North
Korea’s Engagement—
Perspectives, Outlook, and Implications
Conference Report
23 February 2001
This
conference was sponsored by the National Intelligence
Council and the Federal Research Division of the
Library of Congress. Additional copies of this conference
summary can be obtained from the office of the National
Intelligence Officer for East Asia.
The
views expressed in this report are those of individuals
and do not represent official US intelligence or
policy positions. The NIC routinely sponsors such
unclassified conferences with outside experts to
gain knowledge and insight to sharpen the level
of debate on critical issues.
Introduction
The National Intelligence Council (NIC) held a conference
on 23 February 2001 in cooperation with the Federal
Research Division of the Library of Congress on
“North Korea’s Engagement—Perspectives, Outlook
and Implications.” The conference featured
discussion of seven commissioned papers that are
published in this report. Sixty government
and nongovernment specialists participated in the
conference. Following is a brief summary of
the views of the specialists.
Engagement: Causes, Status, Outlook
The specialists agreed that North Korea is pursuing
greater contact with South Korea, the United States,
and other concerned powers stemming from its dire
economic need and the importance of international
support for the survival of the regime. Kim
Chong-il has so far pursued a controlled opening
and not embarked on fundamental systemic change.
He has consolidated his power following the death
of his father, Kim Il Sung, and is clearly responsible
for the changes in policy and greater opening seen
thus far. International support, especially
material assistance from South Korea and other donors,
has been a key incentive in North Korea’s pursuit
of engagement.
The results have included extensive North Korean
contacts with South Korea, the United States and
other concerned powers; large-scale donations of
food, fertilizer, fuel and other assistance; rail,
road, and tourism projects spanning the DMZ; and
current and prospective agreements regulating North
Korea’s missile and weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) programs. North Korea has become increasingly
dependent on foreign support, and the overall danger
of war on the peninsula has declined. Specialists
caution, however, that many uncertainties remain,
especially regarding North Korea’s intentions and
the military standoff on the peninsula that continues
without significant change.
Most specialists foresee incremental progress in
North Korea’s engagement over the next two years,
subject to possible fits and starts because of adverse
developments in North Korea or among the concerned
powers. Progress will remain contingent on
a range of variables, and could be halted or reversed
under some circumstances. Kim Chong-il has
played a key role in North Korea’s diplomatic opening
but does not appear to have a “master plan” for
engagement. He is likely to continue to exploit
the opportunities presented by South Korean President
Kim Dae Jung’s sunshine policy and other international
openings. Because the South Korean leader’s
policy is critically important to the current phase
of engagement, the end of his term in two years
makes longer term projections difficult, according
to the specialists.
Many at the conference thought that the engagement
process was likely to slow this year because of
strong controversy in South Korea over the costs
and limited benefits so far of the sunshine policy
at a time of uncertainty in the South Korean economy.
Some note that a visit by Kim Chong-il to Seoul
later this year could spur the process ahead again.
Some speculate that North Korean elites remain divided
over the pace and course of engagement and are wary
that a US policy review could lead to lower priority
for engagement with the North Korean regime.
The central role of the military in North Korean
decision making could be a drag on forward movement,
though some experts judge that military opposition
was offset by the Korean People’s Army leadership’s
receipt of financial and other benefits related
to the engagement process.
The experts were pessimistic that the North Korean
regime over the longer term (five to 10 years) would
be able to carry out needed economic changes while
sustaining tight political control, as have the
communist regimes in China and Vietnam. North
Korea’s pervasive economic weaknesses and hidebound
political and economic elite are among major impediments
to effective longer term change.
The specialists judge that US policy has played
a key role in North Korea’s recent engagement, second
only to South Korea’s sunshine policy. US
support for engagement, which several participants
note began as early as the Reagan Administration,
provides important political backing for Kim Dae-jung
in the face of his many domestic critics. It also
allows Japanese leaders to provide aid and pursue
negotiations with P’yongyang, despite broad skepticism
among Japanese elites and public opinion.
Issues in Dispute
The specialists differ strongly over how engagement
has affected North Korea’s intentions. Some
argue that North Korean leaders are determined to
make substantial changes in order to survive and
develop in a new international environment defined
by P’yongyang’s increased dependence on foreign
assistance and support. The regime has reached
a turning point requiring more economic reforms
and nascent moves to ease military tensions.
In contrast, others argue that growing aid dependency
and international contacts have not changed North
Korea’s long-term strategy to dominate the peninsula
by military means. North Korean changes thus
far are the minimum needed to take advantage of
the recent and unexpected material benefits provided
by South Korea, the United States, and other powers;
the changes could be easily reversed under different
circumstances. Those who hold this point of
view believe that greater reciprocity must be an
aspect of engagement with North Korea. They
especially believe in the need to seek concrete
concessions, especially regarding the conventional
balance of forces on the peninsula, that keeps in
step with additional benefits and concessions for
P’yongyang.
Implications
The specialists assess that North Korean engagement
will have the following implications for other countries:
China is well positioned to gain from
continued gradual North Korean engagement.
Incremental progress supports Beijing’s interests
in stability on the peninsula, avoids costly Chinese
efforts to shore up the failing North Korean regime,
and allows China to pursue ever closer relations
with the more powerful and influential South Korean
government. Prevailing trends and easing tensions
on the peninsula appear to add to Chinese arguments
against US regional and national missile defense
programs and undercut the rationale for much of
the US military deployments in Northeast Asia.
Japan is poorly positioned to benefit
from some recent trends in North Korean engagement,
though it does benefit from the reduced risk of
war on the peninsula. Gradual progress in
P’yongyang’s relations with South Korea, the United
States and others has reinforced North Korea’s deeply
rooted antipathy to Japan. Tokyo fears being
called upon repeatedly to support financially and
politically US and South Korean arrangements with
North Korea that do little to meet Japan’s concerns.
Thus, Japan believes that US efforts to curb North
Korea’s long-range missile development do not address
Japan’s concern with the immediate threat posed
by North Korea’s deployed medium range ballistic
missiles. Japan also worries about the long-term
implications of a reunified Korea that is anti-Japan.
South Korea will face deepening debate
and political controversy if Kim Dae Jung’s sunshine
policy continues to elicit only limited gestures
and assurances from North Korea. The demand
for greater reciprocity is likely to increase as
opponents jockey for advantage while President Kim’s
power wanes as he approaches the end of his term.
The conferees generally believe that the United
States probably will see its influence reduced
somewhat as North Korea—while still focused on the
US connection—seeks military security, economic
assistance, and political recognition from a broader
range of international players. US ability
to control the pace of the engagement process probably
will decline as South Korea, China, and others improve
their relations with P’yongyang.
The specialists assess that North Korea’s engagement
increasingly challenges the US security paradigm
of the past 50 years that has viewed North Korea
as a major enemy and military threat. It complicates
the existing rationale for the US military presence
in Northeast Asia and challenges US values and norms
as American policy provides aid and pursues negotiations
with a regime that affronts many US-backed norms.
Because of the multifaceted and complicated array
of US policy issues related to engagement with North
Korea, several specialists favor a senior US policy
coordinator for North Korea, though others oppose
such a step as unneeded in the current context.
Conference
Agenda
Welcome
and Ground Rules
Robert L. Worden,
Chief, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress,
and Robert G. Sutter, National Intelligence
Officer for East Asia, National Intelligence Council
Panel
One: Perspectives on North Korea’s
Engagement
Mitchell Reiss,
William and Mary School of Law—Avoiding Déjà
vu All Over
Again: Some Lessons from US-DPRK Engagement
Daryl Plunk,
Heritage Foundation—The New US Administration and
North
Korea Policy: A Time for Review and Adjustment
Donald Oberdorfer,
Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies—North Korea’s Historic Shift:
From Self-Reliance to Engagement
Panel
Two: Perspectives on North Korea’s Engagement
(continued)
Nicholas Eberstadt,
American Enterprise Institute—commentary
Panel
Three: Implications for South Korea, Japan,
and China
Kongdan Oh,
Institute for Defense Analyses—North Korea’s Engagement:
Implications for South Korea
Victor Cha,
Georgetown University—The Ultimate Oxymoron:
Japan’s
Engagement with North Korea
Jonathan Pollack,
Naval War College—China and a Changing North Korea:
Issues, Uncertainties, and Implications
Panel
Four: Implications for the United
States: General Discussion
Michael McDevitt, Center for Naval
Analyses—Engagement with North Korea: Implications
for the United States
Conference
Coordinator: Andrea Savada
Library of Congress
Avoiding
Déjà Vu All Over Again:
Lessons from U.S.-DPRK Engagement
Mitchell
B. Reiss
Dean of International Affairs
Director of the Wendy & Emery Reves Center for
International Studies
College of William & Mary
A
little noticed anniversary took place earlier this
year. Nine years ago, in January 1992, U.S.
Under Secretary of State for Politics Arnold Kanter
met in New York with Kim Young Sun, the Korean Workers
Party Secretary for International Affairs, in what
was the first-ever senior-level meeting between
the United States and the DPRK. Kanter laid
out the seven preconditions North Korea needed to
meet if it wanted to normalize diplomatic relations
with the United States, including resolving the
question of the North’s separation of plutonium
for use in nuclear weapons.[1]
Kim promised that the DPRK would sign a safeguards
agreement with the IAEA in the next few days and
would also implement a bilateral inspection regime
in accordance with its December 1991 Denuclearization
Declaration with the ROK.
Nine
years later, diplomatic relations are still not
normalized between the two countries and important
elements of the North’s nuclear weapons program
remain unresolved. Relations during the intervening
period have oscillated from the high drama of the
June 1994 nuclear crisis to the smiling diplomacy
of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s visit
to P’yongyang in October 2000. In between,
we have witnessed mutual recriminations, allegations
of bad faith, belligerence, aggression, inattention,
and even some cooperation and agreement.
One
theme running through this entire period has been
misunderstanding – of each other’s decision-making
procedures, intentions, motives and sometimes even
policy objectives.
How
could it be otherwise? The DPRK, the “Hermit
Kingdom,” has long been the most isolated country
in the world. What little interaction P’yongyang
had with the international community decreased further
with the end of the Cold War. Its superpower
patron and largest supplier of military equipment,
the Soviet Union, disappeared. The North’s
other strategic partner, China, advanced its own
interests by engaging in a prosperous trade with
the ROK and allowing the simultaneous admission
of both Koreas into the United Nations. The
DPRK’s fraternal allies in Eastern Europe were all
toppled by internal revolutions.
Perhaps
fearful of defections, P’yongyang kept its officials
on a short leash; those who were allowed out of
the country were not allowed out very often.
At the DPRK’s Mission to the UN in New York City,
North Korean representatives have been confined
to radius of 20 miles from midtown Manhattan.
They do not have regular contact with U.S. officials
or other knowledgeable Americans and have only a
rudimentary understanding of how the American political
system works. They have been abysmal at public
relations on the few occasions they have attempted
to shape U.S. domestic and international opinion.
