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The Anabasis of the Holy Cross Brigade

Reflected in the Documents of the United States Government  
1945-1950

The Holy Cross Brigade (*Brygada Świętokrzyska*) of the National Armed Forces (*Narodowe Siły Zbrojne*—NSZ) has been the subject of an increasing number of Polish publications: a result of both the symbolic importance of this group of committed nationalists who forcibly opposed the aggressive policies of both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, and the increased opportunities afforded by the opening of previously closed archives.<sup>1</sup> Among these recent publications, however, there is almost a complete absence of references to U.S. government documents from the National Archives and Records Center (NARA) in Washington, D.C., which is surprising considering that the Holy Cross Brigade crossed American lines in May 1945 after its epic march from central Poland and that it played a role in the U.S. created Polish guard companies performing occupation duties in Germany after the end of the Second World War.<sup>2</sup>

Although the amount of material is much less than what might have been expected, given the relationship between the U.S. government and the Brigade, the documents that are available offer an additional insight into many of the controversies surrounding the Brigade and its activities both during and after the Second World War. More importantly, on the basis of the information made available at NARA and the possibilities offered by the Freedom of Information Act, the file of the investigation carried out by the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) of the United States Army between 1945 and 1950 on the Holy Cross Brigade is now also available to researchers.<sup>3</sup>

In general, the documents at NARA fall into roughly three categories. The first, are those documents created by the various headquarters of the United States Army which either had contact with or were responsible for the Brigade as a military unit and include documents from SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces), the Headquarters of the Third United States Army and the Headquarters of the V and XXII Corps. The second group include documents created by the executive branch including the State Department, War Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). The last and most interesting group of documents are those created by the intelligence

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“community,” e.g., the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) of the United States Army. The CIC file on the Holy Cross Brigade is more than two hundred pages long and consists of materials collected between 1945 and 1950. These documents primarily concern the Brigade’s first contact with the U.S. Army in the spring of 1945, the investigation into accusations that the Brigade collaborated with the Germans during the Second World War, the role played by the Brigade in the organization of the U.S. sponsored guard companies, and lastly the Brigade’s continued post-war political, military and intelligence gathering activities.

It is clear from the available documents that the various commands of the U.S. and Allied Armies were surprised at the sudden appearance in May 1945 of this formation of Polish partisans in western Czechoslovakia since it meant that they had passed through the German front twice: in the East and in the West. On 2 May 1945, a report sent to the commander of the V Corps, part of General George Patton’s Third Army, mentions the appearance of 900 Poles marching West from Pilsen (Plzeň), Czechoslovakia, under the command of Col. Bohun-Dąbrowski, adding that it was unknown “whether they are friend or foe.”<sup>4</sup> Three days later, Captain Laycock of the 23<sup>rd</sup> Infantry reported that he was sending four Polish soldiers to the rear who wanted to find out how best to bring their unit through American lines.<sup>5</sup> On that same day, the Brigade liberated the concentration camp at Holýšov, behind German lines, freeing 700 women prisoners and capturing 200 SS soldiers. Later, Captain Laycock noted that the Czech interpreter working with his unit said that the Polish formation had been drawing rations from the Germans and had been “in general very friendly with them.”<sup>6</sup> The Third Army reported on 27 May that the Brigade consisted of a 1,550 individuals (1,250 soldiers, 250 women, 120 children and 30 old men), and—in direct contradiction to the information provided by Laycock’s Czech translator—it was noted that the Poles did not want to be counted as displaced persons (DPs) but as allies who had fought the Germans for six years. More significantly, they stressed the fact that they did not want to “fall into Russian hands.”<sup>7</sup>

One possible reason for the confusion about the identity of these Polish troops is that the officers of the Brigade initially misrepresented themselves as belonging to the Polish Home Army (*Armia Krajowa*—AK). In early June 1945, an OSS (Office of Strategic Services) report asserted that “[a]ccording to members of the Brigade, the unit under General Bór-Komorowski [Commander of the Home Army] fought the Germans at Warsaw.”<sup>8</sup> And while the Third Army at the beginning of June reported to their immediate superiors at the headquarters of the XII Army

group that the Brigade was not part of any larger formation, i.e. not part of the AK,<sup>9</sup> the OSS maintained in August that, “The Polish Brigade is composed of Polish partisans from the Armia Krajowa (AK, under London control).”<sup>10</sup> At the same time, however, the OSS noted that the Brigade had changed its name from “Home Army, Operation Group West of the National Armed Forces” to the “Holy Cross Brigade of the National Armed Forces,” one sign that the Brigade had been forced to admit that they had never been part of the Home Army. If in fact the officers of the Brigade were responsible for this mystification it is hard to believe that they did not realize it was only a matter of time before Polish authorities in London cleared up the matter. One reason for this deception is that fully aware of the accusations circulating about their collaboration with the Germans, the officers of the Brigade said what they did in order to get as quickly behind American lines and therefore safeguard themselves from the Russians.

In spite of the confusion, the U.S. Army was impressed with the discipline and bearing of these Polish troops. In a dispatch on 22 June 1945, General Harmon, commanding officer of the XXII Corps of the Third Army, presented the following assessment of the Brigade in its first encampment within Czechoslovakia: “At a recent unannounced inspection by the G-3 of this Corps, [it was] disclosed that the Brigade is working hard on its training, presents a very soldierly appearance, and could well be developed into a splendid fighting battalion of infantry.”<sup>11</sup> In a similar positive vein, Air Marshall Tedder noted the following:

There are 1250 Polish nationals in PILSEN area who were part of Polish resistance movement and who fought their way through German lines into CZECHOCHOSLOVAKIA [sic] as an infantry Brigade. Above reputed to be in sympathy with LONDON Polish Government and repatriation represents difficulties. They claim to be part of Allied Forces. Their arms have been impounded but are under their own guard. They are administratively self-contained and with addition of 25 trucks they would be mobile. They are not required for labor or guard duties and for rations only are treated as Displaced Persons. In view of their gallantry it is considered they should not be treated as Displaced Persons... Recommend if possible they be treated as reinforcements for the Polish Army Corps and moved into Twenty First Army Group or Polish Second Corps.<sup>12</sup>

There was one sour note in Tedder’s assessment involving the increasing protests by the Czech government of the presence of the Brigade on its territory. It appears that the Americans were anxious to have the Brigade attached to one of the

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British sponsored Polish units because of the “delicate situation” connected with their presence in the American zone.<sup>13</sup>

On 7 May, several days after the meeting with the U.S. Army, Col. Dąbrowski felt confident enough to claim that the that the Americans had in fact recognized the Brigade as part of the Allied Army.<sup>14</sup> This seems confirmed by the number of photographs that have been published with the Brigade’s officers wearing the distinctive “Indian Head” patch of the U.S. Army’s 2<sup>nd</sup> Division. But by June 26 the first discrete signs appeared that there were increasingly political complications with the Brigade’s presence in Czechoslovakia as an order from the headquarters of the Brigade insisted that soldiers remove any American insignia from their uniforms.<sup>15</sup>

In spite of the attempt to transfer the Brigade to the British, it soon became clear that it was increasingly an American problem. On 23 July 1945, the U.S. Army’s G-3 (Operations) passed along to the American Chief of Staff that the British War Office had refused to accept the Brigade and were requesting a decision whether it would be left in Czechoslovakia or moved to the American Zone in Germany.<sup>16</sup> This report also contained a suggestion from Lt. Col. Szymański, serving as a liaison with the American Army, that perhaps the troops could be sent to labor or transportation companies. Only one day later, a more urgent note was sounded by the OSS claiming that if the U.S. did not immediately intervene and take responsibility for the Brigade there was a chance of open conflict between the Poles and the Czechs.<sup>17</sup> Four days later, the headquarters of the USFET (United States Forces European Theater) sent the Third Army instructions that the British War Office had refused to take the Brigade and that they were to either stay in Czechoslovakia or be disbanded and classified as DPs. The instructions added that, “If unit is disbanded, no objections to employment as labor troops should arise.”<sup>18</sup>

At the same time Patton’s subordinate, General Harmon, was writing his own assessment of the problem. According to Harmon, the Polish Brigade “has been from the beginning an exceedingly difficult problem as far as relations with the Czech government are concerned.”<sup>19</sup> Harmon reiterated the good impression made by the Brigade and that it was a “well disciplined and soldierly unit.” He also stated that he understood that unofficially General Anders of the Polish II Corps was sending a letter to General Patton requesting that the Brigade be moved to the Polish area. There was also a repetition of the idea that the troops be converted into a transportation unit. With regard to the problems with the Czechs, Harmon reminded General Patton that when they had been to Prague, the Czech President, Prime Minister, Minister of War and Chief of Staff had all “requested that the Brigade be taken out of Czechoslovakia.”

Harmon noted that, “All of the allegations of difficulties are magnified tremendously by the Czech officials, but the fact still remains that the official government wants them out of Czechoslovakia.” Whether it was a reaction to Patton’s well known antipathy for Communism and the Russians or by the increasing sense among the Americans that there were going to be problems with their Soviet Allies, Harmon made a point of trying to save face in relation to the Czech demands. “I recommend that we do not convert these men into DPs in Czechoslovakia, but rather ship them out as a military unit and make the transformation in Bavaria as a face saving proposition to us so that the Czechs cannot feel they forced us to make the change. We can simply state to the Czechs that we have found a use for the military unit and then in Bavaria change personnel of the unit into DPs and ship back into Czechoslovakia an equal number of Polish DPs who desire to go to Poland.”

In the middle of these delicate negotiations, there appeared on 30 July 1945 an article by Stefan Litauer for the left leaning British newspaper, the *News Chronicle*, provocatively entitled, “Polish Fascists Rule Five Czech Villages.” According to this article there were 1500 armed Poles from the “notorious pro-fascist NSZ underground army” that were in “virtual occupation” of five German inhabited villages 35 miles from Prague. Litauer claimed that they had retreated with the Wehrmacht and had been invited to join a German organized legion of Eastern Europeans to fight against the Soviets. They were accused of carrying out secret operations against the Soviets and the newly formed Czech government. This article caused consternation among the Allies and doubled the pressure to do something with the Brigade. This was a particularly unfortunate time for such a scandal since it occurred in the middle of the Potsdam conference (17 July–2 August), where the Soviet Union demanded the Brigade’s forced repatriation to Poland.

On the same day the Litauer article appeared the U.S. was informed that despite whatever communications Patton and Anders may have had, the British War Office had definitely refused to take the unit. As a result the Brigade was faced with the stark decision of either staying in Czechoslovakia or moving to Germany. On 1 August, General Harmon informed Col. Dąbrowski that the negotiations had ended with the War Office and that they would not be accepted as reinforcements for the Polish contingents. As a result they either had to remain in Czechoslovakia or be moved into the U.S. Third Army zone where they would be disbanded and placed into DP camps.<sup>20</sup>

A 1949 report written by a member of the exiled Polish Peasants Party (*Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe-PSL*), which found its way into the hands of the CIC, contained an even more detailed picture of the events that led to the Brigade’s

decision to accept the American conditions and relocate to Germany, claiming that the Czech general, Ludvik Svoboda, gave orders to have the Poles interned, but the London government intervened with the Americans and sent representatives to the Czechs.<sup>21</sup> The Brigade, meanwhile, began collecting other Polish DPs, who didn't want to go home, acting as if they were representatives of the London government. After a certain period the Soviet, Polish, and Czech Communists began a campaign against the Brigade, calling them collaborationists and fascists. General Maczek of the 1<sup>st</sup> Polish Division refused to accept the unit as a whole and was only willing to take them as individuals. The Second Corp under General Anders supposedly presented them with a similar choice. Col. Dąbrowski wanted to keep the Brigade together, while Major Zub-Zdanowicz, the Brigade's chief of staff, wanted to accept the conditions made by the Second Corps. In the end, Col. Dąbrowski's view won the day and the Brigade was disarmed and moved to Coburg.

