world of freedom and justice. As far as the United States of America is concerned, I also sincerely wish to emphasize that Thailand always remembers the warmest sympathies and the perfect understanding the United States has extended to her since the very beginning of the relations between our two countries; and more especially in the hour of international difficulties in which, by force of circumstances, Thailand has been compelled to be involved, the goodwill of the United States towards Thailand has been clearly manifested in various instances. This will, for ever, remain engraved in the memory of the whole Thai nation. Now more than ever my country needs the precious assistance and support of the United States of America, and now more than ever we feel so much confident that our expectation will meet with favourable response. Please be assured that on my part I will use every endeavour further to promote the close and cordial relations which happily exist between our two countries.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration. Thawi Bunyaket."

WASHINGTON, 5 September 1945.

740.00119 PW/9–645 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commissioner in India (Merrell)

WASHINGTON, September 6, 1945—noon.

673. For Bishop. Re Dept message via OSS Aug. 18; [39] reurtel New Delhi 728, Sep 3.[40] 1. As stated orally to Brit Dept would have

[38] Handed by the Thai Chargé (Bhakdi) to the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs on September 5. The Chargé was informed that his note was being received "unofficially and informally" inasmuch as it was an official communication from the Thai Government which was not recognized by the United States and that Seni Pramoj continued to be recognized as Thai Minister in his personal capacity.

[39] Not found in Department files.

[40] Not printed; it stated in part: "Rapidly developing situation may not await reaching US-British agreement in Washington. If Department desires any steps be taken by American officers here to assure, if possible, that Anglo-Thai agree-

preferred Brit political negotiations separate from negotiations military agreement and not at Kandy. Issue does not, however, seem sufficiently important to press further.

2. It is Dept view that as military agreement is of Allied character it would be desirable for US military to participate in military talks following directives and guidance sent Wheeler by War.

3. Report received from OSS that SACSEA on Sep 4 presented military agreement to Thai military mission with requirement that they reply by Sep 7. Agreement as reported omits some paragraphs of agreement as communicated to Dept Aug 20, but includes some provisions to which US objects.

4. Brit Chiefs of Staff recommended Sep 4 a CCS telegram to Mountbatten giving text of a proposed interim agreement between SACSEA and Thai High Command. First paragraph would require release Allied POWs and care and transportation at Thai expense. Second paragraph would require cooperation in disarming Japanese, interning enemies, and delivering Japanese military property. Third paragraph would require Thai to make available to Allies their military forces and facilities and land and buildings required for accommodation of stores and troops. Fourth and last paragraph would require Thai to comply with any other requests by SACSEA which he considers necessary to protect military interests of Allies.

5. Dept understands that JCS considering suggestions that third paragraph be limited to Allied requirements in connection with matters covered by first and second paragraphs, and that fourth paragraph be deleted and a new paragraph inserted stating that no military agreement other than the interim agreement should be concluded with Thai pending CCS directive and that any military agreement which may have been concluded should be suspended and subject to change in accordance with directive of CCS.

6. Sent to New Delhi for Bishop. Repeated to Colombo for Bishop.

ACHESON

741.92/9–645 : Telegram

The Commissioner in India (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, September 6, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received September 6—9 : 30 a. m.]

738. Following from Bishop:

"Mountbatten gave Thai 48 hours to sign sweeping economic agreement under guise of military arrangement. Thai have returned to

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ments especially military conform to United States thought as expressed by Department, recommend that War be requested to send immediately to Wheeler directives and guidance. Does Department desire United States officer take part military talks?" (740.00119 PW/9–345). Lt. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler was Commanding General of United States Army Forces in the India–Burma Theater and Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of the Southeast Asia Command.

Bangkok and will radio SACSEA (Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia).

Agreement makes obvious British intention treat Thailand as enemy country to be occupied and controlled. OSS and War Department have details proposed agreement which does not conform to US policy.

If US cannot effectively oppose such harsh terms by Allied Commander, US prestige will be seriously impaired and US goodwill in Thailand sacrificed to the detriment of American overall policies toward Asiatics and the Pacific.

General Wheeler has officially asked Mountbatten for full information regarding Thai negotiations and has alerted US section at Kandy to forward information regarding all developments especially those contrary to US policy.

Message just received from Kandy states Mountbatten has informed British Chiefs of Staff that he expects Thai Regent to empower Thai representative to sign both parts of military agreement and that dependent upon receipt of Thai Regent's authority to sign, SACSEA will proceed with signature both parts military agreement unless he receives advice to the contrary from British Chiefs of Staff before 0400 hours Greenwich mean time September 7.

War Department fully informed by Wheeler.["]

MERRELL

741.92/9–645

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Moffat)[41]

[WASHINGTON,] September 6, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary;
Mr. Abbot Low Moffat, SEA;
Ambassador Winant, in London.

Mr. Acheson telephoned[42] Ambassador Winant in London at 5:30 p. m. Washington time. He informed Mr. Winant that Admiral Mountbatten had presented two military agreements to the Thai delegates at Kandy, Ceylon, and unless instructed to the contrary by the British Chiefs of Staff by 4 a. m. Greenwich time September 7 planned to conclude both agreements; that the material in the two agreements was furnished the State Department and the JCS on August 20; and that the first agreement—a short agreement on strictly military matters—reflected the views of the JCS and the State Department, was

[41] Initialed by the Acting Secretary of State.
[42] Transcript of conversation not printed.

satisfactory to us, and had, we understood, been accepted by the Thai.[43]

He explained that the second agreement, however, would put Thailand for a very considerable period under economic and other controls, and the JCS and the State Department had informed the British Government that they disagree in part with those provisions.

He stated that he thought that our views demonstrated agreement in the essentials with British objectives, but that we were not in agreement on some matters to which we attach considerable importance; that the agreement had been presented in the name of all the allied powers concerned; and that this might put us in a very embarrassing position if concluded and we might have to disavow it.

Mr. Acheson then requested Mr. Winant to try to see Mr. Bevin [44] to urge either that the time limit for the negotiation of the second agreement be extended, or, if already concluded, that the agreement be held in abeyance until the CCS has been able to reconcile the British and American positions; and to say that we recognize the urgency of decisions, but that we feel that a brief delay on the second agreement would avoid considerable embarrassment later. He explained that we do not feel the British have acted unfairly, and we recognize the British have been under considerable time pressure in view of the delay on our side although they may have acted a little hastily; that at all costs we wish to avoid serious embarrassment and hope that Mr. Bevin will see his way to do as we request.

Mr. Winant said that he understood the situation and that if he could not reach Mr. Bevin he would try to reach Mr. Attlee.[45]

892.01/9–645

The British Minister (Sansom) to the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Moffat)

WASHINGTON, September 6, 1945.

DEAR MR. MOFFAT: You will remember that in the State Department's *Aide-Mémoire* of August 22nd, commenting on this Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* of August 20th concerning agreements to be negotiated with Thai representatives at Kandy, we were asked to explain the intention of the words "undertake to participate in any international arrangement regarding tin and rubber" in a paragraph numbered D 5 in the annex to the Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* in question.

[43] Temporary Military Agreement No. 1 was signed at Kandy on September 8 by the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, and Lt. Gen. Sakdi Senanarong, Chief of the Siamese Military Mission to SACSEA; a copy was circulated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on October 8 as C.C.S. 906/6 (741.92/10–845).

[44] Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

[45] Clement R. Attlee, British Prime Minister.

The Embassy was instructed by the Foreign Office on September 1st to inform you that the intention of the clause concerning tin and rubber is that, if there is a Rubber Study Group or Tin Study Group or any other form of international arrangement in which all countries interested in the production or consumption of rubber or tin take part, Thailand would undertake also to take part in it.

I think I told you this orally when we met the night before last, but think it is better to confirm it in writing. I should add that this explanation reached us before we had received the State Department's *Aide-Mémoire* of September 1st, in which the same question was raised.

Yours sincerely, G. B. SANSOM

892.01/9–745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State

LONDON, September 6, 1945—11 : 50 p. m.
[Received September 7.]

2277. Immediately after receiving your telephone call I tried to reach Bevin but as he was out of town I called on the Prime Minister who was most helpful. The instruction sent to Admiral Mountbatten was to negotiate only the first agreement which I was told had been cleared with our Joint Chiefs of Staff. The following sentence however was added, "This agreement does not in any way affect the position of individual Allied governments vis-à-vis Thailand and is entirely without prejudice to any settlement with Thailand which they may contemplate."

Further action will await agreement by the State Department and the Foreign Office and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

[WINANT]

711.94114A O.T./8–1845

The Chief of the Special War Problems Division (Plitt) to the Thai Chargé (Bhakdi)

WASHINGTON, September 7, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES: I refer to the Minister's letter of August 18, 1945,[46] addressed to Mr. Moffat in which he indicated that the Thai authorities would be pleased to look after Allied prisoners of war liberated in Thailand. The Thai Regent suggested that the Japanese Government be instructed forthwith to deliver the

[46] Not printed.

Allied prisoners in Thailand to the Thai authorities who would give them the best possible treatment until they could be repatriated.

The kind offer of the Thai authorities has been brought to the attention of the American military authorities who, I am sure, will be most pleased to have the assistance of the Thai authorities.

Reports received in the Department of State from Thailand indicate that the Thai resistance movement has been most helpful to Allied authorities engaged in the liberation and repatriation of Allied nationals in Thailand.

Please accept my thanks for the assistance which you and your representatives in Thailand have been able to give to the American authorities.

Sincerely yours, EDWIN A. PLITT

741.92/9–845

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

1. His Majesty's Government have given the most careful consideration to the State Department's *Aide-Mémoire* of 1st September. Before replying in detail to the various points raised in it they desire to make certain general observations.

2. His Majesty's Government are most anxious to attain the maximum degree of unity of action with the Government of the United States in the Far East as elsewhere.

3. Moreover it is their desire to see the restoration of a free, sovereign and independent Siam, and a renewal of the old friendly relations between Great Britain and Siam.

4. But if these objectives are to be reached the facts of the situation must be frankly faced. The State Department's Memorandum records that Siam is the only country within the theatre of a combined Anglo-American Command with which one of the Governments represented in that Command is at war while the other is not. This is however solely due to the fact that the United States Government have chosen to ignore a declaration of war made by Siam upon them. His Majesty's Government do not for one moment seek to question this decision on the part of the United States Government but they could hardly admit that it entitled the United States Government to ask that other Governments who are in a state of war with Siam should forego their rights or that it could justifiably be adduced as a reason for the mitigation of the conditions upon which those countries are prepared to liquidate the state of war. On the contrary, His Majesty's Government would hope that the United States Government

on their side will take no action to embarrass them or to compromise their position as an ally at war with Siam. In particular it would be difficult for His Majesty's Government to agree that the action of the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia should be limited solely to matters of concern to the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States in relation to the war against *Japan*.

5. The attitude of His Majesty's Government towards Siam has already been publicly declared in Mr. Bevin's statement in the House of Commons of the 20th August.[47] In that statement the help received from the Siamese Resistance Movement was acknowledged and it was made clear that if the Movement had not taken overt action earlier this was due to advice given by the Allies on purely military grounds. But the fact must not be overlooked that the advice was given in the interests of the Siamese themselves and to prevent premature action which might have had unfortunate consequences for them.

6. His Majesty's Government will now give all due weight to the assistance afforded by the Siamese Resistance Movement. But the state of war between Great Britain and Siam remains to be liquidated and Siam's association with Japan leaves many practical questions for settlement. Mr. Bevin's statement of the 20th August made it clear that the attitude of His Majesty's Government will depend on the way in which the Siamese meet the requirements of the British troops now about to enter their country; the extent to which they undo the wrongs done by their predecessors and make restitution for injury, loss and damage caused to British and Allied interests; and the extent of their contribution to the restoration of peace, good order and economic rehabilitation in South East Asia. If these questions are approached on the Siamese side in the spirit of the proclamation issued by the Regent of Siam on the 16th August,[48] there is good reason to hope that a satisfactory solution may rapidly be reached.

7. The draft Heads of Agreement communicated to the State Department on the 20th August gave an indication of the conditions upon which His Majesty's Government are prepared to liquidate the state of war with Siam and to recognise and collaborate with a friendly Siamese Government. In the State Department's *Aide-Mémoire* it is suggested that in certain respects these terms may constitute an infringement of the sovereignty and independence of Siam. This is only true in the sense that any provisions which an enemy country is required to accept as a condition of the liquidation of a state of war are an infringement of its sovereignty and independence. His Majesty's Government do not believe that their conditions are in any way unjust and it is for Siam, by the fulfilment of these conditions,

[47] *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 413, col. 299.

[48] For text, see letter of August 17, from the Thai Minister, to the Secretary of State, Department of State *Bulletin*, August 19, 1945, p. 261.

to resume her place in the comity of nations on a basis of full equality with other sovereign and independent States.

8. His Majesty's Government have drawn up their conditions in no spirit of retaliation for the injury done to Allied interests by Siam's association with Japan. But they could scarcely accept a position in which Siam should profit from that association or, in such matters as the export of her commodities during the liberation period, from the needs of countries which have suffered from Japanese aggression.

9. His Majesty's Government have also felt it incumbent upon them in their draft Conditions to safeguard the interests of other Allied powers until those powers are in a position to arrive at their own settlement with Siam.

10. In the light of these general considerations His Majesty's Government have examined the various points of detail raised in the State Department's *Aide-Mémoire* with every desire to go as far as possible to meet the views of the United States Government.

11. If they take the question of rice first it is because on one major issue, namely that of the free contribution of 1,500,000 tons of rice, His Majesty's Government regret that they find it impossible to bring their views into conformity with those expressed in the State Department's *Aide-Mémoire.*

12. In the first place, His Majesty's Government do not agree that Siam will face any serious *external* financial and economic problem. On the contrary Siam's external resources (gold and foreign exchange) will have been conserved or even increased during the war period, while her external liabilities will not be increased substantially. There is, to the best of His Majesty's Government's knowledge, comparatively little war damage in Siam to be repaired before Siam can again enjoy a very favourable current trade position with the rest of the world.

13. Secondly, Siam alone among the nations involved in the war has been able in war conditions to accumulate a very large surplus of a commodity essential to the life of neighbouring territories, for the lack of which those territories have suffered hardship and even famine. The consequent rise in the price of rice to approximately three times the pre-war level has aggravated inflationary conditions in neighbouring and other countries.

14. If Siam were to be allowed to unload these involuntarily hoarded stocks at the present scarcity prices, the proceeds would bring Siam's existing holdings of gold and foreign exchange to three times their present level. Even at half that price they would be doubled. In either event Siam would end the war in an incomparably better financial position than any of the other countries which were in a position to offer more serious resistance to the aggressor.

15. His Majesty's Government feel very strongly on this point. They would regard it as contrary to all principles of justice that a country in Siam's position should thus increase her claims upon the production of the rest of the world at a time when so many other nations must continue, for many years, efforts comparable to those which they made during the war in order merely to restore their pre-war standards of living.

16. The view of His Majesty's Government is that Siam should contribute out of her abundance to the needs of other countries. They feel bound therefore to maintain Clause 23 (A) of the Annex to the draft Heads of Agreement as a condition to be accepted by Siam, unless in the meantime Siam makes an offer of a voluntary contribution of the same amount. From a Siamese source to which they have good reason to attach authority, His Majesty's Government understand that this question is in fact under consideration by the Siamese authorities and that there exists at present in Siam a stock-pile of 1,500,000 tons of rice. Should a free contribution be offered by the Siamese Government, His Majesty's Government trust that the United States Government would waive their reluctance to share in the benefit of it.

17. While His Majesty's Government do not, for the above reasons, feel able to forego the free contribution of 1,500,000 tons of rice, they would be very ready in principle to deal with the question of the future production and export of rice along the lines indicated in the State Department's *Aide-Mémoire*, on the understanding that, once the proposed Agreement with the Siamese Government has been concluded, the operations of the proposed Rice Commission should be under British direction and that the principle of combined, as opposed to competitive, activity in the stimulation of the production and export of rice from Siam is accepted from the outset; and furthermore that the prices to be paid should be fixed in agreement with the Rice Commission having regard to the controlled prices of rice in other Asiatic producing areas and that no duties on the export of rice should be imposed greater than those in force before the 7th December 1941.

18. To give time for the further discussion of the United States proposals His Majesty's Government have decided to omit from the Heads of Agreement to be communicated to the Siamese representatives Clause 23 (C) of the Annex as well as the Appendix referred to in that Clause and to amend Clause 23 (B) to read as follows:—

"Thereafter, for so long as in the opinion of the Combined Boards or other authority acting on behalf of the Allies a world shortage of rice continues, to take all possible measures to promote and to maintain the maximum rice production and to make available to an organisation to be set up for the purpose the resulting surpluses in a manner to be indicated by that organisation, and at prices fixed in

agreement with it, having regard to the controlled prices of rice in other Asiatic producing areas."

19. On the other hand, the necessity for acquiring rice from Siam without delay, if famine in liberated territories in Asia and possibly also in India is to be averted, is so great that it is essential forthwith to make temporary arrangements for the collection, bagging, transport to shipping port and shipment of the largest possible quantity of Siamese rice until such time as the proposed Rice Commission is ready to function. Measures are therefore in progress for the despatch at the earliest possible moment of competent personnel for this purpose who could be subsequently absorbed into the proposed Rice Commission.

20. The following observations relate to the other points raised in the State Department's *Aide-Mémoire*.

21. The title "Siamese Liberation Government" was originally employed because it was anticipated that the Agreement would be negotiated with Siamese authorities which had broken away from the Siamese Government then associating with the Japanese. The final Agreement to be concluded on the basis of the draft Heads of Agreement will of course be with the Siamese Government. The word "Liberation" will accordingly be struck out where it now occurs in the draft Heads of Agreement.

Tin and Rubber

22. His Majesty's Government have already explained the intention underlying Clause 5 of Section D of the Heads of Agreement.[49] In the light of the observations in the State Department's *Aide-Mémoire* they have now decided to reword Clause 5 as follows:—

"Undertake to participate in any general international arrangement regarding tin and rubber which conforms with such principles regarding commodity arrangements as may be agreed by the United Nations organisation or its Economic and Social Council."

Treatment of British Commercial Industrial and Professional Interests

23. His Majesty's Government cannot well join in representations to a Government with which they are not in diplomatic relations and they regret that they do not see their way to leaving this important matter for settlement after the state of war has been liquidated. They are however happy to assure the United States Government that, although Clause 3 in Section D of the Heads of Agreement naturally refers to British interests only, it is not their intention to seek any

[49] See note of September 6 from the British Minister, p. 1307.

exclusive privileges for those interests. His Majesty's Government have accordingly decided to add to Clause 3 the following phrase:—

"Nothing in this Clause shall be deemed to preclude the grant of equally favourable treatment to nationals of any or all of the United Nations."

COMPENSATION FOR LOSS, DAMAGE ETC. TO ALLIED NATIONALS, PROPERTY, RIGHTS AND INTERESTS

24. His Majesty's Government regret that they cannot share the United States view that claims under this heading should be postponed until general reparations questions relating to Japan [50] are decided. Nor can they agree that the issue of currency for Japanese needs in Siam during the war affects Siam's capacity to make due compensation to the Allies for loss or damage. While the internal value of the baht has been lowered, Siam's reserves of sterling and gold have been conserved and for the purpose of external payments she is in no worse position than at the beginning of the war. His Majesty's Government would of course have no objection to any consequential claim by Siam against Japan being considered when the general question of Japanese reparations is considered, provided that there is any surplus out of which such claim could be met after the claims of the United Nations have been satisfied.

25. His Majesty's Government have, in response to the representations contained in the State Department's *Aide-Mémoire*, decided to delete Clause 26 of the Annex to the draft Heads of Agreement relating to the payment for relief supplies in gold.

26. It is desirable in the general interest that the present anomalous situation in regard to Siam should be brought to an end at the earliest possible moment. It is thus a matter of great urgency to conclude an Agreement for the liquidation of the state of war between His Majesty's Government and certain other powers on the one hand and Siam on the other. His Majesty's Government are therefore now instructing Mr. Dening to make the necessary arrangements for a Siamese Mission to visit Kandy for the negotiation of an Agreement on the basis of the draft Heads of Agreement (with Annex) amended to take account as far as possible of the views of the United States Government.

WASHINGTON, September 8, 1945.

[50] For documentation on this subject, see pp. 989 ff.

890.00/9–845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 8, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received September 8—1:25 p. m.]

9224. [Here follows substance of conversation on various Far Eastern questions with Sterndale Bennett on the morning of September 8.]

Thailand was discussed at some length and reference made to Mr. Winant's meeting with Prime Minister the night of September 6 and orders which had gone to Mountbatten to sign only the first of the two military agreements referred to in that meeting. Sterndale Bennett says FonOff itself doesn't like certain aspects of the second agreement proposed and that strict instructions have gone to Mountbatten to do nothing regarding it until further orders.

FonOff believes US-British position on Thailand is getting closer but on at least one point British feel they must remain firm. They are at war with Thailand and British troops there cannot be limited in numbers or functions to matters solely of concern to war against Japan.

The question of French Indo-China territories taken by Thailand was raised and Sterndale Bennett said British position was based, as he believed US position was, on the principle that territorial changes made under duress should not be recognized. British believe France has strong case for demanding return of its territory and any effort to differentiate between British territories taken by Thailand and French would make French "see red" and accomplish no good for anybody. Sterndale Bennett feels that *status quo* should be first returned to and then after brief period to let passions cool, a fresh start could be made. He implied that if in making an agreement with France to return to *status quo* Thai Govt should insert some phrase about not prejudicing subsequent negotiation of whole question, there would be no great objection. He feels strongly that if some such procedure is adopted there will be real possibility of mutually satisfactory solution to the matter but that otherwise there would be danger of trouble in South East Asia which would be harmful to all our interests.

WINANT

741.92/9–1045

The British Embassy to the Department of State [51]

TEXT OF HEADS OF AGREEMENT TO BE PRESENTED BY MR. DENING (CHIEF POLITICAL ADVISER TO ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN) ON BEHALF OF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REGENT OF SIAM AT KANDY

The attitude of His Majesty's Government towards Siam will depend on the degree of her co-operation in matters arising out of the termination of hostilities against Japan and on her readiness (*a*) to make restitution to His Majesty's Government and their allies for the injury done to them in consequence of Siam's association with Japan and (*b*) to ensure security and good-neighbour relations for the future.

The particular steps which His Majesty's Government would expect the Siamese Government to take as a condition of recognising it and of agreeing to terminate the state of war, are as follows:—

A. MEASURES OF REPUDIATION

1. Repudiate the declaration of war made on Great Britain on the 25th January 1942 and all measures pursuant to that declaration which may operate to the prejudice of Great Britain and her Allies.

2. Repudiate the Alliance entered into by Siam with Japan on the 21st December 1941, and all other treaties, pacts or agreements concluded between Siam and Japan.

3. Recognise as null and void all acquisitions of British territory made by Siam later than the 7th December 1941 and all titles, rights, properties and interests acquired in such territory since that date by the Siamese State or Siamese subjects.

B. MEASURES OF RESTITUTION AND READJUSTMENT

1. Take the necessary legislative and administrative measures to give effect to Section A above including in particular:—

(*a*) Repeal all legislative and administrative measures relating to the annexation by, or incorporation in, Siam of British territories acquired later than the 7th December 1941.

(*b*) Withdraw as may be required by the competent civil or military authority all Siamese military personnel from British territories annexed by, or incorporated in, Siam after the 7th December 1941; and all Siamese officials and nationals who entered these territories after their annexation by, or incorporation in, Siam.

(*c*) Restore all property taken away from these territories. This would include currency except to the extent to which it could be established that fair value had been given in exchange.

[51] Handed by Sir George Sansom to Mr. Ballantine on September 10.

(*d*) Compensate loss or damage to property, rights and interests in these territories arising out of the occupation of these territories by Siam.

(*e*) Redeem in Sterling out of former Sterling reserves, Siamese notes collected by the British authorities in British territory occupied by Siam since 7th December 1941.

2. Take all possible steps to ensure the prompt succour and relief of all British prisoners of War and internees held in Siam or in any territories purported to have been annexed by or incorporated in Siam,

(*a*) At Siamese expense provide them with adequate food, clothing, medical and hygienic services, and transportation, in consultation with the Allied Military Authorities.

(*b*) Undertake to enter into an agreement with His Majesty's Government for the mutual upkeep of war graves.

3. Assume responsibility for safeguarding, maintaining and restoring unimpaired, British property, rights and interests of all kind[s] in Siam and for payment of compensation for losses or damage sustained. The term "property, rights and interests" to include, *inter alia*, the official property of His Majesty's Government, property whose ownership has been transferred since the outbreak of war, pensions granted to British Nationals, stocks of tin, teak and other commodities, shipping and wharves, and tin, teak and other leases and concessions granted to British firms and individuals prior to the 7th December 1941, and still valid at that date.

4. Desequestrate British banking and commercial concerns and permit them to resume business.

5. Accept liability, with the addition of interest, at an appropriate percentage, in respect of payments in arrears, for the service of the loans and for the payment of pensions in full since the date when regular payments ceased.

6. Undertake to conclude as and when required, with the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia Command or in such other manner as may be satisfactory to His Majesty's Government, an agreement or agreements to cover all or any of the matters specified in the Annex to this document.

C. MEASURES FOR POST-WAR STRATEGIC CO-OPERATION

1. Recognise that the course of events in the war with Japan demonstrates the importance of Siam to the defence of Malaya, Burma, India and Indo-China and the security of the Indian Ocean and South West Pacific areas.

2. Agree, until such time as she is admitted to membership of the United Nations, to carry out such measures for the preservation of

international peace and security as the United Nations Organisation may require.

3. Undertake that no canal linking the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Siam shall be cut across Siamese territory without the prior concurrence of His Majesty's Government.

D. MEASURES FOR POST-WAR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

1. Agree to take all possible measures to re-establish import and export trade between Siam, on the one hand, and neighbouring British territories on the other, and to adopt and maintain a good-neighbourly policy in regard to coastal shipping.

2. Undertake to negotiate with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as soon as practicable a new Treaty of Commerce and Navigation and a Consular and Establishment Convention based on the principles in Clause 4 below.

3. Undertake to negotiate with the Government of India as soon as practicable a new treaty of commerce and navigation based on the principles in the following clause.

4. Pending the conclusion of the Treaties and convention referred to in Clauses 2 and 3 above, undertake to observe the provisions of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed at Bangkok on the 23rd of November 1937 and, in addition, not to enforce measures excluding British commercial or industrial interests or British professional men from participation in Siamese economy and trade (subject to such exceptions, if any, as may be agreed between his Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom or the Government of India and the Siamese Government) or requiring them to maintain stocks or reserves in excess of normal commercial, shipping, industrial or business practice, provided that if the Treaties and convention have not been concluded within a period of three years, this undertaking shall lapse unless it is prolonged by agreement. Nothing in this Clause shall be deemed to preclude the grant of equally favourable treatment to nationals or enterprises of any or all of the United Nations.

