Jefferson, Thomas, 1743-1826 . The Anas / From The Writings of Thomas Jefferson: Volume 1
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THE ANAS.
EXPLANATION OF THE THREE VOLUMES BOUND IN MARBLED PAPER.

   IN these three volumes will be found copies of the official opinions1 given in writing by me to General Washington, while I was Secretary of State, with sometimes the documents belonging to the case. Some of these are the rough draughts, some press copies, some fair ones. In the earlier part of my acting in that office, I took no other NOTE of the passing transactions; but after awhile, I saw the importance of doing it in aid of my memory. Very often, therefore, I made memorandums on loose scraps of paper, taken out of my pocket in the moment, and laid by to be copied f air at leisure, which, however, they hardly ever were. These scraps, therefore, ragged, rubbed, and scribbled as they were, I had bound with the others by a binder who came into my cabinet, did it under my own eye, and without the opportunity of reading a single paper. At this day, after the lapse of twenty-five



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years, or more, from their dates, I have given to the whole a calm revisal, when the passions of the time are passed away, and the reasons of the transactions act alone on the judgment. Some of the informations I had recorded, are now cut out from the rest, because I have seen that they were incorrect, or doubtful, or merely personal or private, with which we have nothing to do. I should perhaps have thought the rest not worth preserving, but for their testimony against the only history of that period, which pretends to have been compiled from authentic and unpublished documents.

   * * * * * * *

    But a short review of facts * * * will show, that the contests of that day were contests of principle, between the advocates of republican, and those of kingly government, and that had not the former made the efforts they did, our government would have been, even at this early day, a very different thing from what the successful issue of those efforts have made it.

   The alliance between the States under the old Articles of Confederation, for the purpose of joint defence against the aggression of Great Britain, was found insufficient, as treaties of alliance generally are, to enforce compliance with their mutual stipulations; and these, once fulfilled, that bond was to expire of itself, and each State to become sovereign and independent in all things. Yet it could not but occur to every one, that these separate independ-



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envies, like the petty States of Greece, would be eternally at war with each other, and would become at length the mere partisans and satellites of the leading powers of Europe. All then must have looked forward to some further bond of union, which would insure eternal peace, and a political system of our own, independent of that of Europe. Whether all should be consolidated into a single government, or each remain independent as to internal matters, and the whole form a single nation as to what was foreign only, and whether that national government should be a monarchy or republic, would of course divide opinions, according to the constitutions, the habits, and the circumstances of each individual. Some officers of the army; as it has always been said and believed, (and Steuben and Knox have ever been named as the leading agents,) trained to monarchy by military habits, are understood to have proposed to General Washington to decide this great question by the army before its disbandment, and to assume himself the crown on the assurance of their support.

   The indignation with which he is said to have scouted this parricide proposition was equally worthy of his virtue and wisdom.

   The next effort was, (on suggestion of the same individuals, in the moment of their separation,) the establishment of an hereditary order under the name of the Cincinnati, ready prepared by that distinction to be ingrafted into the future frame of government, and placing General Washington still at their head.



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The General wrote to me on this subject, while I was in Congress at Annapolis, and an extract from my letter is inserted in 5th Marshall's history, page 28. He afterwards called on me at that place on his way to a meeting of the society, and after a whole evening of consultation, he left that place fully determined to use all his endeavors for its total suppression. But he found it so firmly riveted in the affections of the members, that, strengthened as they happened to be by an adventitious occurrence of the moment, he could effect no more than the abolition of its hereditary principle. He called again on his return, and explained to me fully the opposition which had been made, the effect of the occurrence from France, and the difficulty with which its duration had been limited to the lives of the present members. . Further details will be found among my papers, in his and my letters, and some in the Encyclopedia Methodique et Dictionnaire d'Economie Politique, communicated by myself to M. Meusnier its author, who had made the establishment of this society the ground, in that work, of a libel on our country.

   The want of some authority which should procure justice to the public creditors, and an observance of treaties with foreign nations, produced, some time after, the call of a convention of the States at Annapolis. Although, at this meeting, a difference of opinion was evident on the question of a republican or kingly government, yet, so general through



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the States was the sentiment in favor of the former, that the friends of the latter confined themselves to a course of obstruction only, and delay, to everything proposed; they hoped, that nothing being done, and all things going from bad to worse, a kingly government might be usurped, and submitted to by the people, as better than anarchy and wars internal and external, the certain consequences of the present want of a general government. The effect of their manoeuvres, with the defective attendance of Deputies from the States, resulted in the measure of calling a more general convention, to be held at Philadelphia. At this, the same party exhibited the same practices, and with the same views of preventing a government of concord, which they foresaw would be republican, and of forcing through anarchy their way to monarchy. But the mass of that convention was too honest, too wise, and too steady, to be baffled and misled by their manoeuvres.

   One of these was a form of government proposed by Colonel Hamilton, which would have been in fact a compromise between the two parties of royalism and republicanism. According to this, the executive and one branch of the legislature were to be during good behavior, I.e. for life, and the governors of the States were to be named by these two permanent organs. This, however, was rejected; on which Hamilton left the convention, as desperate, and never returned again until near its final conclusion. These opinions and efforts, secret or avowed, of the



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advocates for monarchy, had begotten great jealousy through the States generally; and this jealousy it was which excited the strong opposition to the conventional constitution; a jealousy which yielded at last only to a general determination to establish certain amendments as barriers against a government either monarchical or consolidated. In what passed through the whole period of these conventions, I have gone on the information of those who were members of them, being absent myself on my mission to France.

   I returned from that mission in the first year of the new government, having landed in Virginia in December, 1789, and proceeded to New York in March, l790, to enter on the office of Secretary of State. Here, certainly, I found a state of things which, of all I had ever contemplated, I the least expected. I had left France in the first year of her revolution, in the fervor of natural rights, and zeal for reformation. My conscientious devotion to these rights could not be heightened, but it had been aroused and excited by daily exercise. The President received me cordially, and my colleagues and the circle of principal citizens apparently with welcome. The courtesies of dinner parties given me, as a stranger newly arrived among them, placed me at once in their familiar society. But I cannot describe the wonder and mortification with which the table conversations filled me. Politics were the chief topic, and a preference of kingly over republi-



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can government was evidently the favorite sentiment. An apostate I could not be, nor yet a hypocrite; and I found myself, for the most part, the only advocate on the republican side of the question, unless among the guests there chanced to be some member of that party from the legislative Houses. Hamilton's financial system had then passed. It had two objects; 1st, as a puzzle, to exclude popular understanding and inquiry; 2d, as a machine for the corruption of the legislature; for he avowed the opinion, that man could be governed by one of two motives only, force or interest; force, he observed, in this country was out of the question, and the interests, therefore, of the members must be laid hold of, to keep the legislative in unison with the executive. And with grief and shame it must be acknowledged that his machine was not without effect ; that even in this, the birth of our government, some members were found sordid enough to bend their duty to their interests, and to look after personal rather than public good.

   It is well known that during the war the greatest difficulty we encountered was the want of money or' means to pay our soldiers who fought, or our farmers, manufacturers and merchants, who furnished the necessary supplies of food and clothing for them. After the expedient of paper money had exhausted itself, certificates of debt were given to the individual creditors, with assurance .of payment so soon as the United States should be able. But the distresses of



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these people often obliged them to part with these for the half, the fifth, and even a tenth of their value; and speculators had made a trade of cozening them from the holders by the most fraudulent practices, and persuasions that they would never be paid. In the bill for funding and paying these, Hamilton made no difference between the original holders and the fraudulent purchasers of this paper. Great and just repugnance arose at putting these two classes of creditors on the same footing, and great exertions were used to pay the former the full value, and to the latter, the price only which they had paid, with interest. But this would have prevented the game which was to be played, and for which the minds of greedy members were already tutored and prepared. When the trial of strength on these several efforts had indicated the form in which the bill would finally pass, this being known within doors sooner than without, and especially, than to those who were in distant parts of the Union, the base scramble began. Couriers and relay horses by land, and swift sailing pilot boats by sea, were flying in all directions. Active partners and agents were associated and employed in every State, town, and country neighborhood, and this paper was bought up at five shillings, and even as low as two shillings in the pound, before the holder knew that Congress had already provided for its redemption at par. Immense sums were thus filched from the poor and ignorant, and fortunes accumulated by those who had them



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selves been poor enough before. Men thus enriched by the dexterity of a leader, would follow of course the chief who was leading them to fortune, and become the zealous instruments of all his enterprises.

   This game was over, and another was on the carpet at the moment of my arrival; and to this I was most ignorantly and innocently made to hold the candle. This fiscal manoeuvre is well known by the name of the Assumption. Independently of the debts of Congress, the States had during the war contracted separate and heavy debts ; and Massachusetts particularly, in an absurd attempt, absurdly conducted, on the British post of Penobscot : and the more debt Hamilton could rake up, the more plunder for his mercenaries. This money, whether wisely or foolishly spent, was pretended to have been spent for general purposes, and ought, therefore, to be paid from the general purse. But it was objected, that nobody knew what these debts were, what their amount, or what their proofs. No matter; we will guess them to be twenty millions. But of these twenty millions, we do not know how much should be reimbursed to one State, or how much to another. No matter; we will guess. And so another scramble was set on foot among the several States, and some got much, some little, some nothing. But the main object was obtained, the phalanx of the Treasury was reinforced by additional recruits. This measure produced the most bitter and angry contest ever known in Congress,



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before or since the Union of the States. I arrived in the midst of it. But a stranger to the ground, a stranger to the actors on it, so long absent as to have lost all familiarity with the subject, and as yet unaware of its object, I took no concern in it.

   The great and trying question, however, was lost in the House of Representatives. So high were the feuds excited by this subject, that on its rejection business was suspended. Congress met and adjourned from day to day without doing anything, the parties being too much out of temper to do business together. The eastern members particularly, who, with Smith from South Carolina, were the principal gamblers in these scenes, threatened a secession and dissolution. Hamilton was in despair. As I was going to the President's one day, I met him in the street. He walked me backwards and forwards before the President's door for half an hour. He painted pathetically the temper into which the legislature had been wrought; the disgust of those who were called the creditor States; the danger of the secession of their members, and the separation of the States. He observed that the members of the administration ought to act in concert; that though this question was not of my department, yet a common duty should make it a common concern; that the President was the centre on which all administrative questions ultimately rested, and that all of us should rally around him, and support, with joint efforts, measures approved by him; and that the



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question having been lost by a small majority only, it was probable that an appeal from me to the judgment and discretion of some of my friends, might effect a change in the vote, and the machine of government, now suspended, might be again set into. motion. I told him that I was really a stranger to the whole subject; that not having yet informed myself of the system of finances adopted, I knew not how far this was a necessary sequence; that undoubtedly, if its rejection endangered a dissolution of our Union at this incipient stage, I should deem that the most unfortunate of all consequences, to avert which all partial and temporary evils should be yielded. I proposed to him, however, to dine with me the next day, and I would invite another friend or two, bring them into conference together, and I thought it impossible that reasonable men, consulting together coolly, could fail, by some mutual sacrifices of opinion, to form a compromise which was to save the Union.

   The discussion took place. I could take no part in it but an exhortatory one, because I was a stranger to the circumstances which should govern it. But it was finally agreed, that whatever importance had been attached to the rejection of this proposition, the preservation of the Union and of concord among the States was more important, and that therefore it would be better that the vote of rejection should be rescinded, to effect which, some members should change their votes. But it was observed that this



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pill would be peculiarly bitter to the southern States, and that some concomitant measure should be adopted, to sweeten it a little to them. There had before been propositions to fix the seat of government either at Philadelphia,. or at Georgetown on the Potomac; and it was thought that by giving it to Philadelphia for ten years, and to Georgetown permanently afterwards, this might, as an anodyne, calm in some degree the ferment which might be excited by the other measure alone. So two of the Potomac members (White and Lee, but White with a revulsion of stomach almost convulsive,) agreed to change their votes, and Hamilton undertook to carry the other point. In doing this, the influence he had established over the eastern members, with the agency of Robert Morris with those of the middle States, effected. his side of the engagement; and so the Assumption was passed, and twenty millions of stock divided among favored States, and thrown in as a pabulum to the stock-jobbing herd. This added to the number of votaries to the Treasury, and made its chief the master of every vote in the legislature, which might give to the government the direction suited to his political views.

   I know well, and so must be understood, that nothing like a majority in Congress had yielded to this corruption. Far from it. But a division, not very unequal, had already taken place in the honest part of that body; between the parties styled republican and federal. The latter being monarchists in



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principle, adhered to Hamilton of course, as their leader in that principle, and this mercenary phalanx added to them, insured him always a majority in both Houses : so that the whole action of legislature was now under the direction of the Treasury. Still the machine was not complete. The effect of the funding system, and of the Assumption, would be temporary; it would be lost with the loss of the individual members whom it has enriched, and some engine of influence more permanent must be contrived, while these myrmidons were yet in place to carry it through all opposition. This engine was the Bank of the United State's. All that history is known, so I shall say nothing about it. While the government remained at Philadelphia, a selection of members of both Houses were constantly kept as directors who, on every question interesting to that institution, or to the views of the federal head, voted at the will of that head; and, together with the stock-holding members, could always make the federal vote that of the majority. By this combination, legislative expositions were given to the constitution, and all the administrative laws were shaped on the model of England, and so passed. And from this influence we were not relieved, until the removal from the precincts of the bank, to Washington.

   Here then was the real ground of the opposition which was made to the course of administration. Its object was to preserve the legislature pure and



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independent of the executive, to restrain the administration to republican forms and principles, and not permit the constitution to be construed into a monarchy, and to be warped, in practice, into all the principles and pollutions of their favorite English model. Nor was this an opposition to General Washington. He was true to the republican charge confided to him; and has solemnly and repeatedly protested to me, in our conversations, that he would lose the last drop of his blood in support of it; and he did this the oftener and with the more earnestness, because he knew my suspicions of Hamilton's designs against it, and wished to quiet them. For he was not aware of the drift, or of the effect of Hamilton's schemes. Unversed in financial projects and calculations and budgets, his approbation of them was bottomed on his confidence in the man.

   But Hamilton was not only a monarchist, but for a monarchy bottomed on corruption. In proof of this, I will relate an anecdote, for the truth of which I attest the God who made me. Before the President set out on his southern tour in April, 1791, he addressed a letter of the fourth of that month, from Mount Vernon, to the Secretaries of State, Treasury and War, desiring that if any serious and important cases should arise during his absence, they would consult and act on them. And he requested that the Vice President should also be consulted. This was the only occasion on which that officer was ever requested to take part in a cabinet question. Some



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occasion for consultation arising, I invited those gentlemen (and the Attorney General, as well as I remember,) to dine with me, in order to confer on the subject. After the cloth was removed, and our question agreed and dismissed, conversation began on other matters, and by some circumstance, was led to the British constitution, on which Mr. Adams observed, " purge that constitution of its corruption, and give to its popular branch equality of representation, and it would be the most perfect constitution ever devised by the wit of man." Hamilton paused and said," purge it of its corruption, and give to its popular branch equality of representation, and it would become an impracticable government: as it stands at present, with all its supposed defects, it is the most perfect government which ever existed. " And this was assuredly the exact line which separated the political creeds of these two gentlemen. The one was for two hereditary branches and an honest elective one : the other, for an hereditary King, with a House of Lords and Commons corrupted to his will, and standing between him and the people.

   Hamilton was, indeed, a singular character. Of acute understanding, disinterested, honest, and honorable in all private transactions, amiable in society, and duly valuing virtue in private life, yet so bewitched and perverted by the British example, as to be under thorough conviction that corruption was essential to the government of a nation. Mr. Adams had originally been a republican. The glare



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of royalty and nobility, during his mission to England, had made him believe their fascination a necessary ingredient in government; and Shay's rebellion, not sufficiently understood where he then was, seemed to prove that the absence of want and oppression, was not a sufficient guarantee of order. His book on the American constitutions having made known his political bias, he was taken up by the monarchical federalists in his absence, and on his return to the United States, he was by them made to believe that the general disposition of our citizens was favorable to monarchy. He here wrote his " Davila," as a supplement to a former work, and his election to the Presidency confirmed him in his errors. Innumerable addresses too, artfully and industriously poured in upon him, deceived him into a confidence that he was on the pinnacle of popularity, when the gulf was yawning at his feet, which was to swallow up him and his deceivers. For when General Washington was withdrawn, these energumeni of royalism, kept in check hitherto by the dread of his honesty, his firmness, his patriotism, and the authority of his name, now mounted on the car of State and free from control, like Phaeton on that of the sun, drove headlong and wild, looking neither to right nor left, nor regarding anything but the objects they were driving at; until, displaying these fully, the eyes of the nation were opened, and a general disbandment of them from the public councils took place.





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   Mr. Adams, I am sure, has been long since convinced of the treacheries with which he was surrounded during his administration. He has since thoroughly seen, that his constituents were devoted to republican government, and whether his judgment is re-settled on its ancient basis, or not, he is conformed as a good citizen to the will of the majority, and would now, I am persuaded, maintain its republican structure with the zeal and fidelity belonging to his character. For even an enemy has said, " he is always an honest man, and often a great one." But in the fervor of the fury and follies of those who made him their stalking horse, no man who did not witness it can form an idea of their unbridled madness, and the terrorism with which they surrounded themselves. The horrors of the French revolution, then raging, aided them mainly, and using that as a raw head and bloody bones, they were enabled by their stratagems of X. Y. Z. in. which **** was a leading mountebank, their tales of tub-plots, ocean massacres, bloody buoys, and pulpit lyings and slanderings, and maniacal ravings of their Gardeners, their Osgoods and parishes, to spread alarm into all but the firmest breasts. Their Attorney General had the impudence to say to a republican member, that deportation must be resorted to, of which, said he, " you republicans have set the example; " thus daring to identify us with the murderous Jacobins of France.

   These transactions, now recollected but as dreams



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of the night, were then sad realities; and nothing rescued us from their liberticide effect, but the unyielding opposition of those firm spirits who sternly maintained their post in defiance of terror, until their fellow citizens could be aroused to their own danger, and rally and rescue the standard of the constitution. This has been happily done. Federalism and monarchism have languished from that moment, until their treasonable combinations with the enemies of their country during the late war, their plots of dismembering the Union, and their Hartford convention, have consigned them to the tomb of the dead; and I fondly hope, " we may now truly say, we are all republicans, all federalists " and that the motto of the standard to which our country will forever rally, will be, "federal union and republican government ; " and sure I am we may say, that we are indebted for the preservation of this point of ralliance, to that opposition of which so injurious an idea is so artfully insinuated and excited in this history.

   Much of this relation is notorious to the world; and many intimate proofs of it will be found in these notes. From the moment where they end, of my retiring from the administration, the federalists2 got unchecked hold of General Washington. His memory was already sensibly impaired by age, the firm tone of mind for which he had been remarkable; was beginning to relax, its energy was abated, a



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listlessness of labor, a desire for tranquillity had crept on him, and a willingness to let others act, and even think for him. Like the rest of mankind, he was disgusted with atrocities of the French revolution, and was not sufficiently aware of the difference between the rabble who were used as instruments of their perpetration, and the steady and rational character of the American people, in which he had not sufficient confidence. The opposition too of the republicans to the British treaty, and the zealous support of the federalists in that unpopular but favorite measure of theirs, had made him all their own. Understanding, moreover, that I disapproved of that treaty, and copiously nourished with falsehoods by a malignant neighbor of mine, who ambitioned to be his correspondent, he had become alienated from myself personally, as from the republican body generally of his fellow-citizens; and he wrote the letters to Mr. Adams and Mr. Carroll, over which, in devotion to his imperishable fame, we must forever weep as monuments of mortal decay.

   February 4th, 1818.



1The opinions here alluded to will be found in the Official Papers of Jefferson.

2 See conversation with General Washington, October 1.

CONVERSATION WITH ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

   August the 13th, 1791 . Notes of a conversation between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. Th: Jefferson mentioned to him a letter received from John Adams, disavowing Publicola, and denying that he ever entertained a wish to bring this country under an hereditary executive, or introduce



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an hereditary branch of Legislature, &c. See his letter. Alexander Hamilton condemning Mr. Adams' writings, and most particularly "Davila," as having a tendency to weaken the present government, declared in substance as follows: " I own it is my own opinion, though I do not publish it in Dan or Bersheba, that the present government is not that which will answer the ends of society, by giving stability and protection to its rights, and that it will probably be found expedient to go into the British form. However, since we have undertaken the experiment, I am for giving it a fair course, whatever my expectations may be. The success, indeed, so far, is greater than I had expected, and therefore, at present, success seems more possible than it had done heretofore, and there are still other and other stages of improvement which, if the present does not succeed, may be tried, and ought to be tried, before we give up the republican form altogether; for that mind must be really depraved, which would not prefer the equality of political rights, which is the foundation of pure republicanism, if it can be obtained consistently with order. Therefore, whoever by his writings disturbs the present order of things, is really blameable, however pure his intentions may be, and he was sure Mr. Adams' were pure. " This is the substance of a declaration made in much more lengthy terms, and which seemed to be more formal than usual for a private conversation between two, and as if intended to qualify some less



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guarded expressions which had been dropped on former occasions. Th: Jefferson has committed it to writing in the moment of A. Hamilton's leaving the room.


   December the 25th, 1791 , Colonel Gunn (of Georgia) dining the other day with Colonel Hamilton, said to him, with that plain freedom he is known to use, "I wish, Sir you would advise our friend King, to observe some kind of consistency in his votes. There has been scarcely a question before the Senate on which he has not voted both ways. On the representation bill, for instance, he first voted for the proposition of the Representatives, and ultimately voted against it." " Why," said Colonel Hamilton, " I'll tell you as to that, Colonel Gunn, that it never Was intended that bill should pass." Gunn told this to Butler, who told it to Th: Jefferson.


CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT WASHINGTON.

   February the 28th, l792 . I was to have' been with him long enough before three o'clock, (which was the hour and day he received visits,) to have opened to him a proposition for doubling the velocity of the post riders, who now travel about fifty miles a day, and might, without difficulty, go one hundred, and for taking measures (by way bills) to know where the delay is, when there is any. I was



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delayed by business, so as to have scarcely time to give him the outlines. I ran over them rapidly, and observed afterwards, that I had hitherto never spoken to him on the subject of the post office, not knowing whether it was considered as a revenue law; or a law for the general accommodation of the citizens : that the law just passed seemed to have removed the doubt; by declaring that the whole profits of the office should be applied to extending the posts, and that even the past profits should be refunded by the treasury for the same purpose: that I therefore conceive it was now in the department of the Secretary of State : that I thought it would be advantageous so to declare it for another reason, to wit : that the department of the Treasury possessed already such an influence as to swallow up the whole executive powers, and that even the future Presidents (not supported by the weight of character which himself possessed,) would not be able to make head against: this department.

   That in urging this measure I had certainly no personal interest, since, if I was supposed to have any appetite for power, yet as my career would certainly be exactly as short as his own, the intervening time was too short to be an object. My real wish was to avail the public of every occasion, during the residue of the President's period, to place things on a safe footing. He was now called on to attend his company, and he desired me to come and breakfast with him the next morning.





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   February the 29th . I did so; and after breakfast we retired to his room, and I unfolded my plan for the post office, and after such an approbation of it as he usually permitted himself on the first presentment of any idea, and desiring me to commit it to writing, he, during that pause of conversation which follows a business closed, said in an affectionate tone, that he had felt much concern at an expression which dropped from me yesterday, and which marked my intention of retiring when he should. That as to himself, many motives obliged him to it. He had, through the whole course of the war, and most particularly at the close of it, uniformly declared his resolution to retire from public affairs, and never to act in any public office; that he had retired under that firm resolution : that the government, however, which had been formed, being found evidently too inefficacious, and it being supposed that his aid was of some consequence towards bringing the people to consent to one of sufficient efficacy for their own good, he consented to come into the convention, and on the same motive, after much pressing, to take a part in the new government, and get it under way. That were he to continue longer, it might give room to say, that having tasted the sweets of office, he could not do without them : that he really felt himself growing old, his bodily health less firm, his memory, always bad, becoming worse, and perhaps the other faculties of his mind 'showing a decay to others of which he was insensible himself ;



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that this apprehension particularly oppressed him: that he found, moreover, his activity lessened, business therefore more irksome, and tranquillity and retirement become an irresistible passion. That however he felt himself obliged, for these reasons, to retire from the government, yet he should consider it as unfortunate, if that should bring on the retirement of the great officers of the government, and that this might produce a shock on the public mind of dangerous consequence.

   I told him that no man had ever had less desire of entering into public offices than myself; that the circumstance of a perilous war, which brought every thing into danger, and called for all the services which every citizen could render, had induced me to undertake the administration of the government of Virginia; that I had both before and after refused repeated appointments of Congress to go abroad in that sort of office, which, if I had consulted my own gratification, would almost have been the most agreeable to me; that at the end of two years, I resigned the government of Virginia, and retired with a firm resolution never more to appear in public life; that a domestic loss, however, happened, and made me fancy that absence and a change of scene for a time might be expedient for me; that I therefore accepted a foreign appointment, limited to two years; that at the close of that, Doctor Franklin having left France, I was appointed to supply his place, which I had accepted,



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and though I continued in it three or four years, it was under the constant idea of remaining only a year or two longer; that the revolution in France coming on, I had so lnterested myself in the event of that, that when obliged to bring my family home, I had still an idea of returning and awaiting the close of that, to fix the era of my final retirement; that on my arrival here I found he had appointed me to my present office; that he knew I had not come into it without some reluctance; that it was, on my part, a sacrifice of inclination to the opinion that I might be more serviceable here than in France, and with a firm resolution in my mind, to indulge my constant wish for retirement at no very distant day that when, therefore, I had received his letter, written from Mount Vernon, on his way to Carolina and Georgia, (April the 1st, 1791) and discovered, from an expression in that, that he meant to retire from the government ere long, and as to the precise epoch there could be no doubt, my mind was immediately made up, to make that the epoch of my own retirement from. those labors of which I was heartily tired. That, however, I did not believe there was any idea in any of my brethren in the administration of retiring; that on the contrary, I had perceived at a late meeting of the trustees of the sinking fund, that the Secretary of the Treasury had developed the plan he intended to pursue, and that it embraced years in its view.

   He said; that he considered the Treasury depart-



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ment as a much more limited one, going only to the single object of revenue, while that of the Secretary of State, embracing nearly all the objects of administration, was much more important, and the retirement of the officer therefore, would be more noticed: that though the government had set out with a pretty general good will of the public, yet that symptoms of dissatisfaction had lately shown themselves far beyond what he could have expected, and to what height these might arise, in case of too great a change in the administration, could not be foreseen.

   I told him, that in my opinion, there was only a single source of these discontents. Though they had indeed appeared to spread themselves over the War department also, yet I considered that as an overflowing only from their real channel, which would never have taken place, if they had not first been generated in another department, to wit, that of the Treasury. That a system had there been contrived, for deluging the States with-paper money instead of gold and silver, for withdrawing our citizens from the pursuits of commerce, manufactures, buildings, and other branches of useful industry, to occupy themselves and their capitals in a species of gambling, destructive of morality, and which had introduced its poison into the government itself. That it was a fact,. as certainly known as that he and I were then conversing, that particular members of the legislature, while those laws were on the carpet, had feathered their nests with paper,



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had then voted for the laws, and constantly since lent all the energy of their talents, and instrumentality of their offices, to the establishment and enlargement of this system; that they had chained it about our necks for a great length of time, and in order to keep the game in their hands had, from time to time, aided in making such legislative constructions of the constitution, as made it a very different thing from what the people thought they had submitted to; that .they had now brought forward a proposition far beyond any one ever yet advanced, and to which the eyes of many were turned, as the decision which was to let us know, whether we live under a limited or an unlimited government. He asked me to what proposition I alluded? I answered, to that in the report on manufactures, which, under color of giving bounties for the encouragement of particular manufactures, meant to establish the doctrine, that the power given by the constitution to collect taxes to provide f or the general welfare of the United States, permitted Congress to take everything under their management which they should deem for the public welfare, and which is susceptible of the application of money; consequently, that the subsequent enumeration of their powers was not the description to which resort must be had, and did not at all constitute the limits of their authority; that this was a very different question from that of the bank, which was thought an incident to an enumerated



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power; that, therefore, this decision was expected with great anxiety; that, indeed, I hoped the proposition would be rejected, believing there was a majority in both Houses against it; and that if it should be, it would be considered as a proof that things were returning into their true channel; and that, at any rate, I looked forward to the broad representation which would shortly take place, for keeping the general constitution on its true ground ; and that this would remove a great deal of the discontent which had shown itself. The conversation ended with this last topic. It is here stated nearly as much at length as it really was; the expressions preserved where I could recollect them; and their substance always faithfully stated.

   March 1, 1792 .


   On the 2d of January, 1792 , Messrs. Fitzsimmons and Gerry (among others) dined with me. These two staid, with a Mr. Larned of Connecticut, after the company was gone. We got on the subject of references by the legislature to the Heads of departments, considering their mischief in every direction. Gerry and Fitzsimmons clearly opposed to them.

   Two days afterwards (January the 9th), Mr. Bourne from Rhode Island presented a memorial from his State, complaining of inequality in the Assumption, and moved to refer it to the Secretary of the Treasury. Fitzsimmons, Gerry and others opposed it; but it Was carried.





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   January the 19th . Fitzsimmons moved, that the President of the United States be requested to direct the Secretary of the Treasury, to lay before the House information to enable the legislature to judge of the additional revenue necessary on the increase of the military establishment. The House, on debate, struck out the words, " President of the United States."


   March the 7th . The subject resumed. An animated debate took place on the tendency of references to the Heads of departments; and it seemed that a great majority would be against it; the House adjourned. Treasury greatly alarmed, and much industry supposed to be used before next morning, when it was brought on again, and debated through the day, and on the question, the Treasury carried it by thirty-one to twenty-seven; but deeply wounded, since it was seen that all Pennsylvania, except Jacobs, voted against the reference; that Tucker of South Carolina voted for it, and Sumpter absented himself, debauched for the moment only, because of the connection of the question with a further Assumption which South Carolina favored; but showing that they never were to be counted on among the Treasury votes. Some others absented themselves. Gerry changed sides. On the whole, it showed that Treasury influence was tottering.