It is clear in a later letter sent on 5 August by General Harmon to Col. Dąbrowski that for the Poles their biggest worry was the possibility of being either handed over to the Russians or being sent back to Poland. Harmon assured the commander of the Brigade: "The United States Army guarantees the full security to the personnel of the Brigade, whether they are part of a military unit or individual displaced persons. In regard to the process of repatriation I can only say that under the present regulations no displaced person will be sent to his native land against his wishes."<sup>22</sup> The fear within the Brigade must have been intense since Harmon felt compelled repeatedly to reassure them that the move to Coburg had no ulterior motives: "I should like to call your attention to the fact that all Poles, Letts, Lithuanians and Estonians who have vacated this area and who have expressed a desire not to return home have gone to Coburg. The installation at Coburg therefore is the great assembly point for all stateless persons of this category. Its proximity to the Russian lines is quite incidental and arises solely from the movement of U.S. and Russian forces into their final occupational zones... I assure you that no harm will come your way." Whether or not the officers of the Brigade believed Harmon or not is immaterial, in the end they had very little choice. Although the fate of General Vlasov's German sponsored Russian Army of Liberation, who had been unceremoniously handed over to the Soviets, must have given the officers of the Brigade cause for concern.

On 6 August the Brigade was moved into the Third Army area in occupied Germany, where it was disarmed and its members sent together to the 70<sup>th</sup> Ordnance Group as a unit. Here they joined a veritable army of displaced Eastern Europeans of military age. The Brigade's commander took advantage of the situation, recruiting



many Poles who were not willing or could not safely go home. By November of 1945 there were 4,000 men under Dąbrowski's command.<sup>23</sup> Perhaps even more importantly, many of the leaders of the NSZ, who had been recently released from German captivity, found their way to the Brigade. Already in May Jerzy Iłkiewicz; Mieczysław Dukalski ("Pomorski", "Zapora"); Col. Ignacy Oziewicz, the first commander of the NSZ arrested by the Gestapo; and Major Stefan Kozłowski ("Aleksander") arrived at the Brigade's encampment. They were joined in August by General Zygmunt Broniewski ("Bogucki"), the last commander in chief of that part of the NSZ that had not joined with the Home Army in 1944, referred to as the NSZ-ONR. This group slowly pushed to the side those officers who had not been closely associated with ONR, such as Major Zub-Zdanowicz ("Ząb").<sup>24</sup>

At the end of the war one of the chief responsibilities of the CIC was finding and arresting Nazi war criminals.<sup>25</sup> Considering the almost miraculous march of the Holy Cross Brigade across both the eastern and western front of the German army, as well as the continued assertions about their collaboration with the Germans made by the Czechs and Soviets, it was only natural that the CIC began an investigation into the Brigade's past in order to avoid any embarrassment to the American government. The CIC was able to reconstruct the beginnings of the Brigade from the rise of the nationalist movement headed by Roman Dmowski at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the split that led to the creation of the Radical National Camp (*Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny*-ONR) in 1934.<sup>26</sup> The Americans were unable to uncover the more secret Order of Poland, which lay at the heart of both the ONR and the Salamander Union (*Związek Jaszczurczy*), the organization's underground military arm created after the German invasion of Poland. And while it was known that the Salamander Union had joined with other nationalist groups to form the National Armed Forces (NSZ), they were unaware of the bloody feud which split this formation in 1944 when part of the organization joined the Home Army, referred to as the NSZ-AK, and part remained independent, referred to as the NSZ-ONR, which later created the Holy Cross Brigade.

Although the full story of the relationship between the Brigade and the military and security services of the Third Reich will probably never be completely known, there is no doubt that some kind of relationship did in fact exist. As Polish historians have made clear this in itself is not surprising since almost all of the Polish underground groups had such contacts to one degree or another. In general they were usually restricted to exchanges of information and denunciations by one underground group made against the other. The most dramatic of which must surely be the botched attempt by the Communists to expose the underground printing

operation of the AK to the Gestapo, which resulted in the destruction of their own underground press, which occurred due to a mistake in the addresses given.<sup>27</sup>

During and after the war the Polish Communists and Soviets characterized the NSZ as a marauding band hunting down and killing Communists and Jews hiding from the Germans. Although it is impossible to ignore the ugly nature of the anti-Semitic propaganda produced by Polish nationalists both before and during the war and the possible effect this had on hardening Polish attitudes to the plight of their Jewish neighbors, there is no proof that the NSZ had a policy of eliminating Polish Jews and little if no evidence that they perpetrated atrocities against them on the basis of their religion.<sup>28</sup> There is at least one example where Communist partisans under the command of Stefan Kilanowicz (“Grzegorz Korczyński”) carried out atrocities against Polish Jews hiding from the Germans that were later attributed to the NSZ.<sup>29</sup>

It is true that after 1943 and the defeat of the German army at Stalingrad, the NSZ became much more interested in attempting to foil Soviet support for the Polish Communist underground than inflicting further losses on what they considered to be an already beaten Germany. Various individuals within the Nazi security establishment were, at the same time, looking for any support they could find to stem the advance of the Red Army. It was out of this confluence of interests that gave birth to contacts between the NSZ and various representatives of the Third Reich. For the Holy Cross Brigade the most overt contacts occurred between SS Captain Paul Fuchs, an officer of the SD (the SS intelligence service) and Captain “Tom.” Born in 1908 near Frankfurt, Fuchs began his career in the criminal police in Augsburg in 1932. After Hitler came to power, he was transferred to work in the Gestapo in Nuremberg where he was responsible for keeping track of party members. In the September campaign he participated in the murderous activities of Einsatzkommando 2/II as it swept across Poland in the wake of the German invasion. Fuchs was then posted to Radom where he would remain until the winter of 1944–1945 when he and the other Gestapo officers were moved to Częstochowa. Fuchs was responsible for Departments IVa (responsible for among other things gathering information on the Communist and opposition movement in occupied Poland) and later, and more importantly, IVn (responsible for supervising informers). By all accounts, Fuchs was completely committed to his work and was perhaps one of the most effective Nazi officers directing operations against the various Polish underground movements, and almost single-handedly wiped out the Communist underground structure in the Radom region. It was probably sometime in the summer of 1943 that Fuchs had his first contact with “Tom.”



Much less is known about “Tom” and what is known is often contradictory.<sup>30</sup> In all probability his real name was Hubert Jura, but he used a number of aliases including “Augustyniak,” Herbert Jung, Jerzy Tom, Tomasz Zan, Tomasz Kamiński and perhaps several others as well. According to one of the last surviving officers of the Brigade, “Tom” admitted that he had been a member of the Salamander Union since the beginning of the war, which would indicate that “Tom” was a member of the ONR’s early underground network.<sup>31</sup> “Tom” resurfaced in 1942 in Warsaw where he used the name Tomasz Zan.<sup>32</sup> Lieutenant and later Captain “Tom” appeared in the Radom region in the summer of 1943, where he assumed overall command of a Special Action squad organized by the NSZ to track down the “Lion” unit of the People’s Guard, responsible for the murder of several NSZ members and innocent civilians in the town of Drzewica near Radom. On 22 July 1943 “Tom’s” unit captured a portion of the “Lion” group in a forest near Przysucha and executed seven of its members.<sup>33</sup>

Sometime after this event, “Tom” made contact with Paul Fuchs, and according to several accounts was able to move freely between Radom and Warsaw without fear of being stopped and searched by the German military police. Although there is some question as to “Tom’s” precise relationship to the NSZ during this time, there is evidence that he was in touch with at least certain members of the leadership throughout this period.<sup>34</sup> As a result of the split in the NSZ, it appears that at least part of “Tom’s” men rebelled and refused to carry out his orders. The part of the NSZ that joined the AK convicted him of treason and sentenced him to death for his contacts with the Germans. Sometime in the spring of 1944 he was shot, but escaped alive—being treated at the German military hospital in Radom. In the fall of 1944 “Tom” resurfaced again in Częstochowa at the head of a partisan group believed to have carried out the execution of several leading figures among the part of the NSZ that joined the AK, including Władysław Pacholczyk, the individual that had attempted to execute him earlier. According to one version “Tom” followed Fuchs to Berlin in the winter of 1944–1945, while “Tom’s” people left with the Holy Cross Brigade.<sup>35</sup>

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The officers in the Brigade maintained in their semi-official history of their famous march, *On the March and In Battle*, that it was an accidental meeting with an obliging German officer that allowed the unit to proceed through the German eastern front, which at that time stretched along the Pilica River, and then on the basis of a pass they received to cross the Oder River in the early part of 1945.<sup>36</sup> On the other hand, the movement of 1,000 armed Polish troops through the rear of the German armies would seem to have required more than simply the accidental

agreement of some lower ranking officer. There does seem to be evidence that an earlier agreement had been reached between Otmar Wawrzkowicz, the intelligence chief of the NSZ, and the Germans while the former was in Kraków.<sup>37</sup> In that case Fuchs and “Tom” were the intermediaries in the continuing relationship between the Germans and the Brigade.

Both “Tom” and Fuchs reappeared in January 1945 attaching themselves to the Holy Cross Brigade as it moved its way across the German-Czech border. On 20 February the Brigade crossed the Czech border and from that date until the second half of March seemed to have been of little interest to the Germans.<sup>38</sup> Then the entire Brigade was taken by rail from the Kolín area southeast to Rozstání near Brno. It was while they were at Rozstání that the Germans began to exert pressure on the Brigade to take an active part in the fighting against the Soviets. Dąbrowski claimed that he refused to accept the German offer but did agree to another German idea to parachute several groups behind Soviet lines to act as partisans, organized by Fuchs and “Tom.”<sup>39</sup> These operations were, on the one hand, the price that the Brigade was forced to pay for the help that the Germans had provided, but, on the other hand, also served the interests of the Poles, who were anxious to reestablish contact with the command of the NSZ left in Poland. Władysław Marcinkowski (“Jaxa”), the brigade’s chief of staff, wrote later that he told the members of one of these groups that they need not obey orders from either the Germans or “Tom.”<sup>40</sup>

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At the same time, Marcinkowski and an interpreter were invited to take part in an anti-Communist conference organized by the Germans and including representatives of various Eastern European right wing groups, including the Romanian Iron Guard and the Hungarian Arrow Cross.<sup>41</sup> It is hard to believe that at this late date, with much of Eastern Europe already under Soviet control, the Germans believed this conference would produce any real solution to their deteriorating military situation. What is much more likely is that they were trying to put together an alternative group of political leaders and potential networks that could be used as a bargaining chip with the Western Allies. One fact supporting this interpretation is that the Brigade was allowed to dispatch emissaries to the Polish London government, which they claimed was necessary before they could agree to any German offer.<sup>42</sup> For the Brigade this was probably nothing more than stalling tactics since their relations with the London government were problematical at best. For their part, the Germans may have seen this as an opportunity to make contact with the West. However, while Dąbrowski claimed that these emissaries made it to General Anders, commander of the Polish Second Corps of the British Army, information about the existence of the Brigade was not passed on further.

