Center for Conflict Analysis
and Resolution

# Conflict Resolution and Civil War:
# Reflections on the Sudanese Settlement of 1972

by

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# About the Author

Christopher R. Mitchell is professor of Conflict Resolution and International Relations at George Mason University, and a core faculty member of the Center. He is an international expert on third-party involvement in international disputes and the author of such works as *The Structure of International Conflict* (1981), *Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role* (1981), and *New Approaches to International Mediation* (co-edited with Keith Webb, 1988), and articles on the theory of de-escalation and conciliation in *International Studies Quarterly*, *British Journal of Political Science*, *Journal of Peace Research* and the *Yearbook of World Affairs*.

Mitchell was educated at University College, London, with his PhD. dissertation focussing on Kenyan political conflicts. He was previously professor of International Relations at the City University, London, Visiting Fellow at the University of Maryland, College Park, Visiting Lecturer at the University of Southern California and at Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.

Mitchell also served as a consultant to the BBC crisis simulation program, "A Game of War," and is honorary treasurer of the South Atlantic Council. He is a member of the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict, University of Kent, Canterbury, England.

# About The Center

The Center for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University has as its principal mission to advance the understanding and resolution of significant and persistent human conflicts among individuals, groups, communities, identity groups, and nations. To fulfill this mission, the center works in four areas: academic programs consisting of a Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in Conflict Analysis and Resolution and a Master of Science (M.S.) in Conflict Management; research and publication; a clinical service program offered through the Conflict Clinic, Inc., center faculty, and senior associates; and public education.

Associated with the center are three major organizations that promote and apply conflict resolution principles. These are the Conflict Clinic, Inc., mentioned above; the Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Development (COPRED), a network organization; and the National Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution (NCPCR), offering conferences and workshops.

Major research interests include the study of deep–rooted conflicts and their resolution; the exploration of conditions attracting parties to the negotiation table; the role of third parties in dispute resolution; and the testing of a variety of conflict intervention methods in a range of community, national and international settings.

Outreach to the community is accomplished through the publication of books and articles, public lectures, conferences, and special briefings on the theory and practice of conflict resolution. As part of this effort, the center's Working Papers offer both the public at large and professionals in the field access to critical thinking flowing from faculty, staff, and students at the center. The Working Papers are presented to stimulate critical consideration and discussion of important questions in the study of human conflict.

# Foreword

Christopher R. Mitchell's "Conflict Resolution and Civil War: The Sudanese Settlement of 1972" is the third in a series of Working Papers reflecting the research interests and findings of the Center for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University. In the first paper, John Burton sets out a theoretical framework for "Conflict Resolution as a Political System." In the second, "Group Rebellion in America," I discuss the causes and nature of civil violence in the United States. And in this study, Professor Mitchell explores a relatively successful settlement of a serious, protracted conflict—the Sudanese civil war—in order to discover conditions for and methods of successful conflict resolution.

The thread uniting these papers is the George Mason Center's mission to develop methods of understanding and resolving deep-rooted conflict. Deep-rooted conflicts, whether between persons, ethni or national groups, classes, or multinational blocs, are those whose intensity and duration imply a serious mismatch between persons and the institutions that attempt to organize their activity. The parties to such conflicts are driven, consciously or not, by imperative and ineluctable demands that certain basic needs be satisfied, certain fundamental values realized, and certain non–bargainable interests protected. The institutional system that embraces them frequently requires restructuring if these basic demands are to be met. *Resolving* such conflicts, as opposed to settling them temporarily, requires change both in the parties' consciousness and in institutional arrangements—a tall order, but one that is necessary and possible if analysts and resolvers of conflict do their jobs.

Christopher Mitchell's paper focuses on an agreement that produced ten years of peace in a nation wracked by civil war. Given the enormous difficulty of settling such conflicts even on a temporary basis, this relatively long–lasting peace, involving significant institutional changes, rightfully attracts his attention. What in the substance of the agreement produced such a result? What did the process by which the agreement was secured have to do with this content? By answering such questions, this paper contributes to the theory of conflict resolution. By illuminating the causes of the Sudanese civil war and the processes used to settle it in 1972, it assists those interested in working to resolve the renewed strife in that country. And by giving a detailed, politically knowledgeable accunt of these processes, it enriches our understanding of the practical dimensions of effective conflict intervention.

July, 1989

Richard E. Rubenstein
Center for Conflict Analysis and Resolution

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## Abstract

In 1972 representatives of the parties to the ten-year old Sudanese civil war met in Addis Ababa and, with the aid of third-party facilitators, entered into an agreement ending that bitter and costly war. Eleven years later, civil war broke out again in the Sudan; it rages even as this working paper goes to press. Nevertheless, there are important aspects in which the settlement of 1972, which brought a decade of peace to the people of the Sudan, can be considered a model for the resolution of civil wars involving demands by large minority groups for autonomy or independence from a central government. Both the process by which the 1972 agreement was arrived at and the content of that agreement merit careful study.

## The 1972 Agreement: A Model Settlement

One of the most interesting examples of recent international conflict management was the process which led to the signing of a peace agreement at Addis Ababa in February 1972. This settlement was made between representatives of the Sudanese government and of the South Sudanese Liberation Movement (SSLM), itself representing an amalgamation of smaller secessionist and guerrilla movements from the southernmost three provinces of that country.

The Agreement brought to a halt complicated, sporadic, but increasingly bitter civil war between "Arab" northerners and "African" southerners (although many southerners had remained part of the northern dominated political regime in Khartoum). It established a considerable degree of regional autonomy for the south, made arrangements for southerners to have continued representation in central government institutions in Khartoum, and established terms for economic assistance from the north to the traditionally impoverished and underdeveloped south. The Agreement also made arrangements for a ceasefire and a subsequent integration of the military wing of the SSLM (the Anya Nya) into the Peoples' Armed Forces (PAF) of the Sudan. It proved to be one of the main foundations of Sudanese President Ja'afar al Nimiery's regime during the following decade and of that decade's peace and stability between the northern and southern regions of the Sudan. This stability lasted

until the terms and the spirit of the Agreement were unilaterally undermined by Nimiery, one of its main architects, and war broke out again in the mid–1980s.

Civil wars and secessionist struggles are the most notoriously difficult of all forms of large scale, violent human conflict to terminate successfully, short of outright "victory" for one side or the other.[1] Hence, the Addis Ababa Agreement is a relative rarity: a negotiated settlement of a major case of "civil strife." Aside from this atypical success, the settlement negotiated at Addis Ababa in early 1972 was unusual in four other respects.

For one thing, it represented a successful solution to a conflict in which the main issue increasingly became the survival of an existing political system, or its division into two separate systems via the secession of a part of the geographical "periphery." This type of domestic dispute is particularly intractable to any form of management. Usually, "solutions" involve the outright victory of the status quo party and the preservation of unity (as in the case of Nigeria or Katanga) or, less frequently, the victory of the revisionist party and the final splitting up of the system (as in the civil war between West and East Pakistan). Resistance to compromise and the pursuit of all or nothing solutions are particularly the case when the previous behavior of the adversaries has been as violent, widespread, and long–lasting as was the case in the Sudan.

Second, the process of arriving at a final agreement involved a successful mediation by a number of external organizations and governments, all of which helped (in a variety of ways) to bring about the final meetings and the eventual settlement. The successful involvement of outsiders in high–level civil strife is also a rarity. Such disputes are normally highly resistant to outside peacemaking, if only because of the barriers posed by doctrines of state sovereignty or non–interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. Such doctrines are usually employed by political incumbents to avoid conferring any recognition or status on "rebel" movements, no matter how well supported they are.

Third, the conventional wisdom about leaders who make peace usually being new replacements for those who have initiated and conducted the war does not seem to hold good in the Sudanese case. It could be argued that the regime of President Nimiery had only been in power since the military coup of May 1969, and was thus in a position to repudiate earlier failures and repression, especially that carried out under the previous military government of General Abboud. However, examination of the final peacemaking process does reveal clearly that it represented a major switch of policy from that pursued by the Nimiery regime between May 1969 and July 1971.

Finally, there is the familiar argument that a successful negotiation or compromise must rest on the unquestioned ability of the leadership of both adversaries to conclude an agreement that can be sold to their supporters (and forced upon any dissident elements), and that this, in turn, depends upon firm control of their organizations and on an unchallenged position of predominance by both leaderships.

Again this did not seem entirely applicable in the Sudanese case. In the north, Nimiery had barely survived an attempted military takeover by members of the Sudanese armed forces connected with the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP). In the south, Major–General Lagu, the military commander of SSLM, was still engaged in building up his leadership position even while southern representatives were conducting preliminary exchanges with representatives of the Khartoum Government.

Given all these particular features of the conflict,[2] can it seriously be argued that the process of peacemaking within the Sudan and the solution eventually hammered out at Addis Ababa constitute a "model" of anything connected with the conflict termination process, whether for Africa or any part of the world facing divisive disputes over unity and territorial integrity? The problem with trying to answer such a question is that the term "model" itself has been subjected to a great deal of abuse in the social sciences, and can take on a wide variety of meanings according to who is using it. Strictly speaking, a model is some formal representation of a system or a process in the real world. A formal language of the model (usually mathematical) is used to map features of that part of the real world in such a way that the relationships in the model are formally equivalent to those in the system or process under study. No attempt will be made to produce such a model here.

A less formal definition is "an example for imitation or emulation," and this is the sense in which the term will be used in this paper. The Sudanese solution will be examined to see whether it might serve as an example for emulation in three senses. The first of these concerns the unilateral problem confronting the decision–makers of parties in conflict who have to decide if (or when) sufficient factors make it "reasonable" to try to achieve a compromise solution, rather than continuing the conflict in the hope of attaining victory. In this respect, is the Sudanese peacemaking process in any way typical of a class of conflict termination problems, making it usable (at least) as a source of general propositions about such decision–making dilemmas?

The second sense in which the Sudanese case might serve as a model adopts the standpoint of the outsiders attempting to ameliorate, and possibly conciliate, situations of widespread and violent civil strife. Does the Sudanese case offer any lessons about appropriate processes which can be initiated in such circumstances, or practices which might well be used in other, all too numerous situations of intractable domestic conflicts?

Third, the actual settlement itself might well be regarded as a potential example for emulation, in that it represented a guide for solutions appropriate for other countries in Africa—or elsewhere—that confront problems of internal, colonially imposed boundaries, major regional differences, and a political community significantly divided along linguistic, religious or ethnic lines. In such situations, traditional answers based upon the conception of a unified nation–state may be wholly unsuitable. The need to develop political forms to cope with such divided social systems is undeniable and urgent, given the colonial legacy in Africa and elsewhere. Can the Sudanese

settlement, perhaps, provide some pointers to the kind of political arrangement that might prove a viable alternative to complete centralization, a federal structure or periodic efforts to secede?

