



MIDDLE EAST

TERRORISM

Selected Group Profiles

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MIDDLE EAST TERRORISM: SELECTED GROUP PROFILES

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PREFACE

On February 26, 1993 a powerful bomb exploded in the underground parking garage of the 110-story World Trade Center in New York City. This terrorist attack, the most spectacular incident in the U.S. during the past ten years, left six people dead, over 1,000 injured, and forced tens of thousands of people working and visiting the Center to flee the building in panic.

The physical damage, including a 50-foot deep crater and some 2,500 tons of debris, was devastating. The attack cost its victims more than two billion dollars in lost business, relocation, and repairs. The Center remained closed for several weeks after the blast.

The psychological and political costs make this bombing particularly unique. The incident forced the U.S to accept that international terrorism has acquired a domestic face. America's innocence about its "domestic immunity" from this scourge of violence disappeared when it became clear that Middle Eastern terrorists were involved.

Moreover, despite the historic September 13, 1994 Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles, terrorism in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Israel proper continues. Political violence also has escalated elsewhere in the Middle East, including Lebanon, Egypt, and Algeria.

In light of those developments, Americans have once again renewed their interest in the terrorist phenomenon. This publication is a reference tool providing detailed information about key Middle East groups. Intended audiences include the media, academia, government, and the inquisitive public.

We believe that this study will be an important tool to increase our understanding of these groups and to assist in the development of an effective counter-terrorism policy. The initiative for this effort was taken by Professor Yonah Alexander, formerly director of the Institute for Studies in International Terrorism at the State University of New York and currently directing the Terrorism Studies Program at The George Washington University. Founder and former editor of *Terrorism: An International Journal*, Professor Alexander is general editor of the *International Library of Terrorism*. He has published more than 50 books on terrorism and international affairs.

Professor Alexander organized a team of research assistants from several universities in the U.S. to conduct the work for this project.

James Colbert, JINSA's communications director, managed the long process of transforming the project into this valuable reference tool.

Middle East Terrorism: Selected Group Profiles was made possible through a generous grant from the Edward and Esther Reiner Philanthropic Foundation; Rabbi and Mrs. Robert Reiner, executors.

Thomas Neumann
JINSA Executive Director

Washington, D.C.
September 1, 1994

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INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is the deliberate employment of violence or the threat of violence by subnational groups and sovereign states in order to attain strategic and political objectives. Its function, to create overwhelming fear in a target population larger than the civilian or military victims attacked or threatened, is not new in history. Acts of individual and collective terrorism committed in modern times have introduced a new breed of extra-legal “warfare” in terms of threats, technology, targets, and impact.

A recent example of this new breed of “warfare” was the July 18, 1994 bombing of a large building in Buenos Aires, Argentina that housed many Argentine Jewish organizations. Some 100 people were killed and more than 200 people were wounded in the attack. It is believed that the explosion was caused by a delivery van packed with nearly 340 pounds of ammonium-based explosives.

A similar device was used in the March 1992 attack on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in which 29 people were killed and 242 people were injured. Responsibility for this attack was claimed by “Islamic Jihad,” one guise of the Lebanese Shiite terrorist group Hizballah (Party of God), which is supported both directly and indirectly by Iran. An affiliated body, Supporters of God, claimed credit for the 1994 blast.

Some observers suggest that the spectacular 1994 Buenos Aires operation was motivated by vengeance for the massacre of 43 Moslem worshippers in the mosque located at the historic Cave of the Machpela in Hebron on February 25, 1994. This brutal attack was undertaken by a lone Jewish terrorist, who was subsequently killed by Muslim worshippers on the site.

Another theory is that the Argentine incident was motivated by an Israeli military action on May 21, 1994, when helicopter-borne commandos landed in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley to abduct Mustapha al-Dirani, leader of the pro-Iranian “Faithful Resistance” group.

Whatever the outcome of the investigation of these cases, the fact is that the nature of hundreds of active terrorist groups throughout the world is shrouded in secrecy. Thus, if contemporary society is to make terrorism, initiated in the name of supposedly “higher” ideological and political purposes, a less inviting tactical and strategic tool and a more costly weapon to its precipitators and their nation-

state supporters, then it is critical to expand our knowledge of the motivations and capabilities of these groups.

It is out of this realization that our project grew. A team of young academic researchers working with the Terrorism Studies Project at The George Washington University have examined both published and unpublished materials in an effort to shed some light on selected Middle East terrorist groups located in Algeria, Egypt, Israel (as well as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip), and Lebanon.

This publication represents the first in a series of monographs on the profiles of various terrorist groups in the Middle East and other regions.

Important contributions were made by Jim Colbert, Director of Communications at the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Ayal Frank and Saruhan Hatipoglu (the American University), James Kirkhope (Columbia University), Paul Ginsburg, Donald Pearson, and Charles Thornton (The George Washington University), and Michael Hankard (Georgetown University).

In addition to these researchers, other individuals who have participated at different times on this project include Leah DiOrio, Gavin Rhodes, David Salzberg, and Alejandro Yepes (The George Washington University), Rohan Fyffe (Rutgers University), Glenn Grisdale (Bowling Green State University), Nazly Guzman (Boston College), and Leanne Haworth (George Mason University).

I gratefully acknowledged the valuable assistance given to this project by numerous experts in terrorism studies working with governmental and non-governmental bodies in the U.S. and abroad. Although this publication represents a cooperative effort between The George Washington University Terrorism Studies Project and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, neither institution bears any responsibility for the information contained herein.

Yonah Alexander

The George Washington University

Washington, D.C.

September 1, 1994

ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION

ALSO KNOWN AS

ANO, Al-Iqtab, Arab Revolutionary Brigades (ARB), Arab Revolutionary Council, Black June, Black September, Fatah the Corrective Movement, The Fatah Revolutionary Council (FRC), Punishment, Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims (ROSM).

IDEOLOGY & OBJECTIVES

- Place the “armed struggle” for the removal of Israel as the first priority of the Palestinian resistance movement.
- Affirm the Arab extremist commitment to the destruction of Israel.
- Threaten or attack the interests of pro-Western regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikhdoms.
- Undermine the Israeli-Palestinian peace process by targeting Fatah officials close to PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and by terrorizing Israelis and Jews worldwide.
- Intimidate those states that imprison ANO operatives.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) was formed in 1973 as a breakaway faction of Yasser Arafat’s Fatah after the PLO leader restricted PLO terror activities to targets in Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Abu Nidal chose to fight any effort at moderation by engaging in international terrorist operations against Israeli and Jewish targets and by targeting pro-Arafat Palestinians and moderate Arab states. A rift between Abu Nidal and Arafat has existed since the split. Abu Nidal has been tried in absentia and sentenced to death by the PLO leader.

ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION

The ANO was first headquartered in Iraq (1973-83) and then in Syria (1983-87). Later, the group moved to Libya and then to Iraq. Since 1992, according to an American government report, it has been headquartered in Libya.

The ANO opposes all efforts toward political reconciliation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The organization contends that terrorism within and among Arab states, and within the Palestinian population, is needed to precipitate an all-embracing Arab revolution that alone will lead to the liberation of "occupied Palestine." It is committed to the return of the 3.5 million Palestinian Arabs and their descendants who live outside of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

As Abu Nidal's following grew, the group's operations against Palestinian moderates escalated, including assassinations in 1978 of three prominent PLO officials allied with Yasser Arafat. Abu Nidal operatives have been engaged in battles, some of which became quite large, with forces loyal to Arafat's Fatah in southern Lebanon for the last several years. Senior officials of both sides have died in the ideologically-motivated clashes.

One senior ANO official killed in these clashes was Walid Khaled, the chief spokesman for the Fatah Revolutionary Council and a top aide to Abu Nidal. He was shot to death in July 1992. According to European reports, 150 ANO operatives were killed and 50 were taken prisoner as a result of fighting between these groups in June 1990.

Reports state that Abu Nidal has been forging new links with other terrorist groups in the Middle East, including Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and HAMAS. There may have been attempts to organize a "Muslim front," under Iranian patronage and the participation of HAMAS and the ANO. According to U.S. intelligence sources, the ANO has also sent money to the West

Bank to build a political presence in that area.

LEADERSHIP

The top echelon of Abu Nidal's Fatah Revolutionary Council (FRC) makes up its Political Bureau. The bureau is composed of the following individuals:

- Sabri Al-Banna (also known as Abu Nidal "The Father of the Struggle"), head of the FRC and is the secretary general. It has been reported that Abu Nidal has cancer.
- Isam Awad (alias Zakariya Ibrahim).
- Mansur Hamdan, assistant secretary general since 1991. Prior to that, he was director of the political office and spokesman for the FRC.
- Abdallah Hasan (alias Abu-Nabil), chairman of the Revolutionary Justice Committee, which issues prison and death sentences against ANO members who betray the organization.
- Isam Marqah (alias Salim Ahmad), assumed the post of assistant secretary-general in 1987 from Mustafa Murad, alias Abu-Nizar, but lost the position in 1991 to Mansur Hamdan. Marqah remained a member of the Political Bureau.
- Sulayman Samri, (alias Dr. Ghassan al-Ali), first secretary of the Central Committee and director of the political office of the General Secretariat.
- Muhammad Wasfi Hannun, commander of the "People's Army."
- Shawqi Muhammad Yusuf (alias Munir Ahmad).

MEMBERSHIP

Estimated membership is approximately 500, including several hundred hard-core operatives and militia in Lebanon.

SOURCES OF SUPPORT

Abu Nidal has financial and organizational support worldwide. The ANO is one of the most financially secure terrorist organizations in the world. The ANO is believed to generate funds in equal proportions from patron states, extortion, and its own network of businesses and front organizations.

Although Syrian President Hafez al-Assad expelled Abu Nidal from Damascus in 1987, the organization maintains a conventional military force in Syrian-controlled Lebanon, and

ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION

maintains training camps in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. Another base of ANO operations has been Sudan, where, in 1991, the organization established a camp to train its operatives. At the end of the 1991 Gulf War, it was reported that Abu Nidal had been allowed to open an office in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

The ANO received considerable support, including safe haven, training, logistical assistance, and financial aid, from Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Iran, and Libya. Although Abu Nidal has at times been imprisoned in Libya and then forced to relocate to Baghdad, Iraq, Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi continues to support his operations. According to Arab reports in 1992, Abu Nidal lives in Khartoum, Sudan.

The ANO has received patronage from Iran. Iraq has continued to fund the ANO. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, assistance levels from Iraq were reportedly \$20-\$50 million a year.

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have provided millions of dollars to the ANO since the Gulf War. These countries aided Abu Nidal in the past to keep him from terrorizing Saudi and Kuwaiti interests, including attacks against their diplomats and allied forces stationed in the Gulf during the Gulf War (1990-1).

A senior Fatah official in Lebanon claimed in November 1992 that Abu Nidal annually receives \$19 million from Saudi Arabia and \$41 million from Iran. According to U.S. intelligence sources, these countries have, in recent years, funded the ANO without conditions.

ANO also draws on an undetermined number of support cells in the United States. Three Palestinian immigrants were indicted in 1993 on charges of smuggling money, purchasing weapons and passports illegally, recruiting membership into a criminal enterprise, and helping to plan terrorist acts, including the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Washington, D.C. and killing American Jews.

Before the Berlin Wall fell, the East German secret service provided ANO bases for training in that country. It was re-

ported that Abu Nidal personally negotiated an arms and training deal with East Germany during a 1985 visit to East Berlin. ANO also received support from Western European underground organizations that once received training and weapons from East-bloc nations.

Despite support from a number of states, the ANO maintains its own political agenda. However, many of the ANO's operations coincide with the interests of its sponsors.

HEADQUARTERS

The ANO was headquartered in Iraq (1973-83) and then in Syria (1983-87). Later, the group moved to Libya and then to Iraq. According to a 1992 American government report, it is now headquartered in Libya.

The ANO maintains operatives in Libya, Sudan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, as well as other states in the Middle East and Africa such as Algeria.

AREAS OF OPERATION

Middle East, Europe, and Asia. Countries have included the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Greece, Austria, Pakistan, India, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Sudan, Turkey, Portugal, Cyprus, Libya, Spain, India, Argentina, and the United States.

TACTICS

The ANO's methods of operation include armed attacks on airports and public gathering places, hijackings, bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings. The group's attacks are noted for their ferocity and have caused massive casualties. ANO attacks have killed over 900 people.

TARGETS

Since 1973-4, the ANO is believed to have carried out more than 90 terrorist operations in approximately 20 countries. The group primarily targets the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, European nations, Jews of any nationality, the PLO, and various Arab nations, including officials from

ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION

Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates.

SELECTED ATTACKS

October 1974

Abu Nidal was sentenced to death in absentia by the Fatah faction of the PLO for the attempted assassination of Fatah official Abu Mazim. This attempt on the life of a Fatah official is one of several blamed on Abu Nidal's organization. Among these, Abu Nidal has been charged with killing Saeed Hammami (former head of the PLO office at the Arab League in London) and Dr. Issam Sartawi (the Fatah roving ambassador in Europe). Abu Nidal may also have been responsible for the assassination of Fahd Qawasme, a PLO Executive Committee member, in Amman, Jordan in 1984.

October 1976-77

Blamed for two failed assassination attempts of then-Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam in Damascus (1976) and in Abu Dhabi (1977). The attack in Abu Dhabi killed Saif Ben Goubash, the state minister for foreign affairs of the UAE, who was standing next to Khaddam.

February 1978

Carried out attack at the Nicosia Hotel in Egypt on the 18th, killing Yusuf Sebai, the editor of the Egyptian newspaper *Al-Ahram* and a close associate of Egyptian President Sadat. Fifteen Egyptians died in firefight between Egyptian commandos and Cypriot national guard troops. Terrorists released 30 hostages and surrendered.

August 1978

Attack on the offices of the PLO in Pakistan.

June 1982

Linked to the June 3rd attempted assassination of Shlomo Argov, Israeli Ambassador to the United Kingdom. Argov was left paralyzed by the attack.

November 1984

Assassinated the British High Commissioner in Bombay, India.

July 1985

Responsible for bombings at two Kuwait City cafes that killed 11 people, including Col. Khalil Ghayth al-Abdallah, head of a Kuwait government task force on counter-terrorism. According to western intelligence sources, these bombings and others targeted against Kuwaiti diplomats (as well as Saudi officials) were Abu Nidal's method of terrorizing Kuwait into providing ANO with money.

September 1985

Hijacked an Egyptian airliner to Malta. Sixty people were killed in this incident, during which Egyptian commandos attempted to rescue the passengers.

December 1985

Carried out massacre at the Rome and Vienna airports, killing 18 and injuring 111 on the 27th.

September 1986

Hijacked Pan American Airlines flight #73 in Karachi, Pakistan on the 5th, killing 17 persons and injuring more than 150.

Less than 24 hours after the Karachi attack, ANO operatives attacked the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul, killing 22 worshippers on the 6th.

1988

Attacked Akropol Hotel and the Sudan Club in Khartoum, Sudan, killing 7 people, including two children and injuring four British nationals and three Americans.

July 1988

Carried out an attack on the Greek ferry *The City of Poros* in which 9 people were killed and 98 injured.

August 1988

The ANO claimed responsibility for a bombing in Haifa, Israel that wounded 25 people.

March and October 1989

ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION

In two separate incidents in Brussels, Belgium, Imam Abdullah al-Ahdal (a local Muslim leader) and Dr. Joseph Wybran (a leader of the Belgian Jewish community) were believed to have been murdered by a Beirut-based group called the Soldiers of Justice. It was reported that this group had links to Abu Nidal and Hizballah.

January 1991

Abu Iyad, considered the second most senior official of Fatah after Yassir Arafat, and Abu Hul, commander of the western sector forces of Fatah, were assassinated in Tunis by an Abu Nidal operative called Abu Zeid.

February 1992

Claimed responsibility for a failed attempt by three Abu Nidal terrorists to infiltrate into Israel from southern Lebanon. All three were killed by the Israel Defense Forces in a gun battle. Two Israeli soldiers were injured.

June 1992

ANO is blamed by the PLO for the assassination of PLO security chief Atef Bseiso in Paris.

March 1993

In three separate attacks in Lebanon, ANO gunmen killed a Fatah official, wounded another at the Ain el-Hilweh refugee camp near Sidon, and fired grenades at PLO offices in the Sabra refugee camp, killing one person.

April 1993

Suspected ANO operatives assassinated Fatah's top official, Lt. Col. Ihsan Mohammed Salem (Yunis Awad), near his home in the Beirut suburb of Talet al-Kayyat. During this month, ANO operatives also attacked and killed a senior Fatah official in Sidon, in southern Lebanon.

June 1993

ANO operatives were suspected of killing Col. Anwar Madi, Fatah's military commander in Lebanon on the 30th.

July 1993

Khalil Abu al-Hanna, a senior ANO lieutenant, was shot to death in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley on the 10th.

October 1993

The Israeli-backed South Lebanese Army (SLA) killed two members of the ANO on the 22nd, after they infiltrated into Israel's "security zone" in southern Lebanon.

January 1994

Fifteen ANO members, including two top officials, were accused by Lebanon's judiciary of killing Jordanian diplomat Naeab Maayta in Beirut. The charges were read on March 24. Three of the 15 are in Lebanese custody.

