

EUROPEAN ANTI-SEMITISM REINVENTS ITSELF



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FOREWORD

There is bad news and good news on the anti-Semitism front in Europe. The bad news is depressingly familiar from the daily papers—an upsurge in violent attacks on Jews over the last four years, so much so that the chief rabbi of France advised against wearing a *kippa* in public places; verbal incitement against Jews and “Zionism” in the streets, in the media, and on the airwaves; the strengthening of far-right, xenophobic parties in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland; and the linking arms of the anti-globalization left and the Islamists to accuse both the United States and Israel of “racism” and “war crimes.”

The good news is that the bad news has not gone unnoticed by the political leadership of Europe and the United States. French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin now chairs an interministerial committee on anti-Semitism that meets monthly. German Foreign Minister Joschke Fischer has called “promoting the life and well-being of Jewish communities in Germany ... [the] yardstick of our ability to create an open and tolerant society.” The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has convened two major forums on anti-Semitism, in Vienna and Berlin, over the past eighteen months, with another planned for Cordoba in 2005. Out of these conferences have come a monitoring system for anti-Semitic crimes, based in the Warsaw Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR); plans for educational programs to combat anti-Semitism and promote Holocaust remembrance; and the appointment of a “special representative on anti-Semitism,” to implement OSCE’s commitments. The U.S. State Department in January 2005 issued its first report on international anti-Semitism, mandated by the Global Anti-Semitism Awareness/Review Act.

But the “news” is not enough. We need an analysis of the underlying trends to understand why this is happening now and what is the nature and seriousness of the threat. Robert Wistrich, Neuberger Pro-

fessor of Modern European and Jewish History at the Hebrew University, has provided just such a scholarly interpretation in this volume. He makes it clear that Europe has by no means returned to the 1930s: There is no discriminatory legislation against Jews, nor do political parties seek to expel or segregate them. Jews are infinitely more secure today because the State of Israel exists as a shield and a refuge.

Yet something has changed, and Prof. Wistrich identifies many elements of this change: There has been a globalization of anti-Semitism, with themes and accusations flying around the world, through the media of modern communication—cyberspace and satellite television. Still, there are distinctive national traits, which the author identifies in a country-by-country analysis.

The Muslim immigration to Europe has brought the importation of a virulent stream of anti-Semitism to European shores, and with it, an obsession with stigmatizing Israel. Anti-Zionism, while not always identical with anti-Semitism, denies uniquely to the Jews the fundamental right to political self-expression through a state. Anti-Zionism of both the Muslim and radical leftist varieties has drawn upon the classical anti-Semitic tropes of Jews as bloodthirsty, conspiratorial, and money-hungry. It has even borrowed from traditional—and otherwise receding—Christian images of Jews (and, by extension, of Israel) as “Christ-killers” and as “unforgiving.”

On yet another level, Wistrich sees Israel as a strategic pawn in Europe’s power struggle with America for political influence in the Middle East. The result has been conspiracy theories about Jewish “neocons” hijacking American foreign policy for Israel’s ends.

Finally, Wistrich concludes that Europe has a deeper problem with Israel, derived from the demons of its Holocaust past—an inability to accept Jews as powerful, rather than powerless, and able to protect themselves. Therefore, the Europeans project their guilty consciences onto the Jewish state, seizing every opportunity to identify its army and its leaders with Nazi symbols and methods. Thus Europe is “shedding its last taboos concerning the Jews”—and in the process, the “era in which the Jews of Europe [could] assume that their peace,

security, and well-being [would] be protected ... by the shadow of the Holocaust” has come to an end.

The American Jewish Committee has seen as its mission since its founding “to safeguard the welfare and security of Jews ... throughout the world,” and certainly this mission today requires our attention to these trends unfolding in Europe. When we understand the underlying significance of the “new” European anti-Semitism, we will be able better to utilize the “good news” to overcome the bad. This study, the latest in a series of analyses of global anti-Semitism published by the American Jewish Committee, adds an important dimension to the literature on this compelling topic.

David A. Harris
Executive Director
American Jewish Committee
March 2005

EUROPEAN ANTI-SEMITISM REINVENTS ITSELF

I find it shameful that in France, the France of “Liberty, equality, fraternity,” synagogues are torched, Jews are terrorized, and their cemeteries profaned ... that in Holland and Germany and Denmark youngsters show off the kaffiyeh like the vanguard of Mussolini displayed the stick and Fascist emblem ... that in almost every European university, Palestinian students take over and nurture anti-Semitism.

--Oriana Fallaci¹

A Ghost Returns

Since the beginning of the new millennium, an ancient specter—that of anti-Semitism—has returned to haunt the European continent. Once considered the preserve of reactionary clerics, conservative nationalists, fascist bigots, and ultra-radical leftists, Judeophobia has undergone a radical mutation in recent years. Since the start of the second Palestinian intifada in September 2000—reinforced by the impact of 9/11 and the war against Iraq—anti-Semitism has become a central feature of the violent Islamic jihadism that has spread from the Middle East to parts of the Muslim diaspora in Europe.

The new anti-Semitism has also been enthusiastically embraced by broad sectors of the antiglobalization movement, which, like the Islamists, fervently believe in the existence of an American-Zionist conspiracy to dominate the world. This new “red-green alliance” reviles Israel and “Jewish-controlled” America, even as it opposes the exercise of Western military power abroad and the export of its democratic ideals to non-Western countries. The antiglobalization enthusiasts are full of self-loathing with regard to the core values of the

West, of which Israel is seen as an outpost, viewing them only as a cover for “racist” and “imperialist” occupations. Europe’s colonial guilt and self-criticism have also been important factors in leading it back to its old habits of anti-Semitism.²

At first glance, this new wave of European anti-Semitism seems puzzling. After all, the emergence of a democratic, multicultural, pluralist European Union (EU)—now extending into Eastern Europe and the Baltic states—should have created the best of all possible worlds for Jews. Traditionally, Jews aspired to precisely the kind of cosmopolitan, supranational federal structures that the European elites have so warmly embraced—a peaceful, prosperous society, tolerant toward its minorities. Indeed, there is today no serious anti-Semitic discrimination in jobs, housing, or access to high positions in the cultural domain or politics. Jews since World War II have steadily risen in economic and social status and been fully accepted in public life. There is considerable interest in Jewish culture, Jewish film festivals, and book fairs. On a day-to-day basis, most European Jews enjoy a satisfactory life and do not suffer any legal disabilities or personal indignities. There is an active Christian-Jewish dialogue; and the commemoration of the Shoah is widely respected and observed across many countries in the European Union. Not only that, but a number of countries, including France and Germany, have stringent laws against Holocaust denial, which have been implemented to good effect.

So, if things are so good, why are they so bad? Why has the antiracist, antifascist consensus that animates much of the European Union failed to prevent a resurgence of anti-Semitism? A key factor here is that mainstream attitudes toward Israel have become so hostile that even moderate positions in defense of Zionism can at times be regarded as beyond the pale. To defend the Jewish state is to risk being seen as an accomplice in war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other horrors.

Indeed, much of the European extreme left, as well as virtually all neo-Nazis and most Islamists, question the right of Israel to exist as an independent state in the Middle East. Many regard Zionism as even worse than Nazism and frequently lash out at the “manipulation”

by Jews of international finance and the global media. But a more moderate version of such fantasies concerning the Jewish state can now be heard in much of Europe’s mainstream public discourse, in the media, the churches, and the universities. Some conservative, socialist, and liberal politicians have joined hands on this issue with indignant artists and intellectuals to proclaim a sacred right to “criticize” the Jews—who are already suspect due to their unholy alliance with “hyperpower” America.³

In November 2003 a poll found that 59 percent of the population of the European Union believes Israel to be the greatest threat to peace in the world, ahead of North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and a string of Arab dictatorships. The United States was ranked fourth in this survey, ordered by the European Commission, while countries like China and Russia were near the bottom of the scale.⁴ Whatever the survey’s flaws in framing the question, its obviously tendentious character, and the superficiality of the responses, there is little doubt that it reflects observable currents in European media coverage of Israel, as well as deeper layers of anti-Semitic prejudice. It is apparent that many Europeans essentially regard Jews as too powerful, conspiratorial, or devious, as well as being a prime cause of global terrorism today.⁵ The Netherlands (74 percent), Austria (69 percent), Luxemburg (66 percent), and Germany (65 percent) lead the pack in considering Israelis to be “warmongers”; only Italy (48 percent) did not give ringing majority endorsement to this proposition, but an independent national survey also showed considerable hostility toward Israel among ordinary Italians.

In Europe it has become part of the conventional wisdom to see Israel as an apartheid state, to pretend that victims of the Holocaust have become Nazis, and to insinuate that the Jewish state properly belongs to President George W. Bush’s “axis of evil.”⁶ The truth that Israel is an oasis of democracy, freedom, and the rule of law in a desert of ruthless and backward autocracies (including the corrupt and repressive Palestinian Authority) is silenced or twisted into its opposite. On the other hand, vicious hate indoctrination, the cult of suicide bombers, and imprisoning of dissidents by the Palestinian Authority—not to mention its lynch justice, repression of women,

and outlawing of homosexuality—have not diminished the European Union’s diplomatic and financial support for the Palestinian Authority (PA); nor did Yasir Arafat’s proven complicity in terrorism and massive personal theft of hundreds of millions of donor dollars earmarked for the Palestinian people prevent him from being lionized by European intellectuals, journalists, and statesmen, both before and after his death.

Israel as a Strategic Pawn

Anti-Semitism, closely linked to anti-Israel and anti-American sentiments, is clearly a central feature in this unparalleled example of double standards. But there is also a larger strategic dimension. Israel has become an important pawn in a European power struggle with America for influence in the Middle East and in the wider world. Ever since the Venice Declaration of 1980, Europe, with some notable exceptions such as Germany, has pursued an increasingly anti-Israeli policy and has sought the diminution of American power in the Middle East.⁷ European support for Arafat, despite the intention of the second intifada to undermine Israel’s moral legitimacy and the resultant resurgence of Jew-hatred in individual European countries, must be seen as an integral part of Europe’s anti-American orientation and will-to-power.

Not by accident have anti-Semitic innuendos about shadowy Jewish “neocons” in the United States been echoing through the chancelleries of old Europe in the past few years. In the House of Lords on March 18, 2003, Lord Jopling (a former cabinet minister) complained about these “neoconservatives” having a “stranglehold on the Pentagon and ... a compliant armlock on the president himself.”⁸ This coded language is now a widespread feature of fashionable anti-Semitism.

Robert Kagan, the prominent American analyst of European affairs, has drily commented in this context: “One finds Britain’s finest minds propounding ... conspiracy theories concerning the ‘neoconservative’ (read: Jewish) hijacking of American foreign policy. In Paris, all the talk is of oil and ‘imperialism’—and Jews.”⁹ The mellifluous

Dominique de Villepin, then French foreign minister (now interior minister), was quoted in April 2003 as saying that “the hawks in the U.S. administration [are] in the hands of [Ariel] Sharon”—another barely disguised message about the omnipotent Jewish lobby in Washington.¹⁰

In France, more than elsewhere in Europe, the theory of a “Jewish” intellectual clique driving American policy has indeed taken hold.¹¹ Partly this is due to the long-standing tradition of French resentment of American power, which was forcefully challenged by General Charles de Gaulle in the mid-1960s. The pro-Arab, pro-Third World orientation of French foreign policy, its ambition to rebuild and lead a united Europe as a counterweight to America, and the desire to appease its large Muslim population have created a social climate highly conducive to a resurgence of anti-Semitism.

Anti-Semitism in France

Hence, it follows that in the first quarter of 2002, French police identified no fewer than 395 anti-Semitic incidents—an extraordinarily high number. In April 2002, several members of the Maccabi football team were physically assaulted on the outskirts of Paris; in the same month, a bus driving pupils and teachers from a Jewish school in Paris was stoned. In Montpellier, Marseilles, and Strasbourg, as well as in the French capital, synagogues were attacked with Molotov cocktails in the first half of that year. In Lyon, during Passover 2002, around twenty men forced open the synagogue’s door, entered with two stolen vehicles, and set them afire.

It is true that after the May 2002 elections, the new government, led by reelected President Jacques Chirac, began to act more firmly and ceased to deny the existence of anti-Semitism in France. In November 2003, in response to arson against a Jewish school, Chirac called an emergency meeting of his senior cabinet and promised to get tough with the perpetrators. After that, Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin began chairing an interministerial committee on anti-Semitism that meets monthly. Some positive results were achieved, at least on the level of law enforcement.

Nevertheless, the general climate is still perceived as hostile and the sense of insecurity has given rise to a constantly growing literature.¹² Not for nothing did the chief rabbi of France advise his coreligionists in the autumn of 2003 to wear baseball caps rather than *kip-pot* in public places. Israeli Prime Minister Sharon's call on France's 650,000 Jews to immigrate to Israel without delay in the summer of 2004 provoked an angry response from President Chirac and sharp criticism from many French Jews.¹³ It was apparent that interference from Israel swiftly raised the specter of "dual loyalty" in France.

Despite determined efforts by the French authorities to demonstrate "zero tolerance" for anti-Semitism and to make this campaign a national priority, the number of reported anti-Semitic incidents has soared since the beginning of 2004, with 298 recorded through August 20 compared to 108 throughout all of 2003. The number of violent incidents has risen by 113 percent, compared to the previous year. Eighty percent of these cases have not been solved, and the reasons for them remain unclear. Only eleven attacks were known to have been committed by members of extreme-right organizations; documented acts carried out by persons of Arab or Muslim origin were five times as high.