## Main Features of the Sudanese Civil War

Before attempting to examine the final settlement constructed in Addis Ababa in 1972, it is helpful to outline the main features of the civil war brought to an end by that Agreement. This brief sketch emphasizes factors in the struggle which seem important for understanding both the difficulties of achieving any final, mutually satisfactory settlement and the processes which finally led to the meetings at Addis Ababa and the conclusion of such a settlement. Anyone interested in a detailed history of the conflict should consult the works mentioned in the bibliography (especially Eprille, 1974, Beshir, 1968, and Wai, 1973).

The conventional date for the outbreak of hostilities between the Arabized North of Sudan and the "African" South (represented by the heterogeneous peoples of the three southernmost provinces in the country) is August 1955, four months before the country formally achieved its independence. On that occasion, southern troops of the Equatoria Corps stationed in Juba mutinied on the rumor that they were to be moved north after independence. After killing several of their officers and a number of northerners and then looting the town, they disappeared into the bush, where for a number of years they formed roving, bandit-like groups pursued with little success by the Sudanese army. The mutiny is held by many to have highlighted and emphasized the ethnic, religious and cultural division between the northern and southern regions of the country, the mistrust between the leaders involved, and the effects of a traditional British policy of administering the two areas separately and very differently, at least until after the Second World War. Whether it also marks the beginning of a sixteen-year struggle between southern political movements and the Khartoum Government—a struggle which led the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to estimates of 176,000 Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries by 1970 and estimated deaths of 500,000 southerners—is another question.

Organized, as opposed to sporadic, military resistance to northern troops only really began in the south in 1962, a process symbolized by the guerrillas' successful capture in September 1963 of an army post at Pacalla after a three-day battle. The new guerrilla organization was called the "Anya Nya." One of its leaders was Colonel (later Major-General) Joseph Lagu, a regular officer in the Sudanese army who had joined the guerrillas in the bush in Equatoria Province, and started to organize them into a force which could systematically harass northern security forces in the south. Guerrilla attacks and organization continued to grow, although development of the campaign was handicapped by external indifference to the regional struggle in Sudan and a consequent lack of arms and resources. The problem was somewhat alleviated

in 1965 by acquisition of arms from the defeated "Simba" rebels in the neighboring Congo (Zaire) and later, in 1969, by Israeli willingness to supply arms and instructors via Uganda. This latter development materially assisted Lagu to extend his hold upon the southern guerrilla organizations and his rise to prominence in the southern leadership.

The vigor with which the military aspects of the conflict were prosecuted by the Khartoum Government varied with the regime in power at the time. The accession to power of Sudan's first military regime, that of Major–General Abboud, produced a policy of sustained repression of southern leaders and politicians, amounting to an attempt to wipe out completely what was always a small elite; and of repression and punitive sanctions by the army pursuing the anti–guerrilla struggle in the south. The civilian regime of Sir al Khatim el Khalifa, which replaced Abboud's government following a civil uprising in Khartoum in 1964, pursued a policy of conciliation. It was during this initial period of return to civilian government that the Round Table Conference of northerners and southerners to consider the regional problem was held (March 1965). Tragically, this Conference collapsed without finding any settlement to the problem, one (but only one) of the stumbling blocks to agreement being the Khartoum Government's inability to control the behavior of the military in the south, which continued to pursue a bloody campaign against the guerrilla forces. Following the elections in June 1965, the new government of Mohamed Mahgoub ushered in a new period of repression and anti–southern policies, causing many southern leaders to flee into an exile from which some had only just returned. The subsequent government of Sadiq al Mahdi pursued a similar policy towards the southern problem when it came to power in 1966.

It was not until the military again intervened in national politics in May 1969, with Ja'afar al Nimiery's coup, that any great change in official northern attitudes to the southern problem was clearly noticeable. Although there were internal differences within the new regime over southern policy, the military government in June 1969 issued a declaration recognizing that historic differences did, indeed, exist between the north and south of Sudan, and putting forward a proposal that the south should be granted some unspecified degree of local autonomy. The offer had no immediate, direct effect upon the course of the struggle, however. It was not until over a year later that serious and continuous negotiations began between representatives of the Khartoum government and leaders of the southern political movement. In the end, it was not until October 1972 (by which time Nimiery had survived an attempted Communist–supported coup), the World Council of Churches (WCC) and All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) had become involved as intermediaries, and prior agreements of mutual non–interference had been concluded between Khartoum and the Emperor of Ethiopia, that delegations from the rival parties to the conflict met to begin formal negotiations to end the dispute.

One factor which contributed to the longevity of the termination process was the continuing inability of the southern leaders to form a unified political movement to represent—even agree upon—southern aspirations, goals and tactics. This inability to overcome the divisions among southerners themselves had been a feature of southern politics throughout the entire period of the civil war. It had bedevilled northern efforts both to produce a coherent policy towards the southern problem and to find a representative body with which to negotiate once northern policy had swung from repression to conciliation. The complex sources of division within the ranks of southern leaders, frequently based upon tribal and personal antagonisms, require a major analysis to do them any justice.[3] For our purpose, it is enough to note that they were important in determining whether educated southern leaders remained to work (when they could) with the government in Khartoum, that is, remained "insiders"; whether they went into exile and formed Sudanese movements (and sometimes governments) in exile—that is, became "outsiders"; or whether they remained in the country but operated in the southern bush with one of the guerrilla forces—that is, became "inside-outsiders."

The dilemma for members of the southern elite became acute following Abboud's army takeover in 1958, and many went into exile in Leopoldville to form the Southern African Closed Districts Union (SACDU), which later became the Sudan African National Union (SANU) based in Kampala. With the overthrow of Abboud, one wing of SANU returned to take part with the newly-formed "Southern Front" in Sudanese politics again and to participate in the Round Table Conference. Another wing remained in exile, subsequently splitting over personal and other rivalries into the Azania Liberation Front, the Sudan African Liberation Front, and SAUC. Even the subsequent period of northern intransigence under Mahgoub and el Mahdi failed to bring southerners together. In spite of a convention held at Angrudi in Eastern Equatoria in August 1969 to set up a South Sudanese Provisional Government, the southern movement continued to remain splintered and divided. Such divisions were exacerbated by the willingness of prominent southern leaders, especially in the Sudanese Communist Party, to work with the northern government of General Nimiery when it came to power in 1969.

It should be emphasized that divisions within the southern political movement lasted right up to (and, in some cases, even beyond) the process of negotiation that preceded the Addis Ababa meetings. It was not until 1970 that most of the southern organizations amalgamated in the South Sudan Liberation Movement. Even then, there was a residue of leaders and organizations in exile who remained separate from the SSLM. Moreover, it was only in May 1971 (when contacts between Khartoum and SSLM were well advanced) that Lagu was able to call a conference in Upper Nile Province to firmly establish the SSLM as representative of the southern movement with Anya Nya as its official military wing, amalgamate other guerrilla groups into Anya Nya, and have his role as Commander in-Chief generally acknowledged. The

SSLM had thus only recently acquired its fragile unity when its representatives finally travelled to Addis Ababa to negotiate about a settlement on behalf of the south.

It is obviously impossible to cover the complexities, the shifts of policies and tactics, the changes in alignments and attitudes, that make up a period of at least ten years' violent civil war in a country as diverse and complicated as the Sudan. All that is attempted above is to draw out a number of themes which were important in their effects upon efforts to terminate the conflict and particularly upon the final process that began at the start of 1970. To recapitulate, emphasis needs to be placed upon four factors:

(a) The historical roots of the division between northern and southern regions of the country, a division reinforced by both imperial administrative and missionary practices.

(b) The relative "insulation" of the struggle from much external involvement, although some intervention took place towards the end of the war. Concerned individuals and groups in London referred to the conflict in Sudan as "the unknown war" and are said to have named their regular periodical on the problem "The Grass Curtain" to symbolize the lack of information on (or outside interest in) African's longest-running civil war.

(c) The relative instability of politics and hence regimes in the northern region of the country, such that, after independence in 1956, four civilian and two military regimes followed one another in rapid succession.

(d) The lack of unity of the southern political movement in general, a lack which reflected uncertainties over the basic position of southerners: whether to work within a unified Sudan and hence press for some form of regional autonomy, or whether to attempt to secede and set up a separate and sovereign state, quite apart form the northern region and its alien-dominated government.

## The Addis Ababa Agreement

The process by which the parties to the Sudanese conflict reached a stage of face-to-face negotiations in Addis Ababa and, finally, a workable agreement, was a complex one.[4] Initial contacts between the Khartoum Government and the SSLM's representative in London began as early as August 1970, originally under the auspices of the Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF). By January 1971, Colonel Lagu's and the SSLM's decision to accept some settlement "... within the framework of one Sudan..." had been communicated to Khartoum, although the nature of this offer did not become generally known in government circles until April, shortly before the attempted anti-Nimiery coup by the SCP. In May a WCC/AACC delegation had agreed with members of the Khartoum Government that it would try to contact southern leaders with a view to arranging formal negotiations, and when the delegation returned to Khartoum in October 1971 it was able to report that southern leaders,

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having consulted among themselves (an extended process given the geographical "scatter" of southern groups and leaders), were ready to discuss preliminary negotiations for autonomy.

Unfortunately, when these preliminary talks took place they ended in failure, in spite of the fact that, a few days before the talks, President Nimiery and Emperor Haile Selassie had agreed to stop aiding each others' "rebels" in Eritrea and the southern Sudan, thus increasing pressure on the south for a settlement. The southerners objected to the Khartoum Government's view of the nature of "regional autonomy" and the war resumed. However, private meetings continued between SSLM representatives and members of Nimiery's government to try to work out acceptable meanings of "autonomy" and "federation," and on January 28 the WCC announced that new talks had been arranged for February 15 under the auspices of the AACC, with the Emperor of Ethiopia acting as formal mediator in the conflict. A few days later the Khartoum Government announced the convening of a conference of aid agencies to discuss humanitarian aid to the south. This was to begin six days after the start of the Addis Ababa negotiations.

In the event, the negotiations took slightly longer than six days, but a draft agreement was finally initialled on February 27 at the Addis Ababa Hilton. The date for final ratification was set for March 12, but this was preempted by President Nimiery, who announced ratification at a public rally in Khartoum on March 3. Ratification for the southerners was a more difficult matter. Colonel Lagu had to request an extension of the time permitted when March 12 arrived. President Nimiery announced a (mainly successful) ceasefire on that day, but when Lagu arrived in Addis Ababa for final ratification on March 26 he brought with him several amendments to the original agreement which had been insisted upon by one or other of the southern leaders not directly involved at the original negotiations. However, when it came to the point of renegotiating and running the risk of an impasse, or retaining the original terms, the SSLM representative chose the latter course. The Addis Ababa Agreement was finally ratified on March 28, 1970.