February 1994

On the 22nd, Jordanian security services arrested 25 ANO members. The ANO is held to be responsible for the murder of the Jordanian diplomat in Beirut.

The group's trade office, which had been used as a front for ANO operations, was also closed. Among those arrested were Abbas al-Qaysi and Fathi Abu-Salimah, both long time prisoners released along with others in late 1990.

April 1994

On the 21st, Lebanese troops closed a Fatah Revolutionary Council (FRC) training camp in eastern Lebanon, confiscating four truckloads of weapons and arresting four terrorists. A force of 75 soldiers backed by four APCs moved into the camp near the village of Aita al-Foukhar, two miles west of the Syrian border. The crackdown included seizing large amounts of arms and ammunition from FRC depots in South Lebanon.

May 1994

On the 19th, the Jordanian government ordered the release of all the ANO members detained in February in connection with the murder of its diplomat in Lebanon.

June 1994

On the 13th, ANO member Yousef Sha'aban confessed in open court to placing a bomb on Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988. On trial for the murder of a Jordanian diplomat in

ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION

January, Sha'aban stated, "I personally blew up the Lockerbie plane. I've told the investigating magistrate about it before, but my confession wasn't documented. I say it again now."

The judge in the trial immediately dismissed Sha'aban's statement from the record. Since evidence has strongly linked Libyan intelligence to the Pan Am bombing (despite the fact that the ANO was among a number of groups initially implicated) it is unclear why Sha'aban claimed responsibility. The relationship between the ANO and Libya is well-documented.

DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE

ALSO KNOWN AS

DFLP, Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP).

IDEOLOGY & OBJECTIVES

- The DFLP is a Marxist-Leninist organization that believes the Palestinian national goal cannot be achieved without a revolution of the working class. DFLP has been known as the Palestinian terrorist organization closest to the communist dogma of the Soviet Union. For much of its history, the DFLP had worked closely with the Palestine Communist Party.
- In the early 1980s, the group's stance toward Israel was considered to be between that of Yasser Arafat's Fatah branch of the PLO and the more radical rejectionist groups. The DFLP is a member of the PLO, but it differs with key elements of Chairman Arafat's policies, particularly Palestinian participation in the peace process (initiated in the 1991 Madrid conference) and the September 1993 Declaration of Principles between Israel and the PLO.
- Seeks revolutionary change in the Arab world, especially in the conservative monarchies, as a necessary precursor to the achievement of Palestinian objectives.
- Advocates an international stance that places the Palestinian struggle within a general world context of liberation in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
- Believes that elite members of the movement should not be separated from the masses. Lower classes should first be educated in true socialism in order to carry out the battle of liberation.
- Repeatedly affirms its "hostility and resistance" to U.S. policy in the Middle East, its support for the nonaligned bloc, and its solidarity with all national liberation move-

DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE

ments that fight against “imperialism” and “racism.”

- Called for upgrading the *intifada* to an armed conflict against Israeli soldiers and civilians in the occupied territories.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The DFLP split from the PFLP in 1969.

At the Spring 1977 Palestine National Council meeting, the DFLP gave its full support to the Palestinian national program, seeking creation of a Palestinian state on any territory liberated from Israel. In this context, the group considers itself more pragmatic and realistic than other radical Palestinian factions which continue to call for the liberation of all of “Palestine.”

In mid-1979, the DFLP reportedly experienced an upsurge in membership and an accompanying increase in influence. Although it remained a member of the Executive Committee of the PLO, the DFLP cooperated increasingly with Palestinian extremists opposed to Fatah, the largest Palestinian faction which is headed by Yasser Arafat.

At the end of 1988, DFLP leader Yasser Abd el-Rabbuh, who was a member of the PLO Executive Committee, indicated that tensions between himself and rival leader Nayif Hawatmeh were reaching a critical stage when Abd el-Rabbuh backed the PLO’s initiative to Israel at the time, which included Arafat’s renunciation of terrorism.

In May 1990, terrorists loyal to Abu Abbas’s Palestine Liberation Front attempted to massacre civilians at a Tel Aviv beach. The attempt violated PLO leader Arafat’s renunciation of PLO terror and ended the ongoing U.S. dialogue with the PLO. At that time, Yasser Abd el-Rabbuh was the PLO representative communicating with U.S. State Department representative Robert Pelletreau.

In July 1991, Abd el-Rabbuh’s faction within the DFLP split from that of Hawatmeh’s faction. The Abd el-Rabbuh-Hawatmeh split was the result of a disagreement concerning

acceptable conditions for Palestinian participation in the peace process. The split occurred after a series of meetings between the two in Damascus earlier that month failed to resolve their differences.

During the DFLP general national congress in Amman in September 1991, Abd el-Rabbuh was elected the Front's secretary general. Hawatmeh's response was that the election was "false and illegitimate."

Soon after the election, Abd el-Rabbuh renounced the Marxist-Leninist line and announced that his faction was a democratic organization that would address itself to all Palestinians.

In 1992, the DFLP of Hawatmeh and the PFLP of Dr. George Habash set up an umbrella organization in Damascus, Syria.

In October 1992, Abd el-Rabbuh announced that he favored continuing the talks on Palestinian self-rule with Israel.

In December 1992, Hawatmeh's faction forcefully took over one of Abd el-Rabbuh's offices in the Yarmouk refugee camp outside Damascus.

In February 1993, Abd el-Rabbuh dropped the DFLP name. Hawatmeh's Damascus-based faction retained the DFLP name and continued to oppose accommodation with Israel. Hawatmeh's DFLP then joined with the PFLP-GC in calling for an end to Palestinian negotiations with Israel and an increase in violent attacks against Israel.

Cooperation between Hawatmeh's DFLP and the PFLP and PFLP-GC leadership signified a formal move to challenge Arafat's Fatah for the leadership of the Palestinian cause. These groups and seven other factions, brought together by their opposition to PLO-sanctioned participation in the peace negotiations with Israel, were based in Syria and, under this umbrella, became known as the "Damascus Ten."

In 1993, it was reported that Abd el-Rabbuh's faction of the DFLP was the driving force behind the new political party in the West Bank and Gaza Strip known as the Palestinian Democratic Union (FIDA). FIDA is reported to be close to Arafat and is based in Ramallah. Abd el-Rabbuh has supported the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and has suggested they may

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be the only practical way to achieve an interim solution. FIDA is reportedly composed of members of Abd el-Rabbuh's faction, members of the Popular Struggle Front of Samir Ghosheh, former members of the Palestine Communist Party (now known as the People's Party), and others.

FIDA's platform reportedly calls for:

- ending the Israeli occupation.
- achieving Palestinian independence.
- repatriation of Palestinians abroad.
- defending the social and democratic interests of various classes and popular groups.
- ensuring wider participation in decision making by these groups.
- redressing the national course and the *intifada*.
- emphasizing the Palestinian "right" to wage "all forms of struggle" to end the occupation.
- emphasizing the need to "develop the *intifada* and mass action."

According to two Palestinian radio station reports in early March 1994, seven Palestinian groups, the DFLP, Fatah, HAMAS, FIDA, the Palestinian People's Party, PFLP, and the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), issued a joint statement urging Yasser Arafat to halt the peace process with Israel and calling for an escalation of the *intifada*. The groups pledged to pursue the armed struggle against "occupation soldiers and herds of settlers" and called the Israeli government "unreliable and not serious." They called for "inflicting painful blows on the Zionist enemy which has removed its mask and revealed its true face."

Following the May 5, 1994 Cairo agreement between Israel and the PLO, DFLP leader Nayif Hawatmeh insisted on continuing the armed struggle against Israel. PFLP leader George Habash called the agreement "humiliating" and advised that the DFLP and his own front hold an emergency meeting to adopt actions in response.

In early June 1994, both the DFLP and the PFLP condemned Jordan for peace gestures toward Israel. The two radical

groups claimed that the Jordanian-Israeli agreement signed at the White House and known as the “Washington Declaration,” violated Arab coordination and opened the door for “normalizing relations between Jordan and Israel at the same time Israel continues to hold onto Arab land occupied since 1967.”

LEADERSHIP

- Nayif Hawatmeh, age 49, is a Jordanian. He founded the DFLP in 1969 after leaving the PFLP. Hawatmeh was the first PLO leader to openly advocate the abandonment of the goal of destroying Israel and creating a Palestinian state in its place. Hawatmeh continues to call for violence against Israel to force it to end the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, he has been accused of “Jordanizing” the DFLP. Most of the identified leaders of his faction are not Palestinians. In 1994, Abd el-Rabbuh was given the post of minister for culture and arts in the administration of Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and Jericho. He returned to the territories in mid-July 1994.
- Yassir Abd el-Rabbuh was, until 1991, the assistant secretary general and the DFLP’s second-in-command. He served as a member of the PLO Executive Committee, headed the PLO’s Information Department, and led the PLO’s dialogue with the United States from late 1988 until mid-1990. Abd el-Rabbuh claimed to have taken control of the DFLP after its split in 1991. In September 1991, he was elected secretary general of the FIDA during a DFLP congress in Amman, Jordan.

Abd el-Rabbuh seemingly has tried to “Palestinize” the DFLP through a close embrace of the PLO and Arafat. He has supported Fatah’s approaches toward Israel. In October 1992, Abd el-Rabbuh favored continuing Palestinian/PLO talks with Israel and criticized DFLP radicals opposed to the talks.

MEMBERSHIP

Estimated at 500.

SOURCES OF SUPPORT

DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE

Financial and military assistance has been provided by Syria and Libya.

HEADQUARTERS

Syria and Lebanon.

AREAS OF OPERATION

Syria, Lebanon, Israel and the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

TACTICS

In the 1970s, the DFLP carried out numerous bombings, grenade attacks, and spectacular operations intended to seize hostages and negotiate their release for the return of Palestinian terrorists held in Israeli prisons.

TARGETS

The group has historically concentrated on attacking civilians within Israel. Since 1988, the DFLP has been involved in small-scale border raids into Israel and violent attacks in the occupied territories.

SELECTED ATTACKS

May 1974

Took over a schoolhouse in Maalot, in northern Israel, and massacred Israeli hostages. Twenty-seven schoolchildren were killed and 134 people were wounded.

November 1974

In an attack on the Israeli town of Beit She'an, three armed DFLP terrorists barricaded themselves in a building demanding the release of 15 jailed Palestinians.

January 1979

Attempted to seize 230 civilians at a hotel in Maalot. The three armed DFLP terrorists were killed by an Israel De-

fense Force (IDF) patrol.

March 1979

Claimed responsibility for planting bombs in Israeli buses to protest President Carter's visit to Israel.

February 1984

Claimed responsibility for a grenade explosion in Jerusalem that wounded 21.

May 1988

Fire bombs at Israeli Minister Ariel Sharon's car. There were no injuries.

August 1990

Ambushed an Israeli military patrol in the Israeli "security zone" in southern Lebanon. (According to the organization, four Israeli soldiers were killed or wounded.)

July 1991

Attacked on an Israeli military patrol in the Gaza Strip on the 1st. (Following the incident, the organization claimed to have killed or wounded seven Israeli soldiers.)

Killed an Israeli soldier at an army post on Mt. Hermon near the Israel-Syrian border on the 3rd.

Claimed responsibility for shooting at an Israeli at the Moraj junction in the Gaza Strip on the 8th.

February 1992

Claimed responsibility for a grenade attack on the IDF headquarters in Jenin, on the West Bank. There were no injuries or damage.

October 1992

Attempted to infiltrate northern Israel from Lebanon to attack Israeli civilians. Three operatives of Hawatmeh's faction were captured on the Israeli-Lebanese border, near Mt. Hermon. Armed with rifles and hand grenades, the three surrendered after they were spotted by and brought under fire by IDF troops.

December 1992

Moderate elements of the DFLP said their offices at the Yarmouk refugee camp in Damascus, Syria, were seized at gunpoint by radical DFLP elements on December 3.

DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE

March 1993

Claimed responsibility for the killing of one Israeli soldier and the wounding of two near the town of Ariel in the West Bank.

May 1993

Claimed responsibility for an ambush attack in the Israeli "security zone" in southern Lebanon, where an Israeli tank was destroyed and seven IDF soldiers were killed.

October 1993

Issued a statement in Damascus claiming responsibility for the stabbing of an Israeli in Hebron in the West Bank. The victim was wounded.

November 1993

Claimed responsibility, along with HAMAS, for an attack in Hebron on the car of former Knesset member Rabbi Chaim Druckman, which resulted in the death of his driver and seriously wounded the rabbi.

On November 28, Israeli helicopters attacked bases belonging to the DFLP and the PFLP in the Ain el-Hilweh refugee camp near Sidon, Lebanon. A Palestinian terrorist and two refugees were injured and two offices were damaged. The following day, Nayif Hawatmeh, the DFLP leader, vowed to step up attacks on Israel to avenge the raid and said it "proves that the conflict with the occupiers and the *intifada* is still on."

December 1993

On December 22, two Israelis were shot at close range and killed in the village of Baytuniya, near Ramallah, on the West Bank. The military wing of the DFLP claimed responsibility for the attack.

March 1994

A Damascus-based radio station reported that the DFLP claimed that a member of its Red Star battalion was killed by an Israeli after the terrorist stabbed two Israelis in Gush Katif, in the Gaza Strip on March 7. It was also claimed that other members of the battalion escaped after the attack.

On March 12, two Palestinian terrorists believed to be-

long to the DFLP were killed and a third was captured near the Lebanese-Israeli border after infiltrating the “security zone” and then spotted by an SLA patrol near the village of Shebaa. A fourth gunman was arrested by UN peacekeepers.

On March 31, DFLP claimed responsibility for the death of an Israeli attacked with axes by two Gazan laborers near Tel Aviv.

July 1994

Claimed responsibility for the stabbing of two Israelis in Kiryat Netafim on the West Bank just before Yasser Arafat’s visit to the territories. DFLP issued a statement which said that part of its strategy was to derail the Palestinian self-rule agreement between the PLO and Israel and claimed the attack on behalf of “a unit of the Red Star forces.” The Palestinian Islamic Jihad also claimed responsibility for the attack.

August 1994

Claimed responsibility for a grenade attack on an Israeli military post in Bethlehem on the 23rd that slightly injured four soldiers.

HAMAS

ALSO KNOWN AS

HAMAS is an acronym for Harakat al-Muqawanah al-Islamiyya, which is Arabic for “Islamic Resistance Movement.” Hamas, as a word, can mean “zealot,” “strength,” and “bravery” in Arabic.

IDEOLOGY & OBJECTIVES

- Commitment to Islam as a way of life.
- Destruction of the “Zionist entity.” According to the movement, the only solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is the fighting of a Holy War, *Jihad*, against Israel.
- Creation of Palestinian Arab state replacing Israel. The movement contends that all of Israel is located on Islamic sacred land. Any concessions that would leave part of the land in Israel’s hands constitutes treason to the Palestinian-Arab cause as well as religious heresy.
- Synthesis of Pan Islamic religious ideals and Palestinian nationalism.
- Active opposition to the Middle East peace process.

HAMAS has laid out the following principles as conditions for joining the Palestine National Council:

- to consider all the land from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River and from the Negev to Lebanon as an Arab state.
- to refuse to recognize Israel.
- to emphasize an armed uprising against Israel.

According to a number of HAMAS spokesmen, the group would be willing to join the Palestine Liberation Organization only if it was allocated 40 percent of the seats in the Palestine National Council. At least one HAMAS spokesman has called for the election of a national Palestinian par-

liament which would redefine the structure and shape of the PLO.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

HAMAS is a radical Islamic fundamentalist organization set up by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin shortly after the *intifada* erupted in December 1987. Its aim was to counter and compete with the secular Palestinian command of the uprising and parallel the violent tactics of the radical Palestinian Islamic Jihad. HAMAS is based on the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood which was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Sheikh Hasan al-Bana. HAMAS originated as the underground military wing of the Brotherhood, and has evolved into a strong political organization.

In September 1989, HAMAS was declared an illegal organization by the Government of Israel. In November of that year, the organization's leading members, including Sheikh Yassin, had charges brought against them by the Israeli government. Yassin himself was tried on nine separate charges including direct involvement in four murders, incitement, possession of firearms, and leadership of an illegal organization.

HAMAS was in open conflict with Iran in the past but has of late smoothed things over with the Islamic republic. Today, HAMAS has organizational and financial links with the Iranian government. HAMAS remains in conflict with the PLO but has also conducted negotiations with it as well. HAMAS officials have met with senior PLO officials, including Yasser Arafat, though some of its hard core members have fought PLO Fatah activists in Gaza.

The HAMAS command network was formed in the last two years as part of the movement's reorganization in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and includes three compartments:

1. Public - Muslim Brotherhood members who are active in Palestinian-Arab institutions and politics.
2. Underground Network - hardcore members that organize demonstrations, transfer funds, carry out intelligence mis-

HAMAS

sions, and battle PLO activists in the territories.

3. Military Wing - The Qassim Battalions make up the militant wing of HAMAS. These armed squads target Israeli civilians and soldiers, as well as Palestinian collaborators. Hardcore members called "Striking Arms" target Israelis and a second underground division called the "Islamic Police" attacks Palestinian Arabs. The Battalions are named for Izzadin al-Qassim, a renowned Palestinian Arab guerilla who fought against the British Army in Mandate Palestine in the 1930s.

