The Nature of the Threat

Terrorist Acquisition and Use of Nuclear Weapons

Al Qaeda operatives have made repeated attempts to buy stolen nuclear material to make a bomb. Intercepted al Qaeda communications reported a member boasting Osama bin Laden planned to carry out a "Hiroshima" on America. Extensive materials on nuclear weapons found in al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan make clear the group's continuing desire for nuclear capability.

The hardest part of making a nuclear weapon is getting plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Since these materials are difficult to make, the most likely way a terrorist will get them is through illicit purchase or theft. In Russia alone, the Cold War legacy of the Soviet Union left vast quantities of weapons, HEU and plutonium, as well as tens of thousands of people with weapons or materials knowledge whose jobs were no longer assured. In dozens of countries around the world, there are more than 100 research facilities with HEU that is inadequately secured and vulnerable to theft. Terrorists seeking nuclear weapons materials may not look where there is the most material; they may go where the material is the most vulnerable.

The chain of global security is only as strong as the security at the weakest, worst-defended site. That's why it is necessary to lock down nuclear weapons and materials around the world. Over the past decade, U.S. and Russian activities carried out under the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction programs, the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program and related programs have made significant progress in securing and eliminating vulnerable weapons and materials in Russia and the new independent states. However, by 2006, a little more than 50 percent of the nuclear materials and warheads in Russia have had cooperative security upgrades. And governments are only in the initial stages of the task of securing and eliminating vulnerable materials from the more than 100 HEU research facilities around the globe. U.S. and Russian officials have pledged to increase the pace substantially both for vulnerable materials in Russia and around the world, but the pace is still not commensurate with the threat.

State Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons Capability

State nuclear weapons programs pose a growing danger. The spread of nuclear technology and related know-how is cause for increasing concern. The exposure of an illicit nuclear trading network centered in Pakistan revealed a stunning operation to bypass international controls on the dissemination of nuclear weapons technology.

In 2006, North Korea tested a nuclear weapon. In South Asia, the risk of nuclear use between Pakistan and India remains high. These two countries have a history of strained relations, wars and cross-border terrorism. Both sides continue to expand their warhead stockpiles and delivery systems. Another cause for increasing concern is that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty does not prevent non-nuclear weapons states from developing the infrastructure to produce nuclear weapons materials under the guise of a peaceful civilian program. The result is that civilian nuclear capabilities used for energy production can be easily converted to a nuclear weapons program. After an 18-year history of conducting a clandestine program to develop nuclear weapons, Iranian leaders have a declared policy of developing a domestic nuclear fuel cycle, and they have made considerable progress in developing uranium-enrichment capabilities that could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons materials.

United States and Russia Remain in Cold War Nuclear Postures

The risk of nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia did not disappear with the end of the Cold War, and in some ways it has grown more dangerous. The United States and Russia continue to maintain thousands of nuclear warheads on land and at sea, ready to fire at a moment's notice — a posture essentially the same as during the Cold War. Russia's degraded early warning systems coupled with the large nuclear rapid and accurate strike potential of the United States provide a continuing incentive for Russia to rely on a "launch-on-warning" capability that is inherently vulnerable to mistakes, accidents and miscalculations. These large missile forces pose a significant security risk to both nations of mistaken, accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch. U.S. and Russian nuclear force size and readiness levels fail to reflect the fundamentally changed political relations between the two countries.

Strategies for Nuclear Threat Reduction

Reducing the risk of nuclear use by terrorists and nation-states requires a broad set of complementary strategies targeted at reducing state reliance on nuclear weapons, stemming the demand for nuclear weapons and denying organizations or states access to the essential nuclear materials, technologies and know how. Ultimately, success in reducing global nuclear threats can be achieved only through cooperation.

No state acting alone has sufficient authority, resources or influence to assuredly protect itself, especially from nuclear terrorism. Moreover, if the United States and Russia were to take steps to de-emphasize their reliance on nuclear weapons, it would give both nations more standing to encourage other nations to dismiss the nuclear option.

NTI is working in four strategic areas designed to address the most urgent, near-term risks, and to take advantage of opportunities where a private organization can leverage greater action from governments on a larger scale. These four areas of activity are:

Securing, consolidating and reducing fissile material

The relative ease of obtaining weapons designs and engineering non-nuclear components makes control over nuclear materials the first line of defense for preventing states or terrorist groups from developing or obtaining nuclear weapons. A global approach to removing and securing nuclear materials is essential because the chain of security is only as strong as its weakest link.

Leveraging resources to address nuclear infrastructure and human capital

As Russia seeks to cut its nuclear weapons workforce in half over the next few years, it must close or convert facilities at ten nuclear sites and eliminate 35,000 jobs. Many of the people who hold those jobs have access to nuclear weapons material or information useful to terrorists seeking nuclear capabilities.