   Committed to writing this 10th of March, 1792 .





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   March the 11th, 1792 . Consulted verbally by the President, on whom a committee of the Senate (Izard, Morris, and King) are to wait to-morrow morning, to know whether he will think it proper to redeem our Algerine captives, and make a treaty with the Algerines, on the single vote of the Senate, without taking that of the Representatives.

   My opinions run on the following heads:

   We must go to Algiers with cash in our hands. Where shall we get it? By loan? By converting money now in the treasury?

   Probably a loan might be obtained on the President's authority; but as this could not be repaid without a subsequent act of legislature, the Representatives might refuse it. So if money in the treasury be converted, they may refuse to sanction it.

   The subsequent approbation of the Senate being necessary to validate a treaty, they expect to be consulted beforehand, if the case admits. So the subsequent act of the Representatives being necessary where money is given, why should not they expect to be consulted in like manner, when the case admits.

   A treaty is a law of the land. But prudence will point out this difference to be attended to in making them; viz. where a treaty contains such articles only as will go into execution of themselves, or be carried into execution by the judges, they may be safely made; but where there are articles which require a law to be passed afterwards by the legislature, great caution is requisite.





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   For example; the consular convention with France required a very small legislative regulation. This convention was unanimously ratified by the Senate.

   Yet the same identical men threw by the law to enforce it at the last session, and the Representatives at this session have placed it among the laws which they may take up or not, at their own convenience, as if that was a higher motive than the public faith: Therefore, against hazarding this transaction without the sanction of both Houses. The President concurred. The Senate express the motive for this proposition, to be a fear that the Representatives would not keep the secret. He has no opinion of the secrecy of the Senate. In this very case, Mr. Izard made the communication to him, sitting next to him at table, on one hand, while a lady (Mrs. McLane) was on his other hand, and the French minister next to her; and as Mr. Izard got on with his communication, his voice kept rising, and his stutter bolting the words out loudly at intervals, so that the minister might hear if he would. He said he had a great mind at one time to have got up in order to put a stop to Mr. Izard.


   March the 11th, 1792 . Mr. Sterret tells me, that sitting round a fire the other day with four or five others, [Mr. Smith of South Carolina was one], some-body mentioned that the murderers of Hogeboom,



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sheriff of Columbia county, New York, were acquitted. "Aye," says Smith, "this is what comes of your damned trial by jury."


   1791. Towards the latter end of November, Hamilton had drawn Ternant into a conversation on the subject of the treaty of commerce recommended by the National Assembly of France to be negotiated with us, and, as he had no ready instructions on the subject, he led him into a proposal that Ternant should take the thing up as a volunteer with me, that we should arrange conditions, and let them go for confirmation or refusal. Hamilton communicated this to the President, who came into it, and proposed it to me. I disapproved of it, observing, that such a volunteer .project would be binding on us, and not them; that it would enable them to find out how far we would go, and avail themselves of it. However, the President thought it worth trying, and I acquiesced. I prepared a plan of treaty for exchanging the privileges of native subjects, and fixing all duties forever as they now stood. Hamilton did not like this way of fixing the duties, because, he said, many articles here would bear to be raised, and therefore, he would prepare a tariff. He did so, raising duties for the French, from twenty-five to fifty per cent. So they were to give us the privileges of native subjects, and we, as a compensation, were to make them pay higher duties. Hamilton, having made his arrangements with Ham



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mond to pretend that though he had no powers to conclude a treaty of commerce, yet his general commission authorized him to enter into the discussion of one, then proposed to the President at one of our meetings, that the business should be taken up with Hammond in the same informal way. I now discovered the trap which he had laid, by first getting the President into that step with Ternant. I opposed the thing warmly. Hamilton observed, if we did it with Ternant we should also with Hammond. The President thought this reasonable. I desired him to recollect, I had been against it with Ternant, and only acquiesced under his opinion. So the matter went off as to both. His scheme evidently was, to get us engaged first with Ternant, merely that he might have a pretext to engage us on the same ground with Hammond, taking care, at the same time, by an extravagant tariff, to render it ' impossible we should come to any conclusion with Ternant : probably meaning, at the same time, to propose terms so favorable to Great Britain, as would attach us to that country by treaty. On one of those occasions he asserted, that our commerce with Great Britain and her colonies was put on a much more favorable footing than with France and her colonies. I therefore prepared the tabular comparative view of the footing of our commerce with those nations, which see among my papers. See also my project of a treaty and Hamilton's tariff.

   Committed to writing March the 11th, l792 .

   



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It was observable, that whenever, at any of our consultations, anything was proposed as to Great Britain, Hamilton had constantly ready something which Mr. Hammond had communicated to him, which suited the subject and proved the intimacy of their communications; insomuch, that I believe he communicated to Hammond all our views, and knew from him, in return, the views of the British court. Many evidences of this occurred; I will state some. I delivered to the President my report of instructions for Carmichael and Short, on the subject of navigation, boundary and commerce, and desired him to submit it to Hamilton. Hamilton made several just criticisms on different parts of it. But where I asserted that the United States had no right to alienate an inch of the territory of any State, he attacked and denied the doctrine. See my report, his NOTE, and my answer. A few days after came to hand Kirkland's letter, informing us that the British, at Niagara, expected to run a new line between themselves and us; and the reports of Pond and Stedman, informing us it was understood at Niagara, that Captain Stevenson had been sent here by Simcoe to settle that plan with Hammond. Hence Hamilton's attack of the principle I had laid down, in order to prepare the way for this new line. See minute of March the 9th. Another proof. At one of our consultations, about the last of December, I mentioned that I wished to give in my report on commerce, in which I could not avoid recommending a commercial



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retaliation against Great Britain. Hamilton opposed it violently; and among other arguments, observed, that it was of more importance to us to have the posts than to commence a commercial war; that this, and this alone, would free us from the expense of the Indian wars; that it would therefore be the height of imprudence in us, while treating f or the surrender of the posts, to engage in anything which would irritate them; that if we did so, they would naturally say, " these people mean war, let us therefore hold what we have in our hands." This argument struck me forcibly, and I said, " if there is a hope of obtaining the posts, I agree it would be imprudent to risk that hope by a commercial retaliation. I will, therefore, wait till Mr. Hammond gives me in his assignment of breaches, and if that gives a glimmering of hope that they mean to surrender the posts, I will not give in my report till the next session." Now, Hammond had received my assignment of breaches on the l5th of December, and about the 22d or 23d had made me an apology for not having been able to send me his counter-assignment of breaches; but in terms which showed I might expect it in a few days. From the moment it escaped my lips in the presence of Hamilton, that I would not give in my report till I should see Hammond's counter-complaint, and judge if there was a hope of the posts, Hammond never said a word to me on any occasion, as to the time he should be ready. At length the President



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got out of patience, and insisted I should jog him. This I did on the 21st of February, at the President's assembly : he immediately promised I should have it in a few days, and accordingly, on the 5th of March I received it.

   Written March the llth, 1792.


   March the 12th, 1792 . Sent for by the President, and desired to bring the letter he had signed to the King of France. Went. He said the House of Representatives had, on Saturday, taken up the communication he had made of the King's letter to him, and come to a vote in their own name; that he did not expect this when he sent this message and the letter, otherwise he would have sent the message without the letter, as I had proposed. That he apprehended the legislature would be endeavoring to invade the executive. I told him, I had understood the House had resolved to request him to join their congratulations to his on the completion and acceptance of the constitution; on which part of the vote, there were only two dissentients, (Barnwell and Benson;) that the vote was thirty-five to sixteen on that part which expressed an approbation of the wisdom of the constitution; that in the letter he had signed, I had avoided saying a word in approbation of the constitution, not knowing whether the King, in his heart, approved it: Why, indeed, said he, I begin to doubt very much



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of the affairs of France; there are papers from London as late as the 10th of January, which represent them as going into confusion. He read over the letter he had signed, found there was not a word which could commit his judgment about the constitution, and gave it to me back again. This is one of many proofs I have had, of his want of confidence in the event of the French revolution. The fact is, that Gouverneur Morris, a high-flying monarchy man,' shutting his eyes and his faith to every fact against his wishes, and believing everything he desires to be true, has kept the President's mind constantly poisoned with his forebodings. That the President wishes the revolution may be established, I believe from several indications. I remember, when I received the news of the King's flight and capture, I first told him of it at his assembly. I never saw him so much dejected by any event in my life. He expressed clearly, on this occasion, his disapprobation of the legislature referring things to the Heads of Departments.

   Written March the 12th .


   Eodem die. Ten o'clock, A. M. The preceding was about nine o'clock. The President now sends Lear to me, to ask what answer he shall give to the committee, and particularly, whether he shall add to it, that, " in making the communication, it was not his expectation that the House should give any answer." I told Mr. Lear that I thought the House



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had a right, independently of legislation, to express sentiments on other subjects. That when these subjects did not belong to any other branch particularly, they would publish them by their own authority; that in the present case, which respected a foreign nation, the President being the organ of our nation with other nations, the House would satisfy their duty, if, instead of a direct communication, they should pass their sentiments through the President; that if expressing a sentiment were really an invasion of the executive power, it was so faint a one, that it would be difficult to demonstrate it to the public, and to a public partial to the French revolution, and not disposed to consider the approbation of it from any quarter as improper. That the Senate, indeed, had given many indications of their wish to invade the executive power: the Representatives had done it in one case, which was indeed mischievous and alarming; that of giving orders to the Heads of the Executive Departments, without consulting the President; but that the late vote for directing the Secretary of the Treasury to report ways and means, though carried, was carried by so small a majority, and with the aid of members so notoriously under a local influence on that question, as to give a hope that the practice would be arrested, and the constitutional course be taken up, of asking the President to have information laid before them. But that in the present instance, it was so far from being clearly an invasion of the Executive, and would



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be so little approved by the general voice, that I could not advise the President to express any dissatisfaction at the vote of the House; and I gave Lear, in writing, what I thought should be his answers. See it.


CABINET MEETINGS.

   March the 31st . A meeting at the President's; present, Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, Henry Knox and Edmond Randolph. The subject was the resolution of the House of Representatives, of March the 27th, to appoint a committee to inquire into the causes of the failure of the late expedition under Major General St. Clair, with the power to call for such persons, papers and records, as may be necessary to assist their inquiries. The committee had written to Knox for the original letters, instructions, &c. The President had called us to consult, merely because it was the first example, and he wished that so far as it should become a precedent, it should be rightly conducted. He neither acknowledged nor denied, nor even doubted the propriety of what the House were doing, for he had not thought upon it, nor was acquainted with subjects of this kind : he could readily conceive there might be papers of so secret a nature, as that they ought not to be given up. We were not prepared, and wished time to think and inquire.

   April the 2d . Met again at the President's, on the same subject. We had all considered, and were



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of one mind, first, that the House was an inquest, and therefore might institute inquiries. Second, that it might call for papers generally. Third, that the Executive ought to communicate such papers as the public good would permit, and ought to refuse those, the disclosure of which would injure the public : consequently were to exercise a discretion. Fourth, that neither the committee nor House had a right to call on the Head of a Department, who and whose papers were under the President alone; but that the committee should instruct their chairman to move the House to address the President. We had principally consulted the proceedings of the Commons in the case of Sir Robert Walpole, 13 Chandler's Debates. For the first point, see pages 161, 170, 172, 183, 187, 207; for the second, pages 153, 173, 207; for the third, 81, 173, appendix page 44; fourth, page 246. NOTE; Hamilton agreed with us in all these points, except as to the power of the House to call on Heads of Departments.

   He observed, that as to his Department, the act constituting it had made it subject to Congress in some points, but he thought himself not so far subject, as to be obliged to produce all the papers they might call for. They might demand secrets of a very mischievous nature. [Here I thought he began to fear they would go on to examining how far their own members. and other persons in the government had been dabbling in stocks, banks, &c., and that he probably would choose in this case to deny their



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power; and, in short, he endeavored to place himself subject to the House, when the Executive should propose what he did not like, and subject to the Executive, when the House should propose anything disagreeable.] I observed here a difference between the British Parliament and our Congress; that the former was a legislature, an inquest, and a council (S. G. page 91.) for the King. The latter was, by the constitution, a legislature and an inquest, but not a council. Finally agreed, to speak separately to the members of the committee, and bring them by persuasion into the right channel. It was agreed in this case, that there was not a paper which might not be properly produced; that copies only should be sent, with an assurance, that if they should desire it, a clerk should attend with the originals to be verified by themselves. The committee were Fitzsimmons, Steele, Mercer, Clarke, Sedgwick, Giles and Vining.


   April the 9th, l792 . The President had wished to redeem our captives at Algiers, and to make peace with them on paying an annual tribute. The Senate were willing to approve this, but unwilling to have the lower House applied to previously to furnish the money; they wished the President to take the money from the treasury, or open a loan for it. They thought that to consult the Representatives on one occasion, would give them a handle always to claim



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it, and would let them into a participation of the power of making treaties, which the Constitution had given exclusively to the President and Senate. They said too, that if the-particular sum was voted by the Representatives, it would not be a secret. The President had no confidence in the secrecy of the Senate, and did not choose to take money from the Treasury or to borrow. But he agreed he would enter into provisional treaties with the Algerines, not to be binding on us till ratified here. I prepared questions for consultation with the Senate, and added, that the Senate were to be apprized, that on the return of the provisional treaty, and after they should advise the ratification, he would not have the seal put to it till the two Houses should vote the money. He asked me, if the treaty stipulating a sum and ratified by him, with the advice of the Senate, would not be good under the Constitution, and obligatory on the Representatives to furnish the money? I answered it certainly would, and that it would be the duty of the Representatives to raise the money; but that they might decline to do what was their duty, and I thought it might be incautious to commit himself by a ratification with a foreign nation, where he might be left in the lurch in the execution: it was possible too, to conceive a treaty, which it would not be their duty to provide for. He said that he did not like throwing too much into democratic hands, that if they would not do what the Constitution called on them to do, the Government



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would be at an end, and must then assume another form. He stopped here; and I kept silence to see whether he would say anything more in the same line, or add any qualifying expression to soften what he had said; but he did neither.

   I had observed, that wherever the agency of either, or both Houses would be requisite subsequent to a treaty, to carry it into effect, it would be prudent to consult them previously, if the occasion admitted. That thus it was, we were in the habit of consulting the Senate previously, when the occasion permitted, because their subsequent ratification would be necessary. That there was the same reason for consulting the lower House previously, where they were to be called on afterwards, and especially in the case of money, as they held the purse strings, and would be jealous of them. However, he desired me to strike out the intimation that the seal would not be put till both Houses should have voted the money.

   April the 6th . The President called on me before breakfast, and first introduced some other matter, then fell on the representation bill, which he had now in his possession for the tenth day. I had before given him my opinion in writing, that the method of apportionment was contrary to the Constitution. He agreed that it was contrary to the common understanding of that instrument, and to what was understood at the time by the makers of it; that yet it



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would bear the construction which the bill put, and he observed that the vote for and against the bill was perfectly geographical, a northern against a southern vote, and he feared he should be thought to be taking side with a southern party. I admitted the motive of delicacy, but that it should not induce him to do wrong; urged the dangers to which the scramble for the fractionary members would always lead. He here expressed his fear that there would, ere long, be a separation of the Union; that the public mind seemed dissatisfied and tending to this. He went home, sent for Randolph, the Attorney General, desired him to get Mr. Madison immediately and come to me, and if we three concurred in opinion that he should negative the bill, he desired to hear nothing more about it, but that we would draw the instrument for him to sign. They came. Our minds had been before made up. We drew the instrument. Randolph carried it to him, and told him we all concurred in it. He walked with him to the door, and as if he still wished to get off, he said, " and you say you approve of this yourself. " " Yes Sir, " said Randolph, " I do upon my honor. " He sent it to the House of Representatives instantly. A few of the hottest friends of the bill expressed passion, but the majority were satisfied, and both in and out of doors it gave pleasure to have, at length, an instance of the negative being exercised.

   Written this the 9th of April .



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   July the 10th, 1792 . My letter of to the President, directed to him at Mount Vernon, had not found him there, but came to him here. He told me of this, and that he would take an occasion of speaking with me on the subject. He did so this day. He began by observing that he had put it off from day to day, because the subject was painful, to wit, his remaining in office, which that letter solicited. He said that the declaration he had made when he quitted his military command, of never again entering into public life, was sincere. That, however, when he was called on to come forward to set the present government in motion, it appeared to him that circumstances were so changed as to justify a change in his resolution: he was made to believe that in two years all would be well in motion, and he might retire. At the end of two years he found some things still to be done. At the end of the third year, he thought it was not worth while to disturb the course of things, as in one year more his office would expire, and he was decided then to retire. Now he was told there would still be danger in it. Certainly, if he thought so, he would conquer his longing for retirement. But he feared it would be said his former professions of retirement had been mere affectation, and that he was like other men, when once in office he could not quit it, He was sensible, too, of a decay of his hearing, perhaps his other faculties might f all off and he not be sensible of it. That with respect to the existing



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causes of uneasiness, he thought there were suspicions against a, particular party, which had been carried a great deal too far; there might be desires, but he did not believe there were designs to change the form of government into a monarchy; that there might be a few who wished it in the higher walks of life, particularly in the great cities, but that the main body of the people in the eastern States were as steadily for republicanism as in the southern. That the pieces lately published, and particularly in Freneau's paper, seemed to have in view the exciting opposition to the Government. That this had taken place in Pennsylvania as to the excise law, according to information he had received from General Hand. That they tended to produce a separation of the Union, the most dreadful of all calamities, and that whatever tended to produce anarchy, tended, of course, to produce a resort to monarchical government.

   He considered those papers as attacking him directly, for he must be a fool indeed to swallow the little sugar plums here and there thrown out to him. That in condemning the administration of the Government, they condemned him, for if they thought there were measures pursued contrary to his sentiments, they must conceive him too careless to attend to them, or too stupid to understand them. That though, indeed, he had signed many acts which he did not approve in all their parts, yet he had never put his name to one which he did not think, on the whole, was eligible. That as to



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the bank, which had been an act of so much complaint, until there was some infallible criterion of reason, a difference of opinion must be tolerated. He did not believe the discontents extended far from the seat of Government. He had seen and spoken with many people in Maryland and Virginia in his late journey. He found the people contented and happy. He wished, however, to be better informed on this head. If the discontents were more extensive than he supposed, it might be that the desire that he should remain in the Government was not general.

   My observations to him tended principally to enforce the topics of my letter. I will not, therefore, repeat them, except where they produced observations from him. I said that the two great complaints were, that the national debt was unnecessarily increased, and that it had furnished the means of corrupting both branches of the legislature; that he must know, and everybody knew, there was a considerable squadron in both, whose votes were devoted to the paper and stock-jobbing interest, that the names of a weighty number were known, and several others suspected on good grounds. That on examining the votes of these men, they would be found uniformly for every Treasury measure, and that as most of these measures had been carried by small majorities, they were carried by these very votes. That, therefore, it was a cause of just uneasiness, when we saw a legislature legislating for their



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own interests, in opposition to those of the people. He said not a word on the corruption of the legislature, but took up the other point, defended the Assumption, and argued that it had not increased the debt, for that all of it was honest debt. He justified the excise law, as one of the best laws which could be passed, as nobody would pay the tax who did not choose to do it. With respect to the increase of the debt by the Assumption, I observed to him that what was meant and objected to was, that it increased the debt of the General Government, and carried it beyond the possibility of payment. That if the balances had been settled, and the debtor States directed to pay their deficiencies to the creditor States, they would have done it easily, and by resources of taxation in their power, and acceptable to the people; by a direct tax in the south, and an excise in the north. Still, he said, it would be paid by the people. Finding him decided, I avoided entering into argument with him on those points.


   Sept. the 30th, 1792 . The constitution as agreed to till a fortnight before the Convention rose, was such a one as he would have set his hand and heart to. lst. The President was to be elected for seven years. Then ineligible for seven years more. ad. Rotation in the Senate. 3d. A vote of two-thirds in the legislature on particular subjects, and expressly on that of navigation. The three New England



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States were constantly with us in all questions (Rhode Island not there, and New York seldom), so that it was these three States, with the five southern ones, against Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware.

   With respect to the importation of slaves, it was left to Congress. This disturbed the two southernmost States, who knew that Congress would immediately suppress the importation of slaves. These two States, therefore, struck up a bargain with the three New England States. If they would join to admit slaves for some years, the southernmost States would join in changing the clause which required two-thirds of the legislature in any vote. It was done. These articles were changed accordingly, and from that moment the two southernmost States, and the three northern ones, joined Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware, and made the majority eight to three against us, instead of eight to three for us, as it had been through the whole Convention. Under this coalition, the great principles of the constitution were changed in the last days of the Convention.

   ANECDOTE. Yates, Lawsing and Hamilton represented New York. Yates and Lawsing never voted in one single instance with Hamilton, who was so much mortified at it that he went home. When the season for courts came on, Yates, a judge, and Lawsing, a lawyer, went to attend their courts. Then Hamilton returned.





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   ANECDOTE. The constitution as agreed at first was, that amendments might be proposed either by Congress or the legislatures. A committee was appointed to digest and redraw. Gouverneur Morris and King were of the committee. One morning Gouverneur Morris moved an instrument for certain alterations (not one-half the members yet come in). In a hurry and without understanding, it was agreed to. The committee reported so that Congress should have the exclusive power of proposing amendments. George Mason observed it on the report, and opposed it. King denied the construction. Mason demonstrated it, and asked the committee by what authority they had varied what had been agreed. Gouverneur Morris then imprudently got up, and said, by authority of the Convention, and produced the blind instruction before mentioned, which was unknown by one-half of the House, and not till then understood by the other. They then restored it, as it originally stood.

   He said he considered Hamilton as having done us more injury than Great Britain and all her fleets and armies. That his (Mason's) plan of settling our debts would have been something in this way. He would have laid as much tax as could be paid without oppressing the people ;-particularly he would have laid an impost of about the amount of the first, laid by Congress, but somewhat different in several of its articles. He would have suspended all application of it one year, during which an office should have



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been open to register unalienated certificates. At the end of the year he would have appropriated his revenue. lst. To pay the civil list. ad. The interest of these certificates. 3d. Instalments of the principal. 4th. A surplus to buy up the alienated certificates, still avoiding to make any other provision for these last. By the time the unalienated certificates should have been all paid, he supposed half the alienated ones would have been bought up at market. He would then have proceeded to redeem the residue of them.


CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT WASHINGTON.

   Bladensburg, October the lst, 1792 . This morning, at Mount Vernon, I had the following conversation with the President. He opened it by expressing his regret at the resolution in which I appeared so fixed, in the letter I had written him, of retiring from public affairs. He said, that he should be extremely sorry that I should do it, as long as he was in office, and that he could not see where he should find another character to fill my office. That, as yet, he Was quite undecided whether to retire in March or not. His inclinations led him strongly to do it. Nobody disliked more the ceremonies of his office, and he had not the least taste or gratification in the execution of its functions. That he was happy at home alone, and that his presence there was now peculiarly called for by the situation of Major Washington, whom he thought irrecoverable, and should



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he get well, he would remove into another part of the country, which might better agree with him. That he did not believe his presence necessary; that there were other characters who would do the business as well or better. Still, however, if his aid was thought necessary to save the cause to which he had devoted his life principally, he would make the sacrifice of a longer continuance. That he therefore reserved himself for future decision, as his declaration would be in time if made a month before, the day of election. He had desired Mr. Lear to find out from conversation, without appearing to make the inquiry, whether any other person would be desired by any body. He had informed him, he judged from conversations that it was the universal desire he should continue, and he believed that those who expressed a doubt of his continuance, did it in the language of apprehension, and not of desire. But this, said he, is only from the north; it may be very different in the south. I thought this meant as an opening to me to say what was the sentiment in the south, from which quarter I came. I told him, that as far as I knew, there was but one voice there, which was for his continuance. That as to myself, I had ever preferred the pursuits of private life to those of public, which had nothing in them agreeable to me.

   I explained to him +he circumstances of the war which had first called me into public life, and those following the war, which had called me from a retirement on which I had determined. That I had con



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stantly kept my eye on my own home, and could no longer refrain from returning to it. As to himself, his presence was important; that he was the only man in the United States who possessed the confidence of the whole; that government was founded in opinion and confidence, and that the longer he remained, the stronger would become the habits of the people in submitting to the Government, and in thinking it a thing to be maintained; that there was no other person who would be thought anything more than the head of a party. He then expressed his concern at the difference which he found to subsist between the Secretary of the Treasury and myself, of which he said he had not been aware. He knew, indeed, that there was a marked difference in our political sentiments, but he had never suspected it had gone so far in producing a personal difference, and he wished he could be the mediator to put an end to it. That he thought it important to preserve the check of my opinions in the Administration, in order to keep things in their proper channel, and prevent them from going too far. That as to the idea of transforming this Government into a monarchy, he did not believe there were ten men in the United States whose opinions were worth attention, who entertained such a thought. I told him there were many more than he imagined. I recalled to his memory a dispute at his own table, a little before we. left Philadelphia, between General Schuyler on one side and Pinckney and myself on the other, wherein



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the former maintained the position, that hereditary descent was as likely to produce good magistrates as election.. I told him, that though the people were sound, there were a numerous sect who had monarchy in contemplation; that the Secretary of the Treasury was one of these. That I had heard him say that this Constitution was a shilly shally thing, of mere milk and water, which could not last, and was only good as a step to something better. That when we reflected, that he had endeavored in the convention, to make an English constitution of it, and when failing in that, we saw all his measures tending to bring it to the same thing, it was natural for us to be jealous; and particularly, when we saw that these measures had established corruption in the legislature, where there was a squadron devoted to the nod of the Treasury, doing whatever he had directed, and ready to do what he should direct. That if the equilibrium of the three great bodies, legislative, executive and judiciary, could be preserved, if the legislature could be kept independent, I should never fear the result of such a government; but that I could not but be uneasy, when I saw that the executive had swallowed up the legislative branch.

   He said, that as to that interested spirit in the legislature, it was what could not be avoided in any government, unless we were to exclude particular descriptions of men, such as the holders of the funds, from all office. I told him, there was great differ



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ence between the little accidental schemes of self interest, which would take place in every body of men, and influence their votes, and a regular system for forming a corps of interested persons, who should be steadily at the orders of the Treasury. He touched on the merits of the funding system, observed there was a difference of opinion about it, some thinking it very bad, others very good; that experience was the only criterion of right which he knew, and this alone would decide which opinion was right. That for himself, he had seen our affairs desperate and our credit lost, and that this was in a sudden and extraordinary degree raised to the highest pitch. I told him, all that was ever necessary to establish our credit, was an efficient government and an honest one, declaring it would sacredly pay our debts, laying taxes for this purpose, and applying them to it. I avoided going further into the subject. He finished by another exhortation to me not to decide too positively on retirement, and here we were called to breakfast.


   October the 3lst, l792 . I had sent to the President, Viar and Jaudenes's letter of the 29th instant, whereupon he desired a consultation of Hamilton, Knox, E.

   Randolph, and myself, on these points: 1. What notice was to be taken hereof to Spain? 2. Whether it should make part of the communication to the legislature? I delivered my opinion, that it



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ought to be communicated to both Houses, because the communications intended to be made, being to bring on the question, whether they would declare war against any, and which of the nations or parts of the nations of Indians to the south, it would be proper this information should be before them, that they might know how far such a declaration would lead them. There might be some who would be for war against the Indians, if it were to stop there, but who would not be for it, if it were to lead to a war against Spain. I thought it should be laid before both Houses, because it concerned the question of declaring war, which was the function equally of both Houses. I thought a simple acknowledgment of the receipt of the letter should be made by me to the Spanish Charges, expressing that it contained some things very unexpected to us, but that we should refer the whole, as they had proposed, to the negotiators at Madrid. This would secure to us a continuation of the suspension of Indian hostilities, which the Governor of New Orleans said he had brought about till the result of the negotiation at Madrid should be known; would not commit us as to running or not running the line, or imply any admission of doubt about our territorial right; and would avoid a rupture with Spain, which was much to be desired, while we had similar points to discuss with Great Britain.

   Hamilton declared himself the advocate for peace. War would derange our affairs greatly; throw us



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back many years in the march toward prosperity; be difficult for us to pursue, our countrymen not being disposed to become soldiers; a part of the Union feeling no interest in the war, would with difficulty be brought to exert itself; and we had no navy. He was for everything which would procrastinate the event. A year, even, was a great gain to a nation strengthening as we were. It laid open to us, too, the chapter of accidents, which, in the present state of Europe, was a very pregnant one-That while, however, he was for delaying the event of war, he had no doubt it was to take place between us for the object in question; that jealousy and perseverance were remarkable features in the character of the Spanish government, with respect to their American possessions; that so far from receding as to their claims against us, they had been strengthening themselves in them. He had no doubt the present communication was by authority from the court.

   Under this impression, he thought we should be looking forward to the day of rupture, and preparing for it. That if we were unequal to the contest ourselves, it behooved us to provide allies for our aid. That in. this view, but two nations could be named, France and England. France was too intimately connected with Spain in other points, and of too great mutual value, ever to separate for us. Her affairs too, were such, that whatever issue they had, she could not be in a situation to



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make a respectable mediation for us. England alone, then, remained. It would not be easy to affect it with her; however, he was for trying it, and for sounding them on the proposition of a defensive treaty of alliance. The inducements to such a treaty, on their part, might be, 1. The desire of breaking up our former connections, which. we knew they had long wished. 2. A continuance of the statu quo in commerce for ten years, which he believed would be desirable to them. 3. An admission to some navigable part of the Mississippi, by some line drawn from the Lake of the Woods to such navigable part. He had not, he said, examined the map to see how such a line might be run, so as not to make too great a sacrifice. The navigation of the Mississippi being a joint possession, we might then take measures in concert for the joint. security of it. He was, therefore, for immediately sounding them on this subject through our ministers at London; yet so as to keep ourselves unengaged as long as possible, in hopes a favorable issue with Spain might be otherwise effected. But he was for sounding immediately, and for not letting slip an opportunity of securing our object.