Among the worst of the anti-Semitic incidents in 2004 were the arson attack in Toulon against a Jewish community center on March 2; the anti-Jewish assault by Arab youths on the son of a local rabbi in Boulogne-Billancourt (May 28); and the stabbing of a young religious Jew by a man screaming "*Allahu Akbar*" in the Seine-Saint Denis district on June 4. Jewish graves were daubed with swastikas in Saverne, Alsace, on July 28, and in the de la Mouche cemetery at Lyon on August 9.¹⁴ On August 13, 2004, anti-Semitic graffiti, including signs saying "Death to the Jews," were found on a wall on the grounds of the Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris. Neither warnings from the government of stiff sentences against perpetrators of anti-Semitic crimes (which today constitute 75 percent of all racist offenses in France) nor tentative efforts at social or civic mobilization have had any material effect.¹⁵

Especially disturbing has been the situation in French *lycées*, where Jewish pupils and teachers have been subject to high levels of harassment, insult, and abuse, above all in those institutions where

there is a significant proportion of immigrant youth from the Maghreb. This North African Muslim population is itself increasingly ghettoized, marginalized, alienated, and resentful toward a French society that it regards as racist. The Jews have become the primary victims of this failure to integrate the Muslims. Jews have suffered the consequences of the endemic prejudices (exacerbated by fundamentalist preachers) of these new immigrants and paid the price for the vicarious identification displayed by the "*Maghrébins*" with the fate of the Palestinians. Jews have also unwittingly become scapegoats for the weakening of French republican institutions and values, as well as the inability of French society to assimilate a particularly recalcitrant Islamic religious culture.¹⁶ In French state schools, many of the North African immigrants identify with Osama bin Laden and openly practice or call for violence against Jews.¹⁷ Nevertheless, Interior Minister Dominique de Villepin went out of his way to reject the idea "that religion is the source of hatred and divisiveness in our country"—yet another attempt to avoid serious public discussion of the Islamist danger in France.¹⁸

On the other hand, the French government's turnabout on allowing Al-Manar, the Lebanon-based Hezbollah television station, to broadcast in France reflected a genuine grappling with the boundaries of public dissemination of religion-based bigotry. Only two weeks after Al-Manar had signed an agreement with France's Higher Audiovisual Council (CSA) not to incite hatred or violence, it was spewing rumors that Israel had spread the AIDS virus to Arab countries and was portraying Zionism as a criminal conspiracy. That brief window of vicious hate-filled propaganda was enough for Prime Minister Raffarin to conclude, "We must stop the broadcasts of Al-Manar without delay."¹⁹ And the fate of Al-Manar was viewed as a test case for the limits a government might impose on satellite-based TV broadcasts on its soil.

The Muslim Factor in Europe

The Palestinian war against the Jews has spread from the Middle East to the European Union, which today is home to about 20 million Muslims.²⁰ Many of these Muslims are law-abiding citizens, and some

have themselves suffered from racist prejudice. The Islamists among them are an entirely different matter. They espouse wild conspiracy theories, promote fanatical religious passions, actively propagate jihadist ideology, and manipulate the emotive symbolism of the Palestinian cause to actively threaten Jews. They have done much to revive the latent anti-Semitism still lurking in the depths of the European psyche, as part of their deliberate strategy of “holy war.”²¹

The Muslim immigration that is transforming Europe is disproportionately young, male, and unemployed. For many of the immigrants, Europe has become a prison of alienation and is perceived as *dar al-Kufr*, the land of impiety. This is the soil on which fundamentalist paranoia can best flourish. Disaffected and marginalized youth are particularly prone to perpetrate anti-Semitic acts—a fact recently acknowledged in a report authored by Jean-Christophe Rufin, a doctor associated with Doctors Without Borders. This document, released by the French government in October 2004, defines racism and anti-Semitism as “the very negation of our [French] national identity.” The report, while downplaying the role of North African youths, did admit that “the threats and violence against French Jews constitute an evident, new and extremely worrying fact.”²²

Even in supposedly enlightened and literate circles, anti-Semitic conspiracy theories and modern, secular versions of the Christian “blood libel” are once again rife, under the mask of “criticizing Israel,” anti-Zionism, and/or anti-Americanism.²³ This campaign contains much malicious disinformation. For example, it accuses not only the Israeli army, but “the Jews” per se, of infanticide (cold-bloodedly murdering Palestinian children.) It includes references to dark “Jewish cabals” that allegedly pushed the United States and Britain into the recent war in Iraq;²⁴ and insinuations that the “neocons” (a codeword for neoconservative American Jewish intellectuals) deliberately stirred up a “civilizational war” against Islam.

Anti-Semitism on the Right

Judeophobia of today is very different from the ethnic, racist, or Nazi anti-Semitism of six decades ago, which had its roots in the nation-

states of late nineteenth-century bourgeois Europe. It also needs to be distinguished from the neo-Nazi, right-wing populist and xenophobic versions of anti-Semitism in post-Holocaust European society, which are still a cause for concern but no longer the key problem today.²⁵ The current wave of anti-Semitism in the countries of the European Union—in contrast to “Islamophobia” or right-wing racism—is not the result of long-term unemployment, economic instability, cultural pessimism, religious conflicts, or a crisis in the political system. Nor is it a product of financial scandals, social *anomie*, or disillusion with the established political parties or with parliamentary democracy. In Western Europe (unlike in the Muslim world, Russia or Eastern Europe) contemporary Judeophobia is more postnational than narrowly nationalist, more anti-American than anticommunist, more “liberal” and leftist than illiberal or antidemocratic.

The most important exceptions to this rule are Germany and also—to a greater extent, if one considers the electoral success of far-right parties—Austria and Switzerland. Support for the Austrian populist right currently runs at 8-10 percent; support for the far-right Freedom Party fell to 10 percent in the elections of 2002, precipitating the resignation of Jörg Haider, the volatile anti-Semitic and antiforeigner demagogue who had headed the Freedom Party. Nevertheless, Haider, who had previously praised aspects of Adolf Hitler’s policies, held on to the governorship of the southern province of Carintia, from which he continued to exert influence.

The success of the right-wing, nativist Swiss People’s Party in October 2003, which finished first among the national parties with 26.6 percent of the vote, led to the elevation of Christoph Blocher to the seven-person ruling Federal Council, as minister of justice and police. Blocher had publicly praised a book denying the Holocaust, and in 1999, was found guilty of anti-Semitic stereotyping by a Zurich court.²⁶ Once in office Blocher began shaping antiforeigner legislation directed against both asylum seekers and children of immigrants; blatantly racist messages—black and brown hands grasping for Swiss passports—figured in the campaign for immigration reform. Swiss xenophobia expressed itself in opposition to EU membership,

as well as in suggestions that Kosovar refugees be repatriated and that kosher and hallal meat be banned even from import.

The hardcore of the Swiss far right wing—small, unstructured groups ranging from young skinheads to old racists—gather annually for winter solstice parties under the rubric of Avalon, “the new heathen circle.” Some of these groups have ties with political parties, such as the Freedom Party, headed by Jürg Scherrer, who was reelected in 2004 despite his repeated racist and anti-Semitic comments, for which he was fined by a Berne high court. Holocaust deniers Jürgen Graf and René-Louis Berclaz were also tried and convicted by Swiss courts, but both fled—the former to Iran, the latter to Serbia—to avoid serving time.

German far-right groups and the former Communists received a big boost in the state elections of September 2004 in Brandenburg and Saxony. The neo-Nazi National Democratic Party (NPD) won 9.3 percent of the vote in Saxony, almost as much as the Social Democrats; while in Brandenburg, the rural state surrounding Berlin, the far-right German People’s Union (DVU) gathered 6.2 percent, enough to stay in the state parliament for another five years. The two extreme right-wing parties would probably have done even better were it not for the strong showing of the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism), heirs of the former ruling Communist Party, which is very well entrenched in East Germany. It was the ex-Communists who benefited most from the region’s high unemployment (running at 20 percent), the cuts in social programs, and fierce opposition to Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s reform program. They also ran a very effective populist campaign that exploited the strong sense of disillusionment with Western capitalism in East Germany, the sensitivity to the “social question,” and nostalgia for the comforts of a Prussian-style, paternalistic “state socialism.”

The far right managed to widen its appeal beyond its constituency of rowdy skinheads, unreconstructed neo-Nazis, and Holocaust deniers, with popular slogans such as “German jobs for Germans first!” Though there are hardly any foreigners or Jews in East Germany, they were nonetheless held responsible in party propaganda for the bleak economic situation and the threatening specter of “glob-

alization.” Both the NPD and the DVU, like their counterparts in Austria, claim that too much German money has gone to Brussels and to help finance the wars of “American imperialism” at the expense of the “small man” (*der kleine Mann*). They have also consistently opposed German government encouragement of Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe and attacked any Jewish public involvement (American, Israeli or local) in internal German affairs.²⁷

The Anti-Semitism of the Secular Left

In contemporary Western and Central Europe, if we exclude attacks from the far right, Jews are rarely targeted as stock exchange speculators, radical journalists, or promoters of the cultural avant-garde; nor are they seen in most of the predominantly secular EU countries as enemies of God, Christ, or the Catholic or Protestant churches. Contemporary carriers of Judeophobia in Europe are much less likely to be believing Christians than in the past—unless they belong to the so-called progressive wings of their churches, with their uncritical apologetics for the Palestinian cause.²⁸ The main exceptions are places like Greece, where the Orthodox Church still propagates traditional anti-Jewish stereotypes, and new EU member states like Poland or Slovakia, where antimodernist Catholicism still lives on in some quarters, especially among rural and older individuals.

The anti-American left, however, is at least as anti-Jewish as the clerical conservative right, especially among those who have embraced a pronounced “antifascist” and “antiracist” credo. The only variety of anti-Semitism that such one-eyed leftists apparently can recognize comes replete with loud shouts of “Sieg Heil!” and the dull thud of Nazi jackboots. Islamic-fascist Jew-hatred, on the other hand, is usually ignored or at best considered a mild irritant. In France, for instance, Jew-baiting has, until recently, often been trivialized as a form of juvenile delinquency, or rationalized as an understandable reaction to oppressive Israeli policies—“the sole source of evil” in the Middle East.²⁹

Left-leaning Judeophobes, unlike their predecessors of a century ago, never call themselves “anti-Semitic.” Indeed, they are usually

indignant at the very suggestion that they have something against the Jews. Such denials notwithstanding, they are generally obsessed with stigmatizing Israel. The dream of the far left has long been to dissolve the hated “Zionist entity” and, in the name of human rights, make the world *Judenstaatrein*.³⁰ Thus, they deny to the Jewish people a fundamental human and political right that they would militantly defend for nonwhite peoples—above all, the Palestinians—namely, the right to national self-determination. This anti-Zionism of the radical leftist camp, profoundly discriminatory toward Jewish nationalism, has now spread into the mainstream liberal left, whose rhetoric relentlessly seeks to undermine the moral and historic legitimacy of a Jewish state. Liberal leftists portray Israel as a state born of the “original sin” of displacing, expropriating, or expelling an “aboriginal” population.

Not only that, but they attribute to the Jews and Israel qualities of cruelty, brutality, bloodthirstiness, duplicity, greed, and immorality drawn straight from the arsenals of classic anti-Semitism.³¹ Such polemics transcend the question of double standards. They go far beyond the long-established media practice of singling out Israel for savage criticism never applied to any other nation-state. Indeed they constitute a clear case of *negationism*—denying the humanity of Israelis in order to stigmatize, defame, and morally disintegrate the Jewish state, as a prelude to its physical destruction.³²

Distinguishing Criticism of Israel from Anti-Semitism

It is, of course, true that not all anti-Zionism is anti-Semitism; there is also little doubt that a significant number of Jews (including a vocal and sometimes militant minority in Israel) are themselves anti-Zionist or “post-Zionist” in outlook. Equally, the term “anti-Semitism” is cheapened when it is used opportunistically or for political reasons.³³ Nevertheless, the delegitimation of Israel all too often slides into a more general defamation of Jews. The call for the demise of Israel expresses, at the very least, an active desire to punish Jews or severely weaken their position.

The media debate over anti-Semitism and “criticism of Israel” that has raged in Europe for the past four years has been characterized

by an extraordinary degree of hypocrisy, bad faith, and transparent political bias. In France, for example, a left-wing international relations expert, Pascal Boniface, cynically paraded himself as the victim and target of an organized campaign of [Jewish] intimidation and Zionist “intellectual terrorism” solely because he “criticized” the Sharon government.³⁴ In Boniface’s Manichean worldview, anti-Semitism does not exist—neither on the left nor among the French Muslim community, let alone among the vast majority of French people. It is simply an invention of ultra-right Jews in Israel, America, and France to cover up for Sharon’s “sadistic” occupation policy.

In Great Britain, the claim is made that, because of the Holocaust, Israel expects to be treated as “beyond reproach.” Those who question this, so we are told, are branded “anti-Semites” in order to invalidate anything they may have to say.³⁵ The diplomatic editor of the *Observer*, Peter Beaumont, mockingly observed in this regard: “Criticize Israel and you are an anti-Semite just as surely as if you were throwing a pot of paint at a synagogue in Paris.”³⁶ The vitriolic Israel-basher Robert Fisk of the *Independent* is another who regularly complains of the “vicious campaign of slander” (i.e., invoking anti-Semitism) waged against journalists like himself who merely “criticize” Israeli policy.³⁷ The *Guardian’s* comment editor, Seumas Milne, also angrily denounced the “absurd slur” that leftist support for Palestinian rights was in any way connected to anti-Jewish racism.³⁸ Like Peter Beaumont, he insisted that concern about the existence of a “new anti-Semitism” was merely a cynical ploy to deflect justified criticism of the Israeli government—“an apologia for Israel’s brutal war of subjugation.”³⁹

Guardian correspondent Jonathan Freedland offers a telling example. In October 2002, Jewish peace activists marching in the streets of London against the war in Iraq found themselves surrounded by hate-filled chanting and placards on which anti-Israel and anti-Jewish imagery were completely blurred. The demonstration called by the Stop the War Coalition, together with the Muslim Association of Britain, included marchers replete with Hamas-style “martyrs’ headbands,” children brandishing toy Kalashnikovs and suicide bomber belts, and blood-curdling slogans and banners twinning the

Star of David and the swastika.⁴⁰ Similar scenes—including cries of “Death to the Jews”—were enacted in the streets of Paris, Rome, Berlin, and other European capitals during the past three years. Were these demonstrators merely expressing political criticism of Ariel Sharon and opposition to the Likud or to the post-1967 unsought occupation of the West Bank and Gaza? The question answers itself.

