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Introduction
Insecurity and security has taken an increasing importance and political weight since the 1980s and more so since the 1990s, first of all, in the United States and then in Europe and the rest of the world. The phenomenon has grown through the often extreme medialisation on the issue of insecurity and security of the great urban agglomerations in wealthy nations. After the 11th September 2001, it was absorbed into the subject of permanent war against the new “global enemy" . Before going into an analysis of the different interpretations of the phenomenon, I believe it would be useful to outline the contents and therefore the theoretical and methodological instruments I intend to use in this work.
1. Insecurity, security, and the rule of law at national level
To be precise, the history of all societies has always been marked by the so-called problems of insecurity and security, terms often used as synonyms or in correlation with others, above all order and disorder, war and peace, the cohesion and the disorganisation or disintegration of society. From the times of Plato and Aristotle to the fathers of contemporary social sciences, the main ambition has always been to develop a theory capable of explaining how to ensure the assertion of order as stability for security, for social peace, thus as a good functioning of the political organisation of society. On the other hand, the enemy of society has always been defined as the opposite, meaning disorder or the in-security, as if it were impossible to think in other terms and as if these opposites were born after the first, hence “unworthy sons”, by-products or deviants. Yet even the universal portrayal of the history of the world start with chaos rather then with order and peace. Even in classical theory, such as Hobbes, order and security came about as an answer to the state of “all-against-all” war . Moreover, the only way to use synonyms opposite to “order” and “security”, if it is not chaos, is anarchy, a term that in the XIX century assumed a certain political connotation. In contemporary social sciences only the following derivatives have been established; dis-order, dis-organisation, dis-integration, as if only we were only dealing with exceptions to the rule which are claimed to derive from order and peace. The myth of a political organisation of society, warrantor of security and therefore of social peace, consensus, cohesion, integration of the majority, if not everybody, dominates all development processes of modernity and the consequent construction of the state. As carefully demonstrated by Foucault, the theories of security and thus of the police, by von Justi, Turquet de Mayenne, Delamare, Guillauté and others (see Foucault, 2004, pages 319-340; Id., 1976; Id., 2001) and the invention of bio-politics (Id, 2004b) correspond exactly to the quest for the myth of an organisation of society capable of guaranteeing security, wealth, peace and the happiness of the majority, to the point of concentrating on the re-education, or rather the re-disciplining, for reintegration, of even the abnormal or deviants. In other words, security, peace, cohesion, wealth and happiness come together as one with social control – endogenous and exogenous - discipline (with all its articulation and interiorization). The administration of social disorder is then thought of as a set of practices and regulations used for re-establishing order and peace. Control must serve discipline and, thus, repression and social surgery would be considered cyclical if not the estrema ratio. The "social issue" is risking to be transformed into a “crime issue" only in the most crucial moments of recurring crises, while social welfare should be favoured in order to retrieve the labour force and also because it costs less. The utilitarian or rationalist theories by I. Ehrlich, G.J. Stigler, G. Becker and others – summarised by F. Jenny and re-analysed by Foucault (2004)- are a sort of updating of Bentham and Beccaria and try to respond to the requirements of government in industrialised society. Liberal democracy, which bridges the XIX and XX centuries, believed that economic development was not possible without liberty and democracy, which go together with peace. Schumpeter, like Galbraith and other liberal democrats, is against war and the arms industry, which he obviously believes is impossible to locate in a Keynesian perspective (apart from the diffusion of “domestic” arms as goods for mass consumption).
The peaceful development of wealthy nations after the Second World War, has created the tendency to give credit to the myth of pacific order that even the most celebrated police sociologist (Egon Bittner, 1990) began to theorise (in the 1960s) that at some point in the not so distant future there would no longer be the need for an institutional body of police, having the right to use legitimate force. In other words, in this linear vision and almost teleological of this supposed progress, of pacification and thus the triumph of democracy, the police as a military force seemed like a sort of embarrassing short-term instrument, an “ugly thing” needed only for the transition towards happiness.
However, world history since '45 has been far from being predominantly peaceful . Nevertheless, it can be said that the wealthy nations have seen relatively few moments of serious conflict, disorder or insecurity, primarily because these have been spread around the globe (with a type of outsourcing which has accompanied the wars of “colonial pacification” and the post-colonial contentions between the two Superpowers, between them and other minor powers). If a search is made, then, among the wealthy nations, between 1945 and the 1980s, a correlation between insecurity and war can only be clearly defined to those dominant societies involved in far-off wars (Algeria and other African countries, South-East Asia and Vietnam, Korea, the Falklands, etc.). The paradox of this period lies exactly in the security of dominant nations in a world context where there have been more wars and death than in the past and under a protective umbrella, capable of the most destructive power. Yet, in those European nations not involved in any post-colonial or colonial war, war was no longer a discernible factor for the population, who for the majority had not forgotten the horrors between 1914 and 1945. It is thus important to underline that after 1945 (up to 11th September 2001) insecurity or disorder caused by enemies or external factors had not provoked any great preoccupation except at certain or specific times. Basically, from the 1970s onwards – though still far from worries about the effects of globalisation – did some alarm about insecurity, due to “external” reasons, begin to spread. Some of these were attached to international organised crime, the trafficking and spread of drugs or the supposed “infra-strategic” threats originating from the South (as defined by Weimberger in FY 1979); others were attached to ecological imbalance to the point that the terms insecurity and security have now become central themes for all environmentalists. En passant, it is perhaps nowadays that a type of competition has developed between visions which are vaguely or explicitly eschatological, where the desire for security seems, at times, a “universal asepsis, immunity for the body and soul against all uncertainty and danger" (a vision that J. P. Aron asked to be refused, as reminded by J. Delumeau, 1999).
