Freedom From War outlines three major stages, to be implemented over many years. During the first stage, the testing of nuclear weapons is to be prohibited by treaty. The size of the war-making capabilities of nations is to be greatly reduced, and treaties and monitoring mechanisms put in place to prepare for the reduction and eventual elimination of all chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. In the second stage, states will engage in further reductions in armaments and military personnel, as the United Nations establishes a permanent international peace force. In the third and final stage, states would retain only those forces, non-nuclear armaments, and establishments required for the purpose of maintaining internal order; they would also support and provide agreed manpower for a UN Peace Force. This series of comprehensive measures aims to bring about a world in which there is freedom from war and security for all states.
Excerpts of Speech by Senator John F. Kennedy, Milwaukee, WI, United States
October 23rd, 1960
In the years preceding World War II, Franklin Roosevelt proclaimed the historic Four Freedoms as the goals of American policy and American society. Tonight, I want to talk to you about one of those freedoms - freedom from fear.
In a message to Congress on January 7, 1941, President Roosevelt translated freedom from fear to mean "a worldwide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor anywhere in the world." In short, freedom from fear was freedom from war - the pursuit of that freedom was the pursuit of peace - the method of achieving that freedom was the method of disarmament.
Today, 20 years later, we are still far from Franklin Roosevelt's goal. War still threatens - this time with weapons of destructive power far beyond the imagination of 1941. The pursuit of peace is still the focus of our leadership, our energies, and our determination. And disarmament is still the most vital step on the road to a lasting peace.
The great question of the 1960's - the overriding concern of all Americans and all men - is whether, in the coming decade, the world will move toward a secure peace and the survival of mankind or whether we will move toward war and common destruction. And how the American people choose in this campaign may well determine our direction in the years to come.
Of course Mr. Nixon and I both want peace. We both want to put an end to the arms race and the prospects of nuclear holocaust. But we do disagree - and we disagree fundamentally - on the nature of the effort and leadership which the pursuit of peace demands.
A few weeks ago, Mr. Nixon put forth his program for peace. The program consisted of setting up more committees and more conferences. It depended on meetings between heads of state and discussions among our own top officials. It was based on the premise that the battle for peace was a battle of words - that we could end the threat of war by talking it away. Thus it is a program which does not grapple with the real nature of the Communist threat to peace. For peace will not come solely through the conference room and the propaganda machine.
Rather the road to a world at peace runs through a revitalized and growing American economy, through the arduous construction of defenses so powerful that the Communists know that peace is their only alternative, through vast research projects to solve the complex difficulties of controlling modern arms, through carefully prepared disarmament programs to be presented by skilled and experienced negotiators, and through the exercise of a firm Presidential leadership which will never allow either our own representatives or the rest of the world to wonder what our position is, to wonder indeed, if we have any position at all, or to doubt the sincerity of our desire for disarmament.
Words alone will never impress Mr. Khrushchev. For he can talk louder and longer than either Mr. Nixon or myself. But he is impressed by strength and by action. And he will agree to disarm only when he is convinced that armed force can never bring a Communist victory.
If we are to secure peace in the 1960's, if we ever hope to negotiate an effective arms control agreement, we must act immediately.
For as each year passes, the control of increasingly complex, mobile, and hidden modern armaments becomes more difficult. And at the same time, as we increase our stockpiles of nuclear bombs, and as we develop pushbutton weapons systems, the danger of nuclear holocaust through accident or through a mistaken belief that war will bring victory, that danger increases.
In short, no problem is more vital or more urgent in the struggle for peace than the problem of effective arms control. Yet, in the past 80 years, this problem has been virtually ignored; we have had no real disarmament policy. And we have completely failed to provide the effort and the leadership which the pursuit of disarmament demands.
In the entire U.S. Government we have had fewer than 100 men working on the complex problems of arms control. And even this handful of workers has been scattered through four or five agencies with little coordination or leadership. A recent independent survey concluded:
The only continuous features of our efforts in the disarmament field have been a lack of continuity in top personnel and a paucity of planning and research efforts.
As a result of this failure we have been steadily unprepared on disarmament. Our delegates to international conferences have been inexperienced, understaffed, and inadequately instructed. And the Soviet Union has consistently had the initiative in the eyes of the world.