When the *New Statesman* in Britain ran a cover story on January 14, 2002, about the perceived might of the pro-Israel lobby, in which a brassy, gleaming gold Star of David (suggesting ostentatious wealth) impaled a supine Union Jack, was that mere criticism of the Israeli government?⁴¹ Evidently not. Such images are the offshoot of a well-established tradition of anti-Semitic iconography that sees the Jews in conspiratorial terms as overmighty and “piercing the heart of the nation.” The *New Statesman* cover line, “A kosher conspiracy?”, made the association even clearer, with echoes of the sinister allegation that Jews are engaged in a secret plot to take over the world.⁴²

A useful checklist to diagnose today’s anti-Semitic wolf in anti-Israeli sheep’s clothing might note the following signs of the disease: the singling out by certain writers of the “Jewish lobby” or the “Jewish vote” for opprobrium, together with strident complaints about Jewish communal solidarity with Israel; the gratuitous emphasis on Jewish wealth or the alleged control by Jews of the media; the growing calls for economic boycotts and sanctions directed exclusively against Israeli products and Israeli academic institutions; or the grossly exaggerated assertion that Jews reject every criticism as “anti-Semitic.”⁴³

Defining Anti-Semitism Today

But what does anti-Semitism actually mean in a European context at the beginning of the twenty-first century? How does it compare with earlier manifestations of Jew-hatred? Is it a concept that adequately describes the current trends in anti-Jewish rhetoric, agitation, and sentiment? One difficulty in answering these questions derives from the fact that anti-Semitism is itself a highly abstract term that often obscures the harsh reality of brutal hatred which it is supposed to describe.⁴⁴ It is certainly not a blanket form of hostility toward “Sem-

ites” in general, as is sometimes claimed by Arab apologists. From the outset it was directed exclusively against Jews. The word was invented in 1879 by a frustrated German Jew-baiter and radical journalist, Wilhelm Marr. He wished to emphasize the “scientific,” ethnic, and non-confessional character of his atheistic opposition to Jews. In his eyes, they were a distinct, threatening, powerful, and unassimilable race, which had already seized control of the German economy and society. “Semites” was his preferred term, precisely because it sounded more neutral, scientific, and modern. Since the late nineteenth century, this concept has been used to embrace a vast spectrum of prejudice, hostility, antipathy, resentment, and opposition to Jews, Judaism, and the Jewish nation—hence, the frequent confusion that its use tends to generate.

Though there is no agreed-upon consensus regarding theoretical definitions, anti-Semitism is much easier to recognize in practice. The methods pursued by modern anti-Semites have ranged from social ostracism to racist polemics in the press to advocating economic boycotts and restrictive academic quotas for Jews.⁴⁵ They have turned at various times to mass political agitation, discriminatory legislation, violent pogroms, expulsion, and ultimately mass murder. The annihilation of six million Jews on European soil by the German and Austrian Nazis (and their many collaborators) was driven by an apocalyptic and totalitarian form of anti-Semitism, unprecedented in its radicalism. The Nazis were guided by the belief that exterminating the Jews was a way to cleanse humanity and to redeem the world from a truly lethal threat to European culture, morality, and aesthetic ideals.⁴⁶ Nazi “eliminationist” anti-Semitism proceeded from the assumption that the Jews were an “inferior,” satanic race, engaged in a deadly conspiracy for world domination, which, if successful, would lead to the extinction of European “Aryan” civilization.

Such paranoid myths that led to the destruction of six million Jews have been discredited in most of contemporary Europe, though they have become commonplace in the Muslim world. One cannot mistake the revulsion with which the political and intellectual elites in the European Union publicly repudiate the biological racism underlying Nazi exterminatory policy.⁴⁷ However, the mainstream

anti-fascist consensus only addresses one aspect—and by no means the most important—of Nazi anti-Semitism and the Holocaust: namely, its racist content. It neglects the continuing vitality of other, equally sordid notions of Jews as a “criminal people” of “ritual murderers,” a gang of vampirelike capitalists, parasitical Shylocks, sly plutocrats, and dark conspirators.

These stereotypes are very much alive today, along with popular conspiracy theories about the United States. For example, a large number of Germans (about 20 percent of the population) believe that the American government and not Osama bin Laden engineered the bombing of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.⁴⁸ Several best-sellers appeared in Germany and France during 2003, blaming the CIA for 9/11, depicting George Bush as a “true reincarnation of Hitler,” or insinuating a hidden connection between the Israeli Mossad and the perpetrators of the Twin Towers massacre.⁴⁹ Millions of Europeans evidently believe in the wild theory that America and Israel jointly or separately orchestrated the attacks in Manhattan; or that 4,000 (sic) Jews—warned in advance by Israeli agents—never reported to their offices at the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.

The anti-Semitic myth of a Jewish world conspiracy did not emerge overnight. It found quintessential modern expression in the notorious late nineteenth-century Russian forgery, the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, which attributed superhuman and occult powers to a small clique of scheming Jews.⁵⁰ This tenacious legend drew on a centuries-old legacy of medieval Christian diabolizing the Jews. Archaic fantasies reawakened to new life in the twentieth century, in the form of full-blown conspiracy theories that postulated Jewish control of Wall Street capitalism as well as international communism, in order to achieve undisputed world rule. New and updated versions of such conspiracy myths are still alive and well in the European Union of today. These speculations assume that Bush, Richard Cheney, and Donald Rumsfeld are being manipulated into waging unnecessary wars by a cabal of cunning subordinates in the Jewish “necon” camp.⁵¹

For contemporary Judeophobes, there is little doubt that Zionism and the State of Israel provide the most tangible expression of the

Protocols’ conspiratorial script. The *Protocols*, it is true, are rarely given unequivocal expression in Western Europe, except by Islamic fundamentalists, neo-Nazis, or a motley crew of Holocaust deniers. Such a paranoid worldview is still too crude for Western Establishment circles, though by no means uncommon in Russia and Eastern Europe. However, under the guise of “anti-Zionism,” anti-Jewish amalgams are permissible and not subject to legal prosecution. As long as it is only “the Zionists” or Israel who are being declared a priori guilty, evil, or criminal—in their essence as well as through their deeds—even the wildest conspiracy myths can be publicized and openly advocated.

Mobilizing Christian Theological Images

Judeophobia is often the symbolic other side of the “Palestinophile” coin. One of the favorite pastimes of its protagonists is mobilizing archaic Christian theological images into the service of a postmodern version of the “anti-Zionist” cause. The “crucifixions” of Jesus and of Yasir Arafat by “deicidal” Israelis/Jews merge into a bizarre, timeless blur of suffering. Poor, downtrodden Palestinians mutate into tortured sacrificial lambs slaughtered by the ancient “Christ-killing” people.⁵² A totally de-Judaized Jesus is transmuted into the first Palestinian martyr, reviving the replacement theology that Christian churches in the West have only recently repudiated. This is historical falsification no less extreme than the “Aryan” Jesus invented by the Nazis in their eschatological war against the Jews and “Judeo-Christianity.”

In the French media, the thirty-nine-day Israeli army siege of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem (April 2002) quickly became a metaphorical replay of the passion of Christ. Its symbolism echoed “the massacre of the innocents” by King Herod, graphically depicted in the New Testament and in Western art.⁵³ Nothing could have been better suited to revive the most deeply entrenched Judeophobic residues in the psyche of the Christian West—organically linking the present-day suffering of the “Palestinian David” at the hands of a Goliath-like Jewish state. The enduring image of the siege in Bethlehem was not the sacrilegious invasion of a major Christian holy place by armed Palestinians, but the photograph of one intrusive Israeli tank guarding the entrance to Manger Square. Worse still, Yasir Arafat

could pose as the defender of the “Holy Land.” The siege of the Church of the Nativity turned into a Palestinian propaganda victory, because the image of a Jewish state hostile to Christianity was already so thoroughly ensconced in the Western psyche.⁵⁴ The Vatican contributed its part by unfounded reprimands to Israel that recalled some of the darker strands of Church history.

As if to underline the force of subliminal perceptions of Israel and Jews as “Christ-killers” in the European media, there was the cartoon in the (non-anti-Semitic) liberal Italian daily, *La Stampa*, on April 3, 2002, showing the infant Jesus in Bethlehem. In this insidious caricature, an Israeli tank points its gun at the baby Christ, who cries: “Are they coming to kill me again?” This casual reference to deicide reveals the astonishing resilience of the Christ-denying image (applied to the State of Israel) still embedded in the European imagination.⁵⁵ Four months earlier, an equally offensive cartoon appeared in the French left-wing daily *Libération* (December 26, 2001), entitled “No Christmas for Arafat.” Yasir Arafat had been banned by Israel from attending the Christmas Mass in Bethlehem. In the cartoon Ariel Sharon was depicted preparing a cross for Arafat, with hammer and nails at the ready. An Israeli tank stood parked nearby.⁵⁶ The caption underneath sarcastically suggested that Arafat “would be welcome for Easter.” A similar motif had appeared in the Easter 2002 issue of the Swedish newspaper *Aftonbladet*, whose editorial page fiercely condemned Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians under a banner heading: “The Crucifixion of Arafat.”⁵⁷ The liberal Swedish *Expressen*, not to be outdone, identified Israel’s military actions with Old Testament “vengefulness,” deploring its acts of war for expressing the primitive Biblical teaching of “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.”⁵⁸

Across the European Union, it has become commonplace to declare that “the Jews, once victims, have become executioners.” This remark of France’s most popular Catholic priest, Abbé Pierre, was made as far back as 1991. Since then, Abbé Pierre has not tired of repeating the ugly canard that the Jews invented genocide; that their Old Testament faith is relentlessly legalistic, tribal, and punitive; and that Zionism is a uniquely vicious example of the ravages inflicted by capitalist globalization on the “wretched of the earth.”⁵⁹ Such beliefs

explain why Father Pierre chose to defend the Holocaust denial theories of his close friend Roger Garaudy—a lapsed Catholic, ex-Stalinist convert to Islam, and a culture hero to millions of Arabs.⁶⁰

British Anti-Semitism in the Media and the Church

The British media have also provided similar examples of traditional Christian anti-Judaism. Thus the radically secular *Guardian* nonetheless invoked ancient associations relating to the “obdurate,” “unrepentant eye for an eye” policy of Israel, singling out the (un-Christian) “unforgiveness of Jews” and the Biblical vengefulness of the Jewish state.⁶¹ Robert Fisk, writing in the *Independent*, played off the theme of the Old and New Testaments to expose Jewish/Israeli intransigence:

The rabbi’s dad had taught him [the settler] about an eye for an eye—or 20 homes for one stone in this case—whereas my dad had taught me about turning the other cheek. Judaism and Christianity had collided. So was it any surprise that Judaism and Islam were colliding?⁶²

The Anglican *Church Times* was no less explicit in disparaging Israel’s “inhumanity,” deploring Palestinian suffering and the unjust behavior of the Jews in the Holy Land.⁶³ It published articles (especially at Christmastime and Easter) juxtaposing classical Christian virtues of peace, hope, and goodwill with their alleged absence in Israel.⁶⁴ The *Church Times* chose to mark Britain’s Holocaust Memorial Day with a particularly malevolent article by the Reverend Richard Spencer, who described events in Ramallah as a “suffering and deprivation that I could only imagine in Auschwitz.”⁶⁵

The English Catholic journal, the *Tablet*, also displayed a marked anti-Israel slant, despite its more favorable attitude toward dialogue with Jews.⁶⁶ It agreed, for example, with the sharp reproach from the Vatican at the “unprecedented [Israeli] violation of Christian holy sites and properties.” But it showed little concern for Palestinian atrocities against Jews on the Sabbath or during a major Jewish festival such as Passover.⁶⁷ Such double standards are routine practice in most of the Christian churches, not only in Great Britain, but across the European Union. There are, of course, a few relatively small

groups of evangelical Christian Zionists in Europe who fervently believe in God's irrevocable Biblical promise of the Land of Israel to the Jews. But in marked contrast to their coreligionists in the United States, they remain isolated and without political clout. The fashionable trend in the churches is to call into question why a Jewish state was founded at all in 1948, since its creation is seen as "morally wrong." What is especially intolerable is that Israeli violence should take place in a territory which "Christians honour as the birthplace of the King of Peace."⁶⁸ On the other hand, Palestinian suicidal terrorism—however appalling its consequences—is *not* seen as desecrating the Holy Land, nor apparently does it transgress Anglican moral teachings.

This hostile position of various Christian churches in Europe is not merely an offshoot of anti-Sharon feeling or political opposition to Jewish settlements in "occupied" territories.⁶⁹ Within the Anglican and Lutheran Churches there are growing numbers who dislike Israel because they believe that Jews are not entitled to any part of the Holy Land; indeed, they feel that a Jewish state is both theologically illegitimate and intrinsically racist. They have been influenced by the revival of an anti-Jewish theology among Arab Christians that seeks deliberately to delegitimize any basis for Israel's existence. This revisionist Middle Eastern version of radical liberation theology presents Palestinian Christians as "the true Israel," oppressed by a malevolent occupation government of theologically "cursed" Jews. Arab Christians who promote this obscurantist theology seek to curry favor with Palestinian Muslims by accusing Israelis of "ethnic cleansing" and "Judaizing" Jerusalem. They often receive a sympathetic hearing in Europe. Especially popular is their pernicious and unfounded claim that the Hebrew Bible provides a "warrant for genocide" in God's name—one which is being callously implemented by a "colonialist" Israel in full view of the world.⁷⁰

The effect on more liberal British Christians of such distorted ideas is to encourage an inversion of stereotypes, in which Jews become modern-day Roman "oppressors" humiliating the Palestinian people, whose suffering is likened to that of Jesus.⁷¹ Such archaic images transform Israeli self-defense into an act of aggression, with

decidedly unpleasant echoes of "deicide." The pro-Palestinian mantra, epitomized by humanitarian organizations such as Christian Aid, assumes that Palestinian Arabs must be innocent "victims" of Israeli policy because they are obviously suffering. The unfortunate corollary is that they are a priori exculpated from any responsibility for their plight.⁷² The fact that the Arab states, the United Nations, and the Palestinian leadership itself have deliberately allowed the exiles of 1948 to rot in refugee camps for fifty-five years is conveniently ignored; only the Jews are to blame.

