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Contact:

Mr. Dr. phil. Daniele Ganser

Senior Researcher

Center for Security Studies (CSS)

Federal Institute of Technology (ETH)

ETH Seilergraben

8092 Zurich

Switzerland

[www.fsk.ethz.ch](http://www.fsk.ethz.ch)

Phone: 0041 61 301 68 20

Fax: 0041 61 301 68 19

[ganser@sipo.gess.ethz.ch](mailto:ganser@sipo.gess.ethz.ch)

## About the author

Dr. phil. Daniele Ganser is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, Switzerland. Born 1972 in the Italian speaking part of Switzerland he studied among other subjects Modern History and International Relations at Basel University in Switzerland, Amsterdam University in the Netherlands, and the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) in England. Daniele Ganser speaks German, Italian, English, French and Spanish and received his Lizentiat summa cum laude and his PhD insigni cum laude from Basel University in Switzerland. He has been director of international relations research at the Think Tank Avenir Suisse in Zurich and a member of the expert commission on human rights in the Swiss Foreign Ministry. He has published books on the sabotage of the United Nations during the Cuban conflict and the missile crisis of 1962 (2000), and on Switzerland in the European Economic Area (2002).



# **The Secret Side of International Relations: An approach to NATO's stay-behind armies in Western Europe**

*by Daniele Ganser*

## I. Introduction

Ever since the beginning of the “war on terrorism” in the wake of the attacks on the United States on September 11 2001 observers in the field of international relations have increasingly stressed that secret networks with a potential for violence pose a great challenge to national and human security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Typically, this danger of a secret and violent network has in the United States and in Western Europe been associated with the Islamist terrorist organisation Al Qaida of Osama Bin Laden.

While research into Al Qaida and similar secret Islamist structures has attracted much funding and attention Western analysis has suffered from a remarkable blind spot: Research into secret and potentially violent networks created by European countries and the United States. The predominantly Christian or secular research community in Western Europe and the United States has with some success investigated “the other”, in this case the radical Islamist community, and correctly detected patterns of deceit, secrecy and violence. Yet by focusing on “the other”, without using the same investigative methods also “on the self”, the research community in the West has arguably allowed for a somewhat unbalanced analysis.

Such an unbalanced analysis can be dangerous. For peace and conflict research has highlighted that the division between two groups and the ensuing degradation of one group by another on moral grounds are essential steps towards violent conflicts. In the case of the Rwandan genocide in 1994 the local Hutu elites first stressed the differences between the Hutus and the Tutsis, while their numerous similarities as human beings gained no prominence in the discourse. Thereafter the ruling Hutus publicly degraded the Tutsis by “a discourse of hate” that designated the Tutsis as “the enemy within” which had to be eliminated Without the separation and the degradation it would not have been possible that in only three months more than 800'000 human beings were killed in a genocide, 75% of which were Tutsis while 25% were moderate Hutus.<sup>1</sup>

Political violence remains a highly complex phenomenon with numerous roots. But if indeed divisions among human beings are a precondition for violence, as

also the debate in Germany following World War Two on the division of Germans into “Nazis” and “Jews” suggested, then the global research community should arguably attempt to bridge the gaps across divisions. One of the strategies to overcome such divisions between for instance Christians and Muslims consists in the strategy by which each community does not focus on the secrecy and violence of the other community, but turns the spotlight upon itself and attempts to analyse one’s own secret and violent strategies. Such attempts are obviously delicate and controversial within ones own socio-political context. Yet if they help to overcome a simplistic black and white pattern that blames “the other” to engage in secret and violent strategies, then the path towards a more balanced understanding might have been opened which could in turn promote a more peaceful coexistence.

In a modest attempt to turn the spotlight on the West this paper attempts to research the example of the secret so-called “stay-behind” armies of NATO that were discovered in 1990 in Italy and other countries of Western Europe. Still today, more than a decade later, the phenomenon remains little known also among experts because primary documents on the subject are being withheld by governments. International research in the last decade was hence forced to rely on very few primary documents, most of them from Italy, parliamentary reports, personal testimonies and reports of investigative journalists. What follows can therefore by no means be an exhaustive analysis, but rather a very general first approach to secret and potentially violent structures created by the Western countries within the West during the Cold War.

## II. Gladio

During the Cold War secret stay-behind armies were created in all countries of Western Europe. Co-ordinated by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), set up and run by the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, also MI6) together with European military secret services, they were charged with preparing against a potential Soviet invasion or the coming to power of communist parties. The Italian secret army, code-named „Gladio”, was the first branch of the network to be discovered in 1990, and hence the keyword “Gladio” has stuck to describe the entire phenomenon. This despite the fact that in other countries the stay-behind armies operated under different code-names such as „SDRA 8” in Belgium, „Absalon” in Denmark, „Counter-Guerrilla” in Turkey and „P-26” in Switzerland.

In Italy in the summer of 1990 Venetian judge Felice Casson discovered the existence of the hitherto unknown so-called „stay-behind army” linked to NATO

while investigating mysterious acts of right-wing terrorism in the country. The documents proving the existence of the special forces were found by Casson in Rome in the archives of the Italian military secret service SISMI (Servizio Informazioni Sicurezza Militare, previously known as SID: Servizio Informazione Difesa, previously known as SIFAR: Servizio Informazioni Forze Armate). They revealed that the secret army was still active and that similar secret stay-behind armies existed across Western Europe.

Among the documents found by Casson the most important one was dated June 1 1959 and entitled "The Special Forces of SIFAR and Operation Gladio". Classified top secret this document of the Italian defence department specified how NATO military planning for unorthodox warfare and anti-communist covert action operations was coordinated by a so called "Clandestine Planning Committee (CPC)" directly linked to NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). The document stressed that next to a Soviet invasion NATO feared above all "internal subversion" and in Italy specifically an increase of power of the communist party PCI (Partito Comunista Italiano). "On the national level, the possibility of an emergency situation as above described has been and continues to be the reason for specific SIFAR activities. These special activities are carried out by the section SAD of the Ufficio R" the document explained with reference to the secret department within SIFAR operating the stay-behind army. "Parallel to this decision the chief of SIFAR decided, with the approval of the Defence Minister, to confirm the previous accords agreed upon by the Italian secret service and the American secret service with respect to the reciprocal co-operation in the context of the S/B operations (Stay Behind), in order to realize a joint operation". The document concluded that an earlier agreement between CIA and SIFAR with date of November 26 1956 "constitutes the basis document of Operation 'Gladio' (name given to the operations developed by the two secret services)."<sup>2</sup>

Casson was alarmed and informed the Italian Senate of his far-reaching discovery. A special investigative Senate committee under Senator Libero Gaultieri, which at the time was investigating massacres and mysterious acts of terrorism in Italy, on 2 August 1990 ordered the Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti of the Christian Democratic Party (DCI) "to inform the parliament within sixty days with respect to the existence, characteristics and purpose of a parallel and occult structure which is said to have operated within our secret service of the military with the aim to condition the political life of the country."<sup>3</sup> The next day the Prime Minister promised the Senate to "provide the Commission with all the necessary documentation, be it on the problem in general, be it on the specific findings made by judge Casson in the context of his investigations", particularly concerning the secret army. "I will present

to the Commission a very precise report which I have asked the Defence Department to prepare. It is about the activities based on NATO planning that have been started for the eventuality of an attack and occupation of Italy or parts of Italy.”<sup>4</sup>

On 24 October 1990, the Italian Prime Minister sent a ten-page report entitled “The so-called 'Parallel SID' - The Gladio Case” to the Senate commission. In this report, he officially confirmed for the first time that a secret army linked to NATO and codenamed „Gladio” had existed in Italy during the Cold War and was still active. The Prime Minister explained that Gladio had been conceived as a network of anti-communist clandestine resistance within NATO countries to oppose a possible Soviet invasion. Subsequent research revealed that the network was furthermore designed to prevent the coming to power of Communist parties in Western Europe. On the suggestion of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the secret army had been hidden within the Italian military secret service which was first called SIFAR (Servizio Informazioni Forze Armate 1949-1966), then, after a scandal, was renamed as SID (Servizio Informazioni Difesa 1967-1978) and, after another scandal, changed its name to SISMI (Servizio Informazioni Sicurezza Militare 1978-today).

With reference to the 1959 document found by judge Casson which refers to an earlier 1956 document, the Prime Minister confirmed that in November 1956 SIFAR and CIA had signed “an accord relative to the organisation and activity of the post-occupation clandestine network, an accord commonly referred to as stay-behind, in which all preceding commitments relevant to matters concerning Italy and the United States were reconfirmed.” As Andreotti confirmed the cooperation between the CIA and the Italian military secret service was supervised and co-ordinated by NATO, which controlled the secret anti-communist stay-behind armies in Western Europe through two clandestine committees, the CPC (Clandestine Planning Committee) and the ACC (Allied Clandestine Committee): “Once the clandestine resistance organisation was constituted, Italy was called upon to participate ... in the works of the CPC (Clandestine Planning Committee) of 1959, operating within the ambit of SHAPE” – NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. Furthermore, as the Prime Minister revealed to the surprised Senators, “in 1964 the Italian secret service also entered the ACC (Allied Clandestine Committee), a body charged with co-ordinating 'the networks of evasion and escape' between the various nations.”<sup>5</sup>

According to the Prime Minister's revelations the secret Gladio army controlled military supplies provided by the CIA that were hidden across the country in over 100 arms-caches, which were stored in watertight containers in forests, meadows and even under churches and cemeteries. According to Andreotti's report, the Gladio caches included “portable arms, ammunition, explosives, hand grenades,

knives and daggers, 60mm mortars, several 57 mm recoilless rifles, sniper rifles, radio transmitters, binoculars and various tools.”<sup>6</sup> As Andreotti explained, the stay-behind guerrilla units would have needed to be independent of the regular forces and their supplies in the case of a communist invasion. They would have gone underground to combat the enemy on enemy-held territory, evacuate the government to a secure exile base outside the country, blow up the enemy’s supply lines, recruit and train a local resistance network, and evacuate allied pilots shot down over enemy-held territory.

The Prime Minister’s revelations to the Senate Commission were soon leaked to the Italian press, whereupon massive protests and sharp criticism ensued. “To cover up or defend a secret military structure composed of members selected according to ideological criteria – dependent upon, or at least under the influence of, a foreign power– that allegedly serves as an instrument of political struggle – cannot be justified by any *raison d’état*”, the Italian daily *La Stampa* commented. “No definition could be given to it other than high treason and an attack on the Constitution.”<sup>7</sup> Between 100,000 and 400,000 scared and angry people organised by the Italian Communist Party (PCI) marched through central Rome chanting and carrying banners: “We want the truth.” Some marchers dressed up as Gladiators. The communist party leader Achille Occhetto told the crowd on the central Piazza del Popolo: “We are here to obtain truth and transparency”, declaring that this march will force the government to reveal the dark secret long held back, namely that the secret army had, in the absence of a Soviet invasion, fought the Italian Communist party with terrorist means<sup>8</sup>

A nationwide search for the secret army started and journalists dug up the hardware evidence, sparing neither saints nor churches. Padre Giuciano recalled the day when the press came to search for the hidden Gladio secrets in his church with ambiguous feelings: “I was forewarned in the afternoon when two journalists from ‘Il Gazzettino’ asked me if I knew anything about arms deposits here at the church. They started to dig right here and found two boxes right away. Then the text also indicated a spot thirty centimetres from the window. So they came over here and dug down. One box was kept aside by them because it contained a phosphorous bomb. They sent the Carabinieri [Italian paramilitary police] outside whilst two experts opened this box, another had two machine guns in it. All the guns were new, in perfect shape. They had never been used.”<sup>9</sup>

As the scandal gained intensity, General Vito Miceli, a former senior member of the NATO Security Office and a former director of the Italian military secret service SID, could hardly believe that the Prime Minister had revealed the Gladio secret. In 1974, the Italian judge Giovanni Tamburino in the context of investigations into right-wing terrorism in Italy had arrested SID director Miceli on charges of



“promoting, setting up, and organising, together with others, a secret association of military and civilians aimed at provoking an armed insurrection to bring about an illegal change in the constitution of the state and the form of government.”<sup>10</sup> On trial on 17 November 1974, a furious Miceli had shouted: “A Super SID on my orders? Of course! But I did not organise the coup d'état myself. It was the United States and NATO who asked me to do it!”<sup>11</sup> Due to his excellent contacts, Miceli got off lightly, was released on bail and spent six months in a military hospital. Yet upon hearing that Andreotti had revealed the entire secret, Miceli shortly before his death in October 1990 angrily shouted: “I have gone to prison because I did not want to reveal the existence of this super-secret organisation. And now Andreotti comes along and tells it to Parliament!”<sup>12</sup>

The Italian Prime Minister, increasingly exposed to hostility and criticism from the Italian communist and socialist parties as well as the Italian military and secret services establishment, on 24 October 1990 made it clear in front of parliament that he was not the only one to blame: “Each chief of government has been informed of the existence of Gladio.”<sup>13</sup> This caused massive embarrassment and compromised, among others, former Socialist Prime Minister Bettino Craxi (in office 1983-1987), and former Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini of the Republican Party (in office 1981-1982) – who at the time was acting President of the Senate. Furthermore it compromised former Prime Minister Arnaldo Forlani (in office 1980-1981) – who at the time was acting secretary of the ruling Christian Democratic Party, and above all former Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga of the Christian Democratic Party (in office 1978-1979), who now was acting Italian President. The magistrates reacted with confusion. Craxi claimed that he had not been informed until he was confronted with a document on Gladio he had signed himself while he was Prime Minister. Spadolini and Forlani claimed they remembered nothing, and Spadolini stressed that there was a difference between what he knew as former Defence Secretary and what he knew as former Prime Minister.<sup>14</sup>

Only Francesco Cossiga, Italian President since 1985, confirmed what Andreotti had revealed and explained that he was even “proud and happy” for his part in setting up Gladio as junior Defence Minister of the Christian Democratic Party.<sup>15</sup> During an official visit to Scotland, the President declared to journalists that all Gladiators were good patriots, adding: “I consider it a great privilege and an act of trust that ... I was chosen for this delicate task ... I have to say that I'm proud of the fact that we have kept the secret for 45 years.”<sup>16</sup> Back in Italy, the President found himself in the midst of a political storm, and requests were made across parties for his immediate resignation or impeachment for high treason. Judge Casson wanted the head of state to testify in front of the investigating Senate committee. The President

refused and even threatened to shut down the entire parliamentary investigation: "I'll send the law extending its mandate [the mandate of the commission already approved by the Senate] back to Parliament and, should they re-approve it, I will have to examine the text anew to see if the conditions exist for the extreme recourse to an absolute [Presidential] refusal to promulgate."<sup>17</sup> The attack was completely without any constitutional grounds and critics in the press started to question the President's sanity.<sup>18</sup> As the Gladio scandal culminated, the Italian President only narrowly escaped his impeachment by stepping down in April 1992, three months before his term expired.<sup>19</sup>

The Italian Senators investigating the secret stay-behind army were determined to gain access to the agreement between CIA and SIFAR dated November 26 1956 and entitled "Agreement between the Italian Intelligence Service and the Intelligence Service of the US concerning the organisation and activity of the secret Italian US post occupation network (stay-behind)". For although Casson had not been able to find this document in the archives of the military secret service the document of 1959 found by him clearly specified that the 1956 document "constitutes the basis document of Operation 'Gladio'". The Senators were mightily surprised when the acting director of the Italian military secret service, Admiral Fulvio Martini, strictly refused to hand out the document, and thus greatly hindered the control of the legislative over the executive. "The agreement between SIFAR and the CIA of 1956 concerning the stay-behind organization can not, as of now, be made public as it is a bilateral agreement classified top-secret", Martini explained to the startled Italian Senators who protested that SIFAR was answerable to the Italian legislative and not to the CIA. "The declassification of the document, which I have already requested on December 13 1990," Martini insisted, "is necessarily subordinate to the agreement of the other party involved", and as the CIA declined the request the Italian Senators could do little more than highlight their protest.<sup>20</sup>

Also without the cooperation of the CIA the Senate investigative commission gathered enough material on secret warfare in Italy and concluded its work in 1994. One year later, it presented to the public a 370-page report.<sup>21</sup> The Senators stated the obvious when they observed that the parliamentary control of the Italian security apparatus had been deficient during the Cold War, particularly with respect to the military secret service. Above all they criticized that the "CIA [had] enjoyed maximum discretion" in Italy during the Cold War.<sup>22</sup> During that period, Italy not only had a strong Communist Party but was also a member of NATO. Since Washington feared that the Communists would weaken NATO "from within", a historical contest between the two opposing sides ensued within the country, leading to acts of violence and bloodshed following World War Two. "The final picture

which emerges from the analysis is one of a country which for more than 40 years has lived through a difficult frontier situation”, the Senators concluded. “Obviously, the tensions which have characterised these 40 years and which were the object of the analysis also had social and therefore internal roots. However, such tensions would have never lasted that long, they would not have taken on such tragic dimensions, and the path towards truth would not have been blocked so many times if the internal political situation would not have been conditioned and supervised by the international framework into which Italy was integrated.”<sup>23</sup>