In their attempt to establish the facts surrounding the Brigade's contacts with the Germans, the Americans were faced with a number of conflicting reports from their various sources. A June 1945 OSS report stated that after the defeat of the Warsaw uprising, "[the Brigade] surrendered 'with honor,' it is said, the Germans allowing them to retain their arms and to move westward, and even offering train accommodation. Instead, the poles [sic] marched through Slovakia and Moravia... Except for a few skirmishes with local German officials, the Brigade appears never to have been opposed by either Wehrmacht or civilian authorities in its march... The Czechs state that many Brigade members carry on their persons large quantities of German and Czechoslovak banknotes." Another OSS report from 26 July 1945 claimed, "Constant exchange of personnel within the Polish Brigade, especially new arrivals in British battle-dress leads to a suspicion that the Brigade is being used as an assembly and clearing center for many suspicious individuals, possibly former Polish collaborators and informers, who by joining the Brigade try to avoid investigation by Allied and Czech authorities." While an August OSS report explained away the possible collaboration of the Brigade by stating, "The Brigade did not surrender its arms but negotiated with the Germans using 'high diplomacy' tactics divulging to the Germans its fascist and anti-Communist tendencies. The officer believes that these tactics saved the Poles from disarming or sending [sic] to the Eastern front to fight the Russians. Excuses such as bad equipment, lack of ammunition etc. were also used by the Poles to convince the Germans that they are not yet ready to fight."

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Perhaps even more surprising is that these conflicting reports continued until 1948. For instance a CIC background report paints an extremely positive picture of the Brigade's wartime activities, claiming that the Brigade fought its way from Poland against the Germans until finally meeting up with the Czech underground.<sup>43</sup> Only eight days later, however, a completely different picture emerged in another CIC report based on allegations from three informants. Here the Brigade was accused of a financing their operations from 1943 with "robbery, assault and murder. The HCB made these attacks on rich citizens of Poland, justifying themselves by claiming that the persons robbed were Communists, Communist sympathizers or friendly to the Nazis... The leaders of the HCB were lining their pockets with a fortune in gold and money which they later converted into US dollars."<sup>44</sup> It's probable that these differences not only reflected a conflict among the CIC's sources, but differences in interpreting the sources and the attitude of individual officers to the quickly changing relations with the Soviet Union.

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In one report based on information provided by a Captain Torbliński there were more specific accusations that several officers of the NSZ's Special Action

squads had openly worked with the Germans during the war, including, “Step” (Henryk Figuro-Podhorski); “Żbik” (Władysław Kołaciński); and Captain “Tom”.<sup>45</sup> According to this informant, “Tom” “gave the names of many members of the PPR which Germans later arrested” and worked closely with Lt. Thomsen, Gestapo chief of section V (responsible for anti-Soviet intelligence).<sup>46</sup> There was also a claim that Tom and perhaps Żbik had shot a colonel of the People’s Guard (GL) near Ćmielów. The PSL report claimed that Żbik had negotiated with the German field police in order to retrieve some of his own soldiers who had been captured.<sup>47</sup> It was reported that the Brigade during its march across Poland was not attacked by the Germans, whereas AK detachments in the same area were continually harried, as well as information that the Germans had provided provisions for the Brigade and that several of its members had been sent on a commando course organized by the Germans in order to be dropped behind Soviet lines.<sup>48</sup>

The CIC discovered the traces of these covert operations in July of 1945. On 9 July, the CIC questioned an Austrian national, arrested on 22 June 1945, who volunteered information concerning the Brigade.<sup>49</sup> Trained as a radio operator, this individual had been attached to a commando unit intended for use behind Soviet lines. According to this document, the subject claimed that he had maintained close liaison with the Polish Brigade and the Ukrainian underground, stating that, “The Polish Brigade consisted of approximately 5,000 men. They were all civilians and belonged to the anti-Russian underground... This Brigade provided a reservoir of prospective agents, to be used in Poland behind Russian lines.” This source also revealed that the Germans intended to create commando units that included SD personnel that were to keep in contact with the Brigade: “This organization was to maintain close liaison with the [unclear] Ukrainians and Polish Brigade, engage in espionage, small scale sabotage, and [unclear] to be ready to take an active part in the ‘impending’ clash between the Western Allies and Russia.” The Polish Brigade was “supposed to create unrest behind the American lines and act as “Russian agents,” thus stirring up clashes between the Russian and the Western Allies.

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this report is information regarding the Brigade’s relationship with Paul Fuchs, the Gestapo officer from Radom. The “Treasury” for this organization was reported to be located in Salzburg. This informant also stated that “Hstuf [*Hauptsturmführer*—Captain] FUCHS and [unclear] obtained all the funds of the SD in Czechoslovakia and proceeded to SALZBURG.” These contacts appear to be confirmed in yet another document regarding a CIC investigation into the activities of Bolesław Pasniecki, reportedly working in the interest of the Russians. There is information that he was in contact

with two members of the Brigade, Captain “Mieczysław” and Lt. Górecki, who were reportedly in touch with a German colonel from Munich that supposedly had access to a hidden stock of arms and had been a former member of the Gestapo.<sup>50</sup> In a CIC report from 6 August there is mention that the “Czech Secret Police advise that there is a strong possibility that SS men, posing as civilians, found their way in the organization [Holy Cross Brigade–HCB] while it was located in Pilsen.”<sup>51</sup>

Further information about Fuchs was provided in a report dated 8 September 1948. “During the time the lower grades of the HCB were perpetuating their massacres, the leaders of the HCB were in close contact with the GESTAPO through a GESTAPO Liaison Officer, rank unknown, named Fnu [First name unknown] Fuchs, presently residing in the MUNICH area, address unknown... The HCB maintained contact with the American forces until they were very close to the advancing American forces and then turned on the Germans, fighting savagely and in earnest. However, they kept the Gestapo Liaison officer, FUCHS, with them... The former Gestapo Liaison officer, Fuchs, is reportedly still in the service of the HCB and acts as adviser in local German affairs, helps smuggle Poles into France and is the go-between in the transfer of funds to Switzerland and Spain. Fuchs reportedly has good connections with his former friends and associates, the Officers of German Intelligence who are in Spain.”<sup>52</sup>

This document not only confirms the possibility that Fuchs crossed the American lines with the Brigade, but more incredibly that he was still in contact with them three years later. It is difficult to explain why either the Brigade or Fuchs would have continued this dangerous relationship, since the Brigade was clearly informed that they were under investigation by the CIC as a result of the furor that they had collaborated with the Germans. Fuchs himself would have been well advised to stay clear of a group of officers who were now dependent on the Americans and under investigation by the CIC. What is even more curious is why the CIC did not follow up these leads regarding the presence of a German SD officer who appeared on their own list of wanted war criminals. Although there is no evidence one way or the other, it may have been that the reason there was no follow-up investigation is that the CIC was warned away from making more inquiries because Fuchs and perhaps even members of the Brigade were working for one or several Western intelligence organizations—it should be pointed out that the CIC itself had a hand in allowing Klaus Barbie to escape justice.<sup>53</sup>

One possibility is that Fuchs was working for the “Gehlen organization,” the intelligence service organized by Reinhard Gehlen (the former head of the German Army’s Soviet intelligence section).<sup>54</sup> The Gehlen organization was created

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in 1945 to provide information about the Soviets to the U.S. Army's G-2 (intelligence section). In 1949 it was put under CIA authority and finally became the foundation of the newly created West German intelligence service, the BND, in 1956. Although the U.S. Army had forbidden Gehlen to recruit former SD or SS officers, his almost complete independence from American supervision made it very easy to ignore such restrictions. And Fuchs, who had set up one of the most impressive nets of agents in occupied Poland, would have been a valuable resource for Gehlen and his American patrons desperate for any information on what was happening behind the quickly closing Iron Curtain. There is at least circumstantial evidence that Gehlen knew about the Holy Cross Brigade and that the source for this information may have come from Fuchs. At the beginning of 1945, Gehlen wrote a report on the state of the Polish underground movement after the Warsaw Uprising describing the NSZ as "the most energetically led partisan organization in Poland," and pointing out that the Special Action squad led by Żbik in the Radom-Kielce area carried out "a ruthless struggle against groups of Soviet agents...while at the same time avoiding conflict with the Wehrmacht."<sup>55</sup> Although there are no sources cited in this report, it is quite probable that this information was provided by Fuchs. More importantly there is evidence that the Americans either had this report or at least knew the contents.<sup>56</sup>

It has been argued that at the beginning of the Cold War the American government created a surrogate army of Eastern European nationalists to be used against the Soviet Union in case of a shooting war and as recruits for covert operations behind the Iron Curtain, disguising the fact by organizing them into service troops carrying out occupation duties in Germany.<sup>57</sup> The CIC's investigation of the Brigade seems to suggest that, at least at first, the U.S. government was mainly interested in trying to find gainful employment for the masses of DP's and urgently needed replacements for American troops who were demanding to go home. For their part, the officers of the Brigade appeared to deal with the Americans much as they had with the Germans: accepting what help they could get in return for intelligence provided by their agents still working in Poland, while keeping much of their own activities a closely guarded secret. It was not until 1948—the year of the Communist coup in Czech and the Berlin blockade—that certain individual members of the Brigade appear to have been recruited to take part in secret U.S. sponsored covert operations, perhaps on behalf of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) created in 1948.

Already in the fall of 1944, the American military began forming "Labor Service" troops in France, many of whom were Poles.<sup>58</sup> A note from the Assistant



Secretary of War provides clear evidence of the numbers involved, claiming that by 15 November 1945 there were 23,400 Estonians, 67,700 Latvians, 50,500 Lithuanians, 838,900 Poles, and 4,100 Czechs, of whom about 25% were considered suitable for military duty or 246,150.<sup>59</sup> Among the advantages listed of utilizing such a pool of men was the increasing desire of American soldiers to be returned home, the financial savings of using such troops and, according to the author, a better aptitude among such troops for occupation service.