HAMAS opposes the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks and uses terrorism in Israel and in the West Bank and Gaza to undermine the talks. This action has served to both intensify HAMAS' five-year rivalry with the PLO (particularly the "mainstream" Fatah branch) and force a strong response from Israel. HAMAS is not represented in the Palestine National Council because of its dispute with the PLO over how many seats it should be given in this body. HAMAS has also made the adoption of many of its objectives a prerequisite for joining the Council.

At the same time, HAMAS has sought (with some success) to improve relations with various Arab states, as well as Iran, at the expense of the PLO. The movement's condemnation of Iraq's invasion and subsequent occupation of Kuwait in 1990-91, unlike the PLO's support of it, should be understood in this context. Senior-level meetings between HAMAS and Fatah officials have been held in Khartoum, Sudan and Tunis, Tunisia. More often than not, the sporadic dialogue has resulted in agreements to disagree.

The rivalry between HAMAS and the PLO has led to bloody clashes between activists of the Islamic movement and those of Fatah in Gaza. These clashes were normally followed by mutual accusations and insults about the other side's respective ideology and objectives. According to a number of reports, HAMAS and the PLO reached an understanding following the signing of the September 1993 Israel-PLO decla-

ration of principles that neither organization would resort to violence against the other.

Reports indicate that HAMAS has also signed an agreement with Iran, in which organizational and financial assistance would be provided to HAMAS by the Islamic republic. This assistance and Iran's vehement opposition to the PLO accord with Israel will likely strengthen HAMAS and have no effect on its bid to challenge PLO interests in the West Bank and Gaza.

Israel's deportation of more than 400 Palestinian Arabs including suspected HAMAS leaders and activists (as well as sympathizers of the radical Palestinian Islamic Jihad) to southern Lebanon in December 1992, weakened HAMAS' organizational infrastructure. However, reports stated that HAMAS' popularity grew following the deportations and note that the first months of 1993 saw a number of daring terrorist attacks by the Qassim Battalions. It would appear that HAMAS' Islamic ideology, welfare system, and violent anti-Israel methods are a popular alternative to the PLO for many Palestinian Arabs in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.

In June 1993, HAMAS restated its vow to carry out terrorist attacks as long as Palestinian delegations continue to negotiate with Israel. HAMAS called upon its operatives and sympathizers to escalate attacks against Israeli soldiers, security and police personnel, and IDF facilities. As in the past, Palestinians were also ordered to close their shops and boycott jobs in Israel. HAMAS designated special days for mass demonstrations and protests as well.

On September 9, 1993, 189 Palestinian deportees, including HAMAS members, were permitted by Israel to return to their homes after being exiled for nine months. Nineteen returned to Israel before this date and the remaining 207 deportees were permitted to return in mid-December 1993.

LEADERSHIP

- Imad al-Alami, an engineer deported from Gaza in 1990, is

HAMAS

HAMAS liaison to Iran and is based in Tehran.

- Mustafa Kanua, deported from Gaza in 1991, represents HAMAS in Lebanon and is the HAMAS liaison to Hizballah.
- Dr. Moussa Abu-Marzuk is head of the political bureau and is liaison to groups such as the PFLP, DFLP and PFLP-GC.
- Muhammad Nazzal, deported from Gaza, is a senior HAMAS official and head of the movement's office in Jordan.
- Abd al-Aziz Rantisi was deported along with some 400 Palestinians to southern Lebanon in December 1992 where he served as the deportees' spokesman. (Rantisi was jailed for six months after Israel permitted his return to the country in December 1993.)
- Ibrahim Rusha, the official spokesman of HAMAS, is based in Jordan.
- Mohammed Sawalha is a recognized HAMAS leader based in London.
- Sheikh Ahmed Yassin founded HAMAS in December 1987. Yassin is a cleric and head of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza. He was given a life sentence by Israel in 1989. Yassin remains HAMAS' spiritual leader.

In addition, there is an upper echelon of activists based primarily in Saudi Arabia. They are responsible for the flow of Saudi funds to the West Bank and Gaza

MEMBERSHIP

There are thousands of supporters and sympathizers, including a small, but unknown size of hardcore operatives. A significant number of these militant activists, wanted by Israeli authorities, have been killed or jailed by the IDF and Israel's security services in the past two years. A number have also been reported to have fled to Egypt. While not all of these operatives, known collectively as the Qassim Battalions, have been killed or caught, they have been constrained by Israel's counter-terrorist tactics. As a result, organized group operations are less frequent than terrorist acts committed by individuals.

SOURCES OF SUPPORT

HAMAS maintains operational and/or organizational links to Islamic governments or movements in Iran, Sudan, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. An unknown number of the movement's activists are trained in Sudan. Many were recruited out of Palestinian camps in Jordan and from inside the occupied territories. Some are veterans of the Afghan war.

HAMAS raises funds from several sources to finance its social and military activities. Donations and membership dues are collected from activists and supporters in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Fundraising is conducted in Islamic and Arab countries and in Palestinian communities worldwide. Reports have indicated that HAMAS received direct financial aid from Arab and Islamic countries including Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.

Iran signed an agreement with HAMAS to undermine the peace process between the Israeli and Palestinian delegations (including the PLO). In return, Iran promised to provide the Palestinian Islamic movement with \$10-20 million dollars annually. Reports indicate that Iran has already delivered on this promise, although the exact sum of the Iranian government's financial assistance to HAMAS is not known. HAMAS was initially cool towards Tehran because of differences between its Sunni background (in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood) and the Shi'a ideology prevalent in Iran, but this antagonism has been dissipating. Warmer relations between Iran and HAMAS can be partially explained by the latter's improving relations with the Iranian-backed Hizballah in Lebanon. Utilizing Iranian backing, Hizballah and HAMAS regard themselves as allies but they operate independently of each other. In addition to furnishing financial assistance, Iran has also provided organizational support to HAMAS, including an agreement to open a HAMAS office in Tehran to increase coordination between them.

HAMAS has diversified its holdings and sources of finance recently to avoid a concentration of influence. Iran report-

HAMAS

edly allocated HAMAS \$15 million for 1993. Kuwait is not restricting private donations to HAMAS institutions in the West Bank and Gaza because of the Islamic movement's opposition to Iraq's invasion and occupation of that country in 1990-1.

HEADQUARTERS

Much of HAMAS' organizational leadership is based outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A sizeable network for policymaking and fundraising is located in the United States. Reports have stated that operational branches (including the movement's international military wing) is commanded by personnel outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip as well. The primary command network, however, exists in those territories.

AREAS OF OPERATION

West Bank, east Jerusalem and Gaza. The public relations infrastructure of HAMAS is based in Amman, Jordan and is under the guidance of Ibrahim Rusha, the movement's official spokesman. Muhammad Nazzal, head of the HAMAS office in Jordan, turned this post into the headquarters of the movement's political, economic, and military activity. In Jordan, HAMAS enjoys a level of immunity from the Hashemite monarchy.

TACTICS

Kidnappings, assassinations, bombings, protests, strikes, agitation, and demonstrations. Qassim squads are recruited and trained from impoverished neighborhoods and operate in 2-3 man cells. These operatives are typically in their 20s or early 30s. The hardcore wing of the movement is known to hide firearms in mosques and the homes of sympathizers.

TARGETS

Israeli civilians, security service personnel, soldiers, and Palestinian collaborators. Targets have also included Israel Defense Force (IDF) installations in the West Bank and Gaza as well as Israeli civilian and military vehicles. (In early December 1993, HAMAS stated that it would change tactics by targeting Israeli settlers instead of Israeli soldiers.)

SELECTED ATTACKS

December 1990

Claimed responsibility for the fatal stabbings of three Israelis in Jaffa's industrial zone, in central Israel on the 14th. Following this incident, Israel arrested more than 1,500 HAMAS members in the West Bank and Gaza.

October 1991

Claimed responsibility for an attack in which two Israeli soldiers were killed and 11 others injured when a Palestinian Arab drove a van into the group standing at a suburban Tel-Aviv bus station on the 11th.

January 1992

Claimed responsibility for a shooting of an Israeli in Kfar Darom in Gaza on the 1st.

February 1992

The Qassim Battalions claimed responsibility for three bomb blasts in the Jewish settlement at Nitzarim, in Gaza, on the 9th. A woman was seriously injured in the first blast and two soldiers were hurt in a subsequent explosion.

May 1992

On the 17th, an Israeli merchant was shot to death by a Qassim Battalions squad near the Beit Lahya refugee camp in Gaza. In separate incidents on the 22nd, two Israeli teenagers were stabbed by Arabs: In Jerusalem, a 15-year-old Jewish seminary student was wounded by an attacker who stabbed him in the back and a 15-year-old girl was stabbed to death in the town of Bat Yam near Tel Aviv. The girl's assailant, a 19-year-old HAMAS activist from Gaza, reportedly tried to attack several other students before being caught.

HAMAS

Three suspected members of the Qassim Battalions and an Israeli border policeman died in a clash during an operation to rout members of the HAMAS group in Gaza on the 24th.

On the 27th, the rabbi of Kfar Darom in Gaza was stabbed to death by a HAMAS activist. The assailant was apprehended and admitted to affiliation with the Qassim Battalions.

June 1992

Graffiti on Gaza walls claimed that the Qassim Battalions were responsible for a June 25 attack in which an Arab man stabbed two Israelis to death in Gaza. Two Palestinians were killed in the Gaza town of Khan Yunis by HAMAS over the weekend of June 13-14.

July 1992

In Gaza, during the week of July 7, more than 1,000 members of HAMAS and the Fatah faction of the PLO fought each other with fists, clubs, and guns. Eight people were shot and wounded and 20 more were beaten in a melee at the Rafah refugee camp.

September 1992

In Gaza, three members of the Qassim Battalions kidnapped a hitchhiking Israeli soldier and stabbed him in the neck critically wounding him on the 18th.

An Israeli border policeman was shot and killed in Jerusalem on the 22nd. The murderer was captured and claimed he had been recruited by the Qassim Battalions. An anonymous caller claimed responsibility for the attack on behalf of the Qassim Battalions.

October 1992

Qassim Battalions claimed responsibility for an attack on two Israeli soldiers in Hebron on the West Bank on the 21st. Operatives followed an Israeli army jeep in a car and fired at four soldiers inside.

Shots were fired from a moving vehicle at an Israeli

army post in Hebron on the 25th. One soldier was killed and another soldier was wounded in the attack.

December 1992

A number of shootings and stabbings of Israeli civilians and soldiers in Israel and in the West Bank and Gaza, including a December 12 kidnapping and murder of an Israeli border guard in the Israeli town of Lod. The murder precipitated the deportation of some 400 suspected HAMAS (and Islamic Jihad) members and collaborators to southern Lebanon.

On the 7th, three terrorists opened fire on an Israeli army jeep with automatic weapons near the Kibbutz Nachal Oz roadblock in the northern Gaza. Three soldiers were killed. Leaflets later distributed in the area claimed that the attack was carried out by the Qassim Battalions.

A Qassim Battalions cell claimed responsibility for an attack on the 12th in which shots were fired at an army jeep at the southern entrance to Hebron, in the West Bank. One soldier was killed and two others were injured in this attack.

January 1993

HAMAS claimed responsibility for both the January 3 murder of an Israeli security officer in Jerusalem and the January 20 murder of an Israeli woman in the industrial district of Holon, Israel.

Two IDF soldiers were killed and a third was wounded in an ambush near Khan Yunis, in Gaza, on the 30th. The attackers reportedly dug under a settlement's security fence and lay in wait for the army patrol. Israeli intelligence sources attributed the attack to HAMAS.

March 1993

Claimed responsibility for two attacks on the 20th. In a pre-dawn ambush on an Israeli army patrol, one soldier was shot to death in Gaza. In the second attack, another Israeli soldier was shot to death while on patrol just outside Ariel, on the West Bank.

HAMAS also planted a bomb which was successfully disarmed in the Israeli town of Ramat Eifal. Eighteen members of the Qassim Battalions were arrested following these attacks.

HAMAS

April 1993

The Qassim Battalions claimed responsibility for a car bomb that exploded in the West Bank at a roadside restaurant frequented by Israeli servicemen. Two Arabs and eight Israeli soldiers were killed while a third Arab was slightly wounded.

HAMAS claimed responsibility for the wounding of two Israeli soldiers stabbed in the West Bank on the 12th.

May 1993

A joint attack involving Qassim Battalion and Fatah Hawks operatives ambushed and killed two Arabs and two Israeli vegetable merchants in Gaza on the 16th.

July 1993

Claimed responsibility for an attack in which two Israeli women were killed after terrorists opened fire inside a commuter bus in Jerusalem, then hijacked a passing car in an effort to escape. Two of the attackers, both members of the Qassim Battalions, were killed by Israeli soldiers in a shootout.

August 1993

Two days after an August 5 attack, the Qassim Battalions claimed responsibility for abducting and killing an Israeli soldier who was hitchhiking from an army base near Ramallah on the West Bank. The soldier's body was burned in a car that was found near Jerusalem.

The Qassim Battalions claimed responsibility for a shootout in the West Bank in which two Israeli soldiers and a Palestinian gunman were killed on the 6th.

September 1993

Claimed responsibility for two separate attempts on September 14 to kill Israeli soldiers and policemen in Gaza. Two HAMAS supporters were shot dead in the attacks. One Israeli soldier was wounded in the first attack while no Israe-

lis were hurt in the second.

In addition to these attacks, responsibility was claimed for the stabbing murder of a 22-year-old Israeli man whose body was found later (October 1) in a citrus grove near Ra'ananah in central Israel.

October 1993

The Qassim Battalions claimed responsibility for an attack on October 18 in which an Israeli was shot and wounded in the northern sector of Gaza.

On the 24th, two Israeli soldiers hitchhiking in Gaza were kidnapped and killed by HAMAS terrorists. In a leaflet distributed later, HAMAS said the attack was in revenge for the killing of Palestinians in the *intifada*. It also said that the slayings "will continue."

On the 29th, HAMAS claimed responsibility for killing an Israeli civilian abducted the day before near Ramallah, in the West Bank, and later found dead.

November 1993

HAMAS and the Damascus-based DFLP claimed responsibility for an attack in which gunmen opened fire on the car of Rabbi Haim Druckman, a former Knesset member on the 7th.

In a shoot out on the 24th in Gaza, a leader of the Qassim Battalions, Imad Aqel, was killed by Israeli soldiers. Aqel was reportedly involved in at least nine attacks against Israeli soldiers in Gaza.

December 1993

Claimed responsibility for a daytime drive-by assault on Israeli civilians near Ramallah in the West Bank in which two Israelis were killed: a 24-year-old teacher from Jerusalem and a 19-year-old. Two other Israelis were also injured in this incident on the 1st. In a statement distributed in Gaza the same day, HAMAS said the attack was the first of a "plan of five parts that will shake the Jewish state."

Claimed responsibility for the murders of an Israeli and his young son shot in their van on the 6th.

Eliahu Levin and Meir Mendelovitch were killed by shots fired at their car from a passing vehicle in the Ramallah area on the 22nd.

Lt. Col. Meir Mintz, commander of the IDF special forces in the Gaza area, was shot and killed by terrorists in an ambush on his jeep at the T-junction in Gaza on the 24th.

HAMAS

January 1994

Grigory Ivanov was stabbed to death by a terrorist in the industrial zone at the Erez junction near the Gaza Strip on the 14th.

February 1994

Noam Cohen, age 28, member of the General Security Service, was shot and killed in an ambush while in his car on the 13th. Two of his colleagues also in the vehicle suffered moderate injuries.

Claimed responsibility for the murder of Israeli Tzipora Sasson, who was shot in the head and abdomen while in her car on the 19th. She was pregnant.

March 1994

Claimed responsibility for an attack on an Israeli passenger bus on the 27th that wounded the driver and one of the passengers.

April 1994

Detonated car bomb in a suicide attack at the Israeli town of Afula on the 13th that killed seven civilians and wounded 52. The car was filled with explosives and nails.

Claimed responsibility for an attack on the 14th in the Israeli town of Ashdod in which one civilian was killed and two were wounded by a lone terrorist with a gun.

Detonated a bomb at the central bus station on the 20th in the Israeli town of Hadera. Five were killed and 30 wounded.

Shachar Simani, 20, of Ashkelon, a cadet in the IDF officer's training course, was stabbed to death and his body was found in Beit Hanina on the 21st. HAMAS claimed responsibility for the attack.

May 1994

Islamic Jihad and HAMAS both claimed responsibility for a drive-by shooting on the 27th in Gaza that killed two Israeli soldiers.

July 1994

Killed a 17-year old Israeli woman, Sarit Prigal, as she drove with her father near the West Bank settlement of Ariel.

Kidnapped and killed Israeli soldier Aryeh Frankenthal on the 13th near the West bank town of Ramallah.

HIZBALLAH

ALSO KNOWN AS

Islamic Jihad, Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, Organization of the Oppressed, Party of God, Revolutionary Justice Organization, Ansarollah (Partisans of God).