The settlement that emerged from Addis Ababa negotiations and the final period of intra-party politicking up to March 28 was a serious attempt to reconcile northern goals of retaining a unitary (or at least united) state with southern fears regarding safety and security, as well as desires for a considerable degree of autonomy. For some southerners, this last goal took the form of a demand for a separate state for the three southern provinces (although Colonel Lagu, after the agreement was concluded, specifically denied that this had ever been his personal goal). The preliminary communique announcing the Addis Ababa talks of February 27 had spoken of "...the fraternal desire of both parties to preserve the unity of their country and to safeguard the aspirations of the Southern Region...," and the final agreement reflected this initial bargaining position.

The main provisions of the Agreement dealt with the nature of the autonomy that would be enjoyed by the south following a ceasefire and a brief (at most eighteen–month) interim period of rule by an Executive Council for the South, initially appointed by President Nimiery. The three southern provinces were to be regarded as a distinct "region" in the Sudan, with a Regional Assembly to be elected by universal adult suffrage within eighteen months of ratification of the agreement. The Assembly would recommend appointments to a Regional Council and choose its own Regional President as head of that council, although formal appointment of both would remain in the hands of the President of Sudan. The Regional Council was to control all aspects of southern policy except defense, foreign affairs, currency and finance, and overall social and economic planning, the latter remaining under the control of the central government in Khartoum, in which the south would also be represented. (Under the Southern Provinces Regional Self–Government Act of 1972 it was later agreed that the Regional Assembly could ask the President to defer the entry into force of any central government legislation applying to the south. The President was also to be responsible for good relations between central Government ministries and members of the southern Council). The Addis Ababa Agreement also stated that, while Arabic would be the official language of the Sudan, north and south, English would be the "common language" of the south and would be taught in schools. Finally, the last of the major provisions of the Agreement dealt with arrangements for the Anya Nya, the southern guerrillas in the bush. These (estimated, incorrectly as it subsequently became apparent, at 12,000) were to be incorporated in the Sudanese army's Southern Command. This force would, for a transitional term, be under the command of a commission of northerners and southerners, until the south had set up its own machinery for maintaining law and order, which was to consist of an armed police force and between 2,000 and 3,000 frontier guards.

The settlement therefore tried to satisfy the southerners by offering a considerable degree of regional autonomy, plus continued participation in central government decision–making and the national army. It provided for the gradual transfer of southern security into southern hands, both as regards control and direct implementation. It provided opportunities for rank and file members of the SSLM to become part of the national army. It safeguarded the position of English as the regional lingua franca and ensured that this would be used for both regional education and administration. In return, the agreement signalled the abandonment of any further effort to take the south permanently out of the Sudan, and maintained "...the unity of their country..." for both northerners and southerners.

That the arrangements did not fully "...safeguard the legitimate aspirations..." of at least some of the southerners is indicated by the difficulties Lagu experienced in getting agreement to these terms prior to ratification, and by the list of amendments that were suggested between March 27 and March 28 only to be finally abandoned by him at Addis Ababa on the latter date. Individual southern leaders denounced both

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the preliminary agreement to negotiate within a framework of a single Sudan and the eventual Agreement ratified at the end of March. One prominent southerner, Gordon Mortat Mayen, denounced the former as an "Arab fraud" from Kinshasa and was promptly expelled by an irate President Mobutu. Similar feelings were expressed by some southerners when the terms of the final Agreement were known. Nonetheless, at the time, the Agreement was generally welcomed by southerners and, although its short-term implementation was not without problems and difficulties, it did form the basis of a period of peace and stability in the three southern provinces.

## Aspects of Peacemaking: (1) Cutting Losses

This brief review of the events leading up to the Addis Ababa Agreement and of that Agreement itself again poses the question whether it is possible (or proper) to use the Sudanese case study as a model for the process of conflict termination between powerful and strongly opposed adversaries. The question of whether it is proper is basically a methodological one. Can one ever derive "lessons" or principles from a single (apparently very unusual) example, or place any reliance upon generalizations arrived at without a systematic comparison of many cases?

The methodological justification for our approach derives from the theory-generating rather than the theory-testing end of the overall theory-building process. There is no sense in which a single case can be used as a test of a general theory or hypothesis, but such a case can be used to generate an analytical framework or a set of hypotheses. The crucial questions are whether the model used in our present case study helps (a) to provide a coherent account of the Sudanese peacemaking process and (b) to generate hypotheses that can be carried over and checked in other cases, thus moving towards a general theory of peacemaking.

In other words, the Sudanese case will be used as a source of fruitful ideas or hypotheses about three aspects of the complex process of peacemaking. Such ideas are presented as starting points for further investigation of the topic. Our use of the term "model" should therefore also be understood as implying a heuristic function for the three aspects of: (a) problems of pre-negotiation decision-making, especially those associated with leaders' calculations about termination and cutting losses; (b) features of successful intermediaries in widespread and violent intra-national conflicts; and (c) the structure of regional settlements that are likely to be acceptable to parties in conflict over issues of regional autonomy or secession. More formally, it could be argued with Lijphart[5] that the present work is partly an example of an interpretive case study, using generalizations to illuminate the ending of the first Sudanese Civil War, but more particularly of a hypothesis-generating case study which starts with "...a more or less vague notion of possible hypotheses ..." and then attempts "...to formulate definite hypotheses to be tested subsequently among a larger number of cases...."[6]

The first heuristic use of the Sudanese case study thus focuses on the circumstances under which decision-makers are likely to consider the option of conciliation and negotiation as opposed to that of continuing the conflict by coercion and violence. What influences leaders in their calculations about the costs and benefits of alternative courses of actions? What, on occasion, persuades them to cut their losses and attempt to make peace with an adversary? In what circumstances can a leader consider the option of seeking peace rather than prosecuting the war?

One of the first clues offered by the case of the Sudan to any general answer to this question is that by the beginning of 1971 the struggle had clearly reached a position of stalemate, and furthermore, a stalemate that was generally perceived to be one of long duration. This is not to say that the balance of forces (or even balance of advantage) between government and guerillas was anywhere near equal. The Anya Nya did not "control" most of the south any more than government forces had succeeded in "pacifying" all key areas. However, while it was true that Sudanese Government forces could move anywhere in the region if in reasonable strength, it was also true that the Any Nya (and hence the SSLM) had a wide measure of popular support from the local population and continued to be able to attract recruits into its ranks and to arm them. As John Howell emphasizes,

> "In guerrilla war, parity is reached not necessarily by equality of
> armed strength, but at a point where the superior conventional force
> of the counter-insurgent is unable either to eradicate the insurgent, or
> prevent his continued recruitment of men and continued access to
> weaponry; and the insurgent is unable to wrest control in areas which
> the counter-insurgent is determined to hold and is unable to destroy
> the political will of the counter-insurgent to defend...."
> (Howell, p. 426)

It seems clear that the war in the south had reached something like this position by 1971. The guerillas could not "win" in any convincing sense, while the government could not eradicate the influence of the Anya Nya.

The perceptions and expectations of decision-makers on both sides are more speculative but, given that neither party fundamentally misperceived the nature of their relationship, it seems likely that Nimiery and the leadership in Khartoum recognized that they were confronting a long-drawn out, frustrating, and highly expensive struggle in the south. Similarly, Lagu and the Anya Nya leadership were equally aware that, unless the Khartoum government's will to continue the conflict collapsed completely, there was no hope of rapid success in achieving their objectives, either of autonomy or secession, by military means.[7] In other words, for all the involved leaders, the future seemed to offer a process of increasingly costly struggle, with little prospect of final, unequivocal[8] success, so that likely sacrifices and costs far outweighed likely gains.

In such circumstances, an added importance must be given to the manner in which the leaders of both sides perceive and evaluate each other's commitment and

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determination to continue in the pursuit of their goals, their unity and intransigence, and their level of previous commitment to and sacrifice in pursuit of their goals that underlie the conflict. If new leaders have come to power within an adversary, to what degree do they appear committed to the goals and strategies of their predecessors, and what public statements have they made that tie them to a continuance of coercion? If the commitment is not strong, what are the adversary's likely terms and conditions, and how firm is his initial bargaining position likely to be? Such questions arise in the Sudanese case because of the fact that President Nimiery's regime in Khartoum was of relatively recent establishment, thus being able to distance itself from its predecssor's aims and behavior. Similarly, unchallenged leadership of the Anya Nya and—by implication—a key position in the SSLM had only recently come into the hands of Colonel Lagu and his associates and was, indeed, only finally confirmed while the initial peacemaking process was under way. As for likely terms, it should have been clear to southern leaders that Nimiery's "new strategy," announced in June 1969, at least recognized differences between north and south as well as holding out some hopes for a form of regional autonomy, although its nature remained ambiguous. To southern leaders, the main obstacles to any serious consideration of some rapprochement (aside from the dynamics of an ongoing guerrilla war) must have remained in the Sudan Communist Party's prior conditions of the development of some new, ".... broad socialist orientated democratic movement in the south...." (Howell, p. 422), an obstacle that was only removed following the purge of powerful SCP members from Nimiery's regime[9] after the abortive coup in 1971.

In short, the Sudanese case suggests that among the key factors that influence parties' decisions to seek some negotiated settlement (as opposed to continuing the conflict through struggle and coercion) are complex inter–party factors, quite apart from the obvious one of the perceived position of both strategic and tactical advantage and the way what may be termed "success on the battlefield" changes over time. Inter–party factors include decision–makers' evaluations of the likely long–term gains and costs of continuing the struggle as against any likely settlement they might be offered by the adversary; evaluations of sacrifices already made in pursuit of the party's goals, which tend to make it more difficult to abandon the struggle and sacrifice previous "investment" of effort, resources and (in many cases) people's lives; evaluations of the extent to which public commitments have tied their own and their adversary's hands over particular courses of action, removing some from realistic consideration; and evaluations of the internal condition of the adversary and particularly the leaders' unity, level of intransigence, room for maneuvre and the interests of dominant factions or groups within that leadership. All of these played a part in the Sudanese parties' considerations of whether, when and how to seek a negotiated settlement as opposed to a victory, and appear not unlikely to be important in other cases.

However, inter-party factors are not the only ones which are important in affecting decisions to seek a negotiated end to a conflict. The Sudanese case suggests that attention must also be directed towards at least two other sets of factors which potentially play a major role in any decision to carry on or to cut losses and negotiate. These are intra-party factors and inter-ally factors. Both appear to have played a major role in the decision-making of both parties in Sudan, and it seems reasonable to argue that the right combination of all three groups of factors must exist if any peacemaking process is to succeed in getting under way, let alone move towards a settlement.