For the United States, the Korean peninsula has
always been relatively neglected when compared to
the much larger and more powerful Japan and China,
which have received far greater time, attention
and resources. With the Asian economic meltdown
in late 1998, Indonesia further displaced North
Korea on the U.S. diplomatic agenda. Contributing
to this institutional reluctance was the fact that
North Korea was a diplomatic black hole. Few
U.S. officials were fluent in Korean, fewer still
had ever met with North Koreans, and only a “privileged”
few had ever visited the North.
The
severe famine in North Korea in mid-decade also
contributed to this institutional neglect.
It seemed the game was not worth the candle as Washington
came to believe the North was in imminent danger
of collapse. Because the DPRK enjoyed no domestic
constituency in the United States and because of
Congressional hostility (especially among Republican
members) to the October 1994 Agreed Framework nuclear
deal, many Clinton Administration officials abjured
responsibility for this issue, believing it to be
a political “loser” and “career ender.” Senior
officials ignored or delegated the matter to more
junior officials, which often amounted to the same
thing. For long periods of time, it appeared
as if no one at the State Department was in charge
of this issue. Under these multiple disincentives,
initial enthusiasm for American engagement gradually
surrendered to complacency.
Unsurprisingly,
the resulting record of U.S.-DPRK interaction has
been mixed. Towards the goal of a more stable
and secure Korean peninsula, some important progress
has been achieved. Work at the nuclear facilities
covered by the Agreed Framework has ceased; this
freeze is being monitored by international inspections.
These facilities could have produced a nuclear arsenal
of 20-30 nuclear weapons by now. In addition,
the North has agreed to a moratorium on ballistic
missile tests.
But
serious questions remain over the scope of P’yongyang’s
nuclear activities, its ongoing chemical and biological
weapons programs, its readiness to eliminate its
ballistic missiles and its interest in reducing
its forward-based military posture along the DMZ.
Is North Korea really stringing the United States
along, willing to agree to meetings in return for
food aid but unwilling to relinquish its weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) programs? Does it
calculate that diplomatic “fatigue” will eventually
allow it to avoid fully cooperating with the IAEA
to reveal the complete history of its nuclear program?
Will it balk at confidence-building measures that
ask it to withdraw its conventional force deployments
along the DMZ? Will it refuse to make any
fundamental changes in the nature of its regime,
allowing only a modicum of foreign investment so
it can maintain itself in power?
In
sum, what are the North’s intentions? The
answer to this question is unknown (perhaps even
by many in North Korea). The new Bush Administration
will need to probe the North Korean regime aggressively
to learn this answer.
This
answer -- and subsequent policy decisions by American
officials -- will be influenced by many factors,
including the lessons learned and policies adopted
by the DPRK. Consequently, it will be useful
not only to review the last nine years of engagement
between the United States and North Korea and examine
what lessons might be extracted. It will also
be helpful to speculate as to what lessons North
Korea may have learned during this period as well.[2]
Strategic
Lessons for the United States
1.
Be Humble
After
almost a decade of interaction, the United States
still doesn’t understand North Korea very well.
The country continues to be “the longest running
intelligence failure in U.S. history,” in the words
of the former American Ambassador to South Korea,
Donald P. Gregg. How are decisions made in
the North? Who’s up and who’s down?
Who makes the decisions? We simply do not
have very good knowledge.
A
short list of serious misestimates by U.S. Government
officials and outside experts would include the
prediction that the “Dear Leader,” Kim Chong-il,
would be unable to consolidate his power and rule
the country after his father’s death in July 1994.
On the contrary, the past few years have not only
demonstrated his tight hold on power, but also his
ability to maintain control and prevent social unrest
despite a disastrous famine and debilitating economic
conditions. Another example came in August
1998, when the U.S. intelligence community was strategically
blindsided when P’yongyang tested a more advanced
ballistic missile years ahead of its estimates. [3]
Finally, many observers both in and out of the U.S.
Government predicted that the North would collapse
in mid-1990s because of food shortages and economic
decline. [4]
The
lesson should be clear: humility should be our guide.
We need to recognize we still do not understand
the DPRK very well. In this environment, the
risk for senior policy-makers is that anyone can
assert he or she is an expert. Therefore the
assumptions behind the policy proposals need to
be stated explicitly and analyzed with care.
2.
Let’s Make a Deal
A
second lesson learned over the past nine years is
that it is possible to do business with North Korea,
even on very sensitive issues. In October
1994, P’yongyang agreed to freeze its nuclear facilities
at Yongbyon and allow them to be inspected around-the-clock
by the IAEA. In September 1999, the North
agreed to suspend its ballistic missile tests; this
pledge was later upgraded to a ballistic missile
moratorium and placed in writing. And the
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
(KEDO) project represents an ongoing example of
the North’s willingness to enter into a variety
of commitments – on direct North-South transportation
links, on establishing an independent communications
network in the North, on sweeping privileges and
immunities for KEDO employees (especially, ROK nationals)
working at the nuclear site, and on sending DPRK
technicians to South Korea for reactor training.
These agreements, and others, prove that diplomacy
can bring tangible benefits.
3.
But It Won’t Be Easy
If
it has been possible to reach agreement with the
North Koreans, a closer examination of the negotiating
histories shows that reaching agreement has rarely
been easy. The North Koreans are skilled and
experienced negotiators, and consequently like to
keep all their options open for as long as possible.
In
addition, the DPRK has been much more comfortable
than the United States in conducting negotiations
in an atmosphere of high tension or even confrontation.
At times, P’yongyang has even tried to generate
bargaining leverage for itself by artificially ratcheting
up tensions. Examples are its March 1993 announcement
that it would withdraw from the NPT in ninety days
and its unmonitored unloading of reactor fuel in
May-June 1994. (In multilateral negotiations
at KEDO during the Supply Agreement negotiations,
North Korea repeatedly threatened to walk out, terminate
the Agreed Framework and restart their nuclear program
if KEDO did not relent or capitulate on an issue.)
This type of behavior should be expected. [5]
The
United States has done best in these negotiations
when it has followed four rules. First, Washington
needs to have a very clear idea of its objectives
and priorities. In the past this was easier
said than done, given the broad spectrum of views
by key participants in the Clinton Administration.
U.S. policy objectives were also influenced by South
Korea and Japan, whose interests and priorities
in dealing with North Korea were often similar to,
but not identical with, those of the United States.
Second,
Washington has done best in these talks when it
has insisted on strict reciprocity. Indeed,
the Agreed Framework is structured so that each
party must reciprocate in a tangible manner before
the other will respond. The United States
has largely followed this “tit-for-tat” approach
in its ballistic missile talks with the North, trading
a relaxation of sanctions in return for a suspension
of tests.[6]
KEDO has also adopted this approach in its dealings
with the DPRK.
Third,
when dealing with the DPRK, patience is not only
a virtue, it confers a tactical and strategic advantage.
North Koreans are culturally very patient -- much
more so than most Americans. Ambassador Stephen
W. Bosworth expressed it succinctly: “Never be more
eager than the North to reach a deal.” [7]
Fourth,
and related to this point, is that the United States
should not be afraid to walk away from the table
if the North’s position is unreasonable. The
occupational hazard for every negotiator is what
might be termed the “Bridge on the River Kwai” phenomenon.
Just as the British colonel, played by Alec Guiness,
fired on British commandoes to stop them from destroying
the bridge, Washington must never lose sight of
its larger objectives in its haste to curry favor
or reach agreement.
4.
And Will the North Keep Its Side of the Bargain?
As
difficult as it is to reach agreement with P’yongyang,
an agreement once reached usually sticks.
Under the Agreed Framework nuclear freeze and with
KEDO, North Korea has demonstrated that it can keep
its side of the bargain.
There
are two important caveats here. First, the
North will keep its side of a bargain – up to a
point. For P’yongyang, no contract is immutable.
North Korea has attempted, sometimes successfully,
to revisit and renegotiate commitments previously
made. This has been observed in at least two
sets of circumstances. If it believes the
other party is not living up to its side of the
bargain, it will backtrack on some of its commitments.
And when a commitment has become politically or
economically inconvenient, the North often has engaged
in highly literal interpretations of the text to
weaken or erode completely its responsibilities.
There is not much to be gained from arguing in response
about the “spirit” of an accord. This is a
particular hazard for American negotiators trained
in the Western legal system. [8]
The
second point is obvious, but worth noting nonetheless.
All agreements with North Korea need to be verified
continuously, rigorously and comprehensively to
ensure strict compliance.
5.
U.S. Leadership is Essential
As
the most powerful country in the region and globally,
the United States has an indispensable role to play
on the Korean peninsula. But American leadership
will be neither cheap nor easy. It will take
additional financial resources, which in the past
Congress has been reluctant to make available.
For example, Congress has been unwilling to fully
fund KEDO’s heavy fuel oil shipments to the DPRK,
which are expected to double this year to approximately
$120 million. Needless to say, it demeans
the United States and diminishes its influence throughout
Asia if Washington is unwilling to adequately fund
the terms of an important U.S. initiative.
(At the same time, the United States can also better
leverage its European, Persian Gulf and Asian partners
to win their financial support for the KEDO project.)
Diplomatically,
Washington’s leadership in engaging North Korea
can also provide helpful political “cover” for Seoul
and Tokyo to do likewise. Following the U.S.
lead, rather than being seen to act independently,
can be helpful in dampening criticism from domestic
political opponents in South Korea and to a lesser
extent in Japan who oppose engagement with the North.
[9]
6.
But Who’s in Charge?
The
past few years have shown that North Korea is too
important to U.S. national security interests to
be ignored. P’yongyang poses a number of challenges
for American policy-makers, ranging from nuclear
issues, ballistic missiles, North-South interaction,
conventional forces, humanitarian relief and economic
sanctions. One of the main challenges for
any Administration is to bridge the gap between
the arms control/nonproliferation experts and the
regional/area specialists in the Administration.
Both the defense issues and the politics must be
“right.”
These
issues require consistent attention at a very senior
level, preferably by a single person with broad
responsibilities. Implementing the policy
– building support within the Administration, winning
Congressional backing, and coordinating with key
allies – will all be indispensable to engaging with
the North. Mid-level officials, no matter
how talented, cannot adequately perform these tasks.
Indeed,
it was only after former Secretary of Defense William
J. Perry became North Korea Policy Coordinator in
November 1998 that the Clinton Administration was
able to overcome what one critic termed its policy
of “strategic incoherence” towards the North and
articulate a clear way forward.
The
period leading up to Perry’s appointment proves
that if the Executive branch does not aggressively
take the lead on a foreign policy issue, Congress
may move to fill the policy vacuum. During
the past few years, Congress has passed a variety
of legislation, some of which has placed additional
constraints on the President’s ability to carry
out policy towards the DPRK. [10]
Much of this was due to Congressional distrust of
the Clinton Administration’s stewardship of U.S.
foreign policy generally and towards the DPRK in
particular. But Congress has now become a
stakeholder in U.S. policy towards North Korea and
will likely watch closely the Bush Administration’s
actions towards the North.
7.
Dynamic Environment, Rapidly Changing
Within
the last twelve months, much has changed on the
Korean peninsula. The June 2000 summit between
Kim Dae-jung and the “Dear Leader,” Kim Chong-il,
was remarkable political theatre. Following
this historic event, the two sides have signed an
agreement for a Seoul-to-Shinuiji rail link, P’yongyang
has attended ASEAN Regional Forum for the first
time, joint de-mining activities continue along
the DMZ, North and South Korean defense ministers
met on Cheju Island and there has been a dialing
down of the propaganda aimed at the South.