The first Polish companies and battalions were formed between March and April of 1945 with the main center of recruitment based in Mannhiem-Karfertal, Langwasser, Winzer and Darmstadt.<sup>60</sup> The soldiers of the Holy Cross Brigade had their own base in Marsfeld near Nuremburg under the supervision of the U.S. Third Army. A report from the winter of 1945 regarding the operations of the 9<sup>th</sup> Labor Supervision Area of the Third Army points out that, "Due to the rapid redeployment of US personnel it was found necessary to find continental substitutes for US guards on installations and over POWs. Consequently a total of 63 Labor Service Companies (Polish Civilians) (Escort Guards) (Prov) were organized in this area. Five of these were trained for the U.S. Air Forces in Europe and for Hq US Forces European Theater, leaving 57 companies now operating under the 9<sup>th</sup> Labor Supervision Area."<sup>61</sup>

The recruitment of these DP's appeared to have immediate political implications as the State Department quickly reminded the War Department of the obvious problems that would arise as a result of this policy. In discussions held by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) on 3 January 1946, Mr. Mathews from the State Department reminded the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. Peterson, that "the use of Eastern European Nationals, such as Poles caused considerable political embarrassment in our relations with the Polish and Soviet Government." This was followed by a letter from the Secretary of State, James Byrnes, to the War Department requesting that they cease the policy of hiring Poles for logistical support of the U.S. Army, warning that "if political repercussions do develop, I shall be compelled to make it clear that these arrangements were not sanctioned by the Department of State."<sup>62</sup>

256 In spite of the opposition by the Department of State, the policy of allowing the Brigade to expand its activities had at least unofficial U.S. government sanction. On 4 February 1946, a report from the headquarters of United States Forces European Theater to the Chief of the CIC, states, "In view of the fact that the Brigade has some 4,000 members and is unofficially allowed by Washington to have up to 38,000 it can become a sizable military force."<sup>63</sup> Precisely who or what agency allowed this

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increase was never stated and whether it was yet another example of bureaucratic confusion or the hints of something more nefarious is impossible to tell. However, this same report also warned about the possibility that either the Polish government in Warsaw or the Soviet Union would make some kind of complaint about the brigade at the newly created United Nations. Therefore the report recommended that “all military processes, such as military training and drilling, as well as military propaganda existing within the guard companies be suppressed since these activities might cause a threat to our relations with the Soviets.”

On the same day this report appeared, an article in the *New York Times* published an article entitled, “Army Enlistment of Foes of Russia.” According to this article there were over 17,000 Poles in the service of the U.S. Army and another 10,000 Yugoslavs. While making the claim that, “These armies of mercenaries are dominated by anti-Semitic and anti-Soviet sympathizers...,” it also stated that there was nothing sinister on the side of the United States government, but only a certain amount of naivete about the goals and activities of these various foreign formations. The article pointed out that due to the demobilization of the American Army there is a desperate need for guards to help with the policing of occupied Germany.

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The U.S. Army insisted that there were no units greater than a company under independent command and the oft-quoted PSL report stated that the Americans had forbidden the organizing of units larger than a company and had insisted on the right of naming the commanders of the guard companies, the removal of all unit distinctions from uniforms and that there be no saluting.<sup>64</sup> Despite these prohibitions it appears that the officers of the Holy Cross Brigade were busily building an impressive organization of 200 officers and 6,250 men organized into 25 companies, recruiting new members from among the Polish population of DPs. In a report to the Assistant Chief of Staff of United States Forces European Theater (USFET), the H.Q. of the Third Army noted, “It considered probable that there has been activity on the part of certain Polish groups directed toward consolidation and the organizing of a Polish army in exile...”<sup>65</sup>

By the end of the winter of 1945/1946, the CIC reported that the Brigade had grown and that in now included 15,334 members of the Mobile Civilian Guard Units in the Third Army area, 5,042 guards in the Seventh Army area and approximately another 5,000 guards working in the Oise area of France.<sup>66</sup> It was clear that the Brigade was expanding its authority among other Poles recruited by the Americans. This activity did not go unnoticed. In April of 1946, Col. Dąbrowski was forced to surrender his formal command because of pressure exerted by the

Soviets and on June 17, 1946 the Americans decided to liquidate the headquarters of the Brigade and to put the separate companies under direct American command.<sup>67</sup> A report written by the Brigade described the previous year's history of the Brigade, including their three years of battles with the Germans and the aid they lent the 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division in its drive to Pilsen. In August the Brigade was disarmed and transferred to Coburg where it was attached to the 70<sup>th</sup> Ordnance Group. The chronicle goes on to describe what life was like for the Brigade in those months since August:

The conditions of work and life with the ordnance [sic] battalions were in the beginning very difficult—our soldiers were treated on the same level with the German DP's, were obliged to work together with them, the job itself was the most unpleasant: cleaning the court-yard [sic] and latrines, unloading coal, loading of iron-scrap, etc. On the other side the soldiers were hungry /DP's food rations/, they destroyed their old uniforms and have not received nearly any supply. They were not seldom treated like enemy workmen instead of allied soldiers. In spite of all these and due to great efforts of the Brigade staff the work itself began every day to be better accomplished and the soldiers—in spite of the work conditions—gave their best to do their duty.<sup>68</sup>

Then suddenly and for unknown reasons the Brigade commanders were informed that the formation would be liquidated and its members sent to DP camps. As it later developed, these troops were simply hired as civilians working for the army and were retained in American service, but the command structure of the Brigade was closed down.

Several weeks after the Brigade command structure was supposed to be disbanded, however, the CIC as part of an on-going investigation into the political activities in the DP camps (Operation Polecat) indicated “the presence of a rather strong organizational movement among the Poles in guard units stationed in Germany. The organization is supposedly sponsored by a group that was at one time in the Swietokrzyska Brigade... The organization has attempted to infiltrate all Polish guard units and to place their officers in the top command positions, with their immediate aim of getting control of all Polish troops in Germany.”<sup>69</sup> In the middle of 1947, the Americans decided to disband the majority of the Polish guard companies. This decision was probably the result of pressure exerted by the Polish Communist government and the Soviet Union. In March of 1946 the

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Polish ambassador in Washington received instructions to start a campaign against the guard companies.<sup>70</sup> One year later during the American-Soviet discussions in Moscow, Molotov raised the issue with the Americans, and it appears in order to appease the Soviets the Americans agreed to demobilize the guard companies.<sup>71</sup> In order to get around these restrictions the officers of the Brigade formed a veteran's organization to continue their activities. At its first Congress that year, the organization represented 71 chapters with 6,683 members and began to aggressively attack other organizations organized by former veterans of the AK.

As late as 1948 the commanders of the Brigade were still in a position to influence the still quite considerable population of DPs who had joined the Guard companies. A CIC report from the Bamberg region states quite clearly that, "The Brigade is organized into territorial military cells. Some of the guard companies are composed exclusively of members of the Brigade... At the present time, the aim of the Holy Cross Brigade is to knit its members into one solid unit which, in the event of conflict or future revolutionary upheaval in Poland could form the nucleus of a regular army. It is uncompromisingly anti-Communist."<sup>72</sup> The report went on to include information about the size of the Brigade, noting that it "is still able to count a membership of 3,000 men. This figure represents a loss of only 1,000 men since the date of its disarmament. In spite of its comparatively small strength, the Brigade is still able to maintain a strong influence in the guard companies because of command positions held by its members." According to an informant, Lt. Roman Stefański, the Brigade was also pursuing active intelligence operations against the rest of the Polish émigré community in Germany, ferreting out Communist agents sent from Poland, including a stated willingness to assassinate at least one individual believed to be working for Warsaw.<sup>73</sup> Dąbrowski, however, refused to agree from "fear of American reaction." Yet another CIC report described the organization's aims: "To propagate the idea of the struggle for a free and independent Poland, to fight against Communism, to spread and cultivate the principles of the Polish American friendship, to maintain organization ties between former soldiers of the Brigade, to cultivate the traditions of partisan life... Activities include: preparation for re-settlement to the United States or to Western European countries."<sup>74</sup>

The Brigade was not only interested in influencing the large DP community in Germany, but also to play a role in *émigré* politics. The main figures involved in these attempts, Kazimierz Gluziński, Jerzy Iłakowicz, Otmar Wawrzkowicz and Stefan Kozłowski, were all members of the secret Order of Poland. Their main rivals were the *émigré* representatives of the Nationalist Party (*Stronnictwo Narodowe*—SN), who were part of the governing coalition of the Polish London government. A major

success for the Brigade was the election of Zygmunt Rusinek, also a member of the Organization of Poland, as the Chairman of the powerful organization, United Poland (based in the American zone of Germany), and then as chairman of the United Polish Military Refugees Organization (*Zjednoczenie Polskiego Uchodźstwa Wojennego*—ZPUW) in November of 1946.<sup>75</sup> The CIC was also interested in the political machinations of the Brigade and learned that the HQ of this group was at Eppstein. When Rusinek returned from London, he found that his organization was taken over by the officers of the Brigade.<sup>76</sup> It also appears that the members of the Brigade were in contact with representatives of the Arciszewski faction in the split that shook the Polish London government with the death of President Raczkiewicz in 1947. In spite of these organizational successes in the fall of 1948, the officers connected with the Order of Poland divided into two competing factions, which was not finally healed until 1949, when the victor of the split, Mieczysław Harusewicz, agreed to a political alliance between the representatives of the former Radical National Camp (ONR) and the Nationalist Party (SN).<sup>77</sup>

The report written for the PSL described the position of the Brigade among the émigré community in language that exhibited both apprehension and respect: “They have enemies in practically every Polish party and are fought at every step. They would be contested even if they were not burdened with the weight of the accusation of collaboration with the Germans. It seems to me that the Holy Cross Brigade...is opposed because it is a group with very powerful possibilities and because it is ‘dangerous.’ The danger is that they possess a responsible ‘brain trust’ and a political leadership with a lot of conspiratorial experience. Among the current collection of Polish political parties outside the country, they are the most united, disciplined and ideologically motivated... The Holy Cross Brigade found itself in this area [Germany] under the most unfavorable conditions, ignored, embattled and disbanded many times. These trials hardened it, and their staff passed the test... They count on an eventual armed conflict and the invasion of Germany by the Soviets and the staff of the NSZ has worked out a plan for settling its people and sympathizers from Germany to France and even farther to Spain.”<sup>78</sup>

260 From 1945 to at least 1947 the Brigade continued to send agents across the German-Czech frontier back into Poland until the Communist secret police finally rolled up their network.<sup>79</sup> It is almost impossible to establish from the documents available whether or not this activity was done at the behest of the U.S. or were carried out on the Brigade’s own behalf. At least there appears to be evidence that the CIC was not behind the organization of these efforts. For example, the Americans arrested two individuals, Jan Kowalski (“Gadomski,” “Wężyk”) and

Bohdan Tymiński, who were reportedly trying to get in touch with individuals from the Brigade. According to this information, Captain “Pomorski,” Mieczysław Dukalski, had sent Tymiński, who was serving in one of the Guard companies, back to Poland with a sabotage group from Regensburg. But before Tymiński could be questioned further by the Americans he escaped.<sup>80</sup> According to the CIC, at least part of the information the Brigade acquired in this way was provided to the U.S., British and French Intelligence, although it was not disclosed what agencies these were. The last information regarding such intelligence gathering activities comes from May of 1950 regarding the Czech organization “Zlatý Kříž” [sic] (the Golden Cross) which was reportedly in contact with the brigade and sending individuals and groups into Czechoslovakia.<sup>81</sup>