From the point of view of insecurity and disorder being attached to “internal” enemies or factors, up to the 1980s in some countries and especially at certain times, “endogenous” terrorism was paid the greatest attention (even if sometimes suspected of connections or manipulation, directly or indirectly, with or by foreign powers) . Probably the most extreme case (always concerning the supposedly democratic nations) is Italy: from December 1969 to 1981 the number of victims of attacks were – proportionately – not much less than those on 11th September (2001) in New York or on the 12th March (2004) in Madrid. And yet, while there was a strong mobilisation in the war on “red” terrorism, which had not however caused carnage amongst the “street” population, there was no permanent war against “black” terrorism and the deviant secret services, who provoked many victims and for those massacres only the rare executioner of the crime had been punished . If this event is compared to the actual war on terrorism, it seems even more evident that the definition of the enemy and the response to them is more and more based on the prevailing theme of the moment, which today has even greater weapons for moulding public opinion.
Anyhow, it is possible to say that terrorism (either “right” or “left” or local) risked overturning the political-institutional structure then in force and caused terror among the majority of the population (in the dominant nations). This does not exclude that the economic and political “return” of this terrorism was exploited in favour of settlements and trends by the leading players. The same can be said for both the war on such terrorism and that against national and international organised crime. The most important aspect of all this experience is that the leading nations in the war on terrorism accumulated knowledge in regulations, experience and resources, which remain, anyway, only the “hard core” of the security measures of such States and even of all the international organisations. In turn, this patrimony had delved into similar past experience, especially those of “the wars of colonial and post-colonial pacification” (for example, the French war against the Algerian FLN, just like all the American operations in Latin America – possibly emblematic of this is the rise of Negroponte as chief of all the American Intelligence agencies). As we shall see later, this patrimony became highly esteemed after September 11th.
On the contrary, it is interesting to notice that until the 1980s, any attention paid to insecurity caused by delinquency and street or “common” crime was negligible. Actually, it is worth remembering that there is no correlation between all crime trends and the attention to insecurity. It is really during the years of the great economic boom that an important increase in so-called predator crimes took place, like others. Such growth did not cause alarm as was granted in certain situations against terrorism or organised crime. The same spread of drug addiction is often depicted as being the fault of the addicted and their parents rather than as the effect of the interaction between drug-dealing supply and drug demand, helped by prohibition policies (it is not by chance that the addicts are punished first, rather than strike at the real players and buffer the causes of such demand).
As a matter of fact, the increase in “common” crime has been established as an effect of the economic boom. The development of democracy seems to induce a control and repression situation which remain a prerogative of the conservatives, even much of the Left, and a practice of control of sanctions insisting ever more on re-education and rehabilitation (exactly like integral parts of welfare development) .
It is worth noting that in the whole time from 1945 to the 1980s, while the defence problem (meaning national security and not external) in the major nations was resolved by the bipolar game and thereby through the allocation of forces and resources to the respective sides, national security remained a jealously guarded object of the national government, the Interior ministers and the police. The concept, the regulation and the practices of these latter ones, apart from the necessary or even useless if not detrimental agreements, always remain those experienced since the beginning of the modern state. It is helpful to underline that this is not the crystal ball version of the police as the armed side of a state which dominates society from high, but a social institution that along with all the others (formal and informal, legitimate and even unlawful, in competition or complementary, tacit or explicit) actively participates in a decisive way in the political organisation. In other words, control, repression and regulation by the police is focused on what it (the police) determines and perceives, in a particular context, as an element of disorder. By placing itself within the game of the political organisation of society, in the middle of other institutions, its definition of threats and enemies and the response to these, originates from a type of mediation given by the leading players, the common one of the majority in society and the one that corresponds to its own interests and expectations. From 1945 to the 1980s, the police in the leading nations dedicated most of their energy to the habitual activity of social surgery (by this the separation of the industrious classes from the dangerous ones) yet leaving to other social institutions part of the same control and repression and also management of the crime and punishment. The main enemy is still that of social and therefore political subversion. The priority in all that time was certainly not the fight against common crime but the reinforcement of social and political control, which is pronounced by a certain form of "joint management", tacit if not explicit and negotiated with the social institutions representing the subordinate classes risking involvement in social disorder. It could be said that the Fordist development of the police is represented by the strong growth in the regulations and resources dedicated to controlling and repressing social and political protest (CRS in France, "Celere" police in Italy, informers, infiltrators and espionage in every part of social and political struggle, etc. ). The Trades Unions, associations, parishes and sports centres, even local (bar) and neighbourhood leaders, are the social institutions guaranteeing in their way control and repression, in other words, the management of disorder and so stopping the police from having to intervene in places which are traditionally hostile to them. And, it is to be remembered, it would have been unthinkable for a local inhabitant to call the police after being the victim of a crime.
