

U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV21/3-h1

AA-3

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

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on RS # 09769*

Subj: Action Report for the period 14 September through 5 October 1950

Ref: (a) CNO restricted ltr Op-345/aa ser 1197P34 dtd 3 August 1950

Encl: (1) CVG-2 conf ltr ser 014 dtd 10 October 1950; Action Report of Carrier Air Group TWO (15 September 1950-- 2 October 1950) with enclosures thereto. P. 79-125

1. In compliance with reference (a), the action report for the period 14 September through 5 October 1950 is hereby submitted.

Part I: Composition of Own Forces and Mission.

A. In accordance with dispatch orders from Commander Seventh Fleet the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21), with Carrier Air Group TWO, embarked, departed SASEBO Harbor, Japan, 14 September 1950 in company with the U.S.S. MANCHESTER (CL-83), U.S.S. RADFORD (DDE-446), and the U.S.S. JAMES E. KYES (DD-787). Capt. L.S. Parks, USN, commanding the U.S.S. MANCHESTER, was OTC. This group of four ships proceeded to the Yellow Sea where it rendezvoused with Task Force 77 on 15 September, reporting for duty to Rear Admiral E.C. Ewen, USN, CTF77 who was also CTG77.4 and ComCarDiv ONE. Rear Admiral J.M. HOSKINS, Commander Carrier Division THREE, in the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), was second in command. The Task Force was operating in accordance with ComCarDiv ONE Operation Order 1-50. Task Force 77 consisted of three carriers, two cruisers, and three divisions of destroyers as follows:

- U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
- U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)
- U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)
- U.S.S. WORCESTER (CL-144)
- U.S.S. MANCHESTER (CL-83)
- Destroyer Divisions 31, 111, and 112

B. The mission of the Task Force was to conduct air operations in the North Korean area in order to: (a) maintain air supremacy, (b) isolate the

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objective area, and (c) provide air cover and support for operations of the Attack Force in its amphibious assault on INCHON scheduled to commence the evening of 15 September 1950.

Part II: Chronological Order of Events.

A. Operations were conducted approximately sixty miles west of Inchon, Korea in the Yellow Sea with replenishment being accomplished in an area immediately to the south-southwest of the scene of operations. For replenishment purposes the Task Force was divided into three groups, with two groups carrying out flight operations while the third replenished. Thus each group in turn had flight operations for two successive days and replenished on the third.

B. Air operations during the period of this report consisted of the following types of missions: Deep support, close support, targets of opportunity sweeps, combat air patrols, target combat air patrols, anti-submarine patrols, naval gun fire spotting, and photo reconnaissance.

C. Enemy opposition was spotty. His ground forces appeared to have little in the way of heavy equipment or armament and his land transport facilities and rolling stock were rapidly reduced to ineffectiveness; the only vehicles observed moving in the later stages of the operation were primitive hand carts and ox carts. Few, if any, enemy planes were seen in the air, and flak was meager to moderate in volume. Mines posed the most serious enemy threat to our operations.

D. The following is an outline of the BOXER's employment during the period covered by this action report:

14 September - Departed Sasebo at 1826I for Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN off the west coast of Korea.

15 September - At 1238I, the BOXER suffered a failure of the number four main reduction gear, necessitating the securing of the number four main engine and locking the propeller shaft. It was determined that the maximum possible sustained speed was 26 knots with a maximum emergency speed of 28 knots for short periods. The number four main engine remained inoperative for the rest of this operation.

At 1415I, the BOXER reported to Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN and took station in formation. At 1432, planes were launched to conduct strikes against shore defenses in the Inchon area in order to prepare the beach for amphibious assault. All planes were recovered at 1820I. Pilots reported no enemy air opposition and, although some flak was encountered, no damage to aircraft was sustained.

16 September - Air operations against Korean targets were continued. During the launch, an F4U, piloted by Ensign J. BROGAN, USN, crashed into the sea and burned when the engine failed. The pilot, who was rescued by

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helicopter, received burns about the face and hands. Lt Comdr. D.C. TAYLOR, USN, in another F4U, made a forced water landing in Inchon Harbor and he, too, was rescued by a helicopter.

17 September - Air strikes against North Korean targets were continued. Two more BOXER pilots were rescued uninjured by helicopters. Lt(jg) E.R. PAINTER, USN, was rescued when his F4U crashed into the sea during take-off, and Ensign R.R. SANDERS, USN, was rescued after making a forced landing in enemy territory southeast of Seoul, where his AD-4 had been damaged by enemy flak and subsequently destroyed by gunfire of accompanying planes.