Tellingly, this “frontier situation” also characterised the parliamentary commission itself. In the commission, which was headed by Senator Libero Gaultieri, the communist and socialist Senators of the left had disagreed with the Christian Democratic Senators of the right on how to interpret the Italian Cold War and the role of the United States in Italy, on how to deal with certain highly sensitive topics including left-wing terrorism, massacres, and right-wing terrorism, and on how to phrase and publish what they had found. For, as all Senators agreed, the Italian Cold War had been particularly violent if compared with other countries in Western Europe. The overall death toll of the terror of the 1970s is estimated at 5,000, with right-wing commandos responsible for the majority of killings. A statistics for the year 1978 record 3,319 right-wing attacks, which resulted in 831 killed and 3,121 wounded.<sup>24</sup>

“Many commentators have accused the commission on the massacres for not having produced, after so many years of research, a clear understanding of why Italy had been the platform for events so tragic and so inexplicable.” Journalists Giovanni Fasanella and Claudio Sestieri later asked Senator Giovanni Pellegrini. “Is this a well-founded accusation according to you?” The Senator admitted that “all reference to the international contest” had been excluded for much too long from the study of his commission as well as from the reports it had produced in 1995. Above all, as Pellegrini admitted, the role of the United States in Cold War Italy and its support for right-wing terrorist had not been addressed in frank terms by the Senate commission. “The great limitation of our culture had thus been that we did not contextualize the internal events with the framework of the international Cold war.”<sup>25</sup>

In order to correct the deficits of the 1995 Gladio report, eight Senators, most of whom belonged to the Democratic Left Party (Partito Democratico della Sinistra, PDS) under the chairmanship of Senator Giovanni Pellegrini continued their research, heard witnesses and saw documents, and presented their own 326-page report without the consent of the entire commission in June 2000.<sup>26</sup> After the dissolution of the Italian Communist Party PCI in February 1991, many former Communists had found a new political home in the PDS. The former communists in their final Senate report

concluded that – apart from preparing for a Soviet invasion – the secret Gladio army had, together with the CIA, the Italian military secret service and Italian right-wing terrorists fought the Italian Communists and the Italian Socialists during the Cold War for fear that the latter would betray NATO “from within”. As judge Felice Casson explained, a so-called “strategy of tension” was employed to stop the Italian left during the Cold War. “That's to say, to create tension within the country to promote conservative, reactionary social and political tendencies”, Casson explained in a BBC documentation on Gladio. “While this strategy was being implemented, it was necessary to protect those behind it because evidence implicating them was being discovered. Witnesses withheld information to cover right-wing extremists.”<sup>27</sup>

“Those massacres, those bombs, those military actions had been organised or promoted or supported by men inside Italian state institutions and, as has been discovered more recently, by men linked to the structures of United States intelligence”, the Italian commission under Senator Pellegrini reported.<sup>28</sup> To support their far-reaching findings – which effectively lead to a reinterpretation of the Cold War in Italy – the Senators included in their report testimonies of several witnesses who had been closely involved in operation Gladio. Gladiator Giuseppe Tarullo, who had entered the Italian military secret service SIFAR in 1961, had testified to the Senators that next to the invasion preparations it had been their task to control the Italian Communists: “We among us also spoke of the internal task of Gladio. It was said that the structure and its foreign connections would also have been activated against a domestic subversion an with support by the Special Forces. By domestic subversion we understood a change of government which did not respect the will of the ruling authority.”<sup>29</sup> Gladiator Giuseppe Andreotti had testified to the Senators during the interrogation that “The Gladio structure was the answer to an internal logic, in that sense, as I have already said, that it had to react against the rise to power in Italy of regimes hated by the population ... thus dictatorships of the right or the left.”<sup>30</sup> Gladiator Manlio Capriata, a General and former head of office R (which ran Gladio within the Italian military secret service SIFAR), explained: “I confirm that the V section, thus the organisation S/B [stay-behind] and thus the CAG [Gladio centre Centro Addestramento Guastatori in Sardinia] had an anti-subversive function if the forces of the left should come to power.”<sup>31</sup>

More than ten years after judge Felice Casson had discovered the secret NATO armies in Italy, international historians are slowly beginning to reinterpret not only the Italian Cold War and the role of the United States on the Mediterranean peninsula, but also seek to reconstruct the history of the secret stay-behind armies across Western Europe. The origins of the network and the strategy can be traced back to World War Two.



### III. World War Two and the British Special Operations Executive

International secret warfare did not start with World War Two. But secret operations behind enemy lines on enemy-held territory reached an unprecedented level when the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, in the summer of 1940 by decree created a new British secret army called “Special Operations Executive” (SOE). SOE’s task was to “set Europe ablaze by assisting resistance movements and carrying out subversive operations in enemy-held territory.” The Prime Minister’s war cabinet memorandum of 19 July 1940 ordered that “a new organisation shall be established forthwith to co-ordinate all action, by way of subversion and sabotage, against the enemy overseas.”<sup>32</sup>

SOE was placed under the command of the Labour Minister of Economic Warfare Hugh Dalton. Dalton, vividly interested in secret warfare, was well suited to the task. “We have to organise movements in enemy-occupied territory comparable to the Sinn Fein movement in Ireland, to the Chinese Guerrillas now operating against Japan, to the Spanish Irregulars who played a notable part in Wellington’s campaign or – one might as well admit it – to the organisations which the Nazis themselves have developed so remarkably in almost every country in the world”, Dalton had urged once Germany had occupied France and Great Britain feared invasion. “This ‘democratic international’ must use many different methods, including industrial and military sabotage, labour agitation and strikes, continuous propaganda, terrorist acts against traitors and German leaders, boycotts and riots.” Dalton had sketched the tasks which soon thereafter were carried out by the SOE dare-devils: “What is needed is a new organisation to coordinate, inspire, control and assist the nationals of the oppressed countries who must themselves be the direct participants. We need absolute secrecy, a certain fanatical enthusiasm, willingness to work with people of different nationalities, complete political reliability.”<sup>33</sup>

Dalton assigned the operational command of SOE to Major General Sir Colin Gubbins, a small, slight, wiry Highlander with a moustache, who played a central role in setting up the stay-behind armies in Western Europe after the war. “The problem and the plan was to encourage and enable the peoples of the occupied countries to harass the German war effort at every possible point by sabotage, subversion, go-slow practices, coup de main raids etc., and at the same time to build up secret forces therein, organised, armed and trained to take their part only when the final assault began”, Gubbins later described the task of SOE. “In its simplest terms, this plan involved the ultimate delivery to occupied territory of large numbers of personnel and quantities of arms and explosives.”<sup>34</sup> Under Gubbins, SOE recruited over 13,000 men and women and in close co-operation with the British secret service carried out

missions in Far East Asia and Western Europe during World War Two. SOE promoted sabotage and subversion in enemy-occupied territory and established a nucleus of trained men who could assist resistance groups in the reconquest of the countries concerned. SOE was disbanded after the war in January 1946 and commander Gubbins resigned.

“SOE was for five years the main instrument of British action in the internal politics of Europe” a formerly classified British Cabinet Office report noted in retrospect, “[I]t was an extremely powerful instrument” since it could serve a multitude of tasks. “While SOE was at work no European politician could be under the illusion that the British were uninterested or dead.”<sup>35</sup> Sir Steward Menzies, director of the British foreign secret service MI6 from 1939 to 1952, was convinced that above all due to the strength of the Communist parties in many countries of Western Europe, an instrument to influence internal politics was of great value also after the end of World War Two. Moreover, the British Chiefs of Staff had observed that the European Communists, above all due to their prominent role in the resistance movements against the fascists, were very popular among the populations of a number of countries including Italy, France, Greece and Belgium. On 4 October 1945, the British Chiefs of Staff directed the creation of a skeleton network. This network was based on the SOE experience and was capable of both rapid expansion in case of war and the servicing of British clandestine operational requirements in times of peace. “Priority was given in carrying out these tasks to countries likely to be overrun in the earliest stages of any conflict by the Soviet Union, but not as yet under Soviet domination.”<sup>36</sup>

Once the secret stay-behind network had been revealed in Italy in 1990, the BBC interviewed Italian General Gerardo Serravalle, who had commanded the Italian Gladio from 1971 to 1974. The General confirmed that co-operation with the British had been intense. Italian anti-communist soldiers had trained secretly in Great Britain, and British instructors had secretly visited the well-hidden Italian Gladio headquarters, called “Saboteur's Training Centre” (Centro Adestramento Guastatori, CAG) and located at Capo Marragiu near the village Alghero on the Italian island Sardinia: “I invited them [the British] because we had visited their bases in England – the stay-behind bases [of the UK] – and in exchange for this visit I invited them.” BBC journalist Marshall wanted to know: “Where is the British stay-behind base?” Upon which General Serravalle laughed and replied: “I'm sorry, I'm not going to tell you where it is, because that enters the area of your country's secrecy.” Investigations later revealed that most secret soldiers were trained at Fort Monckton near Portsmouth. “But you were impressed with the British?”, Marshall wanted to know.

“Yes, I was”, the Italian General Serravalle replied. “Because it's [sic] very efficient, very well organised, and the staff was excellent.”<sup>37</sup>

Due to their experience in secret warfare and the history of SOE the British played a leading role in the secret anti-communist stay-behind armies run by the national military secret services after World War Two. When P-26, the stay-behind army of Switzerland was discovered, the Swiss investigating judge Pierre Cornu to his surprise found that the British MI6 was better informed on the secret stay-behind army in Switzerland than the Swiss government itself: “The fact that the British services knew numerous details about the Swiss resistance organization, more than the Federal Council or the Swiss Defence Ministers, must be criticized.”<sup>38</sup> For, as the British press noted, only the British knew the decisive details about the Swiss secret army, including “who headed it, its code-names and the location of facilities which included sophisticated arms and underground training bunkers.”<sup>39</sup>

The British government and the Prime Minister, John Major, refused to comment as the details of the stay-behind operation surfaced across the continent. „We cannot be drawn into discussing security matters”, spokespersons at the British Ministry of Defence declared day after day.<sup>40</sup> And the British Defence Secretary, Tom King, with reference to the preparations for the Gulf War against Saddam Hussein, declared to journalists: “I am not sure what particular hot potato you're chasing after. It sounds wonderfully exciting, but I'm afraid I'm quite ignorant about it. I'm better informed about the Gulf.”<sup>41</sup> Journalist Hugh O'Shaughnessy concluded: “The silence in Whitehall and the almost total lack of curiosity among MPs about an affair in which Britain was so centrally involved are remarkable.”<sup>42</sup>

Next to Great Britain's secret services, U.S. secret services played a leading role in setting up the anti-communist stay-behind armies in Western Europe after World War Two. The division of work and competition for influence among the two followed the pattern of the declining empire and the emerging superpower: Great Britain was leading in experience and training while the United States was dominant when it came to providing material and funding. “The Americans paid them large sums of money, the equivalent of an excellent salary”, Licio Gelli recalled. As head of the illegal Masonic Lodge Propaganda Due, exposed in Italy in 1981, Gelli had himself been strongly involved in the battle against the Communists and throughout the Cold War cultivated close contacts with the United States. “And they guaranteed the financial support of the families in case a Gladiator was killed.”<sup>43</sup> In late 1990, British Conservative Party member Rupert Allason, who edited the Intelligence Quarterly magazine under the pen-name Nigel West and authored several books on Britain's security services, confirmed that the American and the British secret services collaborated closely and were responsible for the anti-communist stay-behind



network: „We were heavily involved and still are ... in these networks ... The people who inspired it were the British and American intelligence agencies“.<sup>44</sup>

#### IV. The Cold War and the United State's NSC 10/2

During World War Two, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President of the United States, , envied the British efficiency and skill in the field of intelligence and secret warfare. In June 1941, he created the post of "Co-ordinator of Strategic Information" (COI). This post was held by William Joseph Donovan, who was sent to the British for advice. Donovan was given a tour of the British secret service establishment, in particular the Special Operations Executive (SOE). There was "a fairly frank discussion of the nature of SOE's work and the ways in which the USA could assist it."<sup>45</sup> After Donovan had been "given a very full picture of SOE's methods" a deal was struck in September 1941: "The essential points were, on the one hand, British aid to the USA, by sharing of experience and in particular by opening a school in Canada ... on the other hand US aid to Britain, in men, in materials".<sup>46</sup>

In 1942 Roosevelt replaced COI with the US military secret service "Office of Strategic Services" (OSS), which was also headed by Donovan. "OSS became an all-embracing agency for black work, whether Secret Intelligence, Special Operations or unacknowledgeable propaganda".<sup>47</sup> Apart from some friction, SOE and OSS developed good working relations and became dependent on each other: "OSS could hardly move without British organisation and British knowledge ... SOE drew largely on American stores".<sup>48</sup> As co-operation in secret military warfare between London and Washington intensified in September 1942, a written agreement was reached between the British Chiefs of Staff and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. The two principles agreed upon were: "a) Close collaboration between the two Head Offices, through liaison officers in London and Washington. b) The division of the World into the British and American areas, in which ultimate control would rest with the British and American authorities respectively."<sup>49</sup>

After President Roosevelt's death and the closing down of the OSS at the end of World War Two, US secret warfare intensified under President Harry Truman. In July 1947, the "National Security Act" was passed. This act created both the US foreign secret service "Central Intelligence Agency" (CIA) and the "National Security Council" (NSC). Composed by the President, the vice-president, the foreign secretary, the secretary of defence, the director of the CIA, the national security adviser, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and other senior government members, "the National Security Council has evolved into what, without exaggeration, has become the single most powerful staff in Washington."<sup>50</sup> As the command centre for US secret warfare, the NSC, which regularly meets in rooms located beneath the White House, has until today remained "a particular institution, which is known to have been at or across the borderline of legality in the past."<sup>51</sup>

The National Security Act provided a “legal” basis for US covert action and undeclared secret warfare against other countries by giving the CIA the duty to “perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.”<sup>52</sup> This vague formulation was later correctly described by CIA deputy director Ray Cline as “an elastic catch-all clause” allowing the US secret services to engage in a very broad range of activities.<sup>53</sup> More specifically, Truman ordered the US military and intelligence community to fight communism globally by all means. On 18 June 1948, the NSC passed directive ten-slash-two (NSC 10/2), which authorised the CIA to carry out covert action operations in all countries of the world. NSC 10/2 further created a covert action branch within the CIA, the “Office of Special Projects” which was soon renamed to the less revealing “Office of Policy Coordination” (OPC).