These skewed perceptions not only reflect the dominant worldview of the churches, but of the British media, prominent intellectuals, and many students at the universities.⁷³ Fear of Israel has become an unthinking reflex for this left-leaning consensus. It is an outlook exquisitely tailored for an ethically upside-down age that unflinchingly finds moral equivalence between terror and its response, turning victims into aggressors, and obtusely dismissing concern with the new anti-Semitism as another case of "Jewish paranoia."⁷⁴ In reporting on the so-called "massacre" in Jenin in April 2002, the quality British press exhibited these traits with astonishing zeal and "almost wall-to-wall unanimity."⁷⁵

A macabre example of this inverse morality was provided by the ranting lyrics of the Ulster-born British poet Tom Paulin, equating Zionism with Nazism and recasting Jews as contemporary villains rather than erstwhile victims.⁷⁶ Paulin is the Oxford University professor who told the Egyptian daily *Al-Ahram*, "Jewish settlers should be shot dead. I think they are Nazis, racists. I feel nothing but hatred for them."⁷⁷ In the same vein, Paulin's poem of the week for the *Observer* (February 18, 2001) referred to the "Zionist SS" gunning down "little Palestinian boys." The poem was entitled "Killed in the Crossfire"—a reference to Muhammad al-Dura, the Palestinian adolescent presumed to have been killed by Israeli bullets, although this account of his death has been highly questioned. Paulin scaled new heights in flaying Jews in this poem, trivializing the Holocaust and pillorying the "nazified" Jewish state.⁷⁸ The poem also contains a sinister reference to "dumb goys" (gullible or easily duped Gentiles) unable to see through Israel's "real goals." As Winston Pickett has sug-

gested, this phrase echoes Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, in which the Nazi leader tarred Zionism as part of the Jewish world conspiracy, whereby "Jews again slyly dupe the dumb *goyim*."⁷⁹ Tom Paulin's outbursts are symptomatic of the toxic climate of humanist outrage that effortlessly turns Jews into Nazis. This is language of pure slander and nothing more.

The Greek Scene

It is important to realize that the focus of anti-Semitism today has become increasingly globalized. In other words, Judeophobia is an international rather than a purely local issue. The so-called "Jewish question" is not limited to individual countries. Moreover, it transcends the specific problems of American, German, French, British, Russian, or Israeli Jews. Judeophobes around the world are more concerned with international "Jewish power" than with their local Jewish communities, which have often dwindled into numerical insignificance.⁸⁰ Nevertheless, there are distinctive national traditions that significantly affect the local situation of Jewish communities.

The Greek case is particularly illuminating, since its barely 5,000 Jews represent only a tiny minority out of a total population of 10.5 million, which is overwhelmingly Greek Orthodox Christian by faith. The Orthodox Church continues to include anti-Jewish references in its Good Friday liturgy, and one consequence is that religious prejudice against the "Christ killers" still remains potent in Greece. A few years ago, the Orthodox Church insisted that religious affiliation be included on Greek identity cards. When the Greek government was obliged by the EU to remove such references, it was vilified by church leaders for "bowing to Jewish pressure," mentioning by name such organizations as the American Jewish Committee. Equally striking has been the paranoid vision of Zionism as a "Jewish plot for world domination" embraced by populist elements within virtually all Greek political parties. Already in the 1980s, the Greek Social Democratic Party, PASOK, was the most strident in Europe in its use of such anti-Semitic and "anti-Zionist" rhetoric.⁸¹ Today, anti-Semitism of this species is inextricably linked to Greek anti-Americanism (even while

many Greeks have close familial ties to the United States). Greek anti-Semitism, probably the most virulent in Europe, is reinforced by Israel's alliance with Turkey and Greece's own commercial links to the Arab world.

In 2002, there was a sharp rise in anti-Semitic incidents in Greece, largely attributable to the marked strengthening of anti-Israel sentiment in recent years. The plethora of often viciously anti-Israel editorials, cartoons, articles, and letters to the editor published in the press probably contributed to the epidemic of desecrations of Jewish cemeteries and Holocaust memorials in the spring of 2002.⁸² The level of such anti-Jewish vandalism continued to grow in 2003. However, according to the Greek Helsinki Monitoring Organization, it is less the acts of violence themselves than the prevalence of anti-Semitic hate speech in mainstream media and politics that is so alarming. In April 2003, for example, major newspapers ran a completely fabricated story that the Israeli Army was responsible for selling organs removed from dead Palestinians. In the Greek media, Israel is still regularly portrayed as a "Nazi" state, while Greek Jewry finds itself attacked for not "taking a stand against the genocide of the Palestinian people by Sharon."⁸³ Of late, the Greek government has sought to pressure the media to tone down its inflammatory rhetoric, and announced that it would establish January 27 as a national day of remembrance for Greek Jews who died in the Holocaust.

In the category of anti-Semitic hate speech, it would be hard to top the chilling statements made by renowned Greek composer Mikis Theodorakis, who in 2003 pilloried the Jewish nation as the "root of evil"—bloated with "self-importance and wicked stubbornness."⁸⁴

In an interview with *Ha'aretz* magazine on August 27, 2004, this man, who is considered an icon of the progressive left in Europe, spoke openly about the fanatical and domineering traits of the Jews, their control of Wall Street, the banks, the mass media, and the world of music.⁸⁵ Repeatedly, he compared Israel to Nazi Germany, suggesting that Sharon was currently leading the Jews "to the root of evil," just as "Hitler led the Germans."⁸⁶ Like so many other left-wing European intellectuals and artists, the Greek composer claimed to be flabbergasted that "the Jewish people, who have been victims of Nazism,

can support such a fascist policy.”⁸⁷ Theodorakis adamantly maintained that he was an “antiracist,” a firm opponent of anti-Semitism, and a “friend” of Israel, who still supported its right to exist. He vehemently denied that there was any anti-Semitism in Europe; it was merely “a sick reaction” of Jews to avoid self-criticism and to deny the grim reality of Israeli fascism.⁸⁸ According to Theodorakis, Jews enjoyed unlimited support from the United States and dominated the system of globalized capitalism; they had manipulated President Bush, caused the war in Iraq, and together with the Americans, engineered 9/11. The Jews were de facto in control of the sole great superpower and determined to hit the Arabs so “they could help Israel survive.”⁸⁹

At the same time, Theodorakis spoke of the Jewish rejection of Jesus’ message of love. He recalled his religious grandmother’s warnings not to go to the Jewish Quarter at Easter because Jews drank the blood of Christian children. Though a Communist, he still felt that Jews were fanatics who truly believed in their own chosenness and superiority. Their arrogance and aggressiveness ultimately stemmed from their monotheistic religion, a faith that was judgmental, repressive, and had implanted the notion of sin into European culture. Jewish feelings of “superiority” were not only a product of the Bible, but also the outcome of their battle for survival, reinforced by their brilliant successes in the arts, the sciences, and music. He nonetheless accused them of boycotting his work, presumably because he had written the Palestinian national anthem. These statements neatly assemble several layers of old and new Judeophobia. They are the more striking from a man who, to many on the European left, embodies the spirit of freedom, humanist aspirations, cosmopolitanism, and belief in progress. Theodorakis showed himself unable to accept the Jewish people “as a nation like all others,” obliged to wield power in order to survive.⁹⁰

The German Scene

The optimistic view that after the Holocaust negative images of Jews would atrophy focused especially on postwar Germany—despite ample evidence of the tenacity of local anti-Jewish resentment.⁹¹ The

older right-wing anti-Semitism may have been weakened, but it never died. Anti-Zionism permitted its revival by providing it with a new halo of respectability. This successful transplant has been mainly triggered by the “Palestinian question,” the rise of militant Islam and growing anti-Americanism. It has been further amplified by the Internet explosion and the antiglobalization movement.⁹² In the present context of hate speech and violent images from the Middle East racing through cyberspace, there has been an electronic dissemination of Judeophobia at unprecedented levels.

Despite the genuine efforts by the German government to make Jews feel at home in the Federal Republic and the substantial immigration of Jews from the former Soviet Union (which has swelled the official Jewish population to more than 110,000), the normalization of German-Jewish relations has been inevitably strained by these developments. This was recognized by Paul Spiegel, head of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, who noted in May 2002 that the mood across Europe had significantly changed and that anti-Semitism was “worse than at any time since the Nazi era.”⁹³ This perception was fueled by the large number of anti-Semitic e-mails, letters, and phone calls of an aggressive nature sent to the Central Council of Jews and other Jewish communities in Germany after April 2002. Indeed, in 2002 the number of anti-Semitic crimes rose to 1,629—the highest recorded number in the history of the Federal Republic.

Israel-bashing emerged as a highly popular mass spectator sport and as a point of convergence between far-right and left-wing anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism. It enabled “pacifist” antiglobalists from the far right and left to embrace Osama bin Laden and the radical Islamists as part of a coming “anti-Zionist” and anti-American revolution. For example, among Al Qaeda’s greatest admirers we find the German neo-Nazi ideologue Horst Mahler, who during the 1970s was a leading member of the leftist-anarchist Baader-Meinhof terror gang. After spending years in prison, Mahler resurfaced as a true *völkisch* believer, praying for the destruction of both Israel and the United States. Looking back on the 1968 student protest movements in Europe, he reinterpreted his own anticapitalism without difficulty as an embryonic form of National Socialism. Mahler may be an

extreme case, but apparently there are many Germans who would agree with a milder version of his anti-American and anti-Semitic sentiments.⁹⁴

During the second Gulf War, anti-Jewish resentment has flared up once again in the German peace movement. In the past two years, wild allegations have circulated about Israel and a “cabal” of neoconservatives who have propelled the United States into an imperialist war to seize Iraqi oil resources. As in other EU states, President Bush has been portrayed as either a gullible or willing tool in the grip of the “Zionist lobby” and powerful East Coast advisers. Rudolf Scharping, a Social Democratic party leader and former defense minister in Gerhard Schroeder’s cabinet, told a meeting in Berlin on August 27, 2002, that “a powerful—perhaps overly powerful—Jewish lobby” in America encouraged George W. Bush to go to war, according to *New York Times* columnist William Safire.⁹⁵ Scharping, in a letter to the *Times* the following day, denied “blaming American Jews,” but claimed they had “understandable” interests relevant to the issue.

German street demonstrations against the American president (like those in London, Paris, Madrid, Rome, Brussels, and different parts of Scandinavia) consistently have depicted him as a warmonger, “terrorist,” “assassin” or born-again “Crusader.” His image, like that of Ariel Sharon, has been thoroughly demonized through the use of a full array of Nazi-era references, with swastikas adorning his visage. However, the animosity exhibited toward Sharon—“a loathsome monster running amok” or the “personification of the ‘ugly Israeli’”—was perhaps greater than that exhibited toward Bush. He was frozen by the German and European media into the role of the implacable bulldozer, “slaughterer” of Arabs, “pyromaniac,” and unrepentant “war criminal”—apparently insatiable in his appetite for Palestinian blood.

During Operation Defensive Shield, Israel’s military response to the spring 2002 barrage of terror attacks, such stereotypes became more vociferous, reinforced by the insistence that Israel was violating international law, ethical norms, and human rights in a systematic manner. “Cold-blooded executions” were reported in Jenin, as if they had actually occurred, and the *Frankfurter Rundschau* even pictured a

Palestinian variant of Ground Zero, provoked by Israeli hands.⁹⁶ The conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ) was unequivocal in reproving Israel’s policy as a form of “state terrorism.” It recalled that former Israeli Prime Ministers Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir had once been “terrorists,” and that in the Middle East (as elsewhere) negotiations with former terrorists were perfectly normal.⁹⁷ Such comments implied justification for Palestinian tactics, while showing insensitivity to the suffering of ordinary Israelis and a perverse disregard for Israel’s obligation to defend its own citizens.⁹⁸ Typically, Sharon rather than Arafat was blamed by German television and the press for sowing death and destruction. Sharon was further accused of ignoring law and perverting justice through the practice of targeted killings and blowing up houses of terrorists. Israel was even charged with deliberately seeking to obliterate the memory of the Palestinian people.⁹⁹

Consequently, in April 2002, 36 percent of all Germans admitted to feelings of antipathy toward Jews, compared to 20 percent three years earlier. No less than a third of all Germans in this survey believed that “Jews had too much power” in the world, while about 20 percent thought they were to blame for the “major world conflicts.”¹⁰⁰ Opinion surveys have consistently shown that millions of Germans still think of Jews as “too powerful,” as “troublemakers,” or as a danger to world peace. After 9/11 this stereotypically anti-Semitic opinion appears to have been significantly strengthened. Some German commentators began to feverishly explain that legitimate Arab anger at America’s pro-Israel policy was the primary or even the sole cause of terrorism.¹⁰¹

This increasingly skewed picture of the Arab-Israeli conflict—rewritten as a saga of relentless aggression by Israel against “peace-loving” neighbors, reinforcing the anti-Semitic myth of bloodthirsty Jews threatening “conciliatory” Arabs¹⁰²—came to the fore in 2002. That was the year when the flamboyant, media-obsessed Jürgen Möllemann, deputy chairman of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), sought to mobilize lower middle-class anti-Semitic feeling in Germany, combining it with a vehement campaign against Sharon’s “state terrorism.” Möllemann had been head of the German-Arab Society for thirty

years. But in 2002 he began to explicitly embrace the cause of Palestinian suicide bombers as a “justified resistance” to Israeli occupation. Indeed, he blamed the growth of German anti-Semitism primarily on Sharon’s policies and on the “intolerance and malicious manner” of prominent German Jews, such as TV talk-show host Michel Friedman, whose abrasive manner had made him many enemies.¹⁰³

Responding to Möllemann, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer characterized his divisive rhetoric as “unspeakable statements.” Fischer, a long-time friend of Israel and the Jewish people, observed, “The extent to which we succeed in supporting and promoting the life and well-being of Jewish communities in Germany is also a yardstick of our ability to create an open and tolerant society.” Addressing those who were constantly affirming their “right to criticize” Israel, Fischer stated, “Criticism is possible only on the firm foundation of indelible solidarity.”¹⁰⁴

The FDP’s modest performance in the national elections of September 2002 appeared to demonstrate the failure of Möllemann’s spectacular bid to make lower middle-class anti-Semitism politically and socially acceptable in the new Germany. (Möllemann’s death in June 2003 was apparently a suicide.) However, far more Germans agreed with his views on the Jewish-Israeli question than were ready to vote for a party as opportunist, divided, and confused as the FDP. Möllemann’s mixture of nationalism, anti-Israel/anti-Semitic *ressentiment*, and anti-Establishment populism tapped into a level of German ambivalence to Jews whose full potential is unclear but should not be underestimated.¹⁰⁵

This latent anti-Semitism was exhibited in the public reaction to the remarks of Martin Hohmann, a fifty-five-year-old Christian Democrat deputy and former mayor of Neuhof. In a speech on October 3, 2003, he bluntly stated to party constituents that Germany had already atoned enough for the Holocaust. His special wrath was reserved for the notion that Germans were a “guilty people” (*Tätervolk*) because of the Holocaust. He insisted that the same accusation must be applied to Jews because of their decisive role in Russia’s Bolshevik revolution. According to his twisted logic, Jews were the source of global evil because individuals of Jewish origin like Leon Trotsky

had been key figures in the early years of the Red Terror in the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁶ Since millions had been killed in the first phases of the Communist Revolution, one had to ask about “the ‘guilt’ of the Jews.”