2. How can the insecurity emergency since the 1980s be explained?
If an explanation for this emergency is attempted from the point of view of the changes in the threats and external enemies (always for the leading nations), it seems clear that nothing changed until the known impact of September 11th and the attack in Madrid in March 2004. Actually, it is a period of neverending violence, wars and of millions of deaths in Africa, Asia, Central and Latin America, as well as the endemic human catastrophes (famine, disease, etc.). Even by leaving out the historical reconstruction here, it is worth remembering that already at the end of the 1970s the crisis of bipolarism was apparent, not only with the progressive decline of the USSR but also with the decline of North American influence on the world stage, and also for the ex-colonial nations on the areas of influence, and at the same time any hope of non-alignment or reform of the UN vanished.
In this period it may be that we can locate a not easily identifiable empirical fact. We are dealing with the changes in the concept and practices of citizenship in the leading nations. While, to all appearances, basic rights like liberty and democracy seem to have won more space on an international level, the asymmetry between the holders of the conquests and the excluded continues to widen. Moreover, there are some quite revealing paradoxes: in 1972, all the wealthy nations insisted that the Helsinki agreements sanction the principle of the freedom of emigration, while the United Nations confirmed the freedom of movement for all human beings. Yet, no nation has ever considered the recognition of freedom of immigration; not only, just some years after Helsinki, the OCSE nations agreed on a block on migration to the point of eventually organising its total prohibition, and all out war against anyone aspiring to immigrate to the wealthy nations (see infra).
It would then be useful to analyse the changes in the representation and practices of citizenship in the leading nations by means of two main aspects: a) as a reaction and repositioning in relation to the degrading situation in the major countries and generally in relation to world government; b) as a consequence of the great shifts in the economic, political and social balance both on national and international levels. As we shall see, such changes concerning citizenship are actually the same ones affecting the concept of insecurity and security.
The theories, which have suggested interpretations of “post modern” insecurity, can be summarised in two main perspectives, with a third as the median:
1) Insecurity as a product of the increase in crime and social disorder in connection with the crisis of “values” and the weakening of order, with the consequent proposal to re-establish these by resorting to the traditional reactionary arsenal (law and order, more police, severer penalties, etc.); this is the notorious position taken by neo-conservatives, Thatcher and Reagan, and won over by Bush and the different conservative governments in all the wealthy nations (more than theorists, we are dealing with “counsellors of the prince");
2) Insecurity as a product of liberalist development therefore the destructuring of the previous social balance, with the consequent proposal to reconstruct social relations, solidarity, or rather peaceful solutions; this is the well-known democratic position, which does not have much pull among the Centre-Left political organisations (here we can place Bourdieu, Castel, Bauman, Beck, etc.);
3) The median solution: insecurity as a product of all the above mentioned aspects with the consequent proposal of an equilibrium between the two previously mentioned responses, which is the most common position of the Centre-Left political organisations (here we can place Dahrendorf, Giddens, Habermas, Walzer, etc.).
Leaving aside the ambiguities of the “median” proposal, as it would inevitably lead to supporting the first – except for swaying and second thoughts , I feel that it is important to note that while the second interpretation re-proposes a kind of updating of the democratic order paradigm, the neo-conservative one seems, on the one hand, to propose a simple updating of order from a reactionary viewpoint, but on the other hand it seems to break with the traditional concept. Clearly government of the neo-liberal social order can no longer be the same one of the political organisation “industrial” society, hence, the response to insecurity and the search for security can no longer cling to the traditional paradigm, that of control-repression-regulation, or rather education and re-education, recovery of all bonding energy, integration and re-integration, widespread consensus and cohesion. Neo-liberal development cannot and does not want to resume this orientation, both because the new social order has completely changed following the great destructuring caused by the end of modernity (there are no longer the social institutions who in their game guaranteed the management of disorder and so the reconstruction, though temporary, of order), and because nobody is interested in reconstructing a practically stable order in the presence of a development pointing at instability, flexibility and mobility even on a global scale. In reality, there is no importance given to the increase or whatever in crime and deviant behaviour, the insecurity attached to “post-modernity” is not as much a “social issue” that can be treated as a “criminal issue” or the opposite by use of an articulation of modern policing, welfare and bio-politics, as shown by the past of the modern state. We are dealing with an insecurity that is quite diverse from the dominators’ point of view or even that of the dominated. For the latter (as comprehensively explained by Bourdieu, Castel, Bauman et al) it was the tragedy of the erosion or the total loss of gains between the end of the 19th century and the 1980s (political, social, civil rights and even the “security” and small privileges for the subordinates in the leading nations). On this subject, it is worth observing that the classic owners and unions – with at times completely opposite claims – are often the outsiders of the new bargaining game for the government of the political organisation of society. Unions and the “fatherly” industrial owners (even “old” sociologists) are actually on the defensive, inevitably losers because they only represent a minority of liberal society and because they end up defending an equilibrium that can no longer exist (given that it really existed in a democratic mode as thought by such writers). In fact, they are completely wrongfooted in relation to a growth that has dismembered almost entirely the productive and para-productive structure due to technological advancement and transfer to subordinate countries (it is enough just to think of all the concentration of heavy industry, the car industry and the textile industries, etc.).