Frank Wisner, a Wall Street attorney from Mississippi who had commanded OSS detachments in Istanbul and Bucharest during World War Two, was chosen to head OPC. NSC 10/2 stated that OPC shall “plan and conduct covert operations”. By “covert operations” NSC 10/2 designated all activities “which are conducted or sponsored by this government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and conducted that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorised persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.” Specifically covert action operations according to NSC 10/2 “shall include any covert activities related to: propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition, and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.” The directives of NSC 10/2 thus also covered the setting up of secret anti- Communist Gladio armies in Western Europe but explicitly excluded conventional warfare as well as intelligence and counter-intelligence operations: “Such operations shall not include armed conflict by recognised military forces, espionage, counter espionage, and covert and deception for military operations.”<sup>54</sup>

“I never had any thought when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak and dagger operations”, a feeble Truman claimed after his retirement.<sup>55</sup> Yet by then US secret warfare operations were beyond his control. A large Senate investigation into the intelligence community of the United States led by Senator Frank Church in the 1970s found that the CIA covert action branch had not only engaged in assassinations of foreign leaders and coup d’états, but on the explicit request of the Pentagon and NATO had from 1945 to 1950 focused exclusively on

setting up stay-behind armies in Western Europe: “Until 1950 OPC's paramilitary activities (also referred to as preventive action) were limited to plans and preparations for stay-behind nets in the event of future war. Requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these projected OPC operations focused, once again, on Western Europe and were designed to support NATO forces against Soviet attack.”<sup>56</sup>

Frank Wisner of the OPC charged his adjoint Frank Lindsay to co-ordinate the stay-behind network in Europe. Like his superior, Lindsay had learned the trade of secret warfare in the OSS. During World War Two he had operated in Yugoslavia and knew communist secret warfare tactics first hand. Lindsay collaborated closely with Gerry Miller, chief of the CIA Western Europe desk, who recruited CIA officers to be flown to Western Europe to set up the stay-behind armies. Among them was William Colby, CIA director under President Richard Nixon. As an OSS operative during the war, Colby had parachuted behind enemy lines in France and blown up bridges in occupied Norway. In April 1951 Colby sat in front of Miller's desk. The two men knew each other well for Miller had been Colby's superior in OSS operations in Norway during World War Two. According to their understanding the war had never ended, but merely shifted to a secret battle against the communists. Miller assigned Colby to Lou Scherer's unit of the CIA's Scandinavian division: “All right, Bill, get on with it, then. What we want is a good solid intelligence and resistance network that we can count on if the Russkis ever take over those countries” Miller told Colby. “We have some initial planning, but it needs to be filled out and implemented. You will work for Lou Scherer until we see what more needs to be done.”<sup>57</sup>

In his memoirs Colby relates that “one of the main fields of the OPC's work then was planning for the not unlikely possibility of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. And, in the event the Russians succeeded in taking over any or all of the countries of the Continent, Miller explained, the OPC wanted to be in a position to activate well-armed and well-organised partisan uprisings against the occupiers.” Therefore “the OPC had undertaken a major program of building, throughout those Western European countries that seemed likely targets for Soviet attack, what in the parlance of the intelligence trade were known as 'stay-behind nets', clandestine infrastructures of leaders and equipment trained and ready to be called into action as sabotage and espionage forces when the time came.”<sup>58</sup> Setting up the stay-behind network was a major operation for the CIA. By the end of Wisner's first year in office, he had three hundred employees and seven overseas field stations. Three years later, in 1951, OPC had grown to 2,812 full-time people, forty-seven overseas stations with another 3,142 overseas contract agents and a budget which had grown in the same period from \$4.7 million to \$82 million a year.<sup>59</sup> Even Bedell Smith, who in November 1950 had replaced Roscoe Hillenkoetter as Chief of the CIA, argued in

May 1951 that “the scope of the CIA's covert operations already far exceeded what had been contemplated in NSC 10/2.”<sup>60</sup>

According to the findings of the Belgian Senate investigation into NATO's stay-behind armies, non-orthodox anti-communist secret warfare in Western Europe was as of 1948 co-ordinated by the so-called “Clandestine Committee of the Western Union” (CCWU) which regularly united senior officers of European military secret services. When in 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, CCWU was secretly integrated into NATO and by 1951 operated under the label “Clandestine Planning Committee” (CPC). As the European headquarters of the military alliance moved from France to Belgium the chair of the CPC also moved to Brussels in 1968. The Belgian Senators furthermore confirmed the revelations of Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti and reported that a second secret command center labelled „Allied Clandestine Committee” (ACC) had been set up in 1957 on the orders of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) whose duties “included elaborating the directives for the network, developing its clandestine capability and organising bases in Britain and the United States. In wartime, it was to plan stay-behind operations in conjunction with SHAPE; organisers were to activate clandestine bases and organise operations from there.”<sup>61</sup>

Within NATO the command centre in the Pentagon was directing the stay-behind armies in Western Europe together with the CIA, while the Supreme Allied Commander Allied Forces Europe (SACEUR), a US General throughout the Cold War, closely supervised the secret army in Western Europe. An internal Pentagon document of 1957, formerly top-secret and declassified in 1978, reveals the existence of a “CPC charter” which defines CPC's functions within NATO and SHAPE and the European secret services, although unfortunately the CPC charter itself is not part of the declassified document. The document in question is a memorandum for the US Joint Chiefs of Staff written by US General Leon Johnson, US representative to the NATO military committee, written on 3 January 1957. In it, General Johnson comments on the complaints of then acting SACEUR General Lauris Norstad concerning the poor quality of intelligence which the latter had received during the 1956 Suez crisis: “SACEUR has stated a belief that the intelligence received by SHAPE from national authorities during the recent period of tension was inadequate. He states that any re-examination of intelligence support to SHAPE should include the question of increasing and expediting the flow of clandestine intelligence.”

It was in this context that SACEUR Norstad was considering whether the CPC could be used to improve the situation: “In addition, SACEUR notes in reference a that there is no provision in reference b, the charter of the SHAPE Clandestine Planning Committee (CPC), which forbids the examination of peacetime clandestine

activities. He specifically recommends that the SHAPE CPC be authorised to: a) Examine SHAPE's urgent peacetime intelligence requirements. b) Investigate ways in which the national clandestine services can contribute to an improvement of the flow of clandestine intelligence to SHAPE.” Contrary to NATO’s SACEUR, Norstad General Johnson believed that the charter of CPC prevented it from being employed in such a manner. Norstad in his memorandum wrote: “While there is nothing in reference b [the CPC charter] which clearly forbids the CPC examining the various clandestine intelligence activities, I believe that this would be an unwarranted extension of the CPC activities. It is my interpretation of reference b [the CPC charter] that the CPC was set up solely for the purpose of planning in peacetime the means by which SACEUR's wartime clandestine operational requirements could be met. It would appear to me that any increase in the flow of intelligence to SHAPE, from whatever source, should be dealt with by normal intelligence agencies.” Hence the General concluded: “I recommend that you do not approve an extension of the scope of activity of the SHAPE CPC ... Leon Johnson.”<sup>62</sup>

The secret warfare network of the United States in Western Europe was set up “with the utmost secrecy”, as former CIA director Colby stressed. “Therefore I was instructed to limit access to information about what I was doing to the smallest possible coterie of the most reliable people, in Washington, in NATO, and in Scandinavia.”<sup>63</sup> When the network’s cover was blown in 1990, both CIA and NATO reacted with confusion. On 5 November 1990 NATO first categorically denied any involvement. Senior spokesman Jean Marcotta at SHAPE headquarters in Mons, Belgium, said that “NATO has never contemplated guerrilla war or clandestine operations; it has always concerned itself with military affairs and the defence of Allied frontiers.” The very next day, however, a NATO spokesman conceded that NATO's denial of the previous day had been false. The spokesman left journalists only with a short communiqué, which said that NATO never commented on matters of military secrecy, and that Marcotta should not have said anything at all.<sup>64</sup> Similarly, Admiral Stansfield Turner, director of the CIA from 1977 to 1981, strictly refused to answer questions about Gladio in a television interview in Italy in December 1990. When, with reference to the massacres in Italy, the journalists insisted, the former CIA director angrily ripped off his microphone and shouted: “I said, no questions about Gladio!”<sup>65</sup> Here the interview ended.. A decade later, Freedom of Information Request (FOIA) addressed to the CIA by the author was also turned down.

## V. Secret Armies in Southern Europe: Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Greece and France

Turkey, Spain, Portugal, France and Greece, Southern European countries close to Italy and bordering on the Mediterranean sea, all featured not only a stay-behind army during the Cold War, but also at times significant domestic involvement including terror and coup d'états by the secret soldiers.

### Turkey

During the Cold War, Turkey guarded a third of NATO's total borders with Warsaw Pact countries and hence was of great strategic importance to the Western military alliance. Armed by the United States, Turkey set up the largest armed forces in Europe, and the second largest in NATO after the United States. In order to strengthen this strategic outpost, the United States in 1961 even stationed nuclear missiles targeting the Soviet Union in Turkey. When Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev a year later copied this reckless strategy and stationed nuclear missiles targeting the United States in Cuba, the Cuban Missile Crisis ensued, pushing the world to the brink of nuclear warfare. "Why does he put these in there though?" President John F. Kennedy wondered during a crisis meeting of the National Security Council in the White House with reference to Khrushchev's missiles. "It's just as if we suddenly began to put a major number of MRBMs (medium range ballistic atomic missiles) in Turkey. Now that'd be goddam dangerous, I think." With reference to the "Jupiter" missiles in Turkey the President's special assistant McGeorg Bundy answered: "Well, we did, Mr. President."<sup>66</sup> The crisis was solved when both heads of states agreed to withdraw their missiles.

Before Turkey joined NATO on April 4 1952, a secret stay-behind army had been set up in the country under the code name "Counter-Guerrilla". Its headquarters, the Tactical Mobilisation Group (Seferberlik Taktik Kurulu, STK), was located in the building of the CIA organisation American Yardim Heyeti (American Aid Delegation – JUSMATT) in the Bahcelievler district of the Turkish capital Ankara. The Tactical Mobilisation Group was restructured in 1965 and renamed Special Warfare Department (Ozel Harp Dairesi, OHD).<sup>67</sup> When the stay-behind armies of NATO were discovered across Western Europe in 1990, General Dogan Beyazit, President of the Operations Department of the Turkish military (Harekat Dairesi) and General Kemal Yilmaz, Chief of the Turkish Special Forces (Ozel Kuvvetler) on 3 December publicly confirmed for the first time the existence of secret NATO stay-behind units in Turkey, explaining that the stay-behind army was commanded by the Special

Warfare Department (OHD) and had the task “to organise resistance in the case of a communist occupation.”<sup>68</sup> When the press insisted that next to preparing for the Soviet invasion the secret soldiers during the Cold War had engaged in domestic terrorism against the left and the Kurdish minority, the Special Warfare Department refused further comment and later changed its name to Special Forces Command (Ozel Kuvvetler Komutanligi, OKK).

According to his own testimony, former Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit learned of the existence of the secret stay-behind army and the Special Warfare Department for the first time in 1974. Upon his insistence for an explanation, the commander of the Turkish army, General Semih Sancar, informed the Prime Minister that the United States had financed the unit ever since the immediate post-war years.<sup>69</sup> “There are a certain number of volunteer patriots whose names are kept secret and are engaged for life in this special department” the Prime Minister was told. “They have hidden arms caches in various parts of the country.”<sup>70</sup> Ecevit feared that the secret army might be operating beyond all parliamentary control. And his fears were well-founded.

On 1 May 1977, a protest rally of half a million citizens organised by the trade unions took place on Istanbul’s Taskim Square to protest against widespread domestic terror and corruption. Suddenly snipers on surrounding buildings started firing at the speaker's platform. The crowd panicked, thirty-eight were killed and hundreds were injured. The shooting had lasted for twenty minutes, yet several thousand policemen on the scene did not intervene. Bulent Ecevit immediately called the Turkish President Fahri Koruturk and told him that he thought the Counter-Guerrilla had been involved. “Koruturk relayed my fears to the then Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel” who had succeeded Ecevit in office and upon hearing the news „reacted in a very agitated manner” but was unable to challenge the Special Warfare Department.<sup>71</sup>

“I am worried about this civilian organisation. There is no means of knowing or controlling what a young recruit may get up to after twenty years in such an organisation” Ecevit complained to Army Chief of Staff General Kenan Evren with reference to the Counter-Guerrilla stay-behind in 1977. “There is nothing to worry about. We will deal with it”, General Evren replied at the time.<sup>72</sup> On 12 September 1980, General Evren as acting president of the Special Warfare Department and commander of the Counter-Guerrilla staged a military coup d’état and took power in Turkey.<sup>73</sup> When the stay-behind network was exposed in Italy a decade later, former Prime Minister Ecevit declared to the press on 13 November 1990 that the secret unit had been funded by the United States, and that “patriotic volunteers were members of the group. They were trained specially to launch a counter guerrilla operation in the event that the country was occupied.”<sup>74</sup> When Ecevit referred to the possibility that



the Counter-Guerrilla units might have been involved in domestic terror and coup d'états acting Defence Minister Giray snapped: "Ecevit had better keep his fucking mouth shut! [sic]."75

New York journalist Lucy Komisar, who tried to investigate the secret army in her native country, was hardly more successful: "As for Washington's role, Pentagon would not tell me whether it was still providing funds or other aid to the Special Warfare Department; in fact, it wouldn't answer any questions about it" Komisar found with surprise. „I was told by officials variously that they knew nothing about it, that it happened too long ago for there to be any records available, or that what I described was a CIA operation for which they could provide no information. One Pentagon historian said, "Oh, you mean the 'stay-behind' organisation. That's classified."76

## Spain

Similar to Turkey, military forces in Spain also played a dominant role in Cold War society.. Following his victory in the Spanish Civil War in 1939, dictator Franco ruled the country with such an iron fist until his death in 1975 that Spanish Ministers in retrospect claimed that the entire system had been penetrated by secret armies. Calvo Sotelo, Spanish Prime Minister from February 1981 to December 1982, replied to journalists in 1990 that during Franco's dictatorship "the very government was Gladio." While Alberto Oliart, Defence Minister under the Sotelo government, made the same point when he declared it to be "childish" to claim that an anticommunist secret army had been set up in Spain in the 1950s because "here Gladio was the government".77

Following World War Two, the ruthless dictator Franco strengthened his position internationally when in 1953 he sealed a pact with Washington and allowed the United States to station missiles, troops, airplanes and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) antennas on Spanish soil. In return, the United States saw to it that Franco's fascist Spain, could overcome its international isolation against the opposition of many other countries and become a member of the World Peace Organisation UNO in 1955. Franco was grateful that the United States supported him with setting up a secret stay-behind army. Next to US SIGINT installations on the Spanish Canary Islands in Las Palmas, a stay-behind training base run by US instructors was set up, as Italian Colonel Alberto Vollo revealed in 1990."78

Spain became an official member of NATO only in 1982, but during the Cold War secretly cultivated close contacts with the anti-communist stay-behind network of NATO already before that date. Italian General Gerardo Serravalle, commander of

the Italian Gladio stay-behind from 1971 to 1974, related that in 1973 NATO's stay-behind army command centre Clandestine Planning Committee (CPC) discussed the admission of Franco's Spain to the CPC during a meeting in Brussels. The French military secret service and the dominant CIA had allegedly requested the admission of the Spanish network, while Italy represented by Serravalle allegedly opposed the suggestion. In a second CPC meeting, this time in Paris, members of Franco's secret service argued that Spain should be allowed to become a member of the Gladio command centre because Spain had for a long time given the United States the right to station US nuclear missiles on its soil and military ships and submarines in its harbours, but was getting nothing in return from NATO.

Sheltered behind the Pyrenees and far away from the Soviet border, the stay-behind function did not seem to be the first thing on the mind of the Spanish secret service agents attending the meeting. They were much rather interested in a secret network capable of fighting the opposition, above all the Spanish Socialists and Communists following the fall of the dictatorship. "In all meetings there is 'an hour of truth', one must only wait for it", Serravalle related the meeting. „It is the hour in which the delegates of the secret services, relaxed with a drink or a coffee, are more inclined to speak frankly. In Paris this hour came during the coffee break. I approached a member of the Spanish service and started by saying his government had maybe overestimated the reality of the danger of the threat from the East. I wanted to provoke him. He, looking at me in complete surprise, admitted that Spain had the problem of the communists (los rojos). There we had it, the truth.”<sup>79</sup> Run by the Spanish military secret service CESID (Centro Superior de Informacion de la Defensa) the Spanish stay-behind army thereafter was welcomed as a member to both CPC and ACC.

