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FARAJ FAWDA, OR THE COST OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Ana Belén Soage*
Secular activist
and author Faraj Fawda was assassinated by Islamist militants
in 1992 after al-Azhar accused him of blasphemy. His writings,
in which he criticized the viability of the Islamist project
and urged Muslims to reconsider their picture of the past,
stand as a brave attempt to defy those who pretend to monopolize
the interpretation of Islam and use religion to further their
political aims.
The
1980s and early 1990s were an agitated period in the Muslim
world, and political
Islam--or Islamism, as it has come to be known--was behind much
of that agitation. Fears that the Iranian Revolution would
catch on contributed to the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War and
kept it raging for almost a decade. In Afghanistan, the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) and the Saudis supported the Afghan insurgency against
the Soviets, thereby giving birth to a monster that would come
back to haunt them. In October 1981, Egyptian president Anwar
Sadat was assassinated by the Islamic Jihad. Two months later,
the Iraqi Da'wa Party carried out what was probably the first
suicide attack perpetrated by Muslims, against the Iraqi embassy
in Beirut. In 1982, Israel invaded
a Lebanon already torn by civil war, which led to
the creation of Hizballah; the following year, that organization's
suicide bombers destroyed the barracks of the American and
French troops stationed in Beirut, leaving hundreds dead. The year 1987 saw
the outbreak of the first Palestinian intifada and the establishment
of Hamas. In 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa (religious
edict) calling for the assassination of Salman Rushdie for
writing The Satanic Verses. In 1991, the Algerian Islamists
gained the first round of an election they had entered while
openly declaring democracy an impious form of government; when
the regime cancelled the second round, they embarked on an
orgy of rape and murder that lasted throughout the better part
of the 1990s. The Islamist wave seemed unstoppable, and Middle
Eastern regimes, aware of their lack of legitimacy, hesitated
between repression and appeasement.
One of the countries
worst affected by militant Islamism was Egypt. That country saw a proliferation of radical
groups that anathematized each other, attacked Coptic churches
and homes, extorted jizya[1] (Islamic protection tax)
from Coptic families and businesses, and targeted foreign tourists.[2] More moderate Islamists tended to look at them sympathetically;
Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi wrote in 1982:
We
must be brave and admit that our behavior has been partially
responsible for pushing
the youth towards what
we have dubbed "extremism": We call to Islam, but do not practice
it. We read the Koran, but do not implement its rulings. We
pretend to love the prophet (peace be upon him), but do not
follow his Sunna.[3] We write in our constitutions that the religion
of the state is Islam, but do not give it the place it deserves
in government, legislation and guidance.... We should start by
reforming our societies and ourselves according to what God
has dictated, before we ask from our youth serenity, equanimity
and moderation.[4]
As
formerly Marxist intellectuals such as Muhammad Imara or
Tariq al-Bishri jumped
on the Islamist bandwagon, beards made a comeback after decades
out of favor, and the hijab (headscarf) became the norm
rather than the exception in universities and government offices;
only a few dared raise their voices to defend suddenly reviled
ideals such as secularism or "Western" human rights. Among
them, the most outspoken was Faraj Fawda,[5] who
was assassinated in 1992. With characteristic bluntness, he
wrote that the turning of the tide that the Islamic world was
witnessing was nothing short of "civilizational apostasy" (ridda
hadariyya).[6]
CHALLENGING THE "OBSCURANTISTS"
Fawda
was a fierce critic of those he called the "obscurantists" (zalamiyyun).[7] He
distinguished three trends within the Islamist movement: the
traditionalist (e.g. the Muslim Brothers), the revolutionary
(e.g. Islamic Jihad), and the affluent (mainly nouveaux
riches who made their fortunes in Saudi Arabia or as a result of Sadat's economic
liberalization or infitah).[8] However,
he saw overlaps between the three and made sweeping criticisms
of all of them. He diagnosed as "religious delirium" the syndrome
that made them see Egypt as an infidel
state in which Islam was disgraced and the ulama (scholars)
persecuted.[9] He dismissed their demands for the application