   E. Randolph concurred, in general, with me. He objected that such an alliance could not be effected without pecuniary consideration probably, which we could not give. And what was to be their aid? If men, our citizens would see their armies get foothold in the United States, with great jealousy; it



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would be difficult to protect them. Even the French, during the distress of the late war, excited some jealous sentiments.

   Hamilton said, money was often, but not always demanded, and the aid he should propose to stipulate would be in ships. Knox non dissentiente.

   The President said the remedy would be worse than the disease, and stated some of the disagreeable circumstances which would attend our making such overtures.


   November, l792 . Hamilton called on me to speak about our furnishing supplies to the French colony of St. Domingo. He expressed his opinion, that we ought to be cautious, and not go too far in our application of money to their use, lest it should not be recognized by the mother country. He did not even think that some kinds of government they might establish could give a sufficient sanction.3 I observed, that the National Convention



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was now met, and would certainly establish a form of government; that as we had recognized the former government because established by authority of the nation, so we must recognize any other which should be established by the authority of the nation. He said we had recognized the former, because it contained an important member of the ancient, to wit : the King, and wore the appearance of his consent; but if, in any future form, they should omit the King, he did not know that we could with safety recognize it, or pay money to its order.



3 There had been a previous consultation at the President's (about the first week in November) on the expediency of suspending payments to France, under her present situation. I had admitted that the late constitution was dissolved by the dethronement of the King; and the management of affairs surviving to the National Assembly only, this was not an integral Legislature, and therefore not competent to give a legitimate discharge for our payments: that I thought, consequently, that none should be made till some legitimate body came into place; and that I should consider the National Convention called, but not met as we had yet heard, to be a legitimate body. Hamilton doubted whether it would be a legitimate body, and whether, if the King should be re-established, he might not disallow such payments on good grounds. Knox, for once, dared to differ from Hamilton, and to express, very submissively, an opinion, that a convention named by the whole body of the nation, would be competent to do anything. It ended by agreeing, that I should write to Gouverneur Morris to suspend payment generally, till further orders.

   November the l9th, l792 . Beckley brings me the pamphlet written by Hamilton, before the war, in answer to Common Sense. It is entitled " Plain Truth." Melancthon Smith sends it to Beckley and in his letter says, it was not printed in New York by Loudon, because prevented by a mob,. and was printed in Philadelphia, and that he has these facts from Loudon.


   November the 21st, 1792 . Mr. Butler tells me, that he dined last winter with Mr. Campbell from Denmark, in company with Hamilton, Lawrence,



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Dr. Shippen, T. Shippen, and one other person whom he cannot recollect. That after dinner political principles became the subject of conversation; that Hamilton declared openly, that "there was .no stability, no security in any kind of government but a monarchy. " That Lawrence took him up, and entered the lists of argument against him; that the. dispute continued long, and grew warm, remarkably so as between them; that T. Shippen; at length, joined Lawrence in it; and in fine, that it broke up the company. Butler recommended to the company, that the dispute having probably gone farther than was intended, it ought to be considered as confined to the company.


   December the 10th, 1792 . Present : Alexander Hamilton, General Knox, Edmund Randolph, and Th: Jefferson, at the President's. It was agreed to reject meeting the Indians at the proposed treaty; rather than to admit a mediation by Great Britain; but to admit the presence of Governor Simcoe, not as a party (if that was insisted on); and that I should make a verbal communication to Mr. Hammond, in substance, as on the back hereof, which I previously read to the President.


   December the 12th . I made the communication to Mr. Hammond. He said the attendance of Governor Simcoe was a circumstance only men-



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tioned by him, but not desired; that he would decline it without difficulty; declared it to be their most ardent wish that peace should take place, for their fur-trade was entirely interrupted; and he urged as decisive proof of the sincerity of their wish. lst. That they had kept the late Indian council together six weeks at a very great expense, waiting for the Six Nations. ad.

   That the Indians at that council were so perfectly satisfied of their desire that they should make peace, that they had not so much as mentioned in council the applying to the British for any supplies. I immediately communicated this to the President.


   December the l3th, 1792 . The President called on me to see the model and drawings of some mills of sawing stone. After showing them, he in the course of a subsequent conversation asked me if there were not some good manufactories of porcelain in Germany; that he was in want of table china, and had been speaking to Mr. Shaw, who was going to the East Indies to bring him a set, but he found that it would not come till he should no longer be in a situation to want it.

   He took occasion a second time to observe that Shaw said it would be two years at least, before he could have the china here, before which time he said he should be where he should not need it. I think he asked the question about the manufactories in Germany merely to



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have an indirect opportunity of telling me he meant to retire, and within the limits of two years.


   December the l7th . Hammond says the person is here to whom the Six Nations delivered the invitation for Simcoe to attend, who says they insisted on it, and would consider his non-attendance as an evidence that he does not wish for peace; but he says that Simcoe has not the least idea of attending; that this gentleman says we may procure in Upper Canada any quantity of provisions, which the people will salt up expressly during winter; and that he will return and carry our request whenever we are ready.


CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT WASHINGTON.

   Thursday, December the 27th, 1792 . I waited on the President on some current business. After this was over, he observed to me, that he thought it was time to endeavor to effect a stricter connection with France, and that Gouverneur Morris should be written to on this subject. He went into the circumstances of dissatisfaction between Spain and Great Britain, and us, and observed, there was no nation on whom we could rely,. at all times, but France; and that, if we did not prepare in time some support, in the event of rupture with Spain and England, we might be charged with a criminal negligence. [I was much pleased with the tone of these observations. It was the very



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doctrine which had been my polar star, and I did not need the successes of the republican arms in France, lately announced to us, to bring me to these sentiments. For it is to be noted, that on Saturday last (the 22d) I received Mr. Short's letters of October the 9th and 12th, with the Leyden gazettes to October the l3th, giving us the first news of the retreat of the Duke of Brunswick, and the capture of Spires and Worms by Custine, and that of Nice by Anselme.]

   I therefore expressed to the President my cordial approbation of these ideas; told him I had meant on that day (as an opportunity of writing by the British packet would occur immediately) to take his orders for removing the suspension of payments to France, which had been imposed by my last letter to Gouverneur Morris, but was meant, as I supposed, only for the interval between the abolition of the late constitution by the dethronement of the King, and the meeting of some other body, invested by the will of the nation with powers to transact their affairs; that I considered the National Convention, then assembled, as. such a body; and that, therefore, we ought to go on with the payments to them, or to any government they should establish that, however, I had learned last night.; that some clause in the bill for providing reimbursement of the loan made by the bank to the United States, had given rise to a question before the House of Representatives yesterday, which might affect these payments;



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a clause in that bill proposing, that the money formerly borrowed in Amsterdam, to pay the French debt, and appropriated by law, (1690, August 4th, c. 34,s. 2) to that purpose, lying dead as was suggested, should be taken to pay the bank, and the President be authorized to borrow ' two millions of dollars more, out of which it should be replaced; and if this should be done, the removal of our suspension of payments, as I had been about to propose, would be premature.

   He expressed his disapprobation of the clause above mentioned; thought it highly improper in the Legislature to change an appropriation once made, and added, that no one could tell in what that would end. I concurred, but observed, that on a division of the House, the ayes for striking out the clause were twenty-seven, the noes twenty-six; whereon the Speaker gave his vote against striking out, which divides the House : the clause for the disappropriation remained of course. I mentioned suspicions, that the whole of this was a trick to serve the bank under a great existing embarrassment; that the debt to the bank was to be repaid by instalments; that the first instalment was of two hundred thousand dollars only, or rather one hundred and sixty thousand dollars, (because forty thousand of the two hundred thousand dollars would be the United States' own dividend of the instalment). Yet here were two millions to be paid them at once, and to be taken from a purpose



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of gratitude and honor, to which it had been appropriated.


   December the 30th, 1792 . I took the occasion furnished by Pinckney's letter of September the 19th, asking instructions how to conduct himself as to the French revolution, to lay down the catholic principle of republicanism, to wit, that every people may establish What form of government they please, and change it as they please; the will of the nation being the only thing essential. I Was induced to do this, in order to extract the President's opinion on the question which divided Hamilton and myself in the conversation of November, l792, and the previous one of the first week of November, on the suspension of payments to France; and if favorable to mine, to place the principles of record in the letter books of my office. I therefore wrote the letter of December the 30th, to Pinckney, and sent it to the President, and he returned me his approbation in writing, in his NOTE of the same date, which see.


CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT WASHINGTON.

   February the 7th, 1793 . I waited on the President with letters and papers from Lisbon. After going through these, I told him that I had for some time suspended speaking with him on the subject of my going out of office, because I had understood that the bill for intercourse with foreign nations



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was likely to be rejected by the Senate, in which case, the remaining business of the Department would be too inconsiderable to make it worth while to keep it up. But that the bill being now passed, I was freed from the considerations of propriety which had embarrassed me. That &c. [nearly in the words of a letter to Mr. T. M. Randolph, of a few days ago,) and that I should be willing, if he had taken no arrangements to the contrary, to continue somewhat longer, how long I could not say, perhaps till summer, perhaps autumn. He said, so far from taking arrangements on the subject, he had never mentioned to any mortal the design of retiring which I had expressed to him, till yesterday, when having heard that I had given up my house, and that it was rented by another, he thereupon mentioned it to Mr. E. Randolph, and asked him, as he knew my retirement had been talked of, whether he had heard any persons suggested in conversation to succeed me. He expressed his satisfaction at my change of purpose, and his apprehensions that my retirement would be a new source of uneasiness to the public. He said Governor Lee had that day informed him of the general discontent prevailing in Virginia, of which he never had had any conception, much less sound information. That it appeared to him very alarming. He proceeded to express his earnest wish that Hamilton and myself could coalesce in the measures of the government, and urged here the general reasons for it



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which he had done to me in two former conversations. He said he had proposed the same thing to Hamilton, who expressed his readiness, and he thought our coalition would secure the general acquiescence of the public.

   I told him my concurrence was of much less importance than he seemed to imagine; that I kept myself aloof from all cabal and correspondence on the subject of the Government, and saw and spoke with as few as I could. That as to a coalition with Mr. Hamilton, if by that was meant that either was to sacrifice his general system to the other, it was impossible. We had both, no doubt, formed our conclusions after the most mature consideration; and principles conscientiously adopted, could not be given up on either side. My wish was, to see both Houses of Congress cleansed of all persons interested in the bank or public stocks; and that a pure legislature being given us, I should always be ready to acquiesce under their determinations, even if contrary to my own opinions; for that I subscribe to the principle, that the will of the majority, honestly expressed, should give law. I confirmed him in the fact of the great discontents to the south that they were grounded on seeing that their judgments and interests were sacrificed to those of the eastern States on every occasion, and their belief that it was the effect of a corrupt squadron of voters in Congress, at the command of the Treasury; and they see that if the votes of those members who



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had any interest distinct from, and contrary to the general interest of their constituents, had been withdrawn, as in decency and honesty they should have been, the laws would have been the reverse of what they are on all the great questions. I instanced the new Assumption carried in the House of Representatives by the Speaker's vote. On this subject he made no reply.

   He explained his remaining in office to have been the effect of strong solicitations after he returned here; declaring that he had never mentioned his purpose of going out but to the Heads of Departments and Mr. Madison; he expressed the extreme wretchedness of his existence while in office, and went lengthily into the late attacks on him for levees, &c., and explained to me how he had been led into them by the persons he consulted at New York; and that if he could but know what the sense of the public was, he would most cheerfully conform to it.


   February the l6th, 1793 . E. Randolph tells J. Madison. and myself, a curious fact which he had from Lear. When the President went to New York, he resisted for three weeks the efforts to introduce levees. At length he yielded, and left it to Humphreys and some others to settle the forms. Accordingly, an ante-chamber and presence room. were provided, and when those who were to pay their court were assembled, the President set out,



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preceded by Humphreys. After passing through the ante-chamber, the door of the inner room was thrown open, and Humphreys entered first, calling out with a loud voice, " the President of the United States." The President was so much disconcerted with it, that he did not recover from it the whole time of the levee, and when the company was gone, he said to Humphreys, " Well, .you have taken me in once, but by God you shall never take me in a second time."

   There is reason to believe that the rejection of the late additional Assumption by the Senate, was effected by the President through Lear, operating on Langdon. Beckley knows this.


   February the 20th, 1793 . Colonel W. S. Smith called on me to communicate intelligence from France. He had left Paris November the Th. He said the French ministers are entirely broken with Gouverneur Morris; shut their doors to him, and will never receive another communication from him. They wished Smith to be the bearer of a message from the President, to this effect, but he declined; and they said in that case they would press it through their own Minister here. He said they are sending Genet here with full powers to give us all the privileges we can desire in their countnes, and particularly in the West Indies; that they even contemplate to set them free the next summer;



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that they propose to emancipate South America, and will send forty-five ships of the line there next spring, and Miranda at the head of the expedition; that they desire our debt to be paid them in provisions, and have authorized him to negotiate this. In confirmation of this, he delivers a letter to the President from Le Brun, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which Le Brun says that Colonel Smith will communicate plans worthy of his (the President's) great mind, and he shall be happy to receive his opinion as to the means the most suitable to effect it.

   I had, five or six days ago, received from Ternant, extracts. from the lives of his Ministers, complaining of both Gouverneur Morris and Mr. Short. I sent them this day to the President with an extract from a private letter of Mr. Short, justifying himself, and I called this evening on the President. He said he considered the extracts from Ternant very serious-in short, as decisive; that he saw that Gouverneur Morris could be no longer continued there consistent with the public good; that the moment was critical in our favor, and ought not to be lost; that he was extremely at a loss what arrangement to make. I asked him whether Gouverneur Morris and Pinckney might not change places. He said that would be a sort of remedy, but not a radical one. That if the French Ministry conceived Gouverneur Morris to be hostile to them; if they would be jealous merely on his proposing to visit London, they would never be satisfied with us at



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placing him at London permanently. He then observed, that though I had unfixed the day on which I had intended to resign, yet I appeared fixed in doing it at no great distance of time; that in this case, he could not but wish that I would go to Paris; that the moment was important : I possessed the confidence of both sides, and might do great good; that he wished I could do it, were it only to stay there a year or two. I told him that my mind was so bent on retirement that I could not think of launching forth again in a new business; that I could never again cross the Atlantic; and that as to the opportunity of doing good, this was likely to be the scene of action, as Genet was bringing powers to do the business here; but that I could not think of going abroad. He replied that I had pressed him to continue in the public service, and refused to do the same myself. I said the case was very different; he united the confidence of all America, and was the only person who did so : his services therefore were of the last importance; but for myself, my going out would not be noted or known. A thousand others could supply my place to equal advantage, therefore I felt myself free; and that as to the mission to France, I thought perfectly proper. He desired me then to consider maturely what arrangement should be made.

   Smith, in speaking of Morris, said, that at his own table, in presence of his company and servants, he cursed the French Ministers, as a set of damned



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rascals; said the King would still be replaced upon his throne. He said he knew they had written to have him recalled, and expected to be recalled. He consulted Smith to know whether he would bring his furniture here duty free. Smith has mentioned the situation of Gouverneur Morris freely to others here. Smith said also that the Ministers told him they meant to begin their attack at the mouth of the Mississippi, and to sweep along the Bay of Mexico southwardly, and that they would have no objection to our incorporating into our Government the two Floridas.


   February the 25th, 1793 . The President desires the opinions of the Heads of the three Departments, and of the Attorney General, on the following question, to wit : Mr. Ternant having applied for money equivalent to three millions of livres, to be furnished on account of our debt to France at the request of the Executive of that country, which sum is to be laid out in provisions within the United States, to be sent to France. Shall the money be furnished?

   The Secretary of the Treasury stated it as his opinion, that making a liberal allowance for the depreciation of assignats, (no rule of liquidation having been yet fixed,) a sum of about three hundred and eighteen thousand dollars may not exceed the arrearages equitably due to France to the end of 1792, and that the whole sum asked for may be furnished within periods capable of answering the



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purpose of Mr. Ternant's application, without a derangement of the Treasury.

   Whereupon the Secretaries of State and War, and the Attorney General, are of opinion that the whole sum asked for by Mr. Ternant ought to be furnished the Secretary of the Treasury is of opinion that the supply ought not exceed the above-mentioned sum of three hundred and eighteen thousand dollars.

   The President having required the attendance of the Heads of the three Departments, and of the Attorney General, at his house, on Monday the 25th of February, 1793, the following questions were proposed, and answers given:

   1. The Governor of Canada having refused to let us obtain provisions from that province, or to pass them along the water communication to the place of treaty with the Indians; and the Indians having refused to let them pass peaceably along what they call the bloody path, the Governor of Canada at the same time proposing to furnish the whole provisions necessary, ought the treaty to proceed? Answer unanimously, it ought to proceed.

   2. Have the Executive, or the Executive and Senate together, authority to relinquish to the Indians the right of soil of any part of the land north of the Ohio, which has been validly obtained by former treaties?

   The Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of War, and Attorney General, are of opinion that the Executive and Senate have such authority, provided



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that no grants to individuals, nor reservations to States, be thereby infringed. The Secretary of State is of opinion they have no such authority to relinquish.

   3. Will it be expedient to make any such relinquishments to the Indians, if essential to peace?

   The Secretaries of the Treasury and War, and the Attorney General, are of opinion it will be expedient to make such relinquishments if essential to peace, provided it do not include any lands sold or received for special purposes (the reservations for trading places excepted): The Secretary of State is of opinion that the Executive and Senate have authority to stipulate with the Indians, and that if essential to peace, it will be expedient to stipulate that we will not settle any lands between those already sold, or reserved for special purposes, and the lines heretofore validly established with the Indians.

   Whether the Senate shall be previously consulted on this point. The opinion unanimously is, that it will be better not to consult them previously.


   February the 26th, 1793 . Notes on the proceedings of yesterday. [See the formal opinions given to the President in writing, and signed.]

   First question. We are all of opinion that the treaty should proceed merely to gratify the public opinion, and not from an expectation of success. I expressed myself strongly, that the event was so



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unpromising, that I thought the preparations for a campaign should go on without the least relaxation, and that a day should be fixed with the commissioners for the treaty, beyond which they should not permit the treaty to be protracted, by which day orders should be given for our forces to enter into action. The President took up the thing instantly, after I had said this, and declared that he was so much of the opinion that the treaty would end in nothing, that he then, in the presence of us all, gave orders to General Knox, not to slacken the preparations for the campaign in the least, but to exert every nerve in preparing for it. Knox said something about the ultimate day for continuing the negotiations. I acknowledged myself not a judge on what day the campaign should begin, but that whatever it was, that day should terminate the treaty. Knox said he thought a winter campaign was always the most efficacious against the Indians. I was of opinion, since Great Britain insisted on furnishing provisions, that we should offer to repay. Hamilton thought we should not.

   Second question. I considered our right of preemption of the Indian lands, not as amounting to any dominion, or jurisdiction, or paramountship whatever, but merely in the nature of a remainder after the extinguishment of a present right, which gave us no present right whatever, but of preventing other nations from taking possession, and so defeating our expectancy; that the Indians had the full



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undivided and independent sovereignty as long as they choose to keep it, and that this might be forever; that as fast as we extend our rights by purchase from them, so fast we extend the limits of our society, and as soon as a new portion became encircled within our line, it became a fixed limit of our society; that the Executive, with either or both branches of the legislature, could not alien any part of our territory; that by the law of nations it was settled, that the unity and indivisibility of the society was so fundamental, that it could not be dismembered by the constituted authorities, except, 1, where all power was delegated to them (as in the case of despotic governments), or, 2, where it was expressly delegated; that neither of these delegations had been made to our general Government, and therefore, that it had no right to dismember or alienate any portion of territory once ultimately consolidated with us; and that we could no more cede to the Indians than to the English or Spaniards, as it might, according to acknowledged principles, remain as irrevocably and eternally with the one as the other. But I thought, that as we had a right to sell and settle lands once comprehended within our lines, so we might forbear to exercise that right, retaining the property till circumstances should be more favorable to the settlement, and this I agreed to do in the present instance, if necessary for peace.

   Hamilton agreed to the doctrine of the law of nations, as laid down in Europe, but that it was



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founded on the universality of settlement there; consequently, that no lopping off of territory could be made without a lopping off of citizens, which required their consent; but that the law of nations for us must be adapted to the circumstance of our unsettled country, which he conceived the President and Senate may cede; that the power of treaty was given to them by the Constitution, without restraining it to particular objects; consequently, that it was given in as plenipotentiary a form as held by any sovereign in any other society. Randolph was of opinion there was a difference between a cession to Indians and to any others, because it only restored the ceded part to the condition in which it was before we bought it, and consequently, that we might buy rt again hereafter; therefore, he thought the Executive and Senate could cede it. Knox joined in the main opinion. The President discovered no opinion, but he made some efforts to get us to join in some terms which could unite us all, and he seemed to direct those efforts more towards me; but the thing could not be done.

   Third question. We agreed in idea as to the line to be drawn, to wit, so as to retain all lands appropriated, or granted, or reserved.

   Fourth question. We all thought if the Senate should be consulted, and consequently apprizedof our line, it would become known to Hammond, and we should lose all chance of saving anything more at the treaty than our ultimatum.





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   The President, at this meeting, mentioned the declaration of some person, in a paper of Fenno, that he would commence an attack on the character of Dr. Franklin. He said the theme was to him excessively disagreeable on other considerations, but most particularly so, as the party seemed to do it as a means of defending him (the President) against the late attacks on him; that such a mode of defence would be peculiarly painful to him, and he wished it could be stopped. Hamilton and Randolph undertook to speak to Fenno to suppress it, without mentioning it as the President's wish. Both observed that they had heard this declaration mentioned in many companies, and that it had excited universal horror and detestation.

   The paper in Fenno must lie between two persons, viz., Adams and Izard, because they are the only persons who could know such facts as are there promised to be unfolded. Adams is an enemy to both characters, and might choose this ground as an effectual position to injure both. Izard hated Franklin with unparalleled bitterness, but humbly adores the President, because he is in loco regis. If the paper proceeds, we shall easily discover which of these two gentlemen is the champion. In the meantime, the first paper leads our suspicions more towards Izard than Adams, from the circumstance of style, and because he is quite booby enough not to see the injury he would do to the President by such a mode of defence.





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   February the 28th . Knox, E. Randolph and myself met at Knox's, where Hamilton was also to have met, to consider the time, manner and place of the President's swearing in. Hamilton had been there before, and had left his opinion with Knox to wit, that the President should ask a judge to attend him in his own house to administer the oath, in the presence of the Heads of Departments, which oath should be deposited in the Secretary of State's office. I concurred in this opinion. Randolph was for the President's going to the Senate's chamber to take the oath, attended by the Marshal of the United States, who should then make proclamation, &c. Knox was for this, and for adding the House of Representatives to the presence, as they would not yet be departed. Our individual opinions were written, to be communicated to the President, out of which he might form one. In the course of our 'conversation, Knox, sickling for parade, got into great warmth, and swore that our Government must either be entirely new modeled, or it would be knocked to pieces in less than ten years; and that as it is at present, he would not give a copper for it; that it is the President's character, and not the written constitution, which keeps it together.

   Same day. Conversation with Lear. He ex-pressed the strongest confidence that republicanism was the universal creed of America, except of a very few; that a republican administration must of necessity immediately overbear the contrary faction;



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said that he had seen with extreme regret that a number of gentlemen had for a long time been endeavoring to instil into the President, that the noise against the administration of the Government was that of a little faction, which would soon be silent, and which was detested by the people, who were contented and prosperous; that this very party, however, began to see their error, and that the sense of America was bursting forth to their conviction.


   March the 2d, 1793 . See in the papers of this date, Mr. Giles's resolutions. He and one or two others were sanguine enough to believe that the palpableness of these resolutions rendered it impossible the House could reject them. Those who knew the composition of the House, 1, of bank directors; 2, holders of bank stock; 3, stock jobbers; 4, blind devotees; 5, ignorant persons who did not comprehend them; 6, lazy and good-humored persons, who comprehended and acknowledged them, yet were too lazy to examine, or unwilling to pronounce censure; the persons who knew these characters, foresaw that the three first descriptions making one-third of the House, the three latter would make one-half of the residue; and, of course, that they would be rejected by a majority of two to one. But they thought that even this rejection would do good, by showing the public the desperate and abandoned dispositions with which their affairs were conducted. The reso-



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lutions were proposed, and nothing spared to present them in the fulness of demonstration. There were not more than three or four who voted otherwise than had been expected.


   March the 30th, 1793 . At our meeting at the President's, February the 25th, in discussing the question, whether we should furnish to France the three millions of livres desired, Hamilton, in speaking on the subject, used this expression, " When Mr. Genet arrives, whether we shall receive him or not will then be a question for discussion," which expression I did not recollect till E. Randolph reminded me of it a few days after. Therefore, on the 20th instant, as the President was shortly to set out for Mount Vernon, I observed to him, that as Genet might arrive in his absence, I wished to know beforehand how I should treat him, whether as a person who would or would not be received? He said he could see no ground of doubt but that he ought to be received. On the 24th he asked E. Randolph's opinion on the subject, saying he had consulted Colonel Hamilton thereon, who went into lengthy considerations of doubt and difficulty, and viewing it as a very unfortunate thing that the President should have the decision of so critical a point forced on him; but, in conclusion, said, since he was brought into that situation, he did not see but that he must receive Mr. Genet. Randolph told the President



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he was clear he should be received, and the President said he had never had any doubt on the subject in his mind. Afterwards, on the same day, he spoke to me again on it, and said Mr. Genet should unquestionably be received; but he thought not with too much warmth or cordiality, so only as to be satisfactory to him. I wondered at first at this restriction; but when Randolph afterwards communicated to me his conversation of the 24th, I became satisfied it was a small sacrifice to the opinion of Hamilton.


   March the 3lst . Mr. Beckley tells me, that the merchants' bonds for duties on six months' credit became due the 1st instant to a very great amount, that Hamilton went to the bank on that day, and directed the bank to discount for those merchants all their bonds at thirty days, and that he would have the collectors credited for the money at the Treasury. Hence, the Treasury lumping its receipts by the month in its printed accounts, these sums will be considered by the public as only received on the last day; consequently, the bank makes the month's interest out of it. Beckley had this from a merchant who had a bond discounted, and supposes a million of dollars were discounted at the bank here. Mr. Brown got the same information from another merchant, who supposed only six hundred thousand dollars discounted here. But they suppose the same orders went to all the branch banks to a great amount.





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   Eodem die. Mr. Brown tells me he has it from a merchant, that during the last winter the directors of the bank ordered the freest discounts. Every man could obtain it. Money being so flush, the six per cents run up to twenty-one and twenty-two shillings. Then the directors sold out their private stocks. When the discounted notes were becoming due, they stopped discounts, and not a dollar was to be had. This reduced six per cents to eighteen shillings and three pence; then the same directors bought in again.


   April the 7th, 1793 . Mr. Lear called on me, and introduced of himself a conversation on the affairs of the United States. He laughed at the cry of prosperity, and the deriving it from the establishment of the Treasury: he said, that so far from giving into this opinion, and that we were paying off our national debt, he was clear the debt was growing on us; that he had lately expressed this opinion to the President, who appeared much astonished at it. I told him I had given the same hint to the President last summer, ' and lately again had suggested, that we were even depending for the daily subsistence of Government on borrowed money. He said, that was certain, and was the only way of accounting for what was become of the money drawn over from Holland to this country. He regretted that the President was not in the way of hearing full information,



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declared he communicated to him everything he could learn himself; that the men who vaunted the present Government so much on some occasions, were the very men who at other times declared it was a poor thing, and such a one as could not stand, and he was sensible they only esteemed it as a stepping stone to something else, and had availed themselves of the first moments of the enthusiasm in favor of it, to pervert its principles and make of it what they wanted; and that though they raised the cry of anti-federalism against those who censured the mode of administration, yet he was satisfied, whenever it should come to be tried, that the very men whom they called anti-federalists, were the men who would save the Government, and he looked to the next Congress for much rectification.


   April the l8th . The President sends a set of questions to be considered, and calls a meeting. Though those sent me were in his own hand writing, yet it was palpable from the style, their ingenious tissue and suite, that they were not the President's that they were raised upon a prepared chain of argument, in short, that the language was Hamilton's, and the doubts his alone. They led to a declaration of the Executive, that our treaty with France is void. E. Randolph, the next day, told me that the day before the date of these questions, Hamilton went with him through the whole chain of



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reasoning of which these questions are the skeleton, and that he recognized them the moment he saw them.

   We met. The first question, whether we should receive the French minister, Genet, was proposed, and we agreed unanimously that he should be received; Hamilton, at the same time, expressing his great regret that any incident had happened, which should oblige us to recognize the government. The next question was, whether he should be received absolutely, or with qualifications. Here Hamilton took up the whole subject, and went through it in the order in which the questions sketch it. See the chain of his reasoning in my opinions of April the 28th. Knox subscribed at once to Hamilton's opinion that we ought to declare the treaty void, acknowledging, at the same time, like a fool as he is, that he knew nothing about it. I was clear it remained valid. Randolph declared himself of the same opinion, but on Hamilton's undertaking to present to him the authority in' Vattel (which we had not present) and to prove to him, that if the authority was admitted, the treaty might be declared void, Randolph agreed to take further time to consider. It was adjourned. We determined, unanimously; the last question, that Congress should not be called. There having been an intimation by Randolph, that in so great a question he should choose to give a written ' opinion, and this being approved by the President, I gave in mine April



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the a 28th. Hamilton gave in his. I believe Knox's was never thought worth offering or asking for. Randolph gave his May the 6th, concurring with mine. The President told me, the same day, he had never had a doubt about the validity of the treaty; but that since a question had been suggested, he thought it ought to be considered; that this being done, I might now issue passports to sea vessels in the form prescribed by the French treaty. I had for a week past only issued the Dutch form; to have issued the French, would have been presupposing the treaty to be in existence. The President suggested, that he thought it would be as well that nothing should be said of such a question having been under consideration.

   Written May the 6th.


   May the 6th, 1793 . When the question was, whether the proclamation of April the 22d should be issued, Randolph observed, that there should be a letter written by me to the Ministers of the belligerent powers, to declare that it should not be taken as conclusive evidence against our citizens in foreign courts of admiralty, for contraband goods. Knox suddenly adopted the opinion, before Hamilton delivered his. Hamilton opposed it pretty strongly. I thought it an indifferent thing, but rather approved Randolph's opinion. The President was against it; but observed that as there were three



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for it, it should go. This was the first instance I had seen of an opportunity to decide by a mere majority, including his own vote.