On 23 November 1990, Spanish Defence Minister Narcis Serra claimed in parliament that – based on CESID documents he had consulted – Spain had never been a member of the secret stay-behind network, “either before or after the socialist government”. Serra cautiously added that “it has been suggested there were some contacts in the 1970s, but it is going to be very difficult for the current secret service to be able to verify that type of contact.” The Defence Minister was unable to explain the testimonies that clearly stated that Spain had run a secret army and had participated in the secret stay-behind meetings of NATO also before becoming a member in 1982. “Since Spain was not a NATO member at the time,” Serra explained in front of parliament, “common sense says there could not have been very close links.” The Spanish press was not amused and criticised that either the Defence Minister was spreading propaganda, or had either no knowledge or no control over the Department he presided.<sup>80</sup>

## Portugal

During World War Two, Portugal's dictator Salazar had supported the fascist alliance of Hitler and Mussolini together with Spanish dictator Franco. After the defeat of the Axis powers, Portugal for this reason feared international isolation, but due to the support of Harry Truman, then President of the United States, Portugal was able to join NATO as a founding member in 1949. Under the headline "'Gladio' was active in Portugal" the Portuguese press in 1990 informed a stunned national audience that "the secret network, erected at the bosom of NATO and financed by the CIA, the existence of which has recently been revealed by Giulio Andreotti, had a branch in Portugal in the 1960s and the 1970s. It was called 'Aginter Press'" and was allegedly involved in assassination operations in Portugal as well as in the Portuguese colonies in Africa.<sup>81</sup>

Further investigations into the secret Cold War revealed that the stay-behind army was run by the Portuguese military secret service PIDE (Portugal Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado). While no parliamentary investigation was carried out in Portugal, the investigation of the Italian Senate into Gladio and the secret war discovered that Italian right-wing extremists had been trained by Aginter Press. The Italian Senators found that the CIA supported Aginter Press in Portugal and that the secret army was lead by Captain Yves Guillon. Better known by his adopted name of Yves Guerin-Serac, the commander of the Portuguese secret army was a French specialist in secret warfare and a veteran of the French Vietnam war, a veteran of the Korean war, and a veteran of the French war in Algeria who had received war hero medals from the United States including the American Bronze Star for his operations in the Korea War. "Aginter Press", the Italian Gladio report concluded, „according to the latest documents acquired by the criminal investigation, was an information centre directly linked to the CIA and the Portuguese secret service, that specialized in provocation operations.”<sup>82</sup>

"It is difficult to give a precise definition of Aginter Press", Italian judge Guido Salvini, an expert for international right-wing terrorism, explained to the Italian Senators investigating the stay-behind armies. "It is an organisation, which in many countries, including Italy, inspires and supports strategies of selected groups, which intervene according to a defined protocol against the situation they want to combat." Aginter Press operated, Salvini continued, „according to its aims and values, which in their essence are the defence of the Western world against a probable and imminent invasion of Europe by the troops of the Soviet Union and the communist countries.”<sup>83</sup>

Aginter commander Guerain Serac himself described the anti-communist secret army as follows: “Our numbers consist of two types of men: 1) Officers who have come to us from fighting in Indo-China and Algeria, and some who even enlisted with us after the battle for Korea ... 2) Intellectuals who, during this same period turned their attention to the study of the techniques of Marxist subversion”. These intellectuals, as Guerain Serac observed, had formed study groups and shared experiences „in an attempt to dissect the techniques of Marxist subversion and to lay the foundations of a counter-technique.” The battle, it was clear to Guerain Serac, had to be carried out in numerous countries: „During this period we have systematically established close contacts with like-minded groups emerging in Italy, Belgium, Germany, Spain or Portugal, for the purpose of forming the kernel of a truly Western League of Struggle against Marxism.”<sup>84</sup>

Captain Guerain Serac made it a point that the anti-communist struggle had to be carried out on a global scale and, from 1968 to 1971, Aginter operatives together with the CIA and US Green Berets Special Forces participated in the Guatemalan counterterror in which some 50,000 people, mostly civilians, are estimated to have been killed. Thereafter Aginter operatives were present in a secret cold war in Chile in 1973 and involved when the CIA ousted elected socialist President Salvador Allende and replaced him with right-wing dictator Augusto Pinochet.<sup>85</sup> But when Portugal's “Revolution of the Flowers” abolished the dictatorship in May 1974, the Aginter Press headquarter in the Rua das Pracas in Lisbon were also closed down. All Aginter operatives escaped, and crucial documents vanished. Italian Journalist Barbachetto of the Milan- based political magazine L'Europeo later recalled: “Three of my colleagues were present back then during the confiscation of the Aginter archive. They managed to take pictures of parts, only of very small parts, of the large amount of confiscated data.” “The documents were destroyed by the Portugese military,” Barbachetto recalls, „because obviously they feared diplomatic complications with the governments of Italy, France and Germany, if the activities of Aginter in the various European countries would be revealed.”<sup>86</sup>

The issue also remained sensitive after the end of the. On 16 November 1990, Portuguese Defence Minister Fernando Nogueira publicly claimed that he had no knowledge of the existence of any kind of Gladio branch in Portugal and insisted that neither in his Defence Ministry, nor in the General Staff of the Portuguese Armed Forces existed “any information whatsoever concerning the existence or activity of any 'Gladio structure' in Portugal.”<sup>87</sup>

Greece

In order to prevent that the Communist-led Greek resistance would seize power after the end of World War Two, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in late 1944 set up a secret army in Greece. It became known variously as the Greek Mountain Brigade, the Hellenic Raiding Force, or LOK, its Greek acronym (Lochos Oreion Katadromon). Aimed against the Greek Communists and Socialists, the unit under the command of Field Marshall Alexander Papagos excluded “almost all men with views ranging from moderately conservative to left wing.” Under British military supervision and at Churchill's express orders, the unit was filled with royalists and given the task to prepare the country for the return of the king Metaxas.<sup>88</sup>

On 3 December 1944, a mere six weeks after the German occupation forces had been pushed out of the country, a large demonstration organised by the Greek Communists took place in Athens Syntagma Square in front of parliament against British interference in the post-war government of Greece. As the first protesters, numbering between 200 to 600, arrived in a festive mood, armed units on the surrounding rooftops opened fire. The massacre left 25 protesters dead, including children, and 148 wounded. Not long after the killings, the main group of protesters arrived. In a display of remarkable restraint, the 60,000 held an entirely peaceful, emotional and solemn rally among the corpses of their fellow protesters.<sup>89</sup>

When Greece joined NATO in 1952, the Hellenic Raiding Force under Field Marshall Alexander Papagos was firmly integrated into the network of anti-communist secret armies in Western Europe. The secret co-operation was laid down in a document on the Greek secret army dated March 25 1955 and signed by US General Trascott for the CIA, and Konstantin Dovas, Chief of Staff of the Greek military.<sup>90</sup> The parties involved reconfirmed the agreement on the Greek secret army on May 3 1960.<sup>91</sup> Under CIA direction, Raiding Force members were issued with green berets long before the US army's own Green Berets unit came into being. „The Raiding Force doubled as the Greek arm of the clandestine pan-European guerrilla network set up in the 1950s by NATO and the CIA which was controlled from NATO headquarters in Brussels by the Allied Coordination Committee”, British journalist Murtagh related. Next to its domestic control tasks, the Hellenic Raiding Force was trained for the classical stay-behind task. „The idea behind the network was that it would operate as a stay-behind force after a Soviet invasion of Europe. It would coordinate guerrilla activities between Soviet occupied countries and liaise with governments in exile. Those involved would be members of the conquered nations' secret police and intelligence services, plus civilian volunteers.”<sup>92</sup>

“The Greek-American CIA officer recruited several groups of Greek citizens for what the CIA called, 'a nucleus for rallying a citizen army against the threat of a leftist coup.’”, former CIA agent Philipp Agee later explained. “Each of the several

groups was trained and equipped to act as an autonomous guerrilla unit, capable of mobilising and carrying on guerrilla warfare with minimal or no outside direction.” Control of the secret army rested with the CIA and the Greek officers trusted by the CIA. „The members of each such group were trained by the CIA in military procedures. As far as can be determined, most of the paramilitary groups trained in two camps: one near Volos, and the second on Mount Olympos. After the initial training sessions, these groups would drill in isolated areas in Pindos and the mountains near Florina.” As all secret stay-behind armies in Western Europe run by the CIA, the units were equipped with light weapons hidden in arms caches. „These guerrilla groups were armed with automatic weapons, as well as small mountain mortars. The weapons were stored in several places. Most of the military supplies were cached in the ground and in caves. Each member of these paramilitary groups knew where such cached weaponry was hidden, in order to be able to mobilise himself to a designated spot, without orders.” 93

Agee revealed that “paramilitary groups, directed by CIA officers, operated in the Sixties throughout Europe” and stressed that “perhaps no activity of the CIA could be as clearly linked to the possibility of internal subversion.”94 During the night of 20 April 1967, one month before the scheduled elections for which opinion polls predicted an overwhelming victory of the left-leaning Centre Union of George and Andreas Papandreou, the army staged a coup and took over power in Greece. The Hellenic Raiding Force started the coup which was based on the Prometheus plan, a NATO-designed scheme to be put into action in the event of a communist insurgency.”95 Around midnight the Hellenic Raiding Force under paratrooper Lieutenant Colonel Costas Aslanides controlled the Greek Defence Ministry. In the darkness of the night, tanks with flashlights rolled into the capital and under the command of Brigadier General Sylianos Pattakos rounded up the parliament, the royal palace, the radio, and the communication centres. In the space of only five hours over 10,000 people, including George and Andreas Papandreou, were arrested by special units according to detailed lists. Many were tortured. US Senator Lee Metcalf days after the coup criticized the administration of US President Johnson sharply when on Capitol Hill he denounced the Greek junta as “a military regime of collaborators and Nazi sympathisers ... [who are] receiving American aid.”96 The Ambassador of the United States in Athens, Phillips Talbot, complained to the CIA Chief of Station in Athens, Jack Maury, that the coup represented “a rape of democracy.” Maury answered: “How can you rape a whore?”97

The military dictatorship collapsed in 1975. Andreas Papandreou after his release from the prison cells of the junta and years of exile spent in Canada and Sweden returned to Greece and re-entered politics. He formed the Pan-Hellenic

Socialist Movement (PASOK), won the elections of 1981 and as Prime Minister formed the first socialist government of Greece's post war history. Six years before his death, Andreas Papandreou witnessed the exposure of the Gladio network in Italy whereupon he explained to the press on 30 October 1990 that it had been in 1984 when as acting Prime Minister he had discovered a secret NATO army in Greece, which was very similar to the Italian Gladio, and which he had ordered to dissolve. Former Greek Defence Minister Nikos Kouris confirmed that the Greek secret army had been operative throughout the Cold War. "Our clandestine structure started in 1955", Kouris claimed, "with a contract between the chief of the Greek special services and the CIA. When I learned about the existence of this unacceptable pact ... I informed Andreas Papandreou ... and the order was given, to dismantle Red Sheepskin."<sup>98</sup> Passionate calls of the Socialist opposition for a parliamentary investigation of the secret army followed in late 1990 but were defeated by the acting conservative government. Public Order Minister Yannis Vassiliadis stressed that there was no need to investigate "fantasies" concerning alleged links between NATO's stay-behind army and domestic terrorism. "Sheepskin was one of 50 NATO plans which foresaw that when a country was occupied by an enemy there should be an organised resistance" Vassiliadis explained. "It foresaw arms caches and officers who would form the nucleus of a guerrilla war. In other words, it was a nationally justifiable act."<sup>99</sup>

## France

In France a secret stay-behind army was set up soon after the end of World War Two, when both Washington and London feared that the strong French Communists might seize power. Recruited among the French right, the secret soldiers planned to stage a coup d'état in 1947 but were stopped by the French Socialist government. "Towards the end of 1946 we got to know of the existence of a black resistance network, made up of resistance fighters of the extreme right, Vichy collaborators and monarchists", French Socialist Minister of the Interior Edouard Depreux revealed to a baffled press on 30 June 1947. „They had a secret attack plan called 'Plan Bleu', which should have come into action either towards the end of July or on August 6 [1947]."<sup>100</sup> In the wake of the revelations, arrests and investigations followed. Among the arrested conspirators ranged Earl Edme de Vulpian. His castle "Forest" close to Lamballe in the north of France allegedly served as the headquarters for the final coup preparations. Investigating commissioner Ange Antonini found "heavy weapons, battle orders, and operation plans" on the castle. The plans revealed that as an essential component of the secret war the Plan Bleu conspirators had

intended to escalate the tense political climate in France by committing acts of terror and blaming them on the Communists. “It was even planned to assassinate de Gaulle in order to increase the public resentment”, French secret service expert Faligot relates.<sup>101</sup>

After the exposure of the network a new secret army was set up within the French military secret service SDECE (Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage) under Henri Alexis Ribiere. Retired CIA officer Edward Barnes during the French Fourth Republic served as liaison officer to the French secret army and left the country in 1956. After the discovery of the secret armies in 1990, he recalled how not only Washington but also many Frenchmen had been greatly concerned that the strong French communists should come to dominate the country. “There were probably a lot of Frenchmen who wanted to be ready if something happened.” According to Barnes, resisting a Soviet occupation was the primary motivation of the French Gladio, while promoting anti-communist political activity in France “might have been a secondary consideration.”<sup>102</sup>

As the French Fourth Republic ended in chaos in 1958, General Charles de Gaulle returned to power. He strongly distrusted the secret operations which, supported by the CIA and NATO, some French officers were carrying out in France and in the French colony Algeria. De Gaulle was of the opinion that “the French state was under assault by secret forces. Who was to blame? The CIA certainly, believed de Gaulle.”<sup>103</sup> Admiral Pierre Lacoste, director of the French military secret service from 1982 to 1985, later confirmed that some “terrorist actions” against de Gaulle and his Algerian peace plan had been carried out by groups that included “a limited number of people” from the French stay-behind network. Lacoste is a master mind of propaganda and intelligence manipulation who had to resign after the 1985 attack of the DGSE on the Rainbow Warrior ship of Greenpeace. How much of his account is trustworthy remains difficult to assess, including the part when he stressed that this had been the only case when the French Gladio had become operational inside France. Lacoste stressed that he believed Soviet contingency plans for invasion nevertheless justified the stay-behind program during his time in office as chief of the military secret service.<sup>104</sup>

As General Charles de Gaulle’s distrust increased, he confronted NATO directly. France had been among the founding members of NATO in 1949, and European headquarters of the alliance including the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) had been set up on French soil. It came as a massive shock to the White House in Washington when de Gaulle in February 1966 decided to challenge US secret warfare in Europe in general and France in particular head-on and ordered NATO and the United States to either place their military bases in France



under French control or to dismantle them. The United States and NATO did not react to the ultimatum whereupon, in a spectacular decision, de Gaulle took France out of NATO's military command on March 7 1966 and expelled the entire NATO organisation together with its covert action agents from French territory.

The Belgium parliamentary investigation into Gladio and secret warfare later confirmed that in 1968 the Chair of NATO's stay-behind centre CPC had also moved to Brussels.”<sup>105</sup> Belgium Gladio author Jan Willems highlighted that when de Gaulle withdrew France from the integrated command of NATO, some of the secret agreements between France and the United States were cancelled. “On this occasion it was revealed that secret protocols existed concerning the fight against communist subversion, signed bilaterally by the United States and its NATO allies.” De Gaulle denounced these protocols as an infringement of national sovereignty.<sup>106</sup>

After NATO had been expelled from French soil, representatives of the military secret services met in the ACC and CPC stay-behind command centres. A 1982 parliamentary investigation into the French secret services led by Socialist party deputy Jean-Michel Borgey concluded that French and foreign intelligence agents driven by Cold War phobias and obsessed with the “enemy within” had broken the law repeatedly while the secret service had accumulated a record of “failures, scandals, and doubtful operations.”<sup>107</sup> The military secret service SDECE was reformed and changed its name to Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieur (DGSE). A few years later, the French Socialist President François Mitterrand was asked whether France was also running a secret stay-behind army linked to NATO. “When I arrived”, the President wrongly claimed with a reference to his coming to power in 1981, “I didn't have much left to dissolve. There only remained a few remnants, of which I learned the existence with some surprise because everyone had forgotten about them.”<sup>108</sup> The Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti was not amused to see how the French government denied and played down their role in the stay-behind affair and mercilessly declared to the press that far from having been closed down long ago, representatives of the French secret army had also taken part in the secret ACC meeting in Brussels as recently as October 24 1990. This caused considerable embarrassment for Paris.

## VI. Secret armies in Central Europe: Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg

In central Europe, both the NATO members Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg as well as the neutral states Switzerland and Austria operated a secret stay-behind army during the Cold War.

### Germany

In Germany the secret anti-communist stay-behind army was discovered already in 1952 when, on 9 September, former SS officer Hans Otto walked into the police headquarters of Frankfurt and, according to the German governmental records, “declared to belong to a political resistance group, the task of which was to carry out sabotage activities and blow up bridges in case of a Soviet invasion.” According to Otto, who had become alienated from the terrorist structure, “about 100 members of the organisation had been instructed at a school in politics, were trained to use American, Russian and German arms, and drilled in military tactics. Members of the organisation were mostly former officers of the Air Force, the Army or the Waffen-SS.” The official German transcripts record that “Although officially neo-fascist tendencies were not required, most members of the organisation featured them. The financial means to run the organisation had been provided by an American citizen with the name of Sterling Garwood.”<sup>109</sup>

Apart from waiting for the Soviet invasion, the German secret army was also charged with domestic subversion: “As for domestic politics, the tactics of the organisation were aimed at the KPD [Kommunist Party of Germany] and SPD [Socialist Party of Germany].” Stay-behind soldier Otto in his testimony highlighted that the members of the secret army – which was code-named “Technical Service of the German Youth Federation” (“Technischer Dienst des Bundes Deutscher Jugend”, TD BDJ) and commanded by Erhard Peters – were not content with waiting for the Soviet invasion but preferred to engage in covert action operations during peace time instead: “The idea of the Americans was to have all members overrun by the Soviets, and to use them as partisans afterwards. However, this American plan could not be realised by Peters since all men interested in the organisation under all circumstances wanted to escape to the West in case of a Soviet invasion.”<sup>110</sup>

As the scandal came to light, the New York Times reported on October 10 1952 that “Authoritative officials here privately confirmed today that the United States had sponsored and helped finance the secret training of young Germans, including many former soldiers, to become guerrilla fighters in the event of a war

with the Soviet Union". The US newspaper related that the "disclosure yesterday in the State Parliament of Hessen and the banner headline publicity today in the German press have caused the United States Department and the Army considerable embarrassment", above all because "it was discovered that the projected guerrilla group had engaged in political activities. Their leaders ... drew up blacklists of persons who were to be "liquidized", if they were deemed unreliable in a war against the Russians". Therefore "Several joint German - United States meetings were held" because many acting "socialists, including government officials, were on the list, as well as communists".