IDEOLOGY & OBJECTIVES

Hizballah was founded in 1982 in Lebanon as an umbrella organization comprised of radical fundamentalist Shiite groups. It is a political, social, and military organization whose focus and general identity in Lebanon resembles the ideology and militancy of the Iranian revolution. Hizballah is dedicated to the removal of all non-Islamic influences from Lebanon as well as from the region. Hizballah espouses an intense hatred of any influence that contradicts or does not support its Shi'a Islamic ideology.

Hizballah's immediate goal is to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon modeled after the Islamic Republic of Iran and based on Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic ideology. The organization aspires to export the Islamic revolution and to create a worldwide Islamic republic headed by Shiite clerics.

Hizballah preaches war against "western imperialism," epitomized by "the Great Satan" (the United States) and does not recognize the right of the State of Israel to exist. The organization also opposes the U.S.-brokered peace process involving Israel, Lebanon and Syria. Hizballah is regarded as one of the most aggressive and lethal terrorist organizations in the Middle East.

Hizballah's political platform, as published in 1985:

- the establishment of an Islamic republic in Lebanon.
- the fight against western imperialism must be carried on until it is removed from Lebanon and Palestine.
- the conflict with Israel must be carried out in Israel as well as in Lebanon because Islamic rule in Jerusalem is vital.

HIZBALLAH

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Hizballah resulted from a merger between Husayn Musawi's Islamic Amal organization and the Lebanese branch of the Da'wa Party in 1982-83. (Hizballah and other Amal factions fought over the allegiance of the Shiite population of the Bekaa Valley in sporadic combat.)

Iran's increased presence and influence in Lebanon in the early 1980s also contributed to the founding of Hizballah. It is believed that Mahtashemi Pur, Iran's ambassador to Lebanon at the time, played a large role in organizing Hizballah. (As of 1994, Pur remained one of the highest leaders in Iran.) Also in 1982, it was reported that Iranian fighters had been sent to Lebanon to help establish a revolutionary Islamic movement. This movement became known as Hizballah.

The organization's infrastructure includes a resilient militant wing that employs terrorist methods to further its religious and political goals in Lebanon. The Leadership Council is made up of Shiite clerics who take their instructions from the Iranian ambassador in Damascus. The Iranian ambassador in Beirut is also involved in directing the organization.

Three Regional Councils - Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, and Southern Lebanon - each under local leadership, oversee Hizballah activities in their respective regions. These regional affiliates are subordinate to the umbrella framework of the Leadership Council as well as the Decisionmaking Council.

A series of functional committees play roles in the recommendation and implementation of the organization's policies. This structure is indicative of the increased institutionalization of the organization since its founding.

Hizballah's efforts to both consolidate and extend its influence in Lebanon also includes establishing arsenals and expanding its recruiting network. Hizballah has provided medical and other forms of aid to residents in southern Lebanon

to gain adherents.

Since 1992, Hizballah's desire to undermine the Arab-Israeli peace process, which the Lebanese government continues to support, has led it to increase preaching of religious extremism and to step up attacks and provocations against Israel, the Israel Defense Forces, and the Southern Lebanese Army. Hizballah seldom claims responsibility for specific attacks, preferring to do so under a variety of aliases.

Hizballah has also taken advantage of Lebanon's attempt at democracy and ran in the Lebanese parliamentary elections in October 1992. Hizballah succeeded in placing eight of its candidates in the Lebanese parliament and now represents the largest block in the parliament. It is unclear how Hizballah will behave if it can control government policy. The anti-democratic nature of its extremist Islamic ideology does not bode well for Lebanon's democratic experiment.

Hizballah has been implicated in several large-scale bombings of centers of Jewish and Israeli life around the world. Major attacks occurred in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994 and in London in 1994. A large bomb plot was aborted in Bangkok, Thailand in March 1994. The extent to which Iran directly participates in the planning and carrying out of terrorist acts by Hizballah is unclear. There is no doubt that Iran benefits from Hizballah's actions which allow it plausible deniability for acts committed in accordance with its desires.

Acts of terror are carried out by a variety of groups serving under Hizballah including: Islamic Jihad, Organization of the Oppressed, the Party of God, the Revolutionary Justice Organization, and a new group, Ansarollah (Partisans of God).

Ansarollah is reportedly led by Jamal Suleiman, a fundamentalist Palestinian terrorist who broke away from the PLO's mainstream Fatah movement in south Lebanon in 1991. Ansarollah claimed responsibility for the July 1994 bombing of the Jewish community building in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Security experts doubted Ansarollah's ability to carry out the attack and believe it was the work of Hizballah.

LEADERSHIP

A Leadership (Central) Council of Shiite clerics oversees the activities of Hizballah. This council includes the

HIZBALLAH

organization's Secretary-General.

- Sheikh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah heads the Leadership Council and is the spiritual leader of the movement. Fadlallah wields great religious and moral influence, serving as the highest religious authority of the Shi'a community in Lebanon. He was born and educated in Iraq.
- Said Hassan Nasrallah was unanimously elected commander of operations following the death of Hizballah Secretary-General Abbas Mussawi in February 1992. (Mussawi was killed by Israeli Defense Forces in a helicopter raid on February 16 of that year.) Nasrallah was reelected to this post in April 1993. Like his predecessor, he was a founder of the "Islamic Resistance" (the group which has carried out terrorist operations in southern Lebanon). Born in 1960, he was a leader of Amal (the Shiite leftist movement that emerged in Lebanon in the 1970s) before joining Hizballah in 1982.
- Sheikh Subhi Tafili, educated in Qum, Iran, is a member of the Leadership Council and a former Secretary-General.

MEMBERSHIP

There are thousands of activists and militia forces, including hundreds of hardcore radicals. Hizballah sources claim the organization has between 5,000 and 10,000 operatives. According to its leader, Hizballah's support mainly comes from younger Lebanese Shias. The number of support cells around the world is not known.

SOURCES OF SUPPORT

Hizballah's primary sponsor is Iran. The organization receives a substantial amount of operational support (including training and weapons), organizational support (in the form of political backing) and financial assistance from Iran. Iran reportedly provides about \$60 million per year for Hizballah activities. According to Lebanese officials, Iranian aid to the organization had been as high as \$300 million annually.

Iran arms and trains Hizballah through its Revolutionary Guard contingent in Lebanon and has also helped Hizballah

establish itself by training its forces in Iran and shipping sophisticated weapons to the organization's militia via Syria.

Syria extends both direct and indirect aid to Hizballah activists. In addition to serving as an operational channel between Iran and Hizballah, the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley is the site of Hizballah training. The Syrian connection has enabled the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to provide political indoctrination as well as financial and material support to Hizballah.

Hizballah and Iranian Revolutionary Guards work in close concert on terrorist operations. Hizballah also operates independently of the Iranian government. Western government reports state that dissidents within Hizballah have conducted rogue operations not approved by Tehran.

Syrian President Assad and Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani recently agreed to allow Hizballah forces to remain in southern Lebanon and in the eastern Bekaa Valley. Syria's support for Hizballah allows it to attack Israel and other enemies in Lebanon by proxy.

HEADQUARTERS

West Beirut and the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon.

AREAS OF OPERATION

Lebanon, Europe, Latin America, and Africa.

Hizballah is suspected of having established a network of support cells in the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Canada.

Hizballah networks in these countries serve two purposes:

- to raise money for the organization's Middle East operations.
- to provide support for operations in these countries.

Hizballah command centers and supply bases are located in the Bekaa Valley and in South Beirut. Hizballah members are primarily based and operate in these areas as well as in southern Lebanon.

Hizballah terrorist groups, such as the Islamic Jihad, have

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bases, offices, and command posts in populated areas in southern Lebanon. These groups carry out terrorist operations from within these areas, especially against IDF positions and patrols in Israel's security zone in the southernmost portion of Lebanon.

A number of reports state that the organization has been receiving training from the PFLP in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley.

TACTICS

Hizballah militia tend to operate in small units. Hizballah forces in southern Lebanon are widely dispersed and rely on information and support from the local Shiite population. They are equipped with automatic rifles, machine guns, mortars, mines, and rocket-propelled grenades, as well as Katyusha artillery rockets, which have been fired at towns and villages in northern Israel.

In February 1994, Hizballah began successfully ambushing IDF units in southern Lebanon. This increase in Hizballah's operational performance is an ominous sign and indicates serious improvement in training. Greater daring, increased courage under fire, excellent coordination between operatives, and skillful use of sophisticated weaponry have increased Hizballah's ability to inflict casualties on the SLA and IDF. New weapons used include Russian AT-3 Sagger antitank missiles and remote-controlled mines and bombs.

U.S. officials presume that the organization also has some Russian-made shoulder held anti-aircraft missiles such as the SA-7. It was reported in mid-1994 that Syria may have provided Hizballah with the advanced Russian SA-18 man portable anti-aircraft missile.

Hizballah is known or heavily suspected to have been involved in numerous anti-U.S. terrorist operations, including the suicide truck bombing on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut which killed 241 U.S. servicemen and injured several dozen others (October 1983), and an attack on the U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut which killed 20 U.S. citizens (September

1984).

Elements of the organization are responsible for the kidnaping of most, if not all, of the U.S. and other western hostages in Lebanon in the 1980s. The kidnaping campaign was planned in part to compel the United States to pressure Kuwait into releasing Hizballah members who were jailed in that Gulf state following the 1983 attacks on the American and French embassies in Lebanon. These prisoners escaped during Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

All American and most West European hostages have been released as a result of U.S. pressure on Syria and (through third parties) Iran to compel Hizballah to release these hostages. In this context, the usefulness of holding these westerners diminished for this extremist Islamic organization.

In terror operations, Hizballah operatives use a variety of tactics including: suicide attacks (that caused tremendous damage and which were particularly common in the first half of the 1980s) usually through car and truck bomb attacks although some are remote activated; explosive roadside, often radio-triggered, charges (on routes used by IDF and SLA forces, and particularly common during Israel's withdrawal of Lebanon in the mid-1980s as well as in southern Lebanon in the 1990s); light weapon and anti-tank missile attacks (on patrols and outposts); and Katyusha artillery rockets fired at towns in northern Israel as well as IDF and SLA outposts in Lebanon.

During the first half of 1993, Hizballah carried out 60 attacks in the Israeli security zone. This is double the number of attacks in this region during the first six months of 1992 and is equal to the number of attacks carried out by Hizballah during all of 1991. Hizballah's militant campaign against the IDF and the SLA in southern Lebanon has continued since the signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles in September 1993. As of August 1994, Hizballah has launched at least 40 attacks on IDF and the SLA.

Hizballah is heavily suspected of involvement in recent large-scale bombings of centers of Jewish and Israeli life around the world. The 1992 and 1994 Buenos Aires car bomb at-

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tacks, the 1994 London car bomb attack, and the aborted March 1994 truck bomb attack in Bangkok, Thailand, are case in point.

TARGETS

- Non-Islamic influences (including persons, institutions, publications, movies, etc.) and Jewish targets worldwide.
- Western interests in the Middle East.
- Towns and villages in northern Israel.
- IDF and SLA forces stationed and/or operating in southern Lebanon.

SELECTED ATTACKS

April 1983

A suicide car bomb attack against the U.S. Embassy in Beirut killed 49 and wounded 120. This attack was claimed by Hizballah's military wing, the Islamic Jihad.

October 1983

Suicide truck bombing of U.S. Marine Headquarters and barracks in Beirut, Lebanon which resulted in the deaths of 241 U.S. Marines and 56 French soldiers. The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for this incident.

November 1983

Seventy-four people were killed and at least 15 were reported wounded in a series of car bomb attacks against the French Multinational Forces Command in Lebanon.

January 1984

The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the Beirut murder of a U.S. citizen, Malcolm Kerr, the president of the American University of Beirut.

February 1984

Kidnapped in Beirut a U.S. citizen, Professor Frank Reiger. He was rescued in April 1984.

March 1984

Kidnapped William Buckley, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency station chief in Beirut. He was reported killed in 1985. Buckley's remains were returned to the U.S. Embassy in December 1991.

Kidnapped in Lebanon American journalist Jeremy Levin in March 1984. He escaped in February 1985.

May 1984

Kidnapped in Lebanon the Reverend Benjamin Weir, a U.S. citizen. He was released in September 1985.

September 1984

The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for a suicide truck bombing of the U.S. Embassy Annex in East Beirut. Twenty-three persons, including two Americans, were killed.

December 1984

Hijacked a Kuwaiti airliner en route to Tehran, Iran. The hijackers murdered two passengers, both of whom were U.S. Agency for International Development officials.

January 1985

Kidnapped in Lebanon U.S. citizen Father Lawrence Jenco. He was released in July 1986.

March 1985

Kidnapped in Beirut U.S. citizen Terry Anderson, an *Associated Press* journalist. He was released in December 1991.

In a car bomb attack at the Egel Gate crossing point near Metulla, Israel, 12 Israeli soldiers were killed and 20 were wounded. (This was one of several attacks against the IDF in the 1980s.)

May 1985

Kidnapped U.S. citizen David Jacobson, an official at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut. He was released in November 1986.

June 1985

Kidnapped in Lebanon U.S. citizen Thomas Sutherland, the director of the American University of Beirut. He was released in November 1991.

Hijacked TWA Flight 847 en route to Athens, Greece. One passenger, U.S. Navy Diver Robert Stethem, was murdered. Hizballah and a faction of the pro-Syrian Shiite mili-

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tia Amal held 39 U.S. passengers hostage for 17 days in Beirut before they were released.

July 1985

The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the simultaneous bombings of a Northwest Orient Airlines plane and a synagogue in Copenhagen, Denmark. In these bombings, one person was killed and 26 were injured. both incidents.

September 1986

Kidnapped U.S. citizens Frank Reed and Joseph Cicippio in Beirut. Reed was released in April 1990. Cicippio was released in December 1991.

October 1986

Kidnapped U.S. citizen Edward Austin Tracy in Beirut. He was released in August 1991.

January 1987

Kidnapped Anglican Church Envoy Terry Waite as well as Beirut University professors Jesse Turner, Alan Steen, and Robert Polhill in Beirut. All were released by 1991.

June 1987

Kidnapped American journalist Charles Glass in Beirut. He escaped in August 1987.

February 1988

Kidnapped United Nations military observer Lt. Colonel William Richard Higgins, USMC. He was reported killed in 1991. His remains were handed over to the American Embassy in Beirut in December 1991.

October 1988

Claimed responsibility for an attack near an Israeli check point, just north of the Israeli border with Lebanon, in which a suicide bomber drove a van loaded with explosives

into an Israel Defense Force convoy. Eight Israeli soldiers were killed and 9 were injured.

November 1990

Claimed responsibility for the murder of a Saudi diplomat in Beirut.

October 1991

Three Israeli soldiers were killed when a bomb exploded under their armored vehicle in Israel's security zone in southern Lebanon on the 20th. The Hizballah-affiliated Islamic Resistance Movement claimed responsibility for the attack. Hizballah also claimed responsibility for a bomb attack in the security zone nine days later, in which two Israeli soldiers were killed and a third was injured.

January 1992

Bombed the Lebanese village of Tayr Harfa in the security zone. The village's mayor, Salim Ahmad Yusif, was killed.

March 1992

Claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Twenty-nine people were killed and 252 injured.

April 1992

The Hizballah-affiliated Islamic Resistance Movement and the Islamic Jihad-Palestine (PIJ) claimed to have carried out a joint attack in Israel's security zone in southern Lebanon that killed two Israeli soldiers and wounded five others.

Israeli sources said that an Israeli convoy was attacked with gunfire, explosives, rocket-propelled grenades, and missiles. Three terrorists were killed when Israeli soldiers returned fire.

July 1992

Killed one Israeli soldier and injured three with a bomb detonated under a tank in the security zone.

October 1992

Five Israeli soldiers were killed and five were wounded in an ambush in southern Lebanon.

An Israeli tank was immobilized by a roadside bomb

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inside Israel's security zone on the 25th. Two days later, Hizballah fired a rocket into the security zone killing a Lebanese man and his son.

1993

Attacked civilian targets in northern Israel and IDF and South Lebanese Army (SLA) targets in southern Lebanon with rockets. In the first half of 1993, the use of Katyusha rockets inflicted several deaths and damaged or destroyed many vehicles and buildings.

April 1993

A roadside bomb killed three Israeli soldiers injured two in southern Lebanon on the 13th. Hizballah's military wing, the Islamic Resistance, claimed responsibility.

In another attack, one SLA soldier was captured and another escaped after their vehicle was disabled by a roadside bomb.

May 1993

In an attack on the 1st, one Israeli soldier was killed by a roadside bomb in the security zone in southern Lebanon.

One Israeli soldier was killed and two others wounded when an Israeli army patrol was hit by anti-tank rockets and heavy machine gun fire in the security zone on the 18th .

June 1993

Five Katyusha rockets were fired at the Israeli city of Qiryat Shmona on the 28th. The fusillade injured six Israeli civilians and destroyed six houses.

July 1993

Three IDF soldiers were killed and five others were injured by mortar bombs and recoilless rifle fire in the eastern sector of the security zone.

August 1993

In two separate bomb attacks in southern Lebanon on the 19th, eight Israeli soldiers were killed and one was injured.

October 1993

Six Katyusha rockets were fired into positions held by the SLA in the security zone.

In another incident, two Israeli soldiers were injured in clashes with Hizballah operatives.

November 1993

A mortar attack on an IDF post in southern Lebanon wounded two Israeli soldiers on the 5th.