Some of the CIC material indicates that there were suspicions that some members of the Brigade may have been working for the Soviets. In a report from August of 1948 a source in the Kriegsschule DP camp claimed, “some of the members of the group are pro-Communist.”<sup>82</sup> In the report revealing the Brigade’s continued relationship with Fuchs there is the opinion that “information collected by the HCB intelligence section ends up in the possession of the Soviets, since source C believes that Major Fnu Kozłowski of the HCB is working for the Soviet Intelligence.”<sup>83</sup> On the face of it these charges appear ridiculous given the strident anti-Communism of the Brigade, especially considering that according to sources gathered by the Polish Communist intelligence service, Stefan Kozłowski (“Aleksander”) was working exclusively for the CIC.<sup>84</sup> It does appear, however, that the Brigade was infiltrated by Communist agents, including one individual who was even a member of the secret Order of Poland, that were informing Warsaw about the Brigade’s activities.<sup>85</sup>

For the United States and the Brigade 1948 was a watershed year with the coup that overthrew the democratic government in Czechoslovakia, the beginning of the Berlin blockade and the looming possibility of war between the United States and the Soviet Union. While there is no evidence in the National Archives or in the CIC file that the Brigade was part of a secret army working for the American intelligence community, there is evidence that suggests that individuals from the Brigade were recruited to fight in the brushfire wars and covert operations that erupted as a result of the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. For instance, on the basis of letters sent to the Brigade’s headquarters in Germany and intercepted by the CIC, there is evidence that soldiers of the Brigade were fighting with the French Foreign Legion in Morocco and others had gone to the war breaking out against French rule in Southeast Asia. Even more incredibly given the reportedly anti-Semitic reputation of its leadership is the information that members of the



Brigade were being recruited to go to Palestine to bolster the Jewish organizations fighting for the independence of the newly created state of Israel.<sup>86</sup> Other letters claimed that its members were fighting with the Greek army against the Communist insurgency in that country and also providing soldiers in the covert operations against the Albanian Communist government.<sup>87</sup> The operations in Albania were under the control of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), which had been created to carry out covert operations in an attempt to “roll back” Communism in Eastern Europe.

On the other hand, it looks as if the Brigade had its own plans in 1948 in the event that war broke out between the Americans and Soviets. According to the Brigade’s “Plan P,” the situation in Europe was described in the following manner: “In regard to the present uncertain political situation between the U.S.A. and the USSR, war may break out in Europe by a surprise attack from the Soviet forces toward the West with the aim of taking over Germany, Italy and France.”<sup>88</sup> In such an eventuality, the Brigade was prepared to organize and take command of the largest number of Polish DPs possible and withdraw to France or as far away as Spain if necessary. These plans included among others, details about the location and seizure of American automobiles and trucks in order to move this mass of men. The plan may have been made together with Yugoslav émigré formations also in Germany. Like the Brigade’s withdrawal from Poland in 1945, the aim of the operation was to get as large a group of Poles to Spain as possible in order to preserve a cadre for further military operations, much as they had done in their long march from Poland in 1945.

Another indication of the Brigade’s independence is the secret negotiations conducted with the French to move its members to France. Whether this was a result of “Plan P” or the increasing pressure from the Americans that the soldiers of the Brigade be moved out of Germany and resettled in the United States is unclear. In 1948, the Brigade’s officers began negotiations with de Gaulle who was interested in recruiting workers who could offset the influence of Polish Communists activity in Polish immigrant circles in France.<sup>89</sup> As one CIC report noted, “The Brigade was also guaranteed protection against the Communists and promised backing by DE GAULLE in organizing and training an army.”<sup>90</sup> Throughout 1948 the Brigade continued to send groups to France for work.<sup>91</sup> It appears that this was done outside the regular channels, since according to the CIC 40% of the individuals would not have been accepted by the French embassy. According to another document, the soldiers of the brigade were declining to accept CIC screening for repatriation to the United States because of the opportunity of going to France.<sup>92</sup> According to

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this document Col. Dąbrowski “has a working agreement with French General de Gaulle. This agreement is alleged to be in connection with activity (as yet unknown to [name unclear]) concerning the French-Spanish border.” One reason given for this choice of emigration was that the commanders of the Brigade did not want to sever their ties to Poland and to remain in Europe. There was even hope among the officers of the Brigade that de Gaulle was going to help to reorganize a Polish Army.<sup>93</sup>

There are no documents dated later than 1950 either at NARA or among those contained in the CIC’s file related to the Holy Cross Brigade. In spite of the hopes of their officers, it appears that by 1950 the financial pressure to adjust to the realities of a permanent life in emigration and the diminishing probabilities of an armed conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union led to the dissolution of the Holy Cross Brigade. Most of the senior officers of the Brigade were eventually resettled in the United States. Hardened by their knowledge of the vicissitudes of a country, which for over two hundred years had rarely been a subject of its own foreign policy, this small hermetic group of fierce patriots attempted to single-mindedly to realize the goal of a free and independent Poland. It remains to be seen whether their political pragmatism did not permanently compromise their own nationalist ideals. In the end, of course, Poland was not liberated by the covert operations of an elite group, but the open resistance of a popular democratic movement.

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### *Polish Summary*

Brygada Świętokrzyska Narodowych Sił Zbrojnych (NSZ) stała się w ostatnim czasie przedmiotem rosnącej liczby publikacji. Wiąże się to ze wzrostem możliwości badawczych i otwarciem archiwów, zarówno w Polsce jak i poza jej granicami. Do tej pory nie była jednak dostępna dla badaczy dokumentacja rządu USA z Centrum Archiwów Narodowych (NARC – *National Archives and Records Center*) w Waszyngtonie. Obecnie dokumenty te są już odtajnione, co pozwala wyjaśnić wiele kontrowersji otaczających brygadę i jej działalność podczas, i po zakończeniu drugiej wojny światowej. Dokumenty należą do trzech kategorii:

- dokumenty wytworzone przez różne rodzaje sił zbrojnych USA
- dokumenty stworzone przez władzę wykonawczą, w tym Departament Stanu
- dokumenty wywiadu i kontrwywiadu (OSS i CIC).

Wynika z nich, że dowództwa amerykańskie i alianckie różnych szczebli było zaskoczone nagłym pojawieniem się w maju 1945 r. formacji polskich partyzantów w zachodniej Czechosłowacji. 2 maja 1945 r. wysłano raport do dowódcy V Korpusu

Armii USA, stanowiącego część Trzeciej Armii gen. George'a Pattona, w którym wspomniano o pojawieniu się 900 Polaków maszerujących na zachód od Pilzna pod dowództwem pułkownika Bohuna-Dąbrowskiego i dodając, iż „niewiadomo, czy są oni przyjaźni czy wrodozy”. Tego samego dnia brygada oswobodziła obóz koncentracyjny w Holiszowie uwalniając ponad 700 więźniarek i biorąc do niewoli ok. 200 żołnierzy SS. Później Amerykanie odnotowali, że czeski tłumacz pracujący dla jednostki amerykańskiej powiedział, że polska formacja otrzymywała od Niemców racje żywnościowe. Trzecia Armia raportowała, że brygada składała się z 1550 osób (1250 żołnierzy, 250 kobiet, 120 dzieci i 30 starców). Stwierdzono, że Polacy nie chcą być traktowani jako przesiedleńcy, ale jako alianci, ponieważ przez 6 lat walczyli z Niemcami i nie chcą „wpaść w sowieckie łapy”.

Oficerowie brygady robili co mogli, aby jak najszybciej znaleźć się bezpiecznie za liniami amerykańskimi. Armia Stanów Zjednoczonych była pod wrażeniem dyscypliny i postawy polskich oddziałów. Amerykanie byli chętni do przeniesienia brygady do podlegających brytyjskiemu dowództwu jednostek polskich. 7 maja 1945 r. płk Dąbrowski czuł się na tyle pewnie, aby twierdzić, że Amerykanie de facto uznali brygadę za oddział armii sprzymierzonych. Potwierdza to m.in. szereg opublikowanych fotografii, na których widać oficerów brygady noszących odznakę 2 DP Armii Stanów Zjednoczonych, tzw. „głowę Indianina”. Jednak 23 lipca 1945 r. wydział G-3 sił lądowych (armii) ds. operacyjnych przekazał do Komitetu Szefów Sztabów USA informację, że brytyjskie Ministerstwo Wojny odmówiło uznania brygady. Raport zawierał też sugestię od podpułkownika Szymańskiego, służącego jako oficer łącznikowy w sztabie armii, że być może oddziały brygady mogłyby zastać wykorzystane jako kompanie transportowe lub budowlane.

Następnego dnia została przekazana pilna informacja OSS stwierdzającą, że jeżeli Amerykanie natychmiast nie interweniują i nie przejmą odpowiedzialności za brygadę istnieje możliwość wybuchu otwartego konfliktu między Polakami i Czechami. W tym samym czasie podwładny gen. Pattona, generał Harmon, podkreślał dobre wrażenie robione przez brygadę. Dodał on także, że generał Anders dowódca II Korpusu Polskiego wysyłał listy do generała Pattona, w którym prosił o przeniesienie brygady pod swoją jurysdykcję. Biorąc pod uwagę problemy z Czechami, Harmon przypominał Pattonowi, że podczas ich wspólnego pobytu w Pradze, Prezydent Czechosłowacji, premier, minister wojny i szef sztabu domagali się wycofania polskiej jednostki z Czechosłowacji.

W trakcie tych negocjacji 30 lipca 1945 r. ukazał się w lewicującej brytyjskiej gazecie *News Chronicle*, artykuł Stefana Litauera pod prowokacyjnym tytułem

„Polscy faszyci rządzą 5 czeskimi wsiami”. Według tego artykułu 1500 uzbrojonych Polaków z „osławionej profaszystowskiej podziemnej armii NSZ” okupowało 5 zamieszkałych przez Niemców wsi w odległości 35 mil od Pragi. Litauer twierdził, że dokonali oni odwrotu wraz z oddziałami Wehrmachtu i zostali przez Niemców poproszeni o wstąpienie do legionu wschodnioeuropejskiego, aby walczyć z Sowietami. Litauer oskarżał ponadto brygadę o prowadzenie tajnych operacji przeciw Sowietom i rządowi czeskiemu. Publikacja artykułu zbiegła się ze zorganizowaną przez sowieckich, polskich i czeskich komunistów kampanią propagandową, w której żołnierzy brygady nazywano „kolaborantami” i „faszystami”.

Artykuł i nagonka propagandowa spowodowały, że klimat wokół brygady zaczął się psuć. W tym samym czasie jednostka oczekiwała na podjęcie przez sztab aliancki decyzji o jej ewentualnym pozostaniu w Czechosłowacji lub przeniesieniu do Niemiec. 1 sierpnia 1945 r. generał Harmon poinformował płk Dąbrowskiego, że jego jednostka nie została zaakceptowana jako uzupełnienie dla Polskich Sił Zbrojnych na Zachodzie. W rezultacie musi albo pozostać w Czechosłowacji, albo zostać przeniesiona do strefy dyslokacji amerykańskiej 3 Armii, gdzie zostanie rozwiązana, a jej żołnierze umieszczeni w obozach uchodźców.