Hesse's Prime Minister August Zinn was furious when he learned of the secret army which had trained to manipulate the political climate in his state and on 8 October 1952 informed his federal parliament despite very serious US pressure to remain silent. "The organisation received very generous funding. Confiscated documents suggest that it received about DM 50,000 a month". In the agitated session, a furious parliamentarian shouted: "Where did the money come from!?" Zinn related that "The money came from faked orders of an allegedly US agency to the TD" and went on to explain that "The same organisation had a domestic task ... According to the testimony of a leading member, selected 'unreliable' people should be eliminated in the case of X". This sent a new storm of criticism through the parliament, with voices shouting "That means killed! Incredible!" Zinn continued that, "interestingly, there were 15 sheets of paper on communists, but 80 pages on leading Social Democrats ... SPD Interior Minister Heinrich Zinnkann of Hessen was suspected of communist connections". This was greeted with laughter in parliament. "According to testimonies, much secret material had been destroyed, some material has been collected by a US official, and is now therefore also inaccessible. The money and the weapons were provided by an American, who supervised the training." This left parliamentarians once again shouting "Hear ! Hear!"

Zinn concluded: "It is very important to realise that such secret organisations outside all German control are the starting base for illegal domestic activities. Our people had to make this sad experience already three decades ago, and these features were also manifest within this organisation". Zinn's statement was applauded by parliament and several voices were shouting, "Correct! That's right!" "Mr. Reeber of the United States this morning" Zinn continued, "agreed with me, that such organisations are the starting point for domestic terror ... expressed his most sincere regret and condemned the organisation sharply ... He promised not only his full support to clarify the entire affair completely and uproot the remainder of the organisation, but also to prevent such a phenomeon from reoccurring."111

Whatever these efforts looked like, they failed. In late 1990, the German secret army was discovered to be still alive. Parliamentarian Hermann Scheer, defence expert of the German socialist Party (SPD), criticised that the mysterious right-wing network might well be some sort of a “Ku-Klux-Klan”, designed more for peacetime actions against democracy than for an unlikely Soviet invasion. In order to find out the facts, Scheer urged for an immediate and comprehensive juridical inquiry into the highest levels of NATO's shadow army by the German public prosecutor “because the existence of an armed military secret organisation outside all governmental or parliamentary control is incompatible with the constitutional legality, and therefore must be prosecuted according to the criminal law.”<sup>112</sup> Scheer stressed that the investigation had to be started soon “in order to avoid that a cover-up effaces the traces.”<sup>113</sup>

When Scheer and his fellow Socialist parliamentarians were informed that the Socialists, while in power, had also been part of the conspiracy and kept the secret, the criticism suddenly faded away and it was agreed that no public investigation should be carried out. In order to appease the media, intelligence services expert Lutz Stavenhagen on 3 December 1990 hurriedly sent a four-page fax on the German stay-behind army.: This fax was entitled “Report of the Government on the Stay-Behind Organisation of the BND” and confirmed that, in order “to co-ordinate their planning with the military leadership of NATO, the intelligence services taking part in the operation in 1952 established the so-called Coordinating and Planning Committee (CPC). In order to co-ordinate the cooperation among themselves, they in 1954 established the so called Allied Coordination Committee (ACC).” The report revealed that the German secret service BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst) had run the secret army and that its representatives had “been regular members of both CPC and ACC ever since 1959.”<sup>114</sup>

An unnamed former NATO intelligence official commented that Germany had failed to investigate its secret army, which, after World War Two, had “incorporated the full espionage outfit run by Hitler's spy chief Reinhard Gehlen. This is well known since Gehlen was the spiritual father of Stay Behind in Germany and his role was known to the West German leader, Konrad Adenauer, from the outset.” According to the unnamed NATO officer, the President of the United States, Harry Truman and German Chancellor Adenauer had “signed a secret protocol with the US on West Germany's entry into NATO in May 1955 in which it was agreed that the West German authorities would refrain from active legal pursuit of known right wing extremists.”<sup>115</sup>

## Austria

In Austria the presence of right-wing extremists in the secret stay-behind army also complicated the investigation of the phenomenon. The cover of the first Austrian Gladio, or at least parts of it, was blown already two years after the end of the war when a fascist stay-behind network was discovered in 1947. The so-called “Soucek-Rössner conspiracy”, named after its fascists leaders, led to the arrest of a number of right-wing extremists. During trial, both Soucek and Rössner testified that they had recruited and trained “partisan units” for the eventuality of a Soviet invasion. Above all they insisted to the disbelief of many Austrians that they were carrying out the secret operations with the full knowledge and support of the US and British occupation powers. Secret arms caches and communications equipment was found and secured. The judges decided that Soucek and Rössner were the main responsible officials of the conspiracy and sentenced them to death in 1949. However, Theodor Körner, Austrian Chancellor from 1951 bis 1957, pardoned the right-wing conspirators under mysterious circumstances.<sup>116</sup>

As senior members of the Austrian government decided that a stay-behind army could enhance the security of the neutral state, a new network was set up. Under the code-name OWSGV, short for “Austrian Hiking Sports and Social Club” (Österreichischer Wander- Sport- und Geselligkeitsverein) Franz Olah in close cooperation with the CIA and the MI6 directed the unit. “We bought cars under this name. We installed communication centres in several regions of Austria”, Olah later explained and confirmed that “special units were trained in the use of weapons and plastic explosives.”<sup>117</sup> The Austrian secret army OWSGV was not primarily designed as a stay-behind to become operational only in case of a Soviet invasion but had been set up specifically to run clandestine domestic operations against the communist left even in the absence of a Soviet invasion. As Olah insisted, “It wasn't our intention to fight communism in the Soviet Union but to fight against the attempts of communism in our own country. We took weapons. We also had modern plastic explosives that were easy to handle. I had a small arsenal of weapons in my office. There must have been a couple of thousand people working for us.”<sup>118</sup> Olah explained that communication centres were stationed in each of Austria's nine provinces. The military supplies came from his American contacts in the CIA. “Only very, very highly positioned politicians and some members of the union knew about it,” Olah insisted.<sup>119</sup>

When the cover of the European stay-behind armies was blown in late 1990, the Austrian government, fearing for the reputation of its neutrality, refused to comment on the secret NATO army. Yet following the revelations of the US daily

Boston Globe on 20 January 1996 that the CIA had set up secret arms caches for an underground army in neutral Austria, the issue resurfaced. US ambassador to Austria Swanee Hunt with much embarrassment confirmed to the Austrian government that the CIA had indeed set up 79 secret arms caches in neutral Austria “immediately after the war” to equip a secret army. “In the context of the Cold war that would make perfectly good sense”, Hunt reasoned.<sup>120</sup> “The Austrian government, through our bureaucratic error, had not been officially informed”, Hunt regretted and offered her apologies.<sup>121</sup>

Austrian President Thomas Klestil and Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky were embarrassed and angrily insisted that they had known absolutely nothing of the existence of the secret CIA arms caches and demanded that the United States launch a full-scale investigation into the violation of Austria's “permanent neutrality”.<sup>122</sup> While President Bill Clinton was not available for comments at the State Department in Washington, spokesman Nicholas Burns declared to the press: “The aim was noble, the aim was correct, to try to help Austria if it was under occupation. What went wrong is that successive Washington administrations simply decided not to talk to the Austrian government about it.”<sup>123</sup> In response to journalists’ questions, spokesman Burns admitted that similar networks with arms caches also existed in several other European countries. Yet Burns insisted that only the Austrian government had not been informed, declaring with much regret that he could unfortunately not hand out the list specifying where exactly all over Europe these secret caches existed “for fear of forgetting some countries.”<sup>124</sup> When the Austrian governmental commission was charged with investigating the affair, historian Oliver Rathkolb of Vienna University placed a Freedom of Information Request (FOIA) in order to gain access to the relevant CIA documents, yet the CIA in 1997 refused to make any material available due to considerations of “national security”.

### Switzerland

In neutral Switzerland, similar to Austria, the suggestion that a secret army with close NATO connections had operated in the country during the Cold War to many seemed a far-fetched suggestion. A detailed special investigation of the Swiss parliament revealed, however, that a secret stay-behind army codenamed first “Special Service”, and then “P-26” had existed within the Swiss military secret service UNA (Untergruppe Nachrichtendienst und Abwehr) during most of the Cold War. This was made public in a report presented on 17 November 1990. The Swiss parliamentarians concluded that “Irrespective of its members, whom the commission does not suspect of any intentions to harm the state, a secret organization equipped

with weapons and explosives in itself represents a potential danger for the constitutional order as long as it is not factually controlled by the constitutional political organ. The commission has found that this factual control of the P26 organization through the highest national organs was not given".<sup>125</sup> Following the commission's suggestion and upon decision of the Swiss government, the Swiss secret army P26 was officially dissolved on November 21 1990. All arms were secured and returned to the regular military forces.

The parliamentary investigation of the Swiss Defence Department, which had started in early 1990, had proceeded independently of the of Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti's revelations in late 1990. Yet when the Swiss parliament noticed in late 1990 that secret stay-behind armies with links to NATO existed across Western Europe, the sensitive question arose whether P-26 and its predecessors had also been part of this network. The Swiss government gave Swiss judge Pierre Cornu the task to investigate the connections of the Swiss stay-behind network with foreign secret networks and foreign secret services. Cornu met with the parliamentarians involved with the Gladio investigations in Belgium and Italy, heard testimonies in Switzerland, saw classified documents and in September 1991 delivered a report of some 100 pages to the government. While the original report was classified top secret, the government published a short summary of the Cornu report and declared to the public that the Swiss stay-behind had not been linked to NATO.<sup>126</sup>

Upon the publication of the short-version Cornu report, the British press headlined: "UK trained secret Swiss force" and correctly reported that "British secret services collaborated closely with an armed, undercover Swiss organization through a series of covert agreements which formed part of a west European network of 'resistance' groups".<sup>127</sup> Highlighting the very close collaboration, Judge Cornu confirmed: "The cadres of the Swiss organization regarded the British to be the best specialists in the field".<sup>128</sup> "These connections included particularly the regular participation of Special Service and P-26 cadres in courses and exercises in Great Britain, as well as the participation of British specialists as instructors of observers in exercises of the Swiss services."<sup>129</sup> During an English language conversation course taking place in Switzerland in 1984, military instructor Alois Hürlimann had already revealed in poor English and to the surprise of his fellow classmates that he had taken part in secret military training in England. This training, Hürlimann continued, had included a real non- simulated assault on an IRA arms depot in which Hürlimann, fully dressed in battle fatigues, had participated, and in which at least one IRA activist had been killed.<sup>130</sup>

While the Swiss government stressed that such co-operation was normal and had not violated neutrality, the British press with some amusement noted that the MI6

had been better informed on the secret Swiss army than the Swiss government itself. For only the British knew the details about the Swiss secret army, including “who headed it, its code-names and the location of facilities which included sophisticated arms and underground training bunkers.”<sup>131</sup> Judge Cornu was most frustrated that the British had not even talked to him during his investigation. The Swiss stay-behind agents co-operated with similar reluctance. Cornu concluded that a “large part of the Swiss involved appear to have known only very little about the identity of their partners, be it the persons specifically, or the respective services. It must be noted that in this matter powers of recollection faded very rapidly, and/or that the responsible officers were generally very badly informed about their partners on the other side of the channel. Precise questions were often answered imprecisely or in a contradictory manner.”<sup>132</sup>

## Belgium

Next to Switzerland, only Italy and Belgium decided to charge a parliamentary committee with investigating the matter in detail, and a public report was only produced in those three countries.. These parliamentary reports, which are based on testimonies and original documents, remain among the most authoritative data on the history of the stay-behind armies in Western Europe. The Belgian Senators found that Stewart Menzies, the chief of the British secret service MI6, in a letter dated 27 January 1949 had urged the Belgian Prime Minister Paul Henri Spaak to continue the secret collaboration between the United Kingdom and Belgium that was begun during World War Two. Menzies requested that specifically the MI6 must remain involved with setting up the Belgian secret army. “Demands for training and material will arise in the near future”, Menzies explained in his letter and offered his assistance: “I have already undertaken to provide certain training facilities for officers and others nominated by the Head of your Special Service, and I am in a position to provide items of new equipment now in production.” Menzies urged Spaak to keep the letter top secret. Above all, he asked Spaak not to collaborate with the CIA exclusively and suggested that “certain officers should proceed to the United Kingdom in the near future to study, in conjunction with my Service, the technicalities of these matters.”<sup>133</sup>

As the Senate investigation revealed, the Belgium’s stay-behind army had two branches: SDRA8 and STC/Mob. SDRA8 was the military branch located within the Belgian military secret service Service Général du Renseignement (SGR) under the direction of the Defence Ministry. The members of SDRA8 were military men, trained in combat and sabotage, parachute jump and maritime operations. Besides



information gathering, SDRA8 was trained to organise evacuation routes in the case of a Soviet occupation of Belgium. In the case of a complete occupation, SDRA8 agents would have been in charge of accompanying the government abroad and establishing liaisons with the secret agents who remained in Belgium to combat the enemy.<sup>134</sup> During their investigation, the Belgian Senators attempted to clarify the claim that members of SDRA8 had been involved in terrorist attacks in the 1980s. These attacks most prominently included the so-called “Brabant massacres”, during which civilians were gunned down in supermarkets in the Brabant area in order to strike fear to the bones of the population and promote reactionary politics. In what amounted to a massive scandal, the names of the stay-behind members were not made available to the Senators, who had intended to compare them with known suspects of the massacres.<sup>135</sup>

The civilian branch STC/Mob was located within the civilian secret service Security of the State (Sûreté de L'Etat, short Sûreté) under the direction of the Ministry of Justice. The members of the civilian STC/Mob were technicians trained to operate a radio station. Predominantly recruited from groups “with strong religious convictions as a guarantee for their anti- communism”, the STC/Mob men “had the mission to collect intelligence under conditions of enemy occupation which could be useful to the government. Furthermore, STC/Mob was charged with organising secure communication routes to evacuate the members of the government and other people with official functions.”<sup>136</sup> In order to co-ordinate the coexistence of the two Belgian stay-behinds SDRA8 and STC/Mob, an “Inter-Service” co-ordination committee was created 1971. Reunions took place every six months, with the presidency rotating between SDRA and the Sûreté d'Etat. The reunions helped ensure a common position in the international meetings of the NATO secret warfare centres ACC and CPC.<sup>137</sup>

As the Belgian Senators learned with some surprise, the cooperation among secret stay-behind armies in Western Europe worked remarkably well. The Senators discovered that international exercises had been carried out repeatedly throughout the Cold War: “One must note two points regarding these exercises. First of all, we are dealing here with an international network that could evacuate clandestinely a person from Norway to Italy. This implies a very close collaboration and strict co-ordination on an international level between a series of secret services”. The Senators’ report continued: “What is also astonishing is the perfect technical infrastructure which the stay-behind was equipped with: The persons and the material were moved on or intercepted by sea, by air, by parachute. Their arrival zones were marked and controlled. The persons were housed in secure buildings.”<sup>138</sup>

STC/Mob agent Van Ussel, alias Georges 923, described one of these exercises thus: “One of the exercises carried out was the following: On a moonless night and guided by the light signals of the agent of the local network on the beach, an English submarine surfaced on the Norwegian coast and a small raft carried the agent discretely to the main land, ... As the raft returned to the submarine, the ‘visitor’ was taken over by a civilian agent, who questioned and searched him, in order to verify that this was indeed the expected individual. Once inserted into the network, the ‘visitor’ was transported on foot, on horse or by car from network to network until he reached Kristiansand” on the southern coast of Norway. “From there a fisherman who worked for the network transported him to Alborg” on the northern coast of Denmark, “where the Danish network took over. In this way, after a month of travelling, he passed the Netherlands, Belgium and France to reach the Frioul area in Italy on a beautiful morning, without having ever been subjected to even the smallest customs or police control. The latter was in fact one of the aims of the exercise” Van Ussel stressed. “Constantly watched, he had been guided by several dozen evacuation networks.”<sup>139</sup>

#### Netherlands

As in neighbouring Belgium, the Dutch stay-behind army was made up of two branches. One branch was called “Operations”, or “O” for short. It was set up after World War Two by Louis Einthoven, the first chief of the Dutch post-war domestic security service BVD (Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst). Until his death in 1973, Cold warrior Einthoven highlighted the danger of communism within Belgium and introduced “security checks” on the ideological reliability of his stay-behind and BVD agents. “The double function of Einthoven as chief BVD and of O was of course very valuable for us”, a former unnamed Dutch Gladiator later recalled.<sup>140</sup> For during the 16 years that Einthoven directed both branches of the secret army, the Dutch domestic security structure was placed firmly in the Western NATO alliance.

