



Tsunami Evaluation Coalition:

Initial Findings

December 2005

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Introduction

This is an initial report from the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC). The TEC is a collaborative effort by aid agencies (donor governments' aid departments, United Nations agencies, non-governmental organisations, and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement) to improve humanitarian systems by learning from the response to the earthquake and tsunamis of 26 December 2004. Another aim of the TEC is to provide some accountability for the humanitarian system to both the giving and receiving publics.

The TEC carried out five joint thematic evaluations; on the donor response, co-ordination, needs assessment, the impact on local and national capacities, and the linkage of relief with rehabilitation and long-term development. The added value that the TEC joint evaluations bring is the ability to do sectoral assessments which would be difficult for individual

actors to do. It was also hoped that the joint TEC evaluations would reduce the need for individual agency evaluations.

It was originally planned that this report would present the preliminary findings of the TEC thematic evaluations; however the thematic reports have fallen behind their planned timetables. The preliminary findings presented here are based on a variety of sources, including some of the draft TEC evaluation reports, TEC workshops in London and Brussels, and comments by evaluation team leaders, evaluation managers, and members of the TEC's Core Management Group.

The main reports on the work of the TEC will be the five thematic evaluations and the TEC synthesis report, due to be published in June/July 2006. The TEC synthesis report will draw together all the themes as a coherent whole and make recommendations for the future. Given that this report draws on sources other than the incomplete TEC thematic reports, it may present a different range of issues from the synthesis report.

Tsunami Evaluation Coalition



While initial needs were broadly met, in part by local actors, there is room for improvement in the way that agencies are meeting ongoing needs. Key areas for improvement in the current operation of agency responses tsunami response are:

- their engagement with local actors;
- transparency, communication with, and accountability to the affected populations;
- transparency towards their donors.

Despite a number of unique factors, the well-funded tsunami response provides a significant opportunity for the aid community to learn how to improve its performance in future responses. The TEC synthesis report will examine these issues in far more detail and will present detailed recommendations for correcting the weaknesses highlighted by the five thematic TEC studies. The thematic reports will also provide far more detail on the areas in need of improvement, and will identify examples of best practice in the tsunami response that agencies can adopt in future operations.

The impact of the earthquake and tsunamis

The fourth largest earthquake of recent times struck about 100km off the west coast of Sumatra, an hour and a half after dawn on 26 December 2004. A 1,200km section of the earth's crust shifted beneath the Indian Ocean and the earthquake released stored energy equivalent to over of more than 23,000 Hiroshima bombs. This raised the seafloor several metres and sent a train of giant waves (tsunamis) rushing east and west to wreak havoc on the coasts of more than a dozen countries spread over two continents.

Tsunami waves started to strike the Nicobar and Andaman Islands within ten minutes of the earthquake, and Banda Aceh was struck within another ten minutes or so. Within two hours of the earthquake, both Thailand and Sri Lanka had been hit. The east coast of India was hit shortly afterwards.

Tsunamis rolled over the Maldives three hours after the earthquake and lashed the Somali coast more than seven hours after. The earthquake and tsunami killed people in fourteen countries across two continents, with the last two fatalities being swept out to sea in South Africa, more than twelve hours after the earthquake.

The tsunamis were measured on tide gauges around the world, but no further fatalities or major damage were reported outside of the Indian Ocean.

Note: Indonesia figures include the earthquake of 28 March 2005.

Sources for deaths: USAID (2005); except for Myanmar, Tanzania, Bangladesh, and Kenya (AFP, 2005) and Yemen (IRIN, 2005b).

Sources for loss and damage: Said et al. (2005); except for Yemen (IRIN, 2005b) and Seychelles (IRIN, 2005a).