   May the 12th . Lear called on me to-day. Speaking of the lowness of stocks, (sixteen shillings,) I observed it was a pity we had not money to buy on public account. He said, yes, and that it was the more provoking, as two millions had been borrowed for that purpose, and drawn over here, and yet were not here. That he had no doubt those would take notice of the circumstance whose duty it was to do so. I suppose he must mean the President.


   May the 23d . I had sent to the President yesterday, draughts of a letter from him to the Provisory Executive Council of France, and of one from myself to Mr. Ternant, both on the occasion of his recall. I called on him to-day. He said there was an expression in one of them, which he had never before seen in any of our public communications, to wit, " our republic." The letter prepared for him to the Council, began thus : " The Citizen Ternant has delivered to me the letter wherein you inform me, that yielding, &c., you had determined to recall him from his mission, as your Minister Plenipotentiary to our republic." He had underscored the words our republic. He said that certainly ours was a republican government, but yet we had not used



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that style in this way; that if any body wanted to change its form into a monarchy, he was sure it was only a few individuals, and that no man in the United States would set his face against it more than himself; but that this was not what he was afraid of; his fears were from another quarter; that there was more danger of anarchy being introduced. He adverted to a piece in Freneau,s paper of yesterday; he said he despised all their attacks on him personally, but that there never had been an act of the Government, not meaning in the executive line only, but in any line, which that paper had not abused. He had also marked the word republic thus �, where it was applied to the French republic. (See the original paper.) He was evidently sore and warm, and I took his intention to be, that I should interpose in some way with Freneau, perhaps withdraw his appointment of translating clerk to my office. But I will not do it. His paper has saved our Constitution, which was galloping fast into monarchy, and has been checked by no one means so powerfully as by that paper. It is well and universally known, that it has been that paper which has checked the career of the monocrats; and the President, not sensible of the designs of the party, has not with his usual good sense and sang froid, looked on the efforts and effects of this free press, and seen that, though some bad things have passed through it to the public; yet the good have preponderated immensely.





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   June the 7th, 1793 . Mr. Beckley, who has returned from New York within a few days, tells me that while he was there, Sir John Temple, Consul General of the northern States for Great Britain, showed him a letter from Sir Gregory Page Turner, a member of Parliament for a borough in Yorkshire, who, he said, had been a member for twenty-five years, and always confidential for the Ministers, in which he permitted him to read particular passages of the following purport : " that the Government was well apprizedof the predominancy of the British interest in the United States; that they considered Colonel Hamilton, Mr. King, and Mr. W. Smith of South Carolina, as the main supports of that interest; that particularly, they considered Colonel Hamilton, and not Mr. Hammond, as their effective Minister here; that if the anti-federal interest (that was his term), at the head of which they considered Mr. Jefferson to be, should prevail, these gentlemen had secured an asylum to themselves in England." Beckley could not understand whether they had secured it themselves,4 or whether they were only notifed that it was secured to them. So that they understand that they may go on boldly in their machinations to change the Government, and if they should be overset and choose to withdraw, they will be secure of a pension in England, as Arnold, Deane, &c., had. Sir John read passages of a letter (which



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he did not put into Beckley's hand, as he did the other) from Lord Grenville, saying nearly the same things. This letter mentions to Sir John, that though they had divided the Consul Generalship, and given the southern department to Bond, yet he, Sir John, was to retain his whole salary. [By this it would seem, as if, wanting to use Bond, they had covered his employment with this cloak.] Mr. Beckley says that Sir John Temple is a strong republican. I had a proof of his intimacy with Sir John in this circurnstance. Sir John received his new commission of Consul for the northern department, and instead of sending it through Mr. Hammond, got Beckley to enclose it to me for his exequatur. I wrote to Sir John that it must come through Mr. Hammond, enclosing it back to him. He accordingly then sent it to Mr. Hammond.

   In conversation with the President to-day, and speaking about General Greene, he said that he and General Greene had always differed in opinion about the manner of using militia. Greene always placed them in his front: himself was of opinion, they should always be used as a reserve to improve any advantage, for which purpose they were the finest fellows in the world. He said he was on the ground of the battle of Guilford, with a person who was in the action, and who explained the whole of it to him. That General Greene's front was behind a fence at the edge of a large field, through which the enemy were obliged to pass to get at them; and that in



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their passage through this, they must have been torn all to pieces, if troops had been posted there who would have stood their ground; and that the retreat from that position was through a thicket, perfectly secure. Instead of this, he posted the North Carolina militia there, who only gave one fire and fell back, so that the whole benefit of their position was lost. He thinks that the regulars, with their field pieces, would have hardly let a single man get through that field.



[ 4 In the margin is written, by Mr. Jefferson, " Impossible as to Hamilton; he was far above that."]

   Eodem die (June the 7th ). Beckley tells me that he has the following fact from Governor Clinton. That before the proposition for the present General Government, I.e. a little before Hamilton conceived a plan for establishing a monarchial government in the United States, he wrote a draught of a circular letter, which was to be sent to about persons, to bring it about. One of these letters, in Hamilton's handwriting, is now in possession of an old militia General up the North River, who, at that time, was thought orthodox enough to be entrusted in the execution. This General has given notice to Governor Clinton that he has this paper, and that he will deliver it into his hands, and no one's else. Clinton intends, the first interval of leisure, to go for it, and he will bring it to Philadelphia. Beckley is a man of perfect truth as to what he affirms of his own knowledge, but too credulous to what he hears from others.





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   June the 10th, 1793 . Mr. Brown gives me the following specimen of the phrenzy which prevailed at New York on the opening of the new Government. The first public ball which took place after the President's arrival there, Colonel Humphreys, Colonel W. S. Smith and Mrs. Knox were to arrange the ceremonials. These arrangements were as follows: a sofa at the head of the room, raised on several steps, whereon the President and Mrs. Washington were to be seated. The gentlemen were to dance in swords. Each one, when going to dance, was to lead his partner to the foot of the sofa, make a low obeisance to the President and his lady, then go and dance, and when done, bring his partner again to the foot of the sofa for new obeisance, and then to retire to their chairs. It was to be understood, too, that gentlemen should be dressed in bags. Mrs. knox contrived to come with the President, and to follow him and Mrs. Washington to their destination, and she had the design of forcing an invitation from the President to a seat on the sofa. She mounted up the steps after them unbidden, but unfortunately the wicked sofa was so short, that when the President and Mrs. Washington were seated, there was not room for a third person; she was obliged, therefore, to descend in the face of the company, and to sit where she could. In other respects the ceremony was conducted rigorously according to the arrangements; and the President made to pass an evening which his good sense rendered a very miserable one to him.





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   June the 12th . Beckley tells me that Klingham has been with him to-day, and relates to him the following fact: A certificate of the old Congress had been offered at the Treasury and refused payment, and so indorsed in red ink as usual. This certificate came to the hands of Francis, (the quondam clerk of the Treasury, who, on account of his being dipped in the infamous case of the Baron Glaubec, Hamilton had been obliged to dismiss, to save appearances, but with an assurance of all future service, and he accordingly got him established in New York). Francis wrote to Hamilton that such a ticket was offered him, but he could not buy it unless he would inform him and give him his certificate that it was good. Hamilton wrote him a most friendly letter, and sent him the certificate. He bought the paper, and came on here and got it recognized, whereby he made twenty-five hundred dollars. Klingham saw both the letter and certificate. Irving, a clerk in the Treasury, an Irishman, is the author of the pieces now coming out under the signature of Veritas, and attacking the President. I have long suspected this detestable game was playing by the fiscal party, to place the President on their side.


CABINET MEETINGS.

   June the 17th, 1793 . At a meeting of the Heads of Department at the President's this day, on sum-mons from him, a letter from Mr. Genet of the 15th



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inst. (addressed to the Secretary of State on the subject of the seizure of a vessel by the Governor of New York, as having been armed, equipped and manned in that port, with a design to cruise on the enemies of France), was read, as also the draught of an answer prepared by the Secretary of State, which was approved.

   Read, also, a letter of June 14th from Mr. Hammond to the Secretary of State, desiring to know whether the French privateers, the Citizen Genet, and Sans Culottes, are to be allowed to return or send their prizes into the ports of the United States. It is the opinion that he be informed that they were required to depart to the dominions of their own sovereign, and nothing expressed as to their ulterior proceedings; and that in answer to that part which states that the Sans Culottes had increased its force in the port of Baltimore, and remained there in the avowed intention of watching the motions of a valuable ship now lying there, it be answered that we expect the speedy departure of those privateers will obviate the inconveniences apprehended, and that it will be considered whether any practical arrangements can be adopted to prevent the augmentations of the force of armed vessels.


THOMAS JEFFERSON. ALEXANDER HAMILTON. HENRY KNOX.




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   June the 20th, 1793 At a meeting this day of the Heads of Department at the President's, on summons from him, a letter from Messrs. Viar and Jaudines, dated June 18th, and addressed to the Secretary of State, was read; whereupon it is the opinion that a full detail of the proceedings of the United States with respect to the southern Indians and the Spaniards be prepared, and a justification as to the particular matters charged in the said letter; that this be sent, with all the necessary documents, to our Commissioners at the court of Madrid, leaving to them a discretion to change expressions in it which to them may appear likely to give offence in the circumstances under which they may be at the time of receiving it; and that a copy be sent to Mr. Pinckney for his information, and to make such use of the matter it contains as to him should seem expedient; that an answer be written to Messrs. Viar and Jaudines informing them that we shall convey our sentiments on the subject to their court through our commissioners at Madrid, and letting them see that we are not insensible to the style and manner of their communications.

   A draught of a letter from the Secretary of State to Mr. Hammond, asking when an. answer to his letter of May 29th, 1792 , might be expected, was read and approved.


THOMAS JEFFERSON. ALEXANDER HAMILTON. HENRY KNOX.




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   July the 5th, 1793 . A meeting desired by Alexander Hamilton at my office. Himself, Knox, and myself met accordingly. He said that according to what had been agreed on in presence of the President, in consequence of Mr. Genet's declining to pay the $45,000 at his command in the treasury, to the holders of the St. Domingo bills, we had agreed to pay the holders out of other moneys to that amount; that he found, however, that these bills would amount to $90,000 and the question was whether he should assume $90,000 to be paid out of the September instalment. This, he said, would enable holders to get discounts at the banks, would therefore be equal to ready money, and save them from bankruptcy. Unanimously agreed to. We also agreed to a letter written by General Knox to Governor Mifflin, to have a particular inquiry made whether the Little Sarah is arming, &c., or not. I read also Governor Lee's letter about the Governor of South Carolina's proclamation respecting pestilential disease in West Indies. We are all of opinion the evidence is too slight for interference, and doubt the power to interfere. Therefore let it lie.

   Mr. Genet called on me, and read to me very rapidly instructions he had prepared for Michaud, who is going to Kentucky; an address to the inhabitants of Louisiana, and another to those of Canada. In these papers it appears that, besides encouraging those inhabitants to insurrection, he speaks of two generals in Kentucky who have proposed to him



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to go and take New Orleans, if he will furnish the expense, about £3,000 sterling. He declines advancing it, but promises that sum ultimately for their expenses; proposes that officers shall be commissioned by himself in Kentucky and Louisiana; that they shall rendezvous out of the territories of the United States, suppose in Louisiana, and there making up a battalion to be called the -- -- -- -of inhabitants of Louisiana and Kentucky, and getting what Indians they could, to undertake the expedition against New Orleans, and then Louisiana to be established into an independent State, connected in commerce with France and the United States; that two frigates shall go into the river Mississippi, and co-operate against New Orleans. The address to Canada was to encourage them to shake off English yoke, to call Indians to their assistance, and to assure them of the friendly dispositions of their neighbors of the United States.

   He said he communicated these things to me, not as Secretary of State, but as Mr. Jefferson. I told him that his enticing officers and soldiers from Kentucky to go against Spain, was really putting a halter about their necks; for that they would assuredly be hung if they commenced hostilities against a nation at peace with the United States. That leaving out that article I did not care what insurrections should be excited in Louisiana. He had about a fortnight ago sent me a communication for Michaud as consul of France at Kentucky, and desired an Exequatur.



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I told him this could not be given, that it was only in the ports of the United States they were entitled to consuls, and that if France should have a consul at Kentucky, England and Spain would soon demand the same, and we should have all our interior country filled with foreign agents. He acquiesced, and asked me to return the commission and his note, which I did; but he desired I would give Michaud a letter of introduction for Governor Shelby. I sent him one a day or two after. He now observes to me that in that letter I speak of him only as a person of botanical and natural pursuits, but that he wished the Governor to view him as something more; as a French citizen possessing his confidence. I took back the letter and wrote another.


MEMORANDUM OF A MEETING AT THE STATE HOUSE,
PHILADELPHIA, RELATIVE TO THE CASE
OF THE LITTLE SARAH.

   July the 8th, 1793 . At a meeting at the State House of the City of Philadelphia,

   Present: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of War.

   It appears that a brigantine, called the Little Sarah, has been fitted out at the port of Philadelphia, with fourteen cannon and all other equipment, indicating that she is intended to cruise under the authority of France, and that she is now lying in the river Delaware, at some place between this city



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and Mud Island; that a conversation has been had between the Secretary of State and the Minister Plenipotentiary of France, in which conversation. the Minister refused to give any explicit assurance that the brigantine would continue until the arrival of the President, and his decision in the case, but made declarations respecting her not being ready to sail within the time of the expected return of the President, from which the Secretary of State infers with confidence, that she will not sail till the President will have an opportunity of considering and determining the case; that in the course of the conversation, the Minister declared that the additional guns which had been taken in by the Little Sarah were French property, but the Governor of Pennsylvania declared that he has good ground to believe that two of her cannon were purchased here of citizens of Philadelphia.

   The Governor of Pennsylvania asks advice what steps, under the circumstances, he shall pursue?

   The Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of War are of opinion, that it is expedient that immediate measures should be taken provisionally for establishing a battery on Mud Island, under cover of a party of militia, with direction that if the brig Sarah should attempt to depart before the pleasure of the President shall be known concerning her, military coercion be employed to arrest and prevent her progress.

   The Secretary of State dissents from this opinion.





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REASONS FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S DISSENT.

   I am against the preceding opinion of the Secretaries of the Treasury and War, for ordering a battery to be erected on Mud Island, and firing on the Little Sarah, an armed vessel of the Republic of France:

   Because I am satisfied, from what passed between Mr. Genet and myself at our personal interview yesterday, that the vessel will not be ordered to sail till the return of the President, which, by a letter of this day's post, we may certainly expect within eight and forty hours from this time.

   Because the erecting a battery and mounting guns to prevent her passage might cause a departure not now intended, and produce the fact it is meant to prevent.

   Because were such battery and guns now in readiness and to fire on her, in the present ardent state of her crew just in the moment of leaving port, it is morally certain that bloody consequences would follow. No one could say how many lives would be lost on both sides, and all experience has shown that blood once seriously spilled between nation and nation, the contest is continued by subordinate agents, and the door of peace is shut. At this moment, too, we expect in the river twenty of their ships of war, with a fleet of from one hundred to one hundred and fifty of their private vessels, which will arrive at the scene of blood in time to continue it, if not to partake in it.





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   Because the actual commencement of hostilities against a nation, for such this act may be, is an act of too serious consequence to our countrymen to be brought on their heads by subordinate officers, not chosen by them nor clothed with their confidence; and too presumptuous on the part of those officers, when the chief magistrate, into whose hands the citizens have committed their safety, is within eight and forty hours of his arrival here, and may have an opportunity of judging for himself and them, whether the buying and carrying away two cannon, (for according to information, the rest are the nation's own property,) is sufficient cause of war between Americans and Frenchmen.

   Because, should the vessel, contrary to expectation, depart before the President's arrival, the adverse powers may be told the truth of the case : that she went off contrary to what we had a right to expect; that we shall be justifiable in future cases to measure our confidence accordingly; that for the present we shall demand satisfaction from France, which, with the proof of good faith we have already given, ought to satisfy them. Above all, Great Britain ought not to complain : for, since the date of the order forbidding that any of the belligerent powers should equip themselves in our ports with our arms, these two cannon are all that have escaped the vigilance of our officers on the part of their enemies, while their vessels have carried off more than ten times the number, without any



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impediment; and if the suggestion be true (and as yet it is but suggestion) that there are fifteen or twenty Americans on board the Little Sarah, who have gone with their own consent, it is equally true that more than ten times that number of Americans are at this moment on board English ships of war, who have been taken forcibly from our merchant vessels at sea or in port, wherever met with, and compelled to bear arms against the friends of their country. And is it less a breach of our neutrality towards France to suffer England to strengthen herself with our force, than towards England to suffer France to do so? And are we equally ready and disposed to sink the British vessels in our ports by way of reprisal for this notorious and avowed practice?

   Because it is inconsistent for a nation which has been patiently bearing for ten years the grossest insults and injuries from their late enemies, to rise at a feather against their friends and benefactors; and that, too, in a moment when circumstances have kindled the most ardent affections of the two people towards each other; when the little subjects of displeasure which have arisen are the acts of a particular individual, not yet important enough to have been carried to his government as causes of complaint; are such as nations of moderation and justice settle by negotiation, not making war their first step; are such as that government would correct at a word, if we may judge from the late unequivocal



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demonstrations of their friendship towards us; and are very slight shades of the acts committed against us by England, which we have been endeavoring to rectify by negotiation, and on which they have never condescended to give any answer to our Minister.

   Because I would not gratify the combination of kings with the spectacle of the two only republics on earth destroying each other for two cannon; nor would I, for infinitely greater cause, add this country to that combination, turn the scale of contest, and let it be from our hands that the hopes of man received their last stab.

   It has been observed that a general order has been already given to stop by force vessels arming contrary to rule in our ports, in which I concurred. I did so because it was highly presumable that the destination of such a vessel would be discovered in some early stage, when there would be few persons on board, these not yet disposed nor prepared to resist, and a small party of militia put aboard would stop the procedure without a marked infraction of the peace.. But it is a much more serious thing when a vessel has her full complement of men, (here said to be one hundred and twenty,) with every preparation and probably with disposition to go through with their enterprise. A serious engagement is then a certain consequence.

   Besides, an act of force, committed by an officer in a distant port, under general orders, given long ago; to take



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effect on all cases, and with less latitude of discretion in him, would be a much more negotiable case than a recent order, given by the general Government itself (for that is the character we are to assume) on the spot, in the very moment, pointed at this special case, professing full discretion and not using it. This would be a stubborn transaction, not admitting those justifications and explanations which might avert a war, or admitting such only as would be entirely humiliating to the officers giving the order, and to the Government itself.

   On the whole, respect to the chief magistrate, respect to our countrymen, their lives, interests, and affection, respect to a most friendly nation, who, if we give them the opportunity, will answer our wrongs by correcting and not by repeating them; respect to the most sacred cause that ever man was engaged in, poising maturely the evils which may flow from the commitment of an act which it would be in the power and probably in the temper of subordinate agents to make an act of continued war, and those which may flow from an eight and forty hours suspension of the act, are motives with me for suspending it eight and forty hours, even should we thereby lose the opportunity of committing it altogether.





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COPY OF A MINUTE GIVEN TO THE PRESIDENT.

   July the l2th, 1793 . At a meeting of the Heads of the Departments at the President's, on summons from him, and on consideration of various representations from the Minister Plenipotentiary of France and Great Britain, on the subject of vessels arming and arriving in our ports, and of prizes;-it is their opinion that letters be written to the said ministers, informing them that the Executive of the United States is desirous of having done what shall be strictly conformable to the treaties of the United States; and the laws respecting the said cases has determined to refer the questions arising therein to persons learned in the laws; that as this reference will occasion some delay, it is expected that, in the meantime, the Little Sarah, or Little Democrat, the ship Jane, and the ship William, in the Delaware, the Citoyen Genet and her prizes, the brigs LovelyLass and Prince William Henry, and the brig in the Chesapeake, do not depart till the further order of the President.

   That letters be addressed to the Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, requesting their attendance at this place on Thursday the l8th instant, to give their advice on certain matters of public concern, which will be referred to them by the President.

   That the Governor be desired to have the ship Jane attended to with vigilance, and if she be found



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augmenting her force and about to depart, that he cause her to be stopped.


THOMAS JEFFERSON.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON.
HENRY KNOX.


A RECAPITULATION OF QUESTIONS WHEREUPON CABINET MEMBERS HAVE GIVEN OPINIONS.

   Does the treaty with France leave us free to prohibit her from arming vessels in our ports? Thomas Jefferson, Hamilton, Knox, and Randolph-unanimous-it does. As the treaty obliges us to prohibit the enemies of France from arming in our ports, and leaves us free to prohibit France, do not the laws of neutrality oblige us to prohibit her? Same persons answer they do.

   How far may a prohibition now declared be retrospective to the vessels armed in Charleston before the prohibition, to wit, the Citoyen Genet and Sans Culottes, and what is to be done with these prizes? Thomas Jefferson,-It cannot be retrospective at all; they may sell their prizes, and continue to act freely as other armed vessels of France. Hamilton and Knox,-The prizes ought to be given up to the English, and the privateers suppressed. Randolph,-They are free to sell their prizes, and the privateers should be ordered away, not to return here till they shall have been to the dominions of their own sovereign, and thereby purged the illegality of their



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origin. This last opinion was adopted by the President.

   Our citizens who have joined in these hostilities against nations at peace with the United States, are they punishable? E. Randolph gave an official opinion-they were. Thomas Jefferson, Hamilton and Knox joined in the opinion. All thought it our duty to have prosecutions instituted against them,, that the laws might pronounce on their case. In the first instance, two only were prosecuted merely to try the question, and to satisfy the complaint of the British men; and because it was thought they might have offended unwittingly. But a subsequent armament of a vessel at New York taking place with full knowledge of this prosecution, all the persons engaged in it, citizens and foreigners, were ordered to be prosecuted.

   May the prohibition extend to the means of the party arming, or are they only prohibited from using our means for the annoyance of their enemies? Thomas Jefferson of opinion they are free to use their own means, i.e., to mount their own guns, &c. Hamilton and Knox of opinion they are not to put even their own implements or means into a posture of annoyance. The President has as yet not decided this.

   May an armed vessel arriving here be prohibited to employ their own citizens found here as seamen or mariners? Thomas Jefferson,-They cannot be prohibited to recruit their own citizens. Hamilton



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and Knox, -- They may and ought to be prohibited. No decision yet by the President.

   It appears to me the President wished the Little Sarah had been stopped by military coercion, that is, by firing on her; yet I do not believe he would have ordered it himself had he been here, though he would be glad if we had ordered it. The United States being a ship-building nation, may they sell ships, prepared for war, to both parties? Thomas Jefferson,-They may sell such ships in their ports to both parties, or carry them for sale to the dominions of both parties. E. Randolph of opinion they could not sell them here; and that if they attempted to carry them to the dominions of the parties for sale, they might be seized by the way as contraband. Hamilton of same opinion, except that he did not consider them as sizable for contraband, but as the property of a power, making itself a party in the way by an aid of such a nature, and consequently that it would be a breach of neutrality. Hamilton moves that the Government of France be desired to recall Mr. Genet. Knox adds that he be in the meantime suspended from his functions. Thomas Jefferson proposes that his correspondence be communicated to his Government, with friendly observations. President silent.


   July the 15th . Thomas Jefferson, Hamilton and Knox met at the President's.



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applied to Knox for the loan of four cannon to mount at Mud Island. He informed him he should station a guard of thirty-five militia there, and asked what arrangement for rations the general Government had taken. Knox told him nothing could be done as to rations, and he would ask the President for the cannon. In the meantime, he promised him to put the cannon on board a boat, ready to send off as soon as permission was obtained. The President declared his own opinion first and fully, that when the orders were given to the Government to stop vessels arming, &c., in our ports, even by military force, he took for granted the Government would use such diligence as to stop those projects in embryo, and stop them when no force was requisite, or a very small party of militia would suffice; that here was a demand from the Government of Pennsylvania to land four cannon under pretext of executing orders of the general Government; that if this was granted, we should be immediately applied to by every other Governor, and that not for one place only, but for several, and our cannon would be dispersed all over the United States; that for this reason we would refuse the same request to the Governors of South Carolina, Virginia, and Rhode Island; that if they erected batteries, they must establish men for them, and would come on us for this, too. He did not think the Executive had a power to establish permanent guards : he had never looked to anything permanent when the orders were given to the Governors, but



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only an occasional call on small parties of militia in the moments requiring it. These sentiments were so entirely my own, that I did little more than combat on the same grounds the opinions of Hamilton and Knox. The latter said he would be ready to lend an equal number to every government to carry into effect orders of such importance; and Hamilton, that he would be willing to lend them in cases where they happened to be as near the place where they were to be mounted.

   Hamilton submitted the purchase of a large quantity of saltpetre, which would outrun the funds destined to objects of that class by Congress. We were unanimous we ought to venture on it, and to the procuring supplies of military stores in the present circumstances, and take on us the responsibility to Congress, before whom it should be laid.

   The President was fully of the same opinion.

   In the above case of the cannon, the President gave no final order while I remained; but I saw that he was so impressed with the disagreeableness of taking them out of the boat again, that he would yield. He spoke sharply to Knox for having put them in that position without consulting him, and declared that, but for that circumstance, he would not have hesitated one moment to refuse them.


   July the 18th, 1793 . Lear calls on me. I told him that Irving, an Irishman, and a writer in the



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Treasury, who, on a former occasion, had given the most decisive proofs of his devotion to his principal, was the author of the pieces signed Veritas; and I wished he could get at some of Irving's acquaintances and inform himself of the fact, as the person who told me of it would not permit the name of his informer to be mentioned; [Note.-Beckley told me of it, and he had it from Swaine, the printer to whom the pieces were delivered;] that I had long before suspected this excessive foul play in that party, of writing themselves in the character of the most exaggerated democrats, and incorporating with it a great deal of abuse on the President, to make him believe it was that party who were his enemies, and so throw him entirely into the scale of the monocrats. Lear said he no longer ago than yesterday, expressed to the President his suspicions of the artifices of that party to work on him. He mentioned the following fact as a proof of their writing in the character of their adversaries; to wit, the day after the little incident of Richet's toasting " the man of the people," (see the gazettes,) Mrs. Washington was at Mrs. Powel's, who mentioned to her that when the toast was given, there was a good deal of disapprobation appeared in the audience, and that many put on their hats and went out; on inquiry, he had not found the fact true, and yet it was put into -- -'S paper, and written under the character of a republican, though he is satisfied it is altogether a slander of the monocrats. He mentioned this to the Presi-



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dent, but he did not mention to him the following fact, which he knows; that in New York, the last summer, when the parties of Jay and Clinton were running so high, it was an agreed point with the former, that if any circumstances should ever bring it to a question, whether to drop Hamilton or the President, they had decided to drop the President. He said that lately one of the loudest pretended friends to the Government, damned it, and said it was good for nothing, that it could not support itself, and it was time to put it down and set up a better; and yet the same person, in speaking to the President, puffed off that party as the only friends to the Government. He said he really feared, that by their artifices and industry, they would aggravate the President so much against the republicans, as to separate him from the body of the people. I told him what the same cabals had decided to do, if the President had refused his assent to the bank bill; also what Brockhurst Livingston said to -- , that Hamilton's life was much more precious to the community than the President's.


CABINET MEETINGS.

    July the 29th, 1793 . At a meeting at the President's on account of the British letter-of-marque, ship Jane, said to have put up waste boards, to have pierced two port holes, and mounted two cannon (which she brought in) on new carriages which she did not bring in, and consequently having sixteen,



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instead of fourteen, guns mounted, it was agreed that a letter-of-marque, or vessel arme' en guerre, and en merchandise, is not a privateer, and therefore not to be ordered out of our ports. It was agreed by Hamilton, Knox, and myself, that the case of such a vessel does not depend on the treaties, but on the law of nations. Edmund Randolph thought, as she had a mixed character of merchant vessel and privateer, she might be considered under the treaty; but this being overruled, the following paper was written:

   Rules proposed by Attorney General:

   1st. That all equipments purely for the accommodation of vessels, as merchantmen, be admitted. [Agreed.]

   2d. That all equipments, doubtful in their nature, and applicable equally to commerce or war, be admitted, as producing too many minutia. [Agreed.]

   3d. That all equipments, solely adapted to military objects, be prohibited. [Agreed.]

   Rules proposed by the Secretary of the Treasury:

   lst. That the original arming and equipping of vessels for military service, offensive or defensive, in the ports of the United States, be considered as prohibited to all. [Agreed.]

   2d. That vessels which were armed before their coming into our ports, shall not be permitted to augment these equipments in the ports of the United States, but may repair or replace any military equipments which they had when they began their voyage for the United States; that this, however, shall be



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with the exception of privateers of the parties opposed to France, who shall not refit or repair. [Negatived-the Secretary of the Treasury only holding the opinion.]

   3d. That for convenience, vessels armed and commissioned before they come into our ports, may engage their own citizens, not being inhabitants of the United States. [Agreed.]

   I subjoined the following:

   I concur in the rules proposed by the Attorney General, as far as respects materials or means of annoyance furnished by us; and I should be for an additional rule, that as to means or materials brought into this country, and belonging to themselves, they are free to use them.


   August the 1st . Met at the President's, to consider what was to be done with Mr. Genet. All his correspondence with me was read over. The following propositions were made: 1. That a full statement of Mr. Genet's conduct be made in a letter to G. Morris, and be sent with his correspondence, to be communicated to the Executive Council of France; the letter to be so prepared, as to serve for the form of communication to the Council. Agreed unanimously.

   2. That in that letter his recall be required. Agreed by all, though I expressed a preference of expressing that desire with great delicacy; the others were for peremptory terms. 3. To send him off. This was proposed by Knox; but rejected by every



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other. 4. To write a letter to Mr. Genet, the same in substance with that written to G. Morris, and let him know we had applied for his recall. I was against this, because I thought it would render him extremely active in his plans, and endanger confusion. But I was overruled by the other three gentlemen and the President. 5. That a publication of the whole correspondence, and statement of the proceedings, should be made by way of appeal to the people. Hamilton made a jury speech of three-quarters of an hour, as inflammatory and declamatory as if he had been speaking to a jury. E. Randolph opposed it. I chose to leave the contest between them. Adjourned to next day.