(One South Korean wit has claimed that Korea has
gone from being the “Land of Morning Calm” to the
“Land of Morning Surprises.”)
It
is unclear whether these positive developments will
continue, but past practice suggests that the situation
will continue to evolve in unpredictable, at times
even dangerous, directions. It is useful to
recall that only a few short years ago, the South
Korean Navy sunk a North Korean patrol boat on the
wrong side of the Northern Limit Line, P’yongyang
launched a Taepo-Dong I ballistic missile over Japan,
North Korean commandoes tried to infiltrate the
South by submarine, and the North routinely spewed
forth poisonous rhetoric condemning the South Korean
leadership and the illegitimacy of the Seoul regime.
At
times, the United States has not been able to keep
pace with these rapid developments, learning of
meetings between the two Koreas or policy changes
only after-the-fact. Washington has at times
reacted to events rather than shaped them to U.S.
ends. This lesson supports the arguments expressed
above for greater commitment to intelligence gathering,
greater attention by senior policy-makers, and greater
assertion of American leadership.
8.
The United States Can Go It Alone
(But It Is Better If It Does Not Have To)
Although
the United States must always be willing and able
to act unilaterally to defend its interests, it
can significantly reinforce its position and advance
its policies in Northeast Asia if it works closely
with important allies, such as Japan and the ROK.
As
an American official once said about NATO, “The
trouble with alliances are the allies.” With
any multilateral enterprise, members’ interests
overlap but are not necessarily identical; they
often diverge in important ways, whether due to
shaky parliamentary coalitions, domestic public
opinion, financial constraints, or bilateral pressures.
The same reality applies to Northeast Asia.
While Seoul and Tokyo share many of Washington’s
interests in dealing with North Korea, their priorities
and tactics at times may differ widely.
Although
some policy differences can never be completed eliminated,
the last few years have demonstrated that often
they can be overcome, moderated or minimized in
pursuit of a larger common goal. One institutional
example is KEDO, where nationals from all three
countries (and the European Union) work closely
together to implement the LWR project since 1995.
Moreover, Seoul and Tokyo will bear almost all of
the estimated $5 billion financial burden (a price-tag
sure to rise as the project encounters further delays).
Indeed, construction of the LWR plants would be
impossible without these contributions since Congress
passed legislation in 1999 prohibiting any U.S.
funds from being used by KEDO to underwrite the
costs of LWR construction.
Another
example is the highly useful and long overdue Trilateral
Oversight and Coordination Group (TCOG), a U.S.-ROK-GOJ
mechanism recommended in the Perry Report.[11]
Here the United States has worked closely with
its allies to forge a common approach to North Korea.
Since P’yongyang has proven skillful in the past
at exploiting differences among the three countries,
this intensive consultation is crucial. An
option for the Bush Administration is to continue
the TCOG, but with an upgrade in status to symbolize
the importance Washington attaches to this issue
and to ensure that senior-level officials are both
informed and involved.
Finally,
there is additional “value added” of Washington
going forward in concert with its allies.
Should the United States need to reverse course,
enhance its deterrence posture or adopt punitive
measures against North Korea, it will have a much
easier time winning support from Seoul and Tokyo
if all three parties have previously worked closely
together in their policy approach to P’yongyang.
[12]
9.
What “Rogue” Regime?
The
United States no longer refers to the DPRK as a
“rogue” regime or any other of the pejorative labels
that passed for policy wisdom for a number of years.
Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig have written that
attempts to dismiss North Korea as a rogue regime
offer little insight into North Korean objectives
and motivations, and offer little guidance to U.S.
policy-makers seeking to bring North Korea into
the international community as a functioning participant. [13]
In other words, if Washington truly believed that
the North Koreans were rogues, with its imputation
of irrationality, then all policy prescriptions
would lead to an analytical dead end. How
can you deal with a crazy state? [14]
For
this same reason, calling North Korea a rogue regime
created a number of domestic problems, not least
the difficulty of explaining to Congress and the
American public why Washington was meeting and negotiating
with P’yongyang. Avoiding this linguistic
shorthand allows the United States greater flexibility
to engage diplomatically with the North. No
doubt this was one reason why Secretary of State
Albright did an about-face on this issue in June
2000, when she expunged the term from the diplomatic
lexicon in favor of “states of concern.” [15]
Some early signs indicate that the Bush Administration
will steer clear of this trap and deal with the
North on a pragmatic basis. [16]
Strategic Lessons For North Korea
There
are obvious limits as to how well we can understand
North Korean behavior. But some thought must
be paid to what the North may have learned from
the past years of engagement with the United States.
As Washington reviews the past decade, the lessons
it divines -- and the policy prescriptions it proposes
-- will be influenced by North Korea’s anticipated
future behavior. This behavior will have been
shaped by the lessons P’yongyang has learned from
recent experience with the United States.
In other words, there will be what political scientists
and economists call “strategic interdependence,”
where decisions are affected by the dynamic interaction
between two actors who find themselves in a “game.”
It is therefore useful to speculate, from an American
perspective, what lessons the North Koreans may
have learned from the past nine years of engagement
with the United States.
1.
The United States is Afraid of the North’s Strength
The
United States respects the North’s military power.
Whether it is P’yongyang’s nascent nuclear weapons
program, ambitious ballistic missile program, or
million-man military, the North’s potential to destabilize
Northeast Asia (and other regions through ballistic
missile exports) attracts Washington’s attention.
Whenever the North has engaged in highly provocative
behavior, the United States has responded by immediately
re-engaging diplomatically and seeking to address
some of P’yongyang’s concerns. Prominent examples
are the North’s March 1993 threat to withdraw from
the Nonproliferation Treaty, the unmonitored unloading
of spent fuel in May-June 1994 and the August 1998
Taepo-Dong I ballistic missile test. Within
weeks of each event, Washington found itself back
at the negotiating table with P’yongyang, thereby
acceding to one of the North’s main objectives.
And of course, the preponderance of North Korean
conventional force along the DMZ, including artillery
that can reach Seoul, acts as a constant threat
to the South and U.S. forces stationed there.
For
this reason, it is entirely possible the DPRK might
apply this lesson to the new Bush Administration,
testing them if the North believes it is being ignored.
According to a recent article by Robert Manning:
“[D]o not be surprised if P’yongyang tries to provoke
a crisis – perhaps threatening to withdraw from
the Agreed Framework – in an effort to test the
new Administration and put it on the defensive.”
[17]
2.
The United States is Afraid of the North’s Weakness
As
worried as the United States is about the North’s
strength, it is also concerned about its weakness.
A so-called “hard landing” by North Korea would
result in enormous human suffering and physical
hardship in the North and risk destabilizing the
Korean Peninsula and perhaps beyond.
To
avoid this possibility, the United States has taken
the lead in propping up the North Korean regime
in an attempt to stave off collapse. This
assistance has taken the form of food and other
humanitarian aid. North Korea is now the largest
recipient of U.S. aid in Asia, topping $160 million
in 1999 alone, and totaling around $800 million
since the mid-1990s. [18]
That this assistance has routinely continued despite
periodic North Korean belligerence, provocations
and lack of cooperation has sent a powerful signal
to P’yongyang, namely, that the United States will
feed the North – regardless of the policies it adopts.
For North Korea, it would appear, there has been
such a thing as a free lunch.
3.
The United States is an Unreliable Partner
For
P’yongyang, the United States may appear to be an
unreliable partner, often promising more than it
can deliver. The LWR project, which was a
centerpiece of the Agreed Framework negotiated by
the United States, had a target date of 2003; it
now appears the project is at least five years behind
schedule. Further delays may be expected.
It is likely KEDO will claim that these delays will
escalate costs, which will contribute to further
delays.
Washington
has proven unreliable with respect to another element
of the Agreed Framework as well – the pledge to
deliver 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO)
annually to the DPRK until the first LWR is completed.
For the past three years, this commitment has not
been met; the North has had to wait additional months
to receive its quota of oil. This problem
may reach a crisis this year, as skyrocketing oil
prices will double KEDO’s cost in delivering HFO.
If
Washington cannot be trusted to keep its word on
a matter of such obvious importance, why should
P’yongyang trust it on other matters?
4.
The Normal Rules Don’t Apply to North Korea
Whether
because of its strength or its weakness, North Korea
has not had to honor the same diplomatic and economic
rules as other countries. The United
States (and the ROK) have been willing to “encourage”
North Korea to attend meetings, such as the four-party
talks, to consent to inspections at Kumchang-ri,
and to allow family reunions by offering certain
inducements. Often these inducements (or what
used to be called “carrots”) have taken the form
of food aid or financial assistance. This
U.S. policy of “food for meetings” started in 1996
and lasted through the end of the Clinton Administration. [19]
To use a term from contemporary psychology, the
United States has “enabled” North Korea by indulging
its bad habits.
This
also contradicted longstanding U.S. policy of not
using humanitarian assistance as a lever to try
to compel political change. The Clinton Administration
approach here attempted to do two things simultaneously
and ended up doing neither very well. First,
it wanted to deflect charges of appeasement from
its domestic critics who viewed food assistance
as providing comfort to the enemy (especially given
doubts about how the food was monitored and distributed).
Second, it wanted to promote diplomatic movement
with the North. It came up short in both instances.
Getting the North to the negotiating table was not
sufficient to satisfy the Clinton Administration’s
critics, especially in Congress. And “bribing”
the North to attend meetings with food aid sent
the wrong signal to P’yongyang. Once the North
merely showed up, aid would flow and its primary
policy objective was achieved.
This
preferential treatment carried over to the economic
realm. Foreign investors (admittedly, mostly
South Korean) have acquiesced in highly dubious
financial transactions with the North despite the
extremely hostile investment environment characterized
by the absence of the rule of law, private property
rights, or any dispute resolution mechanisms.
These ventures, often assisted by under-the-table
payoffs to North Korean officials, promise little
if any return on investment.
Moreover,
it is not even clear that these investments have
achieved this political purpose – such as the promotion
of North-South interaction -- that could somehow
justify the expense. To take one example,
North Korea is not only reported to receive an estimated
$10 million per year from its tourism project with
Hyundai, but it still manages to keep its own people
insulated from ideological contamination by strictly
limiting access to the South Korean tourists.
5.
Big Brother is Watching
It
is clear that the United States has invested tremendous
resources to uncover North Korea’s military capabilities,
especially with respect to WMD, and that these resources
are quite sophisticated. This became evident
during the 1993-94 nuclear crisis, when the United
States shared high-resolution satellite pictures
with the IAEA; these pictures showed two undeclared
spent fuel sites at the Yongbyon nuclear complex.
In addition, IAEA inspectors trained by the United
States were later able to uncover evidence of “irregularities”
in the DPRK’s initial declaration to the IAEA concerning
the amount of plutonium it had separated.
But
the lesson here is more complicated because of the
Kumchang-ri episode. In this case, the United
States falsely claimed that the DPRK was building
an underground nuclear site thought to house either
a reprocessing facility or nuclear reactor.
In fact, U.S. officials who visited the site found
no such facility.