18 September - Received fuel oil, aviation gasoline, and ammunition from the replenishment group.

19 September - While our aircraft resumed their strikes against Korean targets, the BOXER lost her first pilot. An F4U piloted by Lt(jg) FRANKLIN SMITH, JR., USN, scraped its wing along the flight deck and struck the barrier during a landing attempt causing the plane to crash into the sea in an inverted position. The pilot, who apparently cut his gun before executing a wave-off, was not recovered.

20 September - Deep support missions were predominate in the BOXER's air operations on the 20th. One AD-4 was lost due to enemy ground fire when the plane, piloted by Lt(jg) C.E. SEEMAN, USN, crashed in enemy territory north of Seoul. Lt(jg) SEEMAN was not seen to leave the plane, which exploded and burned; he is considered missing in action.

21 September - Received fuel oil and aviation gasoline from ships in the replenishment group.

22 and 23 September - Air strikes, consisting principally of deep support missions, were continued.

24 September - Fresh and frozen provisions, as well as fuel oil and aviation gasoline, were received from the replenishment group.

25 and 26 September - BOXER aircraft continued to search for, and hit, rapidly diminishing targets in deep support missions. An F4U was lost on 26 September when it plunged into the sea during landing operations. The pilot, Lt(jg) E.F. BASS, USN, was rescued by helicopter.

27 September - In the forenoon BOXER planes conducted an air bombardment of the Fankochi Point area which was coordinated with a surface bombardment. The purpose was to create an illusion of invasion preparations and thus decoy the enemy into diverting troops to the area. At noon the BOXER retired to the replenishment area where fuel oil, aviation gasoline, and ammunition were received.

28 and 29 September - While air strikes continued against rapidly dwindling targets, the ship suffered her third and last pilot casualty of this operation when an F4U, flown by Ensign C/O. HOWELL, USN, was shot down near Uijongbu. Although Ensign HOWELL was seen to parachute clear of the plane and apparently land safely, it was subsequently learned that he died later after having been captured, severely beaten, and shot in the back by the enemy.

30 September - Received fuel oil, aviation gasoline, and ammunition from ships of the replenishment group.

1. October - BOXER aircraft blasted and destroyed a large power plant located just east of Pyongyang. The bombing and rocket attacks were exceptionally accurate. When the planes departed from the area the power plant was in flames with columns of smoke billowing several thousand feet in the air. This choice target was located by ship photo interpreters from photographs taken by BOXER planes.

An F4U, which was hit by AA during the attack, made a forced landing a few miles south of Pyongyang. While awaiting the arrival of a helicopter from Kimpo Airfield, BOXER F4U's and Marine F7F's covered the downed pilot, Ensign C.E. DORRIS, USN. He was recovered in a daring rescue under fire by an Air Force helicopter and returned to Kimpo.

2 October - Upon completion of air operations the BOXER departed from the formation at about 1830I, for Yokosuka, Japan, via Van Dieman Straits, for the purpose of drydocking, inspection of the damage to the number four reduction gear, and removal of the propeller if necessary repairs could not be effected. The destroyers U.S.S. HENDERSON (DD-785) and U.S.S. GURKE (DD-783) accompanied the BOXER as far as Van Dieman Straits at which point they were released and the BOXER proceeded on to Yokosuka alone, anchoring outside the breakwater at 1030I on 5 October 1950, due to heavy weather prevailing.

Part III: Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment.

See enclosure (1).

Part IV: Resumé of battle damage - own and enemy.

The ship sustained no battle damage. See enclosure (1) for damage inflicted on the enemy and for that suffered by BOXER aircraft.

Part V: Personnel Performance and Casualties.

A. In spite of the fact that more than 50 percent of the ship's personnel had but recently reported aboard with practically no prior operational experience, their performance was most gratifying. This group of relatively inexperienced men evolved into a smooth running organization during the first few days of this combat period. The improvement between the first and

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fourth day's operations was remarkable.

B. No personnel casualties were suffered by the ship; see enclosure (1) for air group casualties.

Part VI: Special Comments.

A. Operational Readiness.

1. Upon returning to San Diego on 16 June 1950 from a five-month cruise to the Far East, the BOXER was granted a 30-day period for leave, liberty, and upkeep plus tender availability from 26 June until 15 July. The ship was scheduled to enter the San Francisco Naval Shipyard on 30 August for a much needed four-month overhaul period.