of Shari'a (Islamic law) and asked them how they intended to
deal with specific problems, such as the housing shortage.[10] Convinced that for them democracy was a means, not an end,
he predicted that if they attained power they would turn out
to be like the 1960s Arab revolutionary regimes that proclaimed
freedom to the people but only included in that category their
own supporters.[11] Moreover, he remorselessly derided their leading
figures: He unearthed a 1965 book in which Islamist firebrand
Anwar al-Jundi heaped praise on the Nasserist regime[12],
and expressed surprise that Muslim Brother Muhammad al-Hayyawan,
who had attributed the 1988 Armenian earthquake to God's wrath
against the "atheist" Soviet Union, had not volunteered an
explanation for the 1990 earthquake in Iran.[13] Furthermore,
he wondered about those who looked forward to the advent of
an Islamic state:
Where
does that optimism come from?... From the experience of the
[Islamic] investment companies?[14] From
the bullets that targeted Abu Basha, al-Nabawi and Makram?[15] From
the tolerance shown by the Islamists in Minya, Abu Qurqas and
al-Fayyum?[16] From
the terrific stances of the Islamists vis-à-vis art,
music, acting and singing? From the fantastic yield of the
Iranian experience? Or from the radiant results of the implementation
of the Shari'a in Sudan?[17]
Irony was, in effect,
his preferred weapon. When Farid Zakariyya exposed in the Islamist
weekly al-Ahrar the "scandal" of young couples kissing
by the Nile in an isolated spot of Cairo and demanded the intervention
of the shaykh of al-Azhar, the mufti, and the interior minister,
Fawda was prompt to answer. He mischievously pointed out that
at the time of the righteous ancestors (al-salaf al-salih),
on which the Islamists look back so yearningly, marriage was
easy, polygamy the norm, concubinage widespread, and Muhammad
did not forbid temporary, "pleasure marriage" (zawaj al-mut'a)
until shortly before his death[18]--so,
back then, boys had no reason to kiss girls in some side street
of Medina.[19] When
the Islamist monthly al-I'tisam published an article
in which Abd al-Subur Shahin condemned as immoral the broadcast
of the ballet Swan Lake on public television, he argued
that the problem lay with the onlooker (mushahid) rather
than the looked upon (mushahad) and regaled the reader
with some passages from The Jurisprudence of Looking in
Islam, a 1979 work that not only directs men to avoid looking
at women but also advises them to do likewise with other males
and, in particular, smooth-faced boys.[20] Moreover,
when Muhammad Muru wrote in a book about Shaykh Hafiz Salama
that, during the 1956 Suez Crisis, the shaykh had performed
a prodigy not unlike Jesus' "feeding the multitude" miracle,
he cheerfully announced that the question of Egypt's
food self-sufficiency had finally been resolved.[21]
On
the other hand, Fawda was very serious when it came to exposing
the mistakes
that the Islamists had been able to exploit to impose their
discourse. President Sadat released them from prison, relied
on them to fight the leftist opposition, and claimed the title
of "the devout president" (al-ra'is al-mu'min); for
these reasons, Fawda called his assassination "Sadat's suicide."[22] Pandering to popular religiosity,
government ministries emptied the first floor of their offices
so that their employees could assemble not only to pray but
also to listen to the Koran before prayer and to the day's
talk afterwards, "as if there were no laws stipulating working
hours."[23] Islamist politicians who were
elected to parliament were allowed to modify the oath of office
at will, adding sentences such as "...whilst it does not contradict
the Koran and the Sunna" or "...whilst it does not entail defiance
to the Creator."[24] Worse still, some sectors of the media took advantage of the "democratic
permissiveness" to undermine the fragile democracy;[25] even
the semi-official broadsheet al-Ahram did not shy from
describing Sadat's assassins as "martyrs,"[26] while some of its columnists applauded the
Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)[27] and
launched vicious attacks on the secularists. Fawda denounced:
[A well-known author with a weekly
page in al-Ahram] violently attacks those who defend
secularism, calling them "the Secularist Jihad" and accusing
them of being more dangerous than the real [Islamic] Jihad,
because they act with premeditation and deliberation whereas
the Jihadists had good intentions but inadvertently took the
wrong way.[28]
One
of Fawda's
main concerns was inter-communal strife, chronic in Egypt in the late 1980s and for much of the 1990s.