Yet, the economic and social structure has two Achilles heels: it generates ever increasing insecurity among the subordinates which is actually antithetical to that of the dominators, anxious in their fear of losing control over the former ones and therefore the authority to impose unbearable working and living conditions which liberalist expansion feeds on. Such expansion is going in the direction of heterogeneous and discontinuous segmentation, thus towards a general instability whish is confused with flexibility and generally an increasingly intermingling between lawfulness, informality and unlawfulness (activities which quickly rise and fall). All this can only produce a growth in the black economy and so a universe of workers with less rights or those really “without rights” (in the most extreme case the illegal immigrant, employed cash-in-hand). In other words, the litmus paper of the status of democracy, which is forged with neo-liberal development, stands in the progressive reduction of people having political, social and civil rights and they should hope that this situation may be defended . Probably in light of this, it would be necessary to “gauge” the actual possibility of gaining access and practicing citizenship rights, or on the contrary, the growth in the asymmetry between those who have this chance and those who are totally excluded. Returning to the lucky expression proposed by Bauman, the Unsicherheit thus assumes the form of the typical post-modern insecurity-uncertainty-fear, not for everyone but essentially of the lower classes and especially those most hit by neo-liberal destructuring processes. This Unsicherheit condition is becoming yet more distressing for those increasingly desegregated and who cannot any longer find a reference point for any form of protection and reassurance (precisely because there is disintegration of social relations, the types of previous unions and hence the chance of resistance). There are emblematic examples of desperate struggles, like attempted suicide or actual suicide (the sacked person who threatens to throw themselves off a tower or wishes to die at the bottom of a mine, etc.), while the temporary or “illegal” workers are not able to find the mechanisms to acquire bargaining power. In short, the erosion of the opportunities for collective mobilisation and above all the thwarting of bargaining power is leading to the vast expansion of insecurity among the lower ranks who then no longer sense any prospect of “salvation” (probably in this is placed the revival of religions and sects, like magic or esoterical beliefs of any type). Undoubtedly the most extreme case of attempting an escape from insecurity is (as in the past) migration, which often means being overcome by the war the migrants are part of. In fact, the most important aspect is that insecurity does not have a local or national dimension any more, it is a global phenomenon, or rather the result of several intertwining among social, political and economic factors on a world level. It seems quite obvious that in light of this global insecurity, the chances of local or national mobilisation being incisive are derisive, while “global mobilisation" (or new global) remains quite lean, for the time being. It is pointless to say that it is unimaginable that a world movement, new global, can impose global social contract, peace, balanced and sustainable development on the leaders. The asymmetry of power between the dominators and the dominated, the interests of the former and their tactical and strategic choices, do not permit any margin for bargaining, nothing comparable to the space, despite everything, the lower classes were able to achieve at the end of the 19th century, precisely because it was a situation ruled, moreover, from within the nation state . And it is also in the confused perception of the global dimension of insecurity that migration may appear a constituent element of such or even the picture of the future becoming of the subordinate classes by the major nations.
Even though it may seem paradoxical, part of the subordinate class ends up believing that the reason for insecurity is crime and that reassurance can be gained from more police and more punishment. In fact, faced with the decline of nearly all social institutions, the police seem to be more than ever the only force, because it is reinforced and closer to the population, who expect it to provide all-embracing and thaumaturgical (miraculous) solutions. In other words, the general situation of anomia helps the stronger social actor (where it is not the police, it could even be a criminal organisation).
As for the leading social players, they seem to be marked by the obsession of control due to, exactly, the instability of different actions in an even greater space and greatly limited time. It is not only the fear that in the past concerned possible revolts or popular insurrection, if anything that of mass dissent enough to resort to repression seemingly full of mistakes (for all see Genoa). Yet, even more, we are dealing with a control, which must be founded in violence because neo-liberal development does not permit concessions, it cannot practice peaceful negotiations or this would imply recognition of rights. It is probably this aspect that better explains the continuous rise in private security forces, vigilantes and charge hands, who are freer than the State police and additional to them. In other words, the main objective of “post-modern” control is to guarantee the complete subordination in any work situation and thus the repression of those who do not it passively. The paternalistic and educational-disciplinary aspect of control forged in industrial society has tended to disappear, just like repression directed towards punishment-rehabilitation. We are not dealing with a transformation of the social issue into a crime issue, according to the outline experienced in two centuries of the modern state, but of a tout court control asserting the draconian neo-liberal dominion, which concedes nothing and wants to dispose of/eliminate the product of repression (human excess). It seems quite clear that this dominion thrives on insecurity rather on respite. It is a dominion unavoidably obsessed with all signs of dissent or hostile behaviour (even a banal social protest or a tiny unilateral reduction may seem to be a continuum of terrorism ). From this point of view, it may be possible to affirm that this same obsession for control has helped the extraordinary growth in the security business. The weight and importance of this phenomenon has quickly permeated into all segments of society’s political organisation. The alternative or better still the balance between social solutions and security has favoured the latter, due to the impotence, bewilderment, the inability to comprehend, and even the mystification of the operators of social solutions (security assurance imposes the police conversion of social services, by recluting its embedded on equal terms to what is done in theatres of war). It is common knowledge that the enormous and sprawling security network is not needed to avert, nor to strike so-called widespread crime, but the whole of society is committed to payment the ever increasing cost . In other words, once set off, the security network expands continuously and reproduces and reintroduces the circularity of the interactions supporting it (circularity among the various social characters concerned: from the moral entrepreneur, who becomes the security businessman, to the specialist journalist with their scoops on insecurity, to the police officer anxious for promotion, to the social operator who obtains funding by recycling themselves in this system, to the well-meaning and zealous citizen, the real auxiliary/volunteer soldier of “post-modern” security). The social characters who benefit from the success of security are many and converge with those social circles forming the hard core of neo-liberal social cohesion, founded on the "tautology of fear", hence on the designation of the enemy (Dal Lago, 1999).