2. The Korean incident, however, quickly changed all plans, and, on 27 June 1950, the BOXER received orders to proceed to sea to qualify Air Group ELEVEN, scheduled to sail in the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA. Personnel were recalled from leave and air operations were conducted in the San Diego area until returning to port on 2 July. On 8 July, the ship proceeded to Alameda where she embarked 145 P-51 and 6 L-6 Air Force aircraft, 19 naval carrier aircraft, 1012 passengers, and approximately 2,000 tons of cargo, all destined for the Far East Korean theatre. Upon returning to San Francisco after an ordered speedy round trip to Yokosuka, Japan, the BOXER was granted a ten day availability for urgent repairs at the San Francisco Naval Shipyard. Upon termination of this yard period she proceeded to Alameda for loading and embarkation of Carrier Air Group TWO.

3. On 24 August, upon completion of embarking the air group, the ship proceeded to Pearl Harbor where gunnery, carquals, and refresher operations were conducted during the four and one-half days allowed.

4. The ship departed Pearl Harbor on 4 September for Yokosuka with orders to arrive on 13 September. In addition to a full air group of 96 aircraft, 14 spare aircraft for the FasRon ELEVEN pool were carried which immobilized the flight deck to the extent that not even respotting exercises for the flight deck crew could be conducted.

5. Between having the destination but not the ETA changed from Yokosuka to Sasebo, playing tag with typhoon KEZIA, and attempting to launch the spare aircraft for Kisarazu Air Force Base as ordered or find an alternate destination, the BOXER was delayed in arriving at Sasebo until 14 September. When Kisarazu set Typhoon Condition II, course was radically altered to the south to circle typhoon KEZIA clockwise. The ship then attempted to enter Sasebo the evening of 13 September but found KEZIA in the Sasebo landing circle ahead of her and had to retire for the night after encountering wind gusts as high as 80 knots. KEZIA gave the ship's company a fatiguing time again that night, but early morning of 14 September, the spare aircraft were launched for Naha AFB, Okinawa, instead of for Kisarazu,

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and the ship proceeded up the mine-swept channel entering Sasebo during the forenoon.

6. During the few hours the ship was in Sasebo, personnel were engaged in loading cargo and ammunition as well as in preparations for getting underway prior to darkness. Officers from the Staff of Commander Carrier Division THREE reported aboard with the many effective Operation Orders and the pertinent operating instructions. With the limited time available after sortie from Sasebo the evening of 14 September, a choice had to be made as to whether the Operation Orders should be read first or Carrier Division THREE Officers conduct their briefing. The latter was decided upon and the services performed by these briefing officers were of inestimable value in preparing the ship for immediate combat operations upon rendezvous with Task Force 77 off Korea on 15 September. Study of the Operation Orders and Instructions three days later during replenishment disclosed many details which had unknowingly been overlooked.

B. Air Department.

1. Aircraft Complement.

a. The BOXER reported to Task Force 77 on 15 September "loaded for bear". Instead of the 87 plane normal complement, 96 aircraft were aboard as follows: 64 F4U-4, 18 AD-4, 1 AD-4Q, 3 AD-4N, 3 AD-4W, 3 F4U-5P, and 1 helicopter. The decision to carry additional aircraft was based on:

- (a) The desire to augment the strike and ground support effort to the maximum.
- (b) The reported unavailability of replacement aircraft in the theatre of operations.
- (c) The expected low average availability of F4U-4 aircraft assigned, due to age (majority on third service tour).

b. Although respotting for initial launches and accommodating last minute changes in launch composition were difficult, that all scheduled events were launched without one abort is considered to justify the decision to carry extra aircraft.

2. Flight Deck Operations.

a. Three-fourths of the flight deck crew, including the Flight Deck Officer, reported aboard just prior to the ship's departure from Conlus. This group, with little or no previous carrier experience, had only the 4½ day training period off Pearl Harbor before the ship joined Task Force 77 for these operations.

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b. The first combat launch, made 16 minutes after rendezvous with the Task Force, was an experience from which many lessons were learned in a hurry. The 47-minute launch for 24VF and 14 VA, brought about by a last minute ordered change in composition and the necessity of breaking the tight spot, snaking assigned aircraft through the maze of other planes on the flight deck, and catapult launch for all except a few VF, and aggravated by an abnormal number of duds due to inability to turn up during the preceding bout with typhoon KEZIA, was probably one of the longest in history; but led to immediate corrective measures and the achievement of standard performance in a remarkably short time.