Later in the month, Hizballah car bomb experts were reported to have arrived in Mogadishu, Somalia to assist Somalia militia factions in attacks on U.S. and United Nations targets.

February 1994

Hizballah launched a series of attacks in southern Lebanon on the 5th, including detonating a roadside bomb that injured three SLA soldiers. Mortar bombs and machine guns were fired at two SLA posts and at an Israeli army patrol near the village of Braachit.

An Israeli patrol in the security zone in South Lebanon was attacked with automatic weapons fire, rocket-propelled grenades, and anti-tank missiles on the 7th. Four Israeli soldiers were killed and five were wounded.

March 1994

Security officials in Bangkok, Thailand announced that a plot to blow up the Israeli Embassy with a large truck bomb was foiled when the truck broke down and was abandoned on a Bangkok street. Hizballah was strongly suspected to have been behind the attempt.

Suspected Hizballah operatives fired ten Katyusha rockets at the town of Marjayoun in southern Lebanon on the 3rd. No injuries in the attack were reported.

The Lebanese government ordered the arrest of Hizballah fighters on the 15th after hundreds of gunmen and thousands of Hizballah supporters marched in a street demonstration a week earlier in the Eastern Bekaa Valley to mark "Jerusalem Day." The government was criticized by several politicians because the gunmen displayed their weapons during the march.

Three Hizballah operatives were killed when they ran into an Israeli ambush on their way to an attack targets inside Israel's security zone in southern Lebanon on the 17th.

Two Israeli soldiers and three SLA operatives were killed in Hizballah attacks in the security zone on the 17th.

An IDF patrol was ambushed in the security zone in Lebanon on the 25th. Two Israelis and two SLA soldiers were

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killed.

Separately, an SLA officer was killed by a roadside bomb planted near the Lebanese town of Arnun. Another roadside bomb killed an SLA soldier at the Hardaleh bridge.

Hizballah fighters fired machine guns and anti-tank rockets against an SLA post on a Tallousah position, in southern Lebanon on the 27th. SLA forces defeated the attempt.

Eleven Hizballah members that took part in the armed demonstration were handed over to Lebanese Army officers in the town of Baalbek in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley on the 31st.

April 1994

Mortars and rockets were fired at an IDF post in Sajoud, in southern Lebanon and at an SLA post on the edge of the security zone on the 27th. Following an Israeli retaliation on Hizballah targets in southern Lebanon, the Islamic organization renewed hostilities by firing anti-tank rockets, mortars and machine guns at an SLA post in the security zone.

June 1994

Katyusha rockets were fired at Israeli targets in northern Israel and in the security zone in southern Lebanon on the 2nd. Three rockets hit the town of Nahariya, on the Israeli coast and three others landed in the Hamra passageway in the security zone. No casualties were reported.

Katyusha rockets were fired into Israel on the 3rd. There were no casualties. Israeli retaliation included air raids which killed 26 Hizballah operatives.

Hizballah operatives clashed with Fijian United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) peacekeepers when they prevented Hizballah forces from moving into a zone south-east of the Port of Tyre. During a machine gun and anti-tank rocket battle, one Hizballah fighter was killed and two Fijian peacekeepers were injured.

Hizballah operatives kidnapped six Lebanese citizens and a retired Syrian soldier in the Ba'albak area in the Bekaa Valley on the 9th after they were allegedly seen taking photographs outside the home of former Hizballah leader Shiekh Subhi al-Tufayli. The men were freed several hours later after Syrian authorities threatened to arrest Hizballah members in the Bekaa Valley.

Hizballah operatives ambushed an IDF patrol and killed three Israeli soldiers and injured three others near Beau-

fort Castle in the security zone on the 20th.

Two days later, Hizballah fired anti-tank missiles, mortars, and machine guns at Israeli and Lebanese army positions stationed in the Tallousah region of the central sector of the security zone. No casualties were reported.

An IDF convoy in South Lebanon was ambushed. One IDF soldier was killed and three were wounded on the 27th.

July 1994

A rocket launched at an IDF camp in the security zone in southern Lebanon killed two Israeli soldiers on the 4th.

Attacked an IDF outpost near Reihan in the security zone on the 11th. One Israeli soldier was killed and one was wounded.

A large car bomb destroyed an office building housing many Jewish agencies in downtown Buenos Aires, Argentina, on the 18th. Hizballah is strongly suspected of carrying out the attack although a group calling itself Ansarollah (Partisans of God) claimed responsibility. More than 100 people were killed and 206 were wounded.

Ansarollah made itself known to the world in an April 1994 communique from Sidon, Lebanon. The group had vowed to war against Israel everywhere in the world and with all weapons despite any accords signed by Arab states.

One Israeli soldier was killed and 13 others were injured during battles between Israeli forces and Hizballah operatives in southern Lebanon on the 25th. In these confrontations, Hizballah used anti-tank missiles, rockets, mortar bombs, and machine guns. On the same day, an IDF officer was killed and five soldiers were injured when Hizballah fighters attacked their vehicle with anti-tank missiles in the security zone. Hizballah also fired 12 Katyusha rockets that landed near the south Lebanese town of Kfar Kila, near the Israeli border.

IDF commandos apprehended Hizballah activist Kassem Reihan in southern Lebanon on the 29th. Reihan is being detained in Israel. On the same day, Hizballah operatives fired machine guns and anti-tank missiles at a United Nations helicopter flying over the Lebanese villages of Kafra and Yater.

August 1994

Fired Katyusha rockets into northern Israel, injuring three Israeli children.

Attacked an Israeli patrol and killed two Israeli soldiers and wounded three others. Also destroyed an Israeli tank.

Ambushed an Israeli patrol in south Lebanon and killed one Israeli soldier and injured two others.

ISLAMIC GROUP

ALSO KNOWN AS

Gam'a al-Islamiya.

IDEOLOGY & OBJECTIVES

- To pursue a campaign of violence against elements in Egypt's society that, in the view of the group's religious leaders, are "the enemies of Allah." These "enemies" include the government, the Coptic Christian minority, social institutions, and persons that favor an indeterminate degree of secularism in Egyptian society or espouse opinions determined by the group's leaders to be insulting to Islam. Western representatives (including businesses, foreign workers, and tourists) have also been targeted. The group considers a violent path to be the proper way of "liberating" the Islamic nation of an "infidel" government and the community of "non-believers."
- To overthrow the Egyptian government and replace it with an Islamic state based on *sharia*, or Islamic law.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The resurgence of radical Islam in Egypt stems from a number of societal factors including massive unemployment and rapid urbanization which contribute to an ever growing sense of disillusionment, on a national scale, with the overburdened and inefficient secular government. However, the Islamic movement in general, and those groups that resort to violence in particular, are not unified. Differences exist between the Muslim Brotherhood and the two largest militant groups: the Islamic Group and the Islamic Jihad. Outside alliances, tactical differences, and regional identifications contribute to the rift between the radical groups themselves. The extent of Iranian support and the importance of the Iranian revolutionary experience have drawn a degree of division between these groups. Operational differences exist as well.

Both the Islamic Jihad (IJ) and the Islamic Group (IG) have operated throughout Egypt. Reports state that tactical differ-

ences between the groups appear to be disappearing. This development could lend itself to more concerted cooperation between the two militant organizations, especially if reports that many former Islamic Jihad members have joined the Islamic Group are true. Whatever the case, the Islamic Group is currently the most active underground Islamic movement in Egypt.

The Islamic Group has sought to propagate its message openly to broaden its base of support, whereas the Islamic Jihad has favored clandestine work. Furthermore, the Islamic Jihad is based mainly in northern Egypt while the Islamic Group operates mainly in the south, or Upper Egypt. The IG has recently expanded its influence in this region, taking advantage of a network of schools, clinics, and other social agencies as well as preaching its ideology in local mosques.

The Islamic Jihad organization (of which Islamic Group members were part and from which they split-off) was formed in the late 1970s as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. While the Brotherhood renounced violence, IG believes that violence is a necessary component in its efforts to overthrow the Egyptian government. Cells of Islamic revolutionaries, of which IG activists were a part, factored into the 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. The current leadership council includes several suspects in that assassination. Some of them, and many of their followers, volunteered for the *mujahedeen* fighting the socialist Afghan government and its Soviet allies during the war in Afghanistan.

A radical Islamic organization called the Reconstitution of al-Jihad Organization (I'adat Tashkil Tanzim al-Jihad) affiliated with the IG operates in Cairo and Upper Egypt. Its estimated membership is 400. Between 20 to 30 of its operatives are of Palestinian origin and are linked to HAMAS and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Two group leaders, Majdi Salim and Ayman al-Zawahiri, were recently arrested by Egyptian border troops. The organization stresses the concept of "armed struggle" and the need to seize power from the state in order to create an alternative Islamic state conforming to *sharia*.

The Egyptian radio station *Al-Ahali* reported in early March 1994 that private security firms helped smuggle terrorist leaders into the country. A dozen group leaders, including Jamal Al-Din Farghali, commander of the Islamic Group's military

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wing in Upper Egypt, had reportedly been smuggled into Egypt. Islamic Group extremists were accused in the February 1994 murder of a prosecution witness in a case against colleagues accused of attempting to assassinate Egyptian Prime Minister Atef Sedki. Additional charges against them included plotting two abortive attempts to kill Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, three attempts against the life of the Information Minister, two against the Interior Minister, and one against UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a former Egyptian Foreign Minister.

Islamic extremist groups including the Islamic Group have been unusually quiet July through August 1994. The Egyptian government's battles against militants in late April, including the killing of the alleged leader of a military wing of the Islamic Group, Talaat Yassin Hammam, has been credited for the lull. Their activity may very well increase once new operational leaders take charge.

LEADERSHIP

Most of the Islamic Group's leaders have been exiled from or have fled Egypt. These activists have formed a self-appointed leadership council and reportedly travel frequently between Europe, Afghanistan, and areas in North Africa. The following are top officials of the exiled council:

- Mustafa Hamzeh has been sentenced to death in absentia by Egyptian military court for planning IG operations.
- Mohammed Shawki Islambouly has been sentenced to death in absentia by Egyptian military court for planning IG operations.
- Talat Fuad Kassem served prison terms in Egyptian jails during the 1980s.
- Sheikh Omar Abd el-Rahman has lived in the U. S. for a number of years and is currently in a New York prison awaiting trial for participation in a terrorism conspiracy exposed in 1993. He is the spiritual leader of the Islamic Group and he continues to hold the loyalty of some members of the leadership council, as well as a growing portion of front-line activists within Egypt.
- Rifaat Taha has been sentenced to death in absentia by Egyptian military court for planning IG operations.

A number of Islamic Group leaders have been in conflict with

Sheikh Abd el-Rahman, including:

- Aymon Zawahari, a physician who served a term in an Egyptian prison during the trials for President Sadat's assassination, is accused of reestablishing the underground network in Egypt.
- Abboud Zumor, a former intelligence officer in the Egyptian army who is serving a life sentence in Egypt for his role in the 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat. (One Egyptian press report has stated that a conflict between Rahman and Zumor produced a split within the Islamic Jihad organization into two factions headed by these men. Rahman heads the "Islamic Group" and Zumor heads the "Islamic Jihad.")

An underground network of leaders exists within Egypt as well. These activists coordinate the Islamic Group's activities with the exiled council.

MEMBERSHIP

The Islamic Group is a nationwide movement that enjoys widespread support, including the services of several hundred hardcore operatives. The number of full-time members is estimated to be as high as 10,000. The number of sympathizers is doubtlessly in the hundreds of thousands. Islamic Group members include 800 veterans of the Afghan conflict.

The group has several violent cells that are considered to be loosely knit and decentralized. Individual cells exercise considerable local autonomy even though they share the same broad goal of replacing Egypt's secular governmental authority with Islamic rule. Sources state that not all of the group's local cells have been identified with terrorist acts. The cells often coalesce around temporary, charismatic leaders. A large percentage of IG activists have been jailed by Egyptian authorities who have been engaged in an ongoing battle with the IG since the group launched a violent campaign to destabilize Egypt about two years ago.

SOURCES OF SUPPORT

The Islamic Group has received a large percentage of its funds from sources in Saudi Arabia. However, financial support

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has increasingly come from the Islamic fundamentalist governments in Iran and Sudan. Group cells have also imposed "Islamic taxes" on businesses and communities to help fund their activities.

Islamic Group cells may receive funds for individual operations designated by the exiled leadership council. These funds are used to purchase weapons and materials, both domestically and abroad. In addition, cells are allocated a monthly stipend of \$10,000-20,000.

The Egyptian radio station *Al-Ahali* reported in early March 1994 that among the 12,000 employees of the security firms involved in smuggling terrorist leaders into Egypt [see Historical Background], about 1,900 were on the payroll of the Islamic Group, each receiving from 3,000 to 7,000 Egyptian pounds per month (\$1,000 to \$2,300). Four hundred of these are former police officers and 1,500 are Egyptians who fought in Afghanistan. The report also alleged that senior members of the Islamic Group own shares in the firms. Among those holding shares is Saudi millionaire, Usama Bin-Ladin, suspected of having ties to terrorist groups in Sudan, Egypt and Afghanistan.

HEADQUARTERS

Dispersed throughout Egypt however greater activity occurs in the Cairo slums and in Upper Egypt.

AREAS OF OPERATION

Egypt.

TACTICS

Many Afghan War veterans have been instrumental in the group's violent attacks in Egypt in the past two years. These individuals are highly experienced fighters and possess sur-

plus weapons from the Afghan conflict. These and other Islamic Group hardcore members operate in cells of 10 to 15 persons. Centers of tourism and transportation are a common target for violence with the expectation that the Mubarak government can be undermined by financial hardship. Tactics have included bomb and machine gun attacks on these facilities and persons who frequent them.

TARGETS

Egyptian security and government officials, policemen (including the burning of police vehicles), Coptic Christians (including individuals, churches and property) and foreign tourists. The tourism industry and foreign investors, both of which are major sources of Egyptian revenue, have been frequently targeted since 1991. These targets have included known meeting places of foreigners, tourist buses, and Nile cruise ships.

The Islamic Group has also targeted journalists and partisan figures, such as former and current party leaders and secular intellectuals (political thinkers, educators, and authors) believed by the group to have ties to the Egyptian government.

IG and the Islamic Jihad also blame “Western leanings” and the support of “international Zionism” for attacks on these figures as well as for attacks and threats toward artists, plastic surgeons, gynecologists, and obstetricians as well as Islamic and Christian clergymen (such as the Mufti of al-Azhar University). The Islamic Group has also attacked facilities which it deems “un-Islamic,” such as liquor stores and night clubs.

A new wave of assaults on the interests of the United States has been called for by the leaders of the Islamic Group to retaliate for the incarceration of Sheikh Abd el-Rahman. The IG has promised to attack U.S. targets worldwide.

SELECTED ATTACKS

May 1992

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Fifteen villagers, including 13 Coptic Christians, were killed on the 4th in the Upper Egyptian village of Manshiet Nasser.

October 1992

One British tourist was killed and five Germans were injured in the Upper Egyptian city of Asyut, between Luxor and Cairo, in the Asyut province.

December 1992

The Dutch KLM charter airline Transavia announced the cancellation of its weekly scheduled flight to Cairo in January. A spokesman said the cancellation resulted from the decline in the number of travelers interested in touring Egypt because of concerns over attacks on tourists by militant Islamic organizations, including the Islamic Group.

January 1993

On the 3rd, a Coptic church was bombed but no casualties were reported. During this month, the IG claimed responsibility for a shooting attack on a tourist bus in Giza (near the Pyramids outside Cairo.) This terrorist incident was one of the first to take place in or just outside Cairo and signaled the group's intention to broaden its scope of attacks. Attacks on foreign tourists and tourist sights in Dayrut, in Upper Egypt were predominate in the past.

On the 4th, one Coptic Christian was killed and another seriously wounded in separate incidents in the Upper Egyptian town of Dayrut. A bomb was thrown into the injured man's pharmacy but it did not explode.

February 1993

On the 4th, three terrorists, lying in wait outside the Europe Hotel near the pyramids at Giza, threw a bomb at a tour bus as guests were boarding from the hotel. In another February incident, a bomb exploded in a Cairo cafe, killing a Swede, a Turk and two Egyptians. One of the Egyptians was an Islamic Group member and believed to have planted the bomb.

On the 16th, a bus carrying German tourists was shot at near Asyut. No casualties were reported in this incident, which was the third attack to take place on a tour bus in the first half of this month. A similar incident occurred on the

9th when a bus with 36 German tourists was fired upon near Dayrut.

March 1993

There was a considerable increase in the number of terrorist attacks by radical Islamic organizations during this month. A number of different persons and facilities were targeted, including attacks on Coptic churches and tourist sights as well as against security forces. In response to these attacks, the Egyptian government dispatched large numbers of police and army forces to areas where violence erupted. The government's efforts to curb Islamic strongholds (including those of the Islamic Group) in Cairo and in southern Egypt (including a March 10 raid on the Rahman Mosque in Aswan, a city located 550 miles south of Cairo that is popular with foreign tourists for its ancient ruins), left 43 people dead, including 29 suspected militants and 11 policemen. Eighty-three persons were reported injured. Eighty-seven people were reported arrested during the mosque raid.