So
what is the real lesson? Perhaps that the
United States used Kumchang-ri as a pretext for
other purposes? Or that U.S. capabilities
are not as good as previously thought? That
the North should continue to conceal and deceive
the outside world on nuclear issues as a way to
get Washington’s attention and food assistance?
And to the extent P’yongyang understands U.S. detection
capabilities, will this lead the North to adopt
more sophisticated deception and concealment efforts?
6.
The United States Will Support the “Sunshine” Policy
The
promotion of North-South dialogue has long been
a staple of U.S. policy towards the DPRK; this principle
was enshrined in the October 1994 Agreed Framework
and was regularly repeated by U.S. officials in
their meetings with the North through the rest of
the decade. The culmination of this approach
was realized by the June 2000 summit between the
two Kims.
Reviewing
Washington’s long-time emphasis on North-South dialogue,
a lesson the North has learned is that it will be
difficult for the Bush Administration to reverse
course. [20]
Although early indications suggest that the Bush
Administration will continue to support inter-Korean
dialogue, it is possible that P’yongyang may still
try to leverage its relations with Seoul to compel
Washington to re-engage with the North on its timetable,
not the Bush Administration’s.
Conclusion
During
the past decade, both countries have climbed some
way up a fairly steep learning curve.
North Korea and the United States will need to draw
upon this experience if they wish to move forward
together in securing a more stable Korean Peninsula
during the next few years.
For
the United States, however, dealing with the DPRK
likely to get more, not less, difficult in the next
few years. The North’s recent diplomatic offensive,
what their press has termed “magic diplomacy,” may
constrain Washington’s future flexibility in ways
that are difficult to predict. As other countries
improve relations with the North, there is a risk
that preserving good ties with P’yongyang will be
seen as an end in itself, or as a better means to
an end than issuing threats or demonstrating a robust
deterrence through military exercises. There
is already a growing sense in Asia that the best
way to work with North Korea now that the hermit
kingdom has left its isolation is to broadly engage
P’yongyang through coaxing and “incentives” rather
than through overt displays of deterrence. These
countries, including U.S. allies, may criticize,
frustrate or oppose American actions they view as
provocative to the North. Washington will
suffer a backlash if it is being perceived as adopting
unreasonably harsh measures against P’yongyang.
In
fact, Washington has faced this problem before.
In early 1994, as tensions on the Korean peninsula
increased, the U.S. Commander in South Korea requested
that US/UN forces be reinforced with Patriot missiles.
In the face of strong criticism from Seoul, Washington
backed down. Only in March, after a round
of North-South talks ended badly, were the missiles
shipped to South Korea. And during the 1993-94
period, the United States consistently faced resistance
at the UN Security Council when it tried to adopt
sanctions against North Korea for violating its
IAEA and NPT obligations.
With
P’yongyang’s expanded contacts and warming relations,
this problem will increase. For example, North
Korea’s new friends may now even more harshly criticize
any hardening of the U.S. position over negotiating
the end of the North’s nuclear weapons and ballistic
missile programs. Attempts by the United States
to seek sanctions in the United Nations or reinforce
American troops on the peninsula would likely be
met with strong criticism from U.S. adversaries
and allies alike. Washington will feel growing
pressure to be more flexible, more generous, and
more forthcoming. North Korea may thus be
encouraged to raise its asking price, harden its
stance, and be more patient in dealing with the
United States than before (not a welcome thought).
Under these circumstances, Washington may lose control
over the pace and perhaps even the agenda of its
negotiations.
In
short, the risk is that a subtle shift in the balance
of power at the negotiating table may take place.
And no one is more adept than the North Koreans
at engineering crises and exploiting differences
between the United States and its allies to gain
concessions from Washington and others. American
efforts to resolve the North’s WMD programs, missile
threats, and the conventional force threat will
take longer, cost more, and prove a greater test
of alliance relations – and U.S. diplomatic skill
-- than before. In the past, the North Koreans
have played a weak hand well. Now they will
have the chance to play a much stronger hand.
The
New US Administration
and North Korea Policy:
A Time for Review and Adjustment
Daryl
M. Plunk
Senior Fellow
The Heritage Foundation
Introduction
While most Americans are anxious to see the new
Bush Administration achieve forward movement on
such domestic issues as tax reform and education,
significant foreign policies already confront the
United States. One area that requires early
attention is the US-Republic of Korea alliance.
In recent months, new developments in relations
between democratic South Korea and communist North
Korea require that Washington review its policies
toward the North and, where necessary, make appropriate
adjustments.
Hopeful
but Slow Progress
The
hostile, 50-year old standoff between North and
South Korea fundamentally was affected by last June’s
leaders’ summit in the North’s capital, P’yongyang.
The talks between South Korea’s President Kim Dae-jung
and North Korean leader Kim Chong-il were the first
such meetings between the two bitter enemies since
Korea was divided in 1948. Before departing P’yongyang,
President Kim Dae-jung signed a formal agreement
with the de facto leader and Defense Commission
Chairman of the North that identified concrete avenues
toward reconciliation and eventual reunification
of the Koreas.
The
significance of the summit and the pact cannot be
overestimated. Never before have political
talks between the North and South reached such high
levels. South Korean President Kim deserves praise
for his relentless pursuit of the summit after years
of diplomatic stalemate. The next major step in
the budding peace process will be the reciprocal
visit to Seoul by the North Korean leader.
While a date for that visit has not been set, there
are increasing signs that it may take place around
April.
US-South
Korean Coordination is Essential
Washington should applaud President Kim’s success
at negotiating the pact as well as establishing
Seoul’s leadership role in the process, a role that
the Clinton Administration had downplayed in the
past. To sustain the momentum that President Kim’s
visit to P’yongyang has sparked, the United States
now should execute a careful strategy that keeps
Seoul out in front and continues to offer any US
benefits to the North on a strict, reciprocal basis.
This principle of reciprocity was rarely enforced
during the Clinton Administration and now deserves
close scrutiny by President Bush as he and his senior
advisors review America’s North Korea policy.
The
June 2000 Joint Declaration
The
four-point pact signed by Kim Dae-jung and Kim Chong-il
in P’yongyang on June 14 is brief and concise, yet
broad in its implications:
First,
the two leaders declared that on the matter of national
reunification, Koreans should play the leading role.
This is significant since the Clinton Administration
in recent years assumed the lead role. In doing
this, it inhibited the North–South dialogue and
thus stymied any meaningful progress toward tension
reduction on the Peninsula.
Second,
the two Korean leaders pledged to negotiate toward
a “loose form of federation.” In President Kim Dae-jung’s
mind, this would involve a confederation stage during
which the two governments would cooperate closely
on economic, social and political matters. Defense
and foreign policy issues would remain the sovereign
domain of the respective governments. After a gradual
period of reconciliation under the confederation
arrangement, the two sides eventually would negotiate
formal procedures for reunification of the nation.
Third,
the two leaders pledged to move swiftly to address
the plight of more than 1 million relatives separated
since the national division of Korea. They agreed
to arrange a large separated-family member exchange
for National Liberation Day on August 15.
Fourth,
the leaders pledged to greatly expand their countries’
economic ties, and even cited several specific infrastructure
projects on which the two sides could cooperate.
Tensions
Remain High
Despite
Seoul’s successful efforts to resume North-South
dialogue after a nearly decade-long hiatus, little
meaningful progress has been achieved. A very
limited and highly regimented exchange of several
hundred separated relatives occurred, and the two
sides are wrangling over the next exchange.
Critics of President Kim’s “Sunshine Policy” toward
P’yongyang worry that Kim Chong-il simply is allowing
for perfunctory North-South interaction in return
for stepped up food and financial assistance from
Seoul. The Kumgang-san tourism business, funded
mainly by the Hyundai Group, is painted by President
Kim’s opponents as an operation that, by some accounts,
has generated as much as $25 million in monthly
profits for the North. While the South Korean
leader deserves credit for achieving the historic
summit, Seoul should take care that a proper degree
of North Korean reciprocity also is secured.
Above all, the North must be pressed to begin reduction
of its conventional military threat.
In
Senate testimony on February 7, 2001, CIA Director
George Tenet said that the North continues to pursue
a “military first policy” at the expense of other
national objectives. As a result, “the North
Korean military appears for now to have halted its
near-decade-long slide in military capabilities.”
He concluded that Washington “has not yet seen a
significant diminution of the threat from the North
to American and South Korean interests.”
The
US-Korea security alliance remains dominated by
the serious military threat posed by communist North
Korea, and the Korean peninsula remains the only
spot in the world where tens of thousands of American
lives are at risk. Despite its tattered economy,
the North’s regime maintains one of the world’s
largest standing armies and has used its nuclear
weapons and long-range missile development programs
to extort support from the US and the international
community. The North’s forward deployed forces
require the continued presence of 37,000 US troops
in South Korea at a cost of about 3 billion US taxpayer
dollars per year.
North
Korea Policy: Past Lessons
The
Bush Administration wisely announced early on that
America’s policies toward the North would be reviewed
and, where necessary, changes would be made.
In this regard, an analysis of President Clinton’s
policies and their results is a useful exercise.
How were the past policies conceived, and what did
they achieve? For one thing, North Korea became
one of America’s largest recipients of foreign assistance.
Since 1994, around half a billion dollars has been
spent by Washington on the North in the form of
humanitarian food assistance, payments to the North
for the return of US Korean War-era MIA remains
and energy assistance required under the 1994 US-North
Korea nuclear deal.
Early
in his first term, President Clinton grappled with
the North’s renegade nuclear weapons program.
After many months of tedious negotiations with the
North, the first-ever U.S.-North Korea political
agreement was signed in October 1994. The
so-called Agreed Framework offered benefits to the
North including improved trade and political ties
with Washington, a $50 million per year fuel oil
supply and construction of two nuclear reactors
valued at about $5 billion. Together with
a consortium of about a dozen nations, the United
States is raising funds to support this process,
although Seoul has pledged to pick up most of the
tab. In return, the North agreed to “freeze”
its current nuclear program, preventing it from
processing any more weapons-grade plutonium than
it already has.
The
Clinton Administration proclaimed that the nuclear
threat had been checked. There were serious
holes in this assertion, however. Washington
backed down on its earlier demand that the North
provide a full accounting of its enriched plutonium
stockpile. Inspection of its storage sites,
which the North is obliged to allow under other
international treaty obligations, has been delayed
for years to come. As a result, the North
may have already secretly assembled nuclear bombs.
Even senior Clinton Administration officials made
this public admission. This makes the North’s
missile technology advances all the more threatening.
As
part of the deal, the North promised to resume substantive
dialogue with the South in pursuit of tension reduction.
It refused to do this for nearly six years, yet
the Clinton Administration downplayed this direct
violation of the Framework.
The
North continued its ballistic missile development
program and exported its missile technology to nations
hostile to the US. P’yongyang’s conventional
military threat remains and, considering its missile
advances, has become more dangerous. It is
receiving assistance from the US and its allies
in return for a so-called nuclear “freeze” that
has left all of the North’s nuclear weapons development
capabilities in P’yongyang’s hands. Regarding
fundamental US national security considerations
on the peninsula, Clinton’s North Korea policies
largely have failed.