One of the striking things about the intra-party situation for the adversaries in the Sudanese case was the way in which a number of internal conflicts and dilemmas had to resolve themselves before any realistic settlement effort could be made. For the Khartoum Government, the failure of the SCP coup in 1971 and the March 1970 removal of a serious threat posed to the regime by the Ansari sect had left President Nimiery in a temporary position from which he could contemplate a settlement with the southerners which could only be presented as a compromise rather than as victory. Nimiery's power base was, for the time being, relatively secure. Although no new allies had been won over and future threats seemed inevitable, the influence of some dangerous factions within the regime had been removed. The internal cohesiveness of the Khartoum Government had been temporarily brought to the point where a settlement could be sought (without too much immediate danger of intra-party repudiation), sold to northern interests and made to "stick." Moreover, the northern leader was also astute enough to realize that, by concluding a reasonable settlement with the south, southern fortunes would be tied to those of the northern regime which had arranged and guaranteed the settlement. In a paradoxical sense, the regime's power base would be extended to include its erstwhile adversaries in the south. Not only would reconciled southern leaders develop an interest in remaining Sudanese, they would also develop some level of dependence upon the Nimiery regime and an interest in its survival.[10]

Viewed from Khartoum, the readiness of the southerners to negotiate realistically, and the chance of concluding a workable agreement acceptable to all southern factions, must have seemed problematical, given the divisions within the SSLM and its heterogeneous structure. However, the crucial feature of intra-southern politics during 1970-72 was the gradual and timely emergence of a leadership that could (just) speak and negotiate for the vast bulk of southern factions and an organization that could reasonably claim to be able to implement any "satisfactory" agreement that might be reached. In many ways, one of the most fascinating aspects of the Sudanese settlement was the race between processes of inter-party peacemaking and of intra-party coalition-building and coalition-maintaining. In the event, the dominance of the military wing of the SSLM under Colonel Lagu proved crucial, although the disagreements that wracked the SSLM after the initialling of the draft Addis Ababa

Agreement and its final unaltered ratification by Lagu indicate how nearly the southerners had come to reverting to a set of rival factions with which it was impossible to negotiate systematically and with any finality.

The Sudanese case thus indicates that, in any conflict, the decision-making process that precedes the initiation of any attempt to negotiate a solution is likely to be significantly affected by circumstances within the adversaries as much as the relationship between them. The former could pose serious obstacles to beginning to make peace, as well as to concluding such a delicate procedure. At the very least, attention in future cases might profitably be directed to such considerations as the overall intra-party balance of forces and factions, the interests of dominant factions or groups as well as the personal interests of individual leaders, the level of of the leadership's public commitment to "victory," the level of intra-party cohesion and organization, both of which affect the leaders' ability to control any anti-settlement backlash, and the level of intra-party support for the personnel, policies, and achievements of the existing leadership.

Finally, the Sudanese case emphasizes that few conflicts can remain wholly isolated from what might be termed "extra-system" influences. In many cases, others become involved in the struggle as patrons or supporters of one or other party. Paradoxically, the level of external involvement in the Sudanese civil war remained relatively low.[11] However, examination of the peacemaking process indicates that this involvement did bring a third set of factors into consideration when the major adversaries began to contemplate compromise and negotiation, namely relationships between the parties in Sudan and other governments or organizations that had intervened in the conflict. On the southern side, the outsiders most directly involved in helping, particularly after 1969, were the Israelis, whose patronage consisted of supplying arms for the struggle and whose (apparently mistaken) choice of Lagu's faction as the main conduit for arms did much to help that group become predominant within the southern forces. The objectives of the Israelis appear straightforward. Their aid for the Anya Nya was both a part of their attempt to undermine or divert potential members of an Arab or Islamic anti-Israeli bloc and of their drive to win friends and influence in sub-Saharan Africa. While never substantial, Israeli aid was undoubtedly an important factor in the southerners' ability to continue the fight. Equally, its severance would have seriously undermined the Anya Nya's ability to continue the struggle, at least at the level achieved by 1971.

Paradoxically, the Israelis' ability to continue to aid the Anya Nya depended upon the connivance of the Ugandan Government and this, in turn, depended upon Kampala not discovering any mutual interests with Khartoum. However, this was one of the results of the overthrow of Milton Obote by Idi Amin, for Obote later was able to concentrate exile forces across the Sudanese border in Equatoria, thus posing a threat to Amin's survival. The mutuality of interests between Amin and Nimiery thus led to a situation in 1971 whereby, in return for Sudanese Government promises to

abandon support for Obote's forces in Equatoria[12], Amin agreed to undermine the Anya Nya's outside links through the Israelis in Uganda. He did this by expelling the Israeli mission in Uganda, partly on the grounds that previous efforts to curtail its pro–SSLM activities had been evaded. Both the action and the knowledge that one of their few sources of outside support had been removed must have put some pressure on the SSLM finally to endorse the draft settlement.[13]

In a similar manner, Nimiery was also able to sever the SSLM's links with the Ethiopian Government, which had been using the Anya Nya to counterbalance the aid offered tacitly (or inadvertently) to the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) by Sudanese regimes. Again, this relationship involved the Israelis as arms suppliers to the Anya Nya in Upper Nile province, while, on the other side, the ELF used the Sudan for refugees, base areas and gun–running into Eritrea itself. By the end of 1970 this source of supply and support had helped to consolidate the guerrilla activities and organizations in the south of the Sudan, thus tending to make the leaders more rather than less intransigent, while at the same time becoming more dependent for that unity upon continued Israeli support. However, in March 1971, the Sudanese and Ethiopian governments signed an agreement to stop support for one another's "rebel" forces, while a visit to Ethiopia by President Nimiery in November of that same year appears to have had a major effect of stopping the flow of weapons and equipment to the Anya Nya in the Upper Nile—supplies upon which the guerrillas had come increasingly to depend.

The interpretation outlined above suggests how vulnerable parties (even in such relatively "insulated" conflicts as that in the Sudan) can become to changes in the goals and behavior of external patrons and suppliers of resources. It also suggests that, to some degree, willingness to take a decision to seek a negotiated settlement can depend upon the vulnerability of one's external patrons to pressure or blandishments from the adversary. Had the Israeli connection not proved vulnerable, the willingness of the southerners to conclude a final compromise settlement might not have been high.[14] Hence, a final set of factors to include in any analysis of decision–making preceding (or accompanying) conflict termination initiatives should include such items as the changing interests and level of commitment of the external patrons themselves (whether national governments or other organizations), the sensitivity of external patrons to pressure from other third parties, and the vulnerability of external patrons to direct pressure from adversaries.

In summary, the Sudanese case clearly indicates three broad types of influence upon the process of parties mutually deciding to cut their losses, abandon the struggle (at least temporarily) and begin an exploration of the possibility of a negotiated solution: (a) inter–party relationships, (b) intra–party circumstances, and (c) relationships between the adversaries and any patrons that may be assisting in the dispute.[15] While this simple classification is only a starting point for inquiry, it can serve as a useful guide to other situations of conflict and other decisions for or against termination. Fleshed out, as in Figure 1, it might help to pinpoint sets of

circumstances where settlement processes might begin, as well as those where a successful start is unlikely. Moreover, an understanding of such circumstances might materially aid the correct timing of peace initiatives by third parties and help to answer longstanding questions about appropriate timing of peace feelers, whether these are unilateral or made by third parties.

| Factors affecting decisions to seek a settlement | Northern view | Southern view |
|---|---|---|
| **A. Inter-Party** | | |
| 1. Perceived position of relative tactical advantage over adversary. | Stalemate: recognition of inability to crush Anya Nya. | Stalemate: recognition of P.A.F.'s ability to deny Anya Nya towns, communication centers, etc. |
| 2. Evaluations of own sacrifices made by parties and (especially) current leadership. | Nimiery regime not committed by sacrifices of its predecessors. | Considerable sacrifices but not all directly at behest of new SSLM. |
| 3. Evaluation of public commitments already made by other leadership. | Uncertain, but by Oct. 1970 Lagu had been willing to accept a solution "within framework of one Sudan..." | Uncertain: June '69 Declaration of new policy towards South "based on autonomous rule" but inspired by SCP. |
| 4 Perception of likely long term gains from continuing v. long term costs. | Long drawn out drain on resources against gains in S. support from an acceptable peace. | Gains of peace and aid from N. against sacrifice of increasingly improbable independence. |
| 5. Perception of internal state of adversary (unity, intransigence, level of commitment, etc.). | South committed to rejection of unified Sudan, but otherwise dis-united on goals/in organisation. | Northern intransigence diminished by S. efforts, but also because of new regime. |
| 6. Perception of adversary's likely terms (level of concessions, etc.). | Unclear: some in S. possibly willing to remain in a federalist Sudan, in view of need for aid, relief. | Unclear: N. gvt. might be will-ing to concede internal self gov-ernment but not independence. |
| **B. Intra-party** | | |
| 1. Personal interests of elite deci-sion-makers. | Peace would enhance external reputation of regime and offer new potential source of support in S. | Highly varied and dependent on factional in-fighting among S. movements/leaders. |
| 2. Interests of dominant groups and factions. | Timely agreement with south but price of abandoning Sudan's move into Arab sphere. | Again, varied according to views and positions of factions. |
| 3. Balance of intra-party political forces. | Nimiery dominant, but this could rapidly change. | Lagu and Anya Nya finally dominant in SSLM and could determine whether war contained or not indep. of external political leaders. |
| 4. Level and longevity of leaders' public commitment to "final victory." | Low and never as absolute as previous regimes. | Long and firm, but nature of "victory" open to interpretation. |
| 5. Intra-party cohesiveness and level of control by hierarchy. | High, if only temporarily: state hierarchy still firmly in existence. | At its highest level, if only temp., for entire period of war. |
| 6. Level of intra-party support for policies/personnel of incumbent elite. | Unsure, but immediate threats to regime had been surmounted. | Unsure, but Lagu undoubtedly domi-nant in internal forces & SSLM had es-tab. (temp.) unity among S. factions. |
| **C. Extra-system** | | |
| 1. Attitudes and level of commit-ment of external patrons. | No help from USSR following SCP coup. Egyptian help sporadic, uncertain. | Pragmatic: Israeli support dependent on continued nuisance value of war in Arab-Israeli confrontation: Ethiopian aid dependent on N. help for ELF. |
| 2. Perception of likely shifts in external support | New sources of support unlikely. | Weakening of Ugandan (hence Israeli) assistance. |
| 3. Vulnerability of patrons to pressure from adversary. | No real leverage available to SSLM should new patrons assist N. gvt. | Ugandan tolerance dependent upon N. manipulation of Obote threat to Amin. Ethiopian help vulnerable to deal over N. help for ELF. |
| 4 Change in external support and approval enjoyed by adversary. | Start of interest in Europe in war, but African states still unlikely to act to help S. | No major condemnation of N. policy or activities: still "the un-known war" in Africa. |

**Table 1. Factors Affecting Decisions to Seek a Settlement: Differences Between North and South**

# Aspects of Peacemaking: (2) The Intermediaries

A second major set of lessons that might usefully be provided by the Sudanese case concerns the nature of the mediation process itself and the type of third parties that might be able to operate successfully in similar cases of intense civil strife. In this second sense, the use of the Sudanese case might well be particularly illuminating, since widespread, lethal domestic conflicts involving the possibility of secession are the most difficult to conciliate. To outsiders such conflicts present major problems of access, for no government in such a situation can afford any suggestion of legitimacy or equality to its adversary which would give the latter a tactical advantage in the search for external support and approval. Moreover, the sheer physical problems of establishing and maintaining contact and credibility with insurgents are considerable, particularly when the latter are split into factions by major cleavages and intra–party frictions.