The Islamic Group released a statement calling on the end to previous warnings and the beginning of violent attacks against foreign tourists and businessmen. The statement coincided with a bomb which was planted in a pyramid often visited by tourists, near Cairo. The Islamic Group is believed to have been responsible for this incident which caused no casualties.

On the 27th, a time bomb that Egyptian officials said was planted by Islamic militants exploded in a police office where officers had taken it. The explosion caused the death of one police officer. Seven others were injured. One Western press agency said that it had received a claim from a member of the Islamic Group saying the organization had conducted an attack in Cairo on the same day, a presumed reference to the bombing.

On the 28th, three separate bombings were carried out in the city of Aswan. One under a police car, a second in a city square, and a third at a government building. One police officer was killed and six others were injured.

April 1993

The Islamic Group assassinated a senior security official in Asyut. The official's bodyguard and driver were also

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killed. A communique stated that the attack was in retaliation for the death of an Islamic activist who was killed by the Egyptian police. The group promised further attacks.

June and July 1993

Fifteen Islamic militants, charged with bomb and gun attacks on tourists and an assassination attempt against Egypt's Minister of Information, Safwat al-Sherif, were executed at Cairo's Tora prison.

August 1993

Egyptian government efforts to counter bombings, shootings, and assassination attempts by the Islamic Group resulted in the decrease of terrorist attacks by this group during the months of July and August. However, sporadic attacks were carried out by the Islamic Group, including the murder of a senior police official and two aides, who were shot to death in the Upper Egyptian town of Nag Hammadi on the 7th. Three villagers, suspected of collaborating with Egyptian authorities, were shot and killed in the Asyut area during the same period, presumably by the Islamic Group.

December 1993

Claimed responsibility for the killing of an Egyptian police colonel by two operatives as he left his home in the Cairo suburb of Matariya on the 18th. The Islamic Group sent a fax to an international news organization claiming the murder was in retaliation for the hanging of three of its members on December 16. In the fax, the group stated, "The operation came in revenge for the three martyrs whom the unjust Mubarak government hanged two days ago, particularly brother Muhammad Hammouda who was preparing with some valiant officers in the armed forces to assassinate Mubarak himself." Hammouda and Hisham Taha were part of a group arrested for plotting to assassinate Egyptian government officials and to bomb government buildings.

On the 23rd, in the Upper Egyptian province of Asyut, suspected Islamic Group operatives stabbed to death a civilian who had provided information on their meetings to po-

lice.

On the 27th, a bus carrying Austrian tourists was attacked. Eight tourists were injured and eight Egyptian bystanders were wounded. No group immediately claimed responsibility but Egyptian authorities suspected that militants affiliated with the Islamic Group were behind the attack.

January 1994

Police suspect the Islamic Group was responsible for an attack in which gunmen shot and killed three policemen at a checkpoint near el-Qusiya in Upper Egypt, 190 miles south of Cairo on the 13th. The gunmen fled in a car they stole at gunpoint after the attack. The operatives stole two rifles and a pistol from the officers.

February 1994

On the 6th, three suspected Islamic Group operatives shot and killed a police brigadier outside his home in the town of Asyut. The Islamic Group claimed responsibility for the attack in a statement released the following day.

On the 15th, a small bomb exploded outside the Cairo branch of the Alexandria Kuwait International Bank in the Muhandisheen area of Cairo. The bomb caused minor damage to the bank and two parked cars. There were no injuries. While no one claimed responsibility for the attack, the Islamic Group had previously threatened to attack banks.

On the 17th, unidentified gunmen fired automatic weapons at a tour boat on the Nile River near the Upper Egyptian town of Minya. The boat was hit several times but there were no injuries.

On the 19th, suspected Islamic extremists fired on the train which runs between Cairo and Luxor, wounding a Polish architect, a Taiwanese student, and two Egyptians. Police found spent cartridges in the area bearing the slogans "Islam is coming" and "Revenge for our martyrs."

On the 20th, the Islamic Group claimed responsibility for the February 14 attack on a bus load of Romanian workers, the Nile River boat shooting on February 17, and the February 19 attack on the Cairo-to-Luxor train.

In previous days, the group issued several warnings to

ISLAMIC GROUP

foreigners to leave Egypt and, in its February 20 communique, stated the attacks were “swift retribution” for the recent death sentence handed down to an army officer and two conscripts charged with mining an air-strip close to the Libyan border. The group identified the three as members who had been tasked with the assassination of President Mubarak. It threatened further attacks if the three were executed.

On the 23rd, two German, two Australian, and two New Zealand tourists were injured along with five Egyptians when a bomb exploded on a passenger train in Asyut. The Islamic Group claimed responsibility for this attack the following day as it did of another attack on the 24th in which a bomb exploded outside the Misr-American Bank, in Cairo. The bank, nearby parked cars, and several nearby apartments were damaged in the bombing but there were no injuries.

On the 26th, Egypt executed Abel-Shafi Muhammad Ramadan, who was convicted for the June 8, 1992 murder of writer Farag Foda. The Islamic Group claimed responsibility for the Foda assassination.

March 1994

On the 1st, two bombs exploded near a travel agency bank offices in Cairo. The bombings caused damage but no one was injured. The Islamic Group claimed responsibility for the attacks and said the “operations are the beginning of the revenge for the martyrs of the Hebron massacre (on February 25, in the West Bank), in defiance of the oppressive regime of Mubarak.” The same day, three gunmen attacked a Misr Bank Branch in the Upper Egyptian town of Abu Tig, on the Nile River, 215 miles south of Cairo, but were forced to flee when two police guards returned fire. One of the guards was slightly injured.

On the 3rd, gunmen suspected to be members of the Islamic Group shot and killed a policeman and injured two civilians in the southern Egyptian town of Al-Badari. The same day suspected members of the Islamic Group shot and seriously wounded a shopkeeper when he tried to stop them from placing a bomb outside his shop which is located next

to a branch of the National Bank of Egypt, in the Upper Egyptian town of Al-Qusiya. The gunmen fled after the shooting. Also on March 3, a small bomb exploded outside the Egyptian-American Bank in the Al-Muhandisin area of Cairo, causing minor damage but no injuries.

On the 4th, suspected Islamic Group operatives opened fire on one of two German tour boats on the Nile River, between the towns of Abu Tig and Tima, critically injuring a German woman. No other injuries were reported. The same day, the Islamic Group renewed its warning for foreign tourists and investors to leave Egypt and advised Egyptians to remove their money from banks that charge interest.

On the 8th, the Islamic Group claimed responsibility for the March 7 attacks against three trains that left as many as 11 Egyptians injured in Upper Egypt. The Islamic Group also claimed responsibility for the March 13 firing on a Nile tourist boat that day. No one among the 14 British tourists or Egyptian crew was injured.

On the 26th, three attackers threw a bomb at a car occupied by three prison guards near Cairo, slightly wounding two of the men. The guards were on their way home from work at Abu Za'bal prison where a number of Islamic extremists are imprisoned. The Islamic Group claimed responsibility for the attack the following day.

On the 27th, Egyptian security forces killed four Islamic extremists in a shootout after they ambushed a police car as it passed through the village of Al-Ghanaim in Asyut province. Four policemen were injured in the shootout. Two other people were arrested when they tried to flee in a car after the shootout. On the same day, four suspected Islamic extremist gunmen shot and killed a man suspected of being a police informer in the town of Asyut.

On the 31st, a bomb placed under a parked car exploded outside a branch of the Commercial International Bank in the Cairo suburb of Muhandisin, slightly injuring two people and damaging four cars. The bomb also shattered windows of the bank and caused some internal damage.

April 1994

The Islamic Group claimed responsibility for an attack on a train in southern Egypt on the night of the 16th. The attack took place near the town of Abu Tig. No one was

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injured but some windows were broken on the train that was travelling from Aswan to Cairo. The Islamic Group also threatened to begin operations in new areas of the country unless authorities release hundreds of suspected members arrested by security forces over the past few weeks. That day, the security forces arrested over 300 suspected members of the Islamic Group in sweeps carried out over two days in western Cairo and the Upper Egyptian province of Asyut.

On the 20th, the Islamic Group claimed responsibility for the killing of a police brigadier general in Asyut. The victim, Said Fahma, was shot as he left his home. His bodyguard was also killed in an exchange of fire in which he wounded one of the gunmen who was then captured. The policeman's driver was also wounded.

May 1994

On the 1st, Egyptian police arrested 80 suspected Islamic Group members in the Asyut province and seized 66 weapons.

On the 14th, the Islamic Group claimed responsibility for the killing of three policemen in the Asyut province the day before. The group said the attacks were in response to the raid in Cairo last month in which top Islamic Group leader Talaat Yassin Hammam was killed by security forces.

On the 17th, Egyptian police wounded one militant and arrested three others after a gun battle in the Asyut province town of Sidfa. In other efforts against extremists in Asyut, Egyptian police reported that it arrested 51 suspected militants, and seized 37 weapons (including 12 automatic rifles). The police also seized video tapes of sermons by preachers, including Islamic Group spiritual leader Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman.

On the 21st, suspected members of the Islamic Group opened fire on a train near the town of Manfalut. Train windows were damaged in the attack and a member of the train's staff was wounded.

On the 27th, Egyptian security forces killed a leader of

the Islamic Group after he opened fire on them in the Asyut province town of Badari. The gunman whose machine gun and ammunition were seized after the incident was wanted in connection for attacks on policemen in the area.

August 1994

The Islamic Group claimed responsibility for an attack on a tour bus in the Asyut province that killed a Spanish youth and injured several other foreigners on the 26th.

ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT

ALSO KNOWN AS

FIS, Front Islamique du Salut.

IDEOLOGY & OBJECTIVES

The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a radical Islamic fundamentalist organization, seeks to turn Algeria into an Islamic state with a government based on *sharia*, or Islamic law. To accomplish this objective, FIS is waging a war of terrorism against the government and secular institutions and persons in Algeria.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The FIS was formed in 1989 in opposition to the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN). In 1988, the Algerian government had begun a transition from a totalitarian state towards a more democratic government. This movement towards democracy suffered an apparent reversal when the anti-democratic FIS received a majority of the votes in the December 1991 elections. FIS had vowed to turn the country into an Islamic state within a year of taking power. The FLN subsequently canceled parliamentary elections (scheduled for the end of January 1992), which would likely have given the FIS an absolute majority in the Algerian parliament.

In February 1992, riots, demonstrations, and terrorist operations orchestrated by the FIS followed the election cancellation. The Islamic Salvation Front was subsequently banned by the Algerian government. FIS launched an assassination campaign against Algerian government personnel at both the national and local levels. The Algerian military actively sought to counter the FIS with an all-out assault on the group's members. The last two-and-a-half years have seen violent clashes between the government's security forces and Islamic activists. Since the government instituted a state of emergency at the beginning of 1992, approximately 3,700

people have been killed in the conflict.

In September 1993, FIS and an allied organization calling itself the Islamic Armed Group began to target foreigners. The campaign seeks to drive away foreign investment in Algeria and undermine confidence in the government. Since that time, 56 foreigners have been killed including French, Russians, Italians, Spaniards, and Croats.

A significant number of FIS leaders have taken refuge in France and the United Kingdom since the beginning of 1992. In France, the leaders has been allowed to publish newspapers, raise funds, and recruit members from the resident Algerian population. In addition to FIS leaders mentioned below, Lalali Said (an elected member of the Algerian parliament), Qamar Eddine Kherbane (formerly a member of the FIS Executive Committee), and Benlarache Cherif are living in France.

LEADERSHIP

Following the military coup in Algeria in 1992, many FIS leaders fled to Europe. They include:

- Nasreddine el-Hamdi, now living in France. He was threatened with deportation from France, but has challenged the case in court.
- Djaafar al-Houari, now living in France. He is head of the French branch of the FIS, Fraternelle Algerienne en France (FAF).
- Abbasi Madani, now living in Frankfurt, Germany; He was a professor at the University of Algeria.
- Abdelbaki Sahraoui, now living in Paris. He is a founding member of FIS.
- Rabah Kebir, now living in Aachen, Germany.

The FAF has a strong following among France's four million Muslims. Fugitives from Algeria are able to elude police with the help of FAF. The FAF allows the FIS to liaison and possibly coordinate activities with sympathetic organizations and persons outside of Algeria.

MEMBERSHIP

Official membership in the FIS is kept secret. Membership is stronger in urban areas than in rural areas of Algeria.

ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT

Still, rural migrants are drawn into the movement. FIS attracts considerable numbers of Algerian youth. (More than 50 percent of the Algerian population is under the age of 20.) A significant number of members are university and high-school students as well as the educated unemployed and the disgruntled lower class. The extent of the movement's national network is difficult to estimate.

SOURCES OF SUPPORT

FIS raises the majority of its funding in Algeria through donations.

Iran provides FIS with a significant amount of financial, organizational, and operational support. This includes Iranian support for paramilitary training which has taken place in the Sudan. However, the movement's training primarily takes place in Algeria.

There are also links at the leadership level between FIS and the Sudanese government as well as with Islamic movements in Egypt, Tunisia, and Pakistan. Saudi Arabia has provided FIS with financial assistance in the past, but currently this support is minimal.

HEADQUARTERS

Dispersed throughout Algeria.

AREA OF OPERATIONS

Algeria and France.

TACTICS

The FIS has engaged in both legal and illegal means to achieve its goals. The movement organizes riots, engages in political assassination, attacks security forces, and has murdered foreigners. It also seeks to broaden its political base by participating in elections across the country and it won majorities

in several until they were suspended by the government.

TARGETS

Government employees, police and security forces, local and national officials, and government facilities. In the past year, targets have also included journalists, physicians, and other professionals. Since September 1993, Western targets have been singled out as well. FIS had avoided targets that would adversely affect the Algerian economy. The order to attack foreigners suggests that this is no longer the case. Also, attacks such as destroying freight trains may represent a turning point in the strategy of the Islamic Salvation Front.

SELECTED ATTACKS

November 1992

The most sophisticated ambush attack since the beginning of the FIS's underground campaign of violence was carried out in the town of Lakhdaria, 35 miles southeast of Algiers. A terrorist team ambushed a police vehicle on patrol while a second team sprayed the town's police station with automatic weapons fire. This second attack prevented the occupants from assisting their colleagues. Three officers were killed and two were injured.

December 1992

On the 14th, the heavily fundamentalist Algiers suburb of Badjara was the scene of gunfire while a night curfew was in effect.

On the 20th, security service forces engaged Islamic operatives in a nine hour gun battle in the town of Blida. Three Islamic militants were killed in the shootout that involved at least 50 members of the Algerian government's special units, which surrounded a house belonging to a merchant arrested earlier.

March 1993

On the morning of the 16th, former Education Minister Djilali Liabes was assassinated as he left his home in an Algiers suburb. He was the second senior official to be shot in two days in the same city.

During this month, FIS operatives also killed 18 soldiers in an arms raid on a military barracks 60 miles south of Algiers. The attackers gained access to the barracks with the aid of four military conspirators.

ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT

April 1993

Omar Leulimi, an FIS leader who remained in Algeria, was killed by Algerian security forces.

September 1993

FIS begins targeting foreigners.

October 1993

On October 2-3, security forces killed at least four Islamic militants during a countrywide manhunt. Two days later, a leading politician from the anti-Islamic Ettahaddi Party was gunned down outside his home in an Algiers suburb.

Two government officials were killed in their homes on October 5-6. One ran the Ain Lahdjar regional council in Bouira and the other was appointed in the western Algeria region of Relizane.

FIS supporters are believed to be responsible for the mid-October murder of a prominent doctor and opponent of the Islamic movement. FIS supporters killed a security officer and three civilians during the same period.

On the 12th, Islamic fundamentalists derailed a cargo train east of Algiers, murdered the two-man crew and set fire to 26 cars. The attack followed a government announcement that thirteen Islamic radicals had been executed.

December 1993

In an assault by Islamic militants on the 14th, 12 Bosnians and Croats, all Christians, were killed in a village 40 miles from Algiers. An organization calling itself the "Armed Islamic Group" claimed responsibility for the assault in which the foreigners' throats were slit.

January 1994

On the 31st, the British Embassy in Algiers received a telephone call from an individual claiming to be a member of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The caller stated that FIS would be supporting a two-pronged movement against foreigners in Algeria: (1) The killings of foreigners will be reinstated; (2) All foreigners will be encouraged to leave Algeria.

February 1994

On the 7th, German authorities banned an exiled FIS spokesman, Rabah Keber, for political activities which included advocating violence toward German authorities.

On the 19th, six Muslim shopkeepers in the French city of Nice told police that they received letters allegedly from the FIS that demanded money and that they abide by Muslim practices and adhere to a prohibition on selling alcoholic beverages.

On the 25th, Algerian authorities moved FIS President Abassi Madani and his deputy, Ali Belhadj, from prison and placed them under house arrest. Algerian newspapers speculated that the move may signal a possible amnesty for members of the outlawed FIS.

On the 28th, Spanish authorities identified the three hijackers of an Air Algiers flight to Alicante, Spain as Algerian police officers. The officers said they were seeking asylum but their motivation was not immediately clear. The hijackers surrendered to Spanish police at Alicante. One report said at least one of the men claimed they were members of the FIS but subsequent reports indicate that all the members deny any connection with the Front.