5. Undertake to negotiate a Civil Aviation Agreement in respect of all British Commonwealth Civil Air Services not less favourable than the Agreement of 1937 with respect to Imperial Airways.

6. Undertake to participate in any general international arrangement regarding tin and rubber which conforms with such principles regarding commodity arrangements as may be agreed by the United Nations Organisation or its Economic and Social Council.

E. REGULARISATION OF SIAMESE POSITION IN RELATION TO BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL TREATIES AND HER MEMBERSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

1. Agree to regard as in force such bilateral treaties between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Siam as may be specified by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, subject to any modifications His Majesty's Government may indicate, and to regard as abrogated any such treaties not so specified.

2. Agree to regard as in force any multilateral treaties, conventions or agreements concluded prior to the 7th December, 1941 (*a*) to which Siam was then a party, (*b*) to which Siam was not then a party and which may be specified in a list to be furnished to the Siamese Government. Agree also to accept any modifications thereto which may have come into effect in accordance with the terms of such instruments since that date.

3. Pending admission to any international organisation set up since the 7th December, 1941 being an organisation of which His Majesty's Government is a member, agree to carry out any obligations arising out of, or in connection with, any such organisation or the instrument constituting it, as may at any time be specified by His Majesty's Government.

[Annex]

MILITARY ANNEX

Points to be covered in an agreement or agreements with the Supreme Allied Commander or in such other manner as may be satisfactory to His Majesty's Government.

The Siamese Government shall agree:—

1. To dissolve any military, para-military or political organisation conducting propaganda hostile to the United Nations.

2. To hand over to the Allied military authorities all vessels belonging to the United Nations which are in Siamese ports.

3. To take all possible steps to ensure the prompt succour and relief of all Allied prisoners of war and internees; and at Siamese expense to provide them with adequate food, clothing, medical and hygienic services, and transportation, in consultation with the Allied military authorities.

4. To assume responsibility for safeguarding, maintaining and restoring unimpaired Allied property, rights and interests of all kinds in Siam and for payment of compensation for losses or damage sustained.

5. To desequestrate Allied banking and commercial concerns and permit them to resume business.

6. To co-operate with the Allied military authorities in

(*a*) disarming Japanese forces in Siam and handing them over to the Allies;

(*b*) interning all Japanese (and German) nationals and holding them at the disposal of the Allies: and

(*c*) seizing and delivering to the designated Allied military authority all war material and other materials and supplies under Japanese control, including naval and merchant vessels of all kinds, aircraft, weapons and ammunition, motor and other transport, military stores including aviation and other petrols and fuels, stocks of food and clothing, wireless equipment and any other property whatsoever of the Japanese armed forces.

7. To prohibit trading with the enemies of the Allies so long as the Allies prohibit trade generally with these enemies.

8. To hold all Japanese (and other enemy) property at the disposal of the Allies.

9. To co-operate in the apprehension and trial of persons accused of war crimes or notable for affording active assistance to Japan.

10. To hand over to the Allied military authorities all alleged renegades of Allied nationality.

11. For so long as may be necessary for the conclusion of all matters of military concern to the Allies arising out of the settlement of the war with Japan:—

(*a*) To maintain and make available to the Allied military authorities such of the Siamese naval, land and air forces with their ports, airfields, establishments, equipment, communications, weapons and stores of all kinds as may be specified, and in addition such land buildings and storage as may from time to time be required by the Allied military authorities for the accommodation of troops and stores.

(*b*) To place at the disposal of the Allied military authorities ports and free traffic facilities in and over Siamese territory, as required.

(*c*) To provide free of cost all other supplies and services and all Siamese currency that may be required by the Allied military authorities.

(*d*) To arrange in accordance with the wishes of the Allied military authorities for press and other censorship and control over radio and telecommunication installations or other forms of intercommunications.

(*e*) Except in any areas which may be placed, by agreement between the Siamese Government and the competent Allied military authority, under the direct administration of that authority, to comply in matters of civil administration with all requests which the competent Allied military authority may make in the pursuance of his task.

(*f*) To arrange for facilities for the recruitment of local labour and for the utilisation in Siamese territory of industrial and transport enterprises and of means of communication, power stations,

public utility enterprises and other facilities, stocks of fuel and other materials, in accordance with the requirements and instructions of the competent Allied military authority.

(*g*) To negotiate an agreement granting judicial and other immunities for Allied forces in Siam.

12. To make Siamese merchant vessels, whether in Siamese or foreign waters, subject to the control of the Allies for use as may be required in the general interests of the Allies, for so long as arrangements continue in force for pooling Allied shipping.

13. To agree to the setting up of a military mission, to be appointed by the appropriate military authority to advise on the organisation, training and equipment of the Siamese armed forces.

14. To control banks and business, foreign exchange and foreign commercial and financial transactions as required by the Allies, for so long as may be necessary for the conclusion of all financial and economic matters arising out of the war with Japan.

15. To undertake to prohibit, except in accordance with the directions of the Combined Boards acting on behalf of the Allies or of such similar authority as may replace these Boards, any exports of rice, tin, rubber and teak and to regulate trade in and production of these commodities until, in the opinion of the appropriate organisation which may be set up by the United Nations, the world scarcity in these commodities arising out of the war with Japan no longer exists.

16. (*a*) To make available free of cost at Bangkok, as quickly as may be compatible with the retention of supplies adequate for Siamese internal needs, one and a half million tons of sound white rice, or, if so agreed by the authorities appointed by the Allies for the purpose, the equivalent quantity of paddy.

(*b*) Thereafter, for so long as, in the opinion of the Combined Boards or other authority acting on behalf of the Allies, a world shortage of rice continues, to take all possible measures to promote and to maintain the maximum rice production and to make available to an organisation to be set up for the purpose the resulting surpluses in a manner to be indicated by that organisation and at prices to be fixed in agreement with it, having regard to the controlled prices of rice in other Asiatic producing areas.

17. To arrange the withdrawal and redemption in Siamese currency at par, within a time limit to be specified by the Allies, of all holdings in Siamese territory of baht currency issued by the Allied Command or by any of the Allies if it shall have been found necessary for the competent Allied military authority to use any such currency in Siam. If any such currency so used is not denominated in baht, to arrange upon request for its withdrawal and redemption in Siamese

currency within a time limit to be specified by the Allies at such rates of exchange as may be determined by agreement between the Allies and the Siamese Government. All currency so withdrawn by the Siamese Government shall be handed over free of all cost to the Allied Command. Alternatively the Allied Command would accept payment in dollars or sterling at the recognised rate of exchange for currency not denominated in baht.

741.92/9–1045

The British Minister (Sansom) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine)[52]

The following is the substance of an oral communication which I made to you yesterday:—[53]

(1) The Heads of Agreement and its Annex [54] are linked together by Clause 6 of Section B of the Heads of Agreement and jointly represent the conditions on which H. M. Government are prepared to terminate the state of war with Siam and to recognise the Siamese Government.

(2) The Siamese representatives will be told, when the Heads of Agreement and Annex are communicated to them, that our conditions do not at present cover the question of the territory acquired by Siam from Indo-China in 1941, because it is assumed that this question will be settled separately between Siam and France to the satisfaction of the latter in an Agreement to be negotiated at the same time as our own. But we do not recognise any territorial changes which have been made under duress since the outbreak of the World War, and in view of France's position as our Ally we therefore reserve the right to cover the question of this territory, if necessary, in our own Agreement with Siam and to put forward provisions to that effect at any time during the negotiations.[55]

(3) The comments of the Department of State in their Memorandum of September 1st and those of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff in their Memorandum CCS 906/4 [56] appear to be based on a suspicion that we are seeking to impose military and economic domination over Siam and to continue, for an indefinite period after the state of war with

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[52] Addressed also to the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs.

[53] Covering memorandum of conversation of September 10 by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs not printed.

[54] *Supra.*

[55] In an *aide-mémoire* of August 31, the British Embassy stated that in the draft Heads of Agreement to be presented to the Thais, references to Franco-Thai territorial questions would be excluded as "It is now assumed that these questions will be dealt with in a separate instrument to be negotiated by the French Provisional Government with the Thai Government." (740.00119 P.W./8–3145)

[56] Latter not found in Department files.

her has been liquidated, such servitudes, restrictions or controls as may be immediately desirable. Such a suspicion would be entirely without foundation and we have sought to remove it in our revised texts by indicating, as far as it is practical to do so in present circumstances, the time limits which we have in mind for the duration of some of the obligations which in their original form the Department of State or the U. S. Chiefs of Staff desire to see limited.

For instance, the purely military facilities specified in the Annex are now requested "for so long as may be necessary for the conclusion of all matters of military concern to the Allies arising out of the settlement of the war against Japan." As we have already indicated, we cannot agree that, so long as our state of war remains unliquidated, the action of the Supreme Allied Commander and the rôle of our forces in Siam should be limited necessarily or solely to matters concerned with the surrender of Japanese forces. But, once the state of war with Siam has been liquidated (by the conclusion of an Agreement based on our Heads of Agreement and its Annex as an integral whole) the situation will be different. We should then see no objection to the question of facilities for Allied troops in Siam being linked to the conclusion of all matters of military concern to the Allies arising out of the settlement of the war in Japan, including in particular the removal of all Japanese forces from Siam. This is of course without prejudice to any action which the United Nations organisation might see fit to take, either after the admission of Siam to membership in the United Nations or before such admission in virtue of Clause 2 of Section C of the Heads of Agreement.

G[EORGE] B. S[ANSOM]

[WASHINGTON,] 11/IX/45.

741.92/9–1945

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Government of the United States has studied carefully the *aide-mémoire* from the British Embassy dated September 8, 1945 relating to Siam and the revised Text of Heads of Agreement with Military Annex presented to the Department of State on September 10.

The expression by the British Government of its desire to go as far as possible to meet the views of this Government is appreciated. This Government has approached its consideration of the proposed agreements in similar spirit and with a desire to avoid embarrassing the British Government or any of its allies which are at war with Siam. This has already been demonstrated by the withdrawal last month, at

the urgent request of the British Government, of this Government's resolution to extend the scope of UNRRA operations to include Siam.[57]

Siamese Rice

This Government welcomes the acceptance in principle by the British Government of the principles of the tripartite agreement relating to Siamese rice which it proposed. It concurs in the change suggested by the British Government that export duties on Siamese rice should be limited, without the consent of the Rice Commission, to those in force on December 7, 1941 instead of August 15, 1945, as set forth in the American proposal. It agrees also that the prices to be paid for rice should be fixed by the Siamese Government in agreement with the Rice Commission having regard to the controlled prices of rice in other Asiatic producing areas. The meaning of the suggestion that the operations of the Rice Commission be under British direction is not clear, but it is assumed that it is intended by this suggestion that at least the senior personnel engaged in the execution of operations approved by the Rice Commission be British. This Government has no objection to the suggestion as so understood, and, indeed, it would be agreeable to having the chairmanship of the Rice Commission British and most of the operational personnel British, it being understood, of course, that all decisions of the Rice Commission governing such operations would be by agreement between the British and American representation on the Commission.

With regard to the Rice Commission, this Government has recognized the need for combined Anglo-American dealing with Siamese rice because of the urgency of the problem. It does not wish to be understood as opposing future representation on the Commission of other major rice importing or exporting countries should circumstances arise indicating the desirability of adding such representation to the Commission.

The United States Government regrets the decision of the British Government to require a levy on Siamese rice unless the Siamese make a voluntary gift of rice to the United Nations. This Government also has been informed that the Siamese are considering such a gift, but it has no information as to the contemplated procedure by which such gift would be made. The most desirable procedure would appear to be a gift to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. This Government believes that there would be serious administrative and political difficulties if the allocation of a free contribution of Siamese rice had to be made by the Combined Food

[57] Withdrawal was directed by the Department in telegram 6533, August 4, 2 p. m., to London, which read: "Reurtel 7860 of August 4. Dept favors alternative (B)." (840.50 UNRRA/8–445) For telegram 7860, August 4, 1 p. m., from London, see vol. II, p. 1003.

Board, as every rice-importing nation might wish a share regardless of practical considerations.

If a free contribution is not made by the Siamese Government and if the British Government adheres to its decision to require a levy on Siamese rice, this Government believes that that is a matter for British-Siamese determination and should not be part of any agreement entered into on behalf of or for the benefit of the Allies. This Government is unable to concur in the suggestion that discharge of such a levy should precede the application of the principles proposed in the tripartite agreement and that such agreement should apply only to further production and exports of rice. It believes that the United States and other countries not at war with Siam should be able to purchase, from rice stocks presently available in Siam as well as those hereafter available, the amounts of rice allocated to them by the Combined Food Board at the same time that the British procure the amounts allocated to them by the Combined Food Board. If the British Government insists upon a levy on Siamese rice some British-Siamese arrangement might be made bilaterally whereby rice allocated from time to time by the Combined Food Board for British use could be procured by the British free of charge until the total agreed amount of the levy had been so allocated and procured. By this procedure, the interests of the nations not participating in such levy as well as the interests of the British Government would be fully protected.

With regard to the amounts of rice stocks now available in Siam, this Government has already communicated informally to the British Embassy an estimate which it has received, made on August 2, 1945 by the Siamese authorities in Bangkok, that the amount of rice available for export from the 1944 crop will be about 780,000 metric tons and that the coming crop will probably yield, because of early rains and a drastic reduction in tilled acreage, an export surplus of only 510,000 metric tons. This Government had received earlier an estimate from the Siamese Minister in Washington that stocks on hand totalled about 1,500,000 tons, but it was never able to secure verification of this estimate which it believes may have been based on prewar exports.

This Government welcomes the prompt action which the British Government is taking for the immediate collection, bagging, transport and shipment of Siamese rice as indicated in Paragraph 19 of the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of September 8. It is assumed that such shipments will be in accordance with Combined Food Board allocations and any questions of prices or of procurement without charge will be settled later in accordance with agreements made by the Siamese with the proposed Rice Commission and any British-Siamese

agreement relating to free rice. This Government would appreciate receiving information on matters affecting Siamese rice obtained by any British rice personnel who may enter Siam before American rice personnel.

It would appear that the British and American Governments are in agreement on the principle that the control of Siamese rice and certain other exports should continue during the immediate emergency period that these commodities are in short supply. This Government, however, attaches much importance to the specifying of a date when an agreement of the nature contemplated would expire, with such provision as seems advisable for the renewal of the agreement for a specific period or for its prior termination upon a clearly determinable event. This Government assumes that the acceptance in principle by the British Government of the principles of the suggested tripartite agreement includes the provisions for its termination and renewal as set forth in Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Annex to the Department's *aide-mémoire* of September 1.

It is understood that the provisions of Clauses 15 and 16(*b*) of the Military Annex are not intended for inclusion in an agreement to be negotiated by the Supreme Allied Commander, but are intended to summarize in succinct form the basic principles to be included in the proposed tripartite agreement. To avoid possible confusion and ambiguity, it is hoped that Clauses 15 and 16(*b*) of the Military Annex will be amended so as to conform, in respect to duration and termination, to the provisions of Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the principles of the proposed tripartite agreement.

This Government considers that the references in Clauses 15 and 16(*b*): "an appropriate organization which may be set up by the United Nations", "such similar authority as may replace these Boards", and "other authority acting on behalf of the Allies", are also not sufficiently definite. It would urge that any such references should be to "any successor body [to the Combined Board] [58] determined by the United States and Great Britain".

It is noted that there has been added to Clause 15 the phrase "to regulate trade in and production of these commodities", which phrase did not appear in Clause 22 of the Text of the Military Agreement originally communicated to the Department on August 20. This Government would have no objection to the phrase if amended by the insertion of the word "stimulate" before the word "production". Any connotation of limitation on production implicit in the word "regulate" would thus be avoided, and the phrase would more accurately reflect the objectives sought.

[58] Brackets appear in the original *aide-mémoire*.

If the foregoing suggestions are approved by the British Government, this Government will be glad to agree that the principle of combined instead of competitive action in the stimulation of production and export of rice from Siam during the period of the proposed tripartite agreement be accepted from the outset.

Military Annex

This Government understands that those clauses included in the Military Annex which are of Allied military or quasi-military concern will be included in a military agreement to be concluded by the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command, with the Siamese Military Mission acting on behalf of the Siamese Government; while those clauses not of such military or quasi-military concern will be covered by other agreements such as the proposed tripartite agreement relating to rice and Combined Board allocations.

It is assumed that it would be proposed to include Clauses 1 through 14 and Clause 17 in the military agreement. This Government welcomes the changes which have been made by the British Government in the revision of those clauses. There are still, however, a few points on which this Government hopes that a closer reconciliation of views can be achieved.

Clause 4. This Government has taken note of the British viewpoint that Siam must make compensation for all losses or damages sustained by British property, rights and interests regardless of whether the Siamese Government or the Japanese were responsible therefor. This Government has expressed its view that it would not be just to require Siam to pay compensation for Japanese looting or other damage, especially prior to the Siamese declaration of war, because the only Siamese responsibility for such loss or damage was their yielding after several hours of resistance to overwhelming Japanese armed aggression. It hopes that the British Government may yet accept that view.

It recognizes, however, that insofar as British interests are concerned the matter of compensation to be paid by Siam is a matter for British-Siamese determination. In the text of Heads of Agreement that point is fully covered on behalf of British interests. In Clause 4 of the Military Annex identical language is used applicable to all Allied property, rights and interests. By its terms the United States would thus be included. This Government believes that even though the British Government may desire to retain intact Clause 3 of the Text of Heads of Agreement, Clause 4 of the Military Annex should be amended by adding the words: "for which Siam might be deemed responsible." This Government does not believe that the requirement that Siam pay compensation for all losses or damage sustained should be included in the military agreement. Clause 4, if amended as re-

quested, would meet the minimum requirements on which all are agreed and permit the countries concerned to negotiate by separate agreement (as the British Government proposes to do in the Heads of Agreement) for additional compensation if they desire to do so.

Clause 11. This Government would prefer to see the provisions of Clause 11 limited in their application to matters of military concern to the Allies arising out of the settlement of the war with Japan. It is understood, however, that the British Government attaches considerable importance to not expressly so limiting the application of that clause and it does not desire to embarrass the British Government by pressing for an amendment. This Government understands that when the state of war has been liquidated by the conclusion of an agreement based on the Heads of Agreement and its Military Annex as a whole, it would be the intention of the British Government to limit the application of Clause 11 to such matters. Under the circumstances, this Government does not request an amendment of Clause 11 but it expresses the hope that the Supreme Allied Commander will in actual practice limit its application to matters of military concern arising from the settlement of the war with Japan.

Clause 13. This Government would not be willing to have Clause 13 included in an Allied military agreement, and would prefer to see its omission from the Military Annex believing that the question of a military mission is a matter to be raised by the Siamese with the Government or Governments whose advice the Siamese desire.

Clause 14. This Government would also be unwilling to have Clause 14 as now stated included in an Allied military agreement. It would not object to the inclusion of the first part of the clause (through the word "Allies") if inserted as a subparagraph of Clause 11 and if subject to the same understanding which this Government has with reference to Clause 11. It could not be associated, however, with controls over the Siamese economy which were not related to matters of military concern to the Allies in the settlement of the war with Japan or not embodied in the principles of the proposed tripartite agreement relating to rice and Combined Board allocations as set forth in the Annex to the Department's *aide-mémoire* of September 1 and as modified by this *aide-mémoire.*

Clauses 15, 16(a) and 16(b). As stated in the discussion on Siamese rice, this Government assumes that it is not intended to include the points covered by Clauses 15, 16(*a*) and 16(*b*) in any military agreement to be negotiated by the Supreme Allied Commander. It hopes, however, that those clauses will be changed as indicated in that discussion before their final inclusion in the Military Annex.

Heads of Political Agreement

This Government welcomes confirmation of its understanding as to the use of the term "Siamese Liberation Government" in the text of Heads of Agreement communicated to the Department on August 20.

It also welcomes the change of language which has been made to clarify the intent of Clause 5 of Section D with regard to tin and rubber.

Section E was not communicated to this Government until after the Department's *aide-mémoire* of September 1 had been prepared and was therefore not considered in its comments in that *aide-mémoire*. That section has now been examined and this Government has no comments to offer thereon.

It regrets that its study of Section C relating to postwar strategic cooperation is not yet concluded but it hopes to communicate its views on that section within a very few days.

Its views with regard to the requirement that Siam pay compensation for all losses or damage sustained by British property, interests or rights have been set forth in the discussion of the Military Annex.

This Government has, therefore, only one matter in the Heads of Agreement on which it desires here to comment. It welcomes the assurance by the British Government that Clauses 2, 3 and 4 of Paragraph D of the revised Heads of Agreement are not intended to preclude the granting of equally favorable treatment to nationals of any or all United Nations. This Government does not feel, however, that that assurance clarifies the intent of the British Government on the basic question raised in the Department's *aide-mémoire* of September 1. The British Government has given repeated assurance that it desires Siam to resume her place in the community of nations on the basis of full equality with other sovereign and independent states. This Government would, of course, have no objection to the British Government seeking from Siam national and most favored nation treatment on a basis of mutuality; but the language of Clause 4 could be interpreted to prevent the Siamese Government without the consent of the British Government from establishing any monopolistic industrial, commercial or economic enterprise, whether publicly or privately owned; or from reserving ownership of certain industrial, commercial or economic enterprises to Siamese nationals; or from reserving certain economic or professional pursuits to Siamese nationals. Any such unilateral limitation in the opinion of this Government would deprive Siam of full equality with other sovereign and independent states. This Government did not intend to imply in the Department's *aide-mémoire* of Septem-

ber 1 that representations against unreasonable restraints on participation in Siamese economy and trade might be made by the British Government during a period when it did not have diplomatic relations with Siam. It did mean to object to such an infringement of Siamese sovereignty, as the language of Clause 4 might be construed to imply, and to offer to join with the British Government, after Siamese sovereignty and independence is reestablished and diplomatic relations resumed, in opposing any action which the Siamese might take along the lines suggested unreasonably restricting participation by United Nations nationals in Siamese economy and trade.

This Government again urges the British Government to give assurance that by Clauses 2, 3 and 4 of Section D it does not intend to seek unilateral control, insofar as British interests are concerned, over the power of the Siamese Government in the exercise of a sovereign right to determine conditions relating to Siamese economy and trade.

Recognition of Siamese Government

In the Department's *aide-mémoire* of June 25 there were set forth the conditions on which this Government proposed to recognize the Siamese Government. Under conditions as they now exist this Government would expect to resume diplomatic relations with the Siamese Government at Bangkok when that Government has abrogated the treaties and agreements entered into by the Pibul government with the Japanese. It believes that such abrogation will take place shortly.

It would like to have a diplomatic representative in Bangkok as soon thereafter as possible, but it would not wish to take action which might cause any embarrassment to the British Government. It would not feel justified in delaying resumption of diplomatic relations for any considerable period, but if the British Government contemplates that its negotiations will be completed and that it will resume diplomatic relations with Siam in the near future, it would be willing if desired by the British Government to defer action on its part for a reasonable period of time so that resumption of diplomatic relations with Siam can take place concurrently.

On resumption of diplomatic relations, this Government proposes to assign a Chargé d'affaires ad interim pending the arrival of a Minister, which might be deferred for several weeks. If concurrent recognition takes place as suggested, it is believed that it would be desirable that the first diplomatic representatives of the two Governments have equal status and this Government hopes that such suggestion would be agreeable to the British Government.

WASHINGTON, September 19, 1945.

740.00119 PW/9–2145 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commissioner in India (Merrell) [59]

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1945—6 p. m.

733. Deptel 673, Sep 6. For Yost.[60] Dept would have preferred Brit and French negotiations with Siamese political mission not held at Kandy whether at SEAC headquarters or otherwise (Wartel Crax 28172 Wheeler, Sep 16 and Wartel Tst 504 Oakes, Sep 17 [61]) but under all circumstances does not consider further protest desirable.

In view of Siamese negotiations Dept considers that if agreeable to Wheeler it would be helpful to have Yost at Kandy.

Yost authorized in his discretion to inform Siamese political mission that because acquired with Japanese suasion after Japanese aggression commenced, US does not recognize validity of 1941 transfer Indochinese territories to Siam and considers territories must be restored. US position is not to be considered as supporting or opposing merits of pre-1941 border and is without prejudice to subsequent border readjustments or territorial transfers by peaceful, orderly processes.

Proposed French terms not known here and should be ascertained as soon as possible. US would not object to reasonable provisions no more onerous than Brit Heads of Agreement without Military Annex if modified as US has requested. US would oppose more onerous terms and understands Brit will not support French negotiations except with regard restoration Indochinese territories. Brit have furnished French with Brit Heads of Agreement but not, it is believed, Military Annex.

Embassy London reported Sep 8 [62] that Sterndale Bennett, head Far East Division FonOff, believes Indochinese territorial *status quo ante* should first be restored and after passions cool fresh start might be commenced. Brit would have no great objection, he implied, if Siamese inserted some phrase that agreement for return of territories was not prejudicial to subsequent negotiations on Indochinese boundary problems.

Sent to New Delhi for Yost. Repeated to Colombo for Yost.

ACHESON

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[59] Repeated to Colombo as telegram 104.

[60] Charles W. Yost on September 12 was designated Chargé d'Affaires at Bangkok and given temporary assignment as Political Adviser to the Commanding General of United States Army Forces in the India–Burma Theater. Yost was in New Delhi at this time, en route to his post at Bangkok.

[61] Neither found in Department files.

[62] In telegram 9224, p. 1315.

741.92/9–2445 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in the India–Burma Theater (Yost) to the Secretary of State

KANDY, 24 September, 1945—11 : 16 a. m.
[Received 24 September.]

558. [For Moffat:] General Timberman[63] and I met with Dening this morning. He states that he has explicit instructions from Foreign Office to present to Thai delegation immediately upon their arrival this afternoon (24 Sept local time) the draft agreement with military annex in form submitted to Dept by British Sept 10. He will then give Thais 24 hours to study draft. If they object to certain points he will submit these objections to London by cable for approval or disapproval. He expects London would reply to cable within day or so and that Thais would then be asked to sign agreement as finally cleared by London.

2. Dening stated he had absolutely no authority from London to negotiate with U.S. concerning terms of agreement and therefore was unable even to discuss with me points raised in Dept's No. 105 September 21 to Colombo.[64] He said he understood Anglo-American conversations on the subject are still proceeding in Washington and that if British accept any of U.S. points before agreement is signed appropriate changes could be made in draft. He emphasized, however, that he is under strict instructions to proceed with immediate negotiation and conclusion of agreement with Thais without reference to course of Anglo-American conversations.