At a time when our relative military strength was much higher than it is today, from 1953-55, there was not a single top person in the entire Government working full time on disarmament. We did not come up with a single major new proposal for arms control. And we cared so little about arms control, that we regarded the entire effort as just another branch of psychological warfare, restricting ourselves to propaganda while Soviet armed strength increased.
At the London Conference of 1957 - the first important disarmament meeting, we were represented by a man with absolutely no experience in arms control, Harold Stassen, and we sent him to the meeting without having formulated any American position. It was not until August 29, 1957, more than 5 months after the conference opened, that America had any position at all. And by that time our chief negotiator had been repudiated by the administration, and publicly demoted from the White House staff.
At the next important disarmament conference, the 1958 Geneva Conference on surprise attack, we were represented by a businessman who had been out of Government for 5 years, and who had assumed his duties only 5 weeks before the conference met. Almost up to the opening day of the meeting, we had prepared no position, conducted no special research, formulated no realistic or constructive proposals. The conference was a failure. And our chief negotiator concluded that "I doubt that we have up to this time really given intensive study to the kind of measures which will make this (prevention of surprise attack) possible."
The last important meeting was the 10-nation conference at Geneva this March. In September the administration appointed a Boston lawyer, Charles Coolidge, to prepare an American position. Mr. Coolidge had barely finished his studies when he was replaced by another man - this time a New York lawyer without any experience in disarmament. We had no position ready when the conference started. Our negotiators had to leave Geneva for Washington during the conference itself to try to find out what our policy was. Again, we had failed to prepare for disarmament. We had developed no real policy or position.
Throughout this consistent history of indifference and failure the deadly arms race has continued, the danger of war has mounted, and the Soviet Union has scored propaganda victory after propaganda victory; taking the initiative with its proposals, falsely posing as the friend of peace, pointing to our lack of policy and interest in an effort to picture America as a nation unwilling to reach agreement on arms control.
Of course, it may not be possible to reach an agreement on arms control no matter how hard we work. Perhaps the Russians will be unwilling to give up military force as a method of achieving world domination. Perhaps they will not agree to the effective system of inspection and control which is vital to agreement. Perhaps the Communist Chinese will refuse to participate in arms control negotiation, even though their ultimate participation is essential to effective disarmament. Perhaps the science of inspection will be unable to keep pace with advancing weapons technology.
But no matter how difficult the problems are, how discouraging the obstacles, how uncertain the prospect for agreement, we must, nevertheless, begin a determined, large-scale effort to prepare ourselves for disarmament - to formulate constructive and realistic proposals which have a chance of success. For the hopes of all mankind rest on successful disarmament. And if we let the nations of Africa and Asia and Latin America feel that the United States is the real obstacle to disarmament, that we are not sincere in our desire for peace - if we continue to let the Soviet Union seize the offensive in disarmament negotiations - then these emerging areas of the world may well turn away from America and the free world, and begin to look to the Communist bloc for leadership in the fight for peace.
And, of course, we must also seek disarmament because the only alternative to pursuit of an effective disarmament agreement is the pursuit of our present course - the arms race, the gap, new weapons, the development of even higher orders of mutual terror resulting in the ever higher likelihood of mutual destruction.
But we will not move toward disarmament and a secure peace, we will not be any closer to freedom from fear, if we simply follow Mr. Nixon's plan for meetings, more conferences, more study groups and discussions. For peace takes more than words. It takes hard work and large-scale effort. It takes men and resources and firm leadership from the top. Above all, it takes a government which is organized for the pursuit of peace, as well as the possibility of war, a government which has a program for disarmament, as well as a program for arms.
First, we must work to rebuild our rapidly deteriorating defenses. Winston Churchill has pointed out that "civilization will not last, freedom will not survive, peace will not be kept, unless mankind unite together to defend them and show themselves possessed of a power before which barbaric forces will stand in awe."
It is only when we have a military force strong enough to convince the Russians that they'll never be able to gain any advantage through military strength, only when we can approach the conference table in a position of equality, only then can we hope for fruitful negotiation. Second, we must establish an arms control research institute, under the direction of the President, to undertake, coordinate, and follow through on the research, development, and policy planning needed for a workable disarmament program. Detection and monitoring systems will require new techniques of aerial reconnaissance and radar surveillance, new uses for our communications systems, computers, and cameras, new ways to denature plutonium and inspect power reactors, and a whole host of additional research projects.
The arms control research institute would coordinate and direct all these research efforts, carrying them on itself or farming them out to private firms and universities. The scattered disarmament technicians, scientists, and policymakers could at last work as a unit with a central purpose and direction given by the President himself.