The impact of the earthquake and tsunamis

Country	Dead or missing	Displaced	Losses US\$ mn
Indonesia	166,334	566,898	4,451
Sri Lanka	35,262	519,063	1,454
India	16,389	647,599	1,224
Thailand	8,240		2,198
Somalia	150	5,000	
Maldives	108	21,663	603
Malaysia	74	8,000	
Myanmar	59		
Tanzania	10		
Seychelles	3	200	30
Bangladesh	2		
South Africa	2		
Yemen	2		2
Kenya	1		
Totals	226,560	1,768,423	9,930

Summary of the findings

To date, the main findings of the TEC process appear to be:

Finding 1

The relief phase was effective in ensuring that the immediate survival needs were met, through a mixture of local assistance in the immediate aftermath and international assistance in the first weeks after the disaster. However, these relief responses were generally not based on joint needs assessments and were not well coordinated, leading to an excess of some interventions such as medical teams, alongside shortages in less

accessible areas or less popular sectors such as water supply.

Finding 2

The scale of the generous public response was unprecedented, not only in the amount of money raised (about \$14 billion internationally) but also in the proportion of funding from the general public, and the speed with which money was pledged or donated. The scale of the funding allowed an early shift to rehabilitation and the use of cash assistance programmes. It also acted as a giant lens, highlighting many of the existing problems in humanitarian response systems. The scale of funding also created coordination problems as it increased the number of agencies while removing some of the normal incentives for agencies to engage with coordination mechanisms.

Finding 3

Although local capacity is key to saving lives, this capacity is underestimated and undervalued by the international aid community as well as being overlooked by the international media. International agencies did not engage sufficiently with local actors, and assessed the skills of local actors relative to those of their own agency rather than in terms of skills appropriate to the local context.

Finding 4

The capacity of the international humanitarian system is not infinitely elastic. Despite the generous response to the tsunami, the appeals-based system for funding humanitarian emergencies is flawed, with a pattern of under-funding humanitarian response in general. This pattern of low funding for most emergencies limits the development of capacity within the international aid system, and makes it difficult for the system to scale-up to respond appropriately to a large emergency such as this.

Finding 5

Agencies focus too much on promoting their brand and not enough on the needs of the affected populations. Agencies are still not transparent or accountable enough to the people they are trying to assist. In some cases agencies are also not sufficiently accountable to those providing the funding.

Finding 6

The recovery phase is proving a far bigger challenge than the relief phase. This is due in part to the greater complexity of recovery and to the demands that such complexity places on the aid agencies.

As noted above, the scale of the funding has highlighted many existing issues in the international humanitarian system, many of which are currently being reviewed within the humanitarian reform process. TEC members hope that a critical self-reflection on lessons from the tsunami will contribute to the existing reform debate and will inform current and future policies and actions.

An effective relief phase

Overall, the relief effort is viewed as having been effective. While the relief efforts by family and neighbours probably had the greatest life-saving effect, the international relief effort did prevent suffering through the provision of food, water and shelter on a greater scale than would have been possible with local resources alone.

While effective at limiting suffering, the impact of the response on saving lives was often overstated. Large-scale outbreaks of disease are unusual after such a sudden onset disaster where there are no aggravating factors like prior illness or starvation, aggressive climate, or the creation of large camps.

The relief phase was effective at meeting needs due to the large number of agencies actively seeking populations in need of assistance, rather than to detailed needs assessments or good co-ordination. The relief phase was not efficient in terms of the cost of the assistance provided by the international community, as the lack of

assessments and co-ordination led to duplication in some sectors and gaps in others.

Foreign and national military forces played a key role in search and rescue as well as in delivering assistance in the first week. The way in which the military co-ordinated their efforts (with almost all foreign military contingents placing themselves under local control) was an example of good co-ordination. However, some of the military interventions came with a very high price tag.¹

Scale of the response

The TEC funding study confirmed the unprecedented scale of the public response, which broke records for voluntary giving for an international disaster in most of the countries reviewed. An unusually large proportion of funding flowed to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. At the end of 2005, many large NGOs and the Red Cross have unspent balances to continue operations for several years.

Funds were pledged by donors or donated by the public much faster than normal. Donor funding dramatically increased after the UN's Emergency Relief Co-ordinator, Jan Egeland, characterised the total aid given by richer countries as "stingy" at a tsunami press conference.² It also appears that donor pledges have been translated into disbursements more quickly than in other large disasters.