In such circumstances a number of fundamental questions about third party activities arise. These mainly concern problems of the acceptability of intermediaries and mediatory activities to parties who are engaged in a conflict over the survival of some territorially–based political system. Typically the most baffling questions concern: (a) who might realistically be able to act as a mediator in such circumstances, and (b) what procedures might maximize the chances of achieving some satisfactory negotiated solution. Given that such a settlement did occur in the case of the Sudanese civil war, and that, as indicated above, the Sudanese parties (or at least some parts of them) had come independently to the conclusion that an acceptable negotiated settlement was a possibility[16], what light can the case throw on these two crucial questions?

Before attempting to tackle them it is necessary to deal with a preliminary query: who acted as an intermediary in the complex process that led to the meetings in Addis Ababa and the final conclusion of the settlement agreement in March 1972? An immediate answer would be that the major roles of go–between, establishing contact and communication between the various parties, and of convenor and moderator of both preliminary (November 1971) and substantive negotiations (February 1972) were fulfilled by delegations and personalities from the World Council of Churches (WCC) and its regional adjunct, the All Africa Council of Churches (AACC).[17] Certainly, much of the credit for helping to arrange the final settlement was justifiably assigned to these bodies, and particularly to Kodwo Ankrah (the WCC's Secretary for Africa) and Canon Burgess Carr of AACC. However, it is also the case that other organizations played a role in bringing about both final meetings and agreement.[18] As already noted, a preliminary attempt to make contact between the Khartoum Government and SSLM representatives in London was undertaken in the summer of 1970 by the Movement for Colonial Freedom, and, even though this effort had proved abortive by the end of the year, the preliminary

contacts it established planted the immediate possibility of a negotiated settlement in the minds of key northerners and southerners.

Other organizations affected the overall process productively, but in a rather different manner. For example, while there is evidence to the effect that, as early as December 1970, the WCC was contemplating a scheme to bring the Sudanese Government and the Anya Nya to a negotiating "round table," and that a high-level WCC/AACC delegation to pressure the Khartoum Government towards such an idea was planned[19], the preparatory meetings held in Addis Ababa in January 1971 were ostensibly concerned largely with humanitarian issues rather than mediation. Publicly, the main task was seen as finding some means of channelling humanitarian aid to the south of the Sudan. One reason for this stance may have been a feeling within the AACC that there should be a clear adherence to the OAU's principle of non-interference with the internal affairs of African countries. However, later in March the WCC was replying to a group of southern supporters at Makerere University that its own proposed fact-finding mission to the Sudan also planned to contact southern leaders apart from those working with the Khartoum Government, so that the WCC was then manifestly thinking of something more than a humanitarian function for its mission.

Moreover, when the WCC/AACC mission arrived at Kampala in March, its intention to explore the possibilities of a mediatory role was probably reinforced by meeting two organizations that had been active in Uganda in support of the SSLM, the Kampala Committee and the Makerere Group. The latter had been established by SSLM sympathisers at Makerere University and was channelling aid into the Anya Nya-held areas of the south to help in setting up a civil administration there. The former had been established by the Church Missionary Society and Anglican and Catholic church organizations to coordinate the provision of medical, education and agricultural aid for the south. Both regarded the WCC/AACC's (ostensible) purpose of sending a mission to the Sudan to explore routing aid via the north as misguided. Both set out to persuade the WCC/AACC to undertake a mission of reconciliation, having first clarified what the Khartoum Government's offer of "regional autonomy" might mean in practice. In addition, the groups in Kampala attempted to persuade the WCC/AACC to consider approaching a much wider range of southern opinion than they feared had initially been the intention and to switch the emphasis of their exploration from southerners inside the Sudan to those in exile who represented the more "extreme" southern opinion, such as the groups in Ethiopia, Zaire, Kenya and Uganda. Thus, both the Kampala Committee and the Makerere Group's views must have reinforced any previous intentions of the WCC/AACC to undertake an intermediary rather than a purely humanitarian mission, and had some influence on both the nature of the final WCC mission and the form it took.

While it is true, therefore, to say that the main intermediaries in the process of setting up and conducting peacemaking in the Sudan were the WCC/AACC, other organizations played some role as advisers and pathfinders, particularly in the early stages of the process. What is noticeable about all these third parties, however, is their unofficial and informal nature as regards the normal conduct of international politics. This may provide both a clue to their success in the Sudanese case and an indication of the advantages that such "unofficial diplomats" might enjoy in similar domestic conflicts.

One of the outstanding features of efforts to find solutions for widespread domestic conflict and civil strife is the ease with which formal intermediary initiatives from other governments or from regional or international organizations can be blocked or aborted. Often, other governments are unacceptable as intermediaries, either because they are perceived to have direct interest in the outcome of the struggle or because allowing them to act as intermediaries would confer some benefit in terms of recognition. Equally, international or regional organizations have often tied their own hands as potential intermediaries by taking a stand on the particular case in question, or upon some general principle that directly affects many such cases. Doctrines of non-interference and domestic sovereignty are usually invoked by incumbents to head off unwanted peace initiatives that might confer recognition in some substantive, moral, or legalistic sense. Quiet diplomacy by some international body is usually difficult in today's world of instant communication, global news coverage and the transistor radio. Hence, one lesson of the Sudanese settlement might well be that appropriate third parties to assist in achieving such solutions frequently have to be unofficial, low profile, and, above all, private.

However, even intermediaries of this type must still fulfil a variety of requirements commonly cited as necessary for mediators before their activities will be either acceptable or credible to parties involved in the struggle. It is a commonplace that mediators must be seen to be impartial (or, at least, as balanced in their partialities) and must somehow manage to maintain this perception throughout a process which is almost structured to guarantee a rapid loss of such perceived impartiality.

Many writers have argued that successful intermediaries must be independent from the parties and possess prestige, authority, knowledge, skill, flexibility and access to independent resources and services. On all these dimensions, the position of the WCC/AACC in the Sudanese peacemaking process presents something of a paradox. Certainly the church leaders had no overtly political axe to grind within the Sudan, and few seem to have doubted their genuine disinterest in efforts to achieve a peaceful solution for its own sake. However, in other ways they were thoroughly "involved" in the Sudanese situation. One of the major concerns of the Khartoum Government, for example, was that the churches had been an important element in maintaining and strengthening the divisions between north and south and hence were,

to a degree, "responsible" for southern separatism.[20] Again, the position of the AACC on African intra–state conflicts was well known to southern leaders, both in exile and in the Sudan. More immediately relevant to the SSLM's suspicion of church involvement in any peacemaking initiative—and especially the WCC/AACC's initial proposal for a goodwill mission to the Sudan in 1971—was a previous AACC report resulting from a "goodwill mission" made in 1966. This had somewhat uncritically adopted the Khartoum Government's version of affairs and, especially in the eyes of southern leaders whom the church mission had not approached, damaged the southern cause considerably.

Overidentification with the views, goals, and positions of one of the parties to a dispute can be fatal to any intermediary initiative. (It was this that wrecked the MCF's initiative in autumn 1970, when one of its members published an article in the Nile *Mirror* which virtually adopted the position of Khartoum's Minister for Southern Affairs while also alleging that members of the SSLM were instruments of the CIA!) In the case of the WCC/AACC, the suspicions of both northerners and southerners seem almost to have balanced each other out, and to have been seen as minor obstacles when compared with the likely benefits of making contact and opening discussions about a negotiated solution. Furthermore, the WCC's decision to provide aid to the guerrilla organizations in Southern Africa certainly seems to have raised that body's prestige in Khartoum and suggests that an intermediary's reputation and acceptability can be helped (as well as hindered) by actions taken over issues apparently remotely connected with the situation being mediated. Reputation (and hence acceptability) can be affected by diverse factors. That the WCC itself may have doubted its own position and credibility with the parties can be seen by its efforts to involve other, prestigious African figures in the overall peacemaking process, including President Kaunda and, later, the Emperor of Ethiopia.[21]

What can the actual pattern of events and actions in the Sudanese case tell us about processes of successful mediation in civil wars? This author has suggested that the overall mediation process might fruitfully be viewed as one of an intermediary proceeding to play a number of roles in rough sequence depending upon the stage reached by the peacemaking initiative. Four major stages were identified: initiatory, bilateral contact, face-to-face discussion, and implementation. Each involved a variety of functions to be carried out by a third party (see Figure 2). Certainly, many of these functions can be identified in the Sudanese peacemaking process, although they were not necessarily carried out by a single third party in this case. For example, a frequently enacted role consists of some third party fulfilling what might be termed a synchronizing function by ensuring that the parties to the conflict are equally ready to contemplate the possibility of a negotiated settlement and, hence, are prepared to engage in some form of realistic dialogue.

## Table 2. Stages of mediation

| Mediation stages | Intermediary functions |
| --- | --- |
| (1) Initiatory | Delaying |
| | Synchronizing |
| (2) Bilateral contact | Defining |
| | Communicating |
| | Informing |
| (3) Face–to–face discussion | Providing a forum |
| | Suggesting ideas |
| (a) Confrontation | Initiating |
| | De–committing |
| | Substitute–proposing |
| (b) Negotiation | Excusing |
| | Providing resources |
| | Encouraging |
| | Managing |
| (4) Implementation | Supervising and securing |
| | Guaranteeing |
| | Legitimizing |

It is unarguable that the WCC/AACC intermediaries carried out this role, particularly once their contacts in Kampala and elsewhere indicated in March, 1971 that the SSLM was willing to consider a negotiated settlement and that explorations of the willingness to consider negotiation in Khartoum should be undertaken. The main intermediary took over a synchronizing function as well as that of acting as a go–between and fulfilling a communicating and informing function, partly through the encouragement of other interested third parties, and partly because of the support received from the adversaries themselves. The WCC/AACC were helped in this bilateral contacts stage by the fact that the Khartoum Government had responded favorably to the overtures made from Kampala and, earlier in their initiation stage, by the fact that the MCF initiative had already aborted, thus focussing both SSLM and Khartoum leaders' attention upon the possibilities (and hence the details) of a dialogue with the adversary. In this sense, the WCC/AACC were the heirs of the MCF and also benefited from the thinking and activities of the Makerere Group and the Kampala Committee.