A transition to sustainable civilian employment is critical to avoiding perilous temptations to sell access or information before jobs are lost. Reducing the total population of workers at all levels with access to sensitive materials or facilities will require a diversity of techniques beyond those currently in use. NTI is supporting pilot projects in Russian closed nuclear cities to prevent the spread of nuclear technology and knowledge. These projects are designed as models to be replicated elsewhere to strengthen nuclear security by reemploying personnel with knowledge of sophisticated weapons design and materials handling practices.

Building global cooperation on security goals

With renewed interest in nuclear power, the inherent risks associated with certain dual-use fuel-cycle technologies must be managed to avoid the proliferation of dangerous fissile materials. In order to encourage nations to rely on international sources of fuel supply as opposed to developing indigenous enrichment facilities, NTI pledged to contribute $50 million toward the creation of an international nuclear fuel bank under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Additionally NTI is working with the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management to catalyze the creation of an international institution to help promote best practices for nuclear materials security. Ultimately, sharing best practices could help form the basis for improving nuclear materials management standards globally to better meet the modern threats from terrorists and others seeking nuclear weapons.

Generating new thinking on reducing nuclear risks

More than fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia still maintain thousands of nuclear weapons in essentially the same postures as they were during the height of the Cold War. These weapons pose a dangerous security risk to both nations of a mistaken, accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch. To advance the global effort to reduce the risk of nuclear use, the United States and Russia — the two nations with the largest nuclear stockpiles — must lead in de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons and increasing warning time.

NTI Co-Chairman Sam Nunn has called on the Presidents of the United States and Russia to reduce each country's reliance on nuclear weapons and end their nation's Cold War nuclear force postures by increasing warning time for both countries. If both the United States and Russia can take this step, they can dramatically reduce the chance of an accidental, mistaken or unauthorized launch and deemphasize the role of nuclear weapons in their political and military relations.

Bold and determined presidential leadership in the United States and Russia is essential to making nuclear policies and force structures fit a post-Cold War security environment and to gaining the international cooperation essential to reducing global nuclear risks.

The Nature of the Threat

The potential destructive power of biological weapons is enormous, yet the opportunity for access to dangerous pathogens can be fairly routine and inexpensive. Moreover, the knowledge and expertise to obtain or prepare bioweapons are increasingly available, and the potential for exploitation is embedded in the very scientific and technological advances that hold promise for improving health and preventing disease.

An attack with a bioweapon could produce an infectious disease epidemic that would sicken and kill large numbers of people and persist over a prolonged period as contagion spreads. Unlike other types of attack, there would likely be no recognizable event or immediate casualties, and no physical location where damage is concentrated.

In the absence of an announcement or a fortuitous discovery, authorities may remain unaware that a biological attack has happened until days or weeks have passed and victims begin to appear in physicians' offices and hospital emergency rooms.

Biological weapons can inflict significant damage in small quantities and in the absence of sophisticated delivery mechanisms. Pathogens suitable for bioweapons can be concealed and transported, and many are found in nature, as well as in government, university and industry laboratories. Information about how to obtain and prepare bioweapons is increasingly available on the internet and in open scientific literature.

Moreover, bioweapons activities can be easily hidden within legitimate research laboratories or pharmaceutical sites. The idea of a "dual-use dilemma" has emerged because the same technologies and materials that are used for research to benefit society can also be used by terrorists to make biological weapons.

Compared with nuclear and chemical threats, the strategic and analytic framework for addressing biological threats and the depth of expertise are much less developed.

The response to the biological threat — with its close links to naturally occurring infectious disease — requires a new thinking.

Strategies for Biological Threat Reduction

The complexities of biological threats challenge traditional ways of thinking about prevention, deterrence, nonproliferation and response and require new thinking about how to define and implement enduring solutions.

Threats can emerge from many sources and involve human, plant and animal diseases. It is essential to develop strategies for action that do not imperil the advances in bioscience that we depend upon for progress in improving the health of the human condition.

One strategic fact is in our favor: many of the best steps for fighting infectious diseases are also steps needed to protect against bioterrorist attacks. Whether a disease is naturally occurring or intentionally caused, the essential elements of an effective response are to detect the outbreak, diagnose the disease, and take the right measures to treat it and contain it – immediately.

NTI's Global Health and Security Initiative has identified six critical challenges that are essential to increasing our security against biological threats – whether the threats are intentional or naturally occurring.

• Building a global disease surveillance, early detection and rapid response capability.
• Enacting measures to protect the food supply, both animals and agriculture.
• Supporting the research and development of new vaccines, antimicrobials, and rapid diagnostics.
• Promoting the safe and secure practice of the biomedical sciences by safeguarding access to dangerous pathogens and preventing the misuse of technology, information and advances in the life sciences.
• Strengthen intelligence gathering, data analysis, and sharing of information.
• Develop international standards for cooperative threat reduction.