Why
So Far Off Course?
Clinton Administration officials often answered
Agreed Framework critics with the accusation that
the policy’s opponents never proposed any viable
alternatives. That simply is not true.
The Heritage Foundation, among others, was promoting
a variety of policy options when the nuclear crisis
heated up in 1993. The recommendations in
this paper’s conclusion generally are in line with
the ones Heritage espoused during that timeframe.
The fact is that the Geneva deal was poorly negotiated
and poorly designed.
The
North’s threat and bribery tactics have repeatedly
paid off for P’yongyang. Actually, the most
significant “freeze” in play today relates to three
key issues. Unlike the much touted yet illusionary
nuclear freeze, these other frozen aspects run decidedly
counter to the interests of the US, South Korea
and its allies. They are:
1)
Political and military tensions on the peninsula
remain frozen at dangerously high levels.
Indeed, given the profound ripple effects throughout
the region of the North’s missile program, tensions
are increasing and drawing other nations into
the fray. The Agreed Framework has
ironically and disturbingly created more instability
and frictions than it has solved.
2)
The US was frozen into a largely fruitless bilateral
political dialogue with P’yongyang. Trapped
in a tedious and inconclusive series of talks
with the North, the US became the focus of most
of the North’s attention and energy. Lost
in the shuffle was anything resembling a clear,
forward-looking, comprehensive plan for achieving
lasting peace in Korea.
3)
As a direct result of point two, South Korea was
frozen out of the point position it once held
with respect to peace negotiations with the North.
For decades, the US required that the North deal
directly with Seoul since, in the end, only the
two Koreas can ink the formal agreements that
will be necessary to get the reconciliation process
going. The US position once was that Washington
could not solve the stalemate on its own.
That US position was overturned by the October
1994 deal. Until last June, the North had
refused to hold even one formal government-to-government
dialogue session with the South. The June
summit had more to do with Seoul’s dogged pursuit
of the breakthrough and the North’s frustration
with the Agreed Framework than with the US-North
Korea deal itself.
Why
did our Geneva negotiators not anticipate these
problems? How could they not have suspected
that the first political agreement between Washington
and P’yongyang would turn the North away from, not
toward, productive dialogue with the South?
Did they truly believe that the North was sincere
in pledging to give up its nuclear weapons program
in return for two power plants?
Misguided
Expectations on Both Sides
Some
critics of current US policy believe the answers
lie in two related factors. First, perhaps
in a rush to contain the crisis and loathe to stand
firm in the face of the North’s defiant violation
of its NPT obligations, the North’s demand for the
light water reactor construction project (LWR) was
accepted despite the wholly impractical nature of
scheme. Very serious questions about the viability
of the construction project have emerged that seem
not to have been anticipated by the Clinton Administration.
One fact is that the North does not have the capacity
to distribute the energy that would be produced
by the reactors. There are other technical
and legal matters that have emerged which cast long
shadows of doubt upon the very concept of building
LWRs in the North.
Given
this, one can reasonably suspect that President
Clinton’s negotiators had other considerations in
mind. With a congressional election looming,
they appeared to have been in a rush to sign a deal
before November 1994. The Framework alone
would not bring peace to the peninsula, but it would
buy time. It appears, however, that the Clinton
Administration may not have assessed that the structure
of the deal could in fact worsen tensions.
Another factor may have been those officials in
the Clinton Administration who believed that North
Korea was well on the way to its collapse.
Buying time would pacify and distract P’yongyang
for some months or several years—until the government
there slipped into a coma and made a “soft landing.”
The work on the LWRs would not be in vain then as
they would be inherited and made viable by prosperous
South Korea.
The
other side of the coin was the North’s expectations
and intentions. Clinton Administration officials
did not realize how divergent the North’s perceptions
of the deal were from those of the US. Just
a few weeks after the Geneva deal was signed, senior
North Korean officials met with Heritage Foundation
representatives. What the North Koreans said
was striking and disturbing. For one thing,
the LWRs were not the focal point of their thinking.
In fact, they seemed to place little importance
upon the construction project and its purported
future benefits. Instead, they were elated
over the broader implications they saw in the deal.
Three points dominated their analysis:
1)
As the first formal agreement with the US, the
Framework was an unprecedented political feather
in the North’s hat. It would afford P’yongyang
greatly enhanced stature and legitimacy in the
international community and undercut Seoul’s image
since the deal broke the South’s monopoly on ties
with Washington.
2) The North Korean officials were adamant
in their prediction that these political realignments
would open the way for the North and the US to
conclude a bilateral peace treaty. That,
in turn, would pave the way for the withdrawal
of US forces stationed in South Korea.
3) With the lifting of America’s trade embargo,
the North would be showered with US aid and lucrative
business transactions, thus saving its decaying
economy.
It
is important to point out that, in defending these
predictions, the North Korean officials pointed
to the side letter that President Clinton sent to
“Supreme Leader Kim Chong-il” on the day the Geneva
pact was inked. In it, President Clinton pledged
that the US taxpayer would pay the agreement’s multi-billion
dollar price tag in the event that the South, Japan
and other allies failed to do so. To P’yongyang,
it was proof that it had finally succeeded in its
strategy of isolating Seoul by aligning itself closer
to Washington. The Clinton letter should go
down in history as one of America’s most careless
and disingenuous diplomatic ploys.
Assuming
that the North did indeed wildly misjudge and overestimate
the benefits that would flow from the Geneva accord,
one can understand its subsequent defiant attitude.
P’yongyang believed the agreement would bolster
and protect the North Korean regime and its economy
at the expense of the South, and that it could simultaneously
try to squeeze all it could out of the US, its allies
and the international community. In the end,
Geneva was not about peace. It was about survival.
August
1998: The Beginning of the End of the Framework?
August 1998 was a pivotal month for North Korea
policy, particularly from the US perspective.
That month, The New York Times first reported
on the “suspect site” at Kumchang-ri. Then,
in late August, North Korea shocked the world by
successfully testing a long-range missile.
That missile was fired over Japanese territory,
sending an unmistakable military warning to Japan
and its closest military ally, the US. Within
the space of a few weeks, US attitudes toward North
Korea were shaken to their core. First, there
was dramatic new evidence that the North not only
posed a missile threat to the South and Japan but
also to US territory. Second, the Kumchang-ri
incident, coming four years after the North had
pledged to keep its nuclear program “frozen”, solidified
the opinion of many that P’yongyang never had any
such intention.
South
Koreans have lived under the threat of North Korean
attack for decades. The missiles, while clearly
a matter for concern, are just more arrows in the
North’s quiver in the minds of many South Koreans.
However, from the US perspective, the missile program
aims to extend the North Korean military threat
right to America’s shores. First, of course,
is the specter of the North possessing missiles
tipped with nuclear or chemical weapons capable
of reaching western areas of the US. Next,
the missiles have set off a regional chain reaction
throughout Northeast Asia. This in turn is
an added threat to American security interests.
Japan was so rattled that its officials reportedly
even considered the “preemptive strike” option.
Washington has responded by pursuing a missile defense
initiative similar to the one that President Reagan
was unable to realize even during the cold war.
This, together with broadening discussions of theater
missile defense programs for allies including Korea,
Japan and Taiwan, has become a matter of contention
between Washington and Beijing.
So,
the North has ceased to be simply a peninsular threat.
It is dismaying that some South Korean analyses
blame the current debate over changes in US policies
toward the North on “hard-line Republicans” or “conservatives.”
But, this is not a debate over whether to be “hard”
or “soft” on P’yongyang. Rather, it is a debate
over whether Clinton policies have compounded US
challenges instead of solving them. It is
a debate over how to formulate more effective policies.
How
the Framework Has Failed
It should be recalled that Section III of the Agreed
Framework stipulated, “The DPRK will consistently
take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration
on Denuclearization . . . and the DPRK will engage
in North-South dialogue, as this Agreed Framework
will help create an atmosphere that promotes such
dialogue.”
The
Clinton Administration’s attempts to coax P’yongyang
to the bargaining table with the South were, in
the end, ineffective. The North, mired in
a staggering economic crisis, repeatedly has demanded
commitments of massive food aid from the United
States and South Korea as a precondition to negotiations.
Seoul, Washington and the international community
have provided enormous amounts of humanitarian assistance.
Still, the P’yongyang regime consistently refused
to engage Seoul in political dialogue (until President
Kim’s June initiative) – violating the promise it
made in writing in Geneva in 1994.
The
U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework of October 1994
was hailed by the Clinton Administration as an historic
opportunity to end the state of war that had lingered
on the peninsula since the 1953 Korean War cease-fire.
Instead, military tensions on the peninsula remain
high, no progress has been made in easing the North’s
conventional threat, the North’s economy is in a
free fall and many of its citizens are starving.
Also, under the agreement, the North was allowed
to keep its nuclear card for years to come.
It technically is obliged to allow for full nuclear
transparency just before completion of the two reactors
which, at this point, will not happen for many years.
Also,
in order for the Clinton Administration to coax
concessions from the North, a pattern of payments
and concessions emerged. The 1999 Kumchang-ri
is an embarrassing example of this. Early
that year, the US announced that an underground
site had been identified in North Korea that was
suspected of being used for nuclear weapons development
purposes. When the site became public knowledge,
and thus a political bone of contention with respect
to the purported nuclear freeze, the US demanded
inspections. The North offered to allow inspections
for $300 million. In the end, P’yongyang got
most of what it demanded, and the US got much less.
The food assistance that Washington announced just
weeks before the March 16, 1999, “US-DPRK Joint
Press Statement” was valued in the $200 million
range. Secretary of State Albright proclaimed
that the North had agreed to “multiple site visits”
by US officials to Kumchang-ri. Actually,
what the US received was an “invitation” by the
North to have a single inspection in May 1999.
Any reasonable person would question this failure
to secure immediate inspections. The inspection
turned up nothing, and observers wondered whether
it has been sanitized or simply had been used by
the North as an extortion tool. Consider the
March 18, 1999 commentary published in the South
Korean daily newspaper, Choongang Ilbo:
“In
effect, North Korea traded a cave for gifts equivalent
to a third of its annual trade…The US came away
with nothing, not even face [emphasis added]…The
US backed away big time, too, from its original
refusal to pay any compensation to the North.
The US-North Korea agreement, to be sure, contains
no mention of compensation, but nobody is fooled
by that. The agreement is a straightforward
exchange of assistance for visits. Meanwhile,
of course, North Korea has carted away any evidence
at Kumchang-ri and US ‘visits’ are unlikely to
turn up anything.”
The
North has a growing missile arsenal that is acquiring
intercontinental capabilities. Furthermore,
it is becoming one of the world’s most prolific
salesmen of missile technology to rogue nations.
It is not widely known that, in recent years, the
Clinton Administration discovered not one but two
sales of North Korean missile technology.
In 1996, P’yongyang sold SCUD mobile missile launchers
to Iran. The next year, the Clinton administration,
in a low-key, official notice, published in an obscure
government document, admitted that the North had
been caught yet again selling missile technology.
In both cases, Washington was forced under existing
US law to impose additional (though meaningless)
trade sanctions upon North Korea. In neither
of these cases did the administration take the initiative
of speaking publicly about the North Korean sales
and so neither the US press nor the Congress came
to know the full story of these incidents.