He rejected the arguments of those who pretended that the problem
was caused by "the external enemies of Egypt and Islam" (the
CIA, the Freemasons, the Mossad, etc.) and maintained it had
primarily internal causes: the institutional discrimination
of the Coptic minority; their being dubbed "infidels" by some
shaykhs; a general climate of intolerance in which the conversion
of Christians to Islam is celebrated with great fanfare but
a single Muslim conversion to Christianity causes riots;[29] and, most significantly, the
emergence of Islamism.[30]
He
questioned the rosy picture presented by those who wanted
the return of the "tolerant" Islamic
state: In this, like in everything else, he wrote, Islamic
history was characterized by ebbs and flows. He added that
it was not uncommon for minorities--subject to the whims of
the ruler--to be crushed by an extortionate jizya, forbidden
to ride horses, or even forced to wear distinctive clothing.[31] In
addition, he wondered how Christians could possibly agree to
a system of government in which they would be second class
citizens, relegated to menial jobs by the Islamic principle la
wilaya lil-dhimmi, "no leadership for the non-Muslim (over
Muslims)."[32] Furthermore, to those "moderates" who advocated
forfeiting the jizya if minorities were prepared to
serve in the army, he questioned whether Copts could be expected
to fight and die to protect "the land of Islam and the Muslim creed." [33]
DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM
Fawda
thought that the root of the Islamist question was a fundamental
confusion
between Islam and Muslims: "Islam is a religion and Muslims
are human beings; religion is blameless, while humans make
mistakes,"[34] he wrote. The failure to distinguish
the faith from the believers has led to the quasi-divinization
of Muslim historical figures. As a result, school manuals and
television soap operas offer a sanitized, highly idealized
version of the time of the caliphate.[35] Moreover, he added elsewhere, Egyptians are
only shown one chapter of their history, one dimension of their
identity, while the others are ignored.[36] After
being subjected to such indoctrination, he argued, it was not
surprising that young people wanted to resurrect that imaginary
past of heroism and righteousness, which contrasts so dramatically
with their miserable present and their dim prospects for the
future, or that some parliamentarians considered the reestablishment
of the caliphate the panacea to all problems.[37] He
reflected:
Go ask any European student if he
wishes a return to the time when the Church imposed its rule
in Europe and you will find him rejecting
the idea point-blank, and even refusing to discuss the matter.
That is because he studied history with all its miseries... That
is the difference between us and them. For them, history is
what happened; for us, it is what we would have liked it to
happen.[38]
He
did his best to demystify that past, using for that purpose
the classical
sources, including the chronicles of al-Tabari, Ibn Sa'd, and
al-Mas'udi, as well as the hadith collections of al-Bukhari,
Muslim, and Ibn Hanbal. He wrote in al-Haqiqa al-Gha'iba[39] that
even the period of the Rightly Guided Caliphs had not been
as idyllic as people imagine. The rule of the third caliph,
Uthman, was so marred by corruption that his fellow Muslims
demanded his resignation and, when he refused, decided to kill
him. Uthman's family was not allowed to bury him for three
days--against the Muslim custom, which requires a quick burial--and
he finally had to be laid to rest in the Jewish cemetery.[40] The
next caliph, Ali, was confronted by A'isha (Muhammad's favorite
wife) and Talha and Zubayr (two of his Companions) in the Battle
of the Camel.[41] Fawda invited readers to ponder the fact that those were the
people closest to Muhammad, and that the four men (Uthman,
Ali, Talha, and Zubayr) were among the mubasharun bil-janna--that
is, the handful of people Muhammad had designated as going
straight to heaven.[42] Completing his review with even less edifying
episodes of Umayyad and Abbasid history, he concluded that
the caliphate was a man-created system of government whose
inadequacy has been shown; that Islam is a religion, not a
state; and that, in fact, the state had been a burden on Islam.[43]
However, the growth
of Islamism was not just the result of hankering after a glorified
past, and Fawda acknowledged the role played by other factors.