May 1994

On the 3rd, Italian police placed 15 suspected members of the FIS under investigation after raiding two apartments in Perugia, Italy. Police found false passports and identity cards as well as cellular telephones, cameras, and other electronic equipment. Police also found FIS propaganda leaflets and instructional video tapes on weapons use. The suspects are also being investigated for receiving stolen property. Police said they did not believe the group was planning any attacks but were probably being used as a support cell for Algerian extremists.

On the 25th, a military court in Morocco announced it would try eight Islamic extremists for attempting to smuggle arms to FIS members in Algeria. The men arrested were in possession of 13 automatic pistols, one assault rifle, ammunition, night vision binoculars, military uniforms, and \$63,000 in cash. Two of the men were Algerian and the other six were Moroccan. They said they were Islamic militants

ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT

but did not give details of their affiliation.

July 1994

During the first week of July, seven Italian crewmen of a cargo ship were murdered and an Italian construction manager was abducted and presumably killed.

On the 7th, an Algerian pilot took a government helicopter and defected to Islamic extremist fighters in the Bouira province between Setif and Algiers. The pilot blew up two other aircraft on the ground while escaping. The pilot said he defected because the Algerian president failed to release leading members of the FIS on Algeria's Independence Day.

On the 11th, five Russian workers were murdered near the Algiers suburb of Oued Ouchhayeh.

On the 12th, two Algerian policemen and two suspected FIS gunmen were killed in a shootout outside of the Italian Embassy in Algiers. The gunmen had driven up to the embassy in a truck and opened fire on a police patrol, some 20 meters from the embassy gates. One other gunman was captured and another policeman was injured in the attack.

August 1994

Three French security officers and two consular officers were killed at a French Embassy housing complex in an Algiers suburb on the 3rd. The gunmen failed to set off a large car bomb driven to the building. All the terrorists escaped. Exiled FIS leaders subsequently expressed their approval of the attack.

The military wing of FIS, the Islamic Salvation Army, demanded the release of 16 FIS terrorists detained by the French government.

An Algerian student was detained in France after being found with Islamic fundamentalist propaganda, 100 rounds of ammunition, two pistols and two pistol silencers.

Twenty-five suspected Algerian Islamic extremist fundamentalists were arrested by French police in Morocco.

PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD

ALSO KNOWN AS

PIJ, Islamic Jihad Palestine, Islamic Jihad-Palestine Faction, Islamic Holy War.

IDEOLOGY & OBJECTIVES

- The destruction of the State of Israel through violent means is the prime objective of the Islamic Jihad. The Islamic Jihad rejects any peaceful settlement with Israel.
- The overthrow of Arab governments who do not uphold Islamic law.
- Harsh criticism of the PLO because of that organization's involvement in the peace process with Israel which, according to the PIJ, contradicts the continuation of the Palestinian uprising and its further escalation.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad was founded in the Gaza Strip in 1983. PIJ is an umbrella organization comprised of several fundamentalist Shiite Muslim groups. These factions operate separately but share an allegiance to the Islamic regime in Iran and its goal of putting the region under Islamic law. PIJ has been characterized as one of the most radical and violent Islamic organizations in the Middle East.

PIJ attempted to capitalize on the popular Palestinian Arab *intifada* soon after it erupted in December 1987. It was the first radical organization to issue a call for general strikes. The attempt to lead the popular violent movement ended in failure after the arrest and subsequent deportation in 1988 of its leaders and the arrest of their replacements in Gaza in mid-1988.

PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD

A number of reports state that the Islamic Jihad is used by the Syrian and Jordanian intelligence agencies to carry out terrorist operations. Reports in the Lebanese news media have linked PIJ to the Lebanon-based and Iranian-backed Hizballah. It is believed that the organization has coordinated training exercises and terrorist attacks with the Hizballah. While Hizballah has not traditionally been known to operate in the Gaza Strip, splinter groups with ties to it may have coordinated an April 1992 operation with PIJ in which an Israeli military convoy was attacked in the Gaza Strip.

PIJ has maintained a more radical position than HAMAS. Nevertheless, one of its leaders stated in January 1993 that it would be possible for the group to join the PLO. The PLO would have to undergo a fundamental transformation in its ideological and strategic policies before the Palestinian Islamic Jihad could conceivably join it. Both the PIJ and HAMAS have joined the Palestinian rejection front, a coalition of terror groups opposed to the Israel-PLO accord signed in September 1993. Not unlike HAMAS, the PIJ has negotiated with the PLO in the past. However, it refused to do so when more than 100 of its members, along with several hundred HAMAS activists, were deported by Israel to southern Lebanon in December 1992. Following the deportation, HAMAS held meetings with PLO officials.

A Western news report stated in mid-May 1994 that the PIJ, led by Fathi al-Shkaki, announced its intentions to change tactics to avoid conflict with the Palestinian police force that began providing security in the Gaza Strip that month. According to the report, al-Shkaki advised that his group was still determined to "bring down" the accord between Israel and the PLO, but was rethinking its strategy and would attempt to wield its influence in a more political slant. Nevertheless, the PIJ said (via a fax sent to international news agencies on May 23, 1994) that in defiance of the Palestinian police in the Gaza Strip and Jericho, it would not disarm. The

PIJ statement said, "We tell you we will not give up our weapons or stop our *jihad*, our path to freedom, greatness and honor, our path to paradise."

LEADERSHIP

Five major PIJ factions operate in cells:

- Sheikh Odeh Faction: led by Abed al-Aziz Odeh and Dr. Fathi Abdul Aziz al-Shkaki (the Secretary General of the PIJ). It is the largest of the five factions and is reported to have several hundred followers in the Gaza Strip. Odeh and al-Shkaki were deported by Israel to southern Lebanon from the Gaza Strip in 1988. In 1981, they had been deported from Egypt following President Sadat's assassination. Since the 1988 deportation, they have directed the PIJ from Lebanon.
- "Beit al-Muquades" faction: led by Sheikh As'ad Bayoud al-Tamini. It operates out of Jordan. In January 1993, al-Tamini vowed to step up attacks on Israeli interests.
- Ja'aber Amar Faction: operates from Egypt and the Sudan.
- Ahmed Ma'ana Faction: a break away faction from al-Shkaki's group. Operations of this faction are primarily undertaken from Jordan.
- The Islamic Jihad Companies: established by the Palestine Liberation Organization's Fatah wing, this faction is a traditionally secular-nationalist group. The principal objective of the Islamic Jihad Companies is to recruit Palestinian radical fundamentalists to participate in attacks that further cooperation between the nationalist/secular Palestinian radicals and the Islamic fundamentalist radicals.

MEMBERSHIP

The organizational and operational strength of the PIJ (including sympathizers, supporters, leaders, and hardcore operatives) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is unknown. The number of active members, including hardcore operatives, appears to be considerably smaller than it was in the early to mid-1980s in these areas.

PIJ's support base in southern Lebanon has grown due to Israel's concerted effort to curb PIJ activities in the territo-

PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD

ries. It is difficult to ascertain the extent of support in southern Lebanon, but a credible base of operations has been established in this area since 1988. Israel had actively sought to apprehend and deport the organization's leadership and known operatives, including the deportation of the group's pre-1988 Gaza-based leadership. Second to HAMAS in popularity among Islamic groups in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, PIJ's level of support among the general Palestinian Arab population has been relatively steady over the last several years.

SOURCES OF SUPPORT

PIJ is believed to have received financial, organizational, and operational assistance (including arms, training, intelligence information, and safe haven) from Iran, Sudan, Syria, and Jordan. It is unclear the type or level of assistance that each country provides. Reports state that Iran provides the majority of operational support for the organization. Fathi al-Shkaki lives in Damascus and his faction shares a training base with Hizballah in the Syrian-controlled northern Bekaa Valley of Lebanon. In April 1993, al-Shkaki told reporters that PIJ had been receiving assistance from Iran since 1987. The Islamic government of Sudan continues to be of assistance to the organization. It was reported that the PIJ has, in the past, received arms, logistical assistance (including communication networks), and training from the PLO and its Force 17 elite unit.

HEADQUARTERS

Small cells dispersed throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip with policymaking and logistics operations in southern Lebanon.

AREAS OF OPERATION

The West Bank and Gaza Strip as well as southern Lebanon.

TACTICS

Individual or small group killings (especially by stabbing and bombing), popular agitation and incitement to violence (especially through mass demonstrations), and suicide attacks.

TARGETS

Israeli civilians, security service personnel, soldiers, and Palestinian collaborators. Targets have also included IDF installations in the West Bank and Gaza, and Israeli civilian and military vehicles.

SELECTED ATTACKS

July 1983

Stabbed to death an Israeli student in Hebron in the West Bank on the 7th.

February 1986

PIJ Secretary General Dr. Fatmi Abdul Aziz Shkaki was arrested by Israel.

October 1986

Threw grenades at participants in a military ceremony in Jerusalem on the 15th. One person was killed and 70 were injured.

September 1987

Abed al-Aziz Odeh was arrested by Israeli security forces.

1988

Abed al-Aziz Odeh and Fatmi Abdul Aziz Shkaki were deported to southern Lebanon.

May 1988

PIJ leaders Odeh and Shkaki's two principle replacements in Gaza were arrested by Israel. PIJ's leadership and ability to issue proclamations were severely hindered by the arrest.

PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD

May 1989

Murdered two elderly Israelis at a bus stop in Jerusalem on the 3rd.

July 1989

Claimed responsibility for an attack on a bus on the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem highway, in which 16 people were killed and 25 were injured. One U.S. citizen was killed and seven other U.S. citizens were injured in the July 6 incident.

February 1990

PIJ and a group calling itself the "Organization for the Defense of the Oppressed in Egypt's Prisons" claimed responsibility for killing nine Israeli tourists, two Egyptian security men, and injuring 20 tourists on an Egyptian bus. The attack occurred near Ismailia, Egypt on the 4th.

May 1990

Bombing of a Jerusalem market killed one Israeli and injured nine others.

October 1990

Claimed responsibility for three Israelis killed in Jerusalem.

November 1990

One Israeli soldier was killed in an attack on an IDF post near the Allenby Bridge in the Jordan Valley. The terrorist, identified as a member of the PIJ faction "Beit al-Muquades," crossed the Jordan River from Jordan.

February 1991

Claimed responsibility for two small explosions inside the American Express office in Cairo.

May 1991

A PIJ faction claimed responsibility for a lone attacker who wounded three Israelis in Jerusalem on the 18th.

October 1991

PIJ and the PFLP claimed responsibility for killing two Israelis and wounding at least six, five of whom were children, on a bus north of Jerusalem two days before the opening of the Madrid Arab-Israeli peace conference.

March 1992

A suspected PIJ member stabbed and killed an Israeli student and a Palestinian man who was trying to protect her. Seventeen other students were lightly injured in this incident in the Israeli city of Jaffa.

April 1992

PIJ claimed responsibility for the April 27 killing of an Israeli in Tel Aviv.

October 1992

The Fatmi Shkaki faction of the PIJ claimed responsibility for a roadside bomb explosion in Israel that killed an Israeli woman and injured eight others.

December 1992

A PIJ leader shot one Israeli border policeman to death and wounded three others before dying of his wounds during a clash in the northern West Bank village of Anza.

January 1993

PIJ claimed responsibility for stabbing and wounding four people at the central bus station in Tel Aviv. The assailant was shot to death by a witness of the attack.

March 1993

On the 1st, a Palestinian from the Gaza Strip stabbed and killed two Israelis and injured eight others in Tel Aviv. PIJ Secretary General Fathi al-Shkaki claimed that the man (who was arrested) was a PIJ activist operating on behalf of the organization.

August 1993

On the 2nd, an armed Palestinian Arab believed to be a member of PIJ hijacked a bus belonging to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in the Gaza Strip and rammed two Israeli cars. One Israeli was killed and five others were injured (two critically) in the attack.

PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD

Claimed responsibility for killing an Israeli guard in the West Bank on the 22nd.

September 1993

The PIJ and HAMAS took responsibility for an attack in which two gunmen opened fire on an Israeli army patrol in Gaza City in the Gaza Strip. Three Israeli soldiers were killed. The gunmen escaped with the soldiers' weapons.

October 1993

Claimed responsibility for the murder of two Israeli hikers in a national park in the Judean Desert. The PFLP also claimed responsibility.

November 1993

Single operative stabbed and wounded an Israeli on the 12th. He was in the Gaza Strip to pick up Palestinian workers.

Single operative stabbed an Israeli soldier to death on the 18th.

On the 22nd, an alleged member of PIJ attempted to drive a stolen garbage truck into an army vehicle full Israeli soldiers in the Gaza Strip. The man was shot and killed.

December 1993

Israeli troops shot and killed two wanted members of the PIJ at the Rafah refugee camp in the Gaza Strip on the 13th. A third PIJ member was wounded and captured in the camp.

January 1994

Killed Israeli soldier Ilan Gabai at a Jerusalem bus stop, on the 13th.

February 1994

The Shekaki faction claimed responsibility for the murder of Israeli taxi driver Ilan Sudri.

April 1994

Claimed responsibility for shooting at the Gaza City

IDF headquarters. Two Israeli soldiers were wounded in the attack on the 16th.

May 1994

A PIJ member who was wanted for a February 1993 attack on two Israelis in the Gaza Strip was killed by Israeli soldiers in the West Bank village of Tafuah near Hebron on the 22nd.

On the 26th, an IDF soldier was slightly wounded when Palestinian terrorists fired at the vehicle in which he was riding near the town of Rafah in the Gaza Strip. The PIJ claimed responsibility for the attack, stating that it was in response to the May 21 abduction in Lebanon of Mustafa Dirani by the IDF.

Claimed responsibility for a drive-by shooting in Gaza on the 27th. Two Israeli soldiers were killed. HAMAS also claimed responsibility for the attack.

July 1994

An IDF patrol came under attack in Gush Katif in the southern Gaza Strip. One soldier received light to moderate injuries from the gunfire. A PIJ leaflet which stated that the ambush was in retaliation for violent incidents at Gaza's Erez checkpoint earlier in the week was found at the scene.

Claimed responsibility for drive-by shooting in Gaza on the 7th. Two IDF soldiers were wounded.

Claimed responsibility for the killing of Yarom and Hannah Sakuri in the Israeli town of Kiryat Netafim on the 8th. PIJ called the attack "a present" for PLO leader Yasser Arafat for the PLO's agreements with Israel.

PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT

ALSO KNOWN AS

PLF, Front for the Liberation of Palestine, FLP.

IDEOLOGY & OBJECTIVES

- Conduct terrorist operations on Israeli soil leading to the dismantlement of the State of Israel.
- Establish an independent Arab Palestinian state in place of Israel.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The PLF was founded in 1976 when Abu Abbas split from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). Reports state that the break occurred because of a dispute regarding Syrian military intervention against Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon after the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war. Iraq supported the establishment of the PLF. The PLF was first recognized as an independent group when it obtained seats on the Palestine National Council in 1981. Then, its headquarters were in Damascus. In 1983, the PLF split into two factions: the pro-PLO faction commanded by Abu Abbas, and the pro-Syrian faction of Tal'at Yaqub.

Abu Abbas became a member of the PLO Executive Committee in 1984. In 1988, the PLF and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat feuded over the PLO's moderating stance toward Israel and the use of terrorism against the Israel. A complete split was avoided when Chairman Arafat refused to condemn an attempted terrorist attack by the PLF against Israeli civilians on a beach south of Tel Aviv in 1990. However, the U.S. broke off its dialogue with the PLO because Abu Abbas was then a member of the PLO Executive Committee and because of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat's refusal to condemn the attempt. Abu Abbas left the Committee in 1991. The PLF is one of ten Palestinian groups based in Damascus, Syria, which opposes the PLO-Israel Declaration of Principles signed in

September 1993.

LEADERSHIP

- Muhammad Abbas (aka Abu Abbas) heads the mainstream and pro-PLO faction of the Palestine Liberation Front. He served as PFLP-GC leader Ahmed Jibril's representative in Lebanon before he broke away from Jibril's command in 1976.
- Abd Al Fatah Ghanem heads the pro-Libyan faction.
- Tal'at Yaqub headed the faction that broke away from the command of Abu Abbas in 1983. Yaqub's faction was pro-Syrian. He died of natural causes in 1988.

MEMBERSHIP

It is estimated that there are approximately 50 committed activists in the pro-PLO faction of the PLF. It is estimated that there are approximately 100 committed activists in the pro-Syrian and pro-Libyan factions of the PLF.

PLF forces are dispersed, but the Front is primarily based in Sidon, Lebanon, where the largest PLO faction, Fatah, maintains a sizable military presence. Reports state that the PLF also has assets in Iraq.

SOURCES OF SUPPORT

The PLO has provided military and logistical support to the PLF. Iraq and Libya have provided money and supplies as well.

Libya provided virtually all of the planning, material support, transportation, and training for the PLF's failed May 30, 1990 terrorist attack on the beach near Tel Aviv. The Palestinian National Council declined to discipline or strongly criticize the PLF after this attack as it had previously pledged to do.

The Abu Abbas faction of the PLF has been close to the Iraqi leadership. During the Gulf War, Abu Abbas called on his forces to strike at American and conservative Arab government interests in support of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

AREAS OF OPERATION

PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT

The Middle East.