The Clinton administration established a pattern
of downplaying or ignoring serious hostile actions
taken by P’yongyang, actions that one could conclude
violated the spirit if not the letter of the Agreed
Framework.
America’s
economic, political and security stakes in Northeast
Asia are very high. Should the North attempt
to make good on its infamous threat to turn the
South into a “sea of flames,” the entire region
would be destabilized. In this context, the
Agreed Framework process has not eased Korean tensions.
Clinton
policies have done little more than paper over the
threat and entice P’yongyang to engage in talks
with the United States by offering it a multi-billion
dollar energy infrastructure construction along
with pledges of limited U.S. aid and political ties.
Now, the United States and other nations are responding
to the North’s economic crisis with food aid.
For the first time, the North openly admits to its
economic woes and is publicly appealing for international
support. P’yongyang continues its strategy
of extracting concessions from the United States
and its allies. But, this is a futile game.
The North’s needs are much greater than Washington
and the international community are willing to provide.
Massive aid to a nation that poses a clear and present
military threat is hardly an acceptable option.
As the North continues its slide toward economic
collapse, it can expect only limited aid under the
current circumstances. The multi-billion dollar
bonanza it has been promised – the nuclear reactors
– won’t materialize for years.
The
Geneva Deal’s Basic Flaws
The
General Accounting Office (GAO), a research arm
of the US Congress, has published several reports
highlighting the Framework’s multiple flaws.
It has found that the Agreed Framework is “not legally
enforceable”, either under U.S. or international
law. The GAO determined the document was not
a formal treaty of any sort but rather a “nonbinding
political agreement.” Such a document does
not require prior US congressional approval.
It is reasonable to assume that this was precisely
the aim of the Clinton administration. Still,
the Congress has been compelled to appropriate many
millions of dollars to fund the Clinton deal.
So, the Congress has been something of a hostage
in this process. The GAO concluded that the
Agreed Framework “can have the effect of pressuring
the Congress to appropriate moneys to implement
an agreement with which it had little involvement.”
One could conclude that “no involvement” would have
been a more accurate description of the congressional
role. Also, the report pointed out that the
Congress must eventually approve transfer of any
significant nuclear technology to the North, despite
the fact that it was not consulted.
The
GAO study found that the North eventually would
have to purchase expensive nuclear liability insurance
to protect KEDO participants, including Americans.
Also, the North’s existing power grid or infrastructure
is not nearly capable of distributing the power
that will be generated by the new reactors.
The GAO quotes State Department sources as saying
that this grid will cost about $750 million, a figure
that is considered a very conservative estimate.
The US and its allies understandably say they will
not pay for this enormous project. Given its
economic crisis, it is certain that the North will
not soon be in a position to pay this price.
The GAO states that “North Korea could exert pressure
on others to pay for the grid.”
The
most recent GAO report on these issues was released
in July 1998. Among other things, it stressed
that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
“identified several problems affecting its ability
to determine whether North Korea is complying fully
with…aspects of the nuclear freeze.” One specific
problem is that the North “has not allowed the IAEA
to implement required safeguards measures on the
liquid nuclear waste tanks” at the Yongbyon facility.
Furthermore, “the Agreed Framework allows North
Korea to continue operating certain nuclear facilities
not covered by the freeze,” the report found.
The GAO report notes that a December 1996 State
Department cable expressed “deep concern about whether
North Korea will fulfill critical components of
the Agreed Framework.”
During
talks with the North in 1993 and 1994, U.S. policy
makers spoke of a “package deal” under which P’yongyang
would reap substantial rewards for giving up its
nuclear ambitions and pursuing a lasting peace on
the peninsula. At that time, The Heritage
Foundation, among others, supported this approach
and called for an attractive trade and aid package
from the United States, South Korea, Japan and other
concerned parties in return for P’yongyang’s cooperation.
Instead, the Clinton Administration offered a power
plant construction scheme. What the North
desperately needs now is financial assistance and
economic reform, not the prospect of enhanced electric
power capabilities 10 years from now. What
the US urgently needs now is an unambiguous end
to the North’s nuclear threat and rapid tension
reduction in Korea.
Current
North Korea policy should be changed to address
these critical needs. While this will require
careful diplomacy, there are no legal barriers to
such action. After all, the GAO report to
Congress found that the Agreed Framework is not
legally binding or enforceable under either U.S.
or international law. The study quotes State Department
officials as admitting that the deal was structured
in this manner since “the United States wanted the
flexibility to respond to North Korea’s policies
and actions . . . .” Now is the time to respond.
Sunshine
Policy to the Rescue?
Within days of assuming office, President Kim Dae-jung
sounded some hopeful notes with respect to North
Korea policy. Particularly noteworthy was
his contention that the South should resume its
front-and-center position in dealing with the North.
Seoul’s primacy is essential to success, but Washington
largely bartered its point position away in the
Geneva deal.
Over
the course of his first year in office, President
Kim fleshed out what he calls his “Sunshine Policy.”
It has become a matter of domestic Korean political
controversy since some accuse President Kim of not
requiring enough “linkage” in return for South Korean
assistance. Still, his policies embrace the
fundamental principles necessary for turning our
concerted efforts away from the current, feckless
track and moving them in directions that can eventually
produce positive results.
President
Kim speaks of an appropriate measure of reciprocity,
a concept that would link North Korean good behavior
to incentives that would be offered by Seoul and
its allies. In this, there could be the makings
of a comprehensive “carrot and stick” package deal
that the Clinton administration chose to abandon
in 1994. This is the sort of approach Seoul
should follow, taking care that the principle of
reciprocity is enforced against the North.
It is important for Seoul to resume the point position
in dealing with North Korea. Real progress
toward tension reduction must be achieved primarily
by the Koreans, with the US, Japan, China and other
concerned nations playing important but supporting
roles.
Conclusion
The Cold War may have ended, and North Korea may
no longer have China and the Soviet Union standing
by ready to support its military aggression toward
the South. But, even as its economy crumbles, the
North continues to pose a daily threat to the security
of South Korea, as well as to the interests of the
United States and the South’s other allies.
The time has passed for simply offering reasonable
incentives to P’yongyang to produce reasonable behaviors.
The North must now show substantive efforts and
make rapid progress toward achieving peace and stability
on the Peninsula. President Kim’s North-South summit
initiative gives rise to considerable hope that
this process has begun and that the two Korea’s
are implementing a practical, step-by-step journey
toward peace and reunification. Washington should
step back, support the South in its efforts, and
ensure that future aid is tied to real reciprocity
on the part of the North.
North
Korea’s Historic Shift:
From Self-Reliance to Engagement
Don
Oberdorfer
Johns Hopkins University,
Nitze School
Of Advanced International Studies
The
North-South summit meeting of June 2000 has brought
dramatic change to the Korean peninsula. In political
terms, it is the greatest change since the Korean
War half a century ago. The resulting engagement,
if sustained, has the capability of the inaugurating
a fundamentally new era in Korea and Northeast Asia.
How
did this surprising engagement come about?
What are its essential characteristics? Where
is it leading? What are the prospects of success?
This
paper is a modest effort to explore some of those
questions, even though much essential information
about the origins and inner workings of the transformation
remains unknown. I have always been fascinated
with historical turning points: my first book,
Tet! (1971), was about the turning point
of the Vietnam War; my second book, The Turn:
From the Cold War to a New Era (1991), described
the negotiations which ended the global struggle
between the United States and the Soviet Union.
I find the current shift on the Korean peninsula
no less fascinating or less historic, even though
the final result is still beyond our grasp.
Whatever the developments to come, whether they
bring the renewal of Kim Chong-il’s regime or its
demise, I am convinced that the future of the Korean
peninsula will be different from the past.
Thus, the developments which came to fruition in
the year 2000 will be long remembered.
As
is clear from the paragraph above, I do not believe
the North-South summit meeting in P'yongyang in
June or the events which followed were mere symbolism
without substance, as some in Washington and elsewhere
have contended. Compared with the past, the
events since the June summit have been nothing short
of startling. They are already bringing important
changes to the relationship between the two regimes
that share the Korean peninsula, and they are likely
to bring notable changes to the relationship between
the two Koreas and United States and a host of other
nations.
Since
the June summit, North and South Korea have held
four rounds of formal ministerial talks on the differences
between them and agreed to four North-South pacts
to encourage trade and investment. [21]
Defense ministers of North and South have held one
round of talks to discuss security arrangements,
and lower-level military working groups from the
two opposing armies have held five meetings. Two
sets of emotional meetings to reunite 100 families
on each side have been held, and a third is scheduled
for late February. The athletes of North and
South Korea marched together under a single flag
in one of the most memorable moments of the 2000
Sydney Olympics, in sharp contrast to their bitter
disputes over the 1988 Seoul Olympics. The
two sides have agreed on plans to repair and reconnect
the severed North-South railroad that ran through
the peninsula until the country was divided more
than half a century ago, and to build a highway
alongside the tracks to facilitate commerce and
other exchanges. Rail reconstruction and mine clearing
has begun, to make possible the new links through
the heavily fortified DMZ. In a development which
started earlier, South Korean and foreign tourists
have continued to visit North Korea's Diamond Mountain
by the thousands. North Korea and South Korea's
Hyundai Corporation have continued discussions on
the establishment of an export processing zone at
Kaesong, a historically important city in the center
of the militarily sensitive area just north of the
DMZ. Many of these items represent interactions
which are incomplete and in some cases have run
into problems. But every one of them is unprecedented
in the 50-year struggle between the rival regimes
that inhabit the Korean peninsula.
In
the international area, the North Korean dogma of
juche has given way to an almost dizzying
drive for engagement. Kim Chong-il sent Vice
Marshal Jo Myong Rok, widely regarded as the
second most powerful figure in the regime, to see
President Clinton in Washington, carrying unexpectedly
sweeping proposals to virtually eliminate North
Korea's long-range missile programs. Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright and a team of high U.S.
officials flew to P'yongyang to negotiate further
about the missiles, but were unable forge agreement
on a deal before the Clinton administration left
office. North Korea resumed normalization
talks with Japan in April 2000 after a hiatus of
eight years. In July P’yongyang joined its
first regional security organization, the Asian
Regional Forum sponsored by Southeast Asian nations.
A month later it renewed its application for membership
in its first international financial organization,
the Asian Development Bank. Meanwhile, Kim Chong-
il held summit meetings with the leaders of China
and Russia. In September his government sent letters
to the European Union and every European country
proposing the opening of relations. Since January
1, 2000, North Korea has established diplomatic
relations with Italy, Australia, the Philippines,
Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada
and Spain and has moved toward full relations with
several others. Nearly all of these developments
are also unprecedented.
In
Pursuit of a Summit
In
examining the motive forces behind these changes,
the central focus must be on North Korea.
Although Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine policy was a key
factor in the developments, it brought few results
during its first two years because Kim Chong-il
was not ready fully to engage. From 1972 to
1994 South Korean presidents from Park Chung Hee
through Kim Young Sam had tried at one time or another
to establish serious relationships with Kim Il-sung,
their counterpart in the north, and all except Park
ardently sought summit meetings, but with only minimal
success. Kim Dae-jung was more determined
and more consistent than his predecessors and deserves
much credit, but even his extensive efforts came
to little until a decision was made in P'yongyang
to respond in kind.