After an initial week of hesitation, Angela Merkel, the Christian Democratic leader, called Hohmann’s remarks anti-Semitic in nature and “under no circumstances tolerable.” On November 14, 2003, Hohmann was expelled from the CDU. But, once again, German public opinion did not align with the political Establishment. Some of the more outspoken CDU critics of Hohmann received abusive and even threatening phone calls, as well as a flood of faxes and e-mails protesting efforts to seek his expulsion.¹⁰⁷ In a letter of support for Hohmann, Brigadier General Reinhard Gunzel, commander of an elite German special forces unit, maintained that “the majority of our people shares your thoughts.” Gunzel was swiftly stripped of his post, but a poll by *Die Zeit* revealed that 40 percent of West Germans and 28 percent in the former East Germany supported Hohmann’s statements.¹⁰⁸

The most recent research now suggests that just under 50 percent of Germans do not feel any sense of responsibility to Jews as a result of the Holocaust; over 60 percent are very critical of Israel, and approximately one-third of all Germans hold anti-Semitic views. Moreover, there appears to be a strong correlation between anti-Jewish opinions and the “rejection of a sense of responsibility” relating to the Holocaust—which was notably higher among right-wing voters. So, too, there was also a growing correspondence between hostility to Israel (almost 80 percent agreed that Israelis were occupiers who “have no business being in Palestine”) and anti-Semitism.¹⁰⁹ No fewer than 57 percent of those surveyed believed that “Israelis treat the Palestinians the way the Nazis treated the Jews.”

The view that Israel was not a “normal” democratic state and that its negative features stemmed from “the character of the Jews” was virtually axiomatic among the far right, the radical left, and Islamists, but had also made significant inroads into mainstream opinion. German Jews are especially concerned that the increase in the Muslim population will transform national politics for the worse and lead to an erosion of support from the established German elites, who in the

future will have to take account of this new voting block.¹¹⁰

Nevertheless, for the present, the shift in German public opinion is not openly reflected in official statements. And Germany, on the diplomatic and other levels, continues to maintain a special relationship with Israel that is of considerable importance to the Jewish state.

OSCE Efforts to Combat Anti-Semitism

At the conference of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Berlin at the end of April 2004, German President Johannes Rau clearly stated that “massive anti-Semitism” stood behind much of the opposition to Israeli policy.¹¹¹ He publicly called for opponents of Israel to temper their criticism of a state that, since its foundation, had been under threat of annihilation. The conference, held in Berlin at the invitation of German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, drew over 800 participants, including representatives of a large number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Not only the German president but most delegates from the fifty-five member states of the OSCE acknowledged the sharp increase in European anti-Semitism and pledged themselves to combat it.¹¹² Sessions examined the special nature of anti-Semitism, ways to promote respect for diversity, and how the OSCE can help participating states in developing educational programs. The Berlin Declaration adopted at the close of the two-day meeting addressed most of these concerns: It mandated that statistics on anti-Semitic crimes as well as “best practices” to prevent them be collected through the Warsaw-based human rights watchdog, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). It called for educational programs to combat anti-Semitism and promote Holocaust remembrance. It urged the states to fight hate crimes, with particular attention to the spread of hate on the Internet and in the media.

Since the Berlin meeting there have been two smaller follow-up conferences, one in Paris, focusing on the Internet, and one in Brussels addressing all forms of xenophobia and racism. Another OSCE conference is planned for Cordoba, Spain, in June 2005. Perhaps most significantly in terms of implementation, in December 2004 the

OSCE created the post of “special representative on anti-Semitism” to oversee OSCE’s commitments made at the Berlin and Vienna conferences.

Developments in Spain

Thus far the only full-fledged, successful terrorist attack on European soil has taken place in Madrid—in a traditionally pro-Arab country, whose 20,000 Jews¹¹³ make up less than 0.05 percent of Spain’s population. The Al Qaeda cells that struck Spain were evidently aiming at the withdrawal of a purely symbolic Spanish military presence from the Coalitional forces in Iraq—an endeavor in which they succeeded all too well. Today there are nearly a million Arabic-speaking immigrants in Spain, half of them illegal, some of whom are active or potential recruits to the Islamist war against the West.¹¹⁴

Native Spanish Judeophobia is, however, much more deeply rooted than this new wave of Muslim (primarily Moroccan) immigration. The resonance of this anti-Semitism can be traced back to the late fourteenth-century riots in Spain, in which thousands of Jews were murdered and entire communities forcibly converted to Christianity. The coercive baptisms eventually produced the phenomenon of the *conversos* (Marranos), the Inquisition, and statutes of “blood purity” five centuries before the race laws in Nazi Germany. Spanish Judeophobia reflected a national obsession with religious and ethnic unity: Almost all Spaniards are Catholic, and Spain remains to this day one of the most homogeneous Western countries. Yet today there is a resurgence of interest in Jewish roots, and many Spaniards have proudly identified some Jewish forebears.

In the past, blood libels and sermons to the Jews were more “official” in Spain (enjoying the formal backing of the state) than they were in other European countries.¹¹⁵ Native Judeophobia was extensive among the country’s leading intellectuals and until the present day has retained its hold on Spanish grassroots culture and folklore. This helps to explain why in a comparative study of several European countries at the end of 2002, Spaniards appeared to be the most prejudiced in their stereotypical beliefs about Jews dominating global

finance (71 percent agreed with this proposition), the media, and American politics.¹¹⁶ Seventy-two percent of Spaniards further agreed that Jews were more loyal to Israel than to their own country.¹¹⁷ Fifty-seven percent believed that Jews dwelt too much on the Holocaust (in other European countries the average was 49 percent); a third of all Spaniards agreed that Jews cared only about themselves and used dubious means to achieve what they wanted. On these and other counts, Spain seemed slightly more anti-Semitic than Austria, Switzerland, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Denmark, Britain, or Germany—although, it must be noted, violent incidents against Jews were markedly lower in Spain than in most other European countries.¹¹⁸

The Spanish media has, however, with few exceptions, hewed to an anti-Israel line that frequently demonizes Jews. A cartoon in *La Razón* on June 9, 2001, showed two Israeli policemen beating a Palestinian, while one says to the other: “There’s no time for me to reflect on the Holocaust.”¹¹⁹ The leftist *El País* (May 24, 2001) depicted an Orthodox Jew, carrying an Israeli flag and rifle in his right hand while reading from a Bible in his left hand, over a caption that read: “We are the chosen people for the manufacture of weapons.” The same paper had only one day earlier illustrated Israel’s prime minister with a small figure flying in his direction, holding the caption: “Clio, the muse of history, placing the moustache of Hitler on Sharon.” The Catholic *El Mundo* on April 21, 2001, one-sidedly blamed Israel for rejecting “the proposal of Arafat to work together, for an end to violence”—omitting, naturally, any reference to Palestinian terrorism. A particularly ugly cartoon in *Cambio* (June 4, 2001) pictured Sharon with a yarmulke and a swastika inside the Star of David on his chest, announcing: “From bad can come good. At least, Hitler taught me to invade a country and exterminate every living vermin.”¹²⁰ These and other examples from the Spanish media suggest that many journalists believe it is legitimate to “nazify” Israel and fail to see any anti-Jewish prejudices in such Israel-bashing caricatures.¹²¹ In practice, however, most Spaniards do not distinguish between Israel and “the Jews,” regarding them as one entity.¹²² Not only that, but Spanish cartoonists who are venomously anti-Israel do not hesitate to draw on traditional

stereotypes and stigmatizations of Jews, whether from religious paintings and popular drawings during the Inquisition period or from the Franco era of clerical fascism.¹²³

Spanish journalists such as Javier Nart, a frequent contributor to radio and TV newscasts, not only brand Israel as the main problem in the modern world, but even refer to the head of its “Jewish government” as “an animal, a criminal.”¹²⁴ A leading journalist, Enrique Curiel, writing in *La Razón* in April 2003, also perceived Israel as the source of all unrest in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world. According to his account, Ehud Barak, Sharon, and Bush deliberately provoked the Palestinian intifada through Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount; similarly, it was the Jewish state that was to blame for the Iraqi war.¹²⁵ Spanish academics like Gema Martín Muñoz, writing in *El País*, went even further, claiming that Sharon’s plan had always been the “final solution of the Palestinian question.”¹²⁶

Such demonization of Israel and its leaders seems to be openly encouraged by the international affairs editor of *El País*, José María Bastenier. It was also characteristic of the mainstream Spanish media, including its main TV channels. It was as if the “criminality of Israel” was not even a topic that requires empirical proof. For example, the events in Jenin in April 2002 were spoken of, almost automatically, as “ethnic cleansing” by Israel or even as a “Holocaust.”

In the eyes of the Spanish media, as elsewhere in Europe, it is only Jews who commit “massacres” and acts of “state terror.” Pilar Rahola, a left-wing Spanish journalist who has courageously exposed these double standards, observes: “The Jewish victims in Israel also end up . . . their own executioners. There are no Jewish victims, just as there are no Palestinian executioners. . . . Arab terrorism becomes comprehensible and even acceptable.”¹²⁷ In an earlier interview in October 2002, Rahola had explained that the Spanish left had reduced Israel to one sole image: “a country that occupies territories and whose vocation is to make life miserable for the poor Palestinians. The history of the Holy Land is being reinvented. Everything takes place as if there were instructions: Never recall the faults and errors of the Palestinians, never recall their alliances with dangerous countries such as Iraq.”¹²⁸

Certain Spaniards are undoubtedly among the European pace-setters when it comes to contemporary left-wing Judeophobia. Gaspar Llamazares, leader of *Izquierda Unida* (United Left Party), declared in April 2003 that his party was fed up with the six million Jews killed in the Holocaust and would no longer participate in any homage to their memory.¹²⁹

Even more offensive were the remarks of the Portuguese Nobel Prize laureate for Literature, José Saramago, writing in *El País*. He told his Spanish readers that Israelis were motivated by the “monstrous and rooted ‘certitude’” that they are “chosen by God”; that they were in the grip of an “obsessive psychological and pathologically exclusivist racism,” which they had rationalized by evoking their suffering during the Holocaust. Saramago, a Communist by conviction, had already compared the situation in Ramallah to Auschwitz on a previous visit to the “occupied territories.” Once more he repeated that Israelis were committing crimes “comparable to Auschwitz” while endlessly scratching their own wounds, to show them off to the world “as if it were a banner.”¹³⁰

The Case of Italy

As for Italians, whether Catholic or Communist, they have shown in recent years little tolerance, understanding, or sympathy for those Israeli Jews who are neither ostentatiously humble nor weak, but determined to defend themselves from terrorist attacks. In that sense, Italy, although its current government is allied with America and has proven particularly sensitive to Israel’s predicament, is not much different from the rest of Europe. One can find the same neo-anti-Semitism disguised as anti-Zionism among its leftist intellectuals, who frequently attack Israel as an arrogant, war-mongering nation imbued with “racial superiority” and a religious sense of chosenness.¹³¹

Thus, for Barbara Spinelli, it is a scandal that Israel asserts Biblical rights “which are often meta-historical” in its claims to the land. Writing in *La Stampa* in October 2001, she sharply attacked the religion of Moses and its sacred texts for inflicting suffering on the Palestinians—as if this were the primary ground for Israel’s right to

national self-determination.¹³² She falsely presented Judaism as a dogmatic faith immune to philosophical or theological doubt; she also asserted that Jewry owed an acknowledgment of guilt to the Palestinians and to Islam in general. Worse still, she accused Italian Jews of dual loyalty, questioning their ties to Israel, while suggesting that the Israelis themselves were subject to the “apocalyptic temptation” and secretly dreaming of a “second Holocaust.”¹³³

When a large group of professors from the University of Bologna recently addressed their “Jewish friends,” they chose to define the Jewish people as “a people who suffer, who must suffer because it is in their nature. Because of its fate, the Jewish people must bear the most terrible persecutions without raising a finger, and only then will the Jews gain compassion and solidarity.” Hence Italian Jews were invited by the Bologna professors to join them in condemning Israel, presumably to prove that they were “good Jews.” As Fiamma Nirenstein has suggested, this is a “progressive” vision that unpleasantly echoes ancient theological prejudices, according to which Jews are destined to suffer for having rejected the Christian faith. Only through denouncing the carnal particularism of Israel “in the flesh,” in favor of the universalism of Christian love (“Israel in the spirit”) can Jews be redeemed.¹³⁴

Despite such hostility from intellectuals and the powerful anti-globalist tendencies on the left (anti-American, pro-Arab, and unequivocally anti-Zionist), the level of anti-Semitic violence in Italy has remained low.¹³⁵ The rise in Judeophobia has found expression primarily in media commentary, books, articles, on the Internet, at demonstrations, and in remarks by public figures.¹³⁶

The Situation in Belgium

In Belgium, on the other hand, a country that in the past was considered to have particularly close ties with Israel, the number of anti-Jewish incidents has grown since 2000, reaching a level unprecedented since World War II. This clearly correlates with the general anti-Israel atmosphere and the unbalanced Belgian editorializing—in the media as well as in political life—concerning the Middle East. The well-

organized Jewish community (whose Jewish schools, supported in part with government funds, have the largest percentage of Jewish youngsters attending of any country in Europe) has responded with demonstrations, op-eds in the newspapers, and radio and television spots.

The rapidly growing Muslim population (chiefly of North African origin) has been the main source of aggression against individual Jews, Jewish property, and synagogues. Significantly, it was in Antwerp in 2000 that the Arab European League (AEL), a group known for its militant anti-Zionism, was created.¹³⁷ According to its leader Dyab Abou Jahjah, a Lebanese-born Muslim, since “Antwerp is the bastion of Zionism ... this city has to become the Mecca of the pro-Palestinian movement.”¹³⁸ At an AEL demonstration on April 3, 2002, participants shouted “Death to the Jews,” and young Muslims descended on the Jewish quarter of Antwerp, smashing many shop windows belonging to diamond merchants. Periodic violence against Jews continued throughout 2003 and the early months of 2004, though it has not yet led to any fatalities.