3. I stated it seemed to me that a serious misunderstanding had occurred between London and Washington since we had believed we had received assurances from British Gov at time of signature of Interim Military Agreement that no further agreement would be signed with Thais until Anglo-American views had been reconciled between State Dept and Foreign Office. (See Dept's 96 Sept 8 to Colombo.[65]) I added that the whole point of the negotiations which had been proceeding between Dept and British Embassy in Washington would seem to be negated by apparent British decision to proceed with conclusion of agreement with the Thais within the next few days without regard to course of Anglo-American conversations.

4. Dening stated that the assurances to which I referred related only to agreement with the Thais by SACSEA in the name of the Allies

[63] Brig. Gen. Thomas S. Timberman, Head of the Liaison Staff of the Commanding General of United States Army Forces in the India–Burma Theater.

[64] Not printed. This telegram was sent to London, Chungking, New Delhi, and Colombo with a summary of the British Embassy *aide-mémoire* of September 8, the texts of the Heads of Agreement and Military Annex handed by the British Embassy to the Department on September 10, and the Department's *aide-mémoire* of September 19, pp. 1309, 1316, 1319, 1323, respectively.

[65] Not printed.

and did not cover agreements negotiated between HMG and Thais. He said he understood Dept had stated it had no intention of questioning right of HMG to conclude separate agreement with Siam.

5. I replied that this is of course the case but that basis of the misunderstanding seemed to me to be British assumption that since such agreement was removed from sphere of SACSEA there was no longer an American interest involved. I pointed out that, regardless of the machinery employed, U.S. had definite interest in (1) settlements arising out of a war in which we had played a major role and (2) maintenance of sovereignty of Siam whose position as only independent nation in SEA gave it a unique importance throughout area. I added that our failure to declare war on Siam could hardly be taken as a basis for assuming that we had no interest in an overall settlement with Siam of the character contemplated by HMG.

6. In conclusion I referred to fact that British had informed Thais that the draft agreement had been transmitted to U.S. Gov and expressed view that, if we remain silent, the Thais may well believe, especially in view of long Anglo-American association in SEAC, that draft has our approval. I said that, if HMG proceeded to the conclusion of the agreement without further reference to U.S. views, I personally felt that we would be obliged in our own interest to state to Thais facts of case, that is, that while we found most of the draft reasonable and satisfactory there are several points with which we do not agree and which we are discussing with the British. Dening replied that HMG would be displeased with such a step as it would retard their negotiations.

7. The conversation was friendly but could lead to no result in view of Dening's binding instructions from London. It appears to me that our only alternatives are either (1) to abandon our objectives and let the agreement be signed as is or (2) to ask London urgently to instruct Dening not to conclude the negotiations until Anglo-American views have been reconciled. I should recommend the latter course. In the meantime I should greatly appreciate receiving instructions as to (1) whether there is any further step which the Dept desires me to take here with the British and (2) whether I am authorized, in case the British proceed to the immediate conclusion of the agreement as it stands, to make to the Thais a statement of the U.S. position along the lines suggested in para 7 [*6?*] above. I am keeping in close touch with Dening and also shall be in contact with the Thai delegation.

8. I hope to obtain shortly the necessary information to reply Dept's 104 Sept 21 to Colombo.[66]

[YOST]

[66] See footnote 59, p. 1331.

741.92/9–2545 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, September 25, 1945—1 p. m.

8416. Yost, US political adviser General Wheeler, SEAC, was informed by Dening at Kandy Sep 24 that Dening was to present revised Text of Heads of Agreement with Military Annex to Siamese delegation that afternoon, planning to give Siamese 24 hours to study draft and then telegraph any objections to London for approval or disapproval. Yost requested delay in concluding agreement until reconciliation current Anglo-American discussions but Dening stated instructions forbade delay. Yost pointed out US interested in all final settlements arising out of war and especially interested Siam as only independent nation SEA, and added that as Brit had informed Siamese that Brit had transmitted text of Agreement to US, if US remains silent Siamese will assume that US approves agreement.

Dept promptly on Sep 24 informed Brit Embassy of foregoing and expressed urgent hope that FonOff would immediately instruct Dening to delay conclusion of agreement. In view of Brit informing Siamese that US had been furnished text of agreement, Yost has been authorized to inform Siamese of US views if Dening proceeds to immediate conclusion of agreement in present form.[67] Brit Embassy so informed.[68]

Please discuss with FonOff urging need for delay and deprecating unilateral action during Anglo-American consultations in one of final settlements from war in which US played major role. Views apparently nearly reconciled and US considers Anglo-American unity important. US has scrupulously refrained unilateral action relating Siam or embarrassment of Brit and anticipates reciprocal treatment.

ACHESON

741.93/9–2545

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Moffat)

[WASHINGTON,] September 25, 1945.

Mr. Everson called to say that the Embassy had received a telegram from Dening reviewing his conversation with Yost on the British Heads of Agreement to be presented to the Siamese and stating that Dening had understood Yost to claim that the Anglo-American dis-

[67] The Department message was sent to the OSS on September 24 for transmittal to Mr. Yost and was transmitted by the OSS as No. 1024, September 25.

[68] See *infra*.

cussions had been transferred to Kandy. I stated that I thought this was entirely a misunderstanding as obviously the consultations were continuing between the Department and the Embassy and that it may have arisen from the explanation of the American views which Yost desired to give Dening in support of his request that Dening delay concluding the agreement.

Mr. Everson then said, speaking without instructions, that he thought it would be unfortunate if the United States injected itself as a third party into a British-Siamese discussion by authorizing Yost to tell the Siamese the United States views on the agreement. I stated that Yost had been authorized to do so because we had been brought into the picture by Dening's statement to the Siamese that the text of the proposed agreement had been furnished us and because, with the long record of Anglo-American Allied action and cooperation in Southeast Asia, our silence thereon could be construed by the Siamese only as approval of the agreement. I explained that at no time had we ever said anything to the Siamese about any of the proposed agreements, military or political, or about the Anglo-American discussions.

I remarked that for months we had been endeavoring to secure unity of Anglo-American policies toward Siam and to reconcile conflicting views and that in the middle of our discussions on the proposed military agreement a 48-hour ultimatum had unilaterally been presented to the Siamese without even the terms being shown our military representative although they were Allied terms. I said that that situation was straightened out; but just when a reconciliation of views seemed very imminent we have been confronted again with hasty unilateral British action and as we were implicated in this agreement by the British themselves, we have had to act to protect our position. It seemed immaterial to me that Siamese acceptance of the Heads of Agreement would be followed by a formal agreement in which modifications to meet United States views might be made, because we had no assurance that our views would so be met and because acceptance by the Siamese of the Heads of Agreement might militate against such modifications.

I also pointed out that we were not concerned with the purely British-Siamese aspects of the settlement of the state of war; and after stating our views on those aspects, we had indicated our nonconcern therewith; but that we had a deep interest in the long-range economic and security aspects of the proposed agreement and were concerned therewith.

A[BBOT] L[OW] M[OFFAT]

892.01/9–2545 : Telegram

The Consul at Colombo (Oakes) to the Secretary of State

COLOMBO, September 25, 1945—9 a. m.
[Received 7: 50 p. m.]

219. From Yost. Reference my September 24 thru War Department. Suni of Thai Delegation called on me September 24. He stated Thais had not yet seen British draft agreement but are meeting with Dening September 25. He inquired whether we had in fact seen draft and whether we considered any part objectionable. I limited myself to stating that we had received draft but are still studying and discussing it with British.

Suni said Delegation had full power to negotiate but could not conclude agreement without referring to Bangkok. He expressed especial apprehension at long term economic controls which he feared British might attempt to impose. He felt that strategic arrangements were for negotiation with United Nations Organization rather than with British alone. He said that he was instructed to keep in close touch with me throughout negotiations.

He said British had indicated Thais would also be expected to negotiate agreement with French at Kandy but Thais did not consider they had been at war with France and saw no reason to negotiate with French agreement analogous to that with British.

In regard to Siam-Indochina frontier, Suni expressed view that, the transfer of territory having been freely negotiated with recognized French Government of the day, Siam is justified in holding its gains. I took the opportunity to state the view set forth in third paragraph of Department's 104, September 21 to Colombo.[69]

Suni stated that his Government is extremely eager to see the prompt reopening of Thais [*United States?*] Legation in Bangkok and added that the Pibul treaties with Japan had now been definitively abrogated.[70] [Yost.]

OAKES

741.92/9–2645

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In its *aide-mémoire* of September 19 commenting on the revised Text of Heads of Agreement with Military Annex presented to the Department of State on September 10, the Department stated that it

[69] See footnote 59, p. 1331.
[70] See telegram 8698, October 2, 5 p. m., to London, p. 1348.

hoped to communicate within a few days its views on Section C relating to measures for postwar strategic cooperation.

This Government has considered carefully the three clauses included in that section and the message clarifying the intent of Clause 1 which was communicated to the Department on September 18.[71]

This Government has no comment to offer on Clause 2 or Clause 3 of Section C.

It would urge, however, that Clause 1 be substantially modified. It does not consider that acceptance of Clause 1 by the Siamese is necessary in order to make easier the negotiation of a regional scheme of defense in the world organization for the areas specified and it is concerned lest the clause as now stated might later be construed as an advance commitment by the Siamese for measures of a military or strategic nature to which this Government might have serious objection.

Furthermore, Clause 1 does not accord with the statement in Mr. Eden's letter of November 22, 1944[72] that the British Government considered it a matter of ordinary prudence to stipulate as a condition to the restoration of Siamese sovereignty and independence that the Siamese "should accept such special arrangements for security or economic collaboration as may be judged necessary to the functioning of the postwar international system".

Although this Government has expressed the view that it would not be desirable to make acceptance of such arrangements a condition to the restoration of Siamese sovereignty and independence, in view of the interest of the British Government in the matter and inasmuch as this Government is in accord with the basic objectives stated by Mr Eden, it would not object to the inclusion in the Heads of Agreement of a clause requiring Siamese cooperation in international security arrangements under a United Nations Organization.

It would request, therefore, that the British Government amend Clause 1 to accord with Mr. Eden's statement so that it may read in substance as follows: "Agree to collaborate fully in all pertinent international security arrangements approved by the United Nations Organization or its Security Council and especially such international

[71] On this date, Mr. Everson made the following statement in a telephone call to the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs: "The object of the clause is to render it easier to negotiate a regional scheme of defense in the world organization by warning the Siamese that they will in the future be expected to play their part in defense schemes for the areas specified." This statement was made part of a memorandum of September 19 by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs to Raymond E. Cox of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, not printed (Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Lot 52–M45, Series 5).

[72] See airgram A–1404, November 24, 1944, from London, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 1319.

security arrangements as may relate to the countries of southeastern Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Southwest Pacific areas".

This Government believes that by consultation and by scrupulous respect for the position and interest of the other with relation to Siam a reconciliation of British and American views with regard to that country has been nearly achieved. It hopes that this cooperative approach will be continued so that there may be complete Anglo-American community of views in relation to Siam.

It would appear that there are only two points in relation to the Heads of Agreement in which the United States and British Governments are not yet fully in accord:

(1) Clause 1 of Section C. The United States Government believes that that clause should be amended so as to provide expressly for Siamese collaboration in pertinent international security arrangements within the international security framework.

(2) Clause 4 of Section D. In its present form this Government believes that that clause might be construed to limit legitimate Siamese restrictions relating to Siamese economy and trade and so infringe on Siamese sovereignty and independence contrary to the American position and to the assurances given this Government by the British Government.

With regard to the Military Annex there are only five points on which a community of views has not been achieved:

(1) Clause 4 relating to payment by Siam of compensation for losses or damage sustained by Allied property. The United States believes that the requirement should not exceed that upon which both the British and American Governments are agreed, the question of additional compensation, if any, being left for separate negotiation by the countries involved.

(2) Clause 13 relating to a military mission to Siam. The United States would not wish to have provision for such a military mission included in an Allied military agreement and it would prefer to see the clause omitted from the Military Annex and treated as a matter for Siamese initiative.

(3) Clause 14 for temporary Allied economic controls. The United States believes that the provisions of this clause should be limited to the same duration and understanding as the proposed temporary military controls specified in Clause 11.

(4) Clauses 15 and 16(*b*) relating to Combined Board controls and the production and export of Siamese rice. The United States believes that these clauses should be amended so that they may conform more accurately to the principles of the tripartite agreement proposed by the United States which, in principle, the British Government has approved.

(5) Clause 16(*a*) providing for a levy on Siamese rice. The United States strongly disapproves such a levy, but considers that if the British insist thereon, such a levy should be a matter for separate British-Siamese agreement with no reference to the Allies or impli-

cation that the Allies as such are concerned therewith, and that such a levy should not interfere with procurement in accordance with Combined Board allocations of Siamese rice, whether stocks on hand or future production, by the United States and other countries not concerned with such a levy.

WASHINGTON, September 26, 1945.

Records of the Bangkok Legation,
Lot F167, 800 Political Affairs: Telegram

The Political Adviser in the India–Burma Theater (Yost) to the Secretary of State

[KANDY,] 26 September, 1945.

575. Reference Dept's 1024 Sept 25 through OSS.[73] Greatly appreciate Dept's prompt reply to my 558. Effect has been at least to slow up tempo here. Dening did not meet with Thais until Sept 25 and at that time, contrary to his original intention as stated to me, did not lay down any 24-hour or other time limit within which he expected Thais to comment on draft.

Thais are now studying draft and have also referred it to Bangkok. Their primary concern is with military annex and fact that no time limit is specified for wide powers conferred on "Allied Military Authorities". They also fear that paragraphs 15 and 16 of agreement may develop into more or less permanent control of their export trade. They will give me further reactions in day or so.

Suni is persistently attempting to learn from me which, if any, clauses of agreement US finds objectionable in order that, as he says, Thais may concert their policy with ours. In the hope that there may be further reconciliation of US and British views within next few days, I have continued to reply merely that my Government is studying draft and discussing it with British. The Dept may wish, however, should it develop that British are adamant on any point we consider vital, to instruct me immediately to advise Thais of our views on that point. It should be kept in mind of course that such advice from us might well cause Thais to refuse to accept point in question and thus result in impasse in negotiations.

French have Foreign Office Delegation in Kandy to negotiate agreement with Siam but negotiations have not yet begun. Dening tells me French draft follows British very closely, though containing one or two additional clauses of petty but irritating nature. I hope to see French representatives today and will report fully.

YOST

[73] See footnote 67, p. 1334.

741.92/9–2645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 26, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received September 26—6 : 15 p. m.]

9988. We have just seen Sterndale Bennett regarding Depts 8416, September 25, and he tells us British Embassy Washington has been instructed to make clear to Dept that Dening was not told to give Siamese only 24 hours before having them sign agreement. Heads of Agreement and Military Annex are according to Sterndale Bennett basis upon which formal agreement will later be signed. Foreign Office is now studying latest memorandum from Dept and before final agreement is signed it may be possible to revise certain items to bring them more in line with United States ideas. Bennett said there was considerable misunderstanding over scope of Military Annex, that it might be signed as one agreement or be split up into series of agreements, but that there was no thought of implicating United States in any of its provisions. The Heads of Agreement on the other hand he said contain a purely British-Siamese agreement for winding up the state of war between the two nations. Bennett made it clear that on this the British were not "consulting" the United States as we were not at war with Siam but because of the strong British desire for Anglo-American understanding on Asiatic questions Foreign Office was informing us in advance of British terms and was pleased to receive any comments. He pointed out that British have made considerable modifications to meet United States viewpoint and might make more before final formal agreement is signed but that probably on some points "we would have to agree to disagree".

WINANT

741.92/9–2645 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1945—6 p. m.

8550. Urtel 9988 Sep 26. Dept appreciates assurance by Sterndale Bennett that there was no intention implicate US in Brit-Siamese agreement and that further modifications to meet US views under consideration. Brit Embassy informed Dept Sep 26 that Dening himself notified Siamese that US had some objections to agreement. This eliminated Dept concern that Siamese would believe US supported agreement. US has no desire to interfere in bilateral Brit-Siamese negotiations. Yost has said nothing which might prejudice negotia-

tions and Dept has expressly instructed him [74] not to convey to Siamese US views on any points or details of agreement or military annex.

Please inform Bennett of foregoing. At same time it might be well to explain that on short term conditions to settlement of war US after offering its views expressly recognized that those conditions were of Brit-Siamese concern only; but that proposed agreement is one of final war settlements and US is concerned in long range aspects of agreement such as Clause 1 of Section C and Clause 4 of Section D. For your information Dept is especially anxious that Brit meet US views on latter clause.

ACHESON

Records of the Bangkok Legation,
Lot F167, 800 Political Affairs: Telegram

The Political Adviser in the India–Burma Theater (Yost) to the Secretary of State

[KANDY,] 28 September, 1945.

587. Following are recent developments in Anglo-Thai negotiations.

Thai Delegation has completed study British draft and, though final instructions not yet received from Bangkok, will probably present comments to Dening today. Following are principal points in British draft on which Thais raise questions:

A3. Thais do not wish to repudiate agreement with Japs by which latter agreed repay credits extended to them by Thais.

C1. Thais, while eager to participate in United Nations security arrangements, are puzzled concerning intent this paragraph.

C3. Thais argue this should be matter United Nations rather than purely Anglo-Thai concern.

D1. Thais do not understand reference to "good neighborly policy in regard to coastal shipping" since normal international practice reserves coastal shipping to domestic carriers.

D5. Thais fear 1937 agreement may not be in all respects compatible with Chicago agreements [75] to which Seni subscribed.

E2*b* and E3. Thais fearful broad implications these clauses.

Military Annex 4. Thais willing to compensate but wish establishment Allied Commission to assess all allied damages and determine Thai capacity to pay.

11. Thais wish to limit duration these powers to period required to disarm and intern Japs.

11*d*. Thais wish to limit censorship to prevention anti-allied propaganda.

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[74] Telegram 111, September 27, 6 p. m., to Colombo, not printed.

[75] International Air Services Transit Agreement and International Air Transport Agreement, both opened for signature December 7, 1944; for texts, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series Nos. 487 and 488, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1693 and 1701, respectively. For documentation on discussions regarding international civil aviation at Chicago, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. II, pp. 355 ff.

11*e*. Thais wish to state merely they will cooperate in matters of civil administration with allied military authority.

13. Thais believe this paragraph should be in body of agreement rather than Military Annex and should be tied in to United Nations security arrangements.

14. Thais object to vagueness purpose and duration this paragraph.

15. Thais fear complete and prolonged Allied control their export trade.

16*a*. Thais willing to make gift rice to Allies or Britain on behalf Allies but offer presently limited 20,000 tons monthly for one year.

As Dept will note Thais in far more confident frame of mind than when Regent so promptly accepted original agreement number 2. Whether confidence will evaporate if British begin pounding table remains to be seen.

Suni continues urge daily that US inform Thais its attitude toward various clauses of draft as Thais do not wish approve any clause to which US objects. Suni also fears sudden British demand to sign before Thais have been notified US attitude. I have informed Suni that since this is British draft I presume my Government will wish to present first to British any comments it may have and that, only if British decline to recognize a point US considers vital to its interests, will we wish to make representations to Thais.

Since Dening will presumably today or tomorrow submit Thai comments to London for approval or disapproval, believe Dept would be well advised to obtain at earliest possible moment final British decision US *aide-mémoire* Sept 19.

YOST

741.92/9–2945

The British Embassy to the Department of State [76]

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In accordance with the intention expressed in paragraph 28 of His Majesty's Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* of September 8th His Majesty's Government instructed Mr. Dening on September 10th to arrange for a Siamese Mission to visit Kandy and to present to the Head of the Mission on his arrival the Heads of Agreement and Annex. Action on these instructions is now proceeding. His Maj-

[76] Handed by Mr. Everson to the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs on September 29. In a memorandum of conversation of that date, Mr. Moffat stated that Mr. Everson "informed me that he was instructed to state that with regard to Clause 12 of the Military Annex it was intended that all Siamese shipping should be controlled by U[nited] M[aritime] A[uthority] which would apply the usual principles, and that no reallocation was contemplated of vital Siamese river or coastal vessels. He also stated that in Clause 17 the British agreed to eliminate the word 'such' in the opening clause of the second sentence." (741.93/9–2945)

esty's Government have nevertheless studied most carefully the State Department's further memorandum of September 19th with a desire to contribute what they can to bringing their views and those of United States Government into still closer harmony.

Siamese Rice

2. The questions raised in the State Department's memorandum as to the procurement and distribution of rice do not in the view of His Majesty's Government raise serious difficulties. It is common ground that all rice procured from Siam, as from elsewhere, should be sent to those recipients to which the Combined Food Board gives highest priority. These would not necessarily be the recipients most equitably entitled to participate in the distribution of the free rice.

[Here follow paragraphs numbered 3 through 6 dealing with various procedural matters regarding rice including the procurement of exportable rice by the Rice Commission, the allocation of free rice, and the payment in foreign exchange to Siam for the remainder of its rice exports.]

7. His Majesty's Government welcome the State Department's willingness that the Chairmanship and the bulk of the operational personnel shall be British. As regards the direction of the Commission His Majesty's Government agree that all decisions of the Commission should be reached by agreement between the British and American Representatives on it, any serious difference of opinion being settled by discussions between London and Washington. There must however be a very large number of questions not all of which can be settled locally e.g. procurement and distribution of bags, milling, and the allocation of shipping, and the relative unimportance or urgency of which may render undesirable reference to more than one authority. His Majesty's Government contemplate that in such cases, the decision will be taken by them though naturally the United States Government will be kept fully informed.

8. All information on matters affecting Siamese Rice obtained by any British Rice personnel who may be situated in Siam before the American Rice personnel will of course be communicated to the United States Government.

9. His Majesty's Government agree to take paragraphs 10 and 11 of Annex to State Department's *Aide-Mémoire* of September 1st as the basis of discussion regarding the duration and termination of the proposed agreement but would like to give further consideration to the precise terms of these paragraphs.

10. As regards paragraph 11 of the State Department's memorandum His Majesty's Government are confident that any successor body to the Combined Boards determined by the United States and Great Britain would satisfy the requirements of Clauses 15 and 16(B) and

that the Siamese Government could readily be brought to accept this view if any question should arise. His Majesty's Government consider therefore that there is no need to alter the existing wording in order to meet the points in State Department's Memorandum.

11. His Majesty's Government agree to the amendment to Clause 15 described in paragraph 12 of the State Department Memorandum.

Annex

12. As regards the general observations of the State Department on the Annex His Majesty's Government feel that these are in part based on a misapprehension as to the exact scope of their proposals. The Heads of the Agreement and Annex together constitute the terms on which His Majesty's Government are prepared to liquidate the state of war with Siam and to resume normal and friendly relations with the Siamese Government. As stated in Clause 6 of Section B of the Heads of Agreement, all or any of the matters specified in the Annex may be covered either in an Agreement or Agreements with the Supreme Allied Commander or in such other manner as may be satisfactory to His Majesty's Government. Clauses 3, 6 and 11(A) of the Annex have already been covered by Military Agreement No. 1 concluded by Admiral Mountbatten with the Siamese Military Authorities. As regards the remaining Clauses of the Annex, His Majesty's Government have not yet reached definite conclusions as to the manner in which they should be covered, but in view of the State Department's observations regarding Clauses 4, 13 and 14 they can at once give an assurance that these Clauses will not be included except with the concurrence of the United States, in any Agreement to be signed by Admiral Mountbatten in his capacity as Supreme Allied Commander.

13. His Majesty's Government have given very careful further consideration to the views of the United States Government on Clause 4 of the Annex but they regret that they cannot see their way to amending this Clause as suggested. In terminating the state of war between Siam and themselves in the manner now proposed they feel a certain responsibility for safeguarding the legitimate interests of their Allies and it would be difficult for them to justify a limitation on compensation for loss and damage to Allied property rights and interests which they are not prepared to adopt where British interests are concerned. It will of course be for each of the Allied Governments to decide whether or not to avail itself of Clause 4.

14. As regards Clause 11 His Majesty's Government think there is some misunderstanding since the text handed to Siamese Mission by Mr. Dening in fact opens with the words "for so long as may be necessary for the conclusion of all matters of military concern to

the Allies arising out of the settlement of the war with Japan". The views of the United States Government in this respect have already therefore been met.

15. The views of the United States Government regarding Clause 13 are still under consideration by the departments of His Majesty's Government concerned. It is hoped to communicate views of His Majesty's Government on this matter very shortly.

16. As regards Clause 14 His Majesty's Government are reluctant to accept any restriction which might have the effect of hampering them in any action which may be necessary in connexion with concealed Japanese assets or other matters such as SAFEHAVEN [77] or indeed any financial or economic matters arising out of the war with Japan.

Heads of Agreement

17. Clause 4 of Section D is intended to bridge the gap until the prewar Treaty of Commerce which was abrogated by the Siamese Declaration of War can be replaced by treaties to be freely negotiated under Clauses 2 and 3 of that Section. Clause 4 provides for the observance by Siam of (*a*) the provisions of 1937 Treaty and (*b*) certain additional provisions which are such as His Majesty's Government and Government of India would hope to see embodied in the new treaty to be freely negotiated by Siam. In an endeavour however to meet the views of United States Government, His Majesty's Government are now proposing to amend Clause 4 in two respects:

(1) for the words "in addition" substitute the words "except in regard to matters where the treaty specifically provides to the contrary";

(2) after the words "British professional men" insert the words "on grounds of nationality". It is true that the requirements of Clause 4 impose some limitation on Siamese freedom of action as indeed do all other stipulations which His Majesty's Government think it reasonable to put forward as conditions on which they are prepared to resume relations with the Siamese Government. The United States Government may rest assured however that His Majesty's Government will interpret this restriction in a reasonable manner. His Majesty's Government can moreover give an assurance that they do not seek to exercise this temporary unilateral control over the power of the Siamese Government to determine the conditions relating to Siamese economy and trade in such a way as to confer any exclusive privileges on British nationals or to secure any benefit which they would not consider it equally reasonable for United States nationals to obtain from the Siamese Government.

18. His Majesty's Government have noted with appreciation the readiness of United States Government to defer the resumption of diplomatic relations with Siam for a reasonable period and are happy

[77] For documentation on this subject, see vol. II, pp. 852 ff.

to concur in the United States Government's proposal that British and United States recognition of the Siamese Government should, if possible, be simultaneous and that the first diplomatic representatives of the two Governments should have equal status.

851G.014/10–145

The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Bonnet)[78]

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the French Republic and has the honor to refer to the Embassy's note of August 22, 1945 with regard to the Indochinese territories acquired by Siam in 1941.