Overall, support from all international sources was \$14 billion.³ Affected governments and private donations from within affected countries added another \$2.5 billion at least. There is no reliable estimate of the economic value of the contribution of the affected population to their own survival. Summary financial data is presented on page 6.

While the scale of the response was unprecedented, the scale of the disaster was not. The past forty years has seen disasters that have killed, displaced and affected more people,⁴ or have spread across more countries (e.g. droughts in Africa, hurricanes in the Caribbean).

The generosity of the public reaffirms that the basic humanitarian impulse, the impulse to help other human beings, remains strong. This allays concerns about "donor fatigue" or increasing selfishness in rich countries. However, it is not clear what triggers this impulse as some emergencies, such as the Bangladesh floods in 2004, get relatively little funding from the public.

The ready availability of large amounts of funding allowed a rapid transition to rehabilitation interventions and allowed the use of cash distribution programmes. Cash distribution programmes have the advantage that they empower affected families to target the needs that they identify in their own assessments of the situation.

The TEC Co-ordination study found that the ready availability of funding compromised the normal incentives for agencies to co-ordinate with each other during the first few months. Instead, agencies yielded to pressure from their headquarters, based in part on a fear of the media, to show immediate results. This led to competition for 'turf' and

¹ The support provided across the region by the United States military cost over \$250 million.

² Although the comment referred to overall aid budgets, this was presented in the media as referring to rich country (especially US) funding for the tsunami response.

³ This is a very conservative estimate and only includes contributions for which solid data is available. If estimates of private giving from countries not covered by TEC studies are included, the total for international funding rises to \$15.5 billion.

⁴ A storm surge in the Bay of Bengal in 1970 killed 300,000 to 500,000 in one night. The Tangshan Earthquake in China killed at least 242,000 in 1976. Flooding in Bangladesh in 2004 destroyed over 1 million homes, displaced over 4 million people, and affected over 30 million people.

'clients' and to 'vertical' reporting to agency headquarters, which was often at the expense of 'lateral' co-ordination around the effective use of resources and common strategic planning within and between sectors. Agencies focused more on quantity than on quality. In addition,

agencies which normally lead co-ordination in particular sectors found that their own direct implementation competed for resources with their co-ordination role. These problems lessened with time.

Funding for the tsunami				
<i>(all amounts in billions of US dollars)</i>	Official pledges	General public	All sources	Notes
International sources				
Donor government pledges	6.38			1
International financial institution pledges	1.50			2
To non-governmental organisations		3.59		
To the United Nations		0.49		
To the Red Cross and Red Crescent		1.78		
International subtotal	7.89	5.87	13.75	3
Funds from the general public		1.70		4
Remittances – not measured				5
National sources				
Affected governments – at least	2.5			
Population of affected countries – at least		0.19		
Affected population – not measured				6
Subtotal	2.5	0.19	2.69	

Notes:

All of the figures above are very conservative. Only very solid data has been included in the totals. This data may change as donor and other data is finalised, and as the funding synthesis team identifies any double-counting in the data.

1. Of the government pledges, \$3.9 billion has been committed (promised in a binding way for a particular programme). Of this, \$2.1 billion has already been disbursed by the donors.
2. This is the amount from the banks' own resources rather than from donor contributions to specific tsunami funds. All of the pledges from the World Bank and the Asia Development Bank have been committed.
3. This amount is rounded to \$14 billion in the report to avoid creating a false impression of precision.
4. This amount is not included in the totals as it was raised in countries where the donor response study did not carry out a study of flows from the general public, and where we cannot be sure of the accuracy of the figure.
5. Remittances from the nationals of the affected countries have not been measured. It has been reported that for Sri Lanka alone, remittance flows were \$0.13 billion.
6. The huge contribution of the affected population in providing shelter for affected families, or in their efforts to re-establish their livelihoods has not been measured.

Local capacity is undervalued by aid agencies and the media

A key finding from many of the TEC studies is that the local response was critical to saving lives.⁵ It is a common finding of evaluations of earthquakes and other natural disasters that the vast majority of those rescued are saved by their own actions or the actions of their families, neighbours, or officials. By the time the international rescue teams arrive the vast majority of the survivors have already been saved.