Anti-Semitism is not, however, confined to Islamist groups alone. The far-right Vlaams Blok, which controls one-third of the votes in the city of Antwerp and is the leading party in the province, has long had links with small neofascist and anti-Semitic groups. A Vlaams Blok activist, Oswald Kielemoes, called for “throwing off the Jewish yoke,” in an article in *Dietsland-Europa* in January 2003. Other VB leaders, however, courted the Antwerp Jewish community vote in the May 2003 elections and have joined them in opposing the AEL.¹³⁹

There is also the traditionalist Catholic opposition to Judaism (Flemish and Francophone), which has taken on a more fashionable mode in recent years through the anti-Zionism of the neo-Christian humanitarian movements. Similarly, the radical antiglobalist left (as elsewhere in Europe) is militantly anti-Israel as well as anti-American. Even the francophone Socialist Party (PS) has become increasingly hostile to Israel, choosing to co-opt a fanatical anti-Zionist to the senate.¹⁴⁰ To understand such choices, one needs to know that two-thirds of Brussels Socialist Party municipal councilors are of Muslim North African background—as are 10 percent of the residents of the entire

Brussels region. This is an unprecedentedly high percentage in Europe and largely explains not only the Socialist stance, but also that of the francophone Liberal Party and its leader, Foreign Minister Louis Michel. Anti-Sharon hysteria in Belgium was allowed free rein for electoral reasons, until American pressure began to make itself felt. This anti-Zionist consensus, as in other parts of the European Union, has served multiple purposes. It has permitted the liberation of traditional anti-Jewish stereotypes (religious or secular, right or left-wing) under a respectable cover; it helps some Belgians to feel better about their ugly legacy of colonial guilt; moreover, it has provided a relatively cheap and painless platform for highly selective moral posturing in the name of “human rights.”¹⁴¹

Europe's Holocaust Legacy

Europe has a deeper problem with Israel, deriving from the demons of its own dark past, the legacy bequeathed by the Holocaust.¹⁴² It is as if contemporary Europeans can only accept Jews who reflect the long diasporic tradition of military-political powerlessness. Robust measures of self-defense against terror are distorted to suggest that Israelis have sold their birthright of “prophetic justice” for the arrogance of power, exaggerated national pride, and blind reliance on military might.

Anti-Zionists have in recent years increasingly manipulated the Holocaust as a propaganda weapon against the Jewish state, to demonstrate that Jews are as bad as their former murderers. Branding Israel with the Nazi swastika is not, however, a criticism, but an act of pure defamation. A classic example of this genre can be found in a caricature in *Ethnos* (April 7, 2002), a major center-left, pro-government Greek newspaper, showing two Israeli soldiers in the disputed territories: One says to the other: “Don't feel guilty, my brother! We were not in Auschwitz and Dachau to suffer but to learn.”¹⁴³ The Nazi-like soldiers with the Star of David on their helmets are shown ruthlessly knifing Palestinians.

This constant borrowing of vocabulary, images, and analogies from the Shoah to pillory Israel has indeed become a European specialty in recent years. The swastika has steadily turned into a new yel-

low star to pin on the Jews, as in the viciously satirical poem, “The Free-Thinker,” by a certain Rodolphus, which appeared in 2002 in the popular Flemish *P-Magazine*.¹⁴⁴ The lyrics contain all the core themes of the new Judeophobia, from revulsion toward the Jewish religion and the implacable Mr. Sharon, to familiar accusations of “Jewish racism”—all in the name of human rights. The poem concludes by rejoicing that Europe is slowly but surely liberating itself from the “penitence” inflicted on it after World War II.

At bottom it's bizarre that it took so long
for the world to comprehend
that one genocide does not justify another
yet another monument, museum or memorial
erected under the pressure of the industrialists of the Holocaust
will not make any difference
To dance on the graves of the ancestors
Is in any case indecent.¹⁴⁵

It is indeed a striking and terrible paradox that anti-Semitism has never seemed so potent in Europe since 1945, despite the broader public awareness of the Holocaust. Dead Jews, it would seem, can do no wrong. But living Jews in Israel, bent on ensuring their survival, are another matter entirely. At an Oslo march in observance of Kristallnacht in November 2004, for example, Norwegian Jews were excluded for carrying Israeli flags or other Jewish symbols.¹⁴⁶

Countries such as Sweden, which leads the world in innovative Holocaust education, are peculiarly relentless in their moralistic hectoring of Israel. The Swedish foreign minister, Laila Freivalds, exploited a recent visit to Yad Vashem to downplay anti-Semitism in her own country and to lecture her hosts on the need to accept “criticism”; this, after having publicly compared the behavior of Israelis toward Palestinians with that of the Nazis toward the Jews.¹⁴⁷ The Swedish foreign minister is, however, only one of many European politicians who confuse “criticism” with “demonization” of Israel as if it were a fascist state. Such gross exaggerations are made still worse by the refusal to criticize far more horrific actions by Arabs and Palestinians.¹⁴⁸

European elites have been remarkably slow to grasp the ways in which the methods, defamation techniques, and the vocabulary of

anti-Israeli critics today follow a classic pattern of anti-Semitism. They fail to see that the myths of Jews as “warmongers” and of “Jewish cabals” or alleged Jewish control of America are pure anti-Semitism. Many do not yet grasp that the defamatory image of Israel itself as an oppressive “criminal” state in its essence is a modern blood libel masquerading as legitimate criticism.¹⁴⁹ There has, in fact, been a stunning obtuseness and refusal to recognize that the radical negation of Israel has liberated an increasingly anti-Semitic discourse, one which displaces the cause of all the world's troubles onto the shoulders of the Jewish state—“nazifying” it, while simultaneously trivializing the Shoah.¹⁵⁰

Former European imperialists—whether in Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Holland, Belgium, Germany, Austria, or Italy—prefer to denounce Israeli “colonialism” rather than to deal with their own very real colonial crimes, their own dismal record of collaboration in the Holocaust, or their failure to respond to postwar tragedies, such as in Rwanda, Sudan, Tibet, and Chechnya. Once more, so it would appear, Jews exist to fulfill their time-honored role of serving as a projection screen for repressed European guilt.

The severity of the anti-Jewish verbal violence in contemporary Europe seems to some reminiscent of the 1930s. Nevertheless, some important differences should also be noted. There is today no single center or directing hand for worldwide anti-Semitic propaganda, such as once existed in Nazi Germany or even in the USSR during the 1970s and 1980s. Anti-Semitism today, except for the Muslim Arab world (where it is potentially genocidal), does not have the power of the state and a totalitarian propaganda apparatus behind it. There is no formal anti-Semitic legislation on the horizon in Europe or North America; there are no official anti-Semitic parties or powerful pressure groups seeking to discriminate against Jews, to segregate, or to expel them from the country. Anti-Semitism today is constantly monitored, surveyed, and analyzed at international gatherings and conferences, such as the OSCE conferences mentioned above, which help to raise public awareness of the issue.

Jews themselves are far better equipped and prepared to face the challenge than they were sixty years ago. They have learned at least a

few lessons from the past, though some skepticism is still in order. They have in the State of Israel a powerful shield and refuge, even if the existence and vitality of the Jewish state undeniably serves as a catalyst for the new-style anti-Semitism. Jews can also rely on crucial support from the United States government, American Jewish organizations, and from some European leaders and antiracist organizations.

Conclusion

Despite these positive aspects, there are many dark areas—which we have elaborated—that cannot be ignored. Moreover, the new-style anti-Semitism is far more global than it has ever been in the past, as a result of rapid information systems such as the Internet. Electronic communications greatly amplify the audience that receives bigoted or anti-Semitic messages. In the global village, the dissemination of disinformation—including anti-Semitism—is instantaneous. The wildest myths can proliferate unchecked and uncontrolled in cyberspace, reaching literally millions of gullible people. This is what happened in the case of the mendacious allegation that no Jews turned up for work at the World Trade Center on 9/11. This falsehood was then taken as proof of a Mossad “conspiracy” to frame Muslims—in order to drive a wedge between America and Islam.

Cyberspace also makes it much easier for groups, proscribed by law, to effectively circumvent existing legislation against anti-Semitism or Holocaust denial in certain European countries. In France and Germany, the Internet has made the tough antiracist laws much less effective than they might otherwise have been.

But there are deeper reasons why European governments are finding it rather difficult to put the anti-Semitic genie back into the bottle. For instance, as pointed out earlier, the trigger for the “Jewish Question” is no longer indigenous reactions to Jewish immigration, disproportionate numbers of Jews in certain occupations, fear of emancipation, acculturation, or assimilation. Anti-Semitism is much less focused than before on the local Jewish community or the equal status of Jews within the nation-state. Jews in Europe are perceived by the new anti-Semites as a *global abstraction*, with distant power centers

in the United States and Israel—both of which have been denounced as “rogue states” by large numbers of Europeans. The negative image of the Jew has mutated, so that many, especially on the left, now project onto Israel their fear and loathing of those whom they wish to brand as “fascists,” “warmongers,” “racists,” “child-killers,” or “conspiring cabalists.” In all these areas, Israel serves both as a surrogate for anti-Americanism and as a punching bag in its own right.

The current wave of globalized anti-Semitism that erupted at the beginning of the twenty-first century is fundamentally about Israel. Its focus is on the Middle East, and it is driven by a radicalized Islam. But it is also many-sided, polyvalent, and remains as protean as the diaspora itself. It thrives on the irresolvable indeterminacy surrounding Jewish identity and the complex relationship between Israel and diaspora Jews in the modern age. The distorted myths and fantasies concerning “Jewish power” are, in part, nourished by these virtual-reality elements in Jewish identity itself and by the lack of clear borders for the State of Israel.¹⁵¹

But the anti-Semitic demons are not a Jewish creation. They are, above all, nourished by the threats that globalization (often a synonym for “Americanization”), secularism, and multiculturalism continue to pose for more traditional religious and national identities. On the conservative right and in the Muslim world, in particular, conspiracy theories traditionally regarded the Jews as the subversive pacesetters of transversal disintegrative forces associated with both capitalism and communism. But today, it is the left, especially in Europe, that is leading the assault on Israel and the Jews as capitalist predators and imperialist dynamos in a globalizing world. This is the point where the jihadists, the antiglobalist left, and the far right can join hands as uneasy allies.

The new post-2000 Europe, with a few exceptions, is in the process of shedding its last taboos concerning the Jews. The barriers have been lifted, and images of good and evil are being inverted. Israel is currently denounced in the name of humanism and universal brotherhood; its detractors claim to be standing up against the fallen idols of power politics, empire, nationalism, and military prowess from an earlier era.¹⁵² It is, paradoxically, in the act of repudiating the worst

features of their own past that Europeans now sit in judgment on America, the Jews, and Israel. In celebrating its own multicultural, pluralist, and postnational liberation (more evident in theory than in practice), Europe deplores what it brands as the uniquely tribal and aggressive “arrogance” of the Jewish nation-state, while turning a blind eye to all the dark stains on the record of Palestinian nationalism, ignoring the pathologies of the Arab world, and downplaying the lethal threat of a radically unhinged Islam. In the new Manichean vision born out of “antiracism,” Jewish victims have mutated into “executioners”; the right to self-defense is turned into an act of “imperial” expansionism, while the existence of a Jewish state itself becomes a questionable manifestation of exclusivity and “racist” particularism.

This is the ideology of the new anti-Semitism that operates with a good conscience. But the reality is completely different. We are at the end of an era in which the Jews of Europe can assume that their peace, security, and well-being will be protected from predatory anti-Semitism by the shadow of the Holocaust.

Notes

1. Oriana Fallaci, “Sull’antisemitismo” (On Anti-Semitism), *Panorama*, April 18, 2002, translated from the original Italian by David A. Harris, in *In the Trenches: Selected Speeches and Writings of an American Jewish Activist*, Vol. 3, 2002-2003 (Jersey City, NJ: KTAV, 2004), p. 361.

2. David Hyde, “Europe’s Other Red-Green Alliance,” <http://www.zeek.net/politics>, April 2003. Also Andrew Stuttaford, “As Rome Starts to Smoulder,” *National Review*, Dec. 9, 2003.

3. See Andrei S. Markovits, “Der Salonfähige Antisemitismus,” *Die Tageszeitung*, May 11, 2002, and Günther Jacob, “Israel ist unser Unglück. Anti-Israelismus nach dem 11 September,” *Konkret*, Nr., Aug. 8, 2002, for aspects of this syndrome.

4. See Analytical Report, Flash Eurobarometer 151, “Iraq and Peace in the World,” Nov. 2003, Survey ordered by the European Commission, <http://www.politik.uni-mainz.de/kai.arzheimer/Lehre-Eurobarometer/fb151-in-the-news.html>. Also *Deutsche Welle*, Nov. 4, 2003; BBC News, Nov. 3, 2003; and the *International Herald Tribune*, Nov. 2003, which quotes Italy’s foreign minister as saying that the poll presented a “superficial image of a complex phenomenon.” Particularly shocking was the finding that 66

percent of Europeans who had studied beyond the age of twenty described Israel as a threat.

5. Melanie Phillips, “The Chosen Person,” *Ha’aretz*, Nov. 7, 2003.

6. *Independent*, Nov. 13, 2003, online discussion group on “Add Israel to the axis of evil.” The majority of discussants seemed to agree that Israel’s government is “lawless,” “racist,” “colonialist,” “illegally occupying Palestine,” “bloodthirsty,” and parasitically dependent on the U.S.

7. See Caroline B. Glick, “The European Solution,” *Jerusalem Post*, Nov. 14, 2003.

8. Quoted in “The Shadow Men,” *Economist*, April 24, 2003, http://www.economist.com/world/na/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=1731327.

9. Robert Kagan, “Politicians with Guts,” *Washington Post*, Jan. 31, 2003; quoted in *ibid.*

10. *Economist*, *ibid.* It should be said that in the United States itself, some of the mainstream media have been treating the FBI investigation into AIPAC as if there were a “Jewish conspiracy” at the heart of the U.S. government. See Shmuley Boteach, “American Mossad,” *Jerusalem Post*, Sept. 9, 2004.

11. It is also in France that the convergence of left and right extremes against the common Zionist-American enemy is especially visible. On the far right, Jean-Marie Le Pen attacks global capitalism and B’nai B’rith, while José Bove, leader of the antiglobalist left, insists that attacks on French synagogues were orchestrated by the Mossad. See Yossi Klein Halevi, “Hatreds Entwined,” *Azure* 16 (Winter 2004): 25-31.