The United States Government recognizes that those territories were acquired by Siam with the support of Japan after the course of Japanese aggression had commenced. In accordance with its established policy this Government does not recognize the validity of the transfer of those territories to Siam; it concurs in the view of the French Government that the question of their restoration is not a matter for arbitration; and it believes that those territories should in fact be restored by Siam.

It will be understood, of course, that the foregoing view is not to be considered as supporting or opposing the merits of the pre-1941 Indochinese-Siamese border, and that the position of this Government that the Indochinese territories acquired by Siam in 1941 should be restored is without prejudice to any border readjustments or transfers of territory which may be effected by orderly, peaceful processes subsequent to their restoration.

In accordance with instructions of the Department of State a Department representative has conveyed the foregoing views of this Government to the Siamese political mission which is now at Kandy, Ceylon.[79]

This Government hopes that mutually satisfactory relations between France and Siam will shortly be achieved and aid in the early establishment of peace, stability and tranquility in southeastern Asia which, in view of the enormous investment in life and treasure which the United States has made to achieve peace and security in the Far East and in view of the future responsibility laid upon this nation to help maintain such peace and security, are a matter of deep concern to this Government.

WASHINGTON, October 1, 1945.

[78] Handed to the French Minister (Lacoste) by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) on October 4; see memorandum of conversation, p. 1349. The substance of this note was furnished to the British Embassy in an *aide-mémoire* of October 9.

[79] See telegram 219, September 25, 9 a. m., from Colombo, p. 1336.

741.92/10–145 : Telegram

The Consul at Colombo (Oakes) to the Secretary of State

COLOMBO, October 1, 1945—11 p. m.
[Received October 1—9 : 50 p. m.]

222. Re Department's telegram 111, September 27 to Colombo.[80] From Yost. 1. I have been careful, much to Thai disappointment, not to convey to Thais US views on any points of Agreement or Military Annex. See my 575, September 26 and 587, September 28.

Both Dening and Thais emphasize harmonious course of negotiations here. Thais have been entertained socially by Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia and other British in cordial manner. Dening believes many of Thai comments set forth in 587 are reasonable and that London will be prepared to make concessions. He submitted comments to London September 29 and hopes to have reply within few days. It may not be too presumptuous to suggest that Department's positive expressions of interest at psychological moment has contributed to friendly treatment of Thais by British.

In specific comment on some of points recapitulated in Department's telegram 109, September 27 to Colombo [81] Dening states:

C1.[82] He believes some satisfactory rewording will be worked out in London.

D4. Thais themselves have not raised this point.

Military Annex use [*one*] three. Clause originally drafted before end hostilities with view to facilitating Thai military action against Japs and presumably should be modified now. British Military Mission is now attached to Thai Army, Bangkok, to further cooperation of latter in disarmament and internment of Japs.

15 and 16. Dening has made it clear to Thais UK does not desire rice for own exclusive use but any rice contributed will be distributed accordance with Combined Board allocations.

2. Present understanding here is that immediately after conclusion Anglo-Thai agreement Bird,[83] now at Kandy, will proceed to Bangkok as Political Advisor to British Commanding General. When diplomatic relations are resumed Bird will become Consul General and a diplomatic officer will be sent in to assume charge of Legation.

3. Clarac [84] has presented note to Thais stating that France, "considering itself in a state of hostility with Siam", is ready to negotiate the reestablishment of normal relations on the basis of a return to the

[80] Not printed; but see telegram 8550, September 27, 6 p. m., to London, p. 1340.
[81] Not printed; it summarized the Department's *aide-mémoire* of September 26 to the British Embassy, p. 1336.
[82] This and similar references are to the Heads of Agreement and Military Annex handed by Sir George Sansom to Mr. Ballantine on September 10, p. 1316.
[83] Hugh Rudolph Bird, British Foreign Service Officer.
[84] Achille-Marie Clarac, French Foreign Service Officer serving as Diplomatic Counselor to the French High Commissioner for Indochina.

conditions of June 1940. Clarac hopes Thai delegation will be authorized to negotiate now in Kandy and believes his government will be willing adopt any changes made in British draft as a result of Anglo-Thai negotiations.

In this connection Thais have asked that ref to Indo-China be dropped from paragraph C1 of Anglo-Thai agreement but Dening believes that if territories are to be listed Indo-China must be included. [Yost.]

OAKES

741.92/10–245 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, October 2, 1945—5 p. m.

8698. Dept notified by Siamese Legation [85] of official abrogation by Siam of all treaties and agreements with Japan entered into by Pibul Government and that Japan so informed. US therefore ready to resume diplomatic relations but will defer reasonable period so that Brit and US may act concurrently (Para. 12 Deptel 8298, Sep 21 [86]). Dept has inquired informally of Brit Embassy how soon Brit will be ready. Dept should have about 2 weeks' notice to arrange arrival Legation staff with Yost, but anxious to resume as promptly as possible.

Repeated to Chungking, New Delhi and Colombo for Yost.

ACHESON

740.00119 PW/10–245 : Telegram

The Consul at Colombo (Oakes) to the Secretary of State

COLOMBO, October 2, 1945—midnight.
[Received October 3—3 : 16 p. m.]

224. From Yost. Unless attitude of Thai delegation here is overruled by Bangkok, there seems to be little likelihood that Franco-

[85] On September 14, the Siamese Legation advised the Department of State that the Siamese Government on September 11 officially notified the Japanese Government of the termination of the Pact of Alliance of 1941 and all related agreements, including the treaty transferring Malayan and Burmese territory to Siam (792.-94/9–1445). On October 1, the Siamese Legation advised that all remaining treaties concluded with Japan during Marshal Luang Pibul's premiership had been denounced on September 26 (792.94/10–145). For Department statements on the two notes of the Siamese Legation, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 30, 1945, p. 498, and *ibid.*, October 7, 1945, p. 521.

In a note of September 19, the Siamese Legation stated that a law had been enacted to intern all persons in Siam who were enemies of the United Nations and to control and manage their property; the Japanese Embassy had been closed; and the Legation of Manchoukuo had been ordered to cease functioning (740.-00119 PW/9–1945).

[86] Not printed.

Thai negotiations will make rapid progress. Thai attitude is that, there having been no declaration of war between France and Siam, no state of war exists and French assertion to the contrary is *ex post facto*. They therefore see no pressing need to conclude agreement with French, though would be willing to undertake negotiations in Bangkok with an accredited French diplomatic representative. As to frontier question, their attitude is that transfer was approved by recognized French Govt and that compensation was paid by Siam. They state moreover that should they now return territory to French, Indochinese elements who are resisting French would resent such action and relations between Thais and the peoples of Indochina to whom they are related by blood would be jeopardized. Furthermore Thais ask to whom they could turn over territory since French are not in control of Indochina.

I have re-stated US position set forth in Dept's 104, September 21,[87] laying stress on fact that our interest is in maintenance, regardless of circumstances in a particular case, of the general principle that territorial changes resulting from the exercise of Axis military powers shall be considered null and void. I have emphasized that we consider Siam fully entitled, after territories are restored to Indochina, to raise the question by whatever peaceful means or before whatever international bodies may seem appropriate. Our views have been transmitted to Bangkok for consideration. As long however as the French are as insecure in Indochina as at present it seems probable that Siamese will pursue delaying tactics. [Yost.]

OAKES

851G.014/8–2245

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent)

[WASHINGTON,] October 4, 1945.

Mr. Lacoste called this morning at 11 o'clock at my request. I handed him our note of October 1 in regard to Siam and communicated to him the views expressed in the attached memorandum.

Mr. Lacoste expressed appreciation of the considerate manner in which we had communicated our views but went on to say that these views would probably cause some perturbation in the French Foreign Office. He said that the Foreign Office would naturally assume that there had been conversations between us and the Siamese with regard to what the Siamese wanted in the way of territorial concessions and that the French Foreign Office would be hesitant to give the assurances we had suggested regarding the re-examination of the Indochinese-

[87] See footnote 59, p. 1331.

Siamese border without knowing in advance just what the scope of the discussions might be. I told him that there had been no discussion whatsoever between us and the Siamese with regard to the scope or character of their territorial claims.

[Annex]

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State [88]

Recommended Oral Communication to be made [89] to the French Ambassador when handed note regarding the Indochinese territories acquired in 1941 by Siam.

In connection with our deep concern, referred to in the note, for the early reestablishment of peace, stability and tranquility in southeastern Asia, this Government would like to suggest that in its view it would be most helpful to all the nations concerned with that area if the French Government would give serious consideration to offering voluntarily to the Siamese, immediately following their agreement to restore the Indochinese territories which they acquired in 1941, some public assurance that opportunity would be afforded at an early date for a reexamination of the Indochinese border; and that such reexamination, having in view the possible elimination of potential sources of future unrest or international discontent, would consider the question of making possible changes in the border by orderly and peaceful procedures on their practical merits and with due regard to the opinions and attitudes of the peoples concerned in the border areas.

This suggestion on our part is not made in any spirit of criticism of the legal border between Indochina and Siam as to the appropriateness or desirability of which this Government had no knowledge, nor is it offered in advocacy or support of Siamese claims to territory lawfully within Indochina. It is offered solely in the belief that such a voluntary assurance by the French Government immediately following Siamese agreement to restore the Indochinese territories which they acquired in 1941 would contribute materially to the early reestablishment of peace, stability and tranquility in southeastern Asia; would redound greatly to the credit of the French Government in world public opinion; and would strengthen the prestige of all western powers among the peoples of the Far East.

[88] Prepared by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs on September 27; substance communicated to Mr. Everson of the British Embassy on October 9.

[89] October 4.

741.92/10–645

The British Embassy to the Department of State [90]

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In a sincere endeavour to bring their views into harmony with those of the United States Government, His Majesty's Government decided to amend in certain respects the conditions on which they were prepared to liquidate the state of war between themselves and the Siamese Government. These amendments, together with His Majesty's Government's observations on certain other points raised in the State Department's memorandum of September 19th, were communicated to the State Department in His Majesty's Embassy's memorandum of September 27th.[91] The Embassy's memorandum did not of course refer to the State Department's further memorandum of September 26th, which was not received in time to permit its consideration before despatch of instructions to His Majesty's Embassy.

His Majesty's Government have now studied the State Department's memorandum of September 26th, on which they desire to express the following views:

As His Majesty's Embassy have already indicated to the State Department,[92] the object of clause C 1 of the Heads of the Agreement is to make it easier to negotiate a regional scheme for defence in a world organisation by warning the Siamese that they will in future be expected to play their part in defence schemes for areas specified. The text suggested by the State Department in paragraph 6 of its *Aide-Mémoire* would be a natural development of this idea and His Majesty's Government are ready to embody the substance of it in their Heads of the Agreement with the Siamese Government as a corollary of, though not in place of, clause C 1. In view of the special concern of Great Britain with the security of British territories and of sea routes adjacent to Siam, His Majesty's Government think it important to have on record this recognition by the Siamese Government of the importance of Siam to the defence of those territories and sea routes. They would propose therefore to retain clause C 1 unaltered, but to replace clause C 2 by a new clause to read as follows: "Agree to collaborate fully in all international security arrangements approved by the United Nations Organisation or its Security Council which may be pertinent to Siam and especially such international security arrangements as may relate to countries or areas specified in the preceding clause."

[90] Handed by Mr. Everson to the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs on October 9.

[91] See undated *aide-mémoire* from the British Embassy handed to the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs on September 29, p. 1342.

[92] See footnote 71, p. 1337.

It is hoped that the explanation and assurances given in paragraph 17 of the Embassy's memorandum of September 27th will have gone far to remove the objection which the United States Government originally felt to clause 4 Section D of the Heads of Agreement.

As regards clause 4 of the Annex, His Majesty's Government feel unable to modify the views expressed in paragraph 13 of the Embassy's memorandum of September 27th. The United States Government will appreciate that their insistence on this point is not due to any concern for British interests, which are already fully protected under clause 3 of Section B of the Heads of Agreement, but solely to a sense of their responsibility vis-à-vis their allies.

As regards the limitations of clauses 11 and 14, His Majesty's Government intend to limit the extent as well as the duration of these clauses to the purposes set out therein, but they would prefer not to modify the wording of the clauses since to do so might lead Siam to suppose that this would make more difference in practice than His Majesty's Government think in fact it will.

While in the view of His Majesty's Government the question of a Military Mission is not one which can necessarily be left to Siam's initiative, they are prepared to omit clause 13 of the Annex from the terms now to be accepted by Siam and to treat the matter as one for subsequent negotiation with the Siamese Government.

As regards clauses 15 and 16 B of the Annex, His Majesty's Government are still considering the precise terms of paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Annex to the State Department's memorandum of September 1st.

His Majesty's Government hope that the explanations given in paragraphs 2 to 7 of the Embassy's memorandum of September 27th will have served to allay any United States anxiety that a free contribution of Siamese rice might interfere with or delay procurement and distribution, in accordance with the Combined Food Board's allocations, of rice for the United States and other countries, whether or not they may wish or be entitled to participate in free rice.

WASHINGTON, 6 October 1945.

741.92/9–2945

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department of State has considered carefully the *Aide-Mémoire* of September 29, 1945 presented by the British Embassy in relation to Siam.

Siamese Rice

2. The Department believes that the views of this Government and of the British Government are essentially in harmony with regard to procedures relating to the procurement and export of Siamese rice. It would not, however, wish the Commission, as such, to purchase rice as might be implied from sub-paragraph 3 (*c*) of the Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire*. It believes that the direct purchases contemplated by that sub-paragraph should be made by the Siamese Government or by the British or American or possibly other purchasing authorities. The Commission, this Government believes, should be an administrative agency for stimulating rice production and controlling the export of rice, but should not itself be a purchasing agency.

3. The Department agrees that settlement of the questions of the allocation of any free rice and of the procedures for payment in foreign exchange for purchased rice are not of immediate urgency. It adheres, however, to the principles set forth in paragraph 8 of the Annex to the Department's *Aide-Mémoire* of September 1 subject, of course, to such modifications as may be required in connection with any free rice, and it would point out that this Government will doubtless desire to make its payments to Siam as promptly as practicable and once the Commission is in operation and agreement on prices reached, it would not ordinarily wish to place its payments in a suspense account or arrange for shipments on provisional invoices.

4. Unfortunately the intent of paragraph 7 of the Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* is not clear to this Government. The British Government may be assured that this Government desires to cooperate in every way in expediting the work of the Commission so that it may most effectively carry out its responsibility of stimulating the production and maximizing the export of Siamese rice in accordance with recommended Combined Food Board allocations. To this end it is anxious to simplify procedures and so far as may be possible to obviate needless delays. It will, of course, have particular concern for the prompt procurement and shipment of rice which it purchases in accordance with recommended allocations of the Combined Food Board and for the equitable distribution of needed facilities. Without a clearer understanding of the proposal advanced by the British Government in that paragraph, especially as such proposal might affect various aspects of American procurement, this Government is not in a position to express its agreement or disagreement. It would request, therefore, amplification and clarification of the proposal that under certain circumstances the British authorities take unilateral action.

5. This Government believes that it is important that the proposed tripartite agreement be concluded at the earliest practicable moment

692-141—69——86

and in order to expedite agreement between this Government and the British Government on the details of that agreement for presentation to the Siamese it will furnish to the Embassy within a few days a draft agreement for discussion and comment.

Military Annex

6. With regard to the Allied military agreement, which would include a number of the points set forth in the Military Annex, this Government appreciates the assurance that Clauses 4, 13 and 14 will not be included, except with the concurrence of the United States in that agreement.

7. As regards Clause 14 of the Military Annex, this Government recognizes that the problem of concealed Japanese assets or SAFE-HAVEN or similar financial and economic matters arising out of the war with Japan may extend beyond the period necessary for the conclusion of matters of Allied military concern. It understands the reluctance of the British Government to accept any restriction which would hamper necessary action in relation to such matters. The language of Clause 14 as now stated, however, would give to the Allies complete control over the specified aspects of Siamese economy until the last of such matters was settled and would permit unlimited exercise of that control whether or not related to such matters. In view of the comments in paragraph 16 of the Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire*, this Government is willing to withdraw its suggestion that the first part of Clause 14 be inserted as a sub-clause of Clause 11 and it would be agreeable to its inclusion in the Allied military agreement if that part of Clause 14 which follows the word "Allies" were changed to read "insofar as may be necessary for the conclusion of matters of military, economic and financial concern to the Allies arising out of the settlement of the war with Japan".

8. There has apparently been some confusion as to the views of this Government with regard to Clause 11. Clause 11 does not conform to the views of this Government but, in an effort to meet the views of the British Government, this Government has expressed its willingness not to press for an amendment. It would prefer to have the opening section of Clause 11, when included in the Allied military agreement, read "Insofar as [instead of 'For so long as'] [93] may be necessary for the conclusion of matters of military concern to the Allies arising out of the settlement of the war with Japan".

Heads of Agreement

9. This Government appreciates the willingness of the British Government to try to meet the views of this Government with regard

[93] Brackets appear in the original.

to Clauses 2, 3 and 4 of Section D. Unfortunately, the meaning of paragraph 17 of the Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* is not entirely clear to this Government. That paragraph refers to the restriction on Siam proposed in Clause 4 of Section D as a temporary unilateral control over the power of the Siamese Government to determine certain conditions relating to Siamese economy and trade. The text of Clauses 2 and 3 of Section D of the Heads of Agreement, however, would require that such unilateral control be one of the principles on which a new treaty of commerce and navigation which Siam must negotiate should be based.

10. This Government is concerned over the implications of such unilateral control as a matter of fundamental policy. It believes that no independent and sovereign country should be subjected to unilateral control by another government over its power to determine conditions relating to its economy and trade. The existence of such a unilateral control negates the independence and sovereignty of that country. It believes that future world economic welfare and the effective development of international cooperation must be founded on the fundamental principle of reciprocal treatment in all commercial and economic relations between countries. This Government again therefore earnestly requests that the British Government reconsider Clauses 2, 3 and 4 of Section D so that the economic, commercial and professional relations between Siam and Great Britian may be founded upon the principle of mutuality and not upon unilateral control.

WASHINGTON, October 9, 1945.

741.92/10–1245 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, October 12, 1945—8 p. m.

9096. Paragraph 4 A Deptel 9024, Oct 11.[94] Dept has informed Brit Embassy orally [95] that it welcomes Brit position regarding Section C of Heads of Agreement on Postwar Security and Brit assurance that Clause C 1 is only designed to make easier negotiation for regional schemes of defense in world organization by warning Siamese they must play part in defense of southeastern Asia, and that C 2 is corollary of C 1. Dept pointed out, however, that C 1 standing

[94] Not printed; paragraph 4 A summarized that part of the British Embassy *aide-mémoire* of October 6 which dealt with Clause C of the Heads of Agreement (741.92/10–1145)

[95] On October 11.

alone is historically the language of a protectorate and it requested that C 1 and C 2 be joined by the word "and" and stated in a single clause. By such combination expressed Brit intent to which US has no objection would be accurately stated and unfortunate connotation C 1 when stated without relation to C 2 would be avoided. Repeated to Chungking, New Delhi and Colombo for Yost.

BYRNES

892.01/10–1545

The Siamese Legation to the Department of State [96]

EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE SIAMESE AND FRENCH MISSIONS AT KANDY, CEYLON

At the beginning of October 1945, the head of the French Mission in Kandy approached the head of the Siamese Mission (which had been sent to negotiate with the British authorities) and asked him to inform the Regent of Siam that the Provisional Government of Siam [*France*] considered itself in a state of hostility with Siam but was nevertheless prepared to negotiate for the restoration of a normal relationship on the basis of a return to conditions prior to June 1940.

The head of the French Mission intimated that the French demands would be on the same lines as the heads of the agreement already offered by the British to the Siamese but without the annex to the agreement. He added that the French Government would demand the return of the territories retroceded to Siam in 1941 and, incidentally, the handing over to France of the image of the Emerald Buddha.

The following is the substance of the reply made by the Siamese Government through its mission in Kandy:

1. The Siamese Government can find no ground for the French contention that a state of hostility exists between France and Siam as there have been no hostilities and no declaration of war since the conclusion of the treaty concluded early in 1941.

2. The Free Siamese movement worked for the Allied cause against Japan in the same manner as the Free French movement. In the case of Indo-China, the U.S. and British authorities can testify that the Free Siamese Movement loyally and effectively supplemented the military information supplied by the French underground. At the present moment, the heads of the Free Siamese and Free French Movements have become heads of their respective governments.

[96] Accepted unofficially from the Siamese Chargé (Bhakdi) by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs on October 15.

3. Throughout the war in the Far East, Siam has consistently maintained a friendly attitude towards France and Indo-China and has proved this attitude by giving shelter and assistance to French nationals who came to take refuge in Siam.

4. In its desire to promote lasting peace in Asia, the Siamese Government is willing to negotiate with the French Government through normal diplomatic channels but not through missions sent to Ceylon for a different purpose.[97]

5. As regards the immediate return of territories which France retroceded to Siam in 1941, the Siamese Government would contend that, quite apart from the question of the rightful ownership of the territories, it would be utterly contrary to humanitarian principles to project the peoples of these territories into an area where violent disorder and bloodshed have accompanied attempts at pacification. Besides, since their re-integration in the Kingdom of Siam, the peoples of the disputed territories have enjoyed the rights of full citizenship under the Siamese constitution and share in the government of the country through their freely-elected representatives in the National Assembly.

6. The Siamese Government is however prepared, in a spirit of conciliation, to relinquish the administration of the disputed territories to a four Power Commission, representing the U.S.A., Great Britain, China and the U.S.S.R., so that they may supervise the holding of a plebiscite in due course.

7. The French demand for the delivery to France of the image of the Emerald Buddha is regarded as unwarrantable and seems difficult to reconcile with any genuine desire to promote lasting peace and friendly co-operation.

[WASHINGTON,] October 15, 1945.

851G.014/10–1645

The French Ambassador (Bonnet) to the Secretary of State

[Translation]

No. 832 WASHINGTON, October 16, 1945.

The Ambassador of France to the United States presents his compliments to His Excellency the Secretary of State and has the honor to acknowledge receipt of the note which he was good enough to transmit

[97] In telegram 238, October 13, 10 p. m., from Colombo, Mr. Yost reported that after the Thai Delegation had stated its unwillingness to negotiate with the French at Kandy, the French representatives left Kandy (740.00119 P.W./-10–1345).

to him on October 4 concerning the Indochinese territories annexed by Siam in 1941.[98]

Mr. Henri Bonnet thanks Mr. Byrnes for the said courteous communication, which was at once brought to the knowledge of the French Government, which fully appreciated its spirit and value, and begs to inform him that, in the opinion of his Government, any suggestion that the American Government might make to the Siamese Government with a view to persuading the latter to issue instructions without delay to its representatives at Kandy to conclude with the French representatives who are now there, the necessary agreement to efface the consequences of the events of 1940–1941, would furnish a very useful contribution to the stability and tranquility of Southeast Asia, to which France, like the United States, is profoundly attached. The French Government hopes for the restoration, between France and Siam, of relations imbued with confidence and friendship. Now, it is evident that only after such an agreement can normal diplomatic relations be restored.

Accordingly, the French Government expresses in advance to the American Government all its gratitude for any steps which the latter might be good enough to contemplate taking for the purpose of facilitating the conclusion of the agreement in question.

Mr. Henri Bonnet is happy to avail himself [etc.]

751.92/10–1645

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Moffat)

[WASHINGTON,] October 16, 1945.

Mr. Lacoste called by appointment to give an oral communication from the French Government in response to the oral communication which the Department had made[99] suggesting the possibility of a French assurance to the Siamese that they would have opportunity for reexamination of the Siamese-Indochinese border. His communication was in substance as follows:

France realizes that for the peace and security of Southeast Asia it is necessary that the territory wrenched from Indochina by Siam in 1941 with Japanese help should be restored but that this restoration must be accompanied by a policy on the part of France which will give the Siamese people public, moral satisfaction and make impossible in the future propaganda of the type which led to the 1940–1941 events. On the other hand, it is necessary to avoid the danger of falling into

[98] See note of October 1, p. 1346.
[99] *Ante*, p. 1350.

the trap which everybody followed in the late thirties by adopting an appeasement policy as this can lead only to adding more fuel to military and totalitarian propaganda and claims.

It is felt dangerous to give, at the moment that the territories are reacquired by France, a public assurance to Siam that they will have opportunity to reexamine the border. Such assurance would favor militaristic propaganda as it would inevitably be represented as an acknowledgment of the reasonableness of Siamese claims to the territories and would encourage the Siamese to try to obtain satisfaction. Furthermore, such assurance would be construed as a betrayal of French duty as protectors of Laos and Cambodia.

Mr. Lacoste at this point emphasized his own personal view that this was of great importance, pointing out that these countries are different ethnically from Siam, have strong individuality and governmental institutions under royal families, and that such a statement would cause confusion and unrest in the restored areas as it might be interpreted to indicate their later return to Siam. He added that many Cambodians had fled from Battambang to Cochinchina to flee the Siamese and to remain under the French rule.

On the other hand, the French Government, he continued, recognizes the need of making easier the task of the Regent and the Premier in restoring to France the territories taken by Siam. The Government recognizes that both the Regent and the Premier were always pro-Allied and anti-Japanese. Furthermore, it desires to point out that in 1937 when the present Regent was negotiating with France, his only claim was to certain islands in the Mekong River, and the turning over of those islands to Siam might be considered in the realm of future possibility. The President of the Assembly [Phya Manvarej?],[1] during the period of Siamese aggression, personally informed the French that he did not approve the Siamese acts and the French are also grateful to him.

France, desiring to approach this situation in the same spirit as the United States, is therefore now considering when and how and under what conditions French assurance can be given to the Regent and the Premier so as to encourage their liberal tendencies. They are seeking a formula to assure the Siamese Government, after the *status quo ante* has effectively been reestablished and after consultation with as many people in Cambodia and Laos as may be necessary, that they are willing in a good-neighborly spirit to examine all questions of French-Siamese relations. The declaration which they would make must, therefore, of necessity be more general and vague and broader than the assurance which this Government suggested. It would probably

[1] Brackets appear in the original.

not refer specifically to a border but would imply its inclusion in the questions to be discussed. As to the border, the discussion could of course apply only to matters of local interest and local community and could not include any substantial transfers of territory or Pan-Siamese claims for a Greater Siam (Dai-Pan-Thai). The French Government wished to make it very clear that such a declaration would not be a condition or a counterpart for the restoration of the territories to Indochina.