In all its roles[22] during the two initial stages of the peacemaking process the WCC/AACC had an inestimable advantage over many other potential intermediaries, both "public" and "private," both resourceful and resourceless. This was the degree of access to both African and non–African leaders provided by the church network throughout Africa. This even extended to the Sudan itself, in spite of the expulsion of

missionaries from the southern provinces. Church leaders, both Catholic and Protestant, were able to make contact with key African leaders and governments, with the Sudanese guerrilla organizations and exile groups, and with the Khartoum Government itself. In many ways, this multi–level, multi–functional church network seems to have proved an ideal entry point for peacemaking initiatives in the Sudanese case, while the level of legitimacy provided by church sponsorship for the peacemaking initiative seems to have been vital, not merely in the initiatory and bilateral contacts stage, but also in helping to provide a forum for the talks and setting them up under the aegis of an African elder statesman who was a neighbor and had a direct interest in ending the conflict through negotiation, as well.[23]

Once the third stage of face–to–face discussion had been reached and a forum for that discussion found, the WCC/AACC's role as intermediary became a typical one of helping to "manage" meetings successfully, so that deadlocks were avoided or removed, discussion proceeded smoothly, and suitable wording was found for points of disagreement. At the preliminary talks in November 1971[24] the four church representatives were twice called in to resolve serious deadlocks, in particular one over whether the main talks should take place within the formula of a single Sudan. At the final negotiations in February 1972 (a bilateral discussion took place in London during December 1971) the meeting was chaired by the AACC representative, Canon Burgess Carr (the Emperor had implicitly declined to act as chairman), although he took on the title of "Moderator" rather than Chairman. Available accounts indicate that the meetings were by no means easy, with both parties negotiating hard, determined not to give way on vital issues, although both had obviously prepared initial bargaining positions from which retreat was possible and not wholly unexpected. However, some issues proved particularly intractable, including the powers to be afforded to the President of the Sudan and the question of security and the armed forces in the south. The latter issues revolved around the question of what proportion of northern and southern troops in some future integrated force should be stationed in the south, and this question was eventually referred to the Emperor Haile Selassie himself for determination,[25] thus bringing in another direct intervention from a further intermediary.

Whatever difficulties were encountered during the fourteen days of negotiation, a final draft peace agreement was produced by February 27, 1972, signed in the ballroom of the Addis Ababa Hilton Hotel by all delegates except the leaders (who merely initialled it), and witnessed by the church leaders and the Emperor's official representative. However, as suggested above, there is usually a fourth stage to any peacemaking process, in which intermediaries can play a role—that of implementation, and the Sudanese case proved no exception. Of the many possible "follow up" functions that can be performed by an intermediary, perhaps the most important are to do with initially legitimizing and selling any final agreement to leaders and factions not directly involved in the negotiations. Later, third parties might have the functions

of supervising or guaranteeing the terms of an agreement, but first it is frequently necessary to have it fully accepted by the parties themselves. Often this is no easy task and so it proved with the Addis Ababa Agreement. Between the announcement of the agreement in February and its final ratification in March 1972, much third party activity was directed towards persuading factions within at least one party—the southerners—to accept the agreement's provisions.

Efforts both to publicize and legitimize the agreement began almost as soon as the agreement had been reached in Addis Ababa. The Emperor made a speech immediately after the signing ceremony publicly congratulating all concerned and a reception was held at Organization of African Unity (OAU) headquarters, thus simultaneously signifying the approval and support of Africa's elder statesman and of the relevant regional organization. However, while such action may have helped to legitimize the settlement on the regional and world stage, a much harder task lay in convincing many of the harder line leaders of SSLM factions that the agreement was the best that could be gained at that time and with existing levels of sacrifice. In many ways, the most important actions in persuading doubting or recalcitrant southerners that the agreement should be accepted came from the third parties that had originally persuaded the WCC/AACC to undertake an intermediary role. Many members of the Makerere Group, for example, were active in trying to persuade southerners to accept what one of them has described as "an acceptable, if imperfect, settlement...."[26] The Group underlined the warning that, if the agreement were to be rejected, then relief and other aid would no longer be forthcoming, while if it were accepted, a massive aid program in the south would not merely assist recovery but involve a large foreign presence in the area helping to guarantee the settlement. Similarly, the Kampala Committee threw its weight behind efforts to make SSLM see the sense of accepting the agreement, writing directly to Colonel Lagu and then making transport available to him so that he could contact groups within the southern provinces more easily and persuade them to accept the settlement.

In spite of such efforts, when Lagu arrived in Addis Ababa in late March 1972 to ratify the agreement, he brought with him a large number of amendments which southerners wished to make to the settlement. It was only after the Emperor had used his own personal prestige to reassure the southern leader that the agreement was finally ratified unchanged. In the event, most southerners outside the Sudan accepted the agreement thus ratified as the best that could be hoped for, although a few of them rejected it as a sell-out and continued to hope for some improvement in southern fortunes—international intervention or major new sources of supply—that would provide the opportunity for independence. Such dissent was not widespread, however, and this fact must be partly attributable to the strenuous efforts put in by third parties, both governmental and private, to "sell" the agreement to southerners, but also to northerners within the Sudan.

One major lesson regarding the role of intermediaries emerges from the Sudanese case, in addition to the customary important factors such as access, impartiality, acceptability, and an initial willingness of the parties to consider dialogue. This is that potential intermediaries must also be in a position to avoid conferring public recognition of any sort by their activities on either of the adversaries; otherwise, their activities might become part of the tactical interplay, the gaining of advantages at the expense of the adversary, that signals the continuation, rather than the termination, of a conflict.

A second lesson appears to be that, while the list of potential intermediary functions mentioned above is not wildly inaccurate as far as the Sudanese settlement is concerned, it is a mistake to believe that all functions must necessarily be carried out by the same party. In the Sudanese case, the functions listed above were, in fact, carried out by a number of organizations, some of whom were regarded as impartial by both main adversaries, but some of whom quite clearly were not. The WCC/AACC in its role as a go–between, conciliator and arranger of contacts might well have been viewed as basically impartial by northerners and southerners. The same could hardly be said of the Makerere Group, or of the MCF, or even—in spite of its commitment to "humanitarian" relief—of the Kampala Committee. (In strict power politics terms, any aid to the southerners which removed Khartoum's pressure to bring about a surrender was highly "political.") Nonetheless, it was such directly committed third parties that fulfilled many of the necessary follow up functions that ensured the final ratification of the agreement and that the settlement worked out at Addis Ababa would, at the very least, be given a trial by the adversaries.

## Aspects of Peacemaking: (3) The Settlement

The final sense in which the ending of the Sudanese civil war might well be considered (in some sense) a "model" relates to the nature of the settlement itself, its terms and provisions and the manner of its implementation. Of the three senses in which we have used the settlement as a model, this last is possibly the most interesting and important, not least for the fact that the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 represents an all too rare example of the manner in which conflicts between a central government and a regionally–based movement for some form of "self–determination" or "independence" might be settled without either secession or annihilation of the insurgents. It is in this sense, then, that the agreement and its implementation might well be taken as a preliminary model for regions of the world prone to conflicts which, if mishandled, frequently threaten both the survival of existing political entities and the peace of the region.

### (a) The Terms

At one level of analysis, the lessons offered by the Sudanese settlement concern how it might be possible to cope with three of the major dimensions that customarily

lie at the heart of regionally based struggles for self-determination: (i) the degree of independence that can be obtained consonant with the retention of the minimal level of national unity and integration desired by the central government; (ii) the means of achieving a desired level of regional security (i.e., from the potential dangers posed by the agents of the central government to local interests and even survival) which does not wholly undermine either national unity or national security; (iii) and the extent to which the system devised by the settlement can manage residual and new conflicts as they emerge, both between central government and new region and within the region itself.[27]

In a superficial sense, the first question involves whether a settlement to a conflict maintains a unitary state at one extreme, sets up some federal system or, at another extreme, results in complete secession. In the case of the Sudanese settlement, the negotiated compromise was a system of "regional autonomy," although some observers have argued that what was actually agreed was a federal system under another name. However, the symbolic title of the system established is less important than the practical degree of independent decision-making enjoyed by whatever regional governmental body or bodies are established. This question involves three broad aspects : (i) the degree of central government influence over regional political processes; (ii) the level of administrative independence enjoyed by the region; and (iii) the level of economic and financial autonomy for the region established by the settlement.

The first of these can, to some extent, be gauged by the formal powers handed over to the regional authority and those retained by the central government, but also by the degree to which the central government is subsequently able to influence political processes and outcomes at the regional level. The second is closely linked with the first, but largely involves questions of administrative autonomy at a regional level. For example, where does responsibility for appointment, promotion or posting of regional personnel lie? To what extent are administrative practices in the region subject to central government edict? How much are regional administrative systems open to being swamped by central government appointees?[28] The third involves questions of (i) the ability to raise local taxes rendering the region no longer (or much less) dependent upon central government funds; (ii) the right not to levy centrally imposed taxes or imposts; and (iii) the ability not to be overly dependent upon central government loans and grants for capital development and economic growth.

The actual terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement provide some clues as to how such matters were dealt with, at least in an initial effort to implement some systems of "autonomy" in the south. A large degree of freedom of action was, in fact, handed over to southern leaders by the agreement which, following transitional arrangements, gave to a regionally elected Assembly the power to recommend to the national President a High Executive Council (HEC) which would be responsible for all southern affairs, except defense, foreign affairs, currency and finance, and national

economic and social planning. The Regional Assembly would also select its own Regional President, who would head the HEC as chairman, and recommend the appointment to the national President. (The Regional Assembly also had the power to recommend the Regional President's dismissal!) Affairs in the south were further formally insulated against influence from the north by the Regional Assembly's ability to ask the President to defer entry into force of central government legislation as it applied to the south.

At least on paper, this range of provisions gave the south a high degree of insulation from interference by both central government and northerners in general, while also guaranteeing southern representation in central government, planning, and administration. Some northerners were quick to point out that the south enjoyed a privileged position not available to other Sudanese and there were some fears that similar regional concessions might be demanded by other groups within the remainder of Sudan. However, the key question whether northern presidents would invariably implement the recommendations of southern assemblies exercised some southern minds even in 1972.