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Raport z 1949 r. zawierał nawet bardziej dokładny opis wydarzeń, które prowadziły do podjęcia przez brygadę decyzji o przyjęciu amerykańskich warunków o przeniesieniu do Niemiec. Wynikało z niego, że czeski generał Ludvík Svoboda wydał rozkazy internowania polskich oddziałów, ale Rząd RP na Wychodźstwie interweniował za pośrednictwem Amerykanów i wysłał do Czechów swoich przedstawicieli. Jak wynika z listu wysłanego 5 sierpnia przez generała Harmona do pułkownika Dąbrowskiego, Polacy żyli w niepewności, obawiając się wydania ich przez Amerykanów Sowietom lub przymusowego odesłania do Polski. Harmon ze swej strony zapewnił dowódcę brygady, iż „Armia Stanów Zjednoczonych gwarantuje pełne bezpieczeństwo personelu brygady niezależnie od tego, czy będzie ona częścią sił zbrojnych, czy wystąpi jako indywidualni przesiedleńcy”. Niezależnie od tego czy oficerowie brygady wierzyli w zapewnienia czy nie, mieli niewielki wybór. Możliwość podzielenia losu jednostek ROA gen. Własowa, które zostały wydane w ręce Sowietów, musiała budzić niepokój w szeregach brygady.

Ostatecznie Brygada została rozbrojona i przetransportowana przez Amerykanów do Koburga. W dniu 6 sierpnia 1945 r. wszyscy żołnierze brygady znaleźli się w strefie okupacyjnej 3 Armii w Niemczech. Dowódca brygady korzystał z zaistniałej sytuacji i ściągał do swoich oddziałów wielu Polaków, którzy nie chcieli czy też nie mogli bezpiecznie wracać do kraju. W tej liczbie znaleźli się liczni oficerowie i żołnierze NSZ zwolnieni z niemieckiej niewoli (m.in. pierwszy

komendant NSZ płk Ignacy Osiewicz, generał NSZ Zygmunt Broniewski „Bogucki” i inni. Grupa ta zaczęła spychać na drugi plan oficerów brygady niezwiązanych blisko z Obozem Narodowo-Radykalnym, jak major Leonard Zub-Zdanowicz „Ząb”.

CIC, którego podstawowym zadaniem było ściganie i aresztowanie niemieckich zbrodniarzy wojennych, biorąc pod uwagę „cudowny” marsz brygady przez dwa fronty oraz oskarżenia o kolaborację stawiane przez Czechów i Sowieców, rozpoczął śledztwo w sprawie przeszłości jednostki. CIC zrekonstruowało jej początki sięgając do korzeni ruchu narodowego u progu XX wieku oraz rozłamu związanego z powstaniem w 1934 r. ONR. Amerykanie nie zdołali ustalić wielu rzeczy, np. odkryć istnienia tajnego, wielostopniowego kierownictwa ONR „Organizacji Polskiej” oraz faktu, że w NSZ w 1944 r. doszło do rozłamu na tle procesu scaleniowego z Armią Krajową, a brygada była związana z tą częścią NSZ, która pozostała niezależną od AK.

Inna sprawa, że nawet dziś nie mamy pełnej wiedzy o historii NSZ – np. pozostają okryte tajemnicą stosunki między brygadą a wojskowymi i cywilnymi służbami bezpieczeństwa Trzeciej Rzeszy. Nie ulega bowiem wątpliwości, że takie kontakty istniały, podobnie zresztą jak miało to miejsce w przypadku innych organizacji podziemnych. Prawdą jest natomiast, że począwszy od klęski pod Stalingradem (początek 1943 r.), NSZ stało się bardziej zainteresowane zwalczaniem sowieckiego wsparcia dla polskich komunistów niż zwalczanie Niemców, których uznawano już za pokonanych.

W tym czasie niektórzy Niemcy zaczęli szukać potencjalnych sojuszników, którzy pomogliby upadającej Rzeszy powstrzymać Armię Czerwoną. Tak latem 1943 r. doszło do kontaktu między kapitanem SS Paulem Fuchsem oraz kapitanem NSZ „Tomem”. O „Tomie” wiadomo stosunkowo niewiele, a informacje przekazywane przez niego samego są sprzeczne. Naprawdę nazywał się najprawdopodobniej Hubert Jura, ale posługiwał się dużą liczbą fałszywych nazwisk, np. w 1942 r. występował on w Warszawie jako Tomasz Zan.

W 1943 r. „Tom” działał w okolicach Radomia, gdzie dowodził szwadronem NSZ do zadań specjalnych, który wytropił i rozstrzelał grupę żołnierzy GL z oddziału GL „Lwy” odpowiedzialnych za mord na ludności cywilnej i członkach NSZ w Drzewicy. Wkrótce po tych wydarzeniach „Tom” nawiązał kontakt z Fuchsem, który zagwarantował mu swobodę poruszania się. „Tom” utrzymywał w tym czasie kontakty z dowództwem NSZ, ale ich natura nie jest jasna. W wyniku rozłamu w NSZ część z ludzi „Toma” odmówiła wykonywania jego rozkazów, a następnie przeszła do AK. Wdrożono przeciw niemu śledztwo i na podstawie jego ustaleń został on uznany za zdrajcę i skazany na śmierć. Wiosną 1944 r. został on

nawet postrzelony, ale przeżył i był leczony w niemieckim szpitalu w Radomiu. Następnie „Tom” pojawił się w Częstochowie i związał się z odłamek NSZ, który nie podporządkował się AK.

Opowiadając o przemarszu Brygady Świętokrzyskiej na zachód oficerowie brygady twierdzili, niemiecki front na Pilicy w styczniu 1945 r. udało się im przekroczyć dzięki przypadkowo spotkanemu niemieckiemu oficerowi, a dzięki otrzymanej wówczas przepustce zdołali przekroczyć Odrę kilka dni później. Z drugiej strony wydaje się niemal pewne, że przemarsz tak wielkiej jednostki wymagał poważniejszych uzgodnień ze stroną niemiecką. Prawdopodobnie doszło do nich pod koniec 1944 r. w Krakowie w trakcie spotkania między Otmarem Wawrzkowiczem (szefem wywiadu NSZ) a przedstawicielami władz niemieckich. Fuchs i „Tom” mieli być pośrednikami. Obaj pojawili się w brygadzie w styczniu 1945 r. W tym samym momencie Niemcy zaczęli naciskać, aby brygada wzięła aktywny udział w walce z Sowietami. Dąbrowski twierdził potem, że odrzucił niemiecką propozycję, ale zgodził się na plan przerzucenia za linie sowieckie kilku grup, które miały prowadzić antysowiecką dywersję. Miała to być cena za pozostawienie brygady w spokoju, ale służyła też interesom Polaków, którzy pragnęli odzyskać kontakt z dowództwem NSZ pozostającym w kraju. Z tego samego powodu przedstawiciel brygady Władysław Marcinkowski („Jaxa”) wraz z tłumaczem wziął udział w antykomunistycznej konferencji zorganizowanej przez Niemców, w której uczestniczyli działacze różnych prawicowych grup z Europy Wschodniej, w tym rumuńskiej „Żelaznej Gwardii” i węgierskich „Strzałokrzyżowców”.

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Starając się dojść prawdy o zachowaniu brygady Amerykanie mieli do czynienia ze sprzecznymi raportami, niekiedy zawierającymi całkowicie fałszywe informacje na temat jej rzekomego udziału w Powstaniu Warszawskim i „honorowej kapitulacji”, jak i stałego przepływu przez jej szeregi „podejrzanych indywiduów”, które miały się tam ukrywać przed władzami alianckimi. Jedne raporty zawierały informacje na temat chwalebnej karty bojowej jednostki w walce z Niemcami, inne oskarżały ją o rabunki i mordy. W jednym z raportów wspomniano też o współpracy „Toma” z Niemcami. Informacje na temat specjalnych grup przerzucanych przy pomocy Luftwaffe za linię frontu sowieckiego, a rekrutowanych w szeregach brygady, dotarły do CIC po aresztowaniu austriackiego obywatela, który miał być radiooperatorem w takim zespole. Niektóre z raportów zawierały informacje o ukrywających się w szeregach brygady oficerach SS i SD. Fakt, że Amerykanie szczegółowo nie badali tych informacji mógł być spowodowany tym, iż sami uczestniczyli wówczas w podobnych działaniach, m.in. w umożliwieniu ucieczki Klausu Barbiego. Istnieje też możliwość, że Paul Fuchs – o którego



najprawdopodobniej chodziło – pracował dla organizacji wywiadowczej utworzonej przez Reinharda Gehlena w 1945 r. z zadaniem dostarczania Aliantom informacji o ZSRS. Od 1949 r. organizacja podlegała CIA, a w 1956 r. stała się zaczątkiem niemieckiego wywiadu BND. Fuchs dzięki swojej rozbudowanej sieci agentów w Polsce był dla Gehlena cennym nabytkiem. Istnieją dowody, że Gehlen dysponował dużą wiedzą na temat NSZ, o której napisał w swoim raporcie z początku 1945 r., że jest „najbardziej energicznie dowodzoną organizacją w Polsce”.

Uważa się, że na początku zimnej wojny rząd amerykański myślał o stworzeniu pod swoją komendą armii złożonej z nacjonalistów z Europy Wschodniej. Jednostki te miały być wykorzystane przeciwko ZSRS, a ich formowanie maskowano szyldem kompanii budowlanych, transportowych i wartowniczych. W rzeczywistości wczesne raporty CIC wskazują, że na początku Amerykanie chcieli znaleźć jakieś zatrudnienie dla rzesz uchodźców i pilnie potrzebowali zastępstwa dla własnych demobilizowanych oddziałów. Już w 1944 r. Amerykanie zaczęli tworzyć oddziały „służby roboczej” we Francji, w których było wielu Polaków. Pierwsze polskie jednostki stworzono między marcem a kwietniem 1945 r. w Niemczech. W sumie powstały 63 kompanie z czego 5 zostało przeszkolonych do ochrony amerykańskich lotnisk. Ewakuowani z Czechosłowacji żołnierze Brygady Świętokrzyskiej zostali podzieleni na 25 samodzielnych kompanii wartowniczych. Jednak mimo rozwiązania brygady i jej dowództwa, płk Dąbrowski „Bohun” w praktyce utrzymał kontrolę nad ponad 25 kompaniami stacjonującymi na terenie we Francji i Niemczech. W 1947 r. w wyniku nacisków władz sowieckich i polskich komunistów Amerykanie zdecydowali się rozwiązać większość polskich jednostek wartowniczych.

Niezależnie od działalności wartowniczej oficerowie brygady stworzyli organizację grupującą weteranów jednostki, aby utrzymywać kontrolę nad wciąż liczną rzeszą uchodźców i żołnierzy. Jej wpływy były dostrzegane przez CIC jeszcze w 1948 r. Organizacja weteranów miała też propagować przyjaźń polsko-amerykańską i przygotowywać weteranów do osiedlenia się na obczyźnie (we Francji i Hiszpanii). Weterani odgrywali też pewną rolę w polityce emigracyjnej rywalizując ze Stronnictwem Narodowym. Udało się im doprowadzić do wyboru Zygmunta Rusinka na szefa organizacji „Zjednoczona Polska” oraz Zjednoczenia Polskiego Uchodźstwa Wojennego. CIC było zainteresowane także tą stroną działalności byłych żołnierzy brygady. W jednym z raportów wskazywano, że członkowie brygady cieszyli się szacunkiem i respektem. Brygada prowadziła też działania kontrwywiadowcze starając się wyeliminować komunistyczną agenturę infiltrującą środowisko emigracyjne w Niemczech. W co najmniej jednym przypadku rozważano

fizyczną likwidację zidentyfikowanego agenta. Od 1945 r. do momentu likwidacji siatki przez SB w 1947 r. brygada utrzymywała łączność kurierską z Polską. Nie jest obecnie możliwe ustalenie ile z tych działań wykonywano samodzielnie, a ile za wiedzą czy w imieniu USA. Zdaniem CIC informacje wywiadowcze uzyskane przez brygadę docierały do wywiadów USA, Wielkiej Brytanii i Francji. Ostatnie informacje o takich działaniach pochodziły z 1950 r. i dotyczyły kontaktów z czeską organizacją „Złoty Krzyż”.