Mr. Lacoste concluded by stating that in the way suggested the French Government felt it could make it easier for the Siamese Government and at the same time avoid the risk of aiding the military party or agitators.[2]

A[BBOT] L[OW] M[OFFAT]

740.00119 PW/10–2545

The Department of State to the British Embassy[3]

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department of State has considered the suggestion communicated orally by the British Embassy[4] that the terminal date of the proposed tripartite agreement with Siam be September 1, 1947 instead of March 1, 1947. In conformity with that suggestion, this Government is agreeable to providing in that agreement for a second renewal of six months at the request of the British and American Governments. The suggested revised language of Clause 15 of the Military Annex, however, should it believes exclude reference to the United States or should be revised to read ". . . under the direction of a special organization the establishment of which the British and American Governments desire to negotiate with the Siamese Government . . ."

Unfortunately, there is one important matter upon which it is now apparent that there has been a misunderstanding. From the suggested revised language of Clause 16*a* of the Military Annex communicated to the Department on October 19 [*16*], it would appear that the British Government still proposes to impose on Siam a levy of one and a

[2] The substance of the French note and oral communication of October 16 were communicated orally to Mr. Everson of the British Embassy on October 26 (751.92/10–2645).

[3] Handed to Mr. Everson by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs on October 26.

[4] On October 16. In a memorandum covering the conversation the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs stated that Mr. Everson had handed him a proposed revision of Clauses 15, 16 (*a*), and 16 (*b*) of the Military Annex; and that he had informally given to Mr. Everson a copy of a draft of a proposed tripartite agreement promised in the Department's *aide-mémoire* of October 9 (741.92/10–1645). Mr. Everson gave corrections of the proposed revision to the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs on October 18 (741.92/10–1845).

half million tons of sound white rice or its equivalent in paddy. In its *Aide-Mémoire* of September 8 the British Government expressed the view that Siam had "been able in war conditions to accumulate a very large surplus of a commodity essential to the life of neighboring territories", and that it would be unjust if Siam were "allowed to unload these involuntarily hoarded stocks at the present scarcity prices". The British Government felt that "Siam should contribute out of her abundance to the needs of other countries" and explained that she should be compelled to contribute one and one-half million tons of rice "unless in the meantime Siam makes an offer of a voluntary contribution of the same amount". The *Aide-Mémoire* then continued that it was estimated that the amount of rice so accumulated and on hand was one and one-half million tons. This Government had understood from the foregoing that the levy was intended to be on the rice accumulated during the war, and that if in fact the stocks of rice so accumulated proved to be less than the estimate upon which the British Government apparently relied, the amount of the proposed levy would be correspondingly reduced. That understanding was supported by Paragraph 17 of the same *Aide-Mémoire* which drew a sharp distinction between future production and the million and a half tons of rice on which it was proposed to levy.

This Government is deeply perturbed that the amount of the proposed levy has not been reduced as, according to the best estimate presently available to this Government, the amount of rice accumulated during the war amounted to less than 800,000 tons. Furthermore, there is every indication that the present crop will be unusually small. The amount of the proposed levy would, therefore, equal not only all the stocks accumulated in war conditions, but in addition all the surplus of this year's crop and a substantial part of next year's crop. This Government, while as hitherto stated disapproving any levy, considers that a levy which exceeds in amount the stocks of rice actually accumulated in Siam during the war would be so burdensome upon the Siamese economy and have such wide reaching effect on the interests of this nation and other countries concerned that it most earnestly requests that the amount of the levy be reduced to the amount of stocks so accumulated either by acceptance of the estimate of 780,000 tons made by the Siamese Government prior to the negotiations, or by leaving the determination of the amount so accumulated to a finding by the Rice Commission.[5]

[5] In telegram 930, November 6, noon, from New Delhi, Mr. Yost stated that, at his request, the Strategic Services Unit had made a thorough reexamination of the exportable rice surplus in Siam and had reported that not more than 800,000 tons would be available from November 1945 to November 1946, including the holdover remaining from the last two years (892.61317/11–645). The SSU was successor to the Office of Strategic Services for those functions of the latter inherited by the War Department.

This Government feels that it should raise also at this time a question involving the implementation of the proposed British–Siamese agreement which is of direct concern to it. It is settled American policy that no country, not even the major aggressor nations, should be compelled to pay reparations which, either in amount or kind, will impair its ability to provide for the essential peaceful requirements of its civilian economy without external financial assistance. When it appears that a nation's capacity to pay may not be adequate to meet all reparation claims in full in accordance with the foregoing standard, it is American policy to recommend that all claimant governments associate themselves to make a joint determination of capacity to pay and an equitable settlement of claims.

In the opinion of this Government it is doubtful that the Siamese Government can, from its own resources and without serious impairment of the essential civilian economy of Siam, provide compensation in full for all claims which Allied Governments may advance and in addition meet the proposed rice levy. Indeed, it seems by no means certain that the Siamese economy could provide full compensation even if the value of the proposed rice levy were to be credited against the claims for damage or losses to Allied property, rights and interests. Although the claims of the United States will be relatively small, this Government is directly concerned in the preservation for the Siamese people of an adequate standard of living and of an opportunity for economic progress without dependence upon immediate or future financial aid from any other government. It believes that the prompt and orderly stabilizing of the Siamese economy is an essential element in the establishment and maintenance of peace, stability and tranquility throughout Southeastern Asia.

This Government considers, therefore, that in implementing Paragraph B 3 of the Heads of Agreement and Clause 4 of the Military Annex an Allied Claims Commission should be established to pass upon the claims against Siam for losses or damages sustained by Allied property, rights or interests, to determine Siam's capacity to pay such claims including, of course, the effect of the proposed rice levy, and the method and allocation of compensation to be made. Because the rice surplus accumulated during the war may constitute a major portion of such resources as may be available for meeting external claims, this Government believes that it should be recognized as constituting reparations in kind, and that its allocation should be determined by the Allied Claims Commission.

While the foregoing views relate to the implementation of the proposed agreement, this Government would suggest that possibly some

difficulty in concluding the British-Siamese negotiations could be obviated by clarifying the suggested revised language of Clause 16 *a* of the Military Annex by substituting the words "an Allied Claims Commission" for the words "organization to be indicated by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom".

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1945.

124.92/10–3145

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)[6]

[WASHINGTON,] October 31, 1945.

Sir George Sansom called this morning to say that, after talking with me last week about Siam,[7] he had sent a wire to London stating that we expected to send Yost to Bangkok early in November and that he would probably be designated Chargé of the Legation, which would signal our resumption of diplomatic relations with Siam. He went on to say that the Foreign Office had telegraphed the Embassy, indicating that the British Government was considerably perturbed by this information, and directing Lord Halifax [8] to call on the Secretary to request delay in our resumption of diplomatic relations with Siam. Sir George said that he had called simply to let me know in advance that Lord Halifax intended approaching the Secretary as soon as possible. He went on to explain that the British Government considered it very important that they be given a little more time to complete their negotiations with the Siamese before we reestablish diplomatic relations with that country, and asked whether it would not be possible for Yost, with any number of assistants who wished to accompany him, to proceed to Bangkok simply for the purpose of investigating the situation and keeping us informed, without assuming the title of Chargé. He referred to the fact that the British Foreign Office has similar representation in Bangkok and said that he could fully sympathize with our desire to have someone there.

I told Sir George I would on my own authority, subject however to confirmation by Mr. Acheson, agree to a postponement in our designation of Yost as Chargé. I said that Yost, in some other capacity than Chargé, and his assistants would proceed as soon as possible to Bangkok but that we would feel free a month from now to carry out

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[6] Marginal notation: "OK D[ean] A[cheson].

[7] Memorandum of October 25 by Mr. Vincent not printed.

[8] British Ambassador.

our stated intention of appointing Yost as Chargé and resuming diplomatic relations with Siam.[9]

Sir George thanked me and said that in view of what I told him Lord Halifax would not find it necessary to call upon the Secretary in regard to this matter.

J[OHN] C[ARTER] V[INCENT]

741.92/11–245

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have been considering the view expressed by the Department of State in the *Aide-Mémoire* which was presented to His Majesty's Embassy in Washington on the 9th October, 1945.

Siamese Rice

It is proposed that rice will be purchased by the Siamese Government from the millers at a controlled price and then delivered to the rice unit free on board. The rice unit will ship the rice to destinations determined by the Combined Food Board allocations. But while the Siamese Government may thus incur the major part of the expense of acquiring rice for export, it is considered inevitable that the rice unit will incur certain expenses. The unit may have to engage in the procurement and distribution of bags, it will have to supervise milling, check weights and quality and arrange transport and shipment. The procedure for effecting payment for the rice is being further considered by His Majesty's Government and their proposals will be communicated to the United States Government as soon as possible.

With regard to paragraph 4 of the State Department's *Aide-Mémoire*, it is thought that circumstances may arise in which the rice unit will require urgent instructions on matters concerning the procurement and shipment of rice and it was thought that in urgent cases His Majesty's Government should take the necessary decisions. The establishment in London of a Sub-Committee of the Rice Committee of the Combined Food Board charged with the programming of rice

[9] In telegram 154, November 1, 8 p. m., to Colombo, the Department informed Mr. Yost that it had agreed to defer the official opening of a Legation at Bangkok, reserving the freedom, however, to designate him as Chargé a month hence, and directed him with staff of three to proceed promptly to Bangkok (124.92/10–2745). In a memorandum of conversation the same day, the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs stated that he had telephoned the Siamese Chargé (Bhakdi) that "Yost and several others were expected shortly to proceed to Bangkok; that this did not mean resumption of diplomatic relations, but that Mr. Yost would be there probably in his capacity as political adviser to General Terry". (711.92/11–145) Maj. Gen. Thomas A. Terry became Commanding General, United States Forces in the India-Burma Theater on September 29.

exports from Siam within the framework of the Combined Food Board allocations, with the procurement of supplies for the industry and with the determination of price policy, should reduce the number of such cases to a minimum. It is not contemplated that His Majesty's Government will resolve unilaterally differences of opinion between the American and British representatives within the rice unit.[10]

Military Annex

As the State Department are aware, His Majesty's Government are prepared to omit Clause 13 of the Annex and to treat the question of a Military Mission as one for subsequent negotiation with the Siamese Government.

With regard to the suggested substitution of "in as far as" for "as long" in Clause 14 (now Clause 13), His Majesty's Government can readily give the United States Government assurance that the intention in this clause is simply that the measures indicated shall be enforced only in so far as they may be necessary in the judgment of the Allied Authorities for the purposes stated and with no other objective in view. His Majesty's Government trust that the United States Government will be satisfied with this assurance since it is felt that to modify the wording as suggested would leave room for the misinterpretation by recalcitrant and obstructionist elements of the obligations to be assumed by Siam and of the authority to be vested in the Allied Authorities under these clauses. His Majesty's Government are agreeable however to widen the terms of Clause 14 to include a reference to Military matters. The clause as redrafted will read as follows:

"To control banks and businesses, foreign exchange and foreign commerce and financial transactions as required by the Allies for so long as may be necessary for the conclusion of matters of military, economic and financial concern to the Allies arising out of the settlement of the war with Japan."

Heads of Agreement

It is not the intention of His Majesty's Government that the new treaties of Commerce and Navigation referred to in paragraphs D2, D3, and D4 of the Heads of Agreement should be based on the principle of unilateral control. The principles in Clause 4 would be reciprocally applied. In this connection reference is invited to the provision in Clause 4 that the obligation imposed by it should lapse at the end of three years if no treaty has by then been concluded. In order therefore to make the meaning free from any doubt His

[10] The Department and the British Embassy exchanged further *aide-mémoire* on November 26 and December 10, not printed (the latter, Embassy No. G289/-61/45), which dealt with various aspects of the operations of the Rice Commission (741.92/11–2645 and /12–1045, respectively).

Majesty's Government now propose to insert the words "reciprocal application of the" before the word "principles" in Clauses D2 and 3.

It will be recalled that the *Aide-Mémoire* presented to the State Department on the 29th September contained an assurance that His Majesty's Government would interpret Clause D4 in a reasonable manner and that they would not seek to take advantage of the clause to determine the conditions relating to Siamese economy and trade in such a way as to confer any exclusive privileges on British nationals or secure any benefit which they would not consider it reasonable for United States nationals to obtain from the Siamese Government.

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1945.

124.92/11–745 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in China (Robertson)

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1945—9 p. m.

1824. Urtel 1938, Nov 7.[11] You may inform FonOff informally that US intends to reestablish regular diplomatic relations and recognize present Government of Siam and that it has been ready to do so since Siam disavowed war and repudiated all agreements and treaties with Japan entered into by the Pibul administration. It is, however, anxious to secure liquidation Brit-Siamese state of war and recognition of Siam by UK. Brit believe resumption of diplomatic relations by US at this time might prejudice early conclusion Brit-Siamese negotiations and US has agreed to defer formal resumption relations for a few weeks. US hopes that Brit resumption of diplomatic relations can be concurrent with US action and would welcome establishment of Chinese relations at same time. It will be glad to keep FonOff informed of American plans.

You may of course also stress US position strongly favoring restoration complete Siamese sovereignty and independence and our attitude regarding Indochinese territories acquired by Siam in 1941.

Please keep Dept informed of Chinese plans and if possible trend of discussions referred to.

Sent to Chungking. Repeated to London and to AmPolAd,[12] Bangkok.

BYRNES

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[11] Not printed; it reported the Chinese Government's interest in whether the United States intended to establish diplomatic relations with and recognize the present government of Siam and recommended that "consideration be given to promptly informing Chinese Govt more fully regarding our intentions regarding Siam". (124.92/11–745)

[12] American Political Adviser (Yost).

741.92/11–1245

The British Embassy to the Department of State [13]

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government note that the United States Government agree that the terminal date of the proposed tripartite agreement with Siam should be 1st September, 1947, instead of 1st March, 1947, and that in conformity the United States Government are agreeable to providing in that agreement for a second renewal of six months at the request of the British and American Governments. His Majesty's Government also note the suggested revision of Clause 15 (now 14) but inasmuch as the negotiations with the Siamese Government for the establishment of the special organization referred to may be protracted, and inasmuch as His Majesty's Government consider that it is essential that the Siamese Government should be bound by the provisions of that clause forthwith, His Majesty's Government accept the suggestion that reference in it to the United States of America should be deleted.

2. His Majesty's Government are happy to confirm that it was from the outset their intention that the amount of the free contribution of rice should be limited to that of the accumulated stocks and that there was no wish to levy on future production. The figure of 1,500,000 tons was based on the best available estimates at a time when first-hand information could not be had. In fact His Majesty's Government have reason now to believe that it fell short of reality. M. Seni Premoj informed a member of the Foreign Office that the accumulated stocks in the hands of the Siamese Government were of the order of one and a half million tons.[14] More recently experts of the Siamese Rice Unit in a telegram dated 11th October, stated that investigations showed a likelihood that a surplus of 2,500,000 tons of paddy, which is the equivalent of 1,700,000 tons of rice, had been accumulated. This estimate has been confirmed in a subsequent telegram of October 29th.

3. His Majesty's Government would therefore be very well content to accept the United States Government's suggestion that the amount of the free contribution should be the exact surplus, which should be left to be determined by the Rice Commission after full investigation of the facts, but for the fact that if this course were adopted the Siamese would probably be prejudiced. They would therefore prefer to confine their demand to the original estimate of 1,500,000 tons.

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[13] Handed by Mr. Everson to the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs on November 13.

[14] In a memorandum of June 27 of a conversation with the Thai Minister and various members of his staff, the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs reported a statement by Phra Bhisal, adviser to the Minister on postwar relief and reconstruction, that "there are about 2 million tons of rice ready for export in Thailand". (892.61317/6–2745)

4. As regards the compensation to be paid by the Siamese Government under Section B.3 of the Heads of Agreement and Clause 4 of the Annex, His Majesty's Government note that it is the policy of the United States Government that reparations should not be exacted from a defeated enemy beyond his ability to pay without crippling his peacetime civilian economy. But they do not agree that to make the proposed contribution of rice and at the same time to pay the compensation provided for would unduly strain Siam's economy or jeopardise the stabilisation of that economy, which His Majesty's Government no less than the United States Government earnestly desire to expedite and assist. The free contribution of rice involves a deprivation of a potential source of foreign exchange which in view of Siam's well-known foreign exchange position she can face with equanimity. Apart from her substantial holdings of gold, the sterling assets of Siam at present in the hands of the United Kingdom custodian of enemy property, when ultimately released after all due deductions have been made, will undoubtedly still constitute very substantial assets. The claims for compensation will for the most part fall to be met in Siamese currency; and whilst it is of course impossible to assess in advance of proper investigation of the facts what will be the amount of these claims, His Majesty's Government are confident that they will not be so large as to impose any intolerable strain on Siam's internal economy. The obligation to restore British and Allied interests, with compensation as and when necessary, is one which has been provided for in all the Armistice terms in Europe and it is not one which His Majesty's Government are prepared to forego in the case of Siam, which, in the last resort, is in a far stronger position as regards foreign exchange than any other defeated enemy, and has a good foreign exchange earning potential.

5. The suggestion that the free contribution of rice should be substituted as reparations in kind for all or part of the compensation Siam will be called upon to pay under Section B3 of the Heads of Agreement and Clause 4 of the Annex is therefore unacceptable to His Majesty's Government. This contribution is regarded by His Majesty's Government as implying no such penal connotation as does the word "reparations". It is their intention that it shall constitute a special measure of reconcilement and aid by Siam towards those of the United Nations who suffered directly through denial of Siam's rice exports during the war years; and that it should be allocated by agreement amongst the recipients in accordance with the criteria previously suggested.

6. As for the suggestion that claims for compensation should be brought within the scope of an Allied Claims Commission, which would be charged with the task of assessing Siam's capacity to pay

and of allocating compensation accordingly, His Majesty's Government would not regard it as appropriate for any Government which is not in a state of war to be associated in determining either the capacity of an enemy to pay reparations or the equitable settlement of claims. They would naturally expect that such claims should rank for reparations ahead of those of States which had not been at war. The disposal of British claims against Siam would appear to be a matter for direct settlement between His Majesty's Government and the Siamese Government.

WASHINGTON, November 12, 1945.

741.92/11–1545 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Siam (Yost) to the Secretary of State

BANGKOK, [November 13, 1945.]
[Received November 15—11 a. m.]

2. 1. Landon,[16] Major Thompson, and I called today on Regent, Seni, FonOff and Bird. We conveyed to Seni unofficially gist of Department's 2963.[17]

2. In regard to British agreement, Regent took position that, since Siam did at a great sacrifice concede to a rice levy, British should at least make some minor concessions. He attached great importance to this in order to demonstrate to Siamese public that agreement was result of negotiation and not a dictated peace. He spoke strongly of hardships imposed on Siam by rice levy and confirmed that not more than 800,000 tons exportable surplus now in country. British are accepting only unbroken rice, which, according to Regent, will require 3 years' crops to meet demand of 1½ million tons, thus mortgaging future of nation. Bird, on the other hand, took position that HMG would insist on signatures agreement exactly as presented and did not consider it subject for negotiation. He therefore feared that conclusion of agreement might be delayed until new Assembly could meet and revoke restrictions placed on Seni by old Assembly. He felt Dening's optimism unjustified and saw no reason to resume Anglo-Thai conversations until Siamese ready to accept British terms. He insisted 1,700,000 tons rice exportable surplus on hand.

3. On relations with France, Seni reiterated that Siam was ready to submit frontier question to United Nations and accept their decision,

[16] Kenneth P. Landon, Special Consultant to the Political Adviser in Siam.
[17] Copy not found in Department files. This number was not part of the Department numbering system for messages to Bangkok and possibly refers to a message transmitted for the Department by the Strategic Services Unit.

but Government would be thrown out if it turned over territory to French without arbitration. Such action would also be resented by Annamese at time when they are fighting for independence. Seni did, however, suggest possibility of making public statement prior to arbitration to effect that Siam recognized manner of its recent acquisition of territory had been improper and ill-advised.

4. On relations with China, Seni said Siamese Government desires to resume diplomatic relations, and he had so informed Assembly. He did not wish to act, however, until relations had been resumed with US and Britain.

5. Fuller report on each of subjects dealt with in this message will be submitted shortly.

YOST

741.92/11–2145 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Siam (Yost) to the Secretary of State

BANGKOK, November 21, 1945—11 a. m.
[Received November 22—8 : 58 a. m.]

[14.] British *aide-mémoire* summarized in Dept's No. 8, undated,[18] demonstrates same intransigent attitude reflected by Bird here. British, while granting it is not in their interest to impose intolerable burden on Siamese economy, attach great importance to acceptance by Siamese of heavy penalties as public admission of guilt. British attitude is to some extent irrational but nonetheless obstinate and would seem to demonstrate definite intention to proceed with unilateral policy in Siam whenever they do not find us amenable.

It seems to us that Dept would now be fully justified in presenting to British strong note of protest at unilateral manner in which they are proposing to act. US contribution to victory in Far East was certainly sufficiently great to warrant our having a substantial voice in peace settlement in SEA (South East Asia), particularly in case of only independent country in that area treatment of which by any of the Allies is bound to affect overall relations of West with East. British have no right to make fact they were at war with Siam and we were not excuse for unilateral settlement since our policy was not expression of disinterest in Siam but on contrary one of sympathy and support.

If Dept does not wish to present to British note of protest along above lines, following possible alternative is suggested. British claim they will be willing to reduce penalties on Siam if it proves in fact after signature of agreement that burden on Siamese economy is such

[18] November 15, 1 p. m., not printed; it summarized the British *aide-mémoire* of November 12, p. 1367.

as to cause permanent dislocation. Siamese on other hand maintain that once they have committed themselves they would have no assurance that burdens would ever be lightened. Situation might be met without changing text of agreement by British addressing to Siamese delegation at time of signature a letter stating that should implementation of agreement place intolerably heavy strain on economy of Siam His Majesty's Govt would be glad to consult with Siamese Govt at latter's invitation with view to taking steps necessary in interest of Siamese domestic economy, her international commercial relations and economic stability of SEA. While such a step would be far less satisfactory than our proposal of an Allied Claims Commission to assess all compensation and reparations, it would nevertheless make clear to all parts so [*parties*] that modification of terms was envisaged if conditions warranted. We would then, even though not a member of an Allied Commission, have a lever to exercise pressure on British through diplomatic channels as soon as we felt situation so demanded. Letter might moreover meet Regent's need (ref my No. 2, November 13) for some British concession, however slight, to demonstrate to Siamese that govt has had some voice in negotiations.

If British prove unwilling to reply favorably in case of either alternative approaches above, we believe wisest course would be for us to resume diplomatic relations with Siam without more ado. While this would be step to which British could hardly take exception in view of long period we have already waited at their request, we feel it would give them serious pause and might be more effective than any other move on our part so causing them to reconsider their policy.

[YOST]

741.92/11–1245

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department of State welcomes the information in the British Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* of November 2, 1945 that the British Government proposes to insert before the word "principles" in Clauses D 2 and D 3 of the proposed Heads of Agreement with Siam the words "reciprocal application of the" so as to remove any doubt as to the meaning and intent of those Clauses.

It notes with appreciation also the willingness of the British Government as indicated in the Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* of November 12, 1945 to delete the reference to this Government in the proposed revision of Clause 15 (now 14) of the Military Annex.

692–141—69——88

On October 9 the Department offered further comments on Clause 14 (now Clause 13) of the Military Annex. The assurances of the British Government with regard to the application and intent of that Clause were subsequently received the same day.[19] In view of those assurances and the proposed change set forth in the Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* of November 2, the Department withdraws its request for further amendment to or for the treatment of this Clause in a different manner from Clause 11.

This Government welcomes the confirmation of its understanding that the free contribution of Siamese rice demanded by the British Government is intended not to exceed the surplus rice stocks accumulated in Siam during the war, and that the British Government has no wish to levy on future Siamese production. The Department notes that the British Government, while agreeable to the suggestion that the amount of such accumulated surplus be determined by the Rice Commission, now believes the amount of such surplus rice accumulated during the war to have been approximately two and one-half million tons of paddy or the equivalent of 1,700,000 tons of rice; considers that if the levy were to be fixed at the exact accumulated surplus the amount might therefore be greater than the present demand; and accordingly would prefer to confine its demand to the original estimate of 1,500,000 tons.

In view of the estimate made by British personnel in Siam this Government can appreciate the view expressed by the British Government. The Department has, however, within the past few days received from Mr. Yost in Bangkok an estimate, based on an American survey, which indicates that the total amount of surplus rice available for export from Siam from November 1945 to November 1946 will be less than 800,000 tons. This figure, furthermore, includes not only the surplus stocks accumulated prior to the Japanese surrender, but also the proceeds of the coming crop.

In view of the great discrepancy between the British and American estimates, each estimate may properly be considered open to some doubt and it would seem that the actual amount of surplus Siamese rice accumulated during the war should be determined as accurately as possible by an impartial body such as the proposed Rice Commission. If the principle is accepted by the Siamese that they should make a free contribution of the surplus rice stocks accumulated during the war, it would not be reasonable for them to object if the facts disclosed an amount somewhat in excess of the original British estimate. On the other hand, if the recent American estimate is proved to be more nearly in accordance with the facts, the British Government will not

[19] See *aide-mémoire* from the British Embassy, October 6, p. 1351.

wish to insist on a free contribution in excess of the actual accumulated surplus stocks as that would involve a levy on future production. Accordingly, this Government again earnestly requests the British Government to adopt the foregoing procedure rather than to base its demand on its original estimate of 1,500,000 tons. The British Government may rest assured that Mr. Brookhart [20] and Mr. Willich,[21] the proposed American members of the Rice Commission, would approach any finding as to the amount of such surplus rice stocks with complete impartiality and objectivity.

The Department notes the concern of the British Government that this procedure might be prejudicial to the Siamese should such finding establish that the accumulated surplus in fact exceeded 1,500,000 tons. This Government concurs in the view that this would not be desirable and suggests that it could be obviated by limiting the maximum amount of free rice demanded to 1,500,000 tons. Such a ceiling would in no way endanger the British demand if the British estimate is later established as correct, and it would avoid the uncertainty of a later increase in the demand if the accumulated surplus is found to have been larger than that figure. This Government would warmly welcome action by the British Government in adopting such a ceiling.

There remains only one point regarding the terms of the proposed Heads of Agreement and Military Annex on which this Government has commented and as to which as yet no reply has been received. As explained orally to an officer of the British Embassy on October 11, this Government appreciated the change in Clause C 2 of the Heads of Agreement set forth in the Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* dated October 6, but was still concerned that Clause C 1, standing alone and unrelated to its corollary in Clause C 2, might be subject to possible misconstruction or misinterpretation at some future date. The Department urged therefore that Clauses C 1 and C 2 be conjoined in a single clause. Such change would be quite in accordance with the views and objectives set forth in the Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* of October 9 and the earlier statements of Mr. Eden referred to in the Department's *Aide-Mémoire* of September 26. At the same time such change would obviate the possible danger which this Government considers inherent in the present arrangement of the two Clauses standing separately and unrelated. This Government again earnestly requests, therefore, that these two Clauses be conjoined in a single clause.