3. Wheel Chocks.

Universal airplane wheel chocks of laminated wood construction are considered unsatisfactory and insufficiently durable for normal flight deck usage.

4. Airborne Early Warning (AEW) equipment.

Because of the fact that all AEW racks, test equipment, etc., were removed from this vessel in 1948 and 1949 and were never replaced, the AEW team that came aboard in July 1950 had serious difficulties in servicing their equipment. The Electronics Officers of Fleet Air Alameda and ComAirPac eased the situation somewhat by furnishing all the equipment they had available; but they could supply only a portion of what was required. The remainder, ordered from ASO, Philadelphia, Pa. and given a deadline delivery date of 28 July at Alameda, has not yet been received. Despite the above, due to the ingenious work of the AEW crew, AD-4W aircraft were seldom in an AOG status.

5. Material Damage and Casualties.

a. During the period of this action report, the ship experienced three barrier crashes by F4U-4 aircraft and none by the AD's. One of the F4U-4's sustained but minor damage to its propeller, another required a propeller change, while the third barrier crash required changing the propeller, the engine, and one wing.

b. In addition to the above barrier crashes, two F4U-5Ns engaged late wires slightly off center to starboard, and struck the after 5" turret. The first one, landing after a dawn patrol, sustained damage to its right wing. The second one, a night landing, struck the propeller cone, resulting in engine and propeller changes.

c. The port catapult threw a rim-liner out of the tow cable fairlead sheave beneath the flight deck and was out of commission for eleven hours. The starboard catapult experienced a failure of the rivets in the rim-liner on the retrieving cable fairlead sheave in the machine room and was out for eight hours.

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d. Number two elevator suffered the only other material casualty worthy of note. The interlock switch on the deck-edge elevator platform locks failed to close, thus rendering the elevator inoperative electrically for three hours.

C. Air Intelligence.

1. Readiness.

a. During the BOXER's stay in the Hawaiian area the Air Intelligence Officer, the Photographic Officer and three enlisted photographers were issued temporary additional duty orders to Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet Staff for intelligence briefing and photo interpretation instruction, respectively, which greatly assisted in preparing the ship for combat operations.

b. It is understood that steps are being taken to furnish ships bound for forward areas with essential intelligence material prior to departure from the United States. When this is accomplished, many of the difficulties experienced in this operation will have been eliminated. Greater intelligence liaison between rear areas and forces operating in the forward areas is considered essential.

2. Material.

a. Some initial difficulty was experienced with charts. Some were in short supply; others within the same set had the transverse mercator grid on some sheets and world polyconic on others. Even when charts with proper grids were in use, an appreciable amount of training was necessary before pilots could be depended upon to arrive at the same grid coordinates when using charts of different scales.

b. Determination of proper charts to be carried in single seat aircraft was arrived at after considerable trial and error. The chart packet most favored was one consisting of appropriate coverage with the following:

- (a) Several sheets of USAF World Aeronautical Chart (1/1,000,000) or USAF Pilotege Chart (1/500,000) were joined together to form a large chart for use in navigating. This chart was divided into sections marked to indicate the chart or map providing larger scale coverage of any section.
- (b) AMS L-551 (1/250,000) provided fairly large scale gridded coverage of all of Korea.
- (c) AMS L-751 (1/50,000) is essential for NGF spot aircraft and any aircraft that may be called upon to provide close support, including photo planes and night intruders. Coverage with this map north of 38°-20' was not available. Preparation of gridded charts in booklet form would greatly facilitate handling in aircraft and would permit use of 1/25,000 scale chart for close support work.

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3. Personnel.

a. This command concurs with the comment made in previous action reports concerning the need for non-flying air intelligence officers.

b. It is felt that the peacetime CV air intelligence organization consisting of an Air Intelligence School graduate (a pilot who has had 3 weeks special training) in each squadron and on each CV with only collateral duty as AI officer is entirely inadequate for wartime operations. It is realized that peacetime operations would probably not warrant the assignment of officers to these billets as primary duty nor would the maintenance of all air intelligence material including target dossiers and chart folders on board aircraft carriers be justified. Therefore it is recommended that a pool of Air Intelligence officers familiar with close support and carrier task force strike procedures and requirements be maintained at a central intelligence activity. From such a pool an Air Intelligence officer, in the event of a crisis or mobilization, could be ordered to an air group or aircraft carrier bringing with him, or ensuring earliest delivery of, all necessary information, publications and equipment.

c. The same recommendations are made in regard to maintaining a pool of trained Photo Interpreters. In the interest of reducing to a minimum the number of officers tied up in such a program, which in peacetime must necessarily be kept at a minimum, it is recommended that Air Intelligence officers receive thorough training as Photo Interpreters.