It is in relation to this social cohesion that the concept and practice of citizenship in the dominant nations has become the exclusive prerogative of the included, such as the zealous citizen, with his complete antagonism to those who do not belong to such a universe. The local connotation links tidily with the national or global one of the leading nations (the European Union and the West led by the USA) whereas it seems incompatible with the universalistic concept. All the tragedies in “Third World” societies appear to reinforce that the actual or imaginary privileges linked to citizenship in the major nations can only be maintained by stern protection from the rest of the world. Though the consensus open to explicit racism remains with a minority, there is a near majority perception of migrants as a threat, the same perception for the “damned of the metropoles" as an unbearable presence. Unsurprisingly, representative of the main theories of insecurity indicate young deviants as the main source of “urban misbehaviour”. The idea of security brings back the asepsis alluded to by J.P. Aron, in short a sort of pure wrapped guardian, of decorum, values and welfare, fit only for citizens because of their zealousness, those militating in its defence in all senses. Here emerges the concept of the integrity of national identity as desired by Huntington (2004), with the consequent appeal against any defilement of this, or rather against concessions given to the Blacks or the Browns.
Post September11th
From the security point of view, the main effect of the events of 11 September 2001 could be seen as the fusion between the perception of the outside enemy and the inside enemy. Actually, the move towards this fusion began twenty years ago, when the sources of threat began to be located in the “South” especially by the United States (FY Report 1979, Weimberger). As reminded by some writers, the same fight against irregular immigration took on military techniques and practices up to the point of acquiring aspects of warfare (Bigo, ed., 1998; Ceyhan, 2004). Nevertheless the fervour of the Al Qaeda terrorist attack on NY city (and again in Madrid) really sanctifies the unanimous proclamation of one enemy, the global enemy incarnated by the Muslim terrorist, but not only this. Probably the most important aspect of the Patriot Act and the rules adopted by the EU is that that the definition of terrorism and its supporting forces or all that can be compared to it, is quite extensive. Not only, but also as we shall see, the possibilities of being included in these categories depends on the mercy of the police forces to whom the judiciary authorities become subaltern. The most eloquent example of this extension of criminalisation, in the name of the war on terrorism, is precisely the sequence of police operations after September 11th. Faced with somewhat fearful opponents, any derogation of basic rights would seem to be taken for granted and does provoke any criticism from democratic pubic opinion. Hundreds of people have been arrested purely on the basis of “information” sent by the American secret services or produced by other national agencies. Lawyers have no chance of defending the accused or even of seeing them. The evidence is often absent or absurd and at times so badly made that it is easily disproved. Except for a few cases the investigators manage to assemble enough evidence but that has nothing to do with normal evidence used in a normal trial in full respect of basic rights. Even more striking is the almost extremist expansion of the discretion of the secret services and the police, up to the triumph of free will. As testified by ex-members of the CIA and other secret services, some operations (not only traditionally undercover or those immortalised by films of 007 and various Western and Soviet agents) have been carried out in typical criminal command style since the beginning of the 1980s. Moreover, the seizure of suspects has become more commonplace since September 11th, followed by their deportation, their systematic torture and often in their disappearance (so-called actions "extraordinary rendition" ). This does not just mean what happened in Afghanistan and especially in Guantanamo (Cuba), Abu Graib and other places in Iraq, but also other events that have occurred in the last three years in the seemingly democratic nations, from Canada to Australia to various European countries, who have used as dumps countries where torture and the elimination of detainees is the norm (Egypt, Morocco, Syria, Uzbekistan, etc.).