   August the 2d . Met again. Hamilton spoke again three-quarters of an hour. I answered on these topics. Object of the appeal.-The democratic society; this the great circumstance of alarm; afraid it would extend its connections over the continent; chiefly meant for the local object of the ensuing election of Governor. If left alone, would die away after that is over. If opposed, if proscribed, would give it importance and vigor; would give it a new object, and multitudes would join it merely to assert the right of voluntary associations. That the measure was calculated to make the President assume the station of the head of a party, instead of the head of the nation. Plan of the appeal.-To consist of facts and the decisions of the President. As to facts we



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are agreed; but as to the decisions, there have been great differences of opinion among us. Sometimes as many opinions as persons. This proves there will be ground to attack the decisions. Genet will appeal also; it will become a contest between the President and Genet-anonymous writers-will be same difference of opinion in public, as in our cabinet-will be same difference in Congress, for it must be laid before them-would, therefore, work very unpleasantly at home. How would it work abroad? France-unkind-after such proofs of her friendship, should rely on that friendship, and her justice. Why appeal to the world? Friendly nations always negotiate little differences in private. Never appeal to the world, but when they appeal to the sword. Confederacy of Pilnitz was to overthrow the Government of France. The interference of France to disturb other governments and excite insurrections, was a measure of reprisal. Yet these Princes have been able to make it believed to be the system of France. Colonel Hamilton supposes Mr. Genet's proceedings here are in pursuance of that system; and we are so to declare it to the world, and to add our testimony to this base calumny of the Princes. What a triumph to them to be backed by our testimony. What a fatal stroke at the cause of liberty; et tu Brute. We indispose the French Government, and they will retract their offer of the treaty of commerce. The President manifestly inclined to the appeal to the people.5



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Knox, in a foolish incoherent sort of a speech, introduced the pasquinade lately printed, called the funeral of George W -- n, and James W -- n, King and Judge, &c., where the President was placed on a guillotine. The President was much inflamed; got into one of those passions when he cannot command himself; ran on much on the personal abuse which had been bestowed on him; defied any man on earth to produce one single act of his since he had been in the Government, which was not done on the purest motives; that he had never repented but once the having slipped the moment of resigning his office, and that was every moment since; that by God he had rather be in his grave than in his present situation; that he had rather be on his farm than to be made Emperor of the world; and yet that they were charging him with wanting to be a King. That that rascal Freneau sent him three of his papers every day, as if he thought he would become the distributor of his papers; that he could see in this, nothing but an impudent design to insult him: he ended in this high tone. There was a pause. Some difficulty in resuming our question; it was, however, after a little while, presented again, and he said there seemed to



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be no necessity for deciding it now; the propositions before agreed on might be put into a train of execution, and perhaps events would show whether the appeal would be necessary or not. He desired we would meet at my office the next day, to consider what should be done with the vessels armed in our ports by Mr. Genet, and their prizes.



5 He said that Mr. Morris, taking a family dinner with him the other day, went largely, and of his own accord, into this subject; advised this appeal, and promised, if the President adopted it, that he would support it himself, and engage for all his connections. The President repeated this twice, and with an air of importance. Now, Mr. Morris has no family connections: he engaged then for his political friends. This shows that the President has not confidence enough in the virtue and good sense of mankind, to confide in a government bottomed on them, and thinks other props necessary.

   August the 3d . We met. The President wrote to take our opinions, whether Congress should be called. Knox pronounced at once against it. Randolph was against it. Hamilton said his judgment was against it, but that if any two were for it, or against it, he would join them to make a majority. I was for it. We agreed to give separate opinions to the President. Knox said we should have had fine work, if Congress had been sitting these two last months. The fool thus let out the secret. Hamilton endeavored to patch up the indiscretion of this blabber, by saying " he did not know; he rather thought they would have strengthened the executive arm." It is evident they do not wish to lengthen the session of the next Congress, and probably they particularly wish it should not meet till Genet is gone. At this meeting I received a letter from Mr. Remson at New York, informing me of the event of the combat between the Ambuscade and the Boston. Knox broke out into the most unqualified abuse of Captain Courtany. Hamilton, with less fury, but with the deepest vexation, loaded him with censures.



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Both showed the most unequivocal mortification at the event.


CONFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT WASHINGTON.

   August the 6th, 1793 . The President calls on me at my house in the country, and introduces my letter of July the 31st, announcing that I should resign at the close of the next month. He again expressed his repentance at not having resigned himself, and how much it was increased by seeing that he was to be deserted by those on whose aid he had counted; that he did not know where he should look to find characters to fill up the offices; that mere talents did not suffice for the Department of State, but it required a person conversant in foreign affairs, perhaps acquainted with foreign courts; that without this, the best talents would be awkward and at a loss, He told me that Colonel Hamilton had three or four weeks ago written to him, informing him that private as well as public reasons had brought him to the determination to retire, and that he should do it towards the close of the next session. He said he had often before intimated dispositions to resign, but never as decisively before; that he supposed he had fixed on the latter part of next session, to give an opportunity to Congress to examine into his conduct; that our going out at times so different, increased his difficulty; for if he had both places to fill at once, he might consult both the particular talents and geographical situation of our successors.

   

George Washington
(1732-1799)
From the Original Painting by Gilbert Stuart, now in possession of
the Boston Museum of Fine Arts.





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   He expressed great apprehensions at the fermentation which seemed to be working in the mind of the public; that many descriptions of persons, actuated by different causes, appeared to be uniting; what it would end in he knew not; a new Congress was to assemble, more numerous, perhaps of a different spirit; the first expressions of their sentiments would be important; if I would only stay to the end of that it would relieve him considerably.

   I expressed to him my excessive repugnance to public life, the particular uneasiness of my situation in this place, where the laws of society oblige me always to move exactly in the circle which I know to bear me peculiar hatred; that is to say, the wealthy aristocrats, the merchants connected closely with England, the new created paper fortunes; that thus surrounded, my words were caught, multiplied, misconstrued, and even fabricated and spread abroad to my injury; that he saw also, that there was such an opposition of views between myself and another part of the Administration, as to render it peculiarly unpleasing, and to destroy the necessary harmony. Without knowing the views of what is called the republican party here, or having any communication with them, I could undertake to assure him, from my intimacy with that party in the late Congress, that there was not a view in the republican party as spread over the United States, which went to the frame of the Government; that I believed the next Congress would attempt nothing material, but



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to render their own body independent; that that party were firm in their dispositions to support the Government; that the manoeuvres of Mr. Genet might produce some little embarrassment, but that he would be abandoned by the republicans the moment they knew the nature of his conduct; and on the whole, no crisis existed which threatened anything.

   He said he believed the views of the republican party were perfectly pure, but when men put a machine into motion, it is impossible for them to stop it exactly where they would choose; or to say where it will stop. That the constitution we have is an excellent one, if we can. keep it where it is; that it was, indeed, supposed there was a party disposed to change it into a monarchical form, but that he could conscientiously declare there was not a man in the United States who would set his face more decidedly against it than himself. Here I interrupted him, by saying, " No rational man in the United States suspects you of any other disposition; but there does not pass a week, in which we cannot prove declarations dropping from the monarchical party that our Government is good for nothing, is a milk and water thing which cannot support itself, we must knock it down, and set up something of more energy. " He said if that was the case, he thought it a proof of their insanity, for that the republican spirit of the Union was so manifest and so solid, that it was astonishing how any one could expect to move it.





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   He returned to the difficulty of naming my successor; he said Mr. Madison would be his first choice, but that he had always expressed to him such a decision against public office, that he could not expect he would undertake it. Mr. Jay would prefer his present office. He said that Mr. Jay had a great opinion of the talents of Mr. King; that there was also Mr. Smith of South Carolina, and E. Rutledge; but he observed, that name whom he would, some objections would be made, some would be called speculators, some one thing, some another; and he asked me to mention any characters occurring to me. I asked him if Governor Johnson of Maryland had occurred to him? He said he had; that he was a man of great good sense, an honest man, and he believed, clear of speculations; but this, said he, is an instance of what I was observing; with all these qualifications, Governor Johnson, from a want of familiarity with foreign affairs, would be in them like a fish out of water; everything would be new to him, and he awkward in everything. I confessed to him that I had considered Johnson rather as fit for the Treasury Department. Yes, said he, for that he would be the fittest appointment that could be made; he is a man acquainted with figures, and having as good a knowledge of the resources of this country as any man. I asked him if Chancellor Livingston had occurred to him? He said yes; but he was from New York, and to appoint him while Hamilton was in, and before it should be



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known he was going out, would excite a newspaper conflagration, as the ultimate arrangement would not be known. He said McLurg had occurred to him as a man of first-rate abilities, but it is said that he is a speculator. He asked me what sort of a man Wolcott was. I told him I knew nothing of him myself; I had heard him characterized as a cunning man. I asked him whether some person could not take my office par interim, till he should make an appointment, as Mr. Randolph, for instance. Yes, said he, but there you would raise the expectation of keeping it, and I do not know that he is fit for it, nor what is thought of Mr. Randolph. I avoided noticing the last observation, and he put the question to me directly. I then told him, I went into society so little as to be unable to answer it: I knew that the embarrassments in his private affairs had obliged him to use expedients, which had injured him with the merchants and shop-keepers, and affected his character of independence; that these embarrassments were serious,, and not likely to cease soon. He said if I would only stay in till the end of another quarter (the last of December) it would get us through the difficulties of this year, and he was satisfied that the affairs of Europe would be settled with this campaign; for that either, France would be overwhelmed by it, or the confederacy would give up the contest. By that time, too, Congress would have manifested its character and view. I told him that I had set my



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private affairs in motion in a line which had powerfully called for my presence the last spring, and that they had suffered immensely from my not going home; that I had now calculated them to my return in the fall, and to fail in going then, would be the loss of another year, and prejudicial beyond measure. I asked him whether he could not name Governor Johnson to my office, under an express arrangement that at the close of the session he should take that of the Treasury. He said that men never chose to descend; that being once in a higher Department, he would not like to go into a lower one. He asked me whether I could not arrange my affairs by going home. I told him I did not think the public business would admit of it; that there never was a day now in which the absence of the Secretary of State would not be inconvenient to the public. And he concluded by desiring that I would take two or three days to consider whether I could not stay in till the end of another quarter, for that like a man going to the gallows, he was willing to put it off as long as he could ; but if I persisted, he must then look about him and make up his mind to do the best he could; and so he took leave.


CABINET MEETINGS.

   August the 20th . We met at the President's to examine by paragraphs the draught of a letter I had prepared to Gouverneur Morris on the conduct of Mr. Genet.

   There was no difference of opinion on



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any part of it, except on this expression, " An attempt to embroil both, to add still another nation to the enemies of his country, and to draw on both a reproach which it is hoped will never stain the history of either, that of liberty warring on herself. " Hamilton moved to strike out these words, " that of liberty warring on herself." He urged generally that it would give offence to the combined powers; that it amounted to a declaration that they were warring on liberty; that we were not called on to declare that the cause of France was that of liberty; that he had at first been with them with all his heart, but that he had long since left them, and was not for encouraging the idea here, that the cause of France was the cause of liberty in general, or could have either connection or influence in our affairs. Knox, according to custom, jumped plump into all his opinions. The President, with a good deal of positiveness, declared in favor of the expression; that he considered the pursuit of France to be that of liberty, however they might sometimes fail of the best means of obtaining it; that he had never at any time entertained a doubt of their ultimate success, if they hung well together; and that as to their dissensions, there were such contradictory accounts given, that no one could tell what to believe. I observed that it had been supposed among us all along that the present letter might become public; that we had therefore three parties to attend to,-1st, France; 2d, her enemies; 3d, ` The Anas 391 the people of the United States; that as to the enemies of France, it ought not to offend them, because the passage objected to, only spoke of an attempt to make the United States, a free nation, war on France, a free nation, which would be liberty warring against liberty; that as to France, we were taking so harsh a measure (desiring her to recall her Minister) that a precedent for it could scarcely be found; that we knew that Minister would represent to his Government that our Executive was hostile to liberty, leaning to monarchy, and would endeavor to parry the charges on himself, by rendering suspicions the source from which they flowed; that, therefore, it was essential to satisfy France, not only of our friendship to her, but our attachment to the general cause of liberty, and to hers in particular; that as to the people of the United States, we knew there were suspicions abroad that the Executive, in some of its parts, was tainted with a hankering after monarchy, an indisposition towards liberty, and towards the French cause; and that it was important, by an explicit declaration, to remove these suspicions, and restore the confidence of the people in their Government. Randolph opposed the passage on nearly the same ground with Hamilton. He added, that he thought it had been agreed that this correspondence should contain no expressions which could give offence to either party. I replied that it had been my opinion in the beginning of the correspondence, that while



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we were censuring the conduct of the French Minister, we should make the most cordial declarations of friendship to them; that in the first letter or two of the correspondence, I had inserted expressions of that kind, but that himself and the other two gentle-men had struck them out; that I thereupon con-formed to their opinions in my subsequent letters, and had carefully avoided the insertion of a single term of friendship to the French nation, and the letters were as dry and husky as if written between the generals of two enemy nations; that on the present occasion, however, it had been agreed that such expressions ought to be inserted in the letter now under consideration, and I had accordingly charged it pretty well with them; that I had further thought it essential to satisfy the French and our own citizens of the light in which we viewed their cause, and of our fellow feeling for the general cause of liberty, and had ventured only four words on the subject; that there was not from beginning to end of the letter one other expression or word in favor of liberty, and I should think it singular, at least, if the single passage of that character should be struck out.

   The President again spoke. He came into the idea that attention was due to the two parties who had been mentioned, France and the United States; that as to the former, thinking it certain their affairs would issue in a government of some sort-of considerable freedom-it was the only nation with



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whom our relations could be counted on; that as to the United States, there could be no doubt of their universal attachment to the cause of France, and of the solidity of their republicanism. He declared his strong attachment to the expression, but finally left it to us to accommodate. It was struck out, of course, and the expressions of affection in the context were a good deal taken down.

   August the 23d, 1793 . In consequence of my note of yesterday to the President, a meeting was called this day at his house to determine what should be done with the proposition of France to treat. The importance of the matter was admitted; and being of so old a date as May 22d, we might be accused of neglecting the interests of the United States, to have left it so long unanswered, and it could not be doubted Mr. Genet would avail himself of this inattention. The President declared it had not been inattention, that it had been the subject of conversation often at our meetings, and the delay had proceeded from the difficulty of the thing.

   If the struggles of France should end in the old despotism, the formation of such a treaty with the present government would be a matter of offence; if it should end in any kind of free government, he should be very unwilling, by inattention to their advances, to give offence, and lose the opportunity of procuring terms so advantageous to our country. He was, therefore, for writing to Mr. Morris to get the powers of Mr. Genet renewed to his successor.



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[As he had expressed this opinion to me the afternoon before, I had prepared the draught of a letter accordingly.] But how to explain the delay? The Secretary of the Treasury observed on the letter of the National Convention, that as it did not seem to require an answer, and the matters it contained would occasion embarrassment if answered, he should be against answering it; that he should be for writing to Mr. Morris; mentioning our readiness to treat with them, and suggesting a renewal of Mr. Genet's powers to his successor, but not in as strong terms as I had done in my draught of the letter not as a thing anxiously wished for by us, lest it should suggest to them the asking a price; and he was for my writing to Mr. Genet now an answer to his letter of May 22d, referring to the meeting of the Senate the entering on the treaty. Knox concurred with him, the Attorney General also,-except that he was against suggesting the renewal of Mr. Genet's powers, because that would amount to a declaration that we would treat with that government, would commit us to lay the subject before the Senate, and his principle had ever been to do no act, not unavoidably necessary, which, in the event of a counter revolution, might offend the future governing powers of that country. I stated to them that having observed from our conversations that the propositions to treat might not be acceded to immediately, I had endeavored to prepare Mr. Genet for it, by taking occasion in conversations to



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apprizehim of the control over treaties which our constitution had given to the Senate; that though this was indirectly done, (because not having been authorized to say anything official on the subject, I did not venture to commit myself directly,) yet, on some subsequent conversation, I found it had struck him exactly as I had wished; for, speaking on some other matter, he mentioned incidentally his propositions to treat, and said, however, as I know now that you cannot take up that subject till the meeting of the Senate, I shall say no more about it now, and so proceeded with his other subject, which I do not now recollect. I said I thought it possible by recalling the substance of these conversations to Mr. Genet, in a letter to be written now, I might add that the Executive had at length come to a conclusion, that on account of the importance of the matter, they would await the meeting of the Senate; but I pressed strongly the urging Mr. Morris to procure a renewal of Genet's powers, that we might not lose the chance of obtaining so advantageous a treaty. Edmund Randolph had argued against our acceding to it, because it was too advantageous; so much so that they would certainly break it, and it might become the cause of war. I answered that it would be easy, in the course of the negotiation, to cure it of its inequality by giving some compensation; but I had no fear of their revoking it, that the islanders themselves were too much interested in the concessions ever to suffer



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them to be revoked; that the best thinkers in France had long been of opinion that it would be for the interest of the mother country to let the colonies obtain subsistence wherever they could cheapest; that I was confident the present struggles in France would end in a free government of some sort, and that such a government would consider itself as growing out of the present one, and respect its treaties. The President recurred to the awkwardness of writing a letter now to Mr. Genet, in answer to his of May 22d; that it would certainly be construed as merely done with a design of exculpation of ourselves, and he would thence inculpate us. The more we reflected on this, the more the justice of the observation struck us. Hamilton and myself came into it-Knox still for the letter-Randolph half for it, half against it, according to custom.

   It was at length agreed I should state the substance of my verbal observations to Mr. Genet, in a letter to Mr. Morris, and let them be considered as the answer intended; for being from the Secretary of State, they might be considered as official, though not in writing.

   It is evident that taking this ground for their future justification to France and to the United States, they were sensible they had censurably neglected these overtures of treaty; for not only what I had said to Mr. Genet was without authority from them, but was never communicated to them till this day. To rest the justification of delay on



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answers given, it is true in time; but of which they had no knowledge till now, is an ostensible justification only.


   September the 4th, 1793 . At a meeting held some days ago, some letters from the Governor of Georgia were read, in which a consultation of officers, and a considerable expedition against the Creeks was proposed. We were all of opinion no such expedition should be undertaken. My reasons were that such a war might bring on a Spanish, and even an English war; that for this reason the aggressions of the Creeks had been laid before the last Congress, and they had not chosen to declare war, therefore the Executive should not take on itself to do it; and that according to the opinions of Pickens and Blount, it was too late in the season.

   I thought, however, that a temperate and conciliatory letter should be written to the Governor, in order that we might retain the disposition of the people of the State to assist in an expedition when undertaken. The other gentlemen thought a strong letter of disapprobation should be written. Such a one was this day produced, strong and reprehendatory enough, in which I thought were visible the personal enmities of Knox and Hamilton, against Telfair, Gun, and Jackson-the two last having been of the council of officers. The letter passed without objection, being of the complexion before determined.





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   Wayne's letter was read, proposing that six hundred militia should set out from Fort Pitt to attack certain Miami towns; while he marched against the principal towns. The President disapproved it, because of the difficulty, of concerted movements at six hundred miles distance; because these six hundred men might, and probably would have the whole force of the Indians to contend with; and because the object was not worth the risking such a number of men. We all concurred. It appeared to me, further, that to begin an expedition from Fort Pitt, the very first order for which is to be given now, when we have reason to believe Wayne advanced as far as Fort Jefferson, would be either too late for his movements, or would retard them very injuriously. [Note.-The letters from the Commissioners were now read, announcing the refusal of the Indians to treat, unless the Ohio were made the boundary; and that they were on their return.]

   A letter from Governor Clinton read, informing of his issuing a warrant to arrest Governor Galbaud, at the request of the French Consul, and that he was led to interfere because the Judge of the district lived at Albany. It was proposed to write to the Judge of the district, that the place of his residence was not adapted to his duties; and to Clinton, that Galbaud was not liable to arrest. Hamilton said, that by the laws of New York, the Governor has the powers of a justice of peace, and had issued the warrant as such.





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   I was against writing letters to judiciary officers. I thought them independent of the Executive, not subject to its coercion, and, therefore, not obliged to attend to its admonitions.

   The other three were for writing the letters. They thought it the duty of the President to see that the laws were executed; and if he found a failure in so important an officer, to communicate it to the legislature for impeachment.

   Edmund Randolph undertook to write the letters, and I am to sign them as if mine. The President brought forward the subject of the ports, and thought a new demand of answer should be made to Mr. Hammond. As we had not Mr. Hammond's last answer (of June 20th) on that subject, agreed to let it lie over to Monday.

   Hammond proposed, that on Monday we should take into consideration the fortification of the rivers and ports of the United States, and that though the Executive could not undertake to do it, preparatory surveys should be made to be laid before Congress, to be considered on Monday. The letters to Genet covering a copy of mine to Gov. Morris-of-to the French consuls, threatening the revocation of their Exequatursto Mr. Pinckney on the additional instructions of Great Britain to their navy for shipping our corn, flour, &c., and to Gov. Morris on the similar order of the French National Assembly, are to be ready on Monday.





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   My letter to Mr. Hammond, in answer to his of August 20th, was read and approved. Hamilton wished not to narrow the ground of compensation so much as to cases after August 7th. Knox joined him, and by several observations showed he did not know what the question was. He could not comprehend that the letter of August 7th, which promised compensation (because we had not used all the means in our power for restricting), would not be contradicted by a refusal to compensate in cases after August 7th, where we should naturally use all the means in our power for restriction, and these means should be insufficient. The letter was agreed to on Mr. Randolph's opinion and mine; Hamilton acquiescing, Knox opposing.


   At sundry meetings of the Heads of Departments and Attorney General, from the 1st to the 28th of November, 1793, at the President's, several matters were agreed upon, as stated in the following letters from the Secretary of State, to wit: --

   November the 8th. Circular letter to the representatives of France, Great Britain, Spain, and the United Netherlands, fixing provisionally the extent of our jurisdiction into the sea at a sea league.

   10th. Circular letter to the district attorneys, notifying the same, and committing to them the taking depositions in those cases.

   10th. Circular to the foreign representatives; notifying how depositions are to be taken in those cases.





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   The substance of the preceding letters was agreed to by all; the rough draughts were submitted to them and approved.

   November the 14th. To Mr. Hammond, that the United States are not bound to restore the Rochampton. This was agreed by all. The rough draught was submitted to and approved by Colonel Hamilton and Mr. Randolph. General Knox was on a visit to Trenton.

   10th. Letters to Mr. Genet and Hammond, and the 14th to Mr. Hollingsworth, for taking depositions in the cases of the Conningham and Pilgrim.

   13th. Ditto, to Mr. Genet, Hammond, and Bowle, for depositions in the case of the William.

   14th. Ditto, to Hollingsworth, to ascertain whether Mr. Moissonier had passed sentence on the Rochampton and Pilgrim.

   These last-mentioned letters of the 10th, 13th, and l4th, were, as to their substance, agreed to by all, the draughts were only communicated to Mr. Randolph, and approved by him.

   November the 13th. To Mr. Hammond, inquiring when we shall have an answer on the inexecution of the treaty. The substance agreed by all. The letter was sent off without communication, none of the gentlemen being at Germantown.

   22d. To Mr. Genet, returning the commissions of Pennevert and Chervi, because not addressed to the President.





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   22d. To Mr. Genet, inquiring whether the Lovely-Lass, Prince William Henry, and Jane, of Dublin have been given up; and if not, requiring that they be restored to owners. These were agreed to by all, as to their matter, and the letters themselves were submitted before they were sent to the President, the Secretary of War, and the Attorney-General.

   22d. To Mr. Gore, for authentic evidence of Dannery's protest on the President's revocation of Duplaine's Exequatur. The substance agreed by all. The letter sent off before communication.


THOMAS JEFFERSON.
HENRY KNOX.
EDMUND RANDOLPH.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON. November 23d, 1793 .


   November the 5th, 1793 . E. Randolph tells me; that Hamilton, in conversation with him yesterday, said, " Sir, if all the people in America were now assembled, and to call on me to say whether I am a friend to the French revolution, I would declare that I have it in abhorrence. "


CONFERENCES OF THE CABINET.

   November the 8th, 1793 . At a conference at the President's, where I read several letters of Mr. Genet; on finishing one of them, I asked what should



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be the answer? The President thereupon took occasion to observe, that Mr. Genet's conduct continued to be of so extraordinary a nature, that he meant to propose to our serious consideration, whether he should not have his functions discontinued, and be ordered away? He went lengthily into observations on his conduct, to raise against the Executive, 1, the People; 2, the State Governments; 3, the Congress. He showed he felt the venom of Genet's pen, but declared he would not choose his insolence should be regarded any further, than as might be thought to affect the honor of the country. Hamilton and Knox readily and zealously argued for dismissing Mr. Genet. Randolph opposed it with firmness, and pretty lengthily. The President replied to him lengthily, and concluded by saying he did not wish to have the thing hastily decided, but that we should consider of it, and give our opinions on his return from Reading and Lancaster.

   Accordingly, November the 18th, we met at his house; read new volumes of Genet's letters, received since the President's departure; then took up the discussion of the subjects of communication to Congress. 1. The Proclamation. E. Randolph read the statement he had prepared; Hamilton did not like it; said much about his own views; that the President had a right to declare his opinion to our. citizens and foreign nations; that it was not the interest of this country to join in the war, and that we were under no obligation to join in it; that though



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the declaration would not legally bind Congress, yet the President had a right to give his opinion of it, and he was against any explanation in the speech, which should yield that he did not intend that foreign nations should consider it as a declaration of neutrality, future as well as present; that he understood it as meant to give them that sort of assurance and satisfaction, and to say otherwise now, would be a deception on them. He was for the President's using such expressions, as should neither affirm his right to make such a declaration to foreign nations, nor yield it. Randolph and myself opposed the right of the President to declare anything future on the question, shall there or shall there not be war and that no such thing was intended; that Hamilton's construction of the effect of the proclamation, would have been a determination of the question of the guarantee, which we both denied to have intended, and I had at the time declared the Executive incompetent to. Randolph said he meant that foreign nations should understand it as an intimation of the President's opinion, that neutrality would be our interest. I declared my meaning to have been, that foreign nations should understand no such thing; that on the contrary, I would have chosen them to be doubtful, and to come and bid for our neutrality. I admitted the President, having received the nation at the close of Congress in a state of peace, was bound to preserve them in that state till Congress should meet again, and might proclaim



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anything which went no farther. The President declared he never had an idea that he could bind Congress against declaring war, or that anything contained in his proclamation could look beyond the first day of their meeting.

   His main view was to keep our people in peace; he apologized for the use of the term neutrality in his answers, and justified it, by having submitted the first of them (that to the merchants, wherein it was used) to our consideration, and we had not objected to the term. He concluded in the end, that Colonel Hamilton should prepare a paragraph on this subject for the speech, and it should then be considered. We were here called to dinner.

   After dinner, the renvoi of Genet was proposed by himself. I opposed it on these topics. France, the only nation on earth sincerely our friend. The measure so harsh a one, that no precedent is produced where it has not been followed by war. Our messenger has now been gone eighty-four days; consequently, we may hourly expect the return, and to be relieved by their revocation of him. Were it now resolved on, it would be eight or ten days before the matter on which the order should be founded, could be selected, arranged, discussed, and forwarded. This would bring us within four or five days of the meeting of Congress. Would it not be better to wait and see how the pulse of that body, new as it is, would beat? They are with us now, probably, but such a step as this may carry



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many over to Genet's side. Genet will not obey the order, &c., &c. The President asked me what I would do if Genet sent the accusation to us to be communicated to Congress, as he threatened in the letter to Moultrie? I said I would not send it to Congress; but either put it in the newspapers, or send it back to him ta be published if he pleased. Other questions and answers were put and returned in a quicker altercation than I ever before saw the President use. Hamilton was for the renvoi; spoke much of the dignity of the nation; that they were now to form their character; that our conduct now would tempt or deter other foreign Ministers from treating us in the same manner; touched on the President's personal feelings; did not believe France would make it a cause of war; if she did, we ought to do what was right, and meet the consequences, &c. Knox on the same side, and said he thought it very possible Mr. Genet would either declare us a department of France, or levy troops here and endeavor to reduce us to obedience. Randolph of my opinion, and argued chiefly on the resurrection of popularity to Genet, which might be produced by this measure. That at present he was dead in the public opinion, if we would but leave him so. The President lamented there was not unanimity among us; that as it was, we had left him exactly where we found him; and so it ended.


   November the 21st . We met at the President's. The manner of explaining to Congress the intentions



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of the proclamation, was the matter of debate. Randolph produced his way of stating it. This expressed its views to have been, 1, to keep our citizens quiet; 2, to intimate to foreign nations that it was the President's opinion, that the interests and dispositions of this country were for peace. Hamilton produced his statement, in which he declared his intention to be, to say nothing which could be laid hold of for any purpose; to leave the proclamation to explain itself. He entered pretty fully into all the argumentation of Pacificus; he justified the right of the President to declare his opinion for a future neutrality, and that there existed no circumstances to oblige the United States to enter into the war on account of the guarantee; and that in agreeing to the proclamation, he meant it to be understood as conveying both those declarations; viz. neutrality, and that the casus faederis on the guarantee did not exist. He admitted the Congress might declare war, notwithstanding these declarations of the President. In like manner, they might declare war in the face of a treaty, and in direct infraction of it. Among other positions laid down by him, this was with great positiveness; that the Constitution having given power to the President and Senate to make treaties, they might make a treaty of neutrality which should take from Congress the right to declare war in that particular case, and that under the form of a treaty they might exercise any powers whatever, even those exclusively



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given by the constitution to the House of Representatives. Randolph opposed this position, and seemed to think that where they undertook to do acts by treaty, (as to settle a tariff of duties,) which were exclusively given to the Legislature, that an act of the Legislature would be necessary to confirm them, as happens in England, when a treaty interferes with duties established by law. I insisted that in giving to the President and Senate a power to make treaties, the Constitution meant only to authorize them to carry into effect, by way of treaty, any powers they might constitutionally exercise. I was sensible of the weak points in this position, but there were still weaker in the other hypothesis; and if it be impossible to discover a rational measure of authority to have been given by this clause, I would rather suppose that the cases which my hypothesis would leave unprovided, were not thought of by the convention, or if thought of, could not be agreed on, or were thought of and deemed unnecessary to be invested in the Government. Of this last description, were treaties of neutrality, treaties offensive and defensive, &c. In every event, I would rather construe so narrowly as to oblige the nation to amend, and thus declare what powers they would agree to yield, than too broadly, and indeed, , so broadly as to enable the executive and Senate to do things which the Constitution forbids. On the question, which form of explaining the principles of the proclamation should be adopted, I declared



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for Randolph's, though it gave to that instrument more objects than I had contemplated. Knox declared for Hamilton's. The President said he had had but one object, the keeping our people quiet till Congress should meet; that nevertheless, to declare he did not mean a declaration of neutrality, in the technical sense of the phrase, might perhaps be crying peccavi before he was charged. However, he did not decide between the two draughts.