D. Engineering.

1. At about 1238I, 15 September, while proceeding at 31 knots, 252 RPM, to join up with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN, a loud rumbling noise was heard in the reduction gear to No. 4 main engine. The engine was stopped immediately and locked approximately three minutes later. No. 4 main engine remained inoperative for the rest of the period.

2. The gears were damaged as follows: Sections of ten adjacent teeth, about 7" long, were broken from the forward helix of the lower low-pressure, slow-speed pinion. About fifty teeth from this pinion were pulled loose. The forward helixes of the main gear and all four slow-speed pinions were crushed in a circumferential area about 7" wide.

3. No foreign matter, other than pieces of broken teeth, were discovered in the gears. It was positively established that the inspection plates had not been opened. From the appearance of the broken teeth it is believed that the failure was due to metal fatigue.

4. Numerous derangements were experienced in boilers and associated machinery which necessitated minor repairs. These repairs were made more difficult and embarrassing in view of the fact that No. 4 main engine was out of commission and the remainder of the main propulsion plant had to be operated at or near full power for all flight operations. It is considered that the number of derangements experienced was not excessive in view of the

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fact that the BOXER had steamed 62,400 miles since 10 January 1950 with no actual upkeep period in port.

E. Ship Handling.

1. Good station keeping, maneuvering on three engines while dragging an unfeatherable outboard screw through the water, presented a challenge. New rudder angles, varying between port and starboard turns as well as for speed, had to be determined; but slowed acceleration, particularly when approaching the maximum sustainable speed of 26 knots, was the greater problem.

2. With 10 or more knots of wind for flight operations, acceptable station keeping could be achieved by anticipating execution of speed increases and adding speed for turns. With less than 10 knots of wind, even when other ships operated at top speeds for jet operations, BOXER was able to maintain approximate station by lagging behind down wind or gaining position up wind prior to scheduled flight operations.

3. Other simultaneous course and speed changes, executed with little or no delay and unanticipated, left BOXER hopelessly behind.

F. Communications.

Communications as a whole were considered good, particularly in view of the very large volume of traffic handled. Comments regarding specific communication matters follow:

1. CW.

a. The task force common, 464KC CW, was successfully used when radio silence conditions permitted. Discipline was good. It was particularly effective for delivery of traffic to the Task Force Commander when this vessel was in the replenishment area. It was found that this circuit was not satisfactory when this vessel was on detached duty proceeding to Yokosuka. A continuous guard is not recommended under those conditions.

2. RATT Circuits.

a. The Commander Naval Forces Far East RATT broadcast handled a very large volume of traffic successfully. The paralleling over Guam George Fox of operational immediate and higher precedence messages was helpful. When a message was missed and other heavy ships also did not receive it, there were times when a considerable delay resulted in servicing the message to Radio Tokyo.

b. Recommendations: (1) that adequate maintenance personnel be assigned to guardships in order to insure proper operating conditions of the equipment. None are currently assigned, (2) that more personnel trained in the operation of teletype equipment be assigned guardships. Approximately 4 should be considered as minimum for combat and 3 for normal operations.

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3. UHF RATT.

a. The Ultra High Frequency RATT Circuit among the heavy ships was employed quite successfully. When circuit conditions were good this proved to be a most expeditious means for delivery of traffic.

b. There were times when fading and poor circuit conditions resulted in unsatisfactory communications. Since the MANCHESTER (CL-83) continually had better results, it is believed that this condition was due to antennae problems peculiar to the CV type.

4. UHF Voice.

UHF voice communications employing TDZ/RDZ equipment were considered excellent. It was particularly effective for CIC communications and for use on the bridge during General Quarters. It was found that constant attention to the equipment helped greatly in the proper performance of the equipment. Some trouble with the auto-tune feature of the TDZ/RDZ was experienced.

5. VHF Voice.

a. VHF communications, particularly on the TBS, were generally considered excellent.

b. A need for constant training in voice procedure and individual training in articulation was indicated.

c. On a few occasions names of ships were heard to be given in the clear over VHF circuits. Security indoctrination is always mandatory.