Third - we must begin, perhaps within the framework of the arms control research institute, to plan for the reconversion of our economy from war to peace. Millions of jobs and billions of dollars are tied up in our present defense effort. We must plan for the orderly reallocation of these resources to our peacetime needs.
I do not share the opinion of some that disarmament would bring economic disaster. I believe that America can fruitfully use all our present productive power and much more to meet our vital needs for schools and roads and power and all the rest as well as our commitments to the war against poverty and Communist subversion abroad. But we must begin to plan now if we are not to waste these resources in severe economic dislocation.
Fourth, while we are working to dismantle the engines of destruction we must work out methods of protecting ourselves against the growing danger of accidental war, through sure methods of informing ourselves about suspicious events or accidental firings so that neither nation can make a mistake which will trigger nuclear destruction.
Fifth - And most important, the fight for disarmament must command the personal attention and concern of the President of the United States. Our defense and six disarmament experts are concentrated in many important agencies of Government - in the State Department, the Defense Department, the AEC and others. Only the President can overcome the frictions and differences between those agencies; only he can weld all the parts of the Executive into a singleness of purpose in the pursuit of peace, and only the President can make the hard decisions, decisions involving peace or war, destruction or survival, which peace programs as well as war programs will surely bring.
The struggle for disarmament will not be an easy one. For disarmament is an ideal just as peace itself is an ideal, but it was a great son of Wisconsin, Carl Schurz, who said:
“Ideals are like stars; you will not succeed in touching them with your hands. But, like the seafaring man on the desert of waters, you choose them as your guides, and following them you will reach your destiny.”Carl Schurz came from Wisconsin to Faneuil Hall in Boston in 1859 to make this eloquent profession of faith.
Today, 100 years later, I come from my native city of Boston to Wisconsin, to tell you that Carl Schurz's teachings have not been forgotten. That I know, and all Americans realize, that peace and disarmament are remote and difficult goals. But we have chosen them as ideals to guide our actions. And we will follow those ideals until America and all mankind have reached their destiny of a free people living in a world at peace.
FREEDOM FROM WAR
THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL WORLD
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7277
Disarmament Series 5
The revolutionary development of modern weapons within a world divided by serious ideological differences has produced a crisis in human history. In order to overcome the danger of nuclear war now confronting mankind, the United States has introduced at the Sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations a Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World.
This new program provides for the progressive reduction of the war-making capabilities of nations and the simultaneous strengthening of international institutions to settle disputes and maintain the peace. It sets forth a series of comprehensive measures which can and should be taken in order to bring about a world in which there will be freedom from war and security for all states. It is based on three principles deemed essential to the achievement of practical progress in the disarmament field:
First, there must be immediate disarmament action:
A strenuous and uninterrupted effort must be made toward the goal of general and complete disarmament; at the same time, it is important that specific measures be put into effect as soon as possible.
Second, all disarmament obligations must be subject to effective international controls:
The control organization must have the manpower, facilities, and effectiveness to assure that limitations or reductions take place as agreed. It must also be able to certify to all states that retained forces and armaments do not exceed those permitted at any stage of the disarmament process.
Third, adequate peace-keeping machinery must be established:
There is an inseparable relationship between the scaling down of national armaments on the one hand and the building up of international peace-keeping machinery and institutions on the other. Nations are unlikely to shed their means of self-protection in the absence of alternative ways to safeguard their legitimate interests. This can only be achieved through the progressive strengthening of international institutions under the United Nations and by creating a United Nations Peace Force to enforce the peace as the disarmament process proceeds.
There follows a summary of the principal provisions of the United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World. The full text of the program is contained in an appendix to this pamphlet.
The over-all goal of the United States is a free, secure, and peaceful world of independent states adhering to common standards of justice and international conduct and subjecting the use of force to the rule of law; a world which has achieved general and complete disarmament under effective international control; and a world in which adjustment to change takes place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.
In order to make possible the achievement of that goal, the program sets forth the following specific objectives toward which nations should direct their efforts:
The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their reestablishment in any form whatsoever other than those required to preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations Peace Force;
The elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, other than those required for a United Nations Peace Force and for maintaining internal order;
The institution of effective means for the enforcement of international agreements, and for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations;
The establishment and effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations to insure compliance at all times with all disarmament obligations.