Zmateriałów CIC wynika, że pojawiały się podejrzenia co do pracy niektórych z żołnierzy brygady dla wywiadu sowieckiego. Po 1948 r. nie ma dowodów na to, aby struktury brygady prowadziły stałą współpracę z amerykańskim wywiadem. Jednakże pojedynczy jej żołnierze byli rekrutowani do walki w małych wojnach w Maroku i Azji Południowo-Wschodniej w szeregach Legii Cudzoziemskiej. Jeszcze bardziej niezwykły jest fakt, że mimo antysemickiej reputacji dowódców brygady jej żołnierze byli rekrutowani do wzmocnienia sił zbrojnych walczącego o niepodległość państwa Izrael. Inni mieli walczyć z komunistami w szeregach armii greckiej, czy prowadzić tajne operacje na terenie Albanii.

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Wydaje się, że dowództwo brygady miało własne plany odnośnie ewentualności wybuchu wojny między Amerykanami a Sowietami w 1948 r. Planowano ewakuację jak największej liczby polskich uchodźców do Francji, a nawet Hiszpanii. Plany zakładały nawet zdobycie amerykańskich samochodów i współpracę z organizacjami emigrantów jugosłowiańskich. W 1948 r. grupa oficerów brygady rozpoczęła negocjacje z gen. Charlesem de Gaulle'em, który był zainteresowany w rekrutacji ludzi, którzy mogliby zneutralizować wpływy komunistyczne w środowisku polskich imigrantów. Przez cały rok 1948 brygada wysyłała do Francji grupy do pracy w fabrykach – robiono to poza oficjalnymi kanałami, gdyż zdaniem CIC 40% z wysłanych nie zostałoby zaakceptowanych przez Ambasadę Francji. Jednym z powodów kontaktów z Francuzami była chęć pozostania w Europie i utrzymania kontaktów z Polską. Liczono także na pomoc de Gaulle'a w organizacji Armii Polskiej.

Brak dokumentów późniejszych niż z 1950 r. odzwierciedla fakt, że w tym momencie presja finansowa i malejąca szansa na otwarty konflikt zbrojny między ZSRS a USA sprawiły, że oficerowie brygady musieli się dostosować do realiów życia cywilnego i permanentnego pozostania na emigracji. Zmusiło och to do ostatecznego rozwiązania struktur brygady. Większość wyższych oficerów osiadła w USA. Czas pokazał, że Polska odzyskała wolność nie w wyniku tajnych operacji elitarniej grupy lecz powszechnego, otwartego oporu większości społeczeństwa.

**OPR. MACIEJ JABŁOŃSKI**

## Przypisy

<sup>1</sup> See among others: Cezław Brzoza, ed., *Rozkazy dzienne Bygady Świętokrzyskiej Narodowych Sił Zbrojnych, 1944–1945* [The Daily Orders of the Holy Cross Brigade NSZ, 1944–1945] (Kraków: Biblioteka Centrum Dokumentacji Czynu Niepodległościowego, vol. 2, 2003); Piotr Gontarczyk, *Polska Partia Robotnicza: Droga do władzy 1941–1944* [Polish Workers Party: The Road to Power] (Warszawa: Fronda, 2003); Krzysztof Komorowski, *Polityka i walka: Konspiracja zbrojna Ruchu Narodowego, 1939–1945* [Politics and Struggle: The Armed Conspiracy of the Nationalist Movement] (Warszawa: Rytm, 2000); Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, *Narodowe Siły Zbrojne: “Ząb” przeciw dwu wrogom* [The National Armed Forces: “Ząb” Against Two Enemies] (Warszawa: Fronda, 1999); Leszek Żebrowski, *Narodowe Siły Zbrojne* [The National Armed Forces], 3 vols, (Warszawa: Burchard Edition, 1994); and two recent works that cover the post-war period: Jiří Friedl, “Brygada Świętokrzyska NSZ w Czechosłowacji: Meldunki czechosłowackiego oficera łącznikowego (czerwiec-lipiec 1945r.)” [The Holy Cross Brigade NSZ in Czechoslovakia: Reports of a Czechoslovak Liaison Officer (June–July 1945)], *Zeszyty Historyczne WIN-u*, no. 22 (2004), pp. 123–42 and “Niechciani goście: Brygada Świętokrzyska NSZ w Czechosłowacji” [Unwanted Guests: The Holy Cross Brigade in Czechoslovakia], *Mówią Wieki*, no. 532 (April 2004), pp. 29–35; Jan Żaryn, “Taniec na linie, nad przepaścią” [Dancing on the Edge of Destruction] *Wokół historii i polityki*, ed. Stanisław Ciesielski, Teresa Kulak, Krzysztof Ruchniewicz and Jakub Tyszkiewicz (Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2004): pp. 959–78.

<sup>2</sup> Several documents from the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) have been published in Polish in *Zeszyty do historii Narodowych Sił Zbrojnych*, Zeszyt VI (Montreal–Warszawa, 1994), pp. 56–71; although these fascinating documents come from the first period of contact between the U.S. Army and the Brigade, unfortunately the location numbers given in this publication do not correspond to those at NARA. After an exhaustive search they were not located there by the authors.

<sup>3</sup> Cited as the CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 2004.

<sup>4</sup> TWX for CG, V Corps, 2 May 1945, 2nd Division, Operational Reports–World War II, *Zeszyty do historii Narodowych Sił Zbrojnych*, Zeszyt VI (Montreal–Warszawa, 1994), p. 56; this is the earliest document related to the meeting of the Brigade with the United States Army—unfortunately as previously mentioned it was impossible to locate this document at NARA.

<sup>5</sup> Dispatch, 5 May 1945, 2nd Division, Operational Reports–World War II, *Zeszyty do historii Narodowych Sił Zbrojnych*, Zeszyt VI, p. 56.

<sup>6</sup> Dispatch, 6 May 1945, *ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> H.Q. Third Army to [unclear copy], 27 May 1945, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, p. 211, FOIA.

<sup>8</sup> OSS Mission Germany, Report no. LC-6, Early June 1945, RG226, Entry 108, Box-169, File LC-1-99, pp. 1–2, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

<sup>9</sup> Dispatch from Commanding Officer Third Army to XII Army Group, 2 June 1945, *Zeszyty do historii Narodowych Sił Zbrojnych*, Zeszyt VI, p. 65.

<sup>10</sup> OSS Mission Germany, Czech Unit, APO 655, 8 August 1945, Report no. LC-186, Source: Devon 5, Subsource: Members of the Polish Brigade, Czech Military and Police officials, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, pp. 190–92, FOIA.

<sup>11</sup> Headquarters XXII Corps, Office of the Commanding General to Commanding General, Third U.S. Army, 22 June 1945, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, p. 212, FOIA.

<sup>12</sup> SHAEF, Polish DPs, SHAEF staff message, 5 July 1945, RG 331, 290/7/20/, Box 49, NARA.

<sup>13</sup> Dispatch from EXFOR to SHAEF, 24 June 1945, *Zeszyty do historii Narodowych Sił Zbrojnych*, Zeszyt VI, p. 67.

<sup>14</sup> Rozkaz dzienny [Daily Order] no. 233, *Rozkazy dzienne Brygady Świętokrzyskiej NSZ, 1944–1945*, ed. Czesław Brzoza (Kraków: Fundacja Centrum Dokumentacji Czynu Niepodległościowego, Instytut Polski i Muzeum im. Gen. Sikorskiego, 2003), p. 209.

<sup>15</sup> Rozkaz dzienny [Daily Order] no. 277, *Rozkazy dzienne Brygady Świętokrzyskiej NSZ, 1944–1945*, p. 258.

<sup>16</sup> H.Q. USFET G-3 to Chief of Staff, 23 July 1945, pp. 202–203, CIC File, FOIA.

<sup>17</sup> OSS Report on Polish Brigade, 24 July 1945, *Zeszyty do historii Narodowych Sił Zbrojnych*, Zeszyt VI, p. 69.

<sup>18</sup> USFET MAIN to Third Army, 27 June 1945, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, p. 201, FOIA.

<sup>19</sup> XXI Corps, 1<sup>st</sup> Polish Brigade, 29 July 1945, Letter from Major General Harmon to Commanding General Third U.S. Army, RG 223, 290/69/23/2/ Box 11, NARA.

<sup>20</sup> 1<sup>st</sup> Polish Brigade, HQ XXII Corps to Col. Dąbrowski, 1 August 1945, XXII Corps, RG 338, 290/69/23/2 Box 11, NARA.

<sup>21</sup> *Brygada Świętokrzyska, Szkic Orientacyjny*, October 1949, labeled “For the Internal Use of PSL,” CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, pp. 68–83, FOIA.

<sup>22</sup> XXII Corps, 1<sup>st</sup> Polish Brigade, HQ XXII to Commanding Officer First Polish Brigade, 5 August 1945, RG 338, 290/69/23/2, Box 11, pp.1–2, NARA.

<sup>23</sup> Exhibit A, from “In March and In Combat,” 14 November 1945, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, pp. 186–89, FOIA.

<sup>24</sup> Chodakiewicz, *Narodowe Siły Zbrojne*, p. 225.

<sup>25</sup> See Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting, *America’s Secret Army: The Untold Story of the CIC* (New York and Toronto: Franklin Watts, 1989).

<sup>26</sup> Memo for the Officer in Charge, H.Q. Sub-Region Frankfurt–CIC III Region, 19 June 1948, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, pp. 104–108, FOIA.

<sup>27</sup> Gontarczyk, *Polska Partia Robotnicza*, p. 205.

<sup>28</sup> In their book, Samuel Krakowski and Israel Gutman cite 20 specific examples of murders carried out by the Polish underground against Jews of which only one is blamed on the NSZ. See Israel Gutman and Shmuel Krakowski, *Unequal Victims: Poles and Jews During World War II* (New York: Holocaust Library, 1986), pp. 216–20. In the light of recent research on the NSZ, Professor Krystyna Kersten has backed away from her earlier views and admitted that “what is known today, during the war, and also after its end, the murder of Jews as Jews was not part of their [the NSZ] program.” Quoted in Chodakiewicz, *Narodowe Siły Zbrojne*, p. 243.

<sup>29</sup> Gontarczyk, *Polska Partia Robotnicza*, p. 181.