HEADQUARTERS

Iraq. Operational bases are located in Sidon, Lebanon.

TACTICS

Operationally, the Abu Abbas faction has demonstrated creativity in its method of attack. The group has employed hot air balloons and hang gliders for airborne operations, and has used a civilian passenger ship in an attempted seaborne attack on Israeli civilian targets.

TARGETS

Israelis, Westerners (especially Americans) in the Middle East, and Jews worldwide.

SELECTED ATTACKS

July 1978

Kidnapped 51 United Nations peacekeeping troops in Tyre, Lebanon. The Fatah branch of the PLO forced the PLF to release the soldiers several hours later.

October 1985

Hijacked the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro*. After holding the passengers hostage for two days and murdering a crippled U.S. citizen, Abu Abbas and his terrorist squad surrendered to Egyptian forces in exchange for a promise of safe passage. They were apprehended at a NATO air base in Sicily after U.S. aircraft intercepted and forced down the Egyptian airliner flying the terrorists to a safe haven. Abu Abbas was soon released by the Italian government, but was later sentenced in absentia. The four PLF terrorists responsible for the hijacking were convicted of their crimes and sentenced to prison.

May 1990

Attempted to land on an Israeli beach south of Tel Aviv

on the 5th. The terrorists planned to attack and occupy hotels on the Tel Aviv beach front. Israeli military forces foiled the attempt out to sea where the terrorists' boats were brought under fire.

The terrorists were delivered from Libya by a Libyan ship and then used speedboats to reach the beach. One group was intercepted at sea and the second landed where the IDF was waiting to ambush it. All the terrorists were either killed or captured in these incidents.

May 1992

Exactly two years after the foiled Tel Aviv beach attack, two PLF operatives attempted to raid the Israeli Red Sea resort town of Eilat on the 5th. An Israeli security guard was killed before another killed one of the terrorists and wounded the other. They were believed to have swum from the Jordanian town of Aqaba, located a few kilometers along the coastline opposite Eilat.

POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE

ALSO KNOWN AS

PFLP, Red Eagles (a commonly used name for PFLP activists in the West Bank and Gaza Strip).

IDEOLOGY & OBJECTIVES

The PFLP, a Marxist group, is one of the largest organizations under the PLO umbrella.

- Promote the Palestinian Arab desire for a state to replace Israel as a component of the worldwide Marxist revolution.
- Liberate “Palestine” through an “armed struggle.”
- Establish a Marxist secular government in “Palestine.”
- Oppose any political settlement of the Palestinian conflict, including the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles signed in September 1993.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The PFLP was formed in December 1967 by Dr. George Habash as a merger of three formerly autonomous groups: the Arab Nationalist Movement-Heroes of the Return, the National Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Independent Palestine Liberation Front (unrelated to the current PLF). At its founding, the PFLP was second only to Fatah in size and influence in the Palestinian community. The PFLP quickly established itself as one of the most violent of the Palestinian terrorist groups.

Three years later, as a result of ideological inflexibility, internal disputes and personality conflicts, the PFLP broke into three factions: the PFLP, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC). Habash continued to command the PFLP, but the DFLP and PFLP-GC were declared separate factions. Af-

ter the split, Habash remained consistent in his position towards solving the Palestinian problem - the total "liberation" of the territory of British Mandate Palestine. The PFLP concurrently sought to establish strong ties to other Marxist revolutionary organizations. Those links facilitated PFLP operations in Europe that resulted in much of the group's notoriety. However, since the 1978 death of Wadi Haddad, the PFLP's operational planner of terrorism, the group has carried out most of its attacks against targets in Israel.

Despite the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the PFLP continues to adhere to its Marxist ideology. A new and younger leadership emerged after a PFLP Congress was held in Damascus in February 1993.

Since the beginning of the Palestinian uprising in 1987, PFLP operatives in the West Bank, called the Red Eagles, have sporadically carried out terrorist acts against Israelis. PFLP's opposition to the U.S.-sponsored Arab-Israeli peace talks prompted Habash to form an alliance with several other groups that also rejected these negotiations from the outset. In September 1992, the PFLP and the DFLP announced the formation of a joint leadership to confront the Fatah faction of the PLO and its support for negotiations with Israel.

In 1993, these 10 groups continued their efforts to scuttle Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and pressure Fatah to pull out of these talks. In March of 1993 in Tunis, PFLP deputy commander Ali Mustafa called for direct defiance of U.S. policies and for unification of the Arab and Palestinian nationalist positions against a Palestinian political settlement with Israel. On October 15, 1993, PFLP leader Habash announced from Damascus that a 10-member (the "Damascus Ten") coalition agreed to challenge Chairman Arafat's leadership of the PLO and foil the Israel-PLO accord signed a month earlier.

LEADERSHIP

PFLP founder Dr. George Habash holds the title of Secretary General and wields total control. Habash has remained in the PLO despite publicly differing with PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. Habash has consistently maintained a hard line stance

POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE

toward Israel, calling for the destruction of the Jewish state. A new "Politburo," PFLP's governing body, was elected during the February 1993 PFLP Congress. The following are PFLP politburo members as reported by an Arab news source:

- Dr. George Habash, secretary general.
- Abu Ali Mustafa, deputy secretary general (since 1967).
- Abdul Rahim Lallouh, resides in Jordan and a member of the PLO Executive Committee.
- Abu Ahmed Fuad, military official based in Damascus.
- Saber Mohieddin, operations commander.
- Taysir Kubaa, deputy speaker of the PNC.
- Omar Kutaish, based in Lebanon.

Several additional members were also appointed, including PFLP activists in the occupied territories who were not named for fear of being targeted by Israel.

MEMBERSHIP

Approximately 800 activists.

SOURCES OF SUPPORT

The PFLP receives most of its financial assistance and military support from Syria and Libya. Lebanese reports state that the PFLP runs a training camp in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley of Lebanon. Arab press reports stated that in October 1992, PFLP leader Habash had been granted permanent residency in Amman, Jordan. Habash has been receiving medical treatment in Jordan for the past three years.

PFLP has earned money through front companies and legitimate business ventures. In 1982, the IDF discovered that the PFLP owned and operated a metal works plant in Sidon, Lebanon worth at least \$2 million.

HEADQUARTERS

Damascus, Syria.

AREAS OF OPERATION

The Middle East (especially Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and the occupied territories) and Europe.

TACTICS

Habash has strongly favored large-scale attacks on civilian targets. The PFLP reputation for ruthlessness was built on that strategy. PFLP has taken responsibility for stabbings, shootings, and grenade attacks. Between 1970 and 1977, the PFLP committed numerous acts of international terrorism. However, since the 1978 death of Wadi Haddad, the PFLP's operational planner of terrorism, the group has carried out most of its attacks in the Middle East.

TARGETS

The PFLP was one of the most active terrorist organizations in the early 1970s. International and public condemnation, including from communist-bloc countries, forced the PFLP to curtail its international operations and to concentrate on terror against targets in Israel. Attacks have also been carried out against moderate Arab governments. During the Gulf War, Habash called for violent attacks against U.S., British, and French military targets.

SELECTED ATTACKS

July 1968

Hijacked an Israeli El Al airliner en route from Rome to Israel to Algeria on the 23rd. Held passengers hostage for three weeks and then released all when 12 Palestinian terrorists were released from Israeli prisons.

December 1968

Killed one and injured one on the 26th when two operatives threw grenades and shot at passengers outside the Athens, Greece airport.

February 1969

Killed an El Al Israel Airlines pilot and wounded five passengers in an attack at the Zurich, Switzerland airport.

POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE

Three operatives were wounded and captured, and one was killed.

September 1969

Three attacks were carried out on the 8th: In Brussels, Belgium, three terrorists threw a grenade into an El Al Israel Airlines office wounding two people. Two of the terrorists escaped, and the other was arrested. After interrogation they were handed over to Libya.

In the Hague, Netherlands, a lone terrorist threw a grenade at the Israeli Embassy. He was arrested and interrogated by Dutch police and then handed over to Libya. There were no casualties.

Two terrorists threw a grenade at the Israeli Embassy in Bonn, Germany. There were no casualties.

September 1970

Simultaneously hijacked three airliners on the 6th. Two were flown to Jordan and one to Egypt. The plane flown to Egypt was blown up. All 400 hostages were released by the 29th.

May 1972

PFLP leader Habash masterminded an attack by three members of the Japanese Red Army (radical left wing allies of the PFLP) at Israel's Ben Gurion International airport. Twenty-seven people were killed in this May 30 attack, most of them Christian pilgrims from Puerto Rico. Two terrorists were killed and the other was captured.

July 1973

Hijacked a Japanese airliner en route to Tokyo from Paris and forced it to land at Benghazi, Libya. It was blown up on the 24th. The passengers were released. Four terrorists were arrested by Libyan police but were later released. One terrorist was killed.

October 1977

Hijacked a Lufthansa airliner to Mogadishu, Somalia, with the help of German terrorists and demanded the release of terrorists being held in West German prisons. West German border police stormed the plane, killing three terrorists and capturing a fourth.

April 1979

An attempt to commandeer an El Al Israel Airlines jet failed at Brussels, Belgium airport. At the airplane gate, PFLP operatives threw hand grenades and a gasoline bomb that wounding five Belgians. The terrorists entered an airport restaurant and shot and wounded seven customers.

March 1984

Killed three passengers in an attack on a bus in Ashdod, Israel.

April 1984

Killed one passenger and injured eight others in bus hijacking in Ashkelon, Israel.

November 1986

Killed an Israeli student on street in Jerusalem.

May 1987

Claimed responsibility for a rocket attack on the northern Israeli town of Metulla.

August 1990

A prominent Palestinian lawyer from Nablus was killed by the Red Eagles, possibly for alleged collaboration with Israeli authorities.

November 1990

Clashed with Israeli Defense Forces inside Israel's security zone in southern Lebanon. Five Israeli soldiers and two PFLP guerrillas were killed.

February 1991

Stabbed to death an Israeli student in Jerusalem's Old City on February 28.

October 1991

Claimed responsibility for an attack on a bus carrying Israelis from Nablus to Ramallah in the West Bank. Two Israelis were killed and five others were wounded.

March 1993

The Red Eagles claimed responsibility for killing an Israeli, Simcha Levy, in the Gaza Strip. The killers disguised themselves as women and flagged down the bus which he was driving. Levy was then axed and stabbed to death.

POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE

April 1993

Two Red Eagles axed to death Ian Feinberg, an Israeli who served as an advisor to the European Community in Gaza City on the 18th.

On April 20, a suspect in Feinberg's murder, Majed Abu Moussa, was killed during an IDF operation in the Deir al-Balah refugee camp in the Gaza Strip.

May 1993

Stabbed an Israeli to death near Hebron, in the West Bank.

Israel's security services arrested Mohammed Oda Sakran, another suspect in Ian Feinberg's murder in April 1993.

June 1993

On June 15, two members of the PFLP tried to infiltrate into Israel's "security zone" in southern Lebanon. They were killed by Israeli tank units.

October 1993

Claimed responsibility for the murder of two Israeli hikers in the Judean Desert on October 9.

On October 12, three members of the PFLP were killed by Israeli forces when they attempted to infiltrate into Israel's security zone in southern Lebanon.

December 1993

Two Israelis were found murdered in a Ramle apartment on the West Bank on the 31st. The Red Eagles claimed responsibility.

January 1994

Israeli Moshe Becker of Rishon Le-Zion was murdered by three of his Palestinian employees in his orchard on the 12th. The PFLP claimed responsibility.

March 1994

Murdered an Israeli civilian near Jerusalem's Damascus Gate on the 23rd.

July 1994

An IDF naval patrol boat shot dead two PFLP frogmen and wounded and captured a third off the Israeli coastal city of Rosh Hanikra on the 17th.

POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE – GENERAL COMMAND

ALSO KNOWN AS

PFLP-GC, Jabhat al-Shaabiya li Tahrir Falistin al-Qiyadat al-Ama.

IDEOLOGY & OBJECTIVES

- Actively oppose the Middle East peace process.
- Destroy Israel and establish an independent Arab state called Palestine in its place.
- Attack Israeli citizens, particularly in regions that are in the vicinity of Israel's borders as well as in the occupied territories.
- Oppose both moves toward moderation in the Palestinian movement and the policies of the PLO.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

PFLP-GC head Ahmed Jibril broke off from the PFLP shortly after its formation and formed the PFLP-GC in October 1968. Jibril claimed he had lost confidence in the PFLP leadership and that the group should focus more on violent opposition to Israel than on diplomacy. Jibril also disagreed with the Popular Front's Marxist emphasis on class conflict. In 1977, the PFLP-GC split when Abu Abbas, the former second-in-command, formed the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF).

The PFLP-GC actively participated in the Lebanese civil war in the early 1980s. It attacked and injured U.S. Marines participating in the international peacekeeping forces in Beirut from 1982-83.

The PFLP-GC is part of the ten organization "rejectionist front" that violently opposes the Fatah overtures to Israel. Jibril has campaigned against the approach being taken by Arafat, suggesting that they follow "the logic of defeat." In an April 1993 communique, Jibril and Democratic Front for

POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE – GENERAL COMMAND

the Liberation of Palestine leader Nayif Hawatmeh called for further attacks on Israeli interests to derail the negotiations.

The organization held a graduation in October 1992 for recent recruits trained to attack Israelis. In attendance were leaders of several “rejectionist front” groups.

LEADERSHIP

Ahmed Jibril, former intelligence captain in the Syrian Army.

HEADQUARTERS

Damascus, Syria.

AREAS OF OPERATION

Lebanon, Egypt, Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, and Europe.

MEMBERSHIP

Approximately 500 activists.

SOURCES OF SUPPORT

Syria is the group’s chief sponsor and provides military and logistical support. Libya provides financial support. Iran has taken on increasing importance to the PFLP-GC. In the mid-1980s, Jibril began to shift his support base from Libya to Iran. The PFLP-GC soon became Iran’s principal channel into the Palestinian movement. Jibril facilitated contacts between Iran and other groups (such as HAMAS, DFLP and PFLP). In return for Iranian funding, the PFLP-GC has helped track down and assassinate Iranian opposition figures abroad.

TACTICS

Some in the group specialize in sophisticated bomb attacks, while others utilize armed assaults including hijacking air-

craft, and suicide operations (often using unconventional means).

Jibril was initially interested in developing conventional military capabilities to complement PFLP-GC terrorist activities. As a result, the PFLP-GC has always been known for its conventional military expertise. In addition to ground infiltration capabilities, the PFLP-GC has worked toward developing air and naval infiltration capabilities. The PFLP-GC has shared its terrorist expertise with other international terrorist groups such as the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), and European terror groups that have sent members to Lebanon for training.

The PFLP-GC arsenal includes sophisticated weaponry such as the Russian SA-7 anti-aircraft missile, heavy artillery, and light aircraft, chiefly motorized hang gliders and ultralights. Communist-bloc countries had provided small arms, and Syria and Libya may have also served as conduits for such support.

Tunnels have been built by the PFLP-GC connecting refugee camps in Lebanon. These tunnels change the tactical dimensions of the region by allowing PFLP-GC fighters greater freedom of movement in the ongoing militia skirmishes.

TARGETS

PLO moderates and Israelis in the Middle East. The PFLP-GC actively participated in the Lebanese civil war in the early 1980s, operating against rival militia. It attacked and injured U.S. Marines participating in the international peace-keeping forces in Beirut from 1982-83.

The group has also operated outside the Middle East against Jewish, Israeli, and U.S. targets.

SELECTED ATTACKS

February 1970

Bombed a Swiss airliner and killed 47.

April 1974

Attacked the northern Israeli town of Kiryat Shmona,

POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE – GENERAL COMMAND

killing 12 children and 6 adults.

August 1987

Blamed for a massive explosion in Beirut which destroyed the headquarters of the Abu Abbas organization (Palestine Liberation Front). Two hundred people were believed to have been killed.

November 1987

Utilizing a motorized hang glider to cross the Israeli border from Lebanon and to land just outside an IDF base, a PFLP-GC terrorist killed six Israeli soldiers and wounded seven others before being killed.

February 1990

Killed 11 Israeli tourists on their tour bus in Cairo.

December 1990

Detonated bomb in Bethlehem, killing one Israeli soldier and wounding two others.

June 1991

A ranking PFLP-GC official, Hafez Dalkamoni, was convicted by German courts for bombing U.S. Army trains in Europe.

July 1993

Claimed responsibility for an attack on the 8th, in which two Israeli soldiers were killed and three others were wounded near the village of Ayshiyya, on the northern border of Israel's security zone in southern Lebanon.

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MIDDLE EAST TERRORISM: SELECTED GROUP PROFILES

Yonah Alexander

Terrorism is the deliberate employment of violence or the threat of the use of violence by subnational groups and sovereign states to attain strategic and political objectives.

Terrorists seek to create overwhelming fear in a target population larger than the civilian or military victims attacked or threatened.

Acts of individual and collective terrorism committed in modern times have introduced a new breed of extralegal warfare in terms of threats, technology, targets, and impact.

ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION ¥ DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE ¥ HAMAS ¥ HIZBALLAH ¥ ISLAMIC GROUP ¥ ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT ¥ PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT ¥ PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD ¥ POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE ¥ POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE — GENERAL COMMAND