How many arrested terrorists have actually been involved in terrorist attacks? How many suspects are there? What treatment did they receive? Leaving aside the United States, where according to some sources the number of suspects illegally arrested amounts to about five thousand, and the known cases in European countries relate to an overwhelming majority of people who have been found to be completely extraneous to Islamist terrorism (the most expressive example is the Italian one). In fact, several of the anti-terrorist operations seem to respond to the logic of a media campaign than to terrorist prevention, like the attack in Madrid. It could also be said that issue of insecurity before 11 September 2001, upheld the social construction of new immigrants and their children as public enemy number one, and after that date the alert was raised for an even more terrifying enemy. Nevertheless, the paradox of this phase is the frequent and almost immediate groundlessness of anti-terrorist operations. There has been no real suppression of any terrorist attacks and the evidence against the few arrested suspects, accused of belonging to Al Qaeda or its components, has not demonstrated that these suspects were effectively planning attacks in Europe. Despite this, the media campaign against terrorism occasionally continues to repeat the same type of alarm: terrorist threats in all European capitals, bio-terrorism, etc, etc. (from 2001 to 2005 some headlines have carried more or less the same wording, so much so that since the start of 2005 the words in the article have begun thus:
The fear of chemical and biological attacks has returned ... the alert is worldwide ...the intelligence documents mentioned by the British Home Office Secretary, Charles Clarke, in occasion of the reading of the new anti-terrorism law, underline the existence of a real threat against the population and British interests” by terrorist groups associated to Al Quad, Osaka bin Alden’s network. Previous attacks used conventional means (...) but we know that these terrorist groups wish to use chemical, biological and nuclear weapons ... several people implicated in these terrorist plots are foreigners, however we are increasingly aware of the involvement of British subjects". The Head of Interpol, Richard Noble, has confirmed that the risk of terrorist attacks using chemical weapons remains high. “How could we forgive ourselves for the loss of tens of hundreds of thousands of lives simply because our among priorities there isn’t that of bio-terrorism?” said Noble. .... Interpol has organised a special conference on the threat of bacteriological terrorist attacks and it should take place next March in Lyon, France. ... in the meantime the Patriot Act has been passed again in America and Bush on his European visit has relaunched the Western between Europe and America in order to defeat terrorism and to assure everyone about economic recovery". (This information about the threats appeared first in the USA and then everywhere else between the 17th and 23rd February, 2005, and was printed by nearly all the main European daily newspapers ).
The link between causing alarm and the justification for new resources, and generally between the war on terrorism and economic recovery is clear. When this type of alarmist news is given, there always a series of arrests which the turned out to be on groundless charges . However, one factor comes to the forefront: the media construction of the global enemy has not only created the consensus for the permanent global war against terrorism and rogue states, but also the spread of “total” insecurity. As if this were not enough, above all in 2004 the category of global enemy tended to increasingly include even the typical social enemy. The secret services and part of the media insist that, by now, Al Qaeda recruits anywhere and anyone: drug-dealers, detainees in European prisons, children of Arabs or Muslims, with European nationality, minor delinquents, mosque goers and illegal immigrants. The Italian Minister of Internal Affairs, after having declared "Islam terrorism could find favour among the Italian anti-American movements" , and confirmed suspected infiltration by terrorists in Union Trade protests and also that the “red” terrorists could be linking up with Al Qaeda. The usefulness of putting all the eggs into the global enemy basket, along with its members, supporters and allies, has had an evident effect and provoked new panic in whoever, even the street level policeman. As Bonelli noticed, straight after 11th September, in France, the issue of the global enemy including the typical internal enemy was put forward in the following way:
Pierre Cardo [député-maire Démocratie libérale] invectivait de la sorte le Premier ministre, Jospin: Les attentats du 11 septembre dernier, aux conséquences dramatiques, nous ont tous marqués et ont révélé une nouvelle forme de terrorisme. Cet hyper-terrorisme alimenté par une économie souterraine a pris certaines de ses racines dans nombre de nos quartiers difficiles. Le lien entre terrorisme, trafic d'armes, de drogue, blanchiment d'argent, quoique vous l'ayez longtemps nié, n'est plus à démontrer. Comme il n'est plus à démontrer que certains jeunes de nos quartiers ont été entraînés dans des camps en Afghanistan ou dans les Balkans, et ont même pu, pour certains d'entre eux, servir de base arrière aux attentats de New-York. Dans ce contexte, comment tolérer que, dans nos quartiers, des zones de non-droit continuent à exister, où l'Etat républicain n'a pour seule réponse qu'une police de proximité désarmée, des barres qu'on abat, des médecins qu'on accompagne la nuit et le week-end ? Devra-t-on bientôt faire accompagner la police par des médiateurs ? [Assemblée nationale - 2e séance du 2 octobre 2001. Journal officiel de la République française p. 5310.] Raufer et Bauer, de leur coté rajoutaient une louche : “ Oui, en France aujourd'hui et à partir de ces zones de non-droit inaccessibles aux forces de l'ordre et grouillant d'armes de guerre, assurer la logistique d'un réseau terroriste est stricto sensu un jeu d'enfant ” [Bauer, A. et Raufer, X., La guerre ne fait que commencer, JC Lattès, Paris 2002, p. 233].
This confirms the shift from the social representation of insecurity caused by street crime (and the immigrant as the enemy) to that assigned to a global enemy who could take on the guise of any “Arab”, or even of a pacifist or opponent of neo-liberal globalisation. Consent to "civil strife" and racism increases and thus “Western” cohesion. In the meantime, the insecurity situation, due to the worsening of living and working conditions and the lack of an effective protection of the weak, is concealed. The new security developed with the war against the global enemy does not reassure most of the European population. To tell the truth, as total security or zero tolerance imposed themselves by pointing the finger at increased urban criminality, and as the war in Afghanistan and Iraq has been justified with a pack of lies, the war against the global enemy both on local and world-wide level feeds on recurring alerts and blitz that does not prevent nor repress “global” terrorism.