12. See *Les Antifeujs, Le livre blanc des violences antisémites en France depuis Septembre 2000* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 2001); *Le conflit israélo-palestinien. Les médias français sont-ils objectifs?* (Paris: Observatoire du monde juif, Dossiers et documents, 2002); Gilles William Goldnadel, *Le nouveau Bréviaire de la Haine. Antisemitisme et Antizionisme* (Paris: Éditions Ramsay, 2001); Raphaël Draï, *Sous le signe de Sion. L’antisemitisme nouveau est arrivé* (Paris: Éditions Machalon, 2001). Also Guy Konopnicki, *La Faute des Juifs* (Paris: Éditions Balland, 2002), and Shmuel Trigano, *L’Ébranlement d’Israël* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2002).

13. See the *Jerusalem Post*, July 19, 20, 21, and 22, 2004, especially the editorial “French *Hutzpa*,” July 21, 2004. For the French view, see *Le Monde*, July 19, 2004, “L’appel de Sharon aux juifs de France soulève l’indignation” and its editorial of July 20, 2004, “Sharon et la France.” In 2003, 2,313 French immigrants went to Israel and 2,566 the previous year—double the numbers before 2000.

14. *Jerusalem Post*, Aug. 23, 2004. All these actions were sharply condemned by President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raf-

farin. Speaking on the sixtieth anniversary of the major round-up of French Jews for annihilation during World War II, Raffarin said, "There is no room for anti-Semitism, racism and xenophobia. The head of state and the government have taken, and will take, all necessary measures to put a stop to these attacks, which are an insult to our country." But there have been few arrests or criminal prosecutions.

15. See "Antisémitisme 2004: La poussée de fièvre," *Le Droit de Vivre* 6 (June 2004).

16. See Shmuel Trigano, "The Perverse Logic of French Politics," *Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints* 479 (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, June 2, 2002). Trigano observes that "Islam cannot distinguish between religion and politics. It does not have a tradition or a psychology of being a minority."

17. Marie Benner, "France's Secret Letter," *Vanity Fair* (June 2003); also reproduced in Ron Rosenbaum, ed., *Those Who Forget the Past: The Question of Anti-Semitism* (New York: Random House, 2004), pp. 214-49.

18. "French Official: Attacks on Jews Tripled since Start of Year," *Ha'aretz*, Aug. 29, 2004. De Villepin noted that Christian and Muslim cemeteries had been desecrated as well as Jewish ones, although he did not give figures. He also added that "Islamophobic acts have multiplied dangerously."

19. Elaine Sciolino, "A New French Headache: When Is Hate on TV Illegal?" *New York Times*, Dec. 9, 2004, section A, p. 3.

20. See Robert S. Wistrich, *Muslim Anti-Semitism: A Clear and Present Danger* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 2002) for the highly toxic nature of Judeophobia in the Middle East. For the insidious infiltration of a pro-Islamic, anti-Israel, and anti-Jewish discourse into the framework of the Euro-Arab dialogue, see Bat Ye'or, "Le dialogue euro-arabe et la naissance d'Eurabia," *Observatoire du Monde Juif* 4/5 (Dec. 2002).

21. Pierre-André Taguieff, *La nouvelle Judéophobie* (Paris: Mille et Une Nuits, Fayard, 2002) gives a useful account of current Islamist conspiracy theories.

22. "Muslims, Neo-Nazis not to Blame for French Anti-Semitism," *Jerusalem Post*, Oct. 20, 2004.

23. See Alvin H. Rosenfeld, *Anti-Americanism and Anti-Semitism: A New Frontier of Bigotry* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 2003). For German anti-Americanism and its connection with anti-Semitism, see also Dan Diner, *America in the Eyes of the Germans: An Essay on Anti-Americanism* (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996). For a contemporary cultural perspective from Britain, see Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies, *Why Do People Hate America?* (London: Icon Books, 2002).

24. Colin Brown and Chris Hastings, "Brit MP Dalyell Attacks Bush

and Blair's 'Jewish Cabal,'" *Telegraph*, May 3, 2003. See also Alvin H. Rosenfeld, *Anti-Zionism in Great Britain and Beyond: A "Respectable" Anti-Semitism?* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 2004), pp. 23-5.

25. For an overview, see Robert S. Wistrich, *Antisemitism in the New Europe* (Oxford: Oxford Centre for Hebrew and Jewish Studies, 1994) and the volume which I edited for the Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, entitled *Demonizing the Other: Antisemitism: Racism and Xenophobia* (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999).

26. See <http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/asw99-2000/switzerland.htm>.

27. "Trübsaal in der Zwischenwelt," *Der Spiegel* 39, Sept. 20, 2004, pp. 44-60; "Germany's Far Right Gains Strength," *Jerusalem Post*, Sept. 21, 2004.

28. See, for example, Sean Hawkey, "A Young Couple Is Stopped on the Road to Bethlehem," *Church Times* (the organ of the Anglican Church in Great Britain), Dec. 16, 2002.

29. Konopnicki, *La Faute des Juifs*, p. 168. See also Trigano, *La démission de la République*, pp. 1-18, and Emmanuel Brenner, *Les territoires perdus de la République. Antisémitisme, racisme et sexisme en milieu scolaire* (Paris: Mille et Une Nuits, 2004), pp. 325-56.

30. Robert S. Wistrich, "Waging War on Judeophobes," *Ha'aretz* (Aug. 2003). See also Gilles William Goldnadel, *Le Nouveau Bréviaire de la Haine: Antisémitisme et antisionisme* (Paris: Éditions Ramsay, 2001).

31. See Georges-Elia Sarfati, *L'Antisionisme: Israël/Palestine aux miroirs d'Occident* (Paris: Berg International, 2002), pp. 20-22. Also see Mark Strauss, "Antiglobalism's Jewish Problem," in Rosenbaum, ed., *Those Who Forget the Past*, pp. 271-87, which is particularly good on left-wing conspiracy theories attacking Israel and Jews.

32. See Robert S. Wistrich, *Hitler's Apocalypse: Jews and the Nazi Legacy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), a book that anticipated many of these developments in the wake of the 1982 Lebanon War. Also see Sarfati, *L'Antisionisme*, pp. 38-9.

33. See Eliahu Salpeter, "Israel Is Bad for the Jews," *Ha'aretz*, Nov. 6, 2003; Akiva Eldar, "With Friends like These," *Ha'aretz*, Oct. 27, 2003, and "From Refuge to Jews to Danger for Jews," *ibid.*, Nov. 3, 2003.

34. Pascal Boniface, *Est-il permis de critiquer Israël?* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2003). Boniface had invited the French Socialist Party, before the last general elections in France, to adopt a markedly pro-Palestinian line to win the increasingly important Muslim vote. His book claims that Judeophobia in France has been vastly exaggerated by "pro-Sharon Zionists." See also *Antisémitisme: l'intolérable chantage* (Paris: Éditions la Découverte, 2003), a collaborative work that denounces the French Jewish community and pro-

Israel Jewish intellectuals for inventing an “intolerable blackmail” around the new Judeophobia to justify Sharon’s “suicidal” colonialist policies. Many of the contributors to this hysterical attack against the idea that there is a new anti-Semitism are themselves Jewish.

35. Quoted in the *New Statesman*, July 15, 2000.

36. Peter Beaumont, “Are We Anti-Semitic?” *Observer*, Feb. 12, 2002.

37. Robert Fisk, “How to Shut up Your Critics with a Single Word,” *Independent*, Oct. 21, 2002. Fisk’s record of systematic defamation regarding Israel is such that one wonders on what moral basis he expects any compassion from his critics.

38. Seumas Milne, “This Slur of Anti-Semitism Is Used to Defend Repression,” *Guardian*, May 9, 2002.

39. Ibid. Also Beaumont, “Are We Anti-Semitic?” and Ian Mayer, “Balancing Act,” *Guardian*, May 25, 2002, which speaks of the “blackmail of making one feel ashamed to criticize Israeli actions” and the “orchestrated pressure to equate any criticism of Israeli government action with anti-Semitism.”

40. Jonathan Freedland, “Is Anti-Zionism Antisemitism?” in Paul Iganski and Barry Kosmin, eds., *A New Antisemitism? Debating Judeophobia in 21st-Century Britain* (London: Profile Books, 2003), pp. 113-29.

41. Ibid., pp. 119-20.

42. The *New Statesman* admitted as much in an apologetic editorial. See *ibid.*, p. 119.

43. Ibid., p. 96.

44. See Georg Christoph and Berger Waldenegg, “Antisemitismus: Eine gefährliche Vokabel? Zur Diagnose eines Begriffs,” in *Jahrbuch für Antisemitismus-Forschung* 9 (Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, 2000), pp. 108-26.

45. For parallels between the use of boycotts against Jews in the past and the current anti-Israel campaign, see Manfred Gerstenfeld, “The Academic Boycott against Israel,” *Jewish Political Studies Review* 15: 3-4 (Fall 2003): 9-70.

46. For a broader discussion, see Robert S. Wistrich, *Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred* (New York: Schocken, 1992) and *Hitler and the Holocaust* (New York: Random House, 2002).

47. Alain Finkielkraut, “In the Name of the Other: Reflections on the Coming Anti-Semitism,” *Azure* 18 (Autumn 2004): 21-33, points out that Hitler gave racist anti-Semitism a bad name in postwar Europe, but new forms have appeared that castigate Israel in the name of the Palestinian “other.”

48. An opinion poll published in July 2003 by *Die Zeit* found that 19 percent of Germans believe that the American government ordered 9/11.

This belief is more prevalent among Germans from the former German Democratic Republic (29 percent) than among those in the West (16 percent). See <http://www.broeckers.com/GuardianWeekly.htm>.

49. See “Panoptikum des Absurden,” *Der Spiegel* 37/2003. This reportage demolishes the conspiracy theories of best-selling German authors like Gerhard Wisniewski (“Operation 9/11—An Attack on the Globe”), Mathias Bröckers, and former German cabinet minister Andreas von Bülow (“The CIA and September 11th”), who believe George W. Bush capable of any dastardly deed and insinuate an Israeli/Jewish connection.

50. See Pierre-André Taguieff, *Les Protocoles des Sages de Sion* (Paris: Berg International, 1992), 2 volumes.

51. See Taguieff, “Néo-pacifisme, nouvelle judéophobie et mythe du complot” in Pierre Rigoulot and Michel Taubman, eds., *Irak An 1: Un autre regard sur un monde en guerre* (Paris: Editions du Rocher, 2004), pp. 10-33, for the revival of the notion of a “Jewish war” to describe the “American-Zionist aggression” in Iraq. This myth is also gaining credence in the United States. See Norman Podhoretz, “World War IV: How It Started, What It Means, and Why We Have to Win,” *Commentary* (Sept. 2004): 331-45.

52. See the special issue of *Observatoire du monde juif* 6/7 (Juin 2003) “Les Chrétiens et le conflit proche oriental.” The articles by Bat Ye’or, “La ‘compassion’ assassine,” pp. 14-18, and by Eli Assouline on the Palestinian priest Rafiq Khoury, examine the theological implications of the present situation in the Holy Land. For examples from the Anglican Church in Britain, see Rosenfeld, *Anti-Zionism in Great Britain*, pp. 14-15.

53. Shmuel Trigano, “Le massacre des Saints Innocents dans les lieux de la Nativité,” in *Observatoire* (June 2003), pp. 2-5.

54. See Judith Elizur, “How David Became Goliath: The Demonization of Israel’s Image, 1948-2003,” in Robert S. Wistrich, ed., *Antisemitism International* (Jerusalem: Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, The Hebrew University, Nov. 2003), pp. 41-45.

55. Ibid., p. 41. The image in *La Stampa*, drawn by Giorgio Farattini, is reproduced in Joël and Dan Kotek, *Au nom de l’antisionisme: L’image des Juifs et d’Israël dans la caricature depuis la seconde Intifada* (Paris: Éditions Complexe, 2003), p. 111.

56. Kotek, *ibid.*, p. 108. The caricature by Willem provoked a sharp response from the Israeli ambassador to France, Eli Barnavi, in *Libération*, Dec. 29, 2002. Certainly, he wrote, one had every right to criticize Sharon and his government for preventing Arafat from celebrating Mass in Bethlehem, but why the cross, unless the blasphemous intention was to present the Palestinian leader as a “new Christ?”

57. *Aftonbladet*, April 1, 2002.

58. *Expressen*, Oct. 13, 2000, March 26, 2002. My thanks to Henrik

Bachner for these Swedish references, provided at the Vidal Sassoon International Conference in Jerusalem on "Antisemitism and Prejudice in the Media" (Feb. 2003).

59. On Abbé Pierre, see Nicolas Weill, *Une histoire personnelle de l'antisémitisme* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2003), pp. 98-101, 105-13, 119-22.

60. For Garaudy's radical anti-Zionism and its connection to Holocaust denial in France, see Jacques Tarnero, "Le Négationnisme, ou le symptôme des Temps Pervers: Une énigme récurrente: Le Signe antijuif," in *Revue d'Histoire de la Shoah* 166 (Mai-Août 1999): 44-75.

61. *Guardian*, October 24, 2001. On May 25, 2002, the *Guardian* referred in quasi-theological language to the "blindness" of Jews. See also the report by the Reverend Lucy Winkett (minor canon at St. Paul's Cathedral) which appeared in the *Guardian*, Feb. 14, 2002, entitled "I Watched a Soldier Shoot at Children." The article contrasts dignified, suffering Palestinians with a "brutalized army that regularly shoots at children."

62. Robert Fisk, "Travels in a Land without Hope," *Independent*, Aug. 29, 2002.

63. The *Church Times* (April 26, 2002) gave a platform to Archbishop Desmond Tutu to warn that Israel might "exterminate the Palestinians" and to accuse it of apartheid. My thanks to Dr. Margaret Brearley for bringing this article to my attention.

64. *Ibid.*, Dec. 13, 2002.

65. *Ibid.*, Jan. 24, 2003. Spencer wrote that the Holocaust is instrumentalized in Israel "as a means by which anything is justified"—a wildly misleading statement.

66. The Easter cover story in the *Tablet*, April 6, 2002, "Weep for Jerusalem" quotes the Latin Patriarch Michel Sabbah, whose anti-Israel vitriol is driven by an ardent Palestinian nationalism grafted onto traditional Catholic theology. See also the issues of April 13 and 20, 2002.

67. Margaret Brearley, "Bifocal Vision: Israel and the Intifada in the British Press," in Wistrich, *Antisemitism International*, Nov. 2003, p. 47-53.

68. Paul Valley, "Faith and Reason," *Independent*, Nov. 24, 2001.

69. Melanie Phillips, "Christian Theology and the New Antisemitism," in Iganski and Kosmin, eds., *A New Antisemitism?*, pp. 192-212.