For
most of the half century since the creation of the
regime, North Korea's role on the world scene was
that of menace to the peace. Its attack across the
38th parallel that started the Korean War, its massive
and forward-deployed post-war military force, its
practice of terrorism and its bristling vocabulary
of threats made it a pariah state to be dealt with
disapprovingly and as little as possible by most
of the nations of the world. Beginning with the
death of Kim Il-sung and the evidence of its poverty
and deprivation in the middle 1990's, North Korea
was seen less as a threat and more as an economic
basket case and the object of humanitarian assistance.
Beginning with the June 2000 summit meeting, North
Korea and its leader began to be accepted for the
first time in terms befitting a normal state.
What had been shrouded in mystery began to be explored;
what had been cause for either anxiety or pity began
to be engaged diplomatically and examined at high
levels by many of the world's democratic governments.
In
exploring Kim Chong-il’s turn toward engagement,
it is necessary first to understand that it did
not come out of the blue. His father, Kim
Il-sung, the founder of the state, sought on several
occasions to engage South Korea for his own purposes
and on his own terms. These efforts go all the way
back to 1948, when he invited the nationalist leader
Kim Koo to meetings in P'yongyang, although under
conditions which were intended to establish Kim
Il-sung’s superiority. In 1972, while exploring
the initiative of Park Chung Hee that led to the
first North-South joint declaration, Kim Il-sung
endorsed meetings and frequent contacts between
" the authorities," "political parties and social
organizations" and even the "rulers" of the two
Koreas as part of efforts to eliminate misunderstandings
and achieve unification. [22]
The Great Leader, as he was known in North Korea,
and undertook secret talks, including discussion
of summits, with South Korean presidents Chun Doo
Hwan and Roh Tae Woo Moreover, in 1994, he
agreed to have a full-scale summit meeting in the
North with Kim Young Sam and was actively preparing
for it on the very day he died. [23]
When
in 1995 I asked Kim Yong Sun, a senior aide to both
North Korean leaders, whether Kim Il-sung had engaged
in internal discussions before offering the 1994
summit, he responded that this was unnecessary because
advocating a North-South summit was a “long established
position,” but that the South had always found a
way to thwart it in the past. Later I asked
Hwang Jang Yop, who had been a senior aide to Kim
Il-sung in 1994 but who defected to the South in
1997, why the Great Leader had agreed to the 1994
summit meeting. He responded that there were
three reasons: to avoid war in a dangerous
situation; to obtain South Korean money to overcome
the North’s economic crisis; and to build up the
pro-North Korean factions which still existed in
the South.
In
the immediate aftermath of Kim Il-sung’s death,
his son and heir appeared ready to move ahead to
an early summit. In a meeting in connection
with his father's funeral, Kim Chong-il told Park
Bo-hi, a close aide to the cult leader the Reverend
Moon Sun Myung, that he wished to hold summit talks
with Seoul, which Park described as sure to take
place in "just a matter of time." [24]
This, however, was before President Kim Young Sam,
the South’s incumbent leader, refused to express
condolences at Kim Il-sung’s death and placed his
military on full alert instead. Kim Young
Sam’s actions and his belief that the collapse of
the DPRK was near deeply offended the authorities
the North, who had little to do with him for the
rest of his time as president.
The
coming to power of Kim Dae-jung as South Korea's
president in February 1998 was a crucial factor
in bringing about the North-South summit.
Not only did it eliminate the impediment of Kim
Young Sam, but more importantly, it brought to the
leadership in Seoul a person ready to deal. To my
personal knowledge—gained in talks with him since
I first met him in 1973—Kim has consistently advocated
peaceful coexistence and the easing of North-South
tensions throughout his entire career. [25]
He was red-baited for these positions by a succession
of South Korean politicians and presidents, but
he never gave them up. In his inaugural address
on February 25, 1998, he declared the essence of
his engagement, or Sunshine, policy: "First,
we will never tolerate armed provocation of any
kind. Second, we do not have any intention
to harm or absorb North Korea. Third, we will
actively push reconciliation and cooperation between
the South and North beginning with those areas which
can be the most easily agreed upon." These
were remarkable statements for a South Korean president.
In the months that followed Kim initiated gestures
and declarations to follow through and prove his
sincerity.
North
Korea responded warily at first, harshly criticizing
Kim and his policies, although in notably less vitriolic
words than had been used regarding his predecessor.
Despite the frustrating absence of positive responses,
Kim persisted in his policies and insisted that
eventually they would succeed. This unwavering
persistence was a key element in his success.
When
I first saw Kim as president in March 1998, a month
after his inauguration, he told me, "We're now waiting
for the North Korean attitude. I think there
is discussion among the North Korean leadership
about how to change their policy toward South Korea.”
When I saw him next nearly a year later in February
1999, there was growing criticism in Seoul of the
Sunshine policy because of the absence of a visible
response. Nonetheless, Kim stood firm, saying,
"We have had some positive responses—the four party
talks, talks on the underground [suspect] facility,
missile talks, general officers’ talks, Kim Chong-il’s
meeting with [Hyundai founder] Chung Ju-yung as
a result of the separation of politics from economics,
and 30,000 South Korean tourists visiting the North.
I consider those things to be indirect responses
to my policy.” He added, "I don't think the
engagement policy is perfect or is certain to bring
success—but it is the best we can devise.”
By the time of our third meeting during his presidency
in January 2000, Kim was beginning to receive secret
hints of more direct North Korean responses, but
he did not tip his hand. Asked about the lack
of a clear-cut response to his overtures, Kim told
me, "We told North Korea when they respond to our
efforts for peace, we will respond.” He expressed
the belief that the activities of former Secretary
of Defense William Perry and the growing solidarity
of the United States, South Korea, and Japan would
have a positive influence on North Korea.
The
Decisions of 1998
In
retrospect, according to senior figures involved
in North Korea policy in both Seoul and Washington,
August and September 1998 appears to have been the
period when new decisions began to emerge in P'yongyang
that led eventually to serious engagement.
Paradoxically, the developments of those crucial
weeks seemed at the time to be pointing toward intensified
conflict with the United States, Japan, and other
nations.
In
North Korea military and political leaders were
summoned to P'yongyang for two related events:
the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, and the first meeting
since Kim Il-sung’s death of the Supreme People's
Assembly, in theory the highest legislative authority
in the country. The SPA meeting amended the
constitution, introducing elements of a Chinese-style
socialist market economy, bringing younger, more
pragmatic bureaucrats to positions of power to replace
elderly figureheads, and centralizing governmental
authority in a cabinet system to operate under the
direct control of Kim Chong-il. Four years
after his father's death, Kim Chong-il was officially
designated the nation’s leader as chairman of the
National Defense Commission, a position which was
declared to be "the highest post of the state."
Kim Chong-il’s choosing to rule from a military
post and the increasing prominence of military leaders
in the Assembly–including the fast-rising Vice Marshal
Jo Myong Rok, who was given the honor of nominating
Kim Chong-il to an assembly seat–suggested to many
observers that North Korea was rapidly becoming
an even more militarized regime.
Since
his father's death and especially since 1997, Kim
had been spending a great deal of time establishing
and improving close relations with the North Korean
military. He was preparing to be designated
general secretary of the ruling Workers' Party,
a long awaited event which took place in October
that year. A visitor to P'yongyang in 1997
noticed some of the extraordinary ways in which
he was garnering military support. Large numbers
of officers had been promoted. General officers,
of whom there were now many, were being driven around
the capital by uniformed drivers in new Mercedes
and BMW limousines. Despite the famine in
the countryside, a special floor of the Koryo Hotel,
the capital's best, had been set aside for the lavish
wining and dining of senior military officers.
Outside the capital, Russia-style dachas or recreational
residences were springing up for the use of military
leaders. As it turned out, Kim Chong-il’s’s
new post as chairman of the National Defense Commission
in 1998, with the veteran Jo Myong Rok, former chief
of the Air Force, at his side, cemented his grip
on power, including power over the military, and
set the stage for greater diplomatic flexibility.
The
domestic maneuverings over the new constitution
and new posts for Kim Chong-il and younger technocrats
were overshadowed for the rest of the world by a
spectacular event with international repercussions,
which apparently was intended to celebrate Kim’s
ascendancy: the launching on August 31 of
a three-stage rocket known as Taepodong I from a
testing area on the country’s East Coast. Participants
in the giant 50th anniversary celebration flashed
cards in unison which portrayed a rocket rising
in the air, a display probably created and rehearsed
weeks, if not months, in advance. The announced
purpose of the rocket was to launch a satellite
in space broadcasting the revolutionary hymns, “the
song of General Kim Il-sung and the song of General
Kim Chong-il" as it flew in orbit around the earth.
U.S. officials said, however, that the satellite
failed and fell into the ocean.
Notwithstanding
the satellite’s failure, the rocket had a solid
fuel third state and a greater range than had been
expected, giving it enhanced potential to become
a formidable military missile carrying a deadly
payload. The Taepodong test was front-page
news, far overshadowing the domestic governmental
changes which were hard to assess. In the most dramatic
physical threat to Japan since World War II, the
rocket flew over the Japanese islands, alarming
the Japanese people and also causing great concern
in Washington, where it added punch and power to
the drive to create a national missile defense.
An American official who was in close touch with
P'yongyang at the time believes the North Koreans
did not anticipate the powerful political impact
of the launch.
North
Korea had not tested a potential ballistic missile
since 1993, and that one a Nodong rocket of much
shorter range. P'yongyang apparently prepared
for a test of its longer-range projectile in October
1996 but postponed it after U.S. representations.
In June 1998, North Korea publicly offered to negotiate
with the United States an end to missile sales and
perhaps to deployments, but Washington did not respond.
Preparations for a test were resumed in August 1998
while military and political leaders were being
summoned for the meeting of the Supreme People’s
Assembly.
The
Taepodong test, which was a total surprise to all
but a few experts in the outside world, resurrected
the perception of North Korea as a military threat
after years of being seen primarily as an area of
humanitarian disaster. The tests came only
six weeks after a congressionally sponsored commission
to assess the ballistic missile threat to the United
States, headed by former Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, reported that the threat was greater and
more imminent than the executive branch had acknowledged.
The North Korean launch seemed tailor-made to prove
the point. The launch also came just weeks
after the public revelation that U.S. intelligence
suspected North Korea of preparing to cheat on the
1994 nuclear-weapons accord by digging a giant hole
in the ground to house a clandestine nuclear facility.
All
this greatly strengthened the hand of conservatives
in Congress, who had never liked the 1994 Agreed
Framework nuclear deal, which created the first
non-hostile U.S. relationship with the DPRK and
accorded legitimacy to the North Korean regime.
The possibility that North Korea was preparing to
cheat on its nuclear obligations while testing threatening
missiles was of grave concern even to those who
had been backers of the Agreed Framework inside
and outside the Clinton administration. To
save the nuclear accord and the tenuous U.S.-North
Korean relationship from being scuttled by Congress,
President Clinton named former Secretary of Defense
William Perry as North Korea policy coordinator
to make a full-scale study and recommendations about
what to do regarding North Korea. Although
no one guessed it at the time of their inception,
Perry’s activities would become an important element
in North Korea’s turn toward engagement.
