Treaties & Protocols
Historically treaties have come about due to catastrophic events.
Only after a catastrophe, it seems, does humanity come to its collective
senses and try to manage or contain new weapons. Rarely are we proactive
in anticipating bad outcomes.
World War I - the first of the continuing series - was such an event. In this war, for the
first time, chemical weapons were developed and applied on a mass scale.
The Germans were the pioneers here, leveraging their superior chemical industries
to create and use a number of novel chemical munitions. This granted them a
short-term advantage in a few early battles. However the allies
quickly responded to the new situation
and followed suit. Thus in a short time chemical weapons and chemical
defensive gear became ubiquitous on every front.
Concurrently the Germans also pioneered a new form of biological attack.
In a little-known episode, German agents attempted to spread glanders to
French and Russian horses. At this time the horse remained the key form of military
transport. Therefore the Germans hoped that a glanders epidemic could
seriously limit the mobility of opposing forces. For reasons that are
unclear, this attack largely failed.
Meanwhile the chemical weapons likewise had no real
impact on the outcome of the war, but they did
greatly increase the overall casualty rate for all sides. After the war
it didn't take a futurist to see which way the chlorine clouds were blowing. Technology
was granting mankind terrible new weapons of unparalleled destructiveness.
Should weapons such as this become a normal part of war, then war would
become an entirely more costly thing than in the past. And so, for this
and for other reasons, the Geneva Protocols of 1925 were signed.
Like the proverbial road to Hades, these protocols were paved with worthy rules
and good intentions. And they were quite forward-looking. In particular,
taking note of the failed glanders attack and the recent progress in microbiology,
these protocols predicted the advent of a new generation of biological weapons.
Many felt that such weapons could end up becoming far more deadly than their
chemical cousins. Thus the protocols explicitly
forbade their military use by an aggressor. For this and other good reasons, the protocols
were widely acclaimed and were signed by almost every nation on the planet.
But there were two problems in paradise. First, the treaty effectively forbade
first-use only, not their use in defense. Thus if a state was attacked by prohibited weapons
it had the right to defend itself - with prohibited weapons. Second, given every nation had an
innate right
to self-defense, there were no real limitations to
their actions in the case of another party breaking the first-use clause.
Thus there were no real disincentives to the development of
these weapons. In fact, the reverse was the case.
And so, particularly with regard to biological agents, these protocols were
a failure. Research and deployment only accelerated as the decades filed past
and the technological capabilities increased. By the late 1930's a number
of countries, particularly Japan, had significant biological programs.
(And the Japanese used
their weapons
against China in World War II,
despite having signed the 1925 protocols. More than one Chinese must
have wondered about the efficacy of this treaty, as anthrax and plague
was dropped on top of their heads).
After World War 2, a number of nations took note of the success of
the Japanese efforts. The United States was particularly aggressive.
As the main victor in this war,
the Americans took
the Japanese technology and used it as the foundation for its own
germ-warfare program. Other nations began similar programs at this time.
Although often different in scope and goals, these programs were all characterized
as defensive in nature and thus permitted under the 1925 accords.
Thus biological weapons development continued to gather steam in the decades
after World War 2, despite the theoretical treaty limitations.
However, concern about these weapons also continued to grow. Therefore
a number of concerned scientists and political leaders
never ceased their efforts to improve the 1925 protocols. The threat was obviously growing.
Something had to be done to contain it.
These efforts finally came to
fruition in 1972, when a landmark treaty was signed by 144 countries.
This was the Biological And Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC). Among other things, this treaty
forbade both the use and the possession of biological weapons and associated
agents.
In sweeping terms it abolished the development, acquisition
and stockpiling of all such weapons and made their use,
in any circumstance, illegal.
As in 1925, there were just two problems.
First, the treaty provided no means
of validation and enforcement. If a nation simply swore it had no biological
weapons, that was good enough for the treaty.
Second, many nations resolved to cheat. Despite
signing the treaty they had absolutely no intention of ever
doing something as simplistic as actually abiding by it.
And so, taking political cynicism to new heights, a few countries jumped
to the head of the class and begun intensive new biological programs.
A classic example of such a cheater was the Soviet Union. Just a few months after
signing the treaty the Soviet Union created a huge
biological weapons program, known as
biopreparat.
The ambitions of
this program were impressive and, as befitted the socialist
paradise, everything was done at industrial scales.
Anthrax was a particular success. The Soviets developed a number of particularly
potent strains, including varieties immune to all known vaccines. They then
perfected the difficult art of drying the anthrax spores and encapsulating them
in fine aerosols. Extremely potent forms of smallpox was similarly weaponized and then
mounted onto specially constructed ICBM warheads. Indeed, there were few pathogens
that Soviets did not try to improve and weaponize.
After the demise of the Soviet Union this program was officially disbanded. However,
many of the scientists and materials have subsequently "disappeared". A number of
them are now known to be working in weapons programs in other states.
There were and are many other cheaters, of course. A partial list includes
the United States, France, China, Russia, Cuba, Israel, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya and
Syria.
Because of the BWC's manifest failures and because the threat of biological
weapons has grown increasingly fearsome, pressure grew for amendments to the
treaty. So in 1999 a draft agreement was formulated to set up a
strict and reliable inspections
regime for biological weapons. No longer would a nation's word be sufficient.
Instead, periodic intrusive inspections would insure that the letter and
the spirit were enforced. This was obviously a huge improvement on the
trust-based system.
140 nations signed this draft agreement and again there were hopes that
the terror of these weapons could be rolled back.
At this stage in our story, enter George W. Bush.
The Bush administration of the United States did not like this new agreement.
It violated the principle of state's rights.
It violated the spirit of unfettered capitalism.
Why should the United States allow its pharmaceutical plants to be inspected?
What if other nations used this procedure to steal trade secrets? And, at
a more philosophical level,
why should the world's only hyperpower need deign
to allow foreign inspectors onto its soil?
Therefore the United States refused to sign, effectively killing this agreement.
Other nations took their cue from this and another fierce round of
weapons development has begun.
Thus we are left in our current situation: biological weapons research and
production is accelerating around the world. Knowledge on how to build
them has become widely available. Thus weapons are yearly
growing more potent and destructive, while more nations acquire them.
Meanwhile, terrorist groups are actively trying to procure their own
arsenal. Perhaps it is time for another treaty?
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