The second branch of the Dutch stay-behind was called “Intelligence”, or “I” for short. It had been set up after World War by J. M. Somer, but was commanded by J.J.L. Baron van Lynden after Somer was dispatched to the Dutch colony Indonesia in 1948 to fight the independence movement in his capacity as a warfare expert. Within the Dutch Gladio, tasks were split. The Intelligence (I) unit under Van Lynden was responsible for the collection and transmission of intelligence from occupied areas, preparations and running of exile bases and evacuation operations of the royalty, the government and the security apparatus, including personnel of I&O. The Operations (O) unit under Einthoven had to carry out sabotage and guerrilla operations, and was

charged with strengthening the local resistance and creating a new resistance movement. O was also in charge of sensitizing people to the danger of communism during times of peace. Moreover, O was trained in covert action operations, including the use of guns and explosives, and possessed independent secret arms caches.<sup>141</sup> Most of the costs of the Dutch Gladio were covered by a secret budget of the Dutch Defence Ministry with the spendings being controlled personally by the chairman of the General Accountancy Department (Algemene Rekenkamer).

During his time in office, Van Lynden very actively promoted contacts between the European secret services and their secret armies and insisted that co-operation was mandatory when it came to the erection of international escape and evasion routes (“rat lines”) expected to be of great value in the case of a Soviet invasion. Van Lynden travelled Europe extensively and was much praised for his efforts among the security services. He wished to become the first secretary of the CPC stay-behind centre of NATO. Yet the British distrusted the liberal and open-minded Van Lynden and opposed his nomination.<sup>142</sup> In 1957, CPC members Great Britain, the United States, France, Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands under the participation of van Lynden erected the so called “Six Powers Lines Committee”, which, like the CPC, had the task to organise and co-ordinate stay-behind preparations with a focus on international communication and escape lines. The Six Powers Lines Committee became the Allied Clandestine Committee ACC, which was founded in Paris in 1958. ACC co-ordinated the international Gladio exercises, which were carried out clandestinely with the participation of the different networks. In the case of an invasion, there was an ACC basis in the United States, and one in the United Kingdom from where the secret armies in the occupied territory could be activated and commanded. ACC manuals instructed Gladiators on common covert action procedures, encryption and frequency hopping communication techniques, as well as air droppings and landings.<sup>143</sup>

Following the revelations of Prime Minister Andreotti in Italy, Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Dutch Christian Democratic party, in office since 1982, in November 1990 informed parliament that the Dutch stay-behind during the Cold War had answered to the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister only. Lubbers took pride in the fact that some 30 ministers had kept the secret: “Successive Prime Ministers and Defence Ministers have always preferred not to inform other members of their cabinets or Parliament”.<sup>144</sup> The Dutch parliament also knew nothing of the secret army. “I don't particularly worry that there was, and perhaps still is, such a thing”, parliamentarian Hans Dijkstal of the opposition Liberals observed. “What I do have problems with is that until last night Parliament was never told”.<sup>145</sup>

## Luxemburg

“The word 'Gladio' is a term used for the Italian structure. The term used internationally and inside NATO is 'Stay-Behind“, Luxemburg’s Prime Minister Jacques Santer explained in front of his parliament on November 14 1990: “This term reflects the concept of an organisation designed to become active behind the fronts of a military conflict, thus in case of enemy occupation of the territory. This concept has been designed by NATO. The idea has been derived from the experiences of World War Two, during which similar networks were established during occupation periods, thus in a particularly difficult environment and under enemy control.” Never again, the Prime Minister presented the rationale of the secret network, should a country be so ill-prepared before a war and a potential occupation: “In order to avoid the same preparation gap in the future, it was decided to prepare the foundations of such an organisation already in peace time.” 146

Prime Minister Santer highlighted that Luxemburg had not been alone in running a secret army: “All NATO countries in central Europe have taken part in these preparations, and Luxemburg could not have escaped this international solidarity. Each member state was allowed to define its own structures. Thus, although NATO was the initiator and co-ordinator of the stay-behind network, each country remained the director of its own national component.” The Prime Minister confirmed that the secret service of Luxemburg, the Service de Renseignements, had been running the network. “The agents of this stay-behind network were recruited by the secret service on a voluntarily basis and according to criteria relating to their profession and place of living ... The essence of their mission was to inform NATO on the political and military situation of their region, to organise escape routes out of the occupied territory, and to support the special forces of the military.” Santer emphasized that “the mission was only to be carried out in case of invasion and enemy occupation of the territory.” Replying to a specific parliamentary question, he concluded: “I can answer that I did not have any personal knowledge of the existence of the network, and exactly like the Minister of Belgium, I was surprised to learn about its existence. I do not think that another member of the government could have guessed its existence. Obviously, I cannot make this declaration in my predecessors’ name also, for I did not have the time to consult them before my answer.”147

## VII. Secret armies in Northern Europe: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland

In the Scandinavian countries of Northern Europe, the history of the stay-behind armies has been officially investigated by NATO member Norway only, while NATO members Denmark as well as neutral Sweden and Finland have until now been most reluctant to debate the phenomenon in public.

### Denmark

In Denmark, the secret stay-behind army was codenamed “Absalon” after the medieval Danish Bishop who had defeated the Russians in the Middle Ages by the sword and is today immortalised by a large bronze statue in the Danish capital Copenhagen. “Naturally, the organisation was copied after the resistance movement. There were twelve districts, structured according to the cell principle, but not as tightly organised as during the War” an unnamed Danish secret soldier revealed to the Danish press.<sup>148</sup> The secret army was directed by E. J. Harder, who from 1966 to 1970 had worked at NATO headquarters, and was nicknamed “Bispen”, Danish for “Bishop”, by the secret soldiers.

As in all countries of Western Europe the Danish secret stay-behind army was hidden within the military secret service FE (Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste), where the secretive Special Operations (SO) department directed by Gustav Thomsen supervised Absalon. “Ninety-five per cent were military people. Many leading members of the Territorial Units were also members. The Reserve Officers Federation was a further very useful extra potential to draw upon”, an unnamed source revealed to the Danish press. Allegedly, selected Danish politicians were informed about the existence of the secret army for, according to another unnamed source, the “connection to the conservative popular party was very close. The ideological basis was strongly anti-communist. We were Danish and had strong national feelings based on Christian ideology. It was very important to us that it would not, as in 1940, take two to three years until a resistance unit was organised.” As the source related, the secret army had the twofold task to act in case of invasion or if the Communists seized power in Denmark: “It was during the time of the Cold War and a Russian invasion or take-over of power by the Danish communists was – we felt – a clear and present danger.”<sup>149</sup> Despite its rightist conservative leanings, Absalon did not recruit every right-wing activist, as a former agent pointed out: “Not everybody could become a member. Among others, the right-wing activist Hans Hetler wanted to

become a member. But we did not want him. He had been compromised and we did not think that he had the necessary qualities.”<sup>150</sup>

When the stay-behind armies were discovered across Western Europe in late 1990, the Danish Defence Minister Knud Enggaard was forced to take a stand in front of an alerted Danish parliament. On 21 November 1990, the Defence Minister claimed that it was not true that “any kind” of NATO-supported CIA organisation had been erected in Denmark. To the confusion of some parliamentarians, he added: “Further pieces of information on a secret service operation in case of an occupation is classified material, even highly classified material, and I am therefore prohibited from giving any further information in the Danish parliament.” Member of Parliament Pelle Voigt, who had raised the stay-behind question, thought the Defence Minister's answer to be “contradictory and an indirect confirmation of the fact that Denmark, too, had its secret network.”<sup>151</sup>

## Norway

In NATO member Norway, Vilhelm Evang, the director of the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS), and Jens Christian Hague, the Norwegian Defence Minister, built up the stay-behind army after World War Two. They knew each other well from their wartime exile in London. Hague had been the wartime leader of the Norwegian military resistance organisation, and Evang had joined the small intelligence service of the Norwegian government in exile in London in 1942. Both were convinced that a future Norway had to be better prepared for a potential invasion and occupation.

The secret Norwegian stay-behind was codenamed “Rocamboles” or “ROC” for short. “ROCAMBOLE is a strictly top-secret military organisation under the direct command of the Defence Chief (Chief of Defence Staff), whose task will be to perform isolated missions of particular military importance on occupied Norwegian territory” a memorandum of the Norwegian Defence Ministry dated September 1952 specified. “It is a condition that each single action will be performed on the basis of a direct order by the Defence Chief, and that the task can be performed by a few determined and hardy persons who have been organised, trained and equipped for such missions.” According to the document of the Defence Ministry, ROC had three main tasks in times of war: “1. Destruction of material targets, by explosives or in other ways. 2. Protection of installations or communications on a temporary basis in connection with the liberation of a given area, or 3. Other missions like the organisation of larger secret groups, reception of airlifted personnel and supplies, reconnaissance, special intelligence tasks, guerrilla actions, coups, assassinations,

etc.”<sup>152</sup> Domestic control operations “in case of an internal coup d'état”, as Evang had foreseen them, or missions “to guard against “fifth-column (communist) subversive activities” were not listed by the document but presumably remained valid.

Co-operation with the CIA, the MI6 and NATO was intense, but not always without complications. The written records of the Norwegian Defence Ministry concerning ROC confirm that, in August 1951, NATO's Supreme Commander for Europe (SACEUR) established the so-called Clandestine Planning Committee (CPC) to plan secret operations and manage the European stay-behind network.<sup>153</sup> In April 1952, NIS director Evang was informed that SACEUR had given an order to CPC to summon representatives of the secret services of the NATO countries to CPC. Together with other heads of European secret services, Evang received an invitation from SACEUR US General Matthew Ridgway to attend a CPC meeting in Paris on May 7 1952 for a briefing on the stay-behind situation and a discussion of ROC's relationship to the CPC. Prior to the meeting, Evang contacted his Danish counterpart in order to establish a common approach to the expected NATO questions. Evang and the chief of the Danish secret service agreed to make it clear to the CPC that the Norwegian secret army ROC and the Danish secret army Absalon were not to be used for domestic political manipulation, but only “in the event of a total occupation or a static partial occupation.” Evang in his notes stressed that “it is our job to see that it is the respective governments which, in the last instance, exercise control over” the secret armies. “It was clear that this could only be done if one controlled communications, and if the individual operator's identity was not known to anybody but a small minority of the person's own countrymen. This viewpoint must not, however, be revealed in international discussions.”<sup>154</sup>

Tensions ensued in 1957 when Evang learned that the United States were not respecting Norway's sovereignty. Evang was informed that an American member of NATO's Headquarters Allied Forces Northern Europe (HQ AFNORTH) at Kolsas in Norway “was showing a distinct interest in general military intelligence material and had also had translated at AFNORTH data on Norwegian citizens, especially people who had strongly pacifist and negative attitudes to NATO.” The Norwegian authorities arrested the US-American, and it was revealed that he reported to a named officer at SHAPE. NATO did not trust Norway, Evang concluded, and furiously demanded that this matter become the first item on the agenda at the next meeting of the CPC in Paris on November 19 1957. During the meeting, Evang made it clear that his “government also views this in a very serious light, and I have standing orders not to take part in international planning if such activities are going on.” He threatened that Norway would leave the CPC if NATO secretly continued to violate the sovereignty of its members. “As far as Norway is concerned, our interest in CPC

planning as such has declined steadily since 1954 because there is no future in it for us. We are of the opinion that we are developing a Stay Behind which is to be used at home for the purpose of liberation from an occupation.”<sup>155</sup> As Brigadier Simon, chief of NATO's Special Projects Branch at SHAPE with responsibilities also for CPC, was unable to re-establish trust, Norway withdrew its secret army from NATO and did no longer participate in CPC meetings. Before returning to Norway, Evang wanted an official letter of excuse containing the following main points: “a) The affair had been resolved, b) SHAPE would promise not to continue activity of the sort that has been criticised, c) An appeal to Norway to rejoin.”<sup>156</sup> As the letter was forthcoming, Norway rejoined NATO's Gladio command centre CPC and with its ROC the dispute ended.

In 1978, a Norwegian policeman tracking illegally produced alcohol discovered an arsenal of the secret ROC army when he stumbled across a large underground arms cache containing at least 60 weapons including many machine guns, 12,000 rounds of ammunitions, explosives and sophisticated communications equipment. The owner of the property on which both the illegal alcohol distillery as well as the stay-behind arms cache had been found was identified to be Hans Otto Meyer, a member of the Norwegian Secret Service. Meyer was arrested, but to the surprise of the investigators, his claim that the arsenal had been put up by the secret service for use by a resistance cell was eventually confirmed when Defence Minister Rolf Hansen declared in front of parliament that Norway needed a stay-behind army for its national security. Hansen claimed that the “Norwegian network was not answerable to NATO or other countries, dismissing any connections to the CIA. But he would not discuss details, saying the organisation's activities had to be kept secret.”<sup>157</sup> When, twelve years later, the Norwegian secret army was rediscovered, Defence Ministry spokesman Erik Senstad answered the press’s questions concerning Gladio with the short sentence: “What Hansen said then still applies.”<sup>158</sup>

## Sweden

Neutral Sweden as well as neutral Finland, similar to the non-NATO members Switzerland and Austria in central Europe, found it difficult to face the fact that a secret stay-behind army linked to NATO had existed in the country during the Cold War. In the absence of an official investigation, former members of the secret army took a stand to give their perspective. “I have met, among others, Americans and Canadians during this work. Above all we cooperated with Great Britain. They were our masters in the art of running a secret resistance network”, Swedish stay-behind soldier Reinhold Geijer explained, insisting that the Swedish domestic security police



SÄPO (Säkerhetspolis) had been well informed of the existence of the secret army and even helped with the recruitment.<sup>159</sup> “We selected suitable individuals, had them checked by the SÄPO, and, if accepted, we cautiously approached them with defence questions, and in the end confronted them with a direct question”, Geijer recalled the recruitment procedure. The Swedish leaders of the secret army were trained by the British secret service and the British Special Forces. “In 1959 I went via London to a farm outside Eaton” Geijer recalls such a training session. “This was done under the strictest secrecy procedures, with for instance a forged passport. I was not even allowed to call my wife. The aim of the training was to learn how to use dead letter box techniques to receive and send secret messages, and other James Bond style exercises. The British were very tough. I sometimes had the feeling that we were overdoing it.”<sup>160</sup>

Other stay-behind soldiers took their secrets to the grave. Family members of a Swedish businessman were mightily surprised when, after his death, they found secret rooms, well hidden behind fake walls, in two of the country houses of the family. Those houses were designed and equipped as local resistance headquarters from where exfiltration and sabotage operations would have been directed. “I always thought that all these Sunday excursions were for our benefit!”, the daughter of the secret soldier explained to the press with disappointment and disbelief. “And now I learn that these excursions have not been mere amusement. And although what he did was honourable, I now feel misled. My father had other sides, of which I have never heard.” Another secret soldier who had served in the fire brigade in Skane left his daughter in similar disbelief. “I have never learned anything of all this”, she declared to the press and insisted that the name of her father must remain secret: “Who knows where the discovery of military secrets will lead to?”<sup>161</sup>

The Swedish government and particularly the Defence Department in 1990 found it difficult to explain the stay-behind realities, above all after the Swedish press had started to speculate whether the secret army had been involved with the murder of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, who had planned to transform Scandinavia into a nuclear arms free zone of non-NATO members. Swedish Assistant Under Secretary of Defence Nils Gylden insisted that, despite the reports in the press, he was completely unaware of any secret resistance network in Sweden.<sup>162</sup> General Bengt Gustafsson, Sweden's Chief of Staff, later confirmed that Sweden had indeed set up a secret underground resistance group during the Cold War, insisting, however, that neither NATO nor the CIA were involved.<sup>163</sup> But this account also had to be revised when journalists interviewed former CIA officer Paul Garbler, who had served two tours of duty in Sweden, of which the last one had ended in 1976. Garbler confirmed that the CIA had run stay-behind operations in Western Europe, including Sweden.

“I’m not able to talk about it without causing the Swedes a good deal of heartburn”, Garbler insisted and confirmed only that the Swedish government was a “direct participant” in the operation, as well as “local people outside of politics, but of some standing in the country.”<sup>164</sup>

## Finland

Finland is the only country in Western Europe that has ever been invaded and occupied by the Soviet Red Army. After the beginning of the so-called “Winter War” on 30 November 1939, the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin was expelled from the League of Nations (which collapsed as World War Two started). The Finns, who lost more than 20 per cent of their soldiers in three months, in March 1940 signed a peace treaty in Moscow and surrendered 16,000 square miles of territory to the Soviet Union. After the Finns had attempted in vain to regain some of their territory together with the German army, they were forced to pay war reparations and had to promise to remain neutral after 1945.

Finland, whose frontier with the Soviet Union runs for several hundred kilometres and passes through sparsely populated areas guarded by military men, fences and land mines on both sides, thus found itself in a particularly sensitive position during the Cold War. When a Norwegian stay-behind delegation, including Norwegian secret service director Vilhelm Evang, met with high level CIA and MI6 officers in London in November 1950, Finland was also discussed. During the meeting, the MI6 complained that Finland was “paralysed through a friendship agreement with the Soviet Union” and could therefore be hardly integrated into the secret defence operations of the West. Any operations carried out on the territory had to take place on a very low noise level in order not to provoke the Soviet Union. The participants at the stay-behind conference concluded that, “In Finland, the CIA had the biggest problems. There they could not use the Swedish model, but had to go in directly.”<sup>165</sup> Going in directly in this case meant that the CIA approached Americans in Finland who in turn suggested Finnish citizens who might be willing to co-operate with the West in the top-secret stay-behind operation.