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1945.

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[20] Charles E. Brookhart, Consul at Calcutta, was given the temporary designation of Consul at Bangkok on October 23.

[21] Theodore C. R. Willich of the Foreign Economic Administration.

741.92/11–2445 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Siam (Yost) to the Secretary of State

BANGKOK, November 24, 1945—11 a. m.
[Received November 26—9 : 15 a. m.]

18. Negotiations with British were subject of Cabinet meeting November 22, according to Suni who was present. Two members urged immediate and unconditional acceptance of British terms but Cabinet decided, with concurrence of all other members, government would hold to commitment to Assembly that, in exchange for yielding of rice levy, it would insist on British acceptance points proposed by Siamese. Minor points might be abandoned but not points of substance. If British refuse to accept Siamese modifications, Siamese would announce publicly that negotiations were not free and they were confronted with an ultimatum. That being made clear they would sign the agreement. Prime Minister later informed Suni Regent had approved Cabinet decision and it will unless policy subsequently changed represent Siamese strategy when negotiations are resumed. There is no word yet as to when that will be.

Modifications proposed by Siamese are substantially those outlined in my War Department message 587, September 28 and my SSU message October 10 from Kandy.[22] Particular importance is attached by Siamese to:

(1) Creation of Allied Claims Commission to assess damage and determine extent of Siamese responsibility;
(2) Definition of term "Settlement of war with Japan" to mean disarmament and internment but not evacuation of Japs (Gen. Evans confirms evacuation will probably take 6 months or more);
(3) Some limit on Siamese responsibility for supporting British troops since cost of supplies alone is now 100,000 bahts per day;
(4) Clarification of Paragraph 11 (E) of Military Annex to make certain Britain does not intend to take over administration of Siamese territory;
(5) British proposed that if Siamese consented to rice levy there be no mention of levy in agreement but Siamese wish it mentioned.

Suni also said rumors are being widely circulated in Bangkok, he believes by British, that present government is standing in way of restoration of normalcy and economic stability and, if agreement were signed without further argument, difficulties now confronting country would vanish (we have also encountered these rumors). Suni added that certain political elements following out this line and encouraged by British are attempting to discredit Prime Minister and unseat Cabinet. Finally rumors which, according to Suni, have received credence in highest quarters suggest that US decision not to

[22] Latter not printed.

resume diplomatic relations was intended as a warning to Siamese that they should sign agreement in its present form if they wished formal relations with US resumed. I assured Suni this last rumor is wholly without foundation.

Comment: Suni was obviously sent by Prime Minister who in several conversations with us has exhibited intense discouragement. US obviously does not wish to be placed in position of supporting certain Siamese politicians vis-à-vis others but, on the other hand, we feel it is not in our interest that acts of ours such as failure to resume diplomatic relations be used to discredit a Cabinet endeavoring to maintain Siamese independence and to replace it by one which might be composed of British puppets. I am inclined to believe Regent will be skillful enough to avoid latter eventuality but it cannot be wholly ruled out. For further background and recommendation on this question see my No. 19, November 24.

YOST

892.01/11–2445 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Siam (Yost) to the Secretary of State

BANGKOK, November 24, 1945.
[Received November 27—9:50 a. m.]

19. Growing dissatisfaction among Siamese with present Government under control of the Revolutionary Party arises from (1) its long tenure of office, (2) its failure to reestablish normal relations with Britain and United States, and (3) to solve internal problems of inflation and corruption among civil officials. Siamese speak constantly of desire for capable Government satisfactory to Britain and U. S. [Here follows a reference to rumors of abdication by the King and of his possible successors.] However, unless monarch assumed more authority than at present change of monarch not as significant as possible shift away from current control of Revolutionary Party. It is generally known that British are making efforts through pro-British Siamese to organize a party with political influence but as yet have secured no outstanding leaders. In conversation with Bird was informed that British dislike Revolutionary Party leaders almost without exception and regard their regime as inimical to welfare of Siam and that British would like to see a change for the better. In this connection Siamese believe that British are attempting to achieve their ends by pressing harsh terms on Siamese while making unofficial promises that if a government is set up which is satisfactory to the British the actual implementation on terms will be mild. This ties in with Bird comment to us that after agreement is signed if Siamese feel terms are too harsh they can open negotiations for amelioration.

It becomes increasingly clear that Britain is using peace terms to strengthen its already preponderant political and economic influence in Siam. Respectfully suggest that continued delay by U. S. to resume diplomatic relations is likely to be increasingly interpreted by Siamese as U. S. support of British terms and to contribute to forcing Siam into British hands. We believe that these facts lend weight to recommendations contained in my #14, dated November 21.

YOST

741.92/11–2745 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, November 27, 1945—8 p. m.

10303. Dept informed that about Nov 20 Mountbatten recommended to Brit CS [23] that strong military representation should be continued by Brit in Siam and that a Major General should be appointed head such military. Reasons given by SAC were:

A. About 117,000 Japs in Siam must be guarded and returned to Japan ultimately.

B. On the Burma–Siam Railroad are approximately 20,000 Malayan rubber estate and other laborers who must be evacuated through Bangkok.

C. Adequate export Siamese rice must be assured. This point he stated could not be over-emphasized.

D. Would aid in securing conclusion Siamese Agreement and in assuring its implementation.

Please discuss foregoing with FonOff indicating following views. Dept recognizes that question of guarding Japs is primarily military but feels that Siamese cooperation should, as a political decision, be availed of to maximum extent possible in accordance Allied military agreement. Dept considers:

1. Brit military are in Siam pursuant to Allied military agreement with Siam concluded early Sep for disarming Japs, repatriating POWs [24] and internees, and securing Jap property, and are not there to force conclusion of Brit-Siamese Agreement.

2. POWs have all been repatriated, practically all Japs have been disarmed and concentrated in camps, and Dept understands Malayan APWI [25] are to be shortly evacuated.

3. Neither under military agreement nor under proposed Brit-Siamese Agreement have Brit military any duties or responsibilities relating export Siamese rice. Brit and American Govts have agreed on principles governing export of Siamese rice under civilian aus-

[23] Chiefs of Staff.
[24] Prisoners of war.
[25] Allied Prisoners of War and Internees.

pices. Unnecessary continuance of strong Brit military may on contrary create antagonism which will prevent wholehearted Siamese cooperation needed to assure maximum export.

4. Under specific Brit assurances to US as to application and intent of provisions of Heads of Agreement and Military Annex strong military representation will not be required following conclusion of Brit-Siamese Agreement and would appear contrary to principle involved in resumption Brit diplomatic relations and in promised friendly cooperation with Siam as an independent, sovereign nation.

Sent to London. Repeated to AmPolAd, Bangkok, for information.

BYRNES

741.92/11–2845

The Department of State to the British Embassy [26]

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

This Government appreciates the consideration which the British Government has given to American comments on the terms of the proposed British-Siamese Agreement.

It realizes that unity of British and American approach to Siamese problems is complicated by the fact that Great Britain declared war on Siam and considered it a satellite enemy while the United States ignored the Siamese declaration of war as not representative of the will of the Siamese people and considered Siam a country to be liberated from the enemy. In a sincere effort to maintain unity of British-American action with regard to Siam this Government has earnestly endeavored to accommodate itself to the British position. It withdrew its proposal that Siam, along with Korea and Formosa, should be eligible for UNRRA aid. It has so far declined to reply to Siamese requests for comments on the proposed British-Siamese Agreement. Twice, at British request, it has deferred resumption of diplomatic relations with Siam. It has refrained from pressing its objections to certain of the terms of the proposed British-Siamese Agreement which appear to it unduly harsh in the light of the record of Siam both during and since the war.

This Government, however, is now deeply concerned at the views expressed in the Embassy *aide-mémoire* of November 12, 1945 that the United States may not properly be associated with the British Government in determining Siamese capacity to pay compensation for damage to Allied property and that the claims of the United States and other Allies not at war with Siam must be subordinate

[26] In a memorandum of November 28 to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson), the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) recommended that the Under Secretary deliver this *aide-mémoire* personally to Lord Halifax "to emphasize its importance". (741.92/11–2845) This was done on November 29.

to those of the countries which are at war. This position it is felt would be sound if the British state of war with Siam were unrelated to the war with Japan or if the United States had been a neutral in that war. On the basis of actual facts, however, this Government cannot acquiesce in the British position. Except for the purely technical status raised by the British declaration of war against Siam, the British and American Governments have been completely allied in the war in the East. Siam was in an Allied theatre under combined Anglo-American Command. All operations affecting Siam were Allied in character and were directed solely against the Japanese in that country. Both Governments aided the Siamese. Both Governments requested Siam not to enter the war against Japan until Siamese efforts could be coordinated with the overall Allied strategy against Japan. The surrender of the Japanese in Siam was compelled by the Allied defeat of Japan. Siamese aid in disarming the Japanese and repatriating prisoners of war was provided by an Allied agreement concluded with Siam.[27] Both Governments are equally concerned with the establishment of peace, prosperity and stability in Southeast Asia.

This Government cannot agree that, because of the different technical status in its relationship vis-à-vis Siam, the United States is not concerned equally with Great Britain in the settlement of Allied claims against Siam or that it is not equally concerned in Siam's capacity to pay such claims.

In the same *aide-mémoire* the British Government expresses the view that the rice levy demanded by it is not to be considered as having the penal connotation implied in the word "reparations", but rather as a "special measure of reconcilement and aid by Siam towards those nations who suffered directly through denial of Siam's rice exports during the war years". This Government believes that if this view were to be accepted, a similar demand could logically be made against Indochina and indeed against every country whose normal exports were cut off by the exigencies of war. Furthermore, this view would ignore the fact that Siam and each of such countries has been denied the imports which normally they would have received for those exports.

The singling out of Siam for a special "act of reconcilement" is, in the opinion of this Government, penal in effect and this view is supported by the statement in the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of September 8, 1945 indicating that one purpose of the levy is to prevent Siam ending the war "in an incomparably better financial position than any of the other nations which were in a position to offer resistance to the aggressor".

[27] See footnote 43, p. 1307.

It is noted also that the British proposal does not provide for an allocation of Siamese rice free of cost to those countries suffering a rice shortage. Allocations of Siamese rice will be made by the Combined Food Board or successor body in accordance with regular procedures and quite unrelated to the proposed levy. According to the understanding of this Government the British proposal is actually to distribute among certain of the Allied countries which suffered more from the war than did Siam the value of the rice which Siam is to contribute free of cost. The value of that rice may well exceed one hundred million dollars. The rice purchased pursuant to Combined Food Board allocations by countries not sharing in this distribution would be paid for at controlled prices, while the countries sharing in the distribution would not be required to pay for the rice which they receive until delivery of their share of free rice had been completed. The effect of the rice levy is thus to require Siam to contribute huge sums to the governments of the neighboring colonial areas as a penalty for not suffering as did those areas, for the briefness of Siamese resistance to Japan, and for the declaration of war by the Pibul administration.

Regardless of the technical term applied to such penalty this Government believes that it will have a definite bearing on the economy of Siam and on the ability of Siam to pay Allied claims.

This Government would consider it neither just nor reasonable that the settlement of Allied claims should be subordinated to the benefits of the proposed rice levy to be distributed among other countries which may or may not have claims against Siam. Accordingly it feels strongly that if it be determined that Siam has not the capacity to meet the full levy and in addition pay compensation for Allied claims in full, the value of the levy in whole or in part should be applied in settlement of those claims. It would follow that the Allied Claims Commission, establishment of which has been requested by this Government, should have some control over the distribution of the benefits of the rice levy.

This Government recognizes that Siam has considerable gold and foreign exchange. It is possible, as stated in the Embassy's *aide-mémoire*, that Siam would be able to meet the rice levy, pay all Allied claims in full and still have sufficient foreign exchange assets so that she would not have to turn to other nations for financial assistance. It is also possible that the effect of the huge rice levy and the payment in full of Allied claims would place an intolerable burden on the internal economy of Siam. Those are matters yet to be determined and this Government cannot accept the view that it may not participate in that determination, which is a matter of Allied concern, on equal terms with those of its Allies technically at war with Siam. Furthermore,

this Government must question the principle implied in the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* that Siam should be penalized drastically simply because she may have relatively substantial gold and foreign exchange assets. Such policy might result in Siam suffering relatively more from the Allied victory over Japan than nations far more at fault than was Siam.

This Government attaches such great importance to the basic principles involved in these questions that the American views have been set forth in some detail. It earnestly requests the British Government to reconsider its position set forth in the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of November 12 so that an Allied Claims Commission on which the United States will be equally associated with the British Government will be established to consider Allied claims against Siam, to determine Siam's capacity to pay those claims, including the effect of the proposed rice levy, and to bring about an equitable settlement of such claims; to agree what part, if any, of the value of the proposed rice levy should be applied in settlement of such claims; and to pass accordingly on the distribution of the benefits of that levy.

WASHINGTON, November 29, 1945.

741.92/11–2845

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] November 29, 1945.

Lord Halifax called at my request. I handed him a copy of the *Aide-Mémoire*, dated November 29, explaining its contents briefly. I then made the oral statement contained in the attached Memorandum of Oral Communication [28] and handed Lord Halifax a copy.

Lord Halifax read me a brief memorandum prepared by Sir George Sansom [29] which anticipated that we might press for the resumption of diplomatic relations and urged that this should not be done until the termination of the state of war between Great Britain and Siam. It also urged that we say to the Siamese that they should enter into the agreement which the British proposed.

I said to Lord Halifax that I thought the *Aide-Mémoire* and the written oral statement which I had just handed him pointed out a way for the resolution of these difficulties, and I hoped that the British would find it possible to agree with the suggestions there made in the very near future.

DEAN ACHESON

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[28] *Infra.*

[29] Copy not found in Department files.

741.92/11–2845

Memorandum of Oral Communication to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

[Washington,] November 29, 1945.

Several weeks ago the Department agreed to defer resumption of diplomatic relations with Siam until December 1, at which time it was explained we would feel free to take such action. The Department does not consider that this Government should defer longer the resumption of diplomatic relations to which it attaches a great deal of importance. We would not wish, however, to take such action without affording the British Government opportunity to reply to the Department's *aide-mémoire* of November 23 and to this *aide-mémoire* dated November 29. I would ask, however, most earnestly, that decision on the requests made in these *aide-mémoire* be hastened so that we may receive a reply within a few days.

We believe that one of the factors which may have been delaying the conclusion of the British-Siamese negotiations has been the knowledge of the Siamese Government that this Government had certain objections to the proposed agreement and has been discussing those objections with the British Government. Those objections have never been stated to the Siamese by us and they have been free to conjecture as to American views. If the British Government can see its way to meet the American points of view expressed in these two *aide-mémoire*, we believe that it might be helpful to the early conclusion of the negotiations and we would have no objection were Mr. Dening to inform the Siamese Mission that the American Government had offered a number of comments on the proposed Agreement and Annex; that the British Government had endeavored to meet many of these comments either by changes in the text or by assurances as to the application and intent of the provisions in question; and that, while obviously the American Government had expressed neither approval nor disapproval of the Agreement, it had informed the British Government that it had no further comments to offer on the terms of the Agreement and annex. If the British Government believes that it would be helpful so to inform the Siamese, this Government feels that, in order to explain the American position, Mr. Dening should at the same time convey to the Siamese the same assurances as to the application and intent of various terms which the British Government has given the American Government and explain the principles of the proposed tripartite agreement which the British and American Governments desire to negotiate with the Siamese.

741.92/12–145 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Siam (Yost) to the Secretary of State

BANGKOK, December 1, 1945—9 a. m.
[Received 2 : 53 p. m.]

37. Bird states Anglo-Siamese negotiations will probably be resumed in Singapore week of December 2.[30] He is not optimistic as to outcome in view Siamese Government's commitment to Assembly to hold out on certain points and His Majesty's Government's continued determination to insist agreement be signed as presented. Strategy of Siamese Government will presumably be that described in my No. 18, November 24, 11 a. m.

Bird did indicate greater flexibility might be introduced into rice levy clause by stipulating that a portion be delivered unconditionally while delivery of remainder would depend on availability. Bird disclaimed knowledge whether His Majesty's Government will bring Indo-China question into negotiations but report from US Military Attaché AHQS (Army Headquarters) indicates British, since Siamese refuse to negotiate with French, may incorporate appropriately ideas from French draft agreement into their own. Such action would greatly complicate and prolong negotiations.

Since focal point of negotiations will in fact be Bangkok rather than Singapore where little if any freedom of action will be left to negotiators, Landon will not proceed to Singapore (refDeptel 18, November 26, 8 p. m.[31]) unless later developments should so require. GG (abbr[eviation] unknown)[32] are asking Timberman to keep us currently informed.

In view attitude governments, it seems likely negotiations will come to quick crisis ending in Siamese capitulation along lines described in mytel referred to above. It is not impossible that accidents may intervene (such as recall of Dening to Batavia or introduction Indo-China border question) which would once more prolong negotiations over many weeks. We suggest Department may wish to set some specific date such as December 20 for resumption diplomatic relations with Siam and so inform British. This would afford British reasonable time for completing negotiations and at same time serve as check on introduction of further complicating factors. We cannot too strongly emphasize unsettling effect on both political and economic conditions

[30] In undated telegram 5, received in the Department on November 19, 9 : 40 a. m., the Political Adviser in Siam stated: "Siamese delegation is by agreement with British returning from Kandy to Bangkok. Negotiations will not be resumed at least until transfer of SAC Political Adviser's office to Singapore, which is now scheduled for November 23." (741.92/11–1945)

[31] Not printed: it authorized Mr. Landon to proceed temporarily to Singapore in view of the transfer of British-Siamese negotiations to that city (741.92/-11–2645).

[32] Code room notation.

here of continuation of present diplomatic situation vis-à-vis both Britain and US.

YOST

741.92/12–145 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, December 1, 1945—2 p. m.

10447. 1. Brit Embassy informed Dept orally Nov 30 [33] that Brit could not assent US request for combining Clauses C 1 and C 2 Brit-Siamese Agreement. Denied any special Brit end sought by separate statement Clause 1 and reiterated that only intent is to make easier negotiation with Siam regional scheme of defense "within international organization".

2. Dept attaches deep importance to textual linking of Clause 1 and Clause 2. Such change would express exactly stated Brit intentions. Clause C 1 standing alone might be construed as giving Brit protectorate over Siam or right to military concessions outside international organization denying Security Council jurisdiction. See sections 1 and 2 of Dept *aide-mémoire* Jun 25 to which no Brit reply received. See also Deptel 9791, Nov 21, 1944.[34]

3. Instructions on which Brit oral statement Nov 30 based were obviously despatched before receipt by FonOff of Dept *aide-mémoire* and written oral communication Nov. 29 (Deptel 10408, Nov. 30 [35]). Please stress to FonOff importance US attaches this matter and urge reconsideration when replying Dept's Nov 29 communications.

Sent to London. Repeated to AmPolAd, Bangkok and Chungking for information.

BYRNES

741.92/12–145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 1, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received December 2—6:17 a. m.]

12567. We have discussed with Sterndale Bennett substance of Dept's 10303, November 27, re strong British military representation in Siam. Bennett stated he had seen some recommendation from

[33] Written confirmation dated December 4 was handed by Mr. Everson to the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs on December 5 (741.92/12–445).

[34] *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 1285.

[35] Telegram not printed; it summarized the Department's *aide-mémoire* of November 29, p. 1377.

Mountbatten that British commander in Siam should be major general. There is only about one brigade of British troops in Siam at present and Bennett knows of no intention to increase this number. He promised to find out for us exactly what Mountbatten had recommended in this respect and talk with us again about the matter. He did express the preliminary view that the British military were not in Siam for the purpose of putting pressure on Siamese. He also expressed disagreement with Dept's statement re exports of Siamese rice. While it is true that actual export of Siamese rice will be under civilian auspices, nevertheless the ultimate responsibility for prevention of starvation in southeast Asia (which British feel is a real danger) rests upon military commander.

WINANT

741.92/12–745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 7, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received December 7—5 : 45 p. m.]

12848. ReDepts 10477, December 1. Wilson-Young, in direct charge of Siamese affairs at Foreign Office, gave us emphatic categorical assurance this afternoon that there is no intent by terms of Clause C–1 of British Siamese agreement to create for the British a special military position of any sort in Siam. He explained that question of linking Clauses C–1 and C–2 is for final determination of Chiefs of Staff and not of Foreign Office. Real reason why British are reluctant to link the two as suggested by US is that there is no assurance as to date when regional security arrangements set up under or approved by United Nations Organization would begin to function. Wilson-Young explained that if, for example, some threat to security of British territory in area mentioned should arise prior to setting up of arrangements envisioned in C–2, Clause C–1 would give British "an in" by which they could go to Siamese and ask them to discuss possible measures to meet the crisis. He stated emphatically that C–1 does not place any obligation on Siamese to do anything. He denied that there was any intent that Clause C–1 should give British rights of protectorate over Siam.

Wilson-Young said that if a form of words could be devised to link Clause 1 and 2 which would preserve British position as outlined above, he thought there would be no objection to making the link. However, the matter would have to be discussed with Chiefs of Staff before any final action could be taken. He did not feel optimistic about an acceptable form of words and suggested that it

might be preferable and meet the Dept's fears for the British to give us a formal written declaration regarding their intentions under C–1 which would make clear as stated above that they are not attempting to create for themselves a special military position in Siam. He promised to talk to us again after seeing the Chiefs of Staff.

WINANT

741.92/12–1045

The British Embassy to the Department of State [36]

G 24/405/45

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have considered the text of the *Aide-Mémoire* handed to Lord Halifax on November 29th by Mr. Acheson.

2. His Majesty's Government appreciate the State Department's efforts to maintain unity of British and United States approach to Siamese problems and in view of the arguments now advanced His Majesty's Government are prepared to agree that the United States Government should participate on an equal footing with His Majesty's Government in an Allied Claims Commission. The exact scope and functions of the Commission remain to be determined by consultation between the Governments represented on the Commission.

3. His Majesty's Government fully concur in the view expressed in the State Department's Memorandum of October 25th that an adequate standard of living and an opportunity for economic progress without dependence upon immediate or future financial aid from any other Government should be afforded to the Siamese people; while it is the belief of His Majesty's Government that the Siamese Government can without such financial aid both meet full payment of the Allied claims which may be preferred against Siam and supply free of charge the accumulated surplus stocks of rice, they would be willing to reconsider the matter in consultation with the United States Government should this belief prove to be unfounded. Subject to this understanding however the free contribution of rice should not in His Majesty's Government's view for the reasons given in the following paragraph be regarded as available for the settlement of the claims against Siam to be considered by the Allied Claims Commission.

4. As regards the allocation of free rice referred to in paragraph 6 of the State Department's *Aide-Mémoire* of November 29th, it has throughout been intended by His Majesty's Government that although

[36] Handed by Mr. Everson to the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs on December 11.

the actual physical allocation of rice should be in accordance with the decisions of the Combined Food Board the allocation of *free quotas* should be made in accordance with the decisions of a conference of those of the United Nations who claimed to participate in this scheme and that as a result, rice free of cost should be allocated to those countries suffering a rice shortage because of deprivation of their normal imports from Siam during the war years. In framing this proposal His Majesty's Government have had in mind the analogy of mutual aid whereby the aid is given where the need lies. As has been made clear in previous communications His Majesty's Government are most anxious that the process of settling claims to share in the free rice contribution shall in no way hamper the maximum possible outflow of rice from Siam which will proceed in accordance with Combined Food Board allocations regardless of whether the recipients are to pay or to receive it free (as explained in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the *Aide-Mémoire* which was handed to Mr. Moffat by Mr. Everson on the 29th September).

5. His Majesty's Government trust that the United States Government will agree that His Majesty's Government have met the two suggestions put forward in the State Department's Memorandum of the 29th November, viz. United States participation in an Allied Claims Commission on an equal footing with His Majesty's Government and recognition that Siam should not be called upon both to meet the rice levy and to pay all Allied claims in full if this were to involve the need for external financial assistance. It is their most earnest desire that the agreement should be signed as soon as possible and they welcome the suggestion of the Under Secretary of State that Mr. Dening should be at liberty to inform the Siamese that the United States Government have no further comments to offer on the Heads of Agreement and Annex.

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1945.

741.92/12–1245 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Siam (Yost) to the Secretary of State

BANGKOK, December 12, 1945—11 a. m.
[Received January 4, 1946—10 : 59 a. m.]

60. Since Bird left for Singapore and it will be difficult to follow British side negotiations from here, Landon is proceeding Singapore December 15. Prince Wiwat, head of Siamese delegation, informed newspapers before leaving Bangkok he thought negotiations would be over in 2 weeks. This is further indication Siamese are prepared to yield rather promptly provided British do not introduce new factors such as Indo-China frontier.

YOST

892.61317/12–1245 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Siam (Yost) to the Secretary of State

BANGKOK, December 12, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received December 12—3 : 12 p. m.]

61. Prince Wiwat returned Bangkok today bringing minutes of meeting Singapore with Dening which we have seen.

Dening said Heads of Agreement not a "negotiable instrument", that he was not prepared accept changes of substance but merely changes of form; Siam had declared war on Britain and merely act of grace on Britain's part she did not impose peace terms; Siamese resistance movement had not been sufficiently trained to act effectively and therefore could not have made any contribution to Allied victory, action in making commitment to Assembly that rice gift would be granted only in exchange for British concessions on other points was incomprehensible and inacceptable; rice is not coming out of Siam in adequate quantities and if there is no improvement British will have to inform starving peoples of SEA their plight is due to Siamese procrastination; Siamese Govt is conducting public propaganda campaign to reduce British terms and if continued feelings of British people may be so aroused that terms will be hardened; Siam cannot be member United Nations until she comes to terms with Britain and France; no measures whatsoever to restore Siamese intercourse with outside world can take place until state of war with Britain is terminated; Heads of Agreement minimum terms UK is prepared to accept. Dening concluded by saying further discussion is useless and member of delegation should return to Bangkok to obtain immediately decision from Siamese Govt as to whether it will sign.

Wiwat then enumerated proposed Siamese amendments which were transmitted to Dept. He declared these amendments were of form only and designed merely to enable Siamese Govt to cope with difficult internal political situation. Dening rejected all Siamese amendments and replied in negative to Wiwat's query whether HMG offered any explanation of rejection.

On French question Wiwat said his govt is prepared negotiate at any time in Bangkok with French representative. Dening said French did not wish send representative to Bangkok and he reserved right to include in Anglo-Siamese Agreement at any time up to moment of actual signing a provision for return to Indochina of disputed territories.