The negotiating states are called upon to develop the program into a detailed plan for general and complete disarmament and to continue their efforts without interruption until the whole program has been achieved. To this end, they are to seek the widest possible area of agreement at the earliest possible date. At the same time, and without prejudice to progress on the disarmament program, they are to seek agreement on those immediate measures that would contribute to the common security of nations and that could facilitate and form port of the total program.
The program sets forth a series of general principles to guide the negotiating states in their work. These make clear that:
As states relinquish their arms, the United Nations must be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to assure international security and the peaceful settlement of disputes;
Disarmament must proceed as rapidly as possible, until it is completed, in stages containing balanced, phased, and safeguarded measures;
Each measure and stage should be carried out in an agreed period of time, with transition from one stage to the next to take place as soon as all measures in the preceding stage have been carried out and verified and as soon as necessary arrangements for verification of the next stage have been made;
Inspection and verification must establish both that nations carry out scheduled limitations or reductions and that they do not retain armed forces and armaments in excess of those permitted at any stage of the disarmament process; and
Disarmament must take place in a manner that will not affect adversely the security of any state.
The program provides for progressive disarmament steps to take place in three stages and for the simultaneous strengthening of international institution.
The first stage contains measures which would significantly reduce the capabilities of nations to wage aggressive war. Implementation of this stage would mean that:
The nuclear threat would be reduced:
All states would have adhered to a treaty effectively prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons.
The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons would be stopped and quantities of such materials from past production would be converted to non-weapons uses.
States owning nuclear weapons would not relinquish control of such weapons to any nation not owning them and would not transmit to any such nation information or material necessary for their manufacture.
States not owning nuclear weapons would not manufacture them or attempt to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states.
A Commission of Experts would be established to report on the feasibility and means for the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.
Strategic delivery vehicles would be reduced:
Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles of specified categories and weapons designed to counter such vehicles would be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps; their production would be discontinued or limited; their testing would be limited or halted.
Arms and armed forces would be reduced:
The armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union would be limited to 2.1 million men each (with appropriate levels not exceeding that amount for other militarily significant states); levels of armaments would be correspondingly reduced and their production would be limited.
An Experts Commission would be established to examine and report on the feasibility and means of accomplishing verifiable reduction and eventual elimination of all chemical, biological and radiological weapons.
Peaceful use of outer space would be promoted:
The placing in orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons of mass destruction would be prohibited.
States would give advance notification of space vehicle and military launchings.
U.N. peace-keeping powers would be strengthened:
Measures would be taken to develop and strengthen United Nations arrangements for arbitration, for the development of international law, and for the establishment in Stage II of a permanent U.N. Peace Force.
An International Disarmament Organization would be established for effective verification of the disarmament program:
Its functions would be expanded progressively as disarmament proceeds.
It would certify to all states that agreed reductions have taken place and that retained forces and armaments do not exceed permitted levels.
It would determine the transition from one stage to the next.
States would be committed to measures to reduce international tension and to protect against the chance of war by accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack:
States would be committed to refrain from the threat or use of any type of armed force contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter and to refrain from indirect aggression and subversion against any country.
A U.N. peace observation group would be available to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or breach of the peace.
States would be committed to give advance notice of major military movements which might cause alarm, observation posts would be established to report on concentrations and movements of military forces.
The second stage contains a series of measures which would bring within sight a world in which there would be freedom from war. Implementation of all measures in the second stage would mean:
Further substantial reductions in the armed forces, armaments, and military establishments of states, including strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and countering weapons;
Further development of methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes under the United Nations;
Establishment of a permanent international peace force within the United Nations;
Depending on the findings of an Experts Commission, a halt in the production of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons and a reduction of existing stocks or their conversion to peaceful uses;
On the basis of the findings of an Experts Commission, a reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons;
The dismantling or the conversion to peaceful uses of certain military bases and facilities wherever located; and
The strengthening and enlargement of the International Disarmament Organization to enable it to verify the steps taken in Stage II and to determine the transition to Stage III.
During the third stage of the program, the states of the world, building on the experience and confidence gained in successfully implementing the measures of the first two stages, would take final steps toward the goal of a world in which:
States would retain only those forces, non-nuclear armaments, and establishments required for the purpose of maintaining internal order; they would also support and provide agreed manpower for a U.N. Peace Force.
The U.N. Peace Force, equipped with agreed types and quantities of armaments, would be fully functioning.