Strengthening global disease surveillance, early detection and rapid response

Effective global disease surveillance, early detection and response capabilities are the fundamental building blocks of preparedness against infectious disease threats — whether naturally occurring or resulting from bioterrorism. Surveillance and early detection involve gathering data and monitoring changes in disease incidents. Outbreak response involves acting upon this information by treating illness to prevent the further spread of disease.

Working with critical public health institutions, often in public-private partnerships, NTI has supported and fortified international efforts to enable rapid detection, investigation and early response to infectious disease outbreaks worldwide through the support and development of regional response networks. Working in two critical regions, the Middle East and Asia, NTI projects are serving as models for developing regional cooperation that can be replicated in other areas of the world.

The Middle East Consortium on Infectious Diseases (MECIDS) has brought public health leaders, academic institutions, and private health care facilities in Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority together, and they are now working collaboratively to prevent and reduce the risks posed by infectious diseases. NTI's Global Health and Security Initiative has also launched a new project, BRIDGES (Building Regional Infectious Disease Systems for Global Epidemiologic Surveillance) with partners in Asia, who have recent experience with infectious disease outbreaks such as SARS and avian influenza.

Promoting science security

New advances in the life sciences have brought great benefits to human health. However, the same technologies and tools that fuel these advances can be misused to create biological weapons. Indeed, the rapid pace in biotechnology and the relative accessibility of new techniques and knowledge mean that development of a new generation of biological weapons is all too likely. Rapid developments in biotechnology could facilitate the creation of novel pathogens or entirely new classes of pathogens. Rendering disease agents resistant to antibiotics, more lethal, more contagious, less detectable, infectious to a greater host range, or more stable in an aerosol are all theoretically possible.

The spectacular pace of advances in biological sciences raises legitimate concerns that scientific advances will outpace our ability to make judgments about what should (or should not) be attempted. Moreover, the pace of scientific discovery outpaces governments' abilities to provide oversight of the research community.

NTI has shaped and supported a number of innovative projects that offer new insights into ways to prevent the misuse of life sciences for harm. NTI also is fostering an international discussion on strategies to guard against the destructive application of biological research and development while still supporting the open and constructive pursuit of valuable science. A highlight includes NTI's support for the creation of the International Council for the Life Sciences, now an independent, membership based organization, that is working with the life science community and governments to develop and promote global best practices, standards and training curricula for biosecurity and biosafety.

The Nature of the Threat

When properly distributed, minute quantities of chemical weapons, such as sarin and mustard gas, can sicken and kill. With the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, nations agreed to destroy existing chemical weapons stocks and forgo research and acquisition of such weapons in the future. At the time, 26 nations had declared they had or were suspected of having chemical weapons programs.

Together the United States and Russia have more than 90 percent of the 71,000 metric ton total declared global stockpile of chemical agents, but less than one-fifth of that material has been verifiably destroyed since 1997. The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s resulted in a vulnerable supply of weapons, equipment and know-how.

In addition to the known supply, there are chemical weapons caches around the world that are unaccounted for and may be poorly secured. Separately, there are more than 6,000 commercial chemical facilities that use, produce or store toxic materials that could be deadly if released into the atmosphere. Many of these facilities are located near densely populated areas and remain vulnerable to a terrorist attack.

Inadequately secured chemical weapons stockpiles and commercial facilities are a weak link in the chain of global security that could readily be exploited by terrorists, with deadly results. Securing and dismantling chemical weapons and redirecting production capabilities will reduce the likelihood that terrorists will acquire and use them.

Strategies for Chemical Threat Reduction

Securing and destroying chemical weapons stockpiles

NTI is encouraging regional and global cooperation and investment in stockpile security and destruction, and redirection of know-how and infrastructure to peaceful pursuits through its support of the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Russia has identified chemical weapons destruction as one of its highest priorities for cooperation under the Global Partnership, and Global Partnership nations are contributing to chemical weapons destruction projects in Russia.

NTI is also helping facilitate the destruction of chemical weapons in Russia. Russia has more than 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, mostly modern nerve agents, at seven sites in the west of the country.

The Shchuch’ye chemical weapons destruction facility is the top priority, with more than 1.9 million artillery shells filled with the nerve agents sarin, soman and VX sitting in dilapidated buildings. If dispersed to maximum efficiency, that’s enough material to kill tens of millions of people.

Russia has agreed to destroy these weapons but it will take an international effort to build the destruction facilities and infrastructure necessary to accomplish this. To help spotlight this danger and bring international resources to Russia, NTI issued a $1 million challenge grant conditioned on being matched by a minimum of $2 million in new contributions.

Following this challenge, NTI and the Government of Canada signed a Contribution Agreement under which NTI committed to provide $1 million toward construction of an 11-mile bridge and railway to safely and securely transport the chemical munitions from the current chemical weapons storage depot near Planovy to the destruction facility. Canada is contributing up to $28 million for this purpose through a Canada-United Kingdom agreement.

This infrastructure project is a model for the kind of international cooperation that is essential for reducing the global threats from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.