At end of meeting Dening gave Wiwat new text of Heads of Agreement which we have not yet seen but which according to Prince differs from Kandy text only in paragraph 15 and 16 of Military Annex. These paragraphs would appear modified in accordance US wishes.

Wiwat must return Singapore Dec 15 and Siamese Govt must decide before then whether to sign.

Seni urgently requested US views. We felt unable do more than reiterate general lines US policy toward Siam, to emphasize our interest maintenance Siamese sovereignty and economy and to state that, according our latest word, discussion Heads of Agreement is still proceeding between Washington and London. We have not given any advice to Siamese as to whether they should sign.

Unless Dening is acting without instructions from London, it would appear British are rushing through conclusion of agreement without further reference our views. In light this fact we would recommend diplomatic relations with Siam be resumed immediately and both Siamese and British be informed that whether or not agreement is signed in present form we will continue resist any infringement Siamese sovereignty, any imposition undue burdens on her economy and any unilateral restrictions on her intercourse with rest of world.

Yost

711.90/12–1345 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Siam (Yost) to the Secretary of State

BANGKOK, December 13, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received December 22—4:11 p. m.]

63. Reference Dept's 23 November 28 [37] received 6 December. Careful study will be made as rapidly as possible but following preliminary views on Southeast Asia (not India) submitted on basis: (1) Close observation of Thais, FIC and NEI [38] developments during 6 weeks at SACSEA HQ in Kandy, (2) US [Many] conversations with S[trategic] S[ervices] Unit personnel and American newspaper correspondents only [*who*] have been stationed in or visited those territories, (3) Treatment of developments in those areas by Indian, Ceylonese and Thai press, (4) Personal contacts in Bangkok during past month.

1. So-called "reservoir of goodwill" of United States at end of war was very great, though expectations were much higher than United

[37] Not printed; it repeated telegram 918, November 28, 8 p. m., to New Delhi, which stated: "An increasing number of reports is reaching the Dept to effect that peoples in India and Southeast Asia are rapidly gaining the impression that there is some kind of an understanding to which U.S. is a party whereby this Govt, tacitly or otherwise, is supporting the policies of Brit and other European powers towards their dependencies in that part of the world. It is further reported that as a result of this impression American prestige in that area is seriously deteriorating." The telegram, requesting evaluation of the situation, was sent also to Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Rangoon, Colombo, Singapore, and Batavia (711.90/11–2845).

[38] French Indochina and Netherlands East Indies.

States could hope to fulfill, United States was looked upon as champion of democracy and of liberation of subject peoples and as sponsor of Atlantic Charter.[39] Nationalist parties in FIC and NEI and Thai Govt expected, at least hoped, that United States would follow positive policy of assisting them to resist foreign pressure, restore war-ravaged economies and in the case of subject people obtain treatment analogous to that accorded Philippines.[40] When we took no such action, disillusionment was correspondingly great and view now finds increasing credence that United States hardly interests itself in Southeast Asia except for limited commercial purposes and intends to leave region wholly to disposition of British, French and Dutch. This shift in view has not produced hostility toward United States which is still looked upon as the most disinterested of great powers but has engendered attitude of skepticism toward our stated aim and ideals and growing conviction the peoples of this region failing support from America must either throw themselves upon mercy of British or seek liberation by force. American abstention therefore does not seem likely to contribute to long term stability in Southeast Asia as it makes probable temporary restoration of prewar arrangements which in fact are often unsuited to present-day conditions and cannot for that reason long be maintained except by force.

2. Factors which are contributing in Thailand to this shift of view towards United States policy are the following: (*a*) US reluctance to act independently on resumption of diplomatic relations. Our delay is widely interpreted as indication we will not recognize until Thailand has signed agreement satisfactory to Britain. (*b*) US silence on British peace terms many of which Thais feel infringe this [*their*] sovereignty. General public is, of course, unaware that we have taken a strong position in conversations with British and if our pressure should result in moderating British terms, British not ourselves would get credit. (*c*) US failure promptly to [send to] Thailand medicines and rehabilitation supplies and to establish stable rate of exchange between baht and dollar. Thai public has little conception of tremendous demands on US shipping and resources. (*d*) Negative US policy regarding aspiration toward freedom of peoples of FIC and NEI and [failure to] intervene to prevent forcible reimposition of what peoples of this area consider oppressive alien rule. Unfavorable

[39] Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

[40] The granting of independence to the Philippines on July 4, 1946, was authorized under the Tydings-McDuffie Act, approved March 24, 1934, 48 Stat. 456. The President of the United States was authorized to advance the date of independence prior to July 4, 1946, under Public Law 380, approved June 29, 1944, 58 Stat. 625; see Department memorandum of March 9, 1944, sent to the Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs (Bell), *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. V, p. 1301.

impression is enhanced by use of US vessels to transport British, French, and Dutch troops and use of American equipment by these troops as well as by Mountbatten's retention of title "Supreme Allied Commander", US being generally assumed to be one of the Allies in question.

3. This mission fully realizes that the above is a distorted and one-sided picture and that it contains many basic misconceptions in regard to US policy. We are taking every opportunity to correct these misconceptions in Thailand. We believe it important, however, that the Dept realize that these views are finding increasing acceptance in Southeast Asia. We shall report on this subject in more detail by airmail dispatch along lines of Dept's instructions.[41]

YOST

892.61317/12–1245 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Siam (Yost)

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1945—5 p. m.

49. Urtel 61, Dec 12. You should recommend Siamese Govt not to sign agreement while Brit-American conversations are still pending. Winant is being requested by teletype [42] to discuss immediately and frankly with highest FonOff officials Dening's intransigent attitude and actions and the rice and postwar security points still unsettled.

You may inform Seni that certain American objections have been met by Brit, but that conversations with Brit are still proceeding in pursuance of American objectives.

If Dening makes any statement to Siamese implying American approval of terms or giving American views on terms of Brit-Siamese Agreement or Annex or on proposed tripartite agreement or claims commission, you are at liberty to reply to Siamese Government requests for American comments on terms, to explain US position on such clauses as Annex 11, 12, and 14 in light of specific assurances furnished by Brit Govt, and to explain also principles of Proposed tripartite agreement and matter of Allied Claims Commission.

ACHESON

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[41] In despatch 11, January 4, 1946, the Political Adviser in Siam stated that evidences of the timely and beneficial intervention by the United States in the British-Siamese negotiations "had the most salutary effect in arresting a trend in opinion which bade fair seriously to weaken United States prestige in Siam and in restoring that prestige to a very high level". (711.92/1–446)

[42] *Infra.*

741.92/12–1345 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1945—8 p. m.

10783. Department is increasingly perturbed at the Siamese situation and believes that a solution can be found only by frank discussion, face to face, with top level Foreign Office officials. Exchange of *aide-mémoire* is too dilatory and unsatisfactory.

We had practically completed a full statement of Department views and thinking with request that you have such a discussion as soon as possible when a telegram arrived from Bangkok this morning [43] indicating that Dening is attempting a third ultimatum on Siamese. The matter is therefore of even greater urgency.

You have, we believe, all copies of *aide-mémoire* Department has given to or received from British except two dated December 11. Summaries of these are in telegrams 10758 and 10759 despatched noon December 13.[44]

10758 refers to British *aide-mémoire* of November 30 [45] asking immediate despatch of additional American rice to Southeast Asia as situation there desperate and widespread disturbances anticipated in Malaya, Borneo and Hong Kong after this month unless additional rice provided. Reply dated December 11 [45] informed British that Department has strongly supported their request to the Secretary of Agriculture. At the same time, it urged the British to take all possible steps to increase availability and production of rice and pointed out the adverse effect of low control prices in Burma in securing maximum rice available and stated its belief that proposed Siamese rice levy and uncertainty as to effect of British demands on Siam are having similar result.

10759 referred to British *aide-mémoire* [46] in reply to Department *aide-mémoire* of November 29. British agreed equal American participation on Allied Claims Commission and also agreed that if their belief that Siam can pay Allied claims in full and also rice levy should prove unfounded, they are willing to reconsider in consultation with us. It repeated apologia for rice levy on analogy of mutual aid and repeated view that the allocation of free quotas under the levy should be by the United Nations claiming participation in the scheme.

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[43] No. 61, December 12, 5 p. m., p. 1387.
[44] Neither printed.
[45] Not printed.
[46] British Embassy reply dated December 10 was received on December 11, p. 1385; it was the second of two *aide-mémoire* "dated December 11" referred to in paragraph 3 of telegram 10783.

The telegram from Yost received December 13 [*12*] is repeated below. The long memorandum which will follow was prepared for use in anticipated teletype conversation by Mr. Acheson with you. Connection unavailable in time, so it is repeated verbatim at Mr. Acheson's direction. It is hoped this gives complete picture. If there are any questions suggest that you or Allison arrange teletype conversation with Moffat who will be available regardless of hour.

Department wants to stress its serious concern at situation not only on merits, but also on British position here.

Now follows telegram 61 from Bangkok, December 12:[47]

Now follows memorandum prepared for teletype conversation from Mr. Acheson:

PROPOSED TELETYPE CONVERSATION WITH AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON

Please discuss following matters immediately and frankly with the highest Foreign Office officials:

1. We have just received word that Dening has adopted a completely *intransigeant* attitude towards the Siamese in the British-Siamese negotiations and directed Prince Wiwat, head of the Siamese Mission, to return to Singapore December 14 and that he has informed the Siamese Government that they must decide before December 15 whether or not to sign the agreement. We prefer to believe, in view of the willingness of this Government to defer resumption of diplomatic relations with Siam so as to give the British opportunity to reply to the Department's *aide-mémoire* of November 23 that Dening is acting without British Government instructions in taking this attitude. But because of this development we feel compelled, in response to the Siamese Government's request for advice, to recommend that they not sign the agreement while the British-American conversations are still pending and a telegram to this effect is on its way to Yost.[48]

Neither point raised in the Department's *aide-mémoire* of November 23 is a matter of sole British-Siamese concern, but each is a matter of direct concern to the United States as well. If Dening proceeds with his *intransigeant* attitude, this Government has no course to follow but immediately to resume diplomatic relations with Siam, at which time we will feel free to offer our comments on Agreement and Military Annex and explain fully our position with regard to proposed tripartite rice agreement and Allied Claims Commission. Please urge the Foreign Office to send word immediately to Dening

[47] Not quoted in record copy; see p. 1387.
[48] Telegram 49, December 13, 5 p. m., *supra*.

to reverse his attitude and actions and withdraw the demands for immediate action.

2. Even before we learned this morning of the foregoing development, we were about to ask you to discuss very frankly and urgently with the British the question of Siamese rice and the postwar security clauses.

Please explain that while this Government has consistently disapproved the rice levy it has, in an effort to maintain Anglo-American unity, tried to accommodate itself as far as possible to the British view point. There are several new considerations, however, now apparent and we believe that it is of utmost importance that the British reconsider their whole position on the rice levy. We feel it imperative that they at least meet the requests made in our *aide-mémoire* of November 23 to have the amount of surplus stocks determined impartially instead of basing the levy on a very dubious estimate, and we believe most strongly that the proposed levy should in fact be dropped.

(A) The immediate rice shortage in Southeast Asia is acute and will probably remain severe for a long period, probably two or three years. The coming Siamese crop is only fifty percent of normal. The northern Indochina crop is only fifty percent. The Burma crop is substantially off. It is of utmost importance to increase the immediate availability and production of rice in Southeast Asia. The proposed rice levy and other inflationary factors and the uncertainty attendant upon the effect of the British demands on Siam are definitely detrimental to this basic objective not only directly, but also indirectly by weakening the Siamese Government and by destroying Siamese willingness to cooperate.

For your own information, we have just received word that on December 4 Mountbatten recommended as essential that the British demand for 1,500,000 tons of free rice should be at least partially modified, although without prejudice to an ultimate grant of this total, because the "unstable conditions of the country's economy" is drying up the Siamese rice supply with consequent grave repercussions all over Southeast Asia.

(B) You will remember the British estimated that there are in Siam 1,700,000 tons of surplus rice, while Yost reported only 800,000 tons available and Yost's estimate included the existing stock and the new crop. Yost has now secured estimates independently from two different groups Chinese rice dealers. One group estimated 800,000 tons, the other possibly a million but nearer 900,000 tons as available for export during the coming year, including both stocks on hand and the new crop. There is just a possibility, although we consider this doubtful, that in arriving at these estimates a deduction was made from

the stocks on hand to supplement a possible deficiency in the coming crop for domestic consumption. That may account in small part, although we doubt it, for the discrepancies between the British and American estimates. This Government could not consider in "surplus stocks accumulated in war conditions" any part of stocks on hand needed for domestic consumption. Even if the actual accumulated surplus stocks on hand at the conclusion of the war were, under these circumstances, somewhat more than the estimates given, a levy on more than the amounts actually available for export would violate, in our opinion, the theory of the British position and would amount to a levy on new production by taking from the following crop the amount applied to any deficiency in the coming crop.

(C) We believe that both the manner of Dening's negotiating and the severity of the British terms have had a very adverse effect on the British position in Siam and on future Siamese friendship and cooperation which a liberal policy would have cemented. With unrest throughout Southeast Asia, with increasing antagonism which has arisen from the British situation in the Netherlands East Indies and Indochina, and with potentiality of disorders, as the British themselves have informed us, in Malaya, Borneo, and Hong Kong because of food shortages, we consider the Siamese development particularly unfortunate. The British are Siam's closest neighbors and have had a long record of close and friendly relations. In seeking maintenance of the complete political and economic independence of Siam, an open-door, and the promptest possible reestablishment of the Siamese economy, this Government is not trying to disturb those friendly relations which we consider desirable for the stability and security of Southeast Asia. We do not think that it is too late to reverse the present situation by generous treatment of Siam. We sincerely believe that it would be directly to the British interest in Southeast Asia as well as increasing the flow of Siamese rice and a valuable step in British-American relations if the British would drop entirely the demand for free rice and accept the 20,000 tons per month for twelve months—a total of 240,000 tons—which the Siamese offered voluntarily.

(D) The press has given wide publicity to a UP dispatch from Bangkok giving a harsh interpretation of reported British terms. Strong editorial comment adverse to the British is spreading and there is heavy pressure on the Department to state publicly what it is doing to protect American interests and to secure fair treatment for Siam. Public comments discount the British "state of war" as a pure technicality, not justifying a harsh, or indeed any unilateral, action by the British. We have heard that the question is likely to be raised in Congress very shortly. All of this is extremely harmful to British

position here, particularly at this time. We have mentioned this not as a threat but merely as a statement of fact which they should know.

(E) In this connection, it is suggested that the British may wish to consider in their own interest amending certain clauses such as Annex Clauses 11, 12, and 14 (now 13) so as to conform to the specific assurances as to intent and application which they have given this Government. Under those assurances the British gain no advantages from the broad language used, and when the terms are known will receive only severe criticism both in Siam and here which no amount of explanatory assurances can avoid. The text of those terms will be seized on to justify charges of British control, and British explanations will be dismissed as meaningless on the ground that otherwise the terms would have stated accurately British intentions. The Department has accepted the British assurances and is not requesting these changes, but it would point out that it also will be subject to criticism from similar sources for not pressing textual changes.

3. With regard to the points in the British *aide-mémoire* of December 11 [*10*] in reply to the Department's *aide-mémoire* of November 29, please express this Government's appreciation of British acceptance of equal United States membership on the Allied Claims Commission. The Department understands by that *aide-mémoire* that the British also agree that the UK and US will consult as to the effect on the Siamese economy of the payment of Allied claims and the rice levy and that if the total is found overburdensome, there will be a reduction in the levy.

We have been concerned over the proposed British procedure for the distribution of the suggested free quotas of the rice levy so as to insure against dissipation of Siamese assets which would prevent the payment of legitimate claims in full if the total claims and levy are found to be excessive from the point of view of the Siamese economy. We assume that the British answer meets that point affirmatively.

As a matter of fundamental principle, however, we still cannot approve the British thesis that any country is entitled to receive rice from Siam free of charge because that country did not receive Siamese rice during the war. Such a thesis, if accepted, would establish a new principle in the distribution of the assets of a country with which any of the United Nations has been at war. Until now, so far as we know, such assets have been considered to be subject to allocation only in accordance with claims for damages suffered as a result of the state of war. The mere fact that a country was unable to purchase a commodity during the war period does not, in our opinion, entitle that country to receive that commodity free. We would accept the principle that those countries which have legitimate claims against

Siam and to which rice has been allocated by the Combined Food Board on the basis of need should be entitled, if they wish, to receive such rice free of cost up to the amount of their claims. But we still believe that the proper and advisable procedure would be a gift of the rice by Siam to UNRRA as the organ of all the United Nations. We believe that American public opinion would consider the course proposed by the British as a division of booty unjustifiably seized from a country which never fought the Allies, which in fact aided the Allies and did not enter the war against Japan only because requested not to by the British and American Governments, and which, to be technical, never even surrendered to any of the countries in a state of war with Siam.

4. We have not as yet received a reply to our *aide-mémoire* of November 23 although assured orally by the Embassy that there would be a reply very soon. That *aide-mémoire* raised two points: (1) the amount of the rice levy and (2) the postwar security clauses. We have already discussed in the earlier part of this conversation the point about the amount of the rice levy.

With regard to the postwar security clauses in the proposed Agreement, we cannot follow or understand the British argument stated by Mr. Wilson-Young and reported in your telegram 12848 of December 7. UNO [49] is to be launched in a few days. No threat to the security of British territory is known here which might develop before security arrangements can be approved by UNO. But even if a crisis developed, there is nothing to prevent the British going to the Siamese and discussing possible measures to meet that crisis. It is scarcely credible that the British must have such a clause inserted in an agreement just to make certain that the Siamese would be willing to talk with the British Empire under those circumstances. The statement that Siam is not obligated to do anything by that clause makes the insistence upon retention of this clause slightly absurd.

We refer again to the earlier British position, to which this Government agreed, that Siam should agree to necessary security arrangements within the international organization. We cannot acquiesce in a clause which gives even the color or appearance of a protectorate, whether founded or unfounded. In our opinion this clause would have that appearance standing alone in a bilateral British-Siamese agreement.

5. Except as stated at the beginning of this conversation in connection with Dening's actions, we are willing to defer resumption of diplomatic relations for a few days longer in order to receive the British replies to the American views on the postwar security clauses and on the amount of the rice levy as set forth in the Department's

[49] United Nations Organization.

aide-mémoire of November 23 and as amplified in this conversation. Please stress the deep importance which we attach to the British meeting our views in both these matters. Quite frankly, if they cannot meet our views, we are promptly going to resume diplomatic relations with Siam and, of course, when diplomatic relations are resumed, we will feel free to comment to the Siamese as we have commented to the British on the terms of the proposed Agreement and Annex and our position in regard to the proposed tripartite agreement and the Allied Claims Commission. The Department will also probably find itself in a position where it will have to make its views public.

[ACHESON]

741.92/12–1445 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Siam (Yost) to the Secretary of State

BANGKOK, December 14, 1945—11 a. m.
[Received December 14—11 a. m.]

65. Thai Govt has decided to sign British agreement without reservations. Cabinet was almost unanimous though Sidi [*Seni*] stood out to the end. General feeling was that Thailand as a small country faced by a great one has no alternative but to yield, that it has already delayed more than 3 months without improving situation, and that further delay might result in hardening of British terms.

There are only two qualifications on decision to sign:

1. Dening will be asked to address a letter to the delegation stating that these are the minimum terms which British will accept, that it is not willing to negotiate and that it insists on signature of agreement as it stands. This letter would be published along with the terms of agreement. If Dening refuses to write such a letter, it is probable that Thai will sign anyway but will themselves issue a public statement along these same lines.
2. If Dening should at last moment interject French question into the agreement, the whole matter will have to be referred back to Bangkok for reconsideration.

Prince Wiwat returning to Singapore today. It would thus appear that unless Dening refuses to write letter referred to above or introduce French issue, signature of agreement or at least preliminary exchange of letters between plenipotentiaries may take place within next day or two.

YOST

741.92/12–1445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Singapore (Mallon)

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1945—8 p. m.

84. Dept instructed Yost Dec 13 to recommend to Siamese Govt not to sign Brit-Siamese Agreement while Brit-American conversations proceeding. US still pressing hard for further changes.

Top Sec[ret] message from Yost [50] just received that Siamese have decided to sign Agreement. Message to Yost apparently not received before Siamese action.

Urgent that you at once communicate to Siamese Mission, headed by Prince Wiwat, the recommendation of this Government.[51]

ACHESON

741.92/12–1545 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Siam (Yost) to the Secretary of State

BANGKOK, December 15, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received December 15—9 : 03 a. m.]

68. Immediately upon receipt this morning of Deptel 49, December 13, I saw Seni and Pradit who at once despatched instructions through SSU to Wiwat to delay signing for few days. It is not yet certain Wiwat, who returned to Singapore yesterday, may not have signed before receiving new instructions but not considered likely he had had time to do so.[52]

Seni and Pradit (who has been named Senior Statesman by Royal proclamation and is still the controlling hand in Govt) took action on own responsibility without risking delay involved in calling Cabinet. Seni expressed some anxiety that this further delay by Siam might result in hardening rather than softening of British terms since some Cabinet members maintain present terms are harsher than original 21 demands. We recommend strongly that in order to relieve Siamese of onus Dept inform British that on this occasion Siamese are delaying pursuant to US recommendation.

Both Pradit and Seni expressed deepest appreciation of Dept's action which came when they were in depths of despair. Both also most grateful for recent San Francisco broadcast on US policy toward Siam. Both inquired, however, what action US will be prepared to take if British remain intransigent and continue to insist on accept-

[50] *Supra.*

[51] In telegram 58, December 18, 10 a. m., the Consul at Singapore reported his personal delivery of this message to Prince Wiwat at 7 p. m., December 17 (741.92/12–1845).

[52] In telegram 74, December 17, 3 p. m., the Political Adviser in Siam reported that new instructions had been delivered to Prince Wiwat in time to delay signing the agreement (741.92/12–1745).

ance of terms as they stand. Does Dept wish at this stage to make any reply to this inquiry? Siamese obviously fear possibility that we may be unable to make our support effective and they be left holding the bag.

YOST

741.92/12–1745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 17, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received December 17—3 : 34 p. m.]

13208. ReDepts 10812, Dec 14; Embs 13197, Dec 17.[53] In view of fact that Dept's 10783, December 13, 8 p. m., had not yet arrived, we were unable to discuss detailed objections of Dept to British-Siamese agreement with Foreign Office this afternoon. However we did obtain from Wilson-Young, Acting Head of Far East Dept during absence Bennett in Moscow, definite assurance that no agreement would be signed prior to Wednesday evening Dec 19 London time. He said while it was not certain it would be signed the following day he could give no assurances. Wilson-Young read US [*us?*] text of Foreign Office telegram sent to British Embassy Washington Dec 14 dealing with rice collecting organization and with strategic clauses of British-Siamese agreement. On question of clauses C–1 and C–2, British Embassy was authorized to give Dept written assurance along lines outlined in this Embs 12848, Dec 7. In view of this Foreign Office message, does Dept still desire signing of agreement held up beyond Wednesday evening?

WINANT

741.92/12–1745 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1945—7 p. m.

10846. Brit Embassy has not delivered memorandum pursuant FonOff telegram sent Dec 14 but informed Dept on oral inquiry after receipt urtel 13208, Dec 17 that it does not refer to amount of rice levy. Dept views on suggested Brit assurance regarding Clause C 1 already set forth in Deptel 10783, Dec 13. Dept views situation seriously and requests discussion on highest levels in accordance with

[53] Neither printed; the former quoted telegram 65, December 14, 11 a. m., from the Political Adviser in Siam, p. 1397, and the latter reported receipt of telegram 10812 at 11 : 30 p. m., December 16.

Deptel 10783, Dec 13, and that attempt to conclude Agreement be deferred pending Brit consideration these views. Dept anxious for early conclusion Brit-Siamese Agreement but considers these points definitely of US concern and refers to Brit acceptance of arguments Dept *aide-mémoire* Nov 29 on complete Anglo-American character operations affecting Siam.

ACHESON

741.92/12–1845

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have been giving further consideration to the last paragraph of the State Department's *aide-mémoire* of the 23rd November. They are most anxious to allay the suspicions which appear to be entertained in the State Department of their motives in including clauses C1 and C2 in the heads of the agreement which they intend to negotiate with the Siamese Government.

2. They wish to inform the United States Government that in their view clause C1 imposes no specific obligation on the Siamese Government and that their object in including it is not to create any special military position or to obtain special rights for themselves in Siam. Their reluctance to link clauses C1 and C2 together arises out of their desire to make some provision for the period before the United Nations Organization enters into its functions, during which period, in the event of any threat developing to the security of British territories in South East Asia, they would have a basis for approaching the Siamese Government with a view to consultation about measures to be taken to meet the threat.

3. His Majesty's Government hope that, with the foregoing assurance, the United States Government will no longer feel it necessary to offer objection to the inclusion of clauses C1 and C2 in the heads of the agreement as they stand.

WASHINGTON, 18 December, 1945.

741.92/12–1845 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Siam (Yost) to the Secretary of State

BANGKOK, December 18, 1945—noon.
[Received December 19—10:27 a. m.]

76. Following background information just received from Timberman:

1. Dening has been using every device to get agreement signed in a great hurry. In view his recent press statement stressing how lenient British are being to a defeated enemy but implying if there is more delay the terms will become harsher, Timberman believes British reaction to present delay will be extremely sharp.

2. If Thai negotiations develop favorably, SAC (Supreme Allied Commander) intends withdraw from Thailand Second Brigade (First has already been withdrawn) and Division Headquarters about January 15. If not, present strength will be maintained. In any case present strength will be kept for a while after conclusion of agreement because Dening believes signing of agreement may result in civil disturbances in Thailand.

3. Allied Air CinC (Commander in Chief) has been instructed to grant return passages to Bangkok to Thai delegation without written permission from Dening.

4. SACSEA (Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia) has asked MacArthur [54] if he can furnish Liberty ships for export from Thailand of rice allocated to Philippines by CFB (Combined Food Board). If MacArthur replies in negative, SAC intends to appropriate this rice in SEAC (Southeastern Asia Command).

YOST

741.92/12–1845 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Siam (Yost) to the Secretary of State

BANGKOK, December 18, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received December 19—9 : 35 a. m.]

79. Following reports received by Siamese Govt from Wiwat.

1. On December 15 Wiwat before receiving instructions to delay signature informed Dening Siamese Govt had decided to sign. He added (*a*) that Govt will have to explain to public that these are minimum terms not subject to further negotiation and (*b*) that terms requiring legislative action must await implementation until Assembly meeting in January.