Risks of European involvement in the war against the "global enemy"
As observed by some researchers of Elise consortium (see Bigo, 2005) the European Union aligned with the directions and war practices adopted by the USA against the global enemy, thus wasting an important opportunity to affirm its sovereignty in the crucial field of security and freedom. Nothing helps to demonstrate that Muslim terrorism can be defeated by a “total and permanent war”, by the sacrifice of freedom and encroachment of fundamental rights . Even worse, nothing demonstrates that the fusion between the fight against daily crime and the war against the global enemy can strengthen the internal and external security of European countries, rather than create more risks. It may appear commonplace and paradoxical, but maybe it is appropriate to be reminded that the security of a society does not depend on fantastic super-police or on war mobilisation for a racist “post-modern” crusade. The only possibility for an effective reassurance capacity (rather than a mythical and totally unreal security that never existed) can correspond only to a society where the pacific negotiation of conflicts and differences prevails. This can happen only if the imbalance between the dominant and the dominated is greatly reduced. It is well known that all the forms of terrorism, and even more the violence that exploits the absolute desperation coming from impotence, are possible because of the asymmetry between powers and oppressed. If the European Union does not choose its own path directed to pacific relationships and negotiations with all the different worlds that surround it from the South and the East, the risk is that of being swept away by a war imposed by others, even within its same social body. It is for this reason that the European construction risks appearing insufferably Euro-centric, if not racist, when favouring enlargement to the East and to those pro-Nato countries (like Turkey). In particular, from the point of view of the youth of the outskirts in the South and East of the European Union, the most unbearable injustice consists in the denial of their rights to mobility, to circulation, to globalisation, the same right that, de facto, is denied also to the young Europeans too poor to afford the right to travel and experience life in nearby countries. Something else is evident: after the Second World War until the construction of Fortress Europe (Schengen), any young man coming from Africa, East and Middle East, granted that he managed to depart, could go to any European country. Today this freedom is extremely limited, if not definitely abolished for most people. This suppression of freedom is not only intolerable prohibition policies, it has become war on migration: a war that produces thousands of deaths (people drowned in the Mediterranean, death during attempts on dangerous routes). Special prisons for illegal immigrants who did not commit any crime, collective expulsions becoming real manu militari mass deportations (as those in 2004 from Lampedusa - a small island south of Sicily - to Libya), thousands of deaths: this is what prohibition policies against migration produce. The consequences of a fusion between prohibitionist practices to migration and war against the total enemy are bound to be disastrous.
Has security in Europe been raised by all this? The most convincing answer seems to be negative. At the same time, the twenty years drift of management in matters of security with the result of a permanent war against the total enemy, risks to heavily condition the contents of European citizenship. If the risk was already evident of an euro-centric connotation, connected both to the police-prohibitionist choices towards immigration and to the direction of enlargement of the Union, with the war against the total enemy (intended above all as “Muslim terrorist”) the risk is now increasing, with the prospect of a Europe marshalled against the Islamic world, with a connotation of European citizenship opposed to the concepts of pacific negotiation and solution of all conflicts and peaceful cohabitation of people. The issue of the effective political sovereignty of the European Union appears as crucial as ever, and such as decisive in determining the characterisation of European citizenship as the opportunity of a pacific and respectful perspective of basic rights.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that citizenship is forged from a building process and the intervention of countless interactions between subjects and social institutions, aspects and elements on a local, national and international context. In other words, the concepts and concrete practices of security on a local level and of security on a global level influence the features of citizenship. There is an evident correlation between adopting a wise use of control and the negotiated peaceful management of social disorder, on a local level, and the adoption of peaceful negotiations for quarrels and conflicts on a “world” level. On the contrary, there is evidence of a correlation between “zero tolerance” methods and those of the permanent war against the global enemy".
In relation to these two perspectives, the EU and the single European states waver between the ambiguity if not the temptation to give in to the last option. Furthermore, any forecast on future developments today seems quite reckless.
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See "What are the results of the three years of research of ELISE?” Intervention of Didier Bigo for the round table of 11/02/2005 and the video Draft
On the relationship between disorder and order in human and social sciences I refer to Dal Lago, in Conflitti globali (n.1./2005), the journal of the Elise Italian Team.
See T. von Trotha (2005) and Dal Lago (2005) in the first issue of Conflitti globali.
Among the most important terrorist groups in Europe (some of them still active) it is worth mentioning Eta in Spain, Ira in the Uk, the Corsican terrorists, Action Directe in France and Raf in Germany. Italy is a partially different case: while Br and other “red” terrorist groups are quite similar to the Raf in Germany, the so-called state massacres connected to “black” terrorism and more recently the Mafia attacks are located in the game of profitable games of violence regarding equilibrium among power groups. On studies about terrorism in Europe, see Bigo.
On these issues as well as the massive reconstruction by the “Massacres” Committee, there are many dossiers and publications available on Internet.
The contrast between right and left (or rather between law and order is respect for civil rights) is perhaps more an imaginary construction than a reality. Neither the right nor the left have ever historically been libertarian and attentive towards basic human rights which are moreover far from the interests of liberalists or neoconservatives today (both right and left, referring to Bush and Blair).