They included the crushing 1967 defeat at the hands of Israel,
which had been interpreted as a punishment from God;[44] economic
hardship, especially in some of Cairo's shantytowns, where
people are in constant contact with more affluent areas through
work or studies but struggle to meet their most basic needs;[45] generous financing of books,
magazines, and newspapers by the affluent Islamists;[46] and the political ineffectiveness, when not collusion, alluded
to above.
Fawda also stressed
the responsibility of liberal intellectuals and urged them
to challenge the Islamists.[47] He himself was not afraid of taking controversial stances,
such as his denunciation of the fatwa against Rushdie,
which, in his opinion, offered the world an image of Islam
as a religion unable to confront its critics with anything
other than the sword.[48] He personally believed Islam
to be a tolerant religion that encouraged rationality and inquiry
and felt that he was defending it against those trying to distort
its message for their own purposes.[49] Furthermore, he did not think
that Islam should be held responsible for the backwardness
of the Muslim world any more than Japan's technological prowess should be attributed
to Buddhism or Shinto.[50]
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST FAWDA
Fawda admitted
that he was an irritant even to non-Islamists because, he said,
he had chosen the truth over pleasing people.[51] In his writings he occasionally alluded to
confrontations with the Islamists. For example, during a conference
in Berlin, a youth
told him that his blood was halal (i.e. it could lawfully
be shed).[52] The
Islamist newspaper al-Nur accused him of showing pornographic
films to young people at Nawal al-Sa'dawi's NGO, the Arab Women's
Solidarity Association.[53] In another incident, following the publication of his book Zawaj
al-Mut'a (in which he discussed the different arguments
around the contentious issue of "temporary marriage," practiced
by the Shi'a, but not accepted by Sunni Muslims), one of the
members of Hizb al-Ahrar publicly asked for the hand
of his young daughter for a pleasure marriage.[54]
Fawda's
detractors orchestrated a vicious character assassination
campaign, accusing
him of being on the payroll of the Israelis.[55] They also spread rumors that he had married
his daughter to the son of the Israeli ambassador to Egypt.[56] Fawda
dismissed such attacks as a symptom of the Islamists' inability
to respond to his arguments[57] and remained confident that the word was more
powerful that the bullet.[58] He
believed that, ultimately, those he called "the enemies of
history" would be defeated by reason and progress.[59]
In 1992, a group of teachers from al-Azhar University formed a council to confront the "helpers of evil," "the
secularists known for their enmity towards Islam"[60]--with
Faraj Fawda at the head of their list. On June 3, 1992, the
council issued
a communiqué accusing him of blasphemy. Fawda's supporters
would later describe that document as "an incitement to murder."[61] Five
days later, two members of the Islamist militant group al-Jama'at
al-Islamiyya entered Fawda's office and shot him dead. Fawda's
son was seriously injured in the attack, together with several
bystanders.
The
leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Ma'mun al-Hudaybi, was
among the first to welcome and justify the assassination[62] and, during the trial of the murderers, Azhari scholar and
former Muslim Brother Muhammad al-Ghazali testified that when
the state fails to punish apostates, somebody else has to do
it.[63] In Secularists and Traitors,
Muhammad Muru wrote that those who condemned Fawda's assassination
should also condemn the execution of French collaborators in
the hands of the resistance during the Second World War.[64] For
his part, the head of the Azhari ulama council published Who
Killed Faraj Fawda?. Its conclusion was that Fawda had
brought about his own death.[65]
Ana B. Soage
holds two degrees, in Politics and Translation, from the London Metropolitan University and the University
of Granada. She has lived and worked
in several Middle Eastern countries and is currently conducting
Ph.D. research in Egypt with
a grant from the Spanish government.
NOTES
[1] A
tax imposed on non-Muslims in exchange for the protection
of the Islamist state, because they did not serve (in fact,
were not allowed to serve) in the army.
[2] For
an excellent account of this period, see Gilles Kepel, Le
Prophète et
Pharaon (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1993), translated into English as Muslim
Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh.
[3] The Sunna is
the sum of the reports about Muhammad's words and actions
as handed down by his Companions. Those reports are known
as ahadith (plural of hadith).