<sup>30</sup> For the most complete biography of “Tom” see *Słownik Biograficzny Ziemi Częstochowskiej*, ed. A.J. Zakrzewski, vol.1 (Częstochowa: WSP, 1998), pp. 51–51. According to this source, Herbert Jura was born in 1915 near Bory Tucholskie. According to Herbert Jura himself, he was a reserve lieutenant in the Polish Army and until 1943 was in command of a detachment of the AK. In 1943 he created his own organization and in that same year came under the command of the NSZ. This source is problematic because there are no citations given, particularly with regard to the statements attributed to Jura. According to T. Boguszewski, “Tom” and his organization were never actually under the direct command of the NSZ. See “Organizacja Toma,” *Zeszyty do historii Narodowych Sił Zbrojnych* (Chicago, 1964), pp.45–49. On the other hand, Leszek Żebrowski insists that “Tom” came under the command of the NSZ in 1943, and from the fall of 1944 was a member of the General Staff of the NSZ–ONR as chief of department II. See *Narodowe Siły Zbrojne*, ed. Leszek Żebrowski (Warszawa: Burchard Edition, 1994), p. 19.

<sup>31</sup> Telephone conversation with Stefan Celichowski, September 2004.

<sup>32</sup> “Tom,” Notatka Urzędowa, Gdańsk, 26 July 1971, 0418/4589, Archiwum Instytut Pamięci Narodowej (AIPN), p. 384.

<sup>33</sup> Jerzy Kucharski, *Zanim odejdziemy: Zapiski z konspiracji 1939–1947 NOW, NSZ, AK Okręgów Radom i Łódź* (Gdańsk: OAZA, 1996), pp. 93–94.

<sup>34</sup> The Polish Communist security service (Urząd Bezpieczeństwa–UB) began an investigation into “Tom,” which lasted from December of 1945 to 1972! One individual who claimed to have been “Tom’s” driver revealed during his interrogation that “Tom” was in contact from the summer of 1944 to the winter of 1945 with the main command of the NSZ, including “Oleś,” the pseudonym of Otmar Wawrzukowicz. See “Tom,” 0418/4589 AIPN.

<sup>35</sup> Zbigniew S. Siemaszko, *Narodowe Siły Zbrojne* (London: Odnowa, 1982), p. 154.

<sup>36</sup> Władysława Szaława, *W marszu i boju: Z walk i przeżyć partyzanckich żołnierzy Brygady Świętokrzyskiej* (Munich: Zarząd Główny Samopomocy Żołnierzy Brygady Świętokrzyskiej, 1948), p. 64.

<sup>37</sup> Jan Żaryn, “Taniec na linie, nad przepaścią,” *Wokół historii i polityki*, p. 963.

<sup>38</sup> Chodakiewicz, *Narodowe Siły Zbrojne*, p. 216.

<sup>39</sup> Antoni Bohun-Dąbrowski, *Byłem dowódcą Brygady Świętokrzyskiej Narodowych Sił Zbrojnych* (London: Veritas, 1984), p. 147.

<sup>40</sup> Chodakiewicz, *Narodowe Siły Zbrojne*, p. 218, from a 1991 letter by Marcinkowski to Chodakiewicz.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 217.

<sup>42</sup> Bohun-Dąbrowski, *Byłem dowódcą Brygady Świętokrzyskiej Narodowych Sił Zbrojnych*, p. 149.

<sup>43</sup> H.Q. CIC Region III, sub-region Hersfeld, to Commanding Officer 7970 CIC, 8 September 1948, IRR Case Files, DP Camps File, RG 319, 270/84/20/07, Box 34, NARA.

<sup>44</sup> Agent Report, 7970 CIC Group, sub-region Hersfeld, 16 September 1948, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, pp. 59–61, FOIA, a copy of this document can also be found at the National Archives and Record Center, IRR Case Files, RG 319, 270/84/10/07.

<sup>45</sup> “Brygada Świętokrzyska—Holy Cross Brigade”, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, pp. 126–28, FOIA.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> “Brygada Świętokrzyska, Szkic Orientacyjny”, October 1949, “For the Internal Use of PSL,” CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, pp. 68–83, FOIA. This document is particularly valuable as it was written by someone who was intimately familiar with the the Holy Cross Brigade.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 71–73.

<sup>49</sup> Camp 93 CIC Seventh United States Army, 9 July 1945, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, pp. 206–208, FOIA.

<sup>50</sup> H.Q. CIC USFET, “Operation Polecat,” IRR Case Files, RG 319, 270/84/20/02, Box 101, NARA.

<sup>51</sup> Report on the Polish Brigade, 6 August 1945, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, pp. 193–94, FOIA.

<sup>52</sup> H.Q. CIC Region III, sub-region Hersfeld, To Commanding Officer 7970 CIC, 8 September 1948, IRR Case File, DP Camps, RG 319, 270/84/20/07, Box 34, NARA.

<sup>53</sup> Sayer and Botting, *America’s Secret Army*, p. 330.

<sup>54</sup> See Timothy Naftali, “Reinhard Gehlen and the United States,” *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis* (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 2004), pp. 375–418; Richard Helms with William Hood and introduction by Henry Kissinger, *A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the CIA* (New York: Random House, 2003); Christopher Simpson, *Blowback: America’s Recruitment of Nazis and its Effect on the Cold War* (New York: Collier Books, 1988); Reinhard Gehlen, *The Service:*



*Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen*, trans. David Irving (New York: World Publishing, 1972).

<sup>55</sup> “Raport Gehlena o Polskim Państwie Podziemnym” [Gehlen Report Regarding the Polish Underground State], 1945?, p. 43 and p. 9/ Part II (Polish translation from the German kindly provided by Krzysztof Komorowski).

<sup>56</sup> Statement of General Gehlen on Walter Schellenberg story [undated], Document 5, The CIA and Nazi War Criminals, National Security Archives Website, www.gwu.edu.

<sup>57</sup> Evan Thomas, *The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared. The Early Years of the CIA* (New York and London: Simon and Shuster, 1995); and John Prados, *Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

<sup>58</sup> Czesław Brzoza, “Zapomniana Armia: Polskie Oddziały Wartownicze w Europie (1945–1951)” [The Forgotten Army: The Polish Guard Companies in Europe], *Zeszyty Historyczne*, no. 116 (1996), p. 4.

<sup>59</sup> SWNCC, 15 November 1945, RG 218, 190/01/06/01, Box 251 JCZ UDI, pp. 1–3.

<sup>60</sup> Brzoza, “Zapomniana Armia: Polskie Oddziały Wartownicze w Europie (1945–1951),” pp. 7–8.

<sup>61</sup> 9<sup>th</sup> Labor Supervision Area RG 407, Entry 429, 270/68/19/07, Box 4698A, pp. 1–7, NARA.

<sup>62</sup> SWNCC 222, 3 January 1945, 7 January 1945, LM 53, Microfilm roll 19, NARA.

<sup>63</sup> H.Q. USFET, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 to Chief of CIC, 4 February 1946, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, pp. 146–47, FOIA.

<sup>64</sup> *Brygada Świętokrzyska, Szkic Orientacyjny*, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, pp. 68–83, FOIA.

<sup>65</sup> H.Q. U.S. III Army to Assistance Chief of Staff USFET, 23 February 1946, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, pp. 140–41, FOIA.

<sup>66</sup> “Holy Cross Brigade,” CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, pp. 193–94, FOIA.

<sup>67</sup> Bohun-Dąbrowski, *Byłem dowódcą Brygady Świętokrzyskiej*, p. 179.

<sup>68</sup> Note-memoir, Świętokrzyska Brigade, Polish Provisional Brigade, Headquarters [date unknown, probably November, December 1945], CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, p. 156, FOIA.

<sup>69</sup> H.Q. CIC USFET to Chief of CIC Region V re Operation Polecat, 24 June 1946, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, p. 138, FOIA.

<sup>70</sup> Brzoza, “Zapomniana Armia: Polskie Oddziały Wartownicze w Europie (1945–1951),” p. 10.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>72</sup> H.Q. 970<sup>th</sup> CIC Detachment, Region IV Bamberg, Report of Investigation, 14 May 1948, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, pp. 116–17, FOIA.

<sup>73</sup> Agent Report re “Special Action” Intelligence Unit, Information from informant P-10-v-W, 22 July 1948, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, pp. 109–110, FOIA.

<sup>74</sup> Memo for Officer in Charge, 21 May 1948, CIC Region IV, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, pp. 112–13, FOIA.

<sup>75</sup> Żaryn, “Taniec na linie, nad przepaścią,” p. 974.

<sup>76</sup> *Brygada Świętokrzyska, Szkic Orientacyjny*, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, p. 79, FOIA.

<sup>77</sup> Żaryn, “Taniec na linie, nad przepaścią,” p. 977.

<sup>78</sup> *Brygada Świętokrzyska, Szkic Orientacyjny*, CIC File, p. 83, FOIA.

<sup>79</sup> See Lucyna Kulińska, “Próba rekonstrukcji dróg łączności pomiędzy obozem narodowym w Polsce a emigracją w latach 1945–1947,” *Zeszyty Historyczne WIN-u*, no. 9 (December 1996), pp. 91–104.

<sup>80</sup> H.Q. CIC USFET, Region V, Walden Sub-region, “Operation Polecat,” 7 November 1946, IRR Case Files, RG 319, 270/84/20/02 Box 101, NARA.

<sup>81</sup> Agent Report, 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Regensburg, 23 May 1950, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, p. 4, FOIA.

<sup>82</sup> Agent Report, 7970 CIC re Marian Lis, 19 August 1948, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, p. 98,



FOIA.

<sup>83</sup> Agent Report, 7970 CIC Group, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, pp. 59–61, FOIA.

<sup>84</sup> Żaryn, “Taniec na linie, nad przepaścią,” p. 973.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., p. 972.

<sup>86</sup> Agent Report, 7970 CIC, 22 October 1948, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, pp. 20–24, FOIA. This may not be as incredible as it first appears since at least part of the Polish nationalist movement supported the Polish Zionists as a possible solution to the ethnic problem in Poland. In fact one of the Polish nationalist academic fraternities was the official patron of the Jewish fraternity connected to Włodzimierz Żabotynski’s Betar movement. See Piotr Gontarczyk, “Pod sztandarem Żabotyńskiego,” *Życie* (22–23 August 1998), pp. 14–15.

<sup>87</sup> H.Q. Region IV 7970 CIC, 9 September 1948, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, pp. 63–64, FOIA.

<sup>88</sup> Agent Report, 7970 CIC Group, 29 July 1948, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, pp. 100–103, FOIA.

<sup>89</sup> Brzoza, “Zapomniana Armia: Polskie Oddziały Wartownicze w Europie (1945–1951),” p. 15.

<sup>90</sup> H.Q. CIC European Command to Region V, Walden Sub-Region, 20 May 1948, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, pp. 114–115, FOIA.

<sup>91</sup> H.Q. Region IV 7970 CIC, 5 September 1948, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, pp. 54–55, FOIA.

<sup>92</sup> Agent Report, 7970 CIC, 22 October 1948, CIC Holy Cross Brigade File, pp. 20–24, FOIA.

<sup>93</sup> Summary of Information, Region VI, 7970 CIC, sub-region Regensburg, 18 November 1948, CIC File, p. 15, FOIA.

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