As far as Italy is concerned, Fiat is a prime case where there is a shift from the Valletta system (company unions, spies and internal police squads and collaboration with the State Police and the Carabinieri) to the Romiti reign (espionage and indexing inside the factory including probable exchange of information with the State Police and Carabinieri).
It is worth noting that there are some second thoughts by a few criminologists and also some philosophers etc. (for example, the English criminologists who backed Blair, just like some sociologists accredited the social sensitivity of the first Chirac term or in Italy under the Centre-Left).
See also Bonelli, COE, 2004
In relation to the previously mentioned studies by Foucault.
It is also significant the fact that the opponents to the liberalistic globalizated development have slowly abandoned slogans and arguments of radical antagonism, nowadays defining themselves as newglobal and disobedient, a term, this last one, that reveals the weakness of the opposition to domination in a context of extreme strength imbalance between dominators and dominated.
The first critical analyse of the "maximum-security society" has proposed by Gary T. Marx in his excellent and anticipating book Undercover. Police Surveillance in America, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1988. A recent critical analyse of "zero tolerance" and in particular of the "Broken Windows Policing" is in the important book of Bernard E. Harcourt, Illusion of Order, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 2001.
In a recent interview, Robert Baer, case officer of CIA say that those actions are usuals (see la Repubblica, 17 February 2005)
One of the most impressive aspects of the war against terrorism in Italy is represented by the strange "numbers" announced to the press by acknowledged people: judge Dambruoso, famous for being the first to inquire about them and for his regular stays at the Pentagon, talks of about 2000 people “trained for slaughter/massacre”, but Fusani (Repubblica) wavers between 547 and 50, and Bonini (Repubblica) decides for 4481 targets! At the end of 2003, minister Pisanu talks of a total of 71 arrests during 2003, only 16 in 2000, 33 in 2001 and 64 in 2002: all these figures are contradictory. If two thousand people had been identified as “trained for massacre”, why they hadn’t been arrested? Still, at the beginning of 2004, Dambruoso declares that there is a “kamikaze danger” (Repubblica, 18th March 2004). The analytical account of these aspects is contained in the archives of the Italian Team, which are collecting all media news to the present day, since 2001.
The first alert for the threat of chemical attacks goes back to 10–13 October 2001 when the European Union creates a task force of bioterrorism experts: “The American Government forecasts a counterthrust by terrorists. Main targets are USA installations in Spain, France and Italy. Beware, the retaliation will hit Europe first.” (Repubblica, 9 October 2001).
Example: all the people arrested for the alleged preparation of chemical attack on the American Embassy in Rome were all released: “Ferro cyanide”, all the acquitted 12 Muslims were charged with terrorism: “The fact does not exist” (A. M., il manifesto, 29 April 2004). They had been arrested at the beginning of 2002, between February and March, when the 11th of September of New York was still fresh in the minds of everybody. Carabinieri of Ros declared that eight of them were planning to poison the water supply system of the USA Embassy, in Via Veneto, in Rome: for this reason they were hiding potassium Ferro cyanide in the building where they lived, at Torbellamonaca, in the south-east suburbs. Moreover, very close to the Termini station, a mosque made out on the ground floor of a building was the den for a Muslim “cell”, undoubtedly connected to Al Qaeda. Unfortunately, in front of the Second Court of Assizes, the accusation simply fell apart: yesterday the jury rejected the motions of the Public Prosecutor Erminio Amelio and of the anti-terrorism pool directed by Franco Ionta, acquitting completely the twelve defendants. “The fact does not exist”. Ferro cyanide made its impression, even if the name was far more impressive than the substance itself: in order to poison the water supply system of the USA Embassy, they would have needed a huge amount of it, and not the mere four kilos that the accused were hiding. And nobody would have drunk that red water, a collateral effect that many other poisons do not have. The mystery remained of those underground maps, found by the Carabinieri and never explained by the defendants, but of course this was not enough proof in a trial for a mysterious chemical attack in the centre of Rome. The Public Prosecutor decided then to limit the charge to associative crime, thus “inaugurating” the new Article 270 bis that, since November 2001, punishes association to terrorism, even on an “international” level. The trial against the Muslims was placed alongside another one, opened in the same period of 2002, involving the mosque “Al Harmini” of via Gioberti, near Termini station. In that place no bombs were found but, according to the Ros carabinieri, in a gallery, well hidden from the ears and eyes of the believers, Muslims spoke about Kalashnikovs and terrorist outrages.
See Repubblica 6 January 2001; Repubblica 11 April 2004; Repubblica 26 August 2004: "The President of the Republic during an interview to the weekly magazine "Espresso": "Beware of the small terrorist groups: they are forming a coalition”. Warning from minister Pisanu: "Terrorists in trade union marches”. “And Al Quaeda could infiltrate among the clandestine immigrants”. “Internet becomes amplifier for ultimatums and threats.”
General Tricarico, advisor of the premier Berlusconi declares, in an interview to Corriere della Sera (4 December 2003, page 5): “Less rights, in order to fight terrorism” “We cannot face such an emergency with ordinary laws” “Otherwise it could lead to the same double and questionable track of the American justice for the Guantanamo prisoners” “Sometimes, the protection of privacy works to the detriment of an effective prevention activity”.
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