70. The most influential Anglican British source of this new replacement theology is the Palestinian canon Naim Ateek, whose book *Justice and Only Justice: A Palestinian Theology of Liberation* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1989) brands Zionism as a "primitive" retrogression. Ateek argues that Judaism needs no state and that Israel's treatment of Palestinians constitutes the "real anti-Semitism."

71. "Clergyman Defends Mural Showing Jesus and the IDF," *Jerusalem Post*, April 7, 2002. The Rev. John Armes, a Scottish clergyman at

St. John's Episcopal Church in Edinburgh, unveiled a mural painting at Easter, showing Jesus dead in his mother's arms, surrounded by Roman soldiers and Israeli occupation troops.

72. "A Canterbury Tale," *Jerusalem Post*, March 5, 2003.

73. On the BBC as a "fertile seedbed for the return of 'respectable' antisemitism," see Douglas Davis, "Hatred in the Air: The BBC, Israel, and Antisemitism," in Iganski and Kosmin, eds., *A New Antisemitism?* pp. 130-47.

74. Phillips, "Christian Theology," p. 211. See also "Christians who Hate Jews," *Spectator*, Feb. 16, 2002, by the same author.

75. Tom Gross, "Jeningrad: What the British Media Said," in *National Review*, May 13, 2002.

76. Winston Pickett, "Nasty or Nazi? The Use of Antisemitic Topoi by the Left-Liberal Media," in Iganski and Kosmin, eds., *A New Antisemitism?*, pp. 155-7. In the same volume Howard Jacobson pointedly replies to Paulin, "Gas chambers, euthanasia, experiments on 'degenerates,' human soap factories: does he accuse Zionists of those?" *ibid.*, p. 104.

77. "Oxford poet 'wants U.S. Jews,'" *Daily Telegraph*, April 13, 2002.

78. See *Al Ahram Weekly Online*, April 4-10, 2002, where Paulin states, "I never believed that Israel had the right to exist at all."

79. Pickett, "Nasty or Nazi?," pp. 156-7.

80. Daniel Goldhagen, "The Globalization of Anti-Semitism," *Forward* (New York), May 2, 2003.

81. See Daniel Perdurant, *Antisemitism in Contemporary Greek Society* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, 1995), pp. 8-12. The State of Israel was recognized only de jure by the Greek government in 1990.

82. See <http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/asw2002-3/greece.htm>, Nov. 28, 2003. For the previous year, see also the report on anti-Semitism in Greece by the Greek Helsinki Monitor Minority Rights Group, http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/bhr/english/organizations/ghm_mrgg.antisemitism2002.rtf.

83. See *Antisemitism Worldwide 2003/4*, p. 7, <http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/asw2003-4/generalanalysis.htm>.

84. Herb Keiron, "Greece Repudiates Theodorakis's Anti-Semitism," *Jerusalem Post*, Nov. 14, 2003, p. 5.

85. "A Poisonous Tune Is Playing Again," *Ha'aretz*, Aug. 31, 2004 (editorial).

86. Ari Shavit, "The Jewish Problem According to Theodorakis," *Ha'aretz*, Aug. 27, 2004.

87. *Ibid.*

88. *Ibid.* Theodorakis, like Saramago, uses psychopathological lan-

guage to describe the Jewish “pretense” at victimhood.

89. Ibid. Osama bin Laden was virtually dismissed in this interview as an American agent, while Al Qaeda received no more than a contemptuous passing reference. The Islamic factor simply does not exist for Theodorakis.

90. See *Ha'aretz*, editorial, Aug. 31, 2004, which pointed to Theodorakis's “difficulty in accepting the fact that the Jews living in the diaspora are loyal both to the environment in which they live and to their separate heritage.”

91. See *Studie zum Antisemitismus in Deutschland* (Berlin: Forsa-Studie, 1998) which confirmed six years ago that one in five Germans was latently anti-Semitic.

92. Juliane Wetzels, “Die internationale Rechte und der arabische Antizionismus in World Wide Web,” *Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung* 12 (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2003), pp. 121-44.

93. Quoted in Alvin H. Rosenfeld, “*Feeling Alone, Again*”: *The Growing Uneasy among Germany's Jews* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 2002), p. 5. See also “Antizionismus und Antisemitismus,” *Tribune* (2001) 40 Jg., Heft 157, pp. 116-21, for an interview with Paul Spiegel.

94. See Walter Laqueur, “1948-2003: Some Reflections,” *Partisan Review* 2 (Boston, 2003): 305-16. For Mahler's views, see *NPD-Stellungnahme im Verbotsverfahren vor dem BVerfG vom 20. April 2001*. (The BVerfG is the Federal Constitutional Court.) More recent statements by Mahler on the American-Jewish-Israeli conspiracy to destroy Germany can be found in the 2003 report of the German monitoring group Organization for the Protection of the Constitution entitled *Die Bedeutung des Antisemitismus in aktuellen deutschen Rechtsextremismus*.

95. William Safire, “The German Problem,” *New York Times*, Sept. 19, 2002. The following day, the *Times* reported that Schroeder's minister of justice, Herta Däubler-Gmelin, had compared Bush's tactics to Hitler's, the war in Iraq being simply an attempt to divert attention from domestic problems. For this indiscretion, the justice minister was fired.

96. See the report by Heiko Flottau, “Sperrgebiet,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ), April 3, 2002; also Susanne Knaul, “Raketen treffen Flüchtlingslager,” *Die Tageszeitung* (TAZ), April 9, 2002; Inge Günther, “Leben mit und über Toten,” *Frankfurter Rundschau*, April 18, 2002.

97. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 18, 2002; “Wo verhaüft die Grenze zum Terrorismus,” *FAZ*, May 7, 2002; Manfred Wüst, “Kann man mit Panzern den Terrorismus zerstören?” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, April 18, 2002.

98. Thorsten Schmitz, “Der Mut der Ängstlichen,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Aug. 30, 2001.

99. Heiko Flottau, “Das Gedächtnis eines Volkes wird eliminiert,”

Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 6, 2002.

100. Survey conducted by Prof. Elmar Brähler (University of Leipzig) and Prof. Horst-Eberhard Richter (Frankfurt am Main), *Politische Einstellungen in Deutschland*, June 14, 2002 (Frankfurt am Main: June 2002). Anti-American feelings were shared by 38 percent of all Germans—almost identical to the level of anti-Semitic sentiment. The antipathy toward Arabs was still higher, standing at 49 percent.

101. Jochen Siemens, “Die Quellen des globalen Terrors,” *Frankfurter Rundschau*, Sept. 20, 2001.

102. “Auge um Auge—der biblische Krieg,” *Der Spiegel*, April 8, 2002.

103. “Das Spiel mit dem Feuer,” *Der Spiegel*, 23/2002, pp. 22-38; “Ein Überdosis Politik: Der Fall Möllemann,” *Die Zeit*, 25/2003, June 12, 2003; also Christian Schlüter, “JMW geht. Der Antisemitismus bleibt,” *Frankfurter Rundschau*, Oct. 22, 2002.

104. Joschka Fischer, “Deutschland, deine Juden,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 11, 2002; see also http://www.germany-info.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_fischer_ME_2002_6.htm.

105. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 23, 2002. Möllemann claimed to have received 15,000 e-mails from Germans supporting his views. In his district of North-Rhine Westphalia he received a higher percentage of the vote than the FDP's average in the German national elections of September 2002. It should also be added that in April 2002, more Germans expressed sympathy for the Palestinians (26 percent) than for Israel (24 percent). See the Pew Foundation Survey Report, April 20, 2002.

106. Josef Joffe, “Trotzki und Tätervolk,” *Die Zeit*, Nov. 13, 2003.

107. “CDU vor Hohmann-Abstimmung, Proteste, Austritte und Gewaltandrohung,” *Der Spiegel* (online), Nov. 13, 2003. Ninety percent of the communications to the CDU central office were against expulsion.

108. Amiram Barkat, “More Germans Are Anti-Semitic than Meets the Eye,” *Ha'aretz*, April 19, 2004.

109. Research by Prof. Wolfgang Findte, head of the Communications Psychology Department at Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, cited in *ibid.* See also www.libertyforum.org/showflat.php?Number=1430110.

110. Elizabeth Brook, “What Sets Today's German Jews Apart,” *Jerusalem Post*, July 20, 2004.

111. “Some Israel Critics Are Anti-Semitic,” *Jewish Chronicle*, April 30, 2004.

112. “A Renewed Pledge to Combat Antisemitism,” *International Herald Tribune*, April 29, 2004.

113. This number is in dispute. The Spanish Jewish community claims a higher figure, while the *American Jewish Year Book 2003* (p. 604) puts the Jewish population of Spain at 12,000.

114. See Lawrence Wright, "The Terror Web," *New Yorker*, Aug. 2, 2004.

115. Gustavo D. Perednik, "Naïve Spanish Judeophobia," *Jewish Political Studies Review* 15:3-4 (Fall 2003): 87-110.

116. *European Attitudes towards the Jews: A Study of Five Countries* (New York: Anti-Defamation League, Sept. 2002). Thirty-four percent of all Spaniards, according to this poll, held anti-Jewish views. A parallel study of ten countries two years later found the Spanish figure down to 24 percent. See http://www.adl.org/PresRele/ASInt_13/4483_13.htm.

117. Ibid. In other European countries, the average was 56 percent.

118. See <http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/asw2002-3/Spain.htm>.

119. Quoted in David A. Harris, *Europe on Israel, 2000-2001: A Sampling of Images and Words* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 2001). It is significant that this collection of anti-Israel and Judeophobic caricatures contained more examples from Spain than from any other single European country.

120. Ibid., p. 11.

121. For a questionable defense of left-wing anti-Zionism against the charge of anti-Semitism, see Gonzalo Alvarez Chillida, *El Antisemitismo en España* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2002), pp. 465-66.

122. Hermann Tersch, "El Retorno de la judeofobia," *El País* (Madrid), May 4, 2003.

123. Alejandro Baer and Federico Zukierman, *Anti-Semitism in Graphic Humor—Caricatures and Vignettes of the Spanish Press about the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Madrid: Guesher, 2003), pp. 2-4.

124. Perednik, "Naïve Spanish Judeophobia," p. 100.

125. "The Name of the Problem Is Israel," *La Razón*, April 20, 2003.

126. *El País*, Jan. 27, 2003.

127. Pilar Rahola, address to the 97th Annual Meeting, American Jewish Committee (Washington, May 7, 2003).

128. Pilar Rahola, "Judeophobia Explains the Pro-Palestinian Hysteria of the European Left," *proche-orient.info* (Oct. 2, 2002), interview in French with Marc Tobiass, translated by David A. Harris in *In the Trenches, Vol. 3*, p. 370.

129. Quoted in Perednik, "Naïve Spanish Judeophobia," p. 101.

130. Quoted in Paul Berman, "Bigotry in Print: Crowds Chant Murder," *Forward*, May 24, 2002.

131. See Sergio I. Minerbi, "Neo Anti-Semitism in Today's Italy," *Jewish Political Studies Review* 15: 3-4 (Fall 2003): 111-39.

132. Barbara Spinelli, "Ebraismo senza mea culpa," *La Stampa*, Oct. 31, 2001.

133. Ibid.

134. Fiamma Nirenstein, *Gli Antisemiti Progressisti. La Forma Nuova di*

Un Odio Antico (Milan: Rizzoli, 2004). See also an interview with the author in the *Jerusalem Post*, Sept. 15, 2004.

135. There are approximately 30,000 Jews in Italy out of a population of 57 million. The Jewish population of France is twenty times larger. See <http://www.tau.ac.il/Antisemitism/asw2002-3/italy.htm>.

136. Ibid.

137. See <http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/asw2002-3/belgium.htm>. There are 35,000 Belgian Jews in a population of 10 million.

138. Ibid. The AEL opposes Arab integration into Belgian society, seeks to introduce Islamic law (*sharia*) into Europe "by democratic means," and demands that Arabic be recognized as the fourth official language of Belgium, after Flemish, French, and German.

139. See <http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/asw2003-4/belgium.htm>. On November 10, 2004, a Brussels high court ruled that Vlaams Blok had broken Belgian law in advocating the repatriation of non-European immigrants and was to be stripped of its state funding and television access, thus forcing it to disband. A few days later the party reorganized under the name Vlaams Belang. See http://www.jta.org/page_view_story.asp?intarticleid=14737&intcategoryid=2.

140. Ibid. The candidate was formerly the head of Oxfam, Belgium, and president of the Belgo-Palestinian Association.

141. Joël Kotek, *La Belgique et Ses Juifs: De l'Antijudaïsme comme Code Culturel, à l'anti-Sionisme Comme Religion Civique* (Paris: Les Etudes du Crif, Nr. 4, 2004), pp. 13-17. Anti-Zionism is, of course, the easiest way to win over a Muslim electorate with minimal effort.

142. Manfred Gerstenfeld, ed., *Europe's Crumbling Myths: The Post-Holocaust Origins of Today's Anti-Semitism* (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Public Affairs, 2003), pp. 10-82.

143. Joël and Dan Kotek, *Au nom de l'antisionisme*, p. 113.

144. *P-magazine* has a circulation of about 90,000 copies and was launched in December 1997. See Kotek, *La Belgique et Ses Juifs*, p. 22, for the French text of the poem, from which I have translated a few verses.

145. Ibid. The poet naturally denies that he is an anti-Semite; instead, he accuses Israel of "squeezing" the anti-Semitism it attributes to others, down to the last drop of blood, to cover its own crimes.

146. See <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/news.php3?id=71875>.

147. See Stephen Meisels, "To Be a Jew in Sweden," *Jerusalem Post*, June 9, 2004; also Ilya Mayer, "Whither the White Buses?" *ibid.*, June 18, 2004.

148. See Melanie Phillips, "Return of the Old Hatred," *Observer*, Feb. 22, 2004.

149. See Robert S. Wistrich, "Terrorism Targeting Jews Today Will Not Stop There," *Yediot Aharonot*, Nov. 19, 2003 (Hebrew).

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150. Kotek, *La Belgique et ses Juifs*, pp. 28-9, observes that this trend is all the stronger where local nationalists collaborated with the Nazis during World War II.

151. See the remarks of A.B. Yehoshua, "Setting Borders Will Chase Away the Demons," *Ha'aretz*, Pesach supplement, April 5, 2004, p. 33.

152. Alain Finkielkraut, *Au nom de l'Autre: Réflexions sur l'anti-sémitisme qui vient* (Paris: Gallimard, 2003), pp. 12-13.