Finnish journalist Jukka Rislakki found that “there existed a secret resistance organisation in Finland which had contacts to the West”. His sources confirmed the stay-behind pattern when they explained that “the members of the network trained in secrecy and had arms caches. Several acting and retired officers of the Finnish army were part of the network, as well as men who still hold high functions.” According to the Rislakki’s sources, the activities of the Finnish stay-behind allegedly increased after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, since some Finns feared that the same

could happen to their country, “but already before that invasion there had been secret groups in Finland, and there were arms and training”. One of Rislakki's sources, a member of the Finnish secret network, confirmed that selected members of the Finnish Gladio, like their officially neutral Swedish colleagues, had gone three times to Brussels during his time, where with all probability they had attended the meetings of the NATO stay-behind command centres Allied Clandestine Committee (ACC) and the Clandestine Planning Committee (CPC). “This came to my mind last year [1990]”, the source said, “when it was revealed that the meeting place of Gladio was in Brussels.”<sup>166</sup>

When the Finnish government was approached on the topic in 1991, Defence Minister Elisabeth Rehn called the revelations concerning the secret army “a fairy tale”, adding, somewhat more cautiously, “or at least an incredible story, of which I know nothing.”<sup>167</sup> Retired CIA officer Dave Whipple, who had served the CIA in Vietnam and as chief of Finnish operations had headed the CIA station in Helsinki from 1970 to 1976, was more outspoken on the affair. In 1995, he confirmed that the CIA had supported the secret Finish army with “money, equipment, communication and support. That is, support in a very definite and practical way.”<sup>168</sup> Whipple related that most CIA officers had been shaped in their view of the world in World War Two and its violent solution to problems. “The Second World War shaped, as you understand, the basic ways of thinking of the intelligence service, based on the experiences from the war” Whipple reasoned. “After the war, when the threat from the countries behind the Iron Curtain was big, the idea of establishing a stay-behind network in Europe gained a special breakthrough.” The Gladio network was a major success for the CIA, as Whipple saw it. “After some time these stay-behind networks developed into a very, very good assurance”. Whipple further implied that they could have been used both against a Soviet invasion and against a potential increase of power of the communist party: “Something that worried us was what would happen if the communists would gain power in any of the countries where we had erected stay-behind networks”. Whipple praised the the secret soldiers’ commitment . “The morale was very high, and after a while the networks gained the character of social clubs, a sort of social meeting places. The people who joined these networks were personally recommended by leaders of the local intelligence service.” Secrecy was extremely tight. “They knew how to keep their mouths shut. They knew how to live according to the 'need to know' principle, and not to talk about what they were dealing with.”<sup>169</sup>

## VIII. Conclusion

“Prudent Precaution or source of Terror?” the international press pointedly asked when the secret stay-behind armies of NATO were discovered across Western Europe following the Gladio revelations in Italy in late 1990.<sup>170</sup> After more than ten years of scientific research, the answer is now clear: both. While much more research is needed – above all in NATO archives and in the archives of the secret services – it is already certain that large differences existed among countries involved in the stay-behind network. As the stay-behind armies, next to preparing for a Soviet invasion, also had the task to protect NATO from within and prevent the national communist parties from coming to power, the degree of domestic activity including terrorism naturally varied from country to country according to the strength of the communist party. Hence in Italy, where the communist party was strong, the secret Gladio army was heavily involved with manipulating the political climate, while in Switzerland, where the communist party was outlawed during the Cold War, no such domestic operations seem to have taken place. In a group of Mediterranean countries in which the military represented a dominant force of the society (Turkey, Greece, Spain and Portugal), the secret soldiers according to the evidence now available seem to have been employed to fight the opposition in general.

The parliament of the European Union (EU) in its debate on the secret stay-behind armies of 22 November 1990 correctly realised both the “prudent precaution” as well as the “source of terror” dimension of the secret armies. “Mr. President, it was perfectly legitimate at the end of the Second World War, for the majority of our states to set up services whose purpose was to prepare underground resistance networks that could be activated in the event of our countries being occupied by the forces of the Warsaw Pact”, French parliamentarian De Donnea stressed the prudent precaution which the stay-behind armies represented. “We must therefore pay tribute to all those who, while the Cold War lasted, worked in these networks.” To De Donnea it was clear that the clandestine armies had to remain secret, “For these networks to remain effective, it was obviously necessary for them to be kept secret”.

At the same time, parliamentarian De Donnea stressed that it was important to gain clarity concerning the alleged links of the secret armies to terrorist activities: “Having said that, if there are serious indications or suspicions to the effect that some or all of these networks have operated in an illegal or abnormal way in certain countries, it is in everyone's interest for matters to be brought into the open and for the guilty to be punished.”<sup>171</sup> Elaborating on the terrorist dimension of the secret armies, Greek parliamentarian Ephremidis sharply criticised that the secret units, “set up by the CIA and NATO were actually undermining democracy while pretending to defend

it as the secret armies were used for their own nefarious purposes”. “This affair leaves a bad taste in the mouth, since it has been going on for as long as the European Community has been in existence, and we claim to be creating a new form of democracy” Dutch MP Vandemeulebroucke stated, adding that he was greatly worried that “the budgets for these secret organisations were also kept secret. They were not discussed in any parliament, and we wish to express our concern at the fact that ... it now emerges that there are centres for taking decisions and carrying them out which are not subject to any form of democratic control.” The Dutch parliamentarian concluded: “I should like to protest most strongly against the fact that the American military, whether through SHAPE, NATO or the CIA, think they can interfere in what is our democratic right.”

With no competence in security and defence matters, the parliament of the EU could do little more than send a resolution of protest to the United States and NATO, who, however, failed to engage in a constructive discourse. “This Europe will have no future if it is not founded on truth, on the full transparency of its institutions with regard to the dark plots against democracy that have turned upside down the history, even in recent times, of many European states” Italian parliamentarian Falqui wisely insisted in his statement before the EU parliament. He continued, “There will be no future, ladies and gentlemen, if we do not remove the idea of having lived in a kind of double state - one open and democratic, the other clandestine and reactionary. That is why we want to know what and how many “Gladio” networks there have been in recent years in the Member States of the European Community.” In its resolution, the EU requested “all Member States to take the necessary measures, if necessary by establishing parliamentary committees of inquiry, to draw up a complete list of organisations active in this field, and at the same time to monitor their links with the respective state intelligence services and their links, if any, with terrorist action groups and/or other illegal practices”.

As, however, only EU members Belgium and Italy, and non-EU member Switzerland had formed parliamentary committees that investigated the stay-behind armies and presented a detailed public report, governmental research in the field of Gladio and stay-behind failed on an international level. The task hence rested with the international research community which is indeed increasingly focusing on secret and potentially violent networks in the democracies of Western Europe, the United States, and beyond. If this focus is limited to Islamic terrorism and Al Qaida exclusively, and does not include the more difficult chapters of our own history, the research will remain unbalanced and promote a division between human beings and religious groups which in turn will lead to more violence. By showing the potential abyss within each society, and indeed within each human being, both the demonization of

“the other”, as well as a black and white analysis of international relations can be overcome, and be replaced with a more differentiated and more humble account.



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<sup>1</sup> Compare: Josias Semujanga: *Origins of Rwandan Genocide* (Humanity Books, 2003). Semujanga, an associate professor of literature at the University of Montreal and a Rwandan by birth, details in his book how the culture of hatred was being cultivated by a radio-television network and a newspaper in the national language which prior to the genocide urged the Hutu population that "the enemy within" must be gotten rid of.

<sup>2</sup> *Stato Maggiore della Difesa. Servizio Informazioni delle Forze Armate. Ufficio R - Sezione SAD: Le forze speciali del SIFAR e l'operazione GLADIO. Roma, 1 Giugno 1959.* This document is contained in Mario Cogliatore (ed.): *La Notte dei Gladiatori. Omissioni e silenzi della Repubblica* (Padova 1992), pp. 118-130. Note: All quotations in this article other than from English originals are translations by the author who alone bears responsibility for their accuracy.

<sup>3</sup> Quoted in Cogliatore, *Gladiatori*, p. 131

<sup>4</sup> Quoted in Cogliatore, *Gladiatori*, p. 132

<sup>5</sup> Franco Ferraresi: *A secret structure codenamed Gladio.* In: *Italian Politics. A Review.* 1992, p. 30. Ferraresi quotes directly from the Andreotti document which was leaked to the press and published by the Italian daily *L'Unita* in a special edition on November 14 1990. Also Jean Francois Brozzu-Gentile in his book on Gladio includes the entire document "Il SID parallelo - Operazione Gladio" in his appendix. See: Jean Francois Brozzu-Gentile: *L'affaire Gladio* (Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1994)

<sup>6</sup> Ferraresi, *Gladio*, p. 30, quoting directly from the Andreotti document.

<sup>7</sup> As quoted in Ferraresi, *Gladio*, p. 31

<sup>8</sup> No author specified: *50'000 seek truth about secret team.* In: Canadian daily *The Toronto Star*, November 18, 1990

<sup>9</sup> Padre Giuciano testifying in front of his church in Allan Francovich: *Gladio: The Puppeteers.* Second of total three Francovich Gladio documentaries, broadcasted on BBC2 on June 17, 1992

<sup>10</sup> British political magazine *Statewatch*, January 1991

<sup>11</sup> Jean-Francois Brozzu-Gentile: *L'affaire Gladio.* (1994 ), p. 105

<sup>12</sup> Italian political magazine *Europeo*, November 16, 1990.

<sup>13</sup> Leo Müller: *Gladio. Das Erbe des Kalten Krieges. Der NATO Geheimbund und sein deutscher Vorläufer* (1991), p. 27

<sup>14</sup> Müller, *Gladio*, p. 27

<sup>15</sup> British daily *The Observer*, November 18, 1990

<sup>16</sup> International news service *Reuters*, November 12, 1990

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- <sup>17</sup> Ferraresi, *Gladio.*, p. 32
- <sup>18</sup> British daily, *The Times*, December 9, 1990
- <sup>19</sup> British periodical, *The Economist*, March 30, 1991
- <sup>20</sup> Italian periodical *Europeo*, January 18 1991
- <sup>21</sup> *Senato della Repubblica. Commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sul terrorismo in Italia e sulle cause della mancata individuazione dei responsabili delle stragi: Il terrorismo, le stragi ed il contesto storico politico.* Redatta dal presidente della Commissione, Senatore Giovanni Pellegrino. Roma 1995
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20
- <sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 364
- <sup>24</sup> British political magazine *Searchlight*, No. 47, May 1979, p. 6. Quoted in Herman and Brodhead, *Bulgarian Connection*, p. 50
- <sup>25</sup> Giovanni Fasanella e Claudio Sestieri con Giovanni Pellegrino: *Segreto di Stato. La verità da Gladio al caso Moro* Einaudi Editore. Torino 2000, p. 6
- <sup>26</sup> *Senato della Repubblica. Commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sul terrorismo in Italia e sulle cause della mancata individuazione dei responsabili delle stragi: Stragi e terrorismo in Italia dal dopoguerra al 1974.* Relazione del Gruppo Democratici di Sinistra l'Ulivo. Roma June 2000 The 8 members were: On. Valter Bielli, On. Antonio Attili, On. Michele Cappella, On. Piero Ruzzante, Sen. Alessandro Pardini, Sen. Raffaele Bertoni, Sen. Graziano Cioni, Sen. Angelo Staniscia. Hereafter quoted as "Italian 2000 Senate report on Gladio and the massacres".
- <sup>27</sup> British daily television news program *Newsnight* on BBC1 on April 4, 1991
- <sup>28</sup> Italian 2000 Senate report on Gladio and the massacres, as quoted in: Philip Willan: *US 'supported anti-left terror in Italy'. Report claims Washington used a strategy of tension in the cold war to stabilise the centre-right.* In: British daily *The Guardian*, June 24, 2000
- <sup>29</sup> Italian 2000 Senate report on Gladio and the massacres, p. 41
- <sup>30</sup> Italian 2000 Senate report on Gladio and the massacres, p. 41
- <sup>31</sup> Italian 2000 Senate report on Gladio and the massacres, p. 42
- <sup>32</sup> David Stafford: *Britain and European Resistance, 1940-1945. A Survey of the Special Operations Executive* (Oxford: St. Antony's College, 1980), p. 20
- <sup>33</sup> Letter by Minister Hugh Dalton to Foreign Minister Halifax on July 2, 1940. Quoted in M. R. D. Foot: *An outline history of the Special Operations Executive 1940-1946*, (London: British Broadcasting Cooperation, 1984), p. 19
- <sup>34</sup> E. H. Cookridge: *Inside SOE. The story of Special Operations in Western Europe 1940-45*, (London: Arthur Barker Limited, 1966) p. 13

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- <sup>35</sup> Mackenzie, W. J. M: *History of the Special Operations Executive. Britain and the resistance in Europe*. 4 Volumes. British Cabinet Office. London 1948 (unpublished, Public Records Office London, publication with Frank Cass forthcoming), p. 1152
- <sup>36</sup> Stafford, *Resistance*, in his epilogue, p. 203
- <sup>37</sup> British television. BBC Newsnight, April 4 1991, 10:30 pm. Gladio report by journalist Peter Marshall
- <sup>38</sup> *Schweizer Bundesrat: Schlussbericht in der Administrativuntersuchung zur Abklärung der Natur von allfälligen Beziehungen zwischen der Organisation P26 und analogen Organisationen im Ausland. Kurzfassung für die Öffentlichkeit*. September 19, 1991, pp. 9 and 10
- <sup>39</sup> Kevin Liffey: *Secret Swiss Resistance Force Trained by British*. In: *Reuter News Service*, September 19 1991
- <sup>40</sup> British daily *The Guardian*, November 14, 1990
- <sup>41</sup> British daily *The Guardian*, November 17, 1990
- <sup>42</sup> British daily *The Observer*, June 7, 1992
- <sup>43</sup> Gentile, *Gladio*, p. 28
- <sup>44</sup> International news service *Associated Press*, November 14, 1990
- <sup>45</sup> Mackenzie, *Special Operations Executive*, p. 595
- <sup>46</sup> Mackenzie, *Special Operations Executive*, p. 595 to 597
- <sup>47</sup> Mackenzie, *Special Operations Executive*, p. 596
- <sup>48</sup> Mackenzie, *Special Operations Executive*, p. 601
- <sup>49</sup> Mackenzie, *Special Operations Executive*, p. 599
- <sup>50</sup> Christopher Shoemaker: *The NSC staff: counselling the council*. (1991), p. 1
- <sup>51</sup> John Prados: *Keepers of the Keys. A history of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush* (New York: William Morow, 1991), p. 567
- <sup>52</sup> Thomas Etzold and John Gaddis: *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy 1945-1950*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 12
- <sup>53</sup> Philip Willan: *Puppetmasters. The political use of terrorism in Italy* (London: Constable, 1991), p. 20
- <sup>54</sup> NSC 10/2: *National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects. June 18, 1948*. Formerly Top Secret. Contained in full in Etzold and Gaddis, *Containment*, p. 125. The fundamental importance of NSC 10/2 for the secret anticommunist armies in Western Europe has been realised by almost all Gladio scholars, compare: Jan de Willems (ed.): *Gladio* (Brussels: Editions EPO, 1991), p. 145; Jens Mecklenburg (eds.): *Gladio: Die geheime Terrororganisation der Nato* (Berlin: Elefant Press 1997), p. 17 and 51; Leo Müller: *Gladio - das Erbe des Kalten Krieges. Der Nato-Geheimbund und sein deutscher Vorläufer* (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1991), p. 63.
- <sup>55</sup> Quoted in Christopher Andrew: *For the President's Eyes Only. Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995), p. 171

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<sup>56</sup> *United States Senate. Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence activities. Book IV: Supplementary detailed staff reports on foreign and military intelligence*, p. 36

<sup>57</sup> William Colby: *Honorable Men. My life in the CIA*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), p. 83

<sup>58</sup> Colby, *Honorable Men*, pp. 81 and 82

<sup>59</sup> Powers, Thomas: *The Man who kept the secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980), p. 48. Same figures by Andrew, *Eyes Only*, p. 193

<sup>60</sup> Ludwell Montague: *General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence*, (University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 1992), p. 209

<sup>61</sup> Belgian Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry into Gladio, as summarised in Belgium periodical *Statewatch*, January/February 1992

<sup>62</sup> This document, found by the author, has not previously been discussed in the context of the Gladio discoveries, but clearly is of direct importance, above all for investigations into the Gladio command centre CPC. Memorandum by Lieutenant General Leon W. Johnson, US Representative to the NATO Military Committee Standing Group, of January 3, 1957, to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff on Clandestine Intelligence. Formerly Top Secret. Declassified in 1978.