6. CIC and Aircraft Control Circuits.

a. Several frequencies of the AN/ARC-1 crystalization were in close proximity. This interfered on aircraft control circuits. For example channel #7 (142.02 MC), channel #2 (142.74 MC), channel #5 (143.28 MC), channel #6 (143.64 MC), were less than 1 MC apart. Similarly, channel #9 (140.94 MC) and the Guard channel (140.58 MC) were very close together.

b. Recommendation: That a wider spread on AN/ARC-1 frequencies be used, preferably at least 3 megacycles apart.

7. Cryptoboard.

a. A large number of message were addressed or readdressed to this vessel in cryptochannels not held. This continued during the operation in spite of services which stated the particular cryptochannel was not held and reencypherment was required.

c. A considerable delay was experienced at times in obtaining answers to services on the above messages.

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d. Recommendations: Maintaining an adequately staffed and trained coding board is mandatory. The large number of crypto errors is indicative of unseasoned personnel in this vital phase of communications.

8. Visual.

a. A very large volume of traffic was handled. Flag hoist was employed extensively for tactical signals during daylight. Nancy was used successfully with the heavy ships; some difficulty was experienced with destroyers.

b. This carrier operated with a peacetime complement of 21 signalmen which is far below the war time complement. This placed a more than considerable strain on signalmen to maintain visual guards.

c. Recommendations: The assignment of additional personnel, at least up the wartime complement, is considered mandatory for successful combat operations.

9. Personnel.

a. A need for more trained signalmen and radiomen was apparent. Operating under war conditions without a wartime complement of trained personnel handicaps the execution of reliable, secure, and speedy communications

G. CIC.

1. Doctrine.

a. CTF-77 Operation Order 1-50 was the most complete and concise operation order this CIC has had to work with. It was excellent for a new ship coming into the operation after the operation was underway. The radar guard layout was excellent as to clarity.

b. Duty Carrier and Standby Carrier set-up was not too definitely stated in the operation order and tended to confuse a newly reporting carrier. This was cleared up later in the operation.

c. The method of utilizing individual ships daily to control CAP, strikes and ASP was outstanding. The employment of this method keeps each ship in the Task Force from becoming too burdened with each day's phases of operations.

2. Operating Procedures.

a. When more than one AEW aircraft is airborne they should be separated by 30 to 50 miles to insure proper presentation on their radar.

b. Before designating raids reported by other ships the Task Force CICO should make a quick evaluation to determine whether this is land, friendly CAP, ASP, etc., and make this immediately known to the Force in order

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to clear the circuit: Too many known friendly contacts were continued to be reported as raids when there was no necessity for it.

c. Returning Strike Groups were picked up and designated as raids and, after it was determined they were using proper IFF, were continued to be reported as raids. Some ships, not notified of proper IFF, were unduly alerted. It is recommended that a system of "Red" plus raid number be used upon initial pick up and for all contacts not showing IFF. When it is determined a raid is showing proper IFF change "Red" to "Green" plus raid number. This would aid in clarifying the picture for ships that occasionally miss transmissions.

d. Measures should be taken to insure that Air Force and Navy land based aircraft and seaplanes use proper IFF. Many unnecessary intercepts were made due to lack of IFF or improper code.

e. It is recommended that the practice of using TOMCATS (either aircraft pickets for homing or DD's) be revived in order to bring all returning planes up one approach lane. This would insure early identification and reduce the number of unnecessary intercepts.

f. It is recommended that the CVE Force not be placed directly between the CV Force and land targets. Many duplicate intercepts were made, particularly when the CVE Force was only 25 or 30 miles from the CV Force. A common Force CI Net is recommended when Task Forces are less than 50 miles apart in order to keep each Force aware of returning strikes, raids, and intercepts being made.

g. It is recommended that the Force CIC Officer pass formation information and station assignments to the rejoining Carrier Group, coming from replenishment area, as soon as it can be obtained. CIC does much of the conning at night and requires this information to expedite rejoining the Force. The Task Force CIC Officer should make certain that "Heavies" are informed of screen assignments.

h. It is believed that in operations of this type a LOGAP should be employed to avoid bringing HICAP down to look over low groups. This could be accomplished by splitting one division and keeping a section at 2,000 or 3,000 feet to investigate low groups approaching the force.

i. In order to maintain an effective CAP at all times, it is suggested that Force CIC Officers hold CAP on station or at least at altitude over base until the relieving CAP is on the CAP Controllers channel.

j. It is suggested that more than one FAD frequency be assigned. Having two or more CAP's on one VHF FAD causes considerable difficulty on some intercepts. Also VHF frequencies assigned should be at least three megacycles apart.

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1. During the past operation many ships having communications failure on CI Net Primary switched to Screen Common rather than CI Net Secondary. A radio check at the beginning of each sea watch should be conducted on CI Net Secondary.