Similar problems arose of how much independence a settlement could attain in administrative and economic fields, especially in view of the relative poverty of the south and the disruption caused by the civil war. At the time of the settlement, a large potential sacrifice for the SSLM was the dismantling of grass roots structures of administration, health, and education that had been painfully built up, especially in the last years of the guerrilla struggle—although the quid pro quo in the form of famine relief and development planning was considerable. However, the replacement of even this system by a formal, regional one would inevitably lead to problems of boundary demarcation between central and regional administrations. The issue of efficient centralized administration clashed with the need to mark out clearly that area of essentially southern activity left vague in an inevitably ambiguous agreement. Problems of relations between central and regional economic planning, of assignments out of the south in services that were nationally based, of promotions and educational qualifications, inevitably arise in any arrangement where a system has been established containing two centers of power and two administrative structures. Events soon after the 1972 settlement showed that such difficulties do arise and have to be weighed against advantages offered by the semi–autonomous, two–tier system of administration.

Just the practicalities of administrative independence inevitably prove tricky in any settlement based upon principles of regional devolution, those concerning economic independence are also likely to prove troublesome, and the Sudanese settlement illustrates some problems likely to confront parties to similar regionally–based conflicts. Complete and sovereign economic independence is a myth, even for separate countries. In the case of regions of previously integrated countries, even limited economic autonomy is likely to prove difficult to arrange. This is true

even in countries like the Sudan, where the absolute level of economic exchange between regions has never been great. The problem for creating any genuine form of southern economic autonomy, apart from the initially low level of development and the devastation of the war, was that the south was almost wholly dependent upon the central government and outside aid for economic growth. This proved to be the case even for finances to run administration and government in the south at a minimal level.

The Addis Ababa Agreement guaranteed that the central government would provide revenue and finance for the region in a variety of ways, as well as development funds from a "Special Development Budget." However, the very fact that the "autonomous" southern region was to be so dependent upon the central government for its finances emphasized one of the difficulties likely to attend attempts to establish systems of regional autonomy as solutions to regionally based conflicts. Poor regions seeking regional autonomy are likely to have to accept continued dependence upon, and influence from, a richer center, while rich regions (Katanga, Biafra) are likely to have their efforts to achieve autonomy of any description fiercely resisted by a center determined not to lose control of a rich source of revenue and resources. This became a key issue in Sudan once oil deposits had been discovered in the southern region.

Regarding the security requirements of any settlement, the first obviously involves immediate questions of a ceasefire or armistice which do not appear to imperil the security or survival of either side. However, in the longer term it is frequently the case that a major issue becomes one of actual physical security for the insurgent region, once the insurgent forces have agreed to lay down their arms. How is it possible to ensure that one has not merely turned over the region and its people to a vengeful central government, at the same time as the central government is reassured that a minimum amount of security and law and order (in a conventional sense) is maintained and that the region ceases to be a direct military threat to national security and survival?

In principle, security solutions can range from a wholly integrated national army and security forces at one extreme (in which case, the security fears of any minority regional group will be exacerbated to the degree that the army represents the dominating majority) to a wholly separate regional force, regionally based and with its own local command structure (in which case the central government is likely to see this arrangement as lessening rather than increasing national security). Between these two extremes lies a wide variety of theoretically possible arrangements, involving separate commands, independent regional units, regionally based, mixed forces with separate units, mixed forces with integrated units, or some balance of regional and extra-regional troops stationed in the autonomous regon. In all such arrangements the key questions are likely to be: How many troops in the region, with what balance between locals and outsiders? Are the units separated or integrated? Who is in

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command and with what powers and responsibilities? Who appoints regional commanders and how? What safeguards are there against destabilizing postings into and equally important—postings out of the region? Even in the longer term, these problems usually prove to be crucial to the maintenance of any agreed settlement. In the immediate aftermath of a civil war, with recent antagonists in a guerrilla/security forces campaign involved in some peacetime security "mix," solving the problem of both regional and national security is likely to prove intractable.

The military aspect of the Addis Ababa settlement called for a separate "Southern Command" of 12,000 men, half of whom were to be drawn from the ranks of the Anya Nya. The recruitment, deployment, and eventual integration of the force was to be in the hands of a Joint Military Commission, which was to carry out its task with the difficult objective of ensuring "... that an atmosphere of peace and confidence shall prevail in the Southern Region ...." How this was to be accomplished was by no means clear, given the level of mutual distrust prevailing, the need to preserve some mutual balance of forces as a perceived guarantee to southerners, and an implied agreement that units in the south would, at some later stage, become integrated under both northern and southern officers. The length of time that was to pass before any moves towards unit–level integration were attempted indicated the sensitivity of the security issue to southerners[29] and the difficulties thought likely to accompany any attempt by central government to provide security and law and order in a previously disaffected region.

### (b) The Structure of the Settlement

An alternative way of analyzing the Addis Ababa settlement and examining any final lessons it might have for similar situations is to abandon detailed consideration of the terms and ask what kinds of advantages the agreement offered to the parties in the dispute, and how various factions and individuals in each party might have come to regard the agreement as preferable to a continuation of the armed conflict. Naturally, the benefits available were not equally shared by all northerners or all southerners, but the crucial feature of the Agreement seems to have been that it offered "enough" to a wide enough range of individuals and factions to make it sufficiently acceptable to ensure at least its initial implementation.

First and most obviously, the agreement offered peace and an end to violence for both northerners and southerners. For the latter, moreover, it offered a chance of return and resettlement both for leaders in exile and for the large number of refugees that had fled the southern Sudan into neighboring countries. Hence, the support from those packed in refugee camps for this (and almost any other peaceful) settlement was hardly surprising. Moreover, for southern leaders in exile, the agreement offered a genuine chance of political power and of participating in effective decision-making about the future of their own region. It is true that the agreement fell short of complete independence, but in its draft form it was undoubtedly perceived as offering a chance for southern leaders to put their ideas into effect in the south, and to obtain the political influence and status that they had been seeking. In addition, the proffered two-tier system provided a considerable number of decision-making and administrative roles for southern leaders (both "insiders" and "outsiders," although friction was likely between the two groups) who would be able to make careers and fulfill ambitions at either regional or national levels.

For the leaders in the north (those, that is, who were not tied to old intransigent policies, and thus convinced that the southerners would reject the agreement and enable the conflict to continue), the settlement represented an end to a divisive conflict and potential new basis of support among southerners who would undoubtedly see that the continuation of the settlement depended very much upon the continued existence of the Nimiery regime in Khartoum. For the members of the regime, although the regional settlement was a gamble risking (at least) elite criticism in the north, the success of the peace process ensured a greater solidity and the international status that accrues to those who have successfully made a domestic peace. Its failure might, in the longer term, have left them more vulnerable to their remaining enemies in the north.

It is often easy to see the benefits brought by peace to leadership and elites, in the form of political status, power, opportunity, and support. Usually, it is less easy to see what rewards peace brings to rank and file followers. This is frequently because such aspects are not dealt with directly by the settlement. Followers achieve their

reward by a cessation of violence and physical destruction and thus are the benefits of peace conveyed to them. However, the Addis Ababa Agreement was interesting in that it set out quite explicitly to make available direct benefits to the rank–and–file of the Anya Nya, thus giving them a stake in the settlement. Deliberately, provisions were made to bring what were estimated to be the bulk of the guerrilla forces into the settlement by guaranteeing them roles in the newly–founded Southern Command of the PAF. In other words, benefits were built into the agreement not merely for elites but also for followers—and moreover for armed followers who might otherwise have been able to disrupt the peace process. In the event, far more guerillas proved to be available for recruitment than the estimated 6,000; over 15,000 had to be accommodated. The strain upon meager southern resources was considerable, but 4,000 taken into the police and prison services somewhat eased the burden.[30]

Lessons that such aspects of the Sudanese settlement appear to teach, then, are that successful solutions must include at least some benefits at all levels if they are to be sufficiently acceptable in the initial stages and thus have some chance of survival in the medium and longer term. Not only must elites be satisfied and perceive that the settlement fulfils at least some of their salient goals, but rank–and–file followers, middle echelon administrators, and other key groups must also see that their ends are, to some considerable degree, served by cutting losses and compromising, not by wrecking the agreement and trying to continue the fight onward to victory. In this and other respects, the Addis Ababa settlement appears to offer some useful guidelines for all countries with a geographically concentrated "sub–national" community striving for some degree of autonomy, and potentially able to translate that endeavor into overt and violent conflict.

## Conclusion

All of the foregoing may appear to be "academic" in two senses of the word: irrelevantly hypothetical in the light of the subsequent failure of the agreement to hold, and of no current interest in view of the completely changed situation in Sudanese politics. The agreement ultimately failed to ensure long term stability within the Sudan, or peace between the northern and southern halves of the country, for longer than ten years. Its provisions were steadily undermined by rivalries and cleavages within the ranks of southern leaders themselves, and by the resultant failure of the regional government structure to govern effectively. The discovery of considerable wealth in the south in the form of oil led to divisions and disputes over the sharing of benefits from that discovery, symbolized by the struggle over the siting of a planned oil refinery either in the south near the wells or at Port Sudan on the Red Sea coastline at the end of a lengthy pipeline. The fragility of the south's political autonomy was revealed by President Nimiery's decision to restructure the southern political system into three separate provincial systems in place of the southern regional

system established at Addis Ababa ("repartation"), and was underlined by decisions to transfer southern troops out of the region to posts in northern Sudan. The fragility of social and cultural autonomy was amply and finally demonstrated by President Nimiery's decision to impose the full rigors of Muslim Law (shariya) throughout the entire country, irrespective of the sensibilities of non–Muslim southerners or the spirit of the agreement that he had helped to achieve in 1972.

The southern response was another army mutiny and the formation in 1983 of new and radical resistance movements in the south, one of which took on the name (Anya Nya II) and secessionist objectives of previous southern movements, while another, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and its army (the SPLA), posed a more radical threat to the regime in Khartoum by seeking to become the leaders of a new, democratic and socialist regime for the entire country. Under the leadership of Colonel Dr. John Garang, the SPLM became Khartoum's main adversary in a second civil war which, by 1988, had: (a) engulfed the southern region of the country and left the "rebels" in far firmer control of all save a few strategic towns than even Anya Nya I in 1971; (b) contributed to the overthrow of Nimiery himself and the coming to power of a civilian regime under Sadiq al Mahdi; and (c) resisted all efforts to get northerners and dissident southerners to negotiate a solution to the renewed conflict, in spite of indirect contacts and even direct talks between Garang and al Mahdi.