The TEC studies also found that the international aid community as a whole undervalues the very important contribution of local communities to their own survival and recovery. The international system has not developed methods to build on, capture, or report on such crucially important inputs. The international media also overlook local actors and focus on the international actors.

TEC studies found that the role of national governments was crucial in the response. Affected governments are paying at least \$2.5 billion overall from their own revenues for recovery. The population of the affected countries also gave generously, with \$190 million having been recorded through formal channels.⁶ However, assistance from the affected community itself is often in forms that are rarely quantified in monetary terms (such as providing direct help, accommodation, or food), and it is impossible to estimate

the value of what people have done for themselves to assist their own survival and recovery. It is also impossible to place a value on the effort that affected governments have put into the response, in terms of co-ordination and relief measures.

Remittances are another area where self-help gets overlooked by the international aid community. A recent World Bank report found that money sent home to developing countries by family members working abroad totals \$167 billion through formal channels (and informal channels may add another 50%). This is more than twice the total flow of aid to developing countries (an average of \$72 billion for 1999 to 2003). The flow of remittances is very uneven, but India, one of the affected countries, is the largest recipient of remittances and will get \$21.3 billion in 2005. In both Indonesia and Sri Lanka, remittances amount to about 1% of GDP. However, remittances may be particularly important in conflict areas like Aceh and parts of Sri Lanka, due to it being safer for young men to travel abroad to work than to remain in the conflict area. However, the international aid community does not capture such data and the impact of remittances on tsunami reconstruction is not known.

The underestimation and misunderstanding of local capacity by international actors was a particular problem because of the huge resources that international actors had at their disposal. TEC studies found that during the relief and early recovery stages, many international actors, particularly those who did not have prior experience in the area, tended to undervalue local capacities while overestimating international capacity. In some cases, this led to a situation where inadequately

⁵ The key role of local capacities in determining who lives or dies is illustrated by the contrast between the cases of the Maldives and South Africa. In the Maldives many of those who died did so because they could not swim. In South Africa seven people were swept out to sea but five were rescued by those present.

⁶ This is very definitely an understatement of the actual value of the flows from the public in the affected countries.

prepared international staff hindered local capacity development.

The engagement of international actors with local capacities was most effective and efficient when it was built on established prior partnerships. Such partnerships not only ensured that international actors had a better understanding of the context, but also meant that the international actors better appreciated the nature, strengths and limits of both international actors and local capacity.

Funding system

The majority of funds pledged⁷ by governments appear to have been committed to specific projects, with a good portion already disbursed at the time of writing. In the past, donors have often not lived up to the pledges of assistance they have made, and the money has never been disbursed.

The current appeal-based manner of funding global humanitarian response is very erratic. There was a great deal of money for the tsunami, but there is often very little money for other humanitarian emergencies. One of the main funding mechanisms is the UN's system of flash appeals for sudden onset emergencies, and consolidated appeals for ongoing crises. The levels of such appeals often reflect estimates not of needs but of the needs that are likely to be funded. Even

then, there are huge variations and, on average, just over 60% of the consolidated and flash appeals managed by the UN are funded.⁸

Funding decisions and pledges for the tsunami response were made in parallel with or prior to the UN appeal document being produced and prior to there being a consolidated needs assessment. It was television coverage of the disaster that provided the basis on which funding decisions were based rather than any more formal assessment of needs. The result of such appeals is that funds are earmarked for a particular crisis, and cannot be reallocated to areas of greater need. Funding decisions were taken in response to domestic political pressure in donor countries rather than on the basis of formal needs assessments.

The studies found that while the Good Humanitarian Donorship⁹ initiative makes a good start in guiding donor behaviour,


there is a need for practical guidance to deal with apparent conflicts between its principles. There is also a need for a mechanism to track the flow of funds through the system, not only for official donors but also for private donations.