2. British have made four new proposals re rice: (*a*) His Majesty's Govt will sell Siam one to two hundred thousand ounces gold for sterling at official price 172 shillings three pence per ounce, (*b*) as temporary emergency measure and without prejudice to claim one and one half million tons free rice, HMG will buy rice for sterling until proposal (*a*) above is implemented, (*c*) should Siam not have one and one half million tons exportable surplus, HMG agrees to determination exact surplus by Rice Commission, (*d*) contribution rice may

[54] General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander Allied Powers in Japan.

include proportion broken rice to be determined by Rice Commission.

3. Following procedure for conclusion of agreement has been drawn up by Dening and Wiwat: (*a*) drafts of letters to be exchanged between them (which Siamese wish to contain points (*a*) and (*b*) under paragraph 1 above) being prepared by Dening and final text of terms of agreement expected from London at any moment, (*b*) Wiwat will come to Bangkok December 20 with texts, obtain approval and return to Singapore early next week, (*c*) letters will be exchanged and formal agreement signed immediately upon his return, (*d*) only formal agreement will be published.

4. Australian representative who is participating in negotiations has presented draft terms for terminating state of war with Australia. Terms provide for conclusion of treaty between Siam and Australia before March 14, 1946 obliging Siam *inter alia* (*a*) to carry out such obligations specified in British agreement as Australia may require, (*b*) to compensate Australia for damages, (*c*) to undertake regional political, economic and security cooperation consistent with principles of UNO.

5. Clarac who has appeared in Singapore told Wiwat he had come to give last friendly warning that if Siam delays longer in responding to French invitation to reestablish normal relations French people "would be led to draw the necessary conclusions". Clarac pointed out that British and American Govts have made their views clearly known about restoration of provinces to Indochina.

AmPolAd Comment:

1. British would appear to have substantially met US views re rice though not perfectly clear from Wiwat report that levy would be limited to surplus determined by Rice Commission. Purpose of sale of gold not clear to Siamese or US but may be belief that strengthening Siamese currency by this means would assist steady flow of export rice.

2. If statement re Allied Claims Commission quoted in Deptel 46, December 13 [55] means Commission would have power to adjust total compensation to Siamese capacity to pay, British would appear to have met US on this point as well though this concession not yet communicated to Siamese.

3. If these two points definitely clarified, only security clause would remain in dispute between US and British.

4. Only open issues between British and Siamese are (1) whether letter from Dening should cover points (*a*) and (*b*) of first paragraph this telegram, (2) whether these points should be publicized, (3) pos-

[55] This repeated telegram 10759 to London, not printed; see paragraph 5 of telegram 10783, December 13, 8 p. m., to London, p. 1391; and *aide-mémoire* of November 29 to the British Embassy, p. 1377.

sibility of last minute introduction by British of French frontier question.

5. It would relieve growing strain on tempers of all concerned if these points could be cleared up in time to permit signature of agreement next week.

YOST

892.61317/12–1845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 18, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received 6:41 p. m.]

13240. We talked this afternoon with Sargent,[56] who in absence of Bevin and Cadogan [57] is highest FonOff official, and Wilson-Young, regarding contents of Depts 10783, Dec 13, and 10846, Dec 17. On question of rice levy we were given copy of a revise of Annex to Heads of Agreement which FonOff states was sent this morning to British Embassy Washington for communication to Dept. Article 10 (*a*) of revised annex appears to go a long way toward meeting US point. It provides that Siamese Govt shall "make available free of cost at Bangkok to an organization to be indicated by the Govt of the UK and as quickly as may be compatible with the retention of supplies adequate for Siamese internal needs, a quantity of rice equal to the accumulated surplus of rice at present existing in Siam, subject to a maximum of 1½ million tons the exact amount to be determined by the authorities appointed for the purpose of taking delivery of the rice".

Revised annex is considerably shorter than former annex leaving out original paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 6, 7; considerably reducing 11 by eliminating 11 (*a*), revising (*c*) by inserting after "services", "for use in Siam", eliminating (*d*) and (*e*), revising (*f*), revising (*g*) to add after "Siam", "similar to such agreements as have already been concluded by the Allies with one another"; revising 12 and limiting its extent until March 2, 1946; eliminating 13; slightly revising 14; revising 15 and limiting it to Sept 1, 1947. Item 16 (*a*) becomes 10 (*a*) in revised annex as quoted above. 16 (*b*) puts date limit Sept 1, 1947. Item 17 eliminated.

FonOff also promised to refer question of security clauses again to Chiefs of Staff and will report their reaction shortly.

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[56] Sir Orme Garton Sargent, British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

[57] Sir Alexander M. G. Cadogan, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Considerable surprise was expressed that State Dept had seen fit to instruct Yost to urge Siamese not to sign agreement and that US Govt might even go so far as to resume diplomatic relations with a country still at war with one of its Allies.[58]

WINANT

741.92/12–1945 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1945.

10940. At press conference Dec 19 I said US has earnestly represented to Brit and Siamese our hope Agreement not finally concluded while US discussions with Brit proceeding. We think we have definite interest in matter and hope for courtesy of completion US-Brit discussions before definitive Agreement. US has very considerable interest because of prominent role in Far Eastern war and he feels [*I feel?*] it is entitled to have its views patiently considered. There has been long historic connection between US and Siam. Siam has long had American advisors. Great US sympathy and interest in Siamese effort to develop into an independent, democratic country. US interested in whole economic development and stability Southeast Asia. Economic open door cornerstone American policy.

Sent to London. Repeated to AmPolAd, Bangkok.

ACHESON

741.92/12–2145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 21, 1945—2 p. m.
[Received 6 : 18 p. m.]

13391. With reference Embassy's 13374, Dec 21,[59] reporting *Times* story on British-Siamese agreement, we have just talked with Wilson-Young who tells us that as result of meeting this morning with Chiefs of Staff British opposition to connecting clauses C 1 and C 2 by word "and" has been dropped. British Embassy, Washington, is being instructed to inform Dept.[60]

[58] In telegram 13273, December 19, 11 a. m., the Ambassador in the United Kingdom reported advice from Mr. Wilson-Young that the revised annex summarized in telegram 13240 had been cleared by the highest civil and military authorities in London but required Lord Mountbatten's approval, for "in all such cases final decision is left to authority on the spot". (741.92/12–1945)

[59] Not printed.

[60] On December 22, Mr. Everson sent to the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs a revised version of the text of the Heads of Agreement and of the Military Annex, in which the two clauses were combined (741.92/12–2245).

In view this action by British and their revision of Annex to Heads of Agreement, as reported Embassy's 13240, Dec 18, Foreign Office expresses hope that State Dept will see fit to instruct Yost to withdraw his advice to Siamese not to sign agreement and will in fact instruct him to advise Siamese to sign. Wilson-Young states Dening has telegraphed that it is hoped exchange of letters making basis for later signature of formal agreement can be made on Christmas Eve.

With regard to statement in *Times'* article contained Embassy's 13374 that exact amount and quality of rice to be exported from Siam should be examined by international commission, Wilson-Young stated that rice collecting agency envisioned by paragraph 10 (*a*) of Revised Annex was what is known now as Siamese Rice Unit which operates under orders of British Ministry of Food, but that British are hoping US will agree to join in body and that it can be made truly international. He mentioned talks now going on in Washington regarding possible tripartite agreement which would bring in Siamese as well, and if this should be the case apparently it would be a British-US-Siamese Agency which would determine amount of rice to be collected. He also said that statement in press that signature of agreement may be postponed to allow new Siamese Govt to take office is newspaper "embroidery", basis for which is not known at Foreign Office.

WINANT

741.92/12–2145 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Siam (Yost) to the Secretary of State

BANGKOK, December 21, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received December 21—10:57 a. m.]

88. Wiwat returned to Bangkok December 20 carrying new text Heads of Agreement and Military Annex handed him previous day by Dening. New text embodies extensive concessions by British including those listed in Deptel 69, December 19.[61] Other changes not listed Deptel 69 follow:

1. Heads of Agreement. (*a*) Revision paragraph C–2 along lines Anglo-US conversations (but no linking of paragraphs C–1 and C–2).
(*b*) Revision paragraphs D–2, D–3 and D–4 as agreed in Anglo-US conversations.

2. Military. Revision paragraphs 14, 15 and 16–B as agreed in Anglo-US conversations. (AmPolAd comment: British would appear to have met US views on rice. There is, however, no mention in new text of Allied Claims Commission nor has our point re security clause been met.)

[61] Not printed; it summarized the contents of telegram 13240, December 18, 6 p. m., from London, p. 1403.

Wiwat confirmed that purpose of sale of gold referred to my 79, December 18, is to strengthen Siamese currency and encourage rice growers to dispose of product.

Wiwat also brought texts of letters to be exchanged between Dening and himself, which do not include points mentioned in paragraph 1 my 79. In view changed circumstances Siamese will probably not insist on inclusion these points in letters as long as covered in general way in communiqué to be issued at time of signature of agreement. Dening has still reserved right to introduce French issue but Wiwat thinks it unlikely he will do so. Dening desires Wiwat to return to Singapore about December 25 to sign agreement. Wiwat reports Dening's attitude mellowed noticeably last few days. Siamese now prepared to sign as soon as receive word that US is satisfied. We would appreciate receiving instructions immediately Dept is ready for Siamese to go ahead.

Siamese cabinet overjoyed at substantial modifications in British terms and deeply grateful to US. Acting Secretary's press statement [62] has had wide publicity and great effect on official circles and public generally. US prestige has reached new high in Siam.

YOST

741.92/12–1545 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Siam (Yost)

WASHINGTON, December 22, 1945—10 a. m.

78. 1. Brit have agreed combining Clauses C 1 and C 2 as requested.

2. Urtel 68, Dec 15. Please express appreciation to Seni and Pradit for courtesy in agreeing to delay signing during Brit-US discussions. With these concessions on amount rice levy and security clauses Brit-American discussion concluded on terms Agreement [63] (though discussion on distribution levy may continue). US therefore withdraws recommendation for delay in signing Agreement. This of course is not to be construed as approval of Agreement.

3. You are authorized to discuss fully with Seni and Pradit American position and actions throughout military and civilian negotiations. Please make clear:

(*a*) The assurances which Brit have given us regarding Annex old 11 and 14 on basis of which US acquiescing in military provisions. Be sure they understand that military provisions are generally in line with agreements made even with Allied countries except troop pay which Brit has always required be met by enemy or ex-enemy countries, even co-belligerents.

[62] See telegram 10940, December 19, to London, p. 1404.

[63] For Department statement of December 22 regarding the conclusion of British-American conversations on the proposed British-Siamese agreement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 23, 1945, p. 1021.

(*b*) Principles proposed tripartite agreement which we consider most effective procedure expediting rice exports and protecting Siamese interests.

(*c*) Brit-American understanding as to Claims Commission and consultation on Siamese ability to pay.

(*d*) That although we disapprove rice levy in principle we feel terms best obtainable.

(*e*) In view Anglo-American relationships, US although ready since Oct 2 reluctant to resume diplomatic relations with technical enemy of Brit Ally in face of specific requests to defer action. Such deferment was used, however, to increase pressure for modifying Agreement.

4. Purpose of disclosing American position and actions is not only to protect US position but also to strengthen Siamese Govt in planning to meet internal criticisms and opposition to Agreement. You are authorized as conditions and circumstances appear to warrant to make such public statements as, in your discretion, seem desirable to emphasize American position and assistance taking care, however, not to permit any implication that US is supporting Agreement and also not to emphasize Brit-American disagreements or difficulties and requesting Siamese similarly to avoid such implication or emphasis. It is hoped you will be consulted on any statements by Siamese Govt or officials referring to US so that while fully protecting American position the net effect will be to restore Brit-American-Siamese harmony as rapidly as possible and so help rapid implementing and discharge of Agreement obligations and welfare of Siam.

5. Brit informed substance this telegram.

ACHESON

741.92/12–2245 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Siam (Yost) to the Secretary of State

BANGKOK, December 22, 1945—11 a. m.
[Received December 23—8: 20 a. m.]

89. At press conference December 19 Prime Minister indicated that negotiations with French concerning former Indochina provinces annexed by Siam would probably be undertaken immediately after conclusion of agreement with British. Seni added that question might be referred to World Court for decision.

We learn from Suni who acts as contact man for Pradit and Seni, that Govt is actively considering means of dealing with Indochina question. They are beginning to recognize that act of acquisition of territories of Pibul regime with Japanese aid must be repudiated but hope for domestic political reasons they can:

1. In announcing repudiation refer to an Allied request that they do so.

2. Refer question immediately to UNO for adjudication.

3. Pending UNO decision retain administration of territories, if necessary under supervision of a United Nations commission.

They believe to hand administration of territories immediately back to France would cause grave repercussions among Siamese, Annamites and population of territories. Concrete proposal along these lines may be presented to us informally for consideration in near future.

YOST

711.92/12–2245 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Siam (Yost)

WASHINGTON, December 22, 1945—4 p. m.

80. Dept believes US should not resume diplomatic relations immediately on treaty signing to avoid association therewith, but equally should avoid long delay. Present view is that Jan 1 would be suitable day, but feel we must clear with Brit so that both may act same day, but with US technically in advance in view previous deferment. Please advise Dept immediately your judgment as to most suitable time.

ACHESON

892.014/12–2245

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

A member of the staff of the French Embassy in London called at the Foreign Office on the 11th December to say that he had heard that the Siamese Government would be willing to cede back to the French the territories in dispute between Siam and France if told to do so by the United Nations Organisation.

The French representative was informed that the view of the Siamese Government, as expressed to Mr. Dening at Kandy, was that any Siamese Government which agreed to restore those territories to the French except at the instance of the United Nations Organisation would lose support in Siam. The opinion of His Majesty's Government was that advice from His Majesty's Government and from the United States Government might move the Siamese from that attitude and that the possibility of such advice being given by His Majesty's Government should not be ruled out.

On the 19th December the French Embassy in London was informed that it was hoped to conclude the exchange of letters with the Siamese by December 25th. The French Embassy was not given the impression that the documents attached to the letters or the formal agreement to

follow the exchange of letters would contain any reference to the disputed territories. The French representative requested, however, that His Majesty's Government should record in a written communication to the Siamese, their non-recognition of the Siamese acquisition of those territories in 1941.

Mr. Dening has accordingly been instructed to exchange letters on the subject with the Siamese representative at the same time as he exchanges letters covering the terms of the agreements which are to terminate the state of war. Mr. Dening will state that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom do not recognise the acquisition by Siam of the French territories, and the Siamese representative will reply taking note, on behalf of his Government, of the view of His Majesty's Government.

WASHINGTON, December 22, 1945.

741.92/12–2445 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Siam (Yost) to the Secretary of State

BANGKOK, December 24, 1945.
[Received December 26—4:25 p. m.]

95. Reference Deptel 78 of December 22. Department's message has been conveyed to Seni and he fully understands US position and wisdom of policy outlined at conclusion of message. He reiterated again and again heartfelt gratitude of Siamese Government for US action.

Wiwat will proceed to Singapore December 26 and presumably initial Heads of Agreement and exchange letters with Dening December 27. Signature of formal agreement must await arrival of text from London which may require several days. Publication of terms and joint communiqué by two Governments will take place after signature of formal agreement.

Would appreciate being informed of Department's plans concerning timing of resumption of diplomatic relations as we like [apparent omission] for establishment of Tripartite Rice Commission.

YOST

741.92/12–2545 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Siam (Yost) to the Secretary of State

BANGKOK, December 25, 1945—1 p. m.
[Received 10:18 p. m.]

96. Reurtel 80, December 22, 4 p. m. Believe January 1 would be wholly suitable day. Formal agreement may not be concluded until

some time in January but it would seem quite proper for us to act after Heads of Agreement have been signed.

YOST

892.014/12–2745 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Siam (Yost) to the Secretary of State

BANGKOK, December 27, 1945—10 a. m.
[Received December 27—9 : 18 a. m.]

102. Ref my telegram 89, December 22. Prime Minister has requested me to ask Dept's reaction to following possible method of dealing with Indochina frontier question.

1. Siamese Govt would repudiate acquisition of territories by Pibul regime under Jap sponsorship.
2. Siam would refer issue to UNO for adjudication.
3. Pending UNO decision, territories would be administered under direction of Commission representing either UNO or principal Allied powers.

Though Cabinet is not enthusiastic over proposal, Seni thinks he can convince them if he can say it has US support. He believes that to return territories immediately to France would have grave political repercussions in Siam as well as seriously injure Siam's prestige with other peoples of Southeast Asia.

If US is agreeable to proposal, Seni will when Cabinet approves discuss it with British and French. He is fully aware of desirability of settling question as promptly as possible.

AmPolAd comment: It seems fairly certain that French would reject this proposal unless it were modified to provide for immediate restoration of French administration. On the other hand, it also seems probable that, if territories are returned outright to France at this time, France will block further action on question by UNO and no impartial judgment of issue will be possible. We should therefore be reluctant, particularly in view of fact that territories were ceded to France under duress as recently as 1907,[64] to see US advise Siamese restore them outright, relying wholly on generosity of French to permit subsequent submission of question to UNO. We present following three alternative courses for Dept's consideration: 1. Inform French categorically that we consider delimitation of frontier matter for UNO adjudication and that we will feel justified in urging Siamese to restore territories to French administration only if France first agrees to simultaneous submission of question to appropriate UNO body.

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[64] For text of treaty signed at Bangkok on March 23, 1907, see *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. II, p. 1003.

2. Inform Siamese we cannot approve or disapprove their proposal but that we consider it a suitable basis for discussion which should be submitted to British and French. Inform latter that if they approve proposal we would be willing to participate in commission suggested by Siamese.

3. Maintain position that territories must be restored outright to France but that Siam is free thereafter to raise question before UNO.

YOST

741.92/12–2745 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, December 27, 1945—7 p. m.

11088. Brit Embassy has submitted revised text of Heads Agreement and Annex [65] which they believe correct. Dept has requested deletion of "Military" Annex new Clause 7 [66] as contrary to Brit-US understanding that this Clause relates United Maritime Authority.

Dept has also requested deletion "in the preceding Clause" at end of Agreement new combined Clause C 1.[67]

Sent to London. Repeated to AmPolAd, Bangkok.

ACHESON

741.92/12–2845

The British Embassy to the Department of State [68]

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have kept the French Government informed of recent progress in their negotiations with the Siamese Government. The French Government suggested that when Mr. Dening and the Siamese Delegate exchange the letters which are to terminate the state of war existing between their Governments, they should also record in writing the non-recognition by His

[65] On December 22.

[66] This clause read: "To place Siamese merchant vessels primarily to meet the civil requirements of Siam under the direction of the competent Allied military authorities until 2nd March 1946 or until such earlier date as may be fixed for the cessation of Allied pooling arrangements."

[67] This clause read: "Recognize that the course of events in the war with Japan demonstrates the importance of Siam to the defence of Malaya, Burma, India and Indo-China and the security of the Indian Ocean and South-West Pacific areas, and agree to collaborate fully in all international security arrangements approved by the United Nations Organization or its Security Council which may be pertinent to Siam and especially such international security arrangements as may relate to countries or areas specified in the preceding clause."

[68] Handed by Mr. Everson to the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs on December 29.

Majesty's Government of the acquisition by Siam of certain French territories in 1941. His Majesty's Government have agreed that Mr. Dening should act accordingly and the texts of the letters which he will address to and receive from the Siamese Delegate on this subject follow.

(1) Your Serene Highness. With reference to the oral discussions which have been taking place at Kandy and Singapore between the Siamese Delegation headed by Your Serene Highness, and myself, I am instructed by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to place on record their attitude regarding the acquisition of territories by the Siamese as a result of Japanese action or intervention.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom do not recognize the acquisition by the Siamese of any territories acquired later than December 11th, 1940. This non-recognition includes all territories purported to have been ceded by the Vichy Government on May 9th, 1941.

I am to invite Your Serene Highness to take note, on behalf of the Siamese Government, of the attitude of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

(2) Sir, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of . . . . . in which you inform me that you have been instructed regarding the acquisition of the territories by the Siamese as a result of Japanese action or intervention.

You have further informed me that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom do not recognise the acquisition by Siam of any territories acquired later than the 11th December, 1940, and that this non-recognition includes all the territories purported to have been ceded by the Vichy Government on 9th May, 1941.

I have been instructed by the Siamese Government to inform you that they have taken note of the attitude of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in respect of the territories acquired by Siam later than the 11th December, 1940. I avail etc., etc.

WASHINGTON, December 28, 1945.

741.92/12–2545 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Siam (Yost)

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1945—9 p. m.

91. Dept informed exchange of letters deferred with Dening pressing FonOff to exchange letters, conclude agreement and give full publicity at same time as promptly as possible with Jan 1 recommended date. Dept considers US resumption relations should not precede exchange of letters and is withholding decision date resumption pending FonOff decision on Dening recommendation (urtel 96 Dec 25). If letters and agreement to be signed shortly consider slight delay may be desirable. (ReDeptel 80 Dec 22) Suggest you

discuss with Bird date which seems most desirable under local circumstances and inform Dept your opinion. If, however, agreement not to be signed for some time Dept will reconsider situation and inform you. You are authorized to make such public statement regarding US resumption relations as seems desirable in connection with publication Brit agreement which includes express agreement by Brit "to proceed at once to the resumption of normal relations with Siam and to the exchange of diplomatic representations".

ACHESON

741.92/12–3145 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Siam (Yost)

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1945—4 p. m.

92. 1. Brit-Siamese exchange of letters, signing of Agreement and publication of Agreement to take place 1600 Singapore time Jan. 1. Dept has stressed to Brit Embassy importance in its view simultaneous publication Military Annex because of Allied character and danger reaction to secret clauses.

2. No information yet received regarding Brit plans resumption diplomatic relations. Please wire immediately date you recommend. Dept would prefer concurrent action with Brit but subject to contrary recommendation by you, Dept believes resumption should be not later than Jan 5. Because of danger delay communications you are authorized in your discretion, unless you receive other instructions, to reopen Legation and present letter as Chargé on Jan 5 regardless of Brit action, or sooner and concurrently with Brit if Brit resume relations sooner.[69] Be certain to telegraph advance information as to your decision under this authorization so that simultaneous action and announcement can be made in Washington. Please keep in close touch with Bird. Dept informing Brit Embassy of foregoing authorization.

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[69] In telegram 7, January 4, 1946, 10 a. m., the Department requested Mr. Yost to reopen the Legation and assume charge the following day (124.92/1–346). In telegram 14 bis, January 5, 1946, Mr. Yost advised that he and Mr. Bird had presented their credentials at 10 and 11 o'clock, respectively, that morning and that he had assumed the functions of Chargé d'Affaires as of January 5 (123, Yost, Charles W./1–546). The same day the Department issued a press release on the resumption of diplomatic relations with Siam which stated: "We look forward to even closer friendship in the future and to the early admission of Siam to membership in the United Nations Organization"; for full text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 6 and 13, 1946, p. 5. In telegram 18, January 10, 1946, 1 p. m., the Department requested Bangkok to inform the Siamese Government that "this Govt considers the treaties and agreements in force between the US and Siam on Dec 7, 1941 continue in full force and effect" and furnished a proposed statement to be issued simultaneously by the United States and Siamese Governments (711.92/1–1046). After agreement by the Siamese Government (telegram 56, January 21, 1946, from Bangkok (711.92/1–2146), the Department released the statement on January 24, Department of State *Bulletin*, February 3, 1946, p. 178.

3. Sent to AmPolAd, Bangkok. Repeated to London and Chungking for information.[70]

BYRNES

741.92/12–3145 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Siam (Yost) to the Secretary of State

BANGKOK, December 31, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received January 1, 1946—3 : 54 a. m.]

118. Pursuant to Department's instruction (Deptel No. 78, December 22), following press release being issued tomorrow[71] following announcement of the United States in Siam.

"I am most happy to learn of the successful conclusion of the Anglo-Siamese negotiations by the signature in Singapore of an agreement terminating the state of war between the UK and Siam.[72] The US is naturally most pleased to see normal friendly relations reestablished between two nations for both of which it cherishes such cordial feelings.

"My Government considered that the declaration of war against the US issued by the Pibul Regime in January 1942 was an act taken as a result of the occupation of Siam by Japanese military forces and did not represent the will of the Siamese people. We chose therefore not to recognize the declaration. Later events seemed to justify this decision as Siamese forces did not actively engage in combat against Allied forces and as there sprang up within Siam a resistance movement led by many of the highest government officials which informed the Allied military authorities of its readiness at any time to engage in open resistance to the Japanese.

"As we had not recognized Siamese declaration of war we did not participate in the negotiations at Kandy and Singapore which we [*were*] intended to terminate the state of war between Siam and Britain. This abstention by no means signified, however, that the US was not interested in this settlement which arose out of the victory over Japan in which we played a major part. On the contrary we engaged in prolonged and friendly conversations with the British Government concerning the proposed terms of the agreement and made known our views on a number of points which we considered

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[70] The substance of this telegram was telephoned to the British Embassy on December 31 by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs.

[71] The Bangkok Legation copy of this message reads in part as follows: "Following press release being issued tomorrow: 'As representative of the United States in Siam I am most happy. . . .'" (711.9).

[72] Signed January 1, 1946. For texts of agreement and heads of agreement and related exchanges of notes, see British Cmd. 8140, pts. 1–5, pp. 2–13. For text of the *Communiqué* issued the same day by the Office of the Presidency of the Siamese Council of Ministers, see *The Siam Directory*, 1946, published by the Thai Co., Bangkok, pp. 15 ff. For exchange of notes of January 1, 1946, with a view to terminating the state of war between Siam and Australia, and the Siamese *Communiqué* of the same date, see *ibid.*, pp. 18 ff. The peace agreement between Siam and Australia was signed at Bangkok on April 3, 1946, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLVI, p. 553. No similar treaties appear to have been entered into with Siam by other Dominions in the British Commonwealth.

either of direct concern to US or of general concern to those nations interested in the stability and prosperity of Southeast Asia. The British Government found itself able to concur to [*with*] our views on a number of these points and the Anglo-US conversations on this big subject were therefore concluded a few days ago.

"While the agreement just signed at Singapore is an Anglo-Siamese agreement to which the US is not a party and the terms of which it has not therefore been called upon to approve, we wish to express our satisfaction that our two friends have been able to come to an understanding and our appreciation that they proved so willing to take American interests into account. We are confident that the terms of the agreement will be carried out by both nations in a spirit of wholehearted cooperation with view to making the greatest possible contribution to the security, stability and economic welfare of Southeast Asia. The US will continue to collaborate with Britain and Siam and with the appropriate bodies of the UNO toward the achievement of these same objectives."

YOST