   November the 23d . At the President's. Present, Knox, Randolph, and Th: Jefferson. Subject, the heads of the speech. One was, a proposition to Congress to fortify the principal harbors. I opposed the expediency of the general Government's undertaking it, and the expediency of the President's proposing it. It was amended, by substituting a proposition to adopt means for enforcing respect to the jurisdiction of the United States within its waters. It was proposed to recommend the establishment of a military academy. I objected that none of the specified powers given by the Constitution to Congress, would authorize this. It was, therefore, referred for further consideration and inquiry. Knox was for both propositions. Randolph against the former, but said nothing as to the latter. The President acknowledged he had doubted of the expediency of undertaking the former; and as to the latter, though it would be a good thing, he did not wish to bring on anything



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which might generate heat and ill humor. It was agreed that Randolph should draw the speech and the messages.


   November the 28th . Met at the President's. I read over a list of the papers copying, to be communicated to Congress on the subject of Mr. Genet. It was agreed that Genet's letter of August the 13th to the President, mine of August the 16th, and Genet's of November to myself and the Attorney General, desiring a prosecution of Jay and King should not be sent to the legislature : on a general opinion, that the discussion of the fact certified by Jay and King had better be left to the channel of the newspapers, and in the private hands in which it now is, than for the President to meddle in it, or give room to a discussion of it in Congress.

   Randolph had prepared a draught of the speech. The clause recommending fortifications was left out; but that for a military academy was inserted. I opposed it, as unauthorized by the Constitution. Hamilton and Knox approved it without discussion. Randolph was for it, saying that the words of the Constitution authorizing Congress to lay taxes, &c., for the common defence, might comprehend it. The President said he would not choose to recommend anything against the Constitution, but if it was doubtful, he was so impressed with the necessity of this measure, that he would refer it to Congress, and let them decide for themselves whether the Constitu-



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tion authorized it or not. It was, therefore, left in. I was happy to see that Randolph had, by accident. used the expression " our republic," in the speech. The President, however, made no objection to it, and so, as much as it had disconcerted him on a former occasion with me, it was now put into his own mouth to be pronounced to the two Houses of legislature.

   No material alterations were proposed or made in any part of the draught.

   After dinner, I produced the draught of messages on the subject of France and England, proposing that that relative to Spain should be subsequent and secret.

   Hamilton objected to the draught ivc toto; said that the contrast drawn between the conduct of France and England amounted to a declaration of war; he denied that France had ever done us favors; that it was mean for a nation to acknowledge favors; that the dispositions of the people of this country towards France, he considered as a serious calamity; that the Executive ought not, by an echo of this language, to nourish that disposition in the people; that the offers in commerce made us by France, were the offspring of the moment, of circumstances which would not last, and it was wrong to receive as permanent, things merely temporary; that he could demonstrate that Great Britain showed us more favors than France. In complaisance to him I whittled down the expressions without opposition; struck out that of "favors,



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ancient and recent" from France; softened some terms, and omitted some sentiments respecting Great Britain. He still was against the whole, but insisted that, at any rate, it should be a secret communication, because the matters it stated were still depending. These were, 1, the inexecution of the treaty; 2, the restraining our commerce to their own ports and those of their friends. Knox joined Hamilton in everything. Randolph was for the communications; that the documents respecting the first should be given in as public; but that those respecting the second should not be given to the legislature at all, but kept secret. I began to tremble now for the whole, lest all should be kept secret. I urged, especially, the duty now incumbent on the President, to lay before the legislature and the public what had passed on the inexecution of the treaty, since Mr. Hammond's answer of this month might be considered as the last we should ever have; that, therefore, it could no longer be considered as a negotiation pending. I urged that the documents respecting the stopping our corn ought also to go, but insisted that if it should be thought better to withhold them, the restrictions should not go to those respecting the treaty; that neither of these subjects was more in a state of pendency than the recall of Mr. Genet, on which, nevertheless, no scruples had been expressed. The President took up the subject with more vehemence than I have seen him show, and decided without reserve, that not only what had passed on the



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inexecution of the treaty should go in as public, (in which Hamilton and Knox had divided in opinion from Randolph and myself,) but also that those respecting the stopping our corn should go in as public, (wherein, Hamilton, Knox, and Randolph had been against me). This was the first instance I had seen of his deciding on the opinion of one against that of three others, which proved his own to have been very strong.


   December the 1st, 1793 . Beckley tells me he had the following fact from Lear. Landon, Cabot, and some others of the Senate, standing in a knot before the fire after the Senate had adjourned, and growling together about some measure which they had just lost; "Ah ! " said Cabot, " things will never go right till you have a President for life, and an hereditary Senate." Landon told this to Lear, who mentioned it to the President. The President seemed struck with it, and declared he had not supposed there was a man in the United States who could have entertained such an idea.


CONVERSATION WITH JOHN ADAMS.

   March the 2d, 1797 . I arrived at Philadelphia to qualify as Vice-President, and called instantly on Mr. Adams, who lodged at Francis's, in Fourth street. The next morning he returned my visit at Mr. Madison's, where I lodged. He found me alone in my



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room, and shutting the door himself, he said he was glad to find me alone, for that he wished a free conversation with me. He entered immediately on an explanation of the situation of our affairs with France, and the danger of rupture with that nation, a rupture which would convulse the attachments of this country; that he was impressed with the necessity of an immediate mission to the Directory; that it would have been the first wish of his heart to have got me to go there, but that he supposed it was out of the question, as it did not seem justifiable for him to send away the person destined to take his place in case of accident to himself, nor decent to remove from competition one who was a rival in the public favor. That he had, therefore, concluded to send a mission, which, by its dignity, should satisfy France, and by its selection from the three great divisions of the continent, should satisfy all parts of the United States; in short, that he had determined to join Gerry and Madison to Pinckney, and he wished me to consult Mr. Madison for him. I told him that as to myself, I concurred in the opinion of the impropriety of my leaving the post assigned me, and that my inclinations, moreover, would never permit me to cross the Atlantic again; that .I would, as he desired, consult Mr. Madison, but I feared it was desperate, as he had refused that mission on my leaving it, in General Washington's time, though it was kept open a twelvemonth for him. He said that if Mr. Madison should refuse, he would still appoint



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him, and leave the responsibility on him. I consulted Mr. Madison, who declined as I expected. I think it was on Monday, the 6th of March, Mr. Adams and myself met at dinner at General Washington's and we happened, in the evening, to rise from table and come away together. As soon as we got into the street, I told him the event of my negotiation with Mr. Madison. He immediately said, that, on consultation, some objections to that nomination had been raised which he had not contemplated; and was going on with excuses which evidently embarrassed him, when we came to Fifth street, where our road separated, his being down Market street, mine off along Fifth, and we took leave; and he never after that said one word to me on the subject, or ever consulted me as to any measures of the government. The opinion I formed at the time on this transaction, was, that Mr. Adams, in the first moments of the enthusiasm of the occasion, (his inauguration,) forgot party sentiments, and as he never acted on any system, but was always governed by the feeling of the moment, he thought, for a moment, to steer impartially between the parties; that Monday, the 6th of March, being the first time he had met his cabinet, on expressing ideas of this kind, he had been at once diverted from them, and returned to his former party views.


   July, 1797 . Murray is rewarded for his services by an appointment to Amsterdam; W. Smith of Charleston, to Lisbon.





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   August the 24th . About the time of the British treaty, Hamilton and Talleyrand, bishop of Autun, dined together, and Hamilton drank freely. Conversing on the treaty, Talleyrand said, " mais vraiment Monsieur Hamilton, ce n'est pas bien honnete,, after making the Senate ratify the treaty, to advise the President to reject it." "The treaty," said Hamilton, " is an execrable one, and Jay was an old woman for making it; but the whole credit of saving us from it must be given to the President." After circumstances had led to a conclusion that the President also must ratify it, he said to the same Talleyrand, " though the treaty is a most execrable one,, yet when once, we have come to a determination on it, we must carry it through thick and thin, right or wrong."

   Talleyrand told this to Volney, who told it to me. There is a letter now appearing in the papers, from Pickering to Monroe, dated July the 24th, 1797, which I am satisfied is written by Hamilton. He was in Philadelphia at that date.


   December the 26th, 1797 . Landon tells me, that at the second election of President and Vice President of the United States, when there was a considerable vote given to Clinton in opposition to Mr. Adams, he took occasion to remark it in conversation in the Senate chamber with Mr. Adams, who, gritting his teeth, said, " damn 'em, damn 'em



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damn 'em, you see that an elective government will not do." He also tells me that Mr. Adams, in a late conversation, said, " republicanism must be disgraced, Sir." The Chevalier Yruho called on him at Braintree, and conversing on French affairs, and Yruho expressing his belief of their stability, in opposition to Mr. Adams, the latter lifting up and shaking his finger at him, said, " I'll tell you what the French republic will not last three months." This I had from Yruho.

   Harper, lately in a large company, was saying that the best thing the friends of the French could do, was to pray for the restoration of their monarch. " Then," said a bystander, " the best thing we could do, I suppose, would be to pray for the establishment of a monarch in the United States." " Our people," said Harper, " are not yet ripe for it, but it is the best thing we can come to, and we shall come to it." Something like this was said in presence of Findlay. He now denies it in the public papers, though it can be proved by several members.


   December the 27th . Tenche Coxe tells me, that a little before Hamilton went out of office, or just as he was going out, taking with him his last conversation, and among other things, on the subject of their differences, "for my part," said he, " I avow myself a monarchist; I have no objection to a trial being made of this thing of a republic, but," &c.





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   January the 5th, 1798 . I receive a very remarkable fact indeed in our history, from Baldwin and Skinner. Before the establishment of our present government, a very extensive combination had taken place in New York and the eastern States, among that description of people who were partly monarchical in principle, or frightened with Shay's rebellion and the impotence of the old Congress. Delegates in different places had actually had consultations on the subject of seizing on the powers of a government, and establishing them by force; had corresponded with one another, and had sent a deputy to General Washington to solicit his cooperation. He refused to join them. The new convention was in the meantime proposed by Virginia and appointed. These people believed it impossible the States should ever agree on a government, as this must include the impost and all the other powers which the States had a thousand times refused to the general authority. They therefore let the proposed convention go on, not doubting its failure, and confiding that on its failure would be a still more favorable moment for their enterprise. They there-fore wished it to fail, and especially, when Hamilton, their leader, brought forward his plan of government, f ailed entirely in carrying it, and retired in disgust from the convention. His associates then took every method to prevent any form of government being agreed to. But the well-intentioned never ceased trying, first one thing, then another, till they



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could get something agreed to. The final passage and adoption of the Constitution completely defeated the views of the combination, and saved us from an attempt to establish a government over us by force. This fact throws a blaze of light on the conduct of several members from New York and the eastern States in the convention of Annapolis, and the grand convention. At that of Annapolis, several eastern members most vehemently opposed Madison's proposition for a more general convention, with more general powers. They wished things to get more and more into confusion, to justify the violent measure they proposed. The idea of establishing a government by reasoning and agreement, they publicly ridiculed as an Utopian project, visionary and unexampled.


   February the 6th, 1798 . Mr. Baldwin tells me, that in a conversation yesterday with Goodhue, on the state of our affairs, Goodhue said, " I'll tell you what, I have made up my mind on this subject; I would rather the old ship should go down than not;" (meaning the Union of the States). Mr. Hillhouse coming up, " well," said Mr. Baldwin, " I'll tell my old friend Hillhouse what you say;" and he told him. " Well," said Goodhue, " I repeat that I would rather the old ship should go down, if we are to be always kept pumping so. " " Mr. Hillhouse, " said Baldwin, " you remember when we were learning



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logic together at school, there was the case categorical and the case hypothetical. Mr. Goodhue stated it to me first as the case categorical. I am glad to see that he now changes it to the case hypothetical, by adding, " if we are always to be kept pumping so." Baldwin went on then to remind Goodhue what an advocate he had been for our tonnage duty, wanting to make it one dollar instead of fifty cents; and how impatiently he bore the delays of Congress in proceeding to retaliate on Great Britain before Mr. Madison's propositions came on. Goodhue acknowledged that his opinions had changed since that.


DINNER WITH PRESIDENT ADAMS.

   February the 15th, 1798 . I dined this day with Mr. Adams, (the President). The company was large. After dinner I was sitting next to him, and our conversation was first on the enormous price of labor,6 house rent, and other things. We both concurred in ascribing it chiefly to the floods of bank paper now afloat, and in condemning those institutions. We then got on the Constitution; and in the course of our conversation he said, that no republic could ever last which had not a Senate, and a Senate deeply and strongly rooted, strong enough to bear



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up against all popular storms and passions; that he thought our Senate as well constituted as it could have been, being chosen by the legislatures; for if these could not support them, he did not know what could do it; that perhaps it might have been as well for them to be chosen by the State at large; as that would insure a choice of distinguished men, since none but such could be known to a whole people; that the only fault in our Senate was, that it was not durable enough; that hitherto, it had behaved very well; however, he was afraid they would give way in the end. That as to trusting to a popular assembly for the preservation of our liberties, it was the merest chimera imaginable; they never had any rule of decision but their own will; that he would as lieve be again in the hands of our old committees of safety, who made the law and executed it at the same time; that it had been observed by some writer, (I forget whom he named,) that anarchy did more mischief in one night, than tyranny in an age; and that in modern times we might say with truth, that in France, anarchy had done more harm in one night, than all the despotism of their Kings had ever done in twenty or thirty years. The point in which he views our Senate, as the colossus of the Constitution, serves as a key to the politics of the Senate, who are two-thirds of them in his sentiments, and accounts for the bold line of conduct they pursue.





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6 He observed, that eight or ten years ago, he gave only fifty dollars to a common laborer for his farm, finding him food and lodging. Now he gives one hundred and fifty dollars, and even two hundred dollars to one.

   March the 1st . Mr. Tazewell tells me, that when the appropriations for the British treaty were on the carpet, and very uncertain in the lower House, there being at that time a number of bills in the hands of committees of the Senate, none reported, and the Senate idle for want of them, he, in his place, called on the committees to report, and particularly on Mr. King, who was of most of them. King said that it was true the committees kept back their reports, waiting the event of the question about appropriation; that if that was not carried, they considered legislation as at an end; that they might as well break up and consider the Union as dissolved. Tazewell expressed his astonishment at these ideas; and called on King to know if he had misapprehended him. King rose again and repeated the same words. The next day, Cabot took an occasion in debate, and so awkward a one as to show it was a thing agreed to be done, to repeat the same sentiments in stronger terms, and carried further, by declaring a determination on their side to break up and dissolve the government.


   March the 11th . In conversation with Baldwin, and Brown of Kentucky, Brown said that in a private company once, consisting of Hamilton, King, Madison, himself, and some one else making a fifth, speaking of the " federal government;" " Oh ! " said Hamilton, " say the federal monarchy, let us call things by their right names, for a monarchy it is."





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   Baldwin mentions at table the following fact: When the bank bill was under discussion in the House of Representatives, Judge Wilson came in, and was standing by Baldwin. Baldwin reminded him of the following fact which passed in the grand convention : Among the enumerated powers given to Congress, was one to erect corporations. It was, on debate, struck out. Several particular powers were then proposed. Among others, Robert Morris proposed to give Congress a power to establish a national bank. Gouverneur Morris opposed it, observing that it was extremely doubtful whether the Constitution they were framing could ever be passed at all by the people of America; that to give it its best chance, however, they should make it as palatable as possible, and put nothing into it not very essential, which might raise up enemies; that his colleague (Robert Morris) well knew that "a bank" was, in their State, (Pennsylvania,) the very watchword of party; that a bank had been the great bone of contention between the two parties of the State from the establishment of their constitution, having been erected, put down, and erected again, as either party preponderated; that therefore, to insert this power, would instantly enlist against the whole instrument, the whole of the anti-bank party in Pennsylvania. Whereupon it was rejected, as was every other special power, except that of giving copyrights to authors, and patents to inventors; the general power of incorporating being whittled down to this shred. Wilson agreed to the fact.





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   Mr. Hunter, of South Carolina, who lodges with Rutledge,7 tells me that Rutledge was explaining to him the plan they proposed to pursue as to war measures when Otis came in. Rutledge addressed Otis. Now, sir, said he, you must come forward with something liberal for the southern States, fortify their harbors, and build gallies, in order to obtain their concurrence. Otis said, we insist on convoys for our European trade, and guayda costas, on which condition alone we will give them gallies and fortifications. Rutledge observed, that in the event of war, McHenry and Pickering must go out; Wolcott, he thought, might remain, but the others were incapable of conducting a war. Otis said the eastern people would never abandon Pickering, he must be retained; McHenry might go. They considered together whether General Pinckney would accept the office of Secretary of War. They apprehended he would not. It was agreed in this conversation that Sewall had more the ear of the President than any other person.


   March the 12th . When the bill for appropriations was before the Senate, Anderson moved to strike cut a clause recognizing (by way of appropriation) the appointment of a committee by the House of Representatives to sit during their recess to collect evidence on Blount's case, denying they had power, but by a law, to authorize a committee to sit during recess.





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   Tracy advocated the motion, and said, " We may as well speak out. The committee was appointed by the House of Representatives to take care of the British Minister, to take care of the Spanish Minister, to take care of the Secretary of State, in short, to take care of the President of the United States. They were afraid the President, and Secretary of State would not perform the office of collecting evidence faithfully; that there would be collusion, &c. Therefore, the House appointed a committee of their own. We shall have them next sending a committee to Europe to make a treaty, &c. Suppose that the House of Representatives should resolve, that after the adjournment of Congress, they should continue to sit as a committee of the whole House during the whole recess." This shows how the appointment of that committee has been viewed by the President's friends.

   April the 5th . Doctor Rush tells me he had it from Mrs. Adams, that not a scrip of a pen has passed between the late and present President since he came into office.



7 J. Rutledge, junior.

   April the 13th . New instructions of the British Government to their armed ships now appear, which clearly infringe their treaty with us, by authorizing them to take our vessels carrying produce of the French colonies from those colonies to Europe, and to take vessels bound to a blockaded port. See them in Brown's paper, of April the 18th, in due form.





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   The President has sent a government brig to France, probably to carry despatches. He has chosen as the bearer of these one Humphreys, the son of a ship carpenter, ignorant, under age, not speaking a word of French, most abusive of that nation, whose only merit is, the having mobbed and beaten Bache on board the frigate built here, for which he was indicted and punished by fine.


   April the 25th . At a dinner given by the bar to the federal judges, Chase and Peters, present about twenty-four lawyers, and William Tilghman in the chair, this toast was given, "Our King in old England." Observe the double entendre on the word King. Du Ponceau, who was one of the bar present, told this to Tenche Coxe, who told me in presence of H. Tazewell. Dallas was at the dinner; so was Colonel Charles Sims, of Alexandria, who is here on a lawsuit vs. General Irving.


   May the 3d . The President some time ago appointed Steele, of Virginia, a commissioner to the Indians, and recently Secretary of the Mississippi Territory. Steele was a Counsellor of Virginia, and was voted out by the Assembly because he turned tory. He then offered for Congress, and was rejected by the people. Then offered for the Senate of Virginia, and was rejected: The President has also



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appointed Joseph Hopkinson commissioner to make a treaty with the Oneida Indians: He is a youth of about twenty-two or twenty-three, and has no other claims to such an appointment than extreme toryism, and the having made a poor song to the tune of the President's March.


   October the 13th, 1798 . Littlepage, who has been on one or two missions from Poland to Spain, said that when Gardoqui returned from America, he settled with his court an account of secret service money of six hundred thousand dollars. Ex-relatione Colonel Monroe.


   January, 1799 . In a conversation between Dr. Ewen and the President, the former said one of his sons was an aristocrat, the other a democrat. The President asked if it was not the youngest who was the democrat. " Yes," said Ewen. " Well," said the President, " a boy of fifteen who is not a democrat is good for nothing, and he is no better who is a democrat at twenty." Ewen told Hurt, and Hurt told me.


   January the 14th . Logan tells me that in his conversation with Pickering on his arrival, the latter abused Gerry very much; said he was a traitor to his country, and had deserted the post to which he was appointed; that the French temporized at first



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with Pinckney, but found him too much of a man for their purpose. Logan observing, that notwithstanding the pacific declarations of France, it might still be well to keep up the military ardor of our citizens, and to have the militia in good order; "the militia;" said Pickering " the militia never did any good to this country, except in the single affair of Bunker Hill; that we must have a standing army of fifty thousand men, which being stationed in different parts of the continent, might serve as rallying points for the militia, and so render them of some service." In his conversation with Mr. Adams, Lagan mentioned the willingness of the French to treat with Gerry. "And do you know why?" said Mr. Adams. " Why, sir? " said Logan. "Because," said Mr. Adams; "they know him to have been an anti-federalist, against the Constitution."

   January the 2d, l800 . Information from Tenche Coxe. Mr. Liston had sent two letters to the Governor of Canada by one Sweezy. He had sent copies of them, together with a third (original) by one Cribs. Sweezy was arrested (being an old horse thief), and his papers examined. T. Coxe had a sight of them. As soon as a rumor got out that there were letters of Mr. Liston disclosed, but no particulars yet mentioned, Mr. Liston suspecting that Cribs had betrayed him, thought it best to bring all his three letters, and lay them before Pickering, Secretary of State. Pickering thought them all very innocent.

   In his office they were seen by a Mr.



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Hodgen, of New Jersey, commissary of military stores, and the intimate friend of Pickering. It happens that there is some land partnership between Pickering, Hodgen and Coxe, so that the latter is freely and intimately visited by Hodgen, who, moreover, speaks freely with him on political subjects. They were talking the news of the day, when Mr. Coxe observed that these intercepted letters of Liston were serious things; (nothing being yet out but a general rumor). Hodgen asked which he thought the most serious. Coxe said the second; (for he knew yet of no other). Hodgen said he thought little of any of them, but that the third was the most exceptionable: This struck Coxe, who, not betraying his ignorance of a third letter, asked generally what part of that he alluded to. Hodgen said to that wherein he assured the Governor of Canada, that if the French invaded Canada, an army would be marched from these States to his assistance. After this it became known that it was Sweezy who was arrested, and not Cribs; so that Mr. Liston had made an unnecessary disclosure of his third letter to Mr. Pickering, who, however, keeps his secret for him. In the beginning of the conversation between Hodgen and Coxe, Coxe happened to name Sweezy as the bearer of the letters. " That's not his name," said Hodgen (for he did not know that two of the letters had been sent by Sweezy also), "his name is Cribs." This put Coxe on his guard, and sent him fishing for the new matter.





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   January the 10th . Doctor Rush tells me that he had it from Samuel Lyman, that during the X Y Z Congress, the federal members held the largest caucus they have ever had, at which he was present, and the question was proposed and debated, whether they should declare war against France, and determined in the negative. Lyman was against it. He tells me, that Mr. Adams told him, that when he came on in the fall to Trenton, he was there surrounded constantly by the opponents of the late mission to France. That Hamilton pressing him to delay it, said, " Why, sir, by Christmas, Louis the XVIII. will be seated on his throne." Mr. A. "By whom?" H. "By the coalition." Mr. A. "Ah! then farewell to the independence of Europe. If a coalition moved by the finger of England, is to give a government to France, there is an end to the independence of every country. "


   January the 12th . General Samuel Smith says that Pickering, Wolcott, and McHenry, wrote a joint letter from Trenton to the President, then at Braintree, dissuading him from the mission to France. Stoddard refused to join in it. Stoddard says the instructions are such, that if the Directory have any disposition to reconciliation, a treaty will be made. He observed to him, also, that Ellsworth looks beyond this mission to the Presidential chair. That with this view, he will endeavor to make a treaty,



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and a good one. That Davie has the same vanity and views. All this communicated by Stoddard to S. Smith.


   January the 13th . Baer and Harrison G. Otis told J. Nicholas; that in the caucus mentioned ante 10th, there wanted but five votes to produce a declaration of war. Baer was against it.


   January the 19th . W. C. Nicholas tells me, that in a conversation with Dexter three or four days ago, he asked Dexter whether it would not be practicable for the States to agree on some uniform mode of choosing electors of President. Dexter said, " I suppose you would prefer an election by districts." " Yes," said Nicholas, " I think it would be best;; but would nevertheless agree to any other consistent with the Constitution." Dexter said he did not know what might be the opinion of his State, but his own was, that no mode of election would answer any good purpose; that he should prefer one for life. " On that reasoning, " said Nicholas, " you should prefer an hereditary one." " No," he said,"we are not ripe for that yet. I suppose," added he" this doctrine is not very popular with you. " " No "said Nicholas, " it would effectually damn any man in my State." " So it would in mine," said Dexter;" but I am under no inducement to belie my sentiment, I have nothing to ask from anybody; I had



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rather be at home than here, therefore I speak my sentiments freely." Mr. Nicholas, a little before or after this, made the same proposition of a uniform election to Ross, who replied that he saw no good in any kind of election. " Perhaps, " said he, " the present one may last awhile. " On the whole, Mr. Nicholas thinks he perceives in that party, a willingness and a wish to let everything go from bad to worse, to amend nothing, in hopes it may bring on confusion, and open a door to the kind of government they wish. In a conversation with Gunn, who goes with them, but thinks in some degree with us, Gunn told him that the very game which the minority of Pennsylvania is now playing with McKean, (see substitute of minority in lower House, and address of Senate in upper,) was meditated by the same party in the federal government, in case of the election of a republican President; and that the eastern States would in that case throw things into confusion, and break the Union. That they have in a great degree got rid of their paper, so as no longer to be creditors, and the moment they cease to enjoy the plunder of the immense appropriations now exclusively theirs, they would aim at some other order of things.


   January the 24th . Mr. Smith, a merchant of Hamburg, gives me the following information: The St. Andrew's Club of New York, (all of Scotch tories,) gave a public dinner lately. Among other



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guests, Alexander Hamilton was one. After dinner, the first toast was, " The President of the United States." It was drank without any particular approbation. The next was, " George the Third." Hamilton started up on his feet, and insisted on a bumper and three cheers. The whole company accordingly rose and gave the cheers. One of them, though a federalist, was so disgusted at the partiality shown by Hamilton to a foreign sovereign over his own President, that he mentioned it to a Mr. Schwarthouse, an American merchant of New York, who mentioned it to Smith.

   Mr. Smith also tells me, that calling one evening on Mr. Evans, then Speaker of the House of Representatives of Pennsylvania, and asking the news, Evans said Harper had been just there, and speaking of the President's setting out to Braintree, said, " he prayed to God that his horses might run away with him, or some other accident happen to break his neck before he reached Braintree." This was indignation at his having named Murray, &c., to negotiate with France. Evans approved of the wish.


   February the 1st . Doctor Rush tells me that he had it from Asa Green, that when the clergy addressed General Washington on his departure from the Government, it was observed in their consultation, that he had never, on any occasion, said a word to the public which showed a belief in the Christian



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religion, and they thought they should so pen their address, as to force him at length to declare publicly whether he was a Christian or not. They did so.

   However, he observed, the old fox was too cunning for them. He answered every article of their address particularly except that, which he passed over without notice. Rush observes, he never did say a word on the subject in any of his public papers, except in his valedictory letter to the Governors of the States, when he resigned his commission in the army, wherein he speaks of " the benign influence of the Christian religion." I know that Gouverneur Morris, who pretended to be in his secrets and believed himself to be so, has often told me that General Washington believed no more of that system than he himself did.


   March, l800 . Heretical doctrines maintained in Senate, on the motion against the Aurora. That there is in every legal body of men a right of selfpreservation, authorizing them to do whatever is necessary for that purpose: by Tracy, Read, and Lawrence. That the common law authorizes the proceeding proposed against the Aurora, and is in force here: by Read. That the privileges of Congress are and ought to be indefinite : by Read. Tracy says, he would not say exactly that the common law of England in all its extent is in force here; but common sense, reason and morality,



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which are the foundations of the common law, are in force here, and establish a common law. He held himself so nearly half way between the common law of England and what everybody else has called natural law, and not common law, that he could hold to either the one or the other, as he should find expedient.

   Dexter maintained that the common law, as to crimes, is in force in the United States.

   Chipman says, that the principles of common right are common law.


   March the 11th . Conversing with Mrs. Adams on the subject of the writers in the newspapers, I took occasion to mention that I never in my life had, directly or indirectly, written one sentence for a newspaper; which is an absolute truth. She said that Mr. Adams, she believed, had pretty well ceased to meddle in the newspapers, since he closed the pieces on Davila. This is the first direct avowal of that work to be his, though long and universally understood to be so.


   March the l4th . Freneau, in Charleston, had the printing of the laws in his paper. He printed a pamphlet of Pinckney's letters on Robbins' case. Pickering has given the printing of the laws to the tory paper of that place, though not of half the circulation. The printing amounted to about one hundred dollars a year.



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   March the 24th . Mr. Perez Morton of Massachusetts tells me that Thatcher, on his return from the war Congress, declared to him he had been for a declaration of war against France, and many others also; but that on counting noses they found they could not carry it, and therefore did not attempt it.