The large amount of funding for NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement emphasises that they are central to humanitarian response and not just on the periphery. However, this new role brings added responsibilities in terms of co-ordination, accountability, and transparency. Unfortunately, recent evaluations show that NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement are no stronger in these areas than the United Nations.

Demand for humanitarian action varies from year to year, and the humanitarian system has a certain "surge capacity" or capacity to rapidly scale-up operations. This surge capacity is not infinitely elastic

UN Flash and Consolidated Appeals 1999–2005

Overall funding and range of support for appeals.
Data from OCHA Financial Tracking System. Consulted on 6 December 2005




⁷ Money is first "pledged" or promised by governments, then "committed" for specific purposes or projects before finally being "disbursed" or paid out to the agency receiving it. It may be some time before the agency getting the money actually spends it.

⁸ While the reasons why one appeal is funded and others are not are complex, the variability of the funding illustrates the difficulty of planning for capacity development in the humanitarian aid system.

⁹ This is an initiative by the major donor governments to improve the quality of their support for humanitarian emergencies.

20 Years of funding for emergencies

Source OECD/DAC online database Table 1.
(www.oecd.org/dac/stats/online) consulted on 28 Nov 2005



and is limited by the normal level of funding for emergencies. The funding of \$14 billion for this one emergency needs to be compared with the average annual funding of only \$5.4 billion for all emergencies over the previous five years.

The low level of background funding means that the humanitarian system lacks adequate quick funding mechanisms, stand-by capacity, effective rosters and stand-by arrangements. There is a shortage of aid workers with particular sets of critical skills. The shortage of aid workers with management skills is a particular challenge to scaling-up emergency response.

The scale of funding to the tsunami overwhelmed the systems that agencies have developed to cope with normal levels of response — whether these are systems for recruiting staff or managing the response. One clear example of this is in co-ordination, where the types of mechanisms that work relatively well with 20 or 30 different agencies proved hopelessly inadequate when faced with 200 to 300 agencies. These problems were particularly evident in the initial phases of the response, but improved as the number of agencies decreased.

One welcome aspect of the response was the emergence of new donors, institutions and organisations, with some countries becoming aid donors for the first time. Some of these new organisations may wither and die, but others may develop to become the leading edge of future humanitarian responses. New donors increase the diversity of the donor community and promote a more holistic response.

Accountability versus brand promotion

Accountability refers to agencies being answerable for their actions to both the aid donors and aid recipients. Transparency is closely linked to accountability. Only when agencies are transparent do their donors and clients have the information to properly assess what an agency is doing. One issue emerging from the tsunami response is that agencies are focusing more on protecting their “brand” from negative publicity than on being accountable.

The lack of accountability to aid recipients is an acknowledged weakness of the international relief system. The recipients surveyed for the TEC studies reported that they were not adequately consulted. Furthermore, the studies found that there were large information gaps between agencies and the communities they were serving.

Accountability to donors is normally ensured by the rules of formal institutional donors. The prevalence of individual private donors meant that this mechanism did not apply. Agencies have compensated to some extent by issuing accountability reports to the general public. However, these reports are generally uncritical summaries of what agencies have done, aimed more at promoting their “brand” than presenting a balanced view of their performance.

Independent external evaluations provide one of the best means of accountability for the donor public. Such evaluations are particularly important as agencies normally only report their successes. Across many evaluations from TEC

member agencies there were good examples of accountability with the publication of critical independent external evaluations by some agencies (including Oxfam, CARE, World Vision, the World Food Programme, and the joint evaluations commissioned by the TEC).

However, the Governing Board of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), decided not to publish their first real-time evaluation as originally planned. The board of the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) in the UK decided not to publish the DEC evaluation report until after the first anniversary of the tsunami rather than before it as originally planned (with the result that there will be less media coverage of any criticisms in the evaluation report), and then only published a summary rather than the full report. This is a matter of some concern not only because IFRC and the DEC represent over \$2 billion of funding from the general public between them, but also because previous DEC evaluations have been praised as being among the best in the sector.