The peace keeping capabilities of the United nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligations of all states under such arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to assure peace and the just settlement of differences in a disarmed world.
The nations of the world,
Conscious of the crisis in human history produced by the revolutionary development of modern weapons within a world divided by serious ideological differences;
Determined to save present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of the arms race and to create conditions in which all peoples can strive freely and peacefully to fulfill their basic aspirations;
Declare their goal to be: A free, secure, and peaceful world of independent states adhering to common standards of justice and international conduct and subjecting the use of force to the rule of law; a world where adjustment to change takes place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations; a world where there shall be a permanent state of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and where the resources of nations shall be devoted of man's material, cultural, and spiritual advance;
Set forth as the objectives of a program of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world:
(a) The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their reestablishment in any form whatsoever other than those required of preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations Peace Force;
(b) the elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, other than those required for a United Nations Peace Force and for maintaining internal order; Nations to ensure compliance at all times with all disarmament obligations;
(d) The institution of effective means for the enforcement of international agreements, for the settlement of disputes, and for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.
Call on the negotiating states:
(a) To develop the outline program set forth below into an agreed plan for general and complete disarmament and to continue their efforts without interruption until the whole program has been achieved;
(b) To this end to seek to attain the widest possible area of agreement at the earliest possible date;
(c) Also to seek - without prejudice to progress on the disarmament program - agreement on those immediate measures that would contribute to the common security of nations and that could facilitate and form a part of that program.
Affirm that disarmament negotiations should be guided by the following principles:
(a) Disarmament shall take place as rapidly as possible until it is completed in stages containing balanced, phased and safe-guarded measures, with each measure and stage to be carried out in an agreed period of time.
(b) Compliance with all disarmament obligations shall be effectively verified from their entry into force. Verification arrangements shall be instituted progressively and in such a manner as to verify not only that agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.
(c) Disarmament shall take place in a manner that will not affect adversely thesecurity of any state, whether or not a party to an international agreement or treaty.
(d) As stated relinquish their arms, the United Nations shall be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to assure international security and the peaceful settlement of differences as will as to facilitate the development of international cooperation an common tasks for the benefit of mankind.
(e) Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next shall take place as soon as all the measures in the preceding stage have been carried out and effective verification is continuing and as soon as the arrangements that have been agreed to be necessary for the next stage have been instituted.
Agree upon the following outline program for achieving general and complete disarmament:
(a) An International Disarmament Organization (IDO) shall be established within the framework of the United Nations upon entry into force of the agreement. Its functions shall be expanded progressively as required for the effective verification of the disarmament program.
(b) The IDO shall have: (1) a General Conference of all the parties; (2) a Commission consisting of representatives of all the major powers as permanent members as permanent members and certain other states on a rotating basis; and (3) an Administrator who will administer the Organization subject to the direction of the Commission and who will have the authority, staff, and finances adequate to assure effective impartial implementation of the functions of the Organization.
(c) The IDO shall: (1) ensure compliance with the obligations undertaken by verifying the execution of measures agreed upon; (2) assist the states in developing the details of agreed further verification and disarmament measures; (3) provide for the establishment of such bodies as may be necessary for working out the details of further measures provided for in the program and for such other expert study groups as may be required to give continuous study to the problems of disarmament; (4) receive reports on the progress of disarmament and verification arrangements and determine the transition from one stage to the next.
(a) Force levels shall be limited to 2.1 million each for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and to appropriate levels not exceeding 2.1 million each for all other militarily significant states. Reductions to the agreed levels will proceed by equitable, proportionate, and verified steps.
(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reductions shall be accomplished by transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the IDO. When, at specified periods during the Stage I reduction process, the states party to the agreement have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.
(c) The production of agreed types of armaments shall be limited.
(d) A Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR) Experts Commission shall be established within the IDO for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verifiable reduction and eventual elimination of CBR weapons stockpiles and the halting of their production.
(a) States that have not acceded to a treaty effectively prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons shall do so.
(b) The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped.
(c) Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, agreed initial quantities of fissionable materials from past production shall be transferred to non-weapons purposes.
(d) Any fissionable materials transferred between countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be subject to appropriate safeguards to be developed in agreement with the IAEA.
(e) States owning nuclear weapons shall not relinquish control of such weapons to any nation not owning them and shall not transmit to any such nation information or material necessary for their manufacture. States not owning nuclear weapons shall not manufacture such weapons, attempt to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states, or seek or receive information or materials necessary for their manufacture.