   March the 27th . Judge Breckenridge gives me the following information: He and Mr.. Ross were originally very intimate; indeed, he said, he found him keeping a little Latin school, and advised and aided him in the study of law, and brought him forward. After Ross became a Senator, and particularly at the time of the western insurrection, they still were in concert. After the British treaty, Ross, on his return, informed him there was a party in the United States who wanted to overturn the Government, who were in league with France; that France, by a secret article of treaty with Spain was to have Louisiana; and that Great Britain was likely to be our best friend and dependence. On this information, he, Breckenridge, was induced to become an advocate for the British treaty. During this intimacy with Ross, he said, that General Collot, in his journey to the western country, called on him, and he frequently led Breckenridge into conversations on their grievances under the Government, and particularly the western expedition; that he spoke to him of the advantages that country



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would have in joining France when she should hold Louisiana; showed him a map he had drawn of that part of the country; pointed out the passes in the mountain, and the facility with which they might hold them against the United States, and with which France could support them from New Orleans. He said, that in these conversations, Gollot let himself out with common prudence. He said, Michaud, (to whom I, at the request of Genet, had given a letter of introduction to the Governor of Kentucky as a botanist, which was his real profession,) called on him; that Michaud had a commissary's commission for the expedition, which Genet had planned from that quarter against the Spaniards ; that, the late Spanish commandant of St. Genevieve, with one Powers, an Englishman, called on him. That from all these circumstances, together with Ross's stories, he did believe that there was a conspiracy to deliver our country, or some part of it at least, to the French; that he made notes of what passed between himself and Collot and the others, and lent them to Mr. Ross, who gave them to the President, by whom they were deposited in the office of the Board of War; that when he complained to Ross of this breach of confidence, he endeavored to get off by compliments on the utility and importance of his notes. They now cooled towards each other; and his opposition to Ross's election as Governor has separated them in truth, though not entirely to appearance.





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   Doctor Rush tells me, that within a few days he has heard a member of Congress lament our separation from Great Britain, and express his sincere wishes that we were again dependent on her.


   December the 25th, l800 . Colonel Hitchburn tells me what Col. Monroe had before told me of, as coming from Hitchburn. He was giving me the characters of persons in Massachusetts. Speaking of Lowell, he said he was, in the beginning of the Revolution, a timid whig, but as soon as he found we were likely to prevail, he became a great office hunter. And in the very breath of speaking of Lowell, he stopped : said he, I will give you a piece of information which I do not venture to speak of to others. There was a Mr. Hale in Massachusetts; a reputable, worthy man, who becoming a little embarrassed in his affairs, I aided him, which made him very friendly to me. He went to Canada on some business. The Governor there took great notice of him. On his return, he took occasion to mention to me that he was authorized by the Governor of Canada to give from three to five thousand guineas each to himself and some others; to induce them, not to do anything to the injury of their country, but to befriend a good connection between England and it. Hitchburn said he would think of it, and asked Halc to come and dine with him tomorrow, after dinner he drew Hale fully out. He



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told him he had his doubts, but particularly, that he should not like to be alone in such a business. On that, Hale named to him four others who were to be engaged, two of whom, said Hitchburn, are now dead, and two living. Hitchburn, when he had got all he wanted out of Hale, declined in a friendly way. But he observed those four men, from that moment, to espouse the interests of England in every point and on every occasion. Though he did not name the men to me, yet as the speaking of Lowell was what brought into his head to tell me this anecdote, I concluded he was one. From other circumstances respecting Stephen Higginson, of whom he spoke, I conjectured him to be the other living one.


   December the 26th . In another conversation, I mentioned to Colonel Hitchburn, that though he had not named names, I had strongly suspected Higginson to be one of Hale's men. He smiled and said, if I had strongly suspected any man wrongfully from his information, he would undeceive me; that there were no persons he thought more strongly to be suspected himself, than Higginson and Lowell. I considered this as saying they were the men. Higginson is employed in an important business about our navy.


   February the l2th, 1801 . Edward Livingston tells me, that Bayard applied to-day or last night to



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General Samuel Smith, and represented to him the expediency of his coming over to the States who vote for Burr, that there was nothing in the way of appointment which he might not command, and particularly mentioned the Secretaryship of the Navy. Smith asked him if he was authorized to make the offer. He said he was authorized. Smith told this to Livingston, and to W. C. Nicholas who confirms it to me. Bayard in like manner tempted Livingston, not by offering any particular office, but by representing to him his, Livingston's, intimacy and connection with Burr; that from him he had everything to expect, if he would come over to him.

   To Doctor Linn of New Jersey, they have offered the government of New Jersey. See a paragraph in Martin's Baltimore paper of February the 10th, signed, " A LOOKER. on," stating an intimacy of views between Harper and Burr.


   February the l4th . General Armstrong tells me, that Gouverneur Morris, in conversation with him to-day on the scene which is passing, expressed himself thus. " How comes it," said he, " that Burr who is four hundred miles off, (at Albany,) has agents here at work with great activity, while Mr. Jefferson, who is on the spot, does nothing?" This explains the ambiguous conduct of himself and his nephew, Lewis Morris, and that they were holding themselves free for a prize; i. e., some office, either to the uncle or nephew.





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   February the l6th. See in the Wilmington Mirror of February the l4th, Mr. Bayard's elaborate argument to prove that the common law, as modified by the laws of the respective States at the epoch of the ratification of the Constitution, attached to the courts of the United States.


   June the 23d, 1801 . Andrew Ellicot tells me, that in a conversation last summer with Major William Jackson of Philadelphia, on the subject of our intercourse with Spain, JaGkson said we had managed our affairs badly; that he himself was the author of the papers against the Spanish ministers signed Americanus; that his object was irritation; that he was anxious, if it could have been brought about, to have plunged us in a war with Spain, that the people might have been occupied with that, and not with the conduct of the Administration, and other things they had no business to meddle with.


   December the l3th, 1803 . The Reverend Mr. Coffin of New England, who is now here soliciting donations for a college in Greene county, in Tennessee, tells me that when he first determined to engage in this enterprise, he wrote a paper recommendatory of the enterprise, which he meant to get signed by clergymen, and a similar one for persons in a civil character, at the head of which he wished Mr. Adams to put his name, he being then President, and the



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application going only for his name, and not for a. donation. Mr. Adams, after reading the paper and considering, said, " he saw no possibility of continuing the union of the States; that their dissolution must necessarily take place; that he therefore saw no propriety in recommending to New England men to promote a literary institution in the south; that it was in f act giving strength to those who were to be their enemies; and, therefore, he would have nothing to do with it."


   December the 3lst . After dinner to-day, the pamphlet on the conduct of Colonel Burr being the subject of conversation, Matthew Lyon noticed the insinuations against the republicans at Washington, pending the Presidential election, and expressed his wish that everything was spoken out which was known; that it would then appear on which side there was a bidding for votes, and he declared that John Brown of Rhode Island, urging him to vote for Colonel Burr, used these words : " What is it you want, Colonel Lyon? Is it office, is it money? Only say what you want, and you shall have it."


   January the 2d, l804 . Colonel Hitchburn of Massachusetts, reminding me of a letter he had written me from Philadelphia, pending the Presidential election, says he did not. therein give the details. That he was in company at Philadelphia with Colonel



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Burr and * * * * * * * * that in the course of the conversation on the election, Colonel Burr said, " we must have a President, and a constitutional one, in some way." " How is it to be done ", said Hitchburn; " Mr. Jefferson's friends will not quit him, and his enemies are not strong enough to carry another." " Why," said Burr, " our friends must join the federalists, and give the President." The next morning at breakfast, Colonel Burr repeated nearly the same, saying, " we cannot be Without a President, our friends must join the federal vote." "But," said Hitchburn, "we shall then be without a Vice-President; who is to be our Vice President?" Colonel Burr answered, " Mr. Jefferson."


CONVERSATIONS WITH AARON BURR.

   January the 26th . Colonel Burr, the Vice-President, calls on me in the evening, having previously asked an opportunity of conversing with me. He began by recapitulating summarily, that he had come to New York a stranger, some years ago; that he found the country in possession of two rich families (the Livingstons and Clintons); that his pursuits were not political, and he meddled not. When the crisis, however, of l800 came on, they found their influence worn out, and solicited his aid with the people. He lent it without any views of promotion. That his being named as a candidate for Vice-President was unexpected by him. He



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acceded to it with a view to promote my fame and advancement, and from a desire to be with me, whose company and conversation had always been fascinating to him. That since, those great families had become hostile to him, and had excited the calumnies which I had seen published. That in this Hamilton had joined, and had even written some of the pieces against him. That his attachment to me had been sincere, and was still unchanged, although many little stories had been carried to him, and he supposed to me also, which he despised; but that attachments must be reciprocal or cease to exist, and therefore he asked if any change had taken place in mine towards him; that he had chosen to have this conversation with myself directly, and not through any intermediate agent. He reminded me of a letter written to him about the time of counting the votes, (say February, 1801,) mentioning that his election had left a chasm in my arrangements; that I had lost him from my list in the Administration, &c. He observed, he believed it would be for the interest of the republican cause for him to retire; that a disadvantageous schism would otherwise take place; but that were he to retire, it would be said he shrunk from the public sentence, which he never would do; that his enemies were using my name to destroy him, and something was necessary from me to prevent and deprive them of that weapon, some mark of favor from me which would declare to the world that he retired with my confidence.





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   I answered by recapitulating to him what had been my conduct previous to the election of l800. That I had never interfered directly or indirectly with my friends or any others, to influence the election either for him or myself ; that I considered it as my duty to be merely passive, except that in Virginia, I had taken some measures to procure f or him the unanimous vote of that State, because I thought any failure there might be imputed to me. That in the election now coming on, I was observing the same conduct, held no councils with anybody respecting it, nor suffered any one to speak to me on the subject, believing it my duty to leave myself to the free discussion of the public ; that I do not at this moment know, nor have ever heard, who were to be proposed as candidates for the public choice, except so far as could be gathered from the newspapers. That as to the attack excited against him in the newspapers, I had noticed it but as the passing wind; that I had seen complaints that Cheetham, employed in publishing the laws, should be permitted to eat the public bread and abuse its second officer; that as to this, the publishers of the laws were appointed by the Secretary of the State, without any reference to me; that to make the notice general, it was often given to one republican and one federal printer of the same place; that these federal printers did not in the least intermit their abuse of me, though receiving emoluments from the governments and that I have never thought it proper to interfere far myself,



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and consequently not in the case of the Vice-President. That as to the letter he referred to, I remembered it, and believed he had only mistaken the date at which it was written; that I thought it must have been on the first notice of the event of the election of South Carolina; and that I had taken that occasion to mention to him, that I had intended to have proposed to him one of the great offices, if he had not been elected; but that his election in giving him a higher station had deprived me of his aid in the Administration.

   The letter alluded to was, in fact, mine to him of December the l5th, l800. I now went on to explain to him verbally, what I meant by saying I had lost him from my list. That in General Washington's time, it had been signified to him that Mr. Adams the Vice-President, would be glad of a foreign embassy; that General Washington mentioned it to me, expressed his doubts whether Mr. Adams was a fit character for such an office, and his still greater doubts, indeed his conviction, that it would not be justifiable to send away the person who, in case of his death, was provided by the Constitution to take his place; that it would moreover appear indecent for him to be disposing of the public trusts, in apparently buying off a competitor for the public favor. I concurred with him in the opinion, and, if I recollect rightly, Hamilton, Knox, and Randolph were consulted and gave the same opinions. That when Mr. Adams came to the Administration in his first



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interview with me, he mentioned the necessity of a mission to France, and how desirable it would have been to him if he could have got me to undertake it; but that he conceived it would be wrong in him to send me away, and assigned the same reasons General Washington had done; and therefore, he should appoint Mr. Madison, &c. That I had myself contemplated his (Colonel Burr's) appointment to one of the great offices, in case he was not elected Vice-president; but that as soon as that election was known, I saw it could not be done, for the good reasons which had led General Washington and Mr. Adams to the same conclusion; and therefore, in my first letter to Colonel Burr, after the issue was known, I had mentioned to him that a chasm in my arrangements had been produced by this event. I was thus particular in rectifying the date of this letter, because it gave me an opportunity of explaining the grounds on which it was written, which were, indirectly, an answer to his present hints. He left the matter with me for consideration, and the conversation was turned to indifferent subjects.

   I should here notice, that Colonel Burr must have thought that I could swallow strong things in my own favor, when he founded his acquiescence in the nomination as Vice-President, to his desire of promoting my honor, the being with me, whose company and conversation had always been fascinating with him, &c. I had never seen Colonel Burr till he came as a member of Senate. His conduct very



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soon inspired me with distrust. I habitually cautioned Mr. Madison against trusting him too much. I saw afterwards, that under General Washington's and Mr. Adams' administrations, whenever a great military appointment or a diplomatic one was to be made, he came post to Philadelphia to show himself, and in fact that he was always at market, if they had wanted him. He was indeed told by Dayton in l800, he might be Secretary of War; but this bid was too late. His election as Vice-President was then foreseen. With these impressions of Colonel Burr, there never had been an intimacy between us, and but little association. When I destined him for a high appointment, it was out of respect for the favor he had obtained with the republican party, by his extraordinary exertions and successes in the New York election in l800.


   April the l5th, 1806 . About a month ago, Colonel Burr called on me, and entered into a conversation, in which he mentioned, that a little before my coming into office, I had written to him a letter intimating that I had destined him for a high employ, had he not been placed by the people in a different one; that he had signified his willingness to resign as Vice-President, to give aid to the Administration in any other place; that he had never asked an office however; he asked aid of nobody, but could walk on his own legs and take care of himself ; that I had always used him with politeness, but nothing more;



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that he aided in bringing on the present order of things; that he had supported the administration; and that he could do me much harm; he wished, however, to be on different ground; he was now disengaged from all particular business-willing to engage in something-should be in town some days, if I should have anything to propose to him. I observed to him, that I had always been sensible that he possessed talents which might be employed greatly to the advantage of the public, and that as to myself, I had a confidence' that if he were employed, he would use his talents for the public good; but that he must be sensible the public had withdrawn their confidence from him, and that in a government like ours it was necessary to embrace in its administration as great a mass of public confidence as possible, by employing those who had a character with the public, of their own, and not merely a secondary one through the executive. He observed, that if we believed a few newspapers, it might be supposed he had lost the public confidence, but that I knew how easy it was to engage newspapers in anything. I observed, that I did not refer to that kind of evidence of his having lost the public confidence, but to the late Presidential election, when, though in possession of the office of Vice-President, there was not a single voice heard for his retaining it. That as to any harm he could do me, I knew no cause why he should desire it, but, at the same time, I feared no injury which any man



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could do me; that I never had done a single act, or been concerned in any transaction, which I feared to have fully laid open, or which could do me any hurt, if truly stated; that I had never done a single thing with a view to my personal interest, or that of any friend, or with any other view than that of the greatest public good; that, therefore, no threat or fear on that head would ever be a motive of action with me. He has continued in town to this time; dined with me this day week, and called on me to take leave two or three days ago. I did not commit these things to writing at the time, but I do it now, because in a suit between him and Cheetham, he has had a deposition of Mr.

   Bayard taken, which seems to have no relation to the suit, nor to any other object than to calumniate me. Bayard pretends to have addressed to me, during the pending of the Presidential election in February, 1801, through General Samuel. Smith, certain conditions on which my election might be obtained; and that General Smith, after conversing with me, gave answers from me. This is absolutely false. No proposition of any kind was ever made to me on that occasion by General Smith, nor any answer authorized by me. And this fact General Smith affirms at this moment. For some matters connected with this, see my notes of February the lath and l4th, 1801, made at the moment. But the following transactions took place about the same time, that is to say, while the



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Presidential election was in suspense in Congress, which, though I did not enter at the time,. they made such an impression on my mind, that they are now as fresh, as to their principal circumstances, . as if they had happened yesterday. Coming out of the Senate chamber one day, I found Gouverneur Morris on the steps. He stopped me, and began a conversation on the strange and portentous state of things then existing, and went on to observe, that the reasons why the minority of States was so opposed to my being elected, were, that they apprehended that, 1, I would turn all federalists out of office; a, put down the navy; 3, wipe off the public debt. That I need only to declare, or authorize my friends to declare, that I would not take these steps, and instantly the event of the election would be fixed. I told him, that I should leave the world to judge of the course I meant to pursue by that which I had pursued hitherto, believing it to be my. duty to be passive and silent during the present scene; that I should certainly make no terms; should never go into the office of President by capitulation, nor with my hands tied by any conditions which should hinder me from pursuing the measures which I should deem for the public good. It was understood that Gouverneur Morris had entirely the direction of the vote of Lewis Morris of Vermont, who; by coming over to Matthew Lyon, would have added another vote, and decided the election: About the same time, I called on Mr. Adams. We



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conversed on the state of things. I observed to him, that a very dangerous experiment was then in contemplation, to defeat the Presidential election by an act of Congress declaring the right of the Senate to name a President of the Senate, to devolve on him the government during any interregnum; that such a measure would probably produce resistance by force, and incalculable consequences, which it would be in his power to prevent by negativing such an act. He seemed to think such an act justifiable, and observed, it was in .my power to fix the election by a word in an instant, by declaring I would not turn out the federal officers, nor put down the navy, nor spunge the national debt. Finding his mind made up as to the usurpation of the government by the President of the Senate, I urged it no further, observed the world must judge as to myself of the future by the past, and turned the conversation to something else. About the same time, Dwight Foster of Massachusetts called on me in my room one night, and went into a very long conversation on the state of affairs, the drift of which was to let me understand, that the fears above mentioned were the only obstacle to my election, to all of which I avoided giving any answer the one way or the other. From this moment he became most bitterly and personally opposed to me, and so has ever continued. I do not recollect that I ever had any particular conversation with General Samuel Smith on this subject. Very possibly I had,

   

The White House, with Jefferson's Statue
The White House, with Statue of Thomas Jefferson in the foreground, as it
appeared before removal of the Statue to the Rotunda of the
Capitol. Reproduced from an Old Engraving.





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   however, as the general subject and all its parts were the constant themes of conversation in the private tete-a-tetes with our friends. But certain I am, that neither he nor any other republican ever uttered the most distant hint to me about submitting to any conditions, or giving any assurances to anybody, and still more certainly, was neither he nor any other person ever authorized by me to say what I would or would not do. * * * * * * * * * * * *


CABINET MEETINGS.

   April the 25th . Present all the members of the Cabinet. All the articles of a treaty in maximo and minimo, were agreed to without a single dissent on any article, the former instructions of Monroe were made the ground work. It was proposed to consider whether any measures should be taken under the act for detaching 100,000 militia. It was agreed not on the following grounds: 1. It would spread considerable alarm through the country. 2. If New Orleans (the only place to which danger is apprehended) be really attacked, succor from this act is doubtful, if not desperate. 3. The language of Spain is entirely pacific according to the last letters from Erving.8 4. Were she disposed to send troops across the Atlantic, she could not do it in the present posture of things on the ocean. 5. At Havana they have scarcely any



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troops-certainly none to spare, at Pensacola and Mobile about 600. Baton Rouge 170. 6. In New Orleans we have 200, and in the vicinities which may be drawn there in a few days l,000 more. The militia of New Orleans may be counted on from 500 to l,000, and the seamen about as many more: so that an effective force of about 3,000 may be relied on. We conclude therefore to adopt the following measures:

   1. The gunboats (eight in number) up the Ohio not being ready, order the two bomb vessels and two gunboats built by Commodore Preble to proceed immediately to Charleston, there take gunboat No. 1 and go on, the three gunboats to Lake Pontchartrain and. the two Bombs to New Orleans where the men and stores for them have been some time arrived. The rest of the gunboats from the Mediterranean being daily expected at Charleston or Savanna, if they arrive before those from the Ohio come down, order No. 4. to New Orleans, because we consider six for the Mississippi and three for the lakes sufficient, and when the Ohio boats come down the surplus may be brought off to the Atlantic ports. The gunboats are depended on to guard the passage through the lakes from the quarter of Mobile, to guard the entrance of the mouth of the river from the sea, and to guard the crossing of it at the Acadian settlement should troops approach from Nacogdoches and westward across the Chataleya along the road to the Acadian. settlement.





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   2. Block houses and other defensive works are immediately to be prepared on the neck of the land along which the approach lays from Baton Rouge and Manshac ; at Fort St. Jean, and the most advantageous defiles on the approaches from the Eastward; the troops remaining in the vicinities as at present on account of their health.

   3. The militia of New Orleans, Tombigbee, and Natchez to be kept in readiness, those of New Orleans for its own defense, those of Tombigbee to seize Mobile or Pensacola if their garrisons be drawn off to New Orleans, or to follow on their rear; and those of Natchez to take Baton Rouge, if the garrison be drawn, or to follow and cut off their retreat. There was no dissent to any article of this plan.



8 G. W. Erving was secretary of Legation to Spain at that time.

   May the lst . Present the four Heads of Departments. A letter from the mayor of New York complaining of the murder lately committed, and the trespasses by the Leander, Cambrian and Driver, and asking for a naval force, also the depositions of Pierce. and . It was considered that the laws had made an establishment of goo men for the navy in peace, with power to employ them in any vessels we thought proper; that these might man three frigates, that if it would have been thought proper with three frigates to attack and drive off these three British vessels, yet that two of the three were absent in the Mediterranean, and the third hove down; the latter not to be in readiness under



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a month, and one of the former not possible to be called home under five months, that for so distant and uncertain effect the defense of our commerce in the Mediterranean ought not to be abandoned, that our gunboats were not as yet in place to be stationed in New York and that therefore no force of either of these descriptions were within our power. It was thought proper therefore to recommend a regular prosecution of the murder9 by the state courts of New York or New Jersey if within their jurisdiction, or, if out of it, then by the district court of the United States, and to issue a proclamation for apprehending Henry (?) Whitby, commander of the Leander for the murder, requiring the three vessels to depart, and interdicting them and all other vessels commanded by the present captains of the Cambrian and Driver from the harbors and waters of the United States, and on their failure to depart, or reentering them, to prohibit all intercourse, see the proclamation which was communicated and approved by each of the gentlemen. In all this there was no difference of opinion except that General Dearborne thought we might hold out some promise of naval defense to New York.

   On the prosecution of Ogden and Smith for participating in Miranda's expedition the defense and their friends having contrived to make it a government question, in which they mean to have the



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Administration and judge tried as the culprits instead of themselves, Swartwout, the marshal, to whom, in his duel with Clinton, Smith was second, and is bosom friend, summoned a panel of jurors, the greater part of which were of the bitterest federalists, his letter, too, covering to a friend a copy of Aristides and affirming that every fact in it was true as holy writ. Determined unanimously, that he be removed.



9 A man on a sloop had been killed by a shot fired from the cruiser Leander.

   July the llth . Consultation with_ the Secretary of the Navy, nine gunboats built in the United States, and two gunboats bought in the Mediterranean,' with two Bombs built in the United States, and two Bombs bought in the Mediterranean, and three of our brigs, etc., are daily expected to arrive from the Mediterranean, two of the brigs to come here, and all the other vessels to Charleston. As everything at New Orleans is now quiet, and therefore not pressing we conclude to depend on the eight gunboats built in the Ohio to be in New Orleans in time, and to join to these by an immediate order one of Preble's gunboats, and one of his bombs, this will make up the nine Gunboats agreed on April 25th for the Mississippi and Pontchartrain, with the addition of the bomb, two of the gunboats at Charleston, three shall remain there, three others of them + No 1 (not fit for that place) shall go to Norfolk, six others of them + the other of Preble's gunboats shall go to New York, one boat only how



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ever is to be kept manned at each place, the rest to be hauled up. Preble's other Bomb, the four bombs from the Mediterranean, and all the other brigs, etc., from the Mediterranean to come here to be laid out.


   July the 19th . Consultation with the Heads of Departments. An armed vessel at Norfolk fitting out by Cooper to cruise as a Spanish or French privateer to be seized and placed under a course of law, she is complained of by Mr. Merry.10 Officer to be indemnified. Yrujo-agreed to do nothing as yet. Mr. Madison seemed of a different opinion.

   One gunboat to be kept in service at Charleston and to act against privateers under former instructions, if the appropriation will afford it.

   The frigate under Campbell in the Mediterranean to remain there till next spring.

   Here General Dearborne was called away.

   Swartwout, if the case versus Ogden and Smith is determined at the present session he is to be removed immediately, if it lies over to another, term let him remain to another.


   October the 22nd . Present the four Heads of Departments. The Spaniards have moved to Bayou Pierre a body of 1,000 or 1,200 men, mostly militia, mounted, and 3OO regulars are expected to join them. Our regular force in the Mississippi and Orleans



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territories is 631 men at Natchitoches and ordered there from Fort Adams, 210. At New Orleans, 240 new recruits arrived or arriving at Orleans, making in all 1,081, besides 130 at Tombigby. Two gunboats are at New Orleans (from Ohio) six more daily expected from the same quarter. Two others and two bomb vessels from Boston are arriving there about this time, and General Wilkinson asks 500 mounted men to secure his operations if forced to act hostilely, the acting governor of Mississippi offers 250 volunteers for service on the west side of the Mississippi, and 500 if employed on the east side; the Governor of Orleans counts on 500 militia from the western countries of his territories. Agreed unanimously to require from those two territories 500 volunteers mounted on their own horses, engaged to serve six months, and to be in readiness when called for by the commanding officer of the regulars. This under the law of the last session for calling out a detachment of militia, and further that the marines at New Orleans shall do garrison duty there, so that the 210 men at that place may be moved up to Natchitoches, the gunboats to be under the orders of the commanding officer.

   During the last session of Congress, Colonel Burr who was here, finding no hope of being employed in any department of the Government opened himself confidentially to some persons on whom he thought he could rely, on a scheme of separating the Western from the Atlantic States, and erecting



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the former into an independent confederacy; he had before made a tour of those states, which had excited suspicions, as every motion does of such a Catalinarian character; of his having made this proposition here we have information from General Eaton, through Mr. Ely and Mr. Granger; he went off this spring to the western country. Of his movements on his way information has come to the Secretary of State and myself from John Nicholson and Mr. Williams of the State of New Jersey, respecting a Mr. Tyler, Colonel Morgan, Nevill and Roberts near Pittsburg, and to other citizens through other channels and the newspapers. We are of opinion unanimously that confidential letters be written to the Governors of Ohio, Indiana, Mississippi and Orleans, to the district attorney of Kentucky, of Tennessee, of Louisiana, to have him strictly watched and on his committing any overt act unequivocally, to have him arrested and tried for treason, misdemeanor, or whatever other offense the act may amount to. And in like manner to arrest and try any of his followers committing acts against the laws. We think it proper also to order some of the gunboats up to Fort Adams to stop by force any passage of suspicious persons going down in force.

   General Wilkinson being expressly declared by Burr to Eaton to be engaged with him in this design as his lieutenant or first in command, and suspicions of infidelity in Wilkinson being now become



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very general, a question is proposed what is proper to be done as to him on this account as well as for his disobedience of orders received by him June llth, at St. Louis, to descend with all practicable despatch to New Orleans to mark out the site of certain defensive works there, and then repair to take command at Natchitoches, on which business he did not leave St. Louis till Sept. -- . Consideration adjourned.



10 Merry was the name of the British Minister.

   October the 24th . It is agreed unanimously to call for Captains Preble and Decatur to repair to New Orleans by land or sea as they please, there to take command of the forces on the water, and that the Argus, and two gunboats from New York, three from Norfolk and two from Charleston shall be ordered there, if on a consultation between Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Smith the appropriations shall be found to enable us. That Preble shall, on consultation with Governor Claiborne have great discretionary powers. That Graham shall be sent through Kentucky on Burr's trail, with discretionary powers to consult with the Governors, and to arrest Burr if he has made himself liable. He is to have a commission of Governor of Louisiana, and Doctor Browne is to be removed, letters are to be written by post to Governor Claiborne, the Governor of Mississippi and Colonel Freeman to be on their guard against any surprise of our ports or vessels by him. The question as to General Wilkinson



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postponed till Preble's departure, for further information.


   October the 25th . A mail arrived yesterday from the Westward, and not one word is heard from that quarter of any movements by Colonel Burr. This total silence of the officers of the Government, of the members of Congress, of the newspapers, proves he is committing no overt act against law. We therefore rescind the determination to send Preble, Decatur, the Argus or the gunboats, and instead of them send off the marines, which are here to reinforce or take the place of the garrison at New Orleans with a view to Spanish operations, and instead of writing to the Governors, etc., we send Graham on that rout with confidential authority to enquire into Burr's movements put the Governors, etc., on their guard, to provide for his arrest if necessary, and to take on himself the Government of Louisiana. Letters are still to be written to Claiborne, Freeman, and the Governor of Mississippi to be on their guard.


   November the 8th . Present the four Heads of Departments, agreed on instructions to General Wilkinson, which see.


   November the 25th . Present at first the four Heads of Departments, but after a while General Dearborne withdrew, unwell. Dispatches from Gen-



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eral Wilkinson to myself of October 2lst by a confidential officer (Lt. Smith) show that overtures have been made to him which decide that the present object of the combination11 is an expedition by sea against Vera Cruz : and by comparing the contents of a letter from Cowles Meade to the Secretary of State, with the information from Lt. Smith that a Mr. Swartwout from New York, brother of the irate Marshal, had been at General Wilkinson's camp we are satisfied that Swartwout has been the agent through whom overtures have been made to Wilkinson. We came to the following determination: that a proclamation be issued (see it) and that orders go as follows to Pittsburg, if we have a military officer there, write to him to be vigilant in order to discover whether there are any preparations making, or boats or arms cr other military stores or means providing by any persons against whom there is reasonable ground to suspect that they have in contemplation a military enterprise against any of the territories of Spain (contrary to the Stat. June 5, 94. c. 50), and to stop all bodies of armed men who may be assembled to descend the Ohio under circumstances and appearances so different from those of common emigrants as to induce a reasonable suspicion that they are a part of a combination of persons believed to have such an enterprise in view, to have them bound to the observance of the peace and good



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behavior; or put in a course of legal prosecution, according to the strength of the evidence; and for this purpose to call in the aid of the militia; if we have no officer there, then write to General Nevill.-Marietta. Mr. Gallatin is to write to the Collector to proceed to seize the gunboats building in that neighborhood and suspected to be destined for this enterprise, and to call in the aid of the militia. General Dearborne to write to Governor Tiffin to furnish a guard of militia, sufficient for the detention of the boats, and to write to General Jackson, supposed to be the General of the Brigade on the Virginia side of the river, to furnish any aid of militia which may be necessary from 'the left bank of the river.-Louisville. General Dearborne to write to the Governor of Kentucky of the same tenor as to the officer at Pittsburg.-Massac. General Dearborne to give orders to Captain Bissel of the same tenor, and particularly to stop armed vessels suspected on good grounds to be proceeding on this enterprise and for this purpose to have in readiness any boats he can procure, fitted for enabling him to arrest their passage.-Chickasaw Bluffs. Give same orders as to Bissel.-Fort Adams. Give same orders as to Bissel.-New Orleans. General Wilkinson to direct the stations of the armed vessels, and if the arrangements with the Spaniards will permit him to withdraw, let him dispose of his force as he thinks best to prevent any such expedition, or any attempt on New Orleans, or any of the



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posts or military stores of the United States. (He is also to arrest persons coming to his camp and proposing a concurrence in any such enterprise, or suspected of being in camp with a view to propagate such propositions), this addition is made by General Dearborne with my approbation.