The breakdown of the 1972 settlement was, by 1988, so obvious that it must seem perverse, at the least, to argue that it could serve as a model of anything, let alone "successful" conflict termination. At best, surely, it might be regarded as a temporary truce in a long drawn out, episodic struggle likely to end, if it does come to any definite conclusion (and prolonged stalemate is not impossible), with secession of the southerners or the eventual, forcible reimposition of rule from Khartoum. Even if the agreement lasted for a decade, its ultimate breakdown surely argues an inherent flaw in the content of the settlement (even if not the process of arriving at it). One might conclude that a political arrangement as fragile and as easily overturned as the 1972 settlement cannot be deemed a success to be used as a model.

Two points may be made against this conclusion. The first is the practical point that one of the major demands of the southern dissidents once again fighting in the bush has been that the country should return to the arrangements for regional autonomy (or something very like them) agreed to in 1972. To this is added a call for a democratic, decentralized, and non–military national government, presumably to ensure that new arrangements are not overturned on the personal whim of a non–elected, non–responsive military leader. The fact that one of the parties to the present struggle has, as a prime object, a return to the type of settlement reached in 1972 argues that some merit was and is perceived in the nature of that settlement.

The second point is a less practical one, and raises the issue of the definition of "success." For a conflict termination process to be characterized as a success, must it produce some set of arrangements that lasts for several generations or stands some

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other test of time to demonstrate a most unusual permanence and robustness? Admittedly, it would be pleasant if the arrangements made at Addis Ababa in 1972, at the end of a long civil war, proved to be long-lasting and able to withstand the shifting stresses and strains of Sudanese national politics for decades thereafter without giving way in some fashion. However, all political systems are fragile, nowhere more so in countries that contain major cleavages of a religious, ethno-linguistic, and class nature. It should not be surprising that the strains finally placed upon the Addis Ababa arrangements arising from such a society finally proved too much. In terms of longevity, then, the 1972 Sudanese settlement may not have been a success.

However, the point needs to be made that, with conflict termination processes, there are degrees of success. Some such processes never manage to get the parties into dialogue, let alone to agree to a cessation of fighting. Others reach dialogue but fail to find any possible agreement. Still others—the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 comes to mind—achieve agreement, only to see it repudiated. Still others rapidly break down at the implementation stage and the process ends in recrimination and accusations of bad faith. In these terms, and bearing in mind previous comments about the difficulty of finding any compromise solution to intense civil strife involving the survival of a country, an argument can be made that the Addis Ababa process and agreement itself were a relatively successful example of conflict termination, and therefore might have lessons to teach, perhaps even to those currently seeking an end to the second Sudanese civil war.

In short, I would argue that the agreement concluded at Addis Ababa in February—March, 1972 can be seen as a "model" solution for a not untypical problem in contemporary politics, that of a major conflict caused by a desire for regional independence in a divided society. The settlement provides a model for a peace-making process[31] and for a solution which was, at the time, acceptable because it offered considerable benefits to most sections of the minority without weakening the position of the majority in national affairs or in the country's role in regional and international politics.

The agreement decentralized, without losing complete control of regional affairs, while at the same time offering genuine participation in decision-making on regional affairs to regional elites. It offered considerable security to the regional minority, without weakening the security of the remainder of the country. It preserved important cultural, religious and linguistic values in a region again without diminishing the dominant cultural pattern in the majority's area or without, in the event, weakening national identity; it afforded real, concrete and immediately recognizable benefits to both leaders and rank and file, especially within the regional minority; and it established a system which did nothing to infringe the formal sovereignty and unity of the country in question, while avoiding the formal implications of a federal system and

providing some of the informal benefits of decentralized decision-making appropriate to a large country with under-developed communications.

The format of the final settlement achieved at Addis Ababa is thus one which merits considerable respect for its appropriateness and for the fact that it managed to achieve at least ten years of relative inter-regional peace in a country which had experienced little of that commodity since independence. In spite of its ultimate failure, the Addis Ababa settlement might well serve as a starting point for considering solutions to similar situations, both in Africa and the rest of the world.

## Glossary Of Acronyms

AACC   — All Africa Conference of Churches
ELF     — Eritrean Liberation Front
HEC    — High Executive Council
MCF    — Movement for Colonial Freedom
OAU    — Organization of African Unity
PAF    — People's Armed Forces
SACDU— Southern African Closed Districts Union
SANU  — Sudan African National Union
SCP     — Sudanese Communist Party
SPLA   — Sudan People's Liberation Army
SSLM  — South Sudanese Liberation Movement
WCC   — World Council of Churches

# Footnotes

(1) See the analyses contained in Rosenau (1964) and Eckstein (1964).

(2) Another unusual feature of the civil war, which may account for the way in which it remained relatively insulated from major external intervention by outside governments and political movements, is the fact that if failed to develop any clear-cut ideological features—at least, in the sense that the parties involved fell clearly on to some conventional left-right or east-west dimensions. Other countries did intervene—Israel and Uganda to help the southerners, and Egypt, the USSR and, later the People's Republic of China to assist Khartoum—but never at a high level and never as part of any world-wide ideological struggle.

(3) See John Howell; "Political Leadership and Organisation," Unpub. Ph.D. thesis, Reading University, 1978.

(4) This is necessarily a sketchy and incomplete account of the events leading up to the final settlement. For more detailed descriptions readers should consult Pirouet (1976) and Howell, ibid.

(5) See Arend Lijphart "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review* 65: (2), 1971, pp. 682-694.

(6) Lijphart, ibid. p. 692.

(7) It is something of an oversimplification to treat relevant decision-makers as falling into two clear-cut and separate "leaderships," especially given the overlapping of interests and views, exemplified by such individuals as Abel Alier.

(8) As Howell points out, the southerners (especially Lagu) recognized both that "...the rebels were never likely to be able to overrun a major Sudanese army garrison or take over any sizeable town for anything more than few days..." (p. 426) and that the campaign for African and international recognition of the SSLM had failed totally. (Howell, ibid.)

(9) The SCP supported Nimiery's government and provided both key ideas and key personnel (including the Minister of Southern Affairs, Joseph Garang) between June 1969 and July 1971.

(10) The realism of these calculations was illustrated in the Libyan-backed coup which failed in July, 1976. The southern response to the events in Khartoum was to prepare to send elements of the Sudanese forces stationed in the south (both northerners and southerners) northwards to put down the uprising—although this proved unnecessary in the event.

(11) It is possible that both sides in the Sudanese civil war saw that any major internationalization of the conflict would involve them in major costs to offset any advantages—such as greater external interference, loss of control, freedom of action

and autonomy and the detrimental tying in of the local Sudanese conflict to regional and global confrontations.

(12) In March 1972, immediately after the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement, Obote's forces were moved from their Sudanese government camps in Equatoria to others further north—much further away from the Ugandan borders. In June 1972 they sailed from Sudan to Tanga in Tanzania.

(13) The Israeli expulsion from Uganda was ordered on March 24, 1972, the day on which Colonel Lagu left Kampala for final talks on ratification in Addis Ababa.

(14) Equally, however, the Khartoum Government had the foresight to realize that even cutting off outside resources from the SSLM did not mean that "victory" would be achieved in the short term, and that the SSLM's outside links might easily be restored by a sudden shift in the region's volatile coalition patterns.

(15) Patrons do not, of course, help through altruism. Frequently conflicts can change their nature as the interests of patrons come to dominate those of clients. Local conflicts, such as that on Cyprus, become bound up with Turkish–Greek disputes over the Aegean and over questions of Turkish military security. They also—usually—become more intractable.

(16) Many observers of mediation and conciliation in both international and domestic disputes argue that this is a necessary but not necessarily sufficient condition for the initiation of a successful mediatory process.

(17) Haile Selassie had agreed to act as official mediator for the meetings to be held from February 15, 1972.

(18) Among other activities the Apostolic delegate in Khartoum, Monsignor Calabresi, held a meeting in February 1979 with President Mobutu of Zaire and requested him to undertake the role of mediator in the Sudanese dispute.

(19) H. Assefa: personal communication.

(20) The OAU's commitment to the preservation of the territorial status quo of its member–states has effectively tied its hands as an "impartial" mediator in many African intrastate conflicts, beginning with that in the Ethiopian Ogaden and being most apparent during the Nigerian Civil War.

(21) This argument, plus the alleged direct support and encouragement given by the churches to southern separatists and guerrillas, underlay the expulsion of Christian missionaries from the south of the country in 1964.

(22) It has been suggested that the Emperor stayed aloof from the peace-making process—even to the extent of allowing his Foreign Minister to act as host to the February 1972 talks in Addis Ababa—for fear of becoming involved in discussions that might widen to include Eritrea (Pirouet, p.135).

(23) It might, with truth, be argued that the WCC/AACC performed an intensely practical equalizing function during the peacemaking process by providing SSLM leaders with financial support for fares, accommodation, administrative services when attending conferences, and for legal and constitutional advice (in the form of Sir Dingle Foot).

(24) The fact that the WCC/AACC felt that they needed to rely upon the prestige of an African elder statesman or leading political figures indicates that church leaders were still unsure of their own ability to provide a necessary level of legitimacy to their efforts and any settlement that might possible emerge. Hence their initial efforts to involve President Kaunda and their final move to hold talks in Addis Ababa, both Haile Selassie's capital and the headquarters of the OAU.

(25) This meeting was attended by Dr. Leopoldo Niilus, director of the WCC's Commission on International Affairs, Kodwo Ankrah and Canon Burgess Carr, Secretary of AACC.

(26) The Emperor suggested a solution through a parity agreement; an equal number of southern and northern troops to be stationed in the three southern provinces.

(27) Some important individuals in the Group had serious doubts about accepting.

(28) Dealing with this problem would require a review of Sudanese politics over the past decade and must be the subject of another paper.

(29) In the Sudanese case, for example, clashes subsequently arose over who controlled appointments and postings of the police in the South, and over the extent to which the head of the southern police force was responsible to the Regional Assembly as opposed to the national police commissioner in Khartoum. Again, some criticisms have been made of the retention of the British colonial style of Provincial and District Commissioners in the south who report directly to the President's Office and are responsible to the President himself.

(30) Note the disturbances that occurred on two occasions when efforts were made to integrate PAF and ex-SSLM units, one at Juba in 1974 and the near mutiny at Aboko in 1975.

(31) The HEC decided to employ the remainder as road workers or agricultural/ forestry assistants, but the bill for so doing came to $3 million in the first eighteen months of peace, and in 1973–74 payment for even a number reduced by offering three months' severance pay as bonus amounted to more than all locally raised revenues for the region (Kasfir, 1977, pp. 155–6).

(32) It is also an interesting example of an agreement embodying transitional arrangements difficult to preserve once started (even without President Nimiery's pre–emptive implementation of the ceasefire and the agreement), yet not putting either party in a position of overwhelming disadvantage at any particular stage should the agreement break down.

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# Notes