(f) A Nuclear Experts Commission consisting of representatives of the nuclear states shall be established within the IDO for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.
(a) Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in specified categories and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished in each step by transfer to depots supervised by the IDO of vehicles that are in excess of levels agreed upon for each step. At specified periods during the Stage I reduction process, the vehicles that have been placed under supervision of the IDO shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.
(b) Production of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be discontinued or limited.
(c) Testing of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be limited or halted.
(a) The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass destruction shall be prohibited.
(b) States shall give advance notification to participating states and to the IDO of launchings of space vehicles and missiles, together with the track of the vehicle.
(a) States shall give advance notification to the participating states and to the IDO of major military movements and maneuvers, on a scale as may be agreed, which might give rise to misinterpretation or cause alarm and induce countermeasures. The notification shall include the geographic areas to be used and the nature, scale and time span of the event.
(b) There shall be established observation posts at such locations as major ports, railway centers, motor highways, and air bases to report on concentrations and movements of military forces.
(c) There shall also be established such additional inspection arrangements to reduce the danger of surprise attack as may be agreed.
(d) An international commission shall be established immediately within the IDO to examine and make recommendations of the possibility of further measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication.
(a) States shall reaffirm their obligations under the U.N. Charter to refrain from the threat or use of any type of armed force - including nuclear, conventional, or CBR - contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter.
(b) States shall agree to refrain from indirect aggression and subversion against any country.
(c) States shall use all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of disputes and shall seek within the United Nations further arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes and for the codification and progressive development of international law.
(d) States shall develop arrangements in Stage I for the establishment in Stage II of a U.N. Peace Force.
(e) A U.N. peace observation group shall be staffed with a standing cadre of observers who could be despatched to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or breach of the peace.
The powers and responsibilities of the IDO shall be progressively enlarged in order to give it the capabilities to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II.
(a) Levels of forces for the U.S., U.S.S.R., and other militarily significant states shall be further reduced by substantial amounts to agreed levels in equitable and balanced steps.
(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be further reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished by transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the IDO. When, at specified periods during the Stage II reduction process, the parties have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.
(c) There shall be further agreed restrictions on the production of armaments.
(d) Agreed military bases and facilities wherever they are located shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses.
(e) Depending upon the findings of the Experts Commission on CBR weapons, the production of CBR weapons shall be halted, existing stocks progressively reduced, and the resulting excess quantities destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.
Stocks of nuclear weapons shall be progressively reduced to the minimum levels which can be agreed upon as a result of the findings of the nuclear Experts Commission; the resulting excess of fissionable material shall be transferred to peaceful purposes.
Further reductions in the stocks of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be carried out in accordance with the procedure outlined in Stage I.
During Stage II, states shall develop further the peace-keeping processes of the united Nations, to the end that the United Nations can effectively in Stage III deter or suppress any threat or use of force in violation of the purposes and principles of the united Nations:
(a) States shall agree upon strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the united Nations so as to assure that the United Nations will be able effectively to protect states against threats to or breaches of the peace.
(b) The U.N. Peace Force shall be established and progressively strengthened.
(c) States shall also agree upon further improvements and developments in rules of international conduct and in processes for peaceful settlement of disputes and differences.
By the time Stage II has been completed, the confidence produced through a verified disarmament program, the acceptance of rules of peaceful international behavior, and the development of strengthened international peace-keeping processes within the framework of the U.N. should have reached a point where the states of the world can move forward to Stage III. In Stage III progressive controlled disarmament and continuously developing principles and procedures of international law would proceed to a point where no state would have the military power to challenge the progressively strengthened U.N. Peace Force (emphasis added) and all international disputes would be settled according to the agreed principles of international conduct.
The progressive steps to be taken during the final phase of the disarmament program would be directed toward the attainment of a world in which:
(a) States would retain only those forces, non-nuclear armaments, and establishments required for the purpose of maintaining internal order; they would also support and provide agreed manpower for a U.N. Peace Force.
(b) The U.N. Peace Force, equipped with agreed types and quantities of armaments, would be fully functioning.
(c) The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities to be used by the U.N. Peace Force and those required to maintain internal order. All other armaments would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.
(d) The peace-keeping capabilities of the United Nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligations of all states under such arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to assure peace and the just settlement of differences in a disarmed world.