[4] Yusuf
al-Qaradawi, al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya bayna al-Jumud wal-Tatarruf (Cairo:
Dar al-Shuruq, 2001, 1982), p. 20.
[5] This
is the more correct transcription of our author's name, although
it is often spelled Farag Foda.
[6] Faraj
Fawda in Faraj Fawda, Yunan Labib, and Khalim Abd al-Karim, al-Ta'ifiyya...
ila Ayna? (Cairo: Dar al-Misri al-Jadid lil-Nashr, 1987),
p. 20; Faraj Fawda, Hiwar hawla al-'Almaniyya (Cairo:
Dar wa-Matabi al-Mustaqbal and Beirut: Dar al-Ma'arif, 2005),
p. 9.
[7] Faraj
Fawda, Faraj Fawda wa-Ma'ariku-hu al-Siyasiyya [Compilation
of Press Articles] (Cairo: Al-Amal lil-taba'a wal-nashr,
1994), pp. 207, 315.
[8] Faraj
Fawda, Qabla al-Suqut (Cairo: F. A. Fawda, 1985),
pp. 159-65.
[9] Fawda, Hiwar
Hawla al-'Almaniyya, pp. 76-77.
[10] Fawda, Faraj
Fawda wa-Ma'ariku-hu al-Siyasiyya, p. 312; Fawda, Hiwar
Hawla al-'Almaniyya, pp. 56-57.
[11] Faraj
Fawda, al-Nadhir (Cairo: Dar Misr al-Jadida lil-Nashr
wal-tawzi, 1983), p. 83; Fawda, Faraj Fawda wa-Ma'ariku-hu
al-Siyasiyya, pp. 227-29.
[14] Reference
to the pyramid schemes established by Islamist investment
companies in the 1980s, which left thousands of small investors
without their savings. Fawda exposed their practices in al-Mal'ub (Dar
Misr al-Jadida lil-Nashr wal-tawzi, 1988).
[15] Former
Egyptian interior ministers Hasan Abu Basha and Isma'il al-Nabawi
and journalist Makram Muhammad Ahmad, who were the targets
of assassination attempts in 1987.
[16] Towns
in Upper Egypt where Copts have often
been the victims of Islamist violence. For an account of
the tense inter-communal relations during this period, see
Ami Ayalon, "Egypt's Coptic Pandora's
Box," in Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor (ed.), Minorities
and the State in the Arab World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner,
1999), pp. 63-67.
[17] Fawda, Faraj
Fawda wa-Ma'ariku-hu al-Siyasiyya, pp. 319-20.
[18] According
to the Sunni tradition, the Shi'a believe that zawaj al-mut'a was
not forbidden by the prophet but by Umar, the second caliph,
and it is still considered halal (legal).
[19] Fawda, Faraj
Fawda wa-Ma'ariku-hu al-Siyasiyya, pp. 265-69.
[21] Fawda, Hiwar
Hawla al-'Almaniyya, pp. 59-62.
[22] Fawda, Qabla
al-Suqut, pp. 174-76.
[23] Faraj
Fawda, al-Irhab (Cairo: Dar Misr al-Jadida lil-Nashr
wal-tawzi, 1988), p. 91.
[25] Fawda, Qabla
al-Suqut, pp. 176-78; Fawda, Faraj Fawda wa-Ma'ariku-hu
al-Siyasiyya, pp. 243-48; Fawda, Hiwar Hawla al-Almaniyya,
pp. 50-53.
[26] Fawda, al-Irhab,
p. 103.
[27] Fawda, Faraj
Fawda wa-Ma'ariku-hu al-Siyasiyya, pp. 315-16.
[28] Fawda, al-Irhab,
p. 104.
[29] Faraj
Fawda, Shahid ala al-Asr [Compilation of Press Articles]
(Cairo: 1996), pp. 97-98.
[30] Fawda,
in Fawda, Labib, and Abd al-Karim, al-Ta'ifiyya... ilà Ayna? pp.
13-16.
[31] Ibid.,
p. 16-19; see also Fawda, Hiwar Hawla al-Almaniyya,
pp. 22-25.
[32] Fawda,
in Fawda, Labib, and Abd al-Karim, al-Ta'ifiyya... ilà Ayna? pp.