H. Gunnery Department.

1. Trash Disposal.

a. Trash disposal was a major problem. With the incinerator burning around the clock, it was barely possible to keep up with the ship's normal production of trash. No time was available for periodic cooling down of the firebox, with resultant deterioration. The great amount of wooden boxes and pressed paper connected with current packaging of belly tanks, rockets, and other ammunition presented an additional load with which it was impossible to cope by burning.

b. After the first day's operations during which numerous floating crates and boxes were dodged, orders were issued to break up all crates and boxes into flat surfaces, flatten and puncture all cans, and to stow same until appropriate disposal could be effected.

c. Throughout the period the ship was plagued with countless false reports of mines, periscopes, and just plain "small unidentified floating objects", which could not be ignored in view of the floating enemy mines reported.

2. Ammunition Allowances and Stowages.

a. The ship was constantly under great pressure in loading for this latest trip to NavFE. During the time in which the ammunition was being procured and shipped, several changes in allowance were made. Due to the rather hectic circumstances of trying to completely load the ship in record time, it was not feasible to make an orderly adjustment of the ammunition actually loaded, to that of the new changing allowance. Several boxcars of rockets had to be returned to the Ammunition Depot simply because there was not time to sit down and figure out how to juggle the various magazines to take more of a load.

b. In addition, in an obvious effort to keep us abreast of a rapidly changing forward area situation, verbal instructions were given by ComAirPac staff officers to load to capacity on certain types of bombs when at Pearl Harbor enroute. Additional 100-lb GP bombs, and Tiny Tim rockets were loaded. By the time the ship reached the operating area, the picture had changed and we found ourselves choked with 100-lb bombs which had to be shuffled many times in order to get at the sorely-needed and much used 500-lb GPs. The crowning touch to this situation lay in the fact that extra 500-pounders were available at Sasebo enroute but could not be loaded because there was not time to break out and off-load the 100-lb GPs.

c. The moral to this tale seems to be that ships being deployed to forward areas should be loaded with the standard BuOrd allowance, giving due consideration to limiting overall weight. Then there will be leeway available to the forward area commanders to make any special additional loading required for prospective operations. These operations are often so classified that the rear echelons could not possibly anticipate them in individual ship loading. Furthermore, if a Task Force Commander knows that ships reporting to him have a certain standard ammunition loading he is enabled to plan his strikes and resupply more effectively than if he has to determine individual ship loadings.

d. Stowage of 5" HVAR's presented a serious problem. The magazine stowage plan provides a total racked stowage of 3,290 rocket motors; 3,25" and 5.0". With an allowance of 5000 5.0" motors and 900 3,25" motors, this leaves 2,610 motors to be stored in boxes, in magazines normally assigned to 40MM or 100-lb bombs. Such stowage presents not only an "unboxing" problem, involving multiple handling of the motors and boxes; but an additional fire hazard both in the magazine and in the empty box stowage topside. The difficulties of disposing of this large amount of lumber have been previously mentioned. Some program to increase the proper stowage facilities for rocket motors should be initiated at the earliest possible time, and a serious effort made to bring about an agreement between allowance and stowage facilities.

3. Ammunition Handling.

Compartment No. C-301-L, frame 150 to 159, was isolated and used as a ready service room for assembling rockets. Fire hoses were kept connected and a minimum of ammunition broken out consistent with the strikes being prepared.

4. Ammunition Replenishment.

a. During this period, the BOXER rearmed at sea from U.S.S. MT. MATMAI (AE-16) three times. Rapid and efficient service was rendered and the personnel of the MT. KATMAI were most cooperative in fulfilling our needs to the best of their ability. The only suggestion for improving this procedure would be to provide the AE's with a wider assortment of fuzes which are not normally stocked in ships' allowance.

b. Belted .50 Cal. ammunition supplied took a great load off the shoulders of the aviation ordnance crews. This service should be expanded to include 20MM, belted with M8 links.*

*See enclosure (1), paragraph 3.(h) 2(e) for additional comments on M8 links.

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I. Supply Department.

1. Loading.

a. Despite the brief loading period, a 180-day stock level in nearly all classes was achieved prior to departure from the United States on 24 August. Aviation supplies placed on board averaged nearly 90%. Topping off and the filling of some shortages were accomplished during the approximately 48 hours available at Pearl Harbor in early September.