The TEC studies found that agencies competed not for funding (which everyone had large amounts of), but for turf and clients. Competition was in the individual agencies’ interest as a large client-base allows an agency to promote their “brand” by responding to the public and media pressure for immediate visible action. This competition may even have been in the individual aid client’s interest as it gave them a choice of assistance packages, or the same package several times over. Competition was not in the interest of the affected population as a whole, as duplication and waste reduced the overall resources available.

The level of competition varied throughout the response, with good inter-agency co-operation seen at the very start of the relief phase being overwhelmed by competition as the relief phase increased in pace. The start of the recovery phase was also marked by a renewed burst of competition, particularly for shelter beneficiaries, but collaboration increased as the recovery phase developed.

The response was supply-led rather than demand-driven. In the initial phase particularly, agencies were under pressure to spend money quickly to enable reporting of activities to the general public. This pressure meant that opportunities to engage communities in the early phase were missed and also reduced lateral accountability as some agencies were reluctant to share assessments with each other.

Rehabilitation and recovery is far more complex than relief

The studies found that the affected populations were more satisfied with the initial relief effort than with the recovery effort. It is not clear if this declining approval is due to: recovery needs being more complex than relief needs; the longer time scale needed for recovery interventions to bear fruit; increased expectations for the recovery caused by the over-subscribed relief effort; or a mixture of all three. The greater complexity of the recovery phase included the need to address land-rights and legal

issues, and shifting government policies on housing reconstruction.

One positive aspect is that almost the entire aid community acknowledge the importance of government and community ownership of the recovery process. However, there have been frustrations and delays in developing this ownership. These issues are due in part to the difficult and time-consuming process of arriving at consensus on complex tradeoffs between speed and quality of response and in deciding where people should be encouraged to live so as to reduce risks from future disasters.

Overall, the TEC studies found that the international tsunami response missed the opportunity to address issues of equity, conflict, gender, and governance in an integrated and holistic way. However, some caution is needed here as a single emergency response, no matter how well funded, cannot on its own hope to put in place profound social, cultural, and economic change to completely transform deep-rooted, pre-existing inequalities.

Despite some initiatives, there has been relatively little attention to developing the disaster risk management capacity of communities. This lack of attention has occurred despite the agreement by the international community at the World Conference on Natural Disasters in Kobe in early 2005 to make disaster risk management an integral part of the response. Disaster risk management is a key area of concern given that some of the affected countries are particularly disaster prone.

In the tsunami response, "build back better" has been adopted as a slogan, implying that the response should move beyond limited recovery to development. The transition from relief to rehabilitation,


recovery, and development has always been a difficult area in the past. The complexity of development means that there is no "one right way" and, unlike relief, there are no broadly agreed standards for rehabilitation, recovery, and development.

One of the differences between relief and development is that while development may seek to reduce existing inequities, relief typically seeks to avoid worsening them through seeking to "do no harm". There is concern that increasing inequity can promote conflict within society. The TEC studies found that, due in part to both poor contextual knowledge and to the pressure to act quickly, relief and recovery interventions have not promoted equity. Proportionately more assistance, especially in the recovery phase, has flowed to the better-off, to males, and to the better organised. Marginalised groups have lost out in the assistance programmes.

Both Sri Lanka and Indonesia have been affected by civil conflicts before the disaster. The conflict in Aceh was ongoing at the time of the tsunami and continued for some months afterwards. The adversaries in Sri Lanka were observing a cease-fire, if not always diligently. While the tsunami response has provided a window for peace, this opportunity seems to have been seized in Indonesia, but not in Sri Lanka.

The tsunami response meant that far more assistance flowed to those affected by the tsunami than to those affected by the conflict. This imbalance threatens the sustainability of some of the recovery interventions. Such inequity is particularly dangerous in societies that are recovering from armed conflict.

Annexe: Impact map for the earthquake and tsunamis



Sources: Deaths (USAID, 2005), except for Myanmar, Tanzania, Bangladesh, and Kenya (AFP, 2005), and Yemen (IRIN, 2005b).

Loss and damage: (Said et al., 2005), except for Yemen (IRIN, 2005b), and Seychelles (IRIN, 2005a).