20-21; see also Fawda, Hiwar Hawla al-Almaniyya, p.
82.
[33] Fawda,
in Fawda, Labib, and Abd al-Karim, al-Ta'ifiyya... ilà Ayna? p.
21.
[34] Fawda, Faraj
Fawda wa-Ma'ariku-hu al-Siyasiyya, p. 179; see also
Fawda, Hiwar Hawla al-Almaniyya, pp. 29-30.
[35] Fawda, Faraj
Fawda wa-Ma'ariku-hu al-Siyasiyya, pp. 180-81.
[36] Fawda, al-Irhab,
p. 123.
[37] Fawda, Faraj
Fawda wa-Ma'ariku-hu al-Siyasiyya, p. 182.
[39] The
title of that book is a reference to al-Farida al-Gha'iba,
an influential Islamist pamphlet that identified jihad as
the "lost duty" of Islam, on a par with its five pillars:
the shahada (proclamation of monotheism), prayer,
fast, charity, and pilgrimage to Mecca. Its author, Abd al-Salam Faraj, was executed in 1982 for his
involvement in the assassination of Sadat.
[40] Faraj
Fawda, al-Haqiqa al-Gha'iba (Cairo: Dar wa-matabi
al-Mustaqbal and Beirut: Dar al-Ma'arif, 2003), pp. 25-26.
[44] Fawda, Qabla
al-Suqut, pp. 168-69.
[47] Fawda, Hiwar
Hawla al-Almaniyya, pp. 20-21, 79-80; Fawda, Faraj
Fawda wa-Ma'ariku-hu al-Siyasiyya, pp.
188-89, 302.
[48] Fawda, Shahid
ala al-Asr, p. 95.
[49] Fawda, Faraj
Fawda wa-Ma'ariku-hu al-Siyasiyya, pp. 187,
221, 314; Fawda, Shahid 'ala al-'Asr, pp. 104-05;
Fawda, al-Nadhir, p. 88.
[50] Fawda, Faraj
Fawda wa-Ma'ariku-hu al-Siyasiyya, pp. 186,
304.
[51] Fawda, Faraj
Fawda wa-Ma'ariku-hu al-Siyasiyya, pp. 220-21;
Fawda, in Fawda, Labib, and Abd al-Karim, al-Ta'ifiyya...
ilà Ayna? p. 12; Fawda, al-Irhab, p. 125.
[52] Fawda, Faraj
Fawda wa-Ma'ariku-hu al-Siyasiyya, p. 206.
[55] Fawda, Hiwar
Hawla al-Almaniyya, p. 7.
[57] Fawda, Hiwar
Hawla al-Almaniyya, p. 8.
[58] Fawda, Qabla
al-Suqut, p. 189.
[59] Fawda, Faraj
Fawda wa-Ma'ariku-hu al-Siyasiyya, pp. 231-37;
see also Fawda, al-Nadhir, pp. 78-82, 88-91; Fawda, Hiwar
Hawla al-'Almaniyya, p. 31; Fawda, al-Haqiqa al-Gha'iba,
p. 152.
[60] Aziz,
Abd al-Ghaffar, Man Qatala Faraj Fawda? (Cairo: Dar
al-I'lam al-Duwali, 1992), pp. 10, 210.
[62] Al-Mahdi, "Muqaddimat
al-Nashir fi Ritha Mufakkir Mata Wafiqan."
[63] Tamir
Moustafa, "Conflict and Cooperation between the State and
Religious Institutions in Contemporary Egypt," The
International Journal of Middle East
Studies, Vol. 32 (2000), p. 14. Moustafa has described
the Azhari fatwa against Fawda and his subsequent assassination
as "perhaps the clearest example of a 'division of labor' that
may exist between radical Islamists and al-Azhar shaykhs." Ibid.,
p. 21, n. 64.
[64] Muhammad
Muru, Almaniyyun wa-Khawana (Cairo: Dar Hira, 1996),
pp. 31-32. This is the same Muru that Fawda mocked in one
of his articles, as mentioned above.
[65] Aziz,
Abd al-Ghaffar, Man Qatala Faraj Fawda? p. 211.
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