2. Operating.

a. Since leaving Pearl on 4 September, few major supply problems have been encountered. A current problem was the near-exhaustion of Mark 12 drop tanks due to heavy expenditure for napalm use. 200 stock spares (in addition to 1 per aircraft) were on board upon entering the action zone. The full allowance of some aviation items, such as tail hooks and tail wheel locking pins for F4U-4 aircraft was issued almost at once because of the heavy operating schedule. Replacements in large quantities have been ordered. Initial shortages of certain items, such as cowlflap motors and fuel transfer pumps have been felt sharply, but the problem has been met by temporizing methods such as exchange between carriers of the Task Force or between planes on board. The actual number of operational AOG has averaged about one.

3. Replenishment.

a. Replenishment has consisted entirely of fuel, aviation gasoline, ammunition, fresh provisions and a few items of GSK. All replenishment except the GSK and some provisioning at Sasebo has been accomplished at sea, and has proven quite satisfactory. Exchange of various types of material among many ships of the Task Force on a "when-available" basis, though small in quantity, has produced a heartening effect on all concerned.

J. Recapitulation of Recommendations.

1. Air Operations.

(1) That effective Operation Orders and pertinent Operating Instructions be made available to ships ordered forward earliest practicable, and, not less than one (1) full day, prior to involvement in actual operations.

2. Air Department.

(2) That in similar circumstances carriers going into combat should carry approximate 5-10 percent more aircraft than the normal complement. (5% is the optimum for operations, let the availability of replacement aircraft aboard be the deciding factor)

(3) That the laminated wood construction of universal airplane wheel chocks be improved to prevent parting of the glued joints.

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(4) That action be initiated to bring all CV's up to their full allowance of AEW racks, test equipment, etc.

3. Air Intelligence.

(5) That the supply of maps and charts available to CV's be increased and that the use of one type of grid be standardized, at least within sets.

(6) That gridded charts for close support work be issued in booklet form using a scale of 1/25,000.

(7) That emphasis be placed on pilot training in the use of maps and charts, particularly with reference to grid coordinates.

(8) That AI and PI personnel be issued TAD orders to CinCPacFleet's staff for briefing in advance of departure for combat.

(9) That all possible intelligence material be furnished ships prior to arrival in the forward areas.

(10) That a pool of non-flying AI Officers be established at a central activity so that they can be supplied to the fleet as needed.

(11) That non-flying AI Officers be supplied to carriers going into action in the following quantities: 3 for the ship, one for the Air Group Commander, and one for each squadron aboard.

(12) That AI Officers receive thorough training as Photo Interpreters during peacetime.

4. Communications.

(13) That the TF common CW circuit be not continuously guarded when the ship is proceeding on detached duty beyond effective operating range.

(14) That the communications personnel assigned be brought up to the full wartime complement for CV's going into combat operations, and that this measure be given the highest priority. Special consideration should be given in this regard to assigning trained coding officers as the disparity between peacetime and combat operations is greater in this section than in any other.

(15) That steps be taken to improve the UHF antennae features on a CV.

(16) That personnel be continuously trained in (a) voice procedure and articulation, and (b) security over voice circuits.

(17) That channels on AN/ARC-1 frequencies be spread at least 3 MC apart.

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6. CIC.

- (18) That AEW aircraft should be separated from each other by 30 to 50 miles.
- (19) That the method of utilizing individual ships daily to control CAP, strikes, and ASP be made standard doctrine.
- (20) That the Task Force CIC Officer evaluate raids reported by other ships before designating them as such, and if subsequently discovered to be friendly that they henceforth be referred to as "Green" instead of "Red", using the same number originally assigned.
- (21) That steps be taken to insure proper use of IFF by all friendly planes in the area of operations.
- (22) That the practice of using TOMCATS be revived.
- (23) That Task Forces be separated by more than 50 miles; or one overall Force CIC Controller be established.
- (24) That the Force CICO pass formation information and station assignments immediately to a Carrier Group joining or rejoining the force.
- (25) That for operations of this type a LOCAP as well as a HICAP be employed.
- (26) That the CAP be held on station until relieving CAP is on CAP Controller's channel.
- (27) That more than one FAD frequency be assigned.
- (28) That the CI Net Secondary be used as such.

7. Gunnery.

- (29) That better trash disposal facilities be provided.
- (30) That ships be loaded with standard ammunition loading.
- (31) That proper assigned stowage be provided for all ammunition on war allowance list, especially rockets.
- (32) That belted .50 Cal. and 20MM aircraft machine gun ammunition be provided for supply to ships and squadrons.


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