Annexe: The current status of the TEC Thematic Studies

There are five TEC thematic studies. A sixth study, the Impact Assessment, managed by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), was originally expected to inform the TEC studies, but will not be issuing a first report until well into 2006.

Almost all of the TEC studies have fallen behind their planned timetable for numerous reasons, ranging from an over-optimistic initial timetable to the illness of key team members.

Co-ordination

The Evaluation of Co-ordination was commissioned by the United Nations' Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs. An inter-agency steering committee composed of OCHA, UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, Save the Children UK, USAID and IFRC guided implementation and provided quality-control and overall supervision. The evaluation team carried out field work in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the Maldives and Somalia in September to November 2005. The field work was supported by visits to New York and Geneva to interview key United Nations and Red Cross personnel. Draft country reports are expected to be circulated to interviewees in late December, with a first draft of the main report in late January 2006.

Needs Assessment

The Needs Assessment evaluation is led by a group of three agencies: The World Health Organisation, Swiss Development Cooperation, and the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations. These three organisations also formed the steering committee for the evaluation. The evaluation team carried out field work in Indonesia and Sri Lanka in September and October 2005. The field work was supported by visits to donor countries and to Thailand to interview key decision makers. This evaluation focused on the first three months of the response only. A draft report was circulated to 240 interviewees for their comments in mid December and a consolidated draft report is expected in January 2006.

Donor Response

The study of the International Community's Funding of the Tsunami Emergency and Relief is led by Danida, Danish International Development Assistance. This evaluation is the most complex in terms of the number of component studies. There are over twenty component studies organised around six themes, including: global funds flows, funding by governments, funding to non-governmental organisations, funding to the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, funding to the United Nations, and local funding. Different studies were commissioned by different donor aid departments and NGOs, each of which was responsible for the quality of their component study. Most of the work of the teams was carried out in donor country capitals, but teams from the local funding study carried out field work in Sri Lanka, Indonesia, India, and Thailand in October 2005. All the component studies have been submitted in draft format but not

all are as yet in a final version. A draft funding synthesis report is expected in late January 2006.

The Impact on Local and National Capacities

The Local Capacities evaluation was commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Disaster Mitigation Institute of India (DMI). The steering committee guiding the evaluation includes UNDP, DMI, ActionAid, Unicef, and Cordaid. The evaluation team carried out field work in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and the Maldives in September to November 2005. The team also carried out an extensive survey of affected populations in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka. An initial draft is expected in January 2006.

The Linking of Relief with Rehabilitation and Long-term Development

The Linking Rehabilitation Relief and Development (LRRD) study was commissioned by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). The evaluation had three teams, plus a research team. The Policy Team carried out extensive interviews in donor capitals as well as visiting Colombo, Jakarta and Banda Aceh. The Indonesia team carried out field work in Indonesia in October. The Sri Lanka Team carried out field work in Sri Lanka in October 2005. The teams also commissioned two surveys of the affected population in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. It is planned that this study will have a further round of analysis in late 2006 to see what changes have occurred. The draft LRRD synthesis report is expected in late January 2006. The research team prepared a conceptual overview of LRRD to inform the other teams.

The Synthesis Study

The Synthesis Study will synthesise the five TEC thematic evaluations, but will also be informed by evaluations carried out by the TEC member agencies, as well as tertiary sources. The Synthesis Study will be published together with the thematic evaluations.

Data sources on the impact of the tsunamis

AFP (2005, 8 Apr 2005). Death toll in Asian tsunami disaster revised down to 217,000.

Retrieved 21/12/2005, 2005, from: www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/0/9d7eabcd556b2409c1256fdd0030c9b5?OpenDocument

IRIN (2005a, 3 May 2005). SEYCHELLES: Tsunami recovery programme needs funds, UN.

Retrieved 21/12/2005, 2005, from: www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=46922&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa&SelectCountry=SEYCHELLES

IRIN (2005b). YEMEN: No assistance for tsunami victims.

Retrieved 21/12/2005, 2005, from: www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=47875&SelectRegion=Middle_East&SelectCountry=YEMEN

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