11 Referring to Aaron Burr's " Conspiracy," for which he was tried in 1807, and acquitted after a long trial.

   December the l5th . See a message agreed on unanimously to furnish money for distressed French-not sent; Turreau withdrawing request.


   December the l6th . Present the four Heads of Departments, being informed that the Cambrian, one of the vessels proscribed by the proclamation of May last, is in Hampton road, we agreed to issue the proclamation, which see, dated December 20th, to write to Generals Matthews and Wells to furnish militia for cutting off supplies, and to order the revenue cutters and boats, and the gunboats at Norfolk under Captain Decatur to attend to the same: but first to inform Mr. Erskine12 of what is to be done, and detain our orders some days to give time for the effect of his interference. The papers were to have gone off on the 20th, but that morning he informed Mr. Madison the Cambrian was gone -- so our orders and proclamation were suppressed, see the draught of the proclamation.



12 Baron Erskine (David Montague) was British Minister to the United States, 1806-1810.

   December the 19th . Present the Heads of Departments (except Mr. Gallatin). See an unfinished



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letter of December 20th to Governor Claiborne, containing the sum of the orders agreed to be sent.


   February the 2nd, 1807 . Present the Heads of Departments and Attorney General, letters having been received from our Ministers in London of November llth, informing that they were likely to settle satisfactorily the great points of colonial commerce (indirect) blockade, jurisdiction, commerce on footing gentis amicissimae. East India the same, on that of Jay's treaty, but that the right of taking their seamen out of our vessels at sea (which in its exercise 'took ours also) would not be given up by treaty though moderated in practice, and that our commanders meant to conclude such an one, I propose these questions.

   1. Shall we agree to any treaty yielding the principle of our non-importing act, and not securing us against impressments? Unanimously not. Because it would be yielding the only peaceable instrument for coercing all our rights. The points they yield are all matters of right. They are points which Bonaparte and Alexander will concur in settling at the treaty of peace, and probably in more latitude than Great Britain would now yield them to us, and our treaty would place on worse ground as to them than will be settled for Europe. The moment is favorable for making a stand and they will probably yield and the more probably as their negotiators had agreed to an article that they would not impress



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on the high seas, or in any other than their own ports; which had once before been agreed to with Mr. King,13 but retracted in both cases. We had better have no treaty than a bad one. It will not restore friendship, but keep us in a state of constant irritation.

   2. Shall we draw off in hostile attitude, or agree formally that there shall be an understanding between us that we will act in practice on the very principles proposed by the treaty (except as to the East India commerce), they defining what breaks the continuity of a voyage; blockades, jurisdiction, etc., and we agreeing to recommend to Congress to continue the supervision of the nonimporting the last mode decided unanimously.

   Art. 3. Shall we consult the Senate? unanimously not, had the first question been decided affirmatively their advice should have been asked. Mr. Madison was not satisfied whether we ought not to propose giving up the right of employing their seamen at all in our vessels, and making it penal on our commanders, as an inducement to them to give up impressment and trust to the effect of such a law for securing to them the use of all their seamen, our commanders are to be immediately instructed to adhere to their original instructions which made the impressment a sine qua non.


   February the 27th . Present Madison, Dearborne, Smith, Rodney, agreed to discharge all the militia



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at the stations from the mouth of Cumberland upwards, to give up all boats and provisions seized (except Blannerhasset's) or pay the value, applying them in that case to public use; to institute an inquiry into the proceedings of Burr and his adherents from New York to New Orleans, and particularly to appoint good men at the following points: Pittsburg, Marietta, Wood County, Cincinnati, Louisville, Nashville, Vincennes, St. Louis, Natchez, New Orleans, Statesburg, City of Washington, Philadelphia, New York, and other points in that State, to take affidavits. The Attorney General to prepare interrogatories, the vessels in the Mediterranean to be relieved, the Act for 30,000 volunteers, to be committed to Governors of Western States for execution.

   The Arkansa to be explored.



13 Rufus King was Minister to England 1796 to 1804.

   March the l7th . Present all. British treaty agreed that the article against impressment shall be a sine qua non according to our instrument of February 3rd. So also the withdrawing the declaration respecting the French decree of blockade or the modifying it so as not to affect the treaty, and as the treaty is opened for these purposes, endeavor to alter the following articles, 1. East India trade, restore Jay's articles. 2. Keep the one now in. 3. Expunge it, but on this head we are to enquire of merchants before we send the instrument. Art. 8. Avoid if possible the express abandonment of free



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ships free goods. Art. 10. Have blockade defined according to the British note formerly received. Art. 17. Expunge, stipulation to receive their vessels of war, and especially the humiliating stipulation to treat their officers with respect, reserve the right to indemnifications-absolutely forbid the proposed Convention for giving them a right to trade with the Indians of Louisiana. Art. 5. Tonnage, etc., consult with merchants.

   A circular letter to the Governors, etc., for carrying the volunteer act in execution was agreed on.

   Persons were named for conducting enquiries into Burr's treasons, etc., and his associates, and Newark and Trenton in Jersey, and Newport in Kentucky were added.

   It was agreed that the seamen employed at New Orleans were to be considered and paid as militia at militia prices, and that the surplus pay stipulated to them should be paid out of the Navy funds.


   April the 3rd . Present the four Heads of Departments. Agreed to propose to Great Britain not to employ any of her seamen on her stipulating not to impress from our ships, to endeavor to make the article for indirect colonial commerce extensive in time with the duration of the treaty, agreed also to admit them under the former treaty to pay no more duty on Indian goods imported by the lakes. than we take from our own people, on obtaining from them an acknowledgment of our right to extend



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the regulation, of Indian commerce within our limits to their traders as well as our own, as is the case with commerce in general in Atlantic States.

   The enquiry into Burr's conspiracy to be begun by the Attorney General immediately.


   July the 2nd . Present all the Heads of Department and Attorney General. The Proclamation of this day unanimously agreed to.14

   A copy of the proclamation to be enclosed to the Governors.

   Recall all our vessels from the Mediterranean, by a vessel to be sent express.

   Send the Revenge to England, with despatches to our Minister, demanding satisfaction for the attack on the Chesapeake, in which must be included. 1. A disavowal of the Act and of the principle of searching a public armed vessel. 2. A restoration of the men taken. 3. A recall of Admiral Barclay. Communicate the incident which has happened to Russia. Orders had been already issued for a court of enquiry on Barron. The vessels recalled from the Mediterranean are to come to Boston. When may be further orders.


   July the 4th . Present the same. Agreed that a call of Congress shall issue the fourth Monday of August (24th) to meet the fourth Monday in October



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(26th) unless new occurrences should render an earlier call necessary. Mr. Smith wished an earlier call.



14Which was to the effect that all armed English ships leave the United States' ports. This proclamation was provoked by the Chesapeake-Leopard affair.

   July the 5th . Present the same. It was agreed to call on the Governors of the States to have their quotas of l00,000 militia in readiness. The object is to have the portions on the sea-coast ready for any emergency, and for those in the North we may look to a winter expedition against Canada.


   July the 7th . Present the Secretaries of State and Navy and Attorney General. Agreed to desire Governor of Virginia to order such portion of Militia into actual service as may be necessary for defense of Norfolk, and of the gunboats at Hampton and in Matthews County.


   July the 26th . Norfolk. Agreed that all the militia at this place, and on both sides of the James river be dismissed, except: 1. An artillery company to serve the spare guns at Norfolk, and to be trained to their management. 2. A troop of cavalry to patrole the country in the vicinity of the squadron, as well to cut off their supplies as to give notice of any sudden danger : to meet which the militia of the borough and neighboring counties must hold themselves in readiness to march at a moment's warning, a major to command the two companies of artillery and cavalry. Offensive measures.

   Prepare all necessaries for an attack of Upper



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Canada and the upper part of Lower Canada, as far as the mouth of Richlieu river.

   Prepare also to take possession of the islands of Campobello, etc., in the bay of Passamaquoddy.

   The points of attack in Canada to be-1. Detroit, 2.

   Niagara, 3. Kingston, 4. Montreal.

   
1. Detroit. 300 militia of Michigan.
  1000 " from the State of Ohio.
  100 regulars from forts Detroit, Fort Wayne.
    1400  
2. Niagara. 1500 militia from Pennsylvania and Genesee.
      artillery company of regulars from Niagara.
    1500  
3. Kingston. 1500 militia from New York.
    1500  
4. Montreal. 1500 militia from New York.
  2000 " Vermont.
  1000 " Massachusetts.
  1000 " New Hampshire.
    5500  
5. Campobello. 500 militia from Maine.
       


General Officers for the attack on

Detroit,-General Hull.

Niagara.

Kingston,-Gansevoort.

Montreal.

Campobello, -- Colonel Trescott, or Brigadier General Chandler,





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   It is understood that everything which is not already in the neighborhood of the places can be got and carried as fast as the men can be collected and marched, except provisions to Detroit.

   Half tents and travelling carriages for artillery to be made.


Measures to be taken for obtaining information from:

Detroit through General Hull.

Niagara-Erastus Granger.

Kingston.

Montreal-Saillee.

Quebec.

Halifax-some person to be covered under a commission for.

Some merchant who may have a vessel there under adjudication.

The Secretary at War to recommend to the Governors to press for twelve month volunteers under the last act, rather than six months.

The same under the former.


   July the 27th. Defensive measures.

   The places needing defense divided into three classes.

   1. -- Where batteries only need be provided to be guarded in common by a few men only and to be manned, when necessary; by militia.

   2.-Places which from their importance, require some stronger defense, but which from the forts



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already built, the difficulty of access and the strength of their adjacent population need only repairs, some inconsiderable additions to their works and garrisons.

   3. -- Places which from their importance, and ease of access by land or water may be objects of attack and which from the weakness of their population, difficulties of defense, etc., will need particular attention and provision, in distributing the sea ports into these classes their importance so far as depends on their tonnage, collection of import, exports domestic and foreign may be obtained from a table prepared by the Secretary of the Treasury which see. 1st class may be taken from :that table readily perhaps some places not in that may require some defense.

   

2nd class.

Portsmouth, N. H. On each of these we conferred successively,
and came so far to a general understanding of the
nature and extent of the works, and number of gunboats
necessary for their defense, as might enable the
Secretary of War to make out a detailed statement for
each, for future consideration, estimating the expense
of works, number of men, and number of gun boats
necessary for each.
Newburyport}  
Salem}  
Boston}  
Providence}  
New London}  
Saybrook}  
New Haven}  
Philadelphia}  
Wilmington, Del.}  
Baltimore}  
James River}  
Ocracoke}  
Wilmington, N. C.}  
Charleston}  





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3rd class.

Portland On these also successively, conferences
took place so as to enable the Secretary of
War to make a similar statement as to them.
Newport}  
New York}  
Alexandria and}  
Washington}  
Norfolk}  
Savanna}  
New Orleans}  


   July the 28th . The existing appropriations for fortifications being not more sufficient for New York, Charleston, .. and New Orleans, it is thought best to employ them entirely on those places, and leave the others till further appropriations.

   It is thought that the Secretary of the Navy should purchase on credit timber and other materials for a great number of gunboats; suppose l00, but that they should chiefly be of those kinds which may be useful for the Navy should Congress not authorize the building gunboats.

   Also that he should purchase on credit 500 tons of saltpetre and 100 tons of sulphur on the presumption that Congress will sanction it.

   Our stock of swords, pistols and mortars being not sufficient, the Secretary at War will take measures for procuring a supply of the two former articles and will keep Troxall constantly employed in making mortars until a sufficient stock be provided.

   The Secretary of the Navy will take immediate measures for procuring from London 100 telescopes of about ten guinea price for the establishment of telegraphs.





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   It is agreed that about l5,000 regular troops will be requisite for garrisons and about as many more as a disposable force, making in the whole 30,000 regulars.

   It is also recommended to the Secretary of the Navy to recruit the whole number of marines allowed by law, to wit, about ll00, principally for the service of the gunboats. On the question, Under what circumstances I may order Decatur to attack the British vessels in our waters? it is the opinion that if they should blockade any place, preventing vessels from entering or going out or proceed. systematically in taking our vessels within our waters, that the gunboats should attack them if they can do it with a good prospect of success. But Decatur is not to do this without orders from me. Should they attack Norfolk or enter Elizabeth river Decatur may attack them without waiting orders.

   In endeavoring to obtain information of the state of the British posts to be attacked the following will be proper objects of enquiry:

   1. The regular force.

   2. The force of the militia they may command and the temper and disposition of the people, and whether armed.

   3. The character of the commanding officer,

   4. The situation of the port, whether in good repair-if requiring regular approaches-the situation of their magazines, etc.

   5. Plans of the works, maps of the roads, what are the obstacles to the March of troops, etc.





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   It is agreed that Congress shall be called to meet on Monday the 26th of October and that we will assemble here on Monday the 5th of October, the proclamation to issue immediately.

   

MR.GALATIANS ESTIMATE.

  D. D.
30,000 men employed ashore and in gunboats @ 300...... 9,000,000
Navy .......................... 1,500,000  
Occasional militia................ 1,000,000  
Ordnance,transports,fortifications......... 1,500,000  
    4,000,000
Interest on public debt...................   3,500,000
All civil expenses..........................   1,500,000
    18,000,000

   

Ways and Means.

Present impost reduced by war to......... 8,000,000  
Additional duties and taxes............ 2,500,000  
Sales of lands.................... 500,000  
Deficiency to be supplied by annual loan..... 7,000,000  
    18,000,000
Besides which we must borrow
annually the installments of public
debt becoming due that year.
   






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   October the 10th. Present the four Secretaries. Agreed unanimously that in consideration of information received as to the strength of the British posts in Canada, 3,000 men (instead of l500) must be ordered against Niagara and 500 only, instead of l500 against Kingston. That in the message at the opening of Congress the treaty and negotiations should not be laid before them, because still depending.





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   October the 22nd . Present all. The Constitution is to remain at Boston, having her men discharged: the Wasp is to come to New York; the Chesapeake is to remain at Norfolk; and the sending the United States frigate to New York is reserved for further consideration, enquiring in the meantime how early she should be ready to go-it is considered that in case of war, these frigates would serve as receptacles for enlisting seamen to fill the gunboats occasionally. After agreeing as above, proceeding to consider how the crew of the Constitution should be paid off (the Navy funds being exhausted) before the meeting of Congress, it was concluded that in order to gain time till their meeting, the Constitution should be brought round to New York, and the United States be destined for Boston.


   (October) the 31st . Gunboats to be stationed at New York, seventeen at Norfolk, three at Charleston, fifteen at New Orleans and eight building in Western country. They are to have eight men for the guns, three sailors for the sails, and to depend on militia of the place for the rest, a captain for each flotilla.


   November the 27th . Present all. Governor Hull writes from Detroit November 8th, that he has called on the Governor of Ohio for 500 militia infantry and a company of horse, in consequence of



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a collection of Indians, kept at Amherstburg and other indications of war. General Dearborne having before directed Hull to strengthen his garrison (of 50 regulars) by calling into service three companies of militia of the place, thought it would be sufficient if we ordered three or four companies more from Ohio. The other gentlemen thought we had better let Hull's call take its course, being attentive the moment we receive intelligence from England to modify it accordingly.

   Agreed that an order shall be inclosed to Governor Claiborne to remove by military force intruders on the Batture under the act of the last session of Congress.

   Information being received that great numbers of intruders have set down on the lands. lately obtained from the Chickasaws and Cherokees,.and particularly within the Yazoo tract and some also within the Cherokee lines, the. Secretary at War is to give immediate orders for removing them by military force.


   January the 25th 1808 . Mr. Dawson called on me and informed me that yesterday he was called on by a Mr. Hall, a native of the United States but a British subject engaged in commerce here who told him he had had a vessel condemned at Halifax and was going to England to prosecute the appeal. That being acquainted with Mr. Erskine, and known



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also to Mr. Rose since his arrival, he had informed them, and they had desired him to be the bearer of their dispatches which would be ready on the a 7th. These dispatches he said would be delivered to him in a box, would contain all their communications to their Government, consequently their operations here intrigues, spies, friends, information, their own views, prospects and designs. That he believed his appeal would cost him as much as he should recover that he was now a ruined man, had been cruelly treated by England, therefore wished to quit that country and become an American. That for a proper reward (he did not say what) he would take the papers out of the box which should be delivered him, deliver them to us, fill the box with blank papers, return to New York and making some excuse for not going he would send the box to its address. He said we should be on our guard for that those Ministers had many spies in Washington and one in the President's house who informed them of everything passing. This man is known to have been much attended to by Erskine, to have been at his parties, at those of Taylor, etc.

   My answer to Mr. Dawson was that the Government would never be concerned in any transactions of that character; that moral duties were as obligatory on nations as on individuals, that even in point of interest a character of good faith was of as much value to a nation as an individual and was that by which it would gain most in the long run. That



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however, he might assure Hall that we would keep his secret. Mr. Pawson had consulted with Mr. Nicholas on this communication, and after I had given him the above answer I mentioned it to Mr. Madison who approved of it.


CABINET MEETINGS.

   April the 5th . Present the four Secretaries. Having now 100 gunboats building and about 70 in service, we agreed that 20 should be stationed at New Orleans with 20 men in each, about half a dozen to be kept in different places for enforcing the embargo with eight or ten men each. Of the residue, keep on the stocks as many as we can by agreement, for preservation, and to all the rest allow two men each. Let the frigates and sloop remain where they are with about 20 or 30 men each to keep them clean, which will reduce the number of seamen to less than goo. The original establishment, as the law on which the proclamation is founded expires with the end of this session, it is rather believed that its renewal would not renew the proclamation; and as it would be disagreeable either to renew or revoke it, we conclude to let it go off in that doubtful way which may afford a reason f or not proceeding to actual hostilities against British armed vessels entering our waters. We agree to renew the call for 100,000 Militia and Volunteers.





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   June the 30th . Present the four Secretaries and Attorney General. 96 applications for permission to send vessels out for property. Agreed as general rules: 1. That no permission shall be granted after the of 2. None to Europe, because of. the danger of the capture or detention of the vessels and money can be drawn thence so easily by bills, and to such advantage by the favorable exchange. 3. None to Asia, or the Continent of Africa, except Mogadore. 4. None to South America beyond the line. From such distances, vessels could not return before war may take place. Agreed to continue the regulation of Mr. Gallatin's circular of May 20th; except that it may be relaxed as to vessels usually employed in the coasting trade. This has a special view to the relief of North Carolina, that her corn and lumber may be sent coastwise. The Chesapeake being manned may be sent on a cruise from St. Mary's to Passamaquoddy. Two gunboats are to be built on Lake Champlain, and one on Lake Ontario-as many as convenient of the troops now raising are to be rendezvoused along Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence, a copy of the Attorney General's opinion on the Mandamus issued to Theus in South Carolina to be sent to the districts Attorney with instructions to oppose all future attempts of the kind, and Theus to be reprimanded for his countenance to the procedure.-We are agreed that a mission to St. Petersburg is expedient; the time not now decided.





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   July the 6th . Present the four Secretaries and Attorney General. 1. England revokes her orders of November and January. Shall we suspend the embargo laws as to her? Answer unanimously, we shall. 2. If she revokes the order of November alone? Answer, we shall suspend, the Attorney General alone dissenting. 3. If she revokes the order of November as to our own produce only? Answer unanimously, not to suspend, but in that case to call Congress at an earlier day? If France repeals her Berlin and Milan decrees, and restores the property sequestered, shall we suspend the embargo laws as to her? Answer, call Congress and declare the embargo laws as to France suspended in fourteen days. Mr. Madison is strongly opposed to this latter part; the suspension, because it lets our vessels fall into the hands of England and so pre-determines the question of war. If the embargo is suspended as to one of the powers, it must be so as to the whole world except the other power and all other nations having similar decrees or orders existing against us.


   October the 22nd . Present the four Secretaries. Intruders on the new purchase south of Tennessee, two on the Indian lands (Choctaw and Cherokee) on each side of that purchase, three on the north side of Red river. Agreed unanimously as to the first to appoint a Register and he to give notice to all the intruders to come in and make a declaration



-484-


that they have no claim to the lands, and that a military be sent in the spring to remove all who do not. There is a Colonel Harrison claiming and surveying under Coxe, who probably will not disclaim right, and will therefore be removable without disturbing the others, who are said to be industrious men of property and disposed to obey the laws. The land office can be opened in the spring which will settle everything.

   2. As to intruders on the Indian lands, give notice to depart, and if they do not, remove them in the spring by military force; except from Doublehead's land.

   3. As to those on Red river, let them alone and get Congress to extend the land law to them, as they are conveniently situated to support New Orleans. Unanimously agreed to. Order the detachment of 100,000 men under the law of last session, to be ready early in the spring that we may be prepared for any change in our foreign relations.

   Unanimously agreed in the sentiments which should be unauthoritatively expressed by our agents to influential persons in Cuba and Mexico, to wit, " if you remain under the dominion of the kingdom and family of Spain, we are contented; but we should be extremely unwilling to see you pass under the dominion or ascendancy of France or England. In the latter cases should you choose to declare independence, we cannot now commit ourselves by saying we would make common cause with you but



-485-


must reserve ourselves to act according to the then existing circumstances, but in our proceedings we shall be influenced by friendship to you, by a firm belief that our interests are intimately connected, and by the strongest repugnance to see you under subordination to either France or England, either politically or commercially?" Anderson, our Consul going to Havana is to be instructed accordingly; so is Hughes who is going to Mexico in quest of Pike's men,15 and Burling is to be sent to the city of Mexico under pretext of searching for Pike's men also, but in truth to communicate these sentiments to proper characters. Claiborne is to be entrusted with them also, to communicate according to the occasions he may find.


CONVERSATION WITH THE BRITISH MINISTER.

   November the 9th . Conversation with Mr. Erskine. He was much alarmed at the conversation out of door looking like a declaration of war with Great Britain.

   He spoke (declaring that if he was an American he would so view the thing) as the most rational for us to let our commerce go out and take its chance and that we should defend it against all equally, indeed

   After a long examination and the seizure of his papers he was escorted home, arriving at Natchitoches, July 1, 1807.



-486-


he seemed to think it best we should declare against all. He said this would be viewed as so equal that no rancorous war would be waged by either and peace would be easy at any time. I told him that there were but three alternatives, 1. war, 2. embargo, 3. submission, and that no American would look a moment at the last; he agreed to it.

   I told him I thought it possible France might repeal her decrees as to us, yet I did not understand from Mr. Pinckney's communications that England would even then revoke her decree; he declared in the most explicit terms she would. I then explained that the French repeal might only go to the high sea. He observed that he did not know that that could produce a repeal from England, because the exclusion of her merchandise would remain.

   I observed to him that I thought England decided on much by misrepresentations and from the errors of strangers who associated with but one party. He cleared himself of that by saying he mixed much with both, and could not be supposed to have any interest but in coming at the truth and communicating it.

   I noted to him the conversation of Mr. Canning in the month of June when Mr. P. inferred the orders would be revoked and the month of July when he was totally off. I intimated to him my suspicions that the Halifax expedition was intended to support a hoped insurrection in Boston. He protested at once decidedly against the error of that suspicion,



-487-


that his Government could not be so uninformed as to think of countenancing the taking adverse possession of a place they could not hold many days : and that assuredly they had not a single hostile view towards this Country, and that the people of England were equally averse to a rupture with us. He spoke of the situation of Spain and that Bonapartewould soon be ousted there. Lamented the state of the world and I joined him in that and said, that if either Bonaparte or his King were to die we should have peace. He said the Prince of Wales was as much anti-Bonapartian as anybody. That he was persuaded there could be no safety in a peace with him which would let their navy go down and Bonaparte's get up. I observed that went to a principle of eternal war. He said, no; that that danger would be lessened by Bonaparte's death, or by such a spirit of insurrection in the North as had appeared in Spain.

   I told him I was going out of the Administration and, therefore, might say to him things which I would not do were I to remain in. I wished to correct an error which I at first thought his Government above being led into from newspapers, but I apprehended they had adopted it, this was the supposed partiality of the Administration and particularly myself in favor of France against England. I observed that when I came into the Administration there was nothing I so much desired as to be on a footing of intimate friendship with England, that



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I knew as long as she was our friend no enemy could hurt : that I would have sacrificed much to have effected it and, therefore, wished Mr. King to have continued there as a favorable instrument. That if there had been an equal disposition on their part I thought it might have been effected; for although the question of impressments was difficult on their side and insuperable with us, yet had that been the sole question, we might have shoved along, in the hope of some compromise; that, indeed, there was a ground of accommodation which his Ministry had on two occasions yielded to for a short time, but retracted; that during the Administration of Mr. Addington and the short one of Mr. Fox, I had hoped such a friendship practicable, but that during all other Administrations I had seen a spirit so adverse to us that I now despaired of any change. That he might judge from the communications now before Congress whether there had been any partiality to France to whom he would see we had never made the proposition to revoke the embargo immediately which we did to England and again that we had remonstrated strongly to them on the style of Mr. Champagny's letter, but had not to England on that of Canning, equally offensive. That the letter of Canning now reading to Congress was written in the high ropes and would be stinging to every American breast.

   He admitted Mr. Canning wrote strongly, and spoke strongly, always taking the highest ground.



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I told him it was an unhappy talent, that nothing enabled a man to get along in business so well as a smooth temper and smooth style. I observed that if we wished war. with England as the Federalists charged us, and I feared his Government might believe, nothing would have been so easy when the Chesapeake was attacked, and when even the Federalists themselves would have concurred, but on the contrary that our endeavors had been to cool down our countrymen and carry it before their Government. He said it would have been very unjust to have made an individual act the ground of war, which his Government might and did disavow. I agreed to that, but added that the same class of men had committed and were in the habit of committing so many atrocious insults on us, that it was impossible not to feel them deeply. That I did not charge his 'Government with approving all this, because I believed that they could not control them, that the officers were allied to the highest families in the kingdom, were supported by such an aristocracy as that no minister dare move against one, unless he had acted as a coward and then the nation would support the minister in shooting him. He said I w as much mistaken in supposing the Government could not control the officers of the navy; that there was such a multitude of applicants to enter the navy as placed the whole very much under the power of the Government, and besides that they had such a number of officers beyond what they could



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employ as made. it easy for a Minister to leave one unemployed.

   I told him in the course of the conversation that this country would never return to an intercourse with England while those orders of council were in force, in some part of it also I told him that Mr. Madison (who it was now pretty well seen would be my successor, to which he assented,) had entertained the same cordial wishes as myself to be on a friendly footing with England.

   I committed all this to writing the moment Mr. Erskine left me. I have always expressed the substance and very often the very words and phrases expressed. They were however much more dilated than is here expressed on paper.



15 Captain Zebulon Montgomery Pike was sent on a geographical expedition to Louisiana in 1806. He and his party were arrested by a detachment of Spanish cavalry for trespassing on Spanish territory, and were carried to Santa Fe.

CABINET MEETINGS.

   December lst . Present the four Secretaries. The expedition prepared at Halifax, consisting of 4,000 men, is believed to be kept in readiness, in case war is declared by us, or obviously imminent, it is to go off instantly. Abandoning Upper Canada, to us, and take possession of New Orleans, we therefore determine unanimously that all the new recruits from Pennsylvania inclusively Southwardly and Westwardly shall be sent off immediately (being about 2,000 men) those in the Atlantic States by sea, the Western down the Ohio and Mississippi and provisions to be sent down the Mississippi with the men, if the state of the river permits them to go,



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besides these there are l,000 of the old troops which can be rapidly brought to New Orleans; that we may count on l,000 good militia of Orleans, and l,000 of Mississippi to be instantly commanded, making a force of 5,000 men. That thirty gunboats shall be immediately sent into Lake Pontchartrain, and we are to ask 3,525 seamen for the next season, to fifteen for seventeen gunboats, and the residue to fill the eleven small vessels we have from the John Adams, now a corvette, down. These eleven small vessels to be sent immediately to the Eastern ports to enforce the embargo. We are to undertake to make the canal at New Orleans, cost it what it will.


   February the lst, l809 . Present all. On the execution of the act for employing an additional Naval force. Agreed. 1. To raise men to man the thirty gunboats to proceed to New Orleans. 2. As many as will man thirty more to be sent to different ports to support the embargo. 3. To man the small vessels below the size of a frigate. 4. To man the Constitution. By the time these are raised we shall know whether the embargo, war, or what else is to be the state of things.

   The Chesapeake is to proceed instantly to Boston.


   February the 25th . Present Secretaries of State, Treasury, Navy and Attorney General.. What or-ders shall be given as to English and Spanish ships attempting to pass New Orleans for Baton Rouge?





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   Answer, English ships have been hitherto prohibited, that being the highest port of entry. Spanish ships have been permitted to go up, except when having slaves on board.

   Let things continue so till Congress rises, when their proceedings will decide what should be done.

   Agreed that orders shall be given to the military to remove squatters from the lands of the Chickasaws, Cherokees and Choctaws, except Doublehead's reserve and Wafford's settlement.