<sup>63</sup> Colby, *Honorable Men*, p. 83

<sup>64</sup> British daily *The European*, November 9 1990

<sup>65</sup> British daily *The Independent*, December 1 1990

<sup>66</sup> Quoted in Daniele Ganser: *Reckless Gamble. The Sabotage of the United Nations in the Cuban conflict and the missile crisis of 1962* (New Orleans: University Press of the South, 2000), p. 92

<sup>67</sup> Selahattin Celik: *Türkische Konterguerilla. Die Todesmaschinerie* (Köln: Mesopotamien Verlag, 1999), p. 44. Celik is the leading Turkish scholar on the Turkish Gladio Counter-Guerrilla next to officer Talat Turhan. His original work appeared in 1995 in Turkish under the title: *Olüm Makinesi Türk Kontrgerillasi*. Celik is Kurdish, his sister and his brother and three of his cousins were killed by the Counter-Guerrilla and he himself is in danger. Although scrupulous on the facts he admits that the massacres in his family have lead to a certain bias and a critical approach towards the Turkish stay-behind: "I have not written this work as an independent neutral person. I am biased. I have written this book as a son of the Kurdish people, which fights for its survival against the war machinery of the Turkish regime and fights for its right to live in peace ... how can we grasp and communicate the crime of the systematic destruction of the Kurdish intellectuals?" (*Türkische Konterguerilla* , p. 354). Under his pen name Serdar Celik he published also a ten page summary of his book in English on the Internet entitled: *Turkey's Killing Machine: The Contra Guerrilla Force*. (<http://www.ozgurluk.org/mhp/0061.html>). I will quote hereafter both from his book (*Türkische Konterguerilla* ) and his internet article (*Turkey's Killing Machine*).

<sup>68</sup> Celik, *Turkey's Killing Machine*. His source is an Interview with the President of the Turkish

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General Staff Dogan Gures, in Turkish daily *Milliyet* 5./6. September 1992

<sup>69</sup> Lucy Komisar: *Turkey's Terrorists: A CIA Legacy Lives On*. In: *The Progressive*, April 1997

<sup>70</sup> Komisar, *A CIA Legacy*

<sup>71</sup> Celik, *Türkische Konterguerilla*, p. 41 and Komisar, *A CIA Legacy*

<sup>72</sup> Komisar, *A CIA Legacy*

<sup>73</sup> German news magazine *Der Spiegel: Spinne unterm Schafsfell: In Südeuropa war die Guerrilla truppe besonders aktiv - auch bei den Militärputschen in Griechenland und der Türkei?*, November 26 1990, pp. 173-177

<sup>74</sup> Turkish daily *Milliyet*, November 13 1990

<sup>75</sup> Komisar, *A CIA Legacy*

<sup>76</sup> Komisar, *A CIA Legacy*

<sup>77</sup> *Calvo Sotelo asegura que Espana no fue informada, cuando entro en la OTAN, de la existencia de Gladio.*

*Moran sostiene que no oyo hablar de la red clandestina mientras fue ministro de Exteriores*. In: Spanish daily *El Pais*, November 21 1990

<sup>78</sup> Angel Luis de la Calle: *Gladio: Ligacoes obscuras em Espanha*. In: Portugese daily *Expresso*, December 8 1990

<sup>79</sup> Gerardo Serravalle: *Gladio* (Roma: Edizioni Associate, 1991), p. 82

<sup>80</sup> *Spain says it never joined Gladio. TV says agents trained there*. Reuters international news service, November 23 1990

<sup>81</sup> Joao Paulo Guerra: *"Gladio" actuou em Portugal*. In: Portugese daily *O Jornal*, November 16 1990

<sup>82</sup> *Senato della Repubblica. Commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sul terrorismo in Italia e sulle cause della mancata individuazione dei responsabili delle stragi: Il terrorismo, le stragi ed il contesto storico politico*. Redatta dal presidente della Commissione, Senatore Giovanni Pellegrino. Roma 1995, p. 204 and p. 241

<sup>83</sup> *Commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sul terrorismo in Italia e sulle cause della mancata individuazione dei responsabili delle stragi*. 9th session, February 12 1997.

URL: [www.parlamento.it/parlam/bicam/terror/stenografici/steno9.htm](http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/bicam/terror/stenografici/steno9.htm)

<sup>84</sup> Quoted in Stuart Christie: *Stefano Delle Chiaie* (London: Anarchy Publications, 1984), p. 29

<sup>85</sup> Peter Dale Scott: *Transnational Repression: Parafascism and the US*. In: British periodical *Lobster Magazine*, Nr. 12, 1986, p. 16

<sup>86</sup> Egmont Koch and Olivier Schröm: *Deckname Aginter. Die Geschichte einer faschistischen Terror Organisation*, (17 pages. Unpublished), p. 8

<sup>87</sup> Portugese daily *Diario De Noticias*, November 17 1990

<sup>88</sup> Peter Murtagh: *The Rape of Greece. The King, the Colonels, and the Resistance* (London: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 29

<sup>89</sup> Murtagh, *Rape*, p. 24

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- <sup>90</sup> Müller, *Gladio*, p. 55. And Jens Mecklenburg (ed.): *Gladio: Die geheime Terrororganisation der Nato* (Berlin: Elefant Press, 1997), p. 19
- <sup>91</sup> Jacques Baud: *Encyclopédie du renseignement et des services secrets*. (Paris: Lavauzelle, 1997), p. 546
- <sup>92</sup> Murtagh, *Rape*, p. 41
- <sup>93</sup> Philip Agee and Louis Wolf: *Dirty Work. The CIA in Western Europe*. (Secaucus: Lyle Stuart Inc., 1978), pp. 155 and 156
- <sup>94</sup> Agee, *Dirty Work*, p. 154
- <sup>95</sup> Murtagh, *Rape*, p. 114
- <sup>96</sup> Christopher Simpson: *Blowback. America's Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988), p. 81
- <sup>97</sup> Agee, *Dirty Work*, p. 154
- <sup>98</sup> Gentile, *Gladio*, p. 137
- <sup>99</sup> International news service Associated Press, November 14 1990
- <sup>100</sup> Roger Faligot and Pascal Krop: *La Piscine. Les Services Secrets Français 1944 - 1984* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1985), p. 85
- <sup>101</sup> Faligot and Krop, *Piscine*, p. 86
- <sup>102</sup> Jonathan Kwitny: *The CIA's Secret Armies in Europe. An International Story*. In: *The Nation*, April 6 1992, pp. 446 and 447
- <sup>103</sup> Douglas Porch: *The French Secret Services. From the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995), p. 419
- <sup>104</sup> Jonathan Kwitny: *The CIA's Secret Armies in Europe. An International Story*. In: *The Nation*, April 6, 1992 pp. 446 and 447
- <sup>105</sup> Belgian Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry into Gladio, as summarised in British periodical *Statewatch*, January/February 1992
- <sup>106</sup> Jan de Willems (ed.): *Gladio* (Brussels: Editions EPO, 1991), p. 81
- <sup>107</sup> Porch, *Secret Services*, p. 404
- <sup>108</sup> Quoted in Gentile, *Gladio*, p. 141. Also quoted by international news service *Associated Press*, November 13 1990
- <sup>109</sup> Leo Müller: *Gladio. Das Erbe des Kalten Krieges. Der NATO Geheimbund und sein deutscher Vorläufer* (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1991), p. 72. German journalist Leo Müller has certainly offered the best description of the 1952 events in Germany in his early book on NATO's Gladio network. The quote of the testimony of Hans Otto is

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contained in the so called "BDJ TD report", which the government of Hessen made available to the public in the aftermath of the scandal.

<sup>110</sup> Müller, *Gladio*, p. 130, quoting the TD BDJ report.

<sup>111</sup> Speech of Zinn in front of the Landtag in Hessen on October 8, 1952. Reprinted in Müller, *Gladio*, p. 146 - 152.

<sup>112</sup> Quoted in Müller, *Gladio*, p. 14

<sup>113</sup> No author specified: *Das blutige Schwert der CIA. Nachrichten aus dem Kalten Krieg: In ganz Europa gibt es geheime NATO Kommandos, die dem Feind aus dem Osten widerstehen sollen. Kanzler, Verteidigungsminister und Bundeswehrgenerale wussten angeblich von nichts. Die Spuren führen nach Pullach, zur 'stay-behind organisation' des Bundesnachrichtendienstes.* In: German weekly news magazine, *Der Spiegel*, November 19 1990

<sup>114</sup> *Bericht der Bundesregierung über die Stay-Behind Organisation des Bundesnachrichtendienstes.* Four pages written by Lutz Stavenhagen, Bonn. December 3 1990

<sup>115</sup> British periodical *Searchlight*, January 1991

<sup>116</sup> Austrian political magazine *Zoom*, Nr. 4 /5, 1996: *Es muss nicht immer Gladio sein. Attentate, Waffenlager, Erinnerungslücken*, p. 98

<sup>117</sup> German daily *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 23 1996

<sup>118</sup> Jonathan Kwitny: *The CIA's Secret Armies in Europe. An International Story.* In: *The Nation*, April 6 1992, p. 446

<sup>119</sup> Jonathan Kwitny: *The CIA's Secret Armies in Europe. An International Story.* In: *The Nation*, April 6 1992, p. 446

<sup>120</sup> Caroline Drees: *US to reveal details of secret Austria arsenals.* In: International news service *Reuters*, January 22 1996

<sup>121</sup> International news service *Reuters*, January 29 1996

<sup>122</sup> Ian Traynor: *Britain pressed to reveal arsenals: Austria demands truth on Allies' cold war tactics.* In: British daily *The Guardian* January 22. And Hella Pick: *Britain hid arms in cold war Austria: Allies relied on former Waffen SS personnel to repel potential Soviet invasion - US weapons may now be in the hands of neo-Nazis.* In British daily *The Guardian*, January 27 1996

<sup>123</sup> Sam King: *Hunt for secret US war gold grips Austria.* In: British daily *The Sunday Times*, January 28 1996

<sup>124</sup> International news service *Agence France Press*, January 22 1996

<sup>125</sup> *Schweizer Parlament: Bericht der Parlamentarischen Untersuchungskommission zur besonderen Klärung von Vorkommnissen von grosser Tragweite im Eidgenössischen Militärdepartement.* Bern. November 17, 1990, pp. 200 and 204. In Switzerland this crucial document on the stay-behind is referred to as PUK EMD, with "PUK" being short for "parliamentarian investigation" and "EMD" standing for "Defence Departement".

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<sup>126</sup> *Schweizer Bundesrat: Schlussbericht in der Administrativuntersuchung zur Abklärung der Natur von allfälligen Beziehungen zwischen der Organisation P26 und analogen Organisationen im Ausland. Kurzfassung für die Öffentlichkeit.* September 19, 1991, p. 2. Next to the PUK EMD report this document is the second most authoritative source for data on the Swiss stay-behind. Quoted hereafter as "*Short public version of the 1991 Cornu Report*".

<sup>127</sup> Richard Norton-Taylor: *UK trained secret Swiss force.* In: British daily *The Guardian*, September 20 1991

<sup>128</sup> *Short public version of the 1991 Cornu Report*, p. 7

<sup>129</sup> *Short public version of the 1991 Cornu Report*, pp. 16-17

<sup>130</sup> Urs Frieden: *Die England Connection. PUK EMD: P26 Geheimarmist Hürlimann im Manöver.* In: Swiss weekly *Wochenzeitung*, November 30 1990

<sup>131</sup> Kevin Liffey: *Secret Swiss Resistance Force Trained by British.* In: *Reuter News Service*, September 19 1991

<sup>132</sup> *Short public version of the 1991 Cornu Report*, p. 4

<sup>133</sup> The letter is given in full in the *Belgian Senate 1991 Gladio Report*, pp. 212-213

<sup>134</sup> *Enquête parlementaire sur l'existence en Belgique d'un réseau de renseignements clandestin international, rapport fait au nom de la commission d'enquête par MM. Erdman et Hasquin.* Document Senat, session de 1990-1991. Brussels, p. 33. Hereafter quoted as *Belgian Senate 1991 Gladio Report*

<sup>135</sup> *Belgian Senate 1991 Gladio Report*, p. 100

<sup>136</sup> *Belgian Senate 1991 Gladio Report*, p. 29

<sup>137</sup> *Belgian Senate 1991 Gladio Report*, p. 29

<sup>138</sup> *Belgian Senate 1991 Gladio Report*, p. 47

<sup>139</sup> Michel Van Ussel: *Georges 923. Un agent du Gladio belge parle. Témoignage.* (Brussels: Editions La Longue Vue, 1991), p. 57

<sup>140</sup> Paul Koedijk: *De Geheimste Dienst. Gladio in Nederland. De geschiedenis van een halve eeuw komplot tegen de vijand* In: *Vrij Nederland*, January 25 1992, p. 13

<sup>141</sup> Frans Kluiters: *De Nederlandse inlichtingen en veiligheidsdiensten* (Gravenhage: Sud,1993), p. 308

<sup>142</sup> Koedijk, *Geheimste Dienst*, p. 12

<sup>143</sup> Kluiters, *Nederlandse*, p. 311

<sup>144</sup> International news agency *Associated Press*, November 14 1990

<sup>145</sup> International news agency *Associated Press*, November 14 1990

<sup>146</sup> All data from the declarations of Luxembourg Prime Minister Jacques Santer to parliament on November 14 1990. Quoted in full in the Luxembourg daily, *Luxemburger Wort*, November 15 1990

<sup>147</sup> *Luxemburger Wort*, November 15 1990



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- <sup>148</sup> Iver Hoj: *Ogsa Danmark havde hemmelig haer efter anden verdenskrig*. Danish daily *Berlingske Tidende* November 25 1990
- <sup>149</sup> Iver Hoj: *Ogsa Danmark havde hemmelig haer efter anden verdenskrig*. Danish daily *Berlingske Tidende* November 25 1990
- <sup>150</sup> Jacob Andersen: *Mere mystik om dansk Gladio*. Danish daily *Information*, November 26 1990
- <sup>151</sup> Iver Hoj: *Ogsa Danmark havde hemmelig haer efter anden verdenskrig*. Danish daily *Berlingske Tidende* November 25 1990
- <sup>152</sup> Olav Riste: *The Norwegian Intelligence Service 1945 –1970* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), p. 19
- <sup>153</sup> Riste, *Norwegian Intelligence Service*, p. 43
- <sup>154</sup> Quoted in Riste, *Norwegian Intelligence Service*, p. 43
- <sup>155</sup> Riste, *Norwegian Intelligence Service*, p. 47
- <sup>156</sup> Riste, *Norwegian Intelligence Service*, p. 48
- <sup>157</sup> International news service *Associate Press*, November 14 1990
- <sup>158</sup> International news service *Associated Press*, November 14 1990
- <sup>159</sup> Thomas Kanger and Oscar Hedin: *Erlanders hemliga gerilla. I ett ockuperat Sverige skulle det nationella motståndet ledas från Äppelbo skola i Dalarna*. In: Swedish daily *Dagens Nyheter*, October 4 1998
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- <sup>162</sup> Lars Foyen: *Neutral Sweden set up CIA backed resistance network*. In: International news agency *Reuters*, December 18 1990
- <sup>163</sup> British daily *The Guardian*, December 21 1990
- <sup>164</sup> Jonathan Kwitny: *The CIA's Secret Armies in Europe. An International Story*. In: *The Nation*, April 6 1992, p. 448
- <sup>165</sup> Ronald Bye and Finn Sjøe: *Norges Hemmelige Haer - Historien om Stay Behind* (Oslo: Tiden Norsk Verlag, 1995), pp. 71 and 75
- <sup>166</sup> Jukka Rislakki: *Vastarintaliike seurasi presidentti Kekkonen yhteyksiä*. Article given by Rislakki to the author on January 5 2001
- <sup>167</sup> German weekly *Tageszeitung*, August 17 1991, quoting Swedish daily *Dagens Nyheter*, August 14 1991
- <sup>168</sup> Ronald Bye and Finn Sjøe: *Norges Hemmelige Haer - Historien om Stay Behind* (Oslo: Tiden Norsk Verlag, 1995), p. 84. Dave Whipple in an interview with Erhard Helskog and Finn Sjøe in Washington on May 2 1995

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<sup>169</sup> Bye and Sjøe, *Hemmelige Hae*, p. 84. Dave Whipple in an interview with Erhard Hølskog and Finn Sjøe in Washington on May 2 1995

<sup>170</sup> International news service *Reuters Western Europe*, November 15 1990

<sup>171</sup> Debates of the European Parliament, November 22, 1990. Official transcripts