The
Aid-based Regime
Nearly
everyone who has examined Kim Chong-il’s turn toward
engagement has identified economic necessity as
the principal motive force. Kim Dae-jung,
for example, told a dinner meeting of Korean experts
in New York on September 7, 2000, that "North Korea's
desperate situation, [its] economic travail," was
the most important reason behind Kim Chong-il’s
agreement to the June summit. The North Korean
leader realized, according to Kim Dae-jung, that
without improved relations with South Korea, "others
won't help" the North in its economic quest.
This was especially true of the United States, Kim
told the dinner meeting. North Korea wished
to sideline South Korea while responding to the
United States, he said. But "the United States
clearly rejected this," he said.
Because
authoritative data is missing, there is much dispute
about the precise state of North Korea's economic
output. It is almost universally agreed by
outside observers, however, that the economy had
been on a sharp downward path beginning with the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and especially
since the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994. There
is also a strong consensus that the economy began
to "stabilize" around 1998 or 1999 at a very low
level, which was close to an economic collapse.
The South Korean central bank, the Bank of Korea,
went so far as to announce a 6 percent gain for
North Korean national income in 1999, but this figure
is widely disputed. [26]
Whether North Korea's economy stabilized, hit bottom,
or actually turned around near the end of the decade,
it seems likely that the relative improvement enabled
Kim Chong-il to experience enough of a breather
to experiment with external economic support of
a more fundamental nature than mere humanitarian
food aid for subsistence purposes. It is also
possible that he realized that humanitarian aid
to starving people was not likely to continue forever.
Donor countries and aid groups, weary from years
of coping with a mostly man-made famine in which
as many as a million or more people may have died,
were beginning to be afflicted with fatigue.
Starting
with the reports of extreme famine in outlying areas
in the mid 1990's, the international community began
supplying humanitarian assistance, principally food
and medicine, into North Korea. The aid through
foreign government grants, the UN’s World Food Program,
private aid agencies, and the heavy fuel oil provided
by the United States through the Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization (KEDO) under the
1994 nuclear accord produces about $400 million
annually, according to Marcus Noland, the most careful
independent record keeper of such data. This
aid has come from 49 different countries, with the
United States, South Korea, China, Japan, and the
European Union being largest contributors.
In addition, North Korean income from missile sales
and illicit activities such as counterfeiting and
the drug trade adds up to nearly as much, Noland
has estimated. [27]
Altogether these sums are roughly equal to the aggregate
value of all of North Korea's recorded exports of
slightly less than $1 billion per year.
Aside
from China, which wishes to keep North Korea afloat
for security and ideological reasons, the most likely
source of immediate economic assistance is South
Korea, many of whose citizens originated in the
North and whose businessmen speak the same language.
North Korea's largest and most important individual
benefactor these days is South Korea's Hyundai group,
the country's largest industrial combination, whose
85-year-old founder, Chung Ju Yung, was born in
North Korea and has always wished to aid the people
he left behind. In October 1998, a month after
becoming head of the government, Kim Chong-il played
host to the visiting industrialist in P'yongyang.
They agreed to a deal under which Hyundai would
pay North Korea $25 million per month to bring tourists
from South Korea and, eventually, from other countries
to the famed Diamond mountains just north of the
DMZ. The enormous potential of this connection
in Korean terms is suggested by the fact that the
Hyundai group’s combined sales in 1997 exceeded
$90 billion—more than five times the national output
of North Korea. Hyundai’s payments of $150
million in the first six months of Diamond Mountain
tourism might be a modest sum in international financial
terms, but it was close to the total sales of North
Korea's largest export, textiles, in 1997.
Hyundai claimed when the deal was struck that it
would be self-supporting, but it has turned out
to be a big money loser. The company, now
in growing economic trouble, has asked North Korea,
so far unsucessfully, to permit it to slash its
payments in half. The deal remains controversial
in Seoul, especially since Hyundai has been making
its payments in cash to a North Korean bank account
in Macao, which reportedly benefits Kim Chong-il
and his ruling elite but not the North Korean people.
Although
Hyundai’s dealings with North ostensibly are the
workings of private business, in fact the Kim Dae-jung
government has played a critically important role.
In 1989 Chung Ju-yung was the first important South
Korean industrialist to visit the North, but the
disapproval of the Kim Young Sam government prevented
him from returning to negotiate possible deals.
Kim Dae-jung, on the other hand, encouraged Hyundai’s
activities with the North under his policy of separating
politics from business. The Diamond Mountain
tourism deal was widely hailed as the first fruit
of Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine policy. There have
been widespread suspicions that Kim’s government
has acted to protect the ailing conglomerate from
its creditors in order to further the North-South
relationship. A senior aide to Kim described
Hyundai’s dealings with the North as an important
part of a confidence-building process, especially
in late 1998 and early 1999. That the Diamond
Mountain payments continued even during periods
of increased tension between the two governments
was an important lesson for P'yongyang, according
to the aide. “They began to trust us,” he said.
Looking
at these developments, Marcus Noland recently described
the DPRK as "an increasingly aid-dependent economy.”[28]
After a visit to Seoul in early 1999, I observed
much the same phenomenon and reported in The Washington
Post that North Korea's increasing dependence on
outside assistance represents "a sea change in the
country's relations with the outside world—one that,
in the long run, is likely to have a greater effect
on this bitterly divided peninsula than the current
controversy over a clandestine nuclear facility
or concern about its surprisingly sophisticated
ballistic missile program." [29]
In my view the significance of this change is very
great in political as well as economic terms, internally
as well as externally. Although the DPRK maintains
the slogan of “military first,” the recent activities
of Kim Chong-il and governmental officials suggest
a change in priorities. From the time of his
father's death in 1994 through 1998, the great majority
of announced activities by Kim Chong-il were with
military units or on military occasions. That
began to change in 1999, even though he had become
chairman of the Military Commission. In the
first 11 months of 2000, he was officially reported
to have made at least 22 on-the-spot guidance tours
in the economic sector compared to 13 military inspection
visits. He had made more than 30 military visits
the year before. [30]
Simultaneously, both Kim and his government began
spending much more time with people from the outside
world. Kim was reported to have engaged in
about 20 meetings with foreigners during 1999, many
more than in the past. According to a South
Korean intelligence report, lesser ranking DPRK
officials made 222 overseas visits in 1999, compared
to 134 in 1998 and 99 in 1997. [31]
Although
P’yongyang still maintains a pose of superiority
in dealings with outsiders and often acts in recalcitrant
ways that frustrate its benefactors, it has so far
been careful to yield on the issue at hand before
a breaking point is reached. For example,
when a South Korean tourist was briefly held on
charges of trying to entice a North Korean soldier
to defect, the Kim Chong-il regime stepped in quickly
to put the matter right. The most notable
exception to this pattern has been relations with
Japan, which is the likely source of billions of
dollars in aid because it generously supplied aid
to South Korea when those two countries normalized
their relations in 1965. A deal with Japan,
while logical and beneficial to P'yongyang, remains
to be made, possibly because of Kim Il-sung’s famous
history as leader of an anti-Japanese guerilla group
and because of the deep-seated cultural and historical
antipathy between all Koreans and the Japanese who
occupied their country in the first half of the
20th century.
Kim’s
openings to the outside world in the June summit
and thereafter have made him a more acceptable aid
recipient. Unless a convincing case could
be made that the blame for his actions lay elsewhere,
returning to an international posture of threat
would be hazardous for Kim. It would probably
mean a severe cutback or even an end to most of
the humanitarian aid, except for aid from the reliable
Chinese. I doubt that Kim wishes to place
his future entirely in the hands of his massive
Chinese neighbor.
Following
the arrival of the first tourist ship to Diamond
Mountain in November 1998 and the beginning then
of the monthly cash payments, North Korea began
to make overtures toward governmental relations
with the South. In February 1999, the North
publicly proposed high-level North-South political
talks, and privately sent messages through private
enterprises asking for economic assistance.
The following month P'yongyang agreed to permit
U.S. access to the disputed underground site at
Kumchang-ni in return for humanitarian food assistance.
In missile talks P'yongyang negotiators expressed
willingness to suspend its missile exports in return
for compensation and finally named a proposed figure,
$1 billion annually for three years. The United
States declined, but the talks continued.
Toward
Breakthroughs with Seoul and Washington
A
variety of signals from P'yongyang in the early
months of 1999 suggested that Kim Chong-il was preparing
to move ahead toward ties with South Korea and possibly
with the United States. The atmosphere darkened
notably in June, however, when a nine-day standoff
between North and South Korean naval vessels in
the Yellow Sea resulted in the sinking of a North
Korean torpedo boat and the death of about 30 North
Korea seamen, but no serious injury to ROK sailors
or equipment. Shortly after the naval clash,
North-South diplomatic talks in Beijing, which had
been expected to result in major progress, broke
up because of bitter charges and counter-charges
about the incident.
At
the time, the South Korean and international press
was full of speculation about whether hard-liners
in P'yongyang had instigated the conflict to torpedo
a coming North-South rapprochement, or whether Kim
Chong-il himself was to blame. More than a
year after the clash, senior U.S. and South Korean
officials said they knew at the time that the confrontation
was unintentional. The actual cause was a
doubling in the annual quota demanded from North
Korean fishermen for crabs which inhabit the waters
of the Yellow Sea, including those on the southern
side of the Northern Limit Line, a nautical dividing
line which North Korea has never fully accepted.
“ It wasn't planned by either side,” said a U.S.
official in retrospect, “but once you got into it,
it became a test of manhood.” Had it not been
for the naval clash, the dramatic North-South developments
of 2000 might well have taken place in 1999, according
to a senior ROK official. If so, this would
have given Kim Dae-jung’s engagement policies more
time to work, and might have allowed time for a
sweeping U.S.-DPRK missile deal before President
Clinton left office.
The
American track of Kim Chong-il’s engagement with
the outside world began to take shape with naming
of William Perry in late 1998 to be policy coordinator
for North Korea, a measure of near desperation in
order to save the policy from fatal blows administered
by an angry Congress. The former Defense Secretary
initially thought the job would take a few months
at most; in fact, it engaged him intensively for
nearly a year. Perry, who had presided at
the Pentagon when the United States and North Korea
came close to war in June of 1994, consulted extensively
both inside and outside the government and especially
with the allies in Seoul and Tokyo. In May
1999 he flew to P'yongyang to present the North
Korean government with his views and obtain its
ideas, presenting himself as speaking not only for
the United States but South Korea and Japan as well.
A
crucial element of Perry’s findings was that the
United States must "deal with the North Korean government
as it is, not as we might wish it to be."
In clearer terms than ever stated before at such
a high level, Perry accepted North Korea as a reality
and indicated that the United States, like the South
Korea of Kim Dae-jung, would not seek to undermine
it. This was of central importance to Kim
Chong-il. In P'yongyang, Perry outlined two different
roads that potentially lay ahead for the foreign
relations of the North Korean regime.[32]
One road involved "complete and verifiable assurances
that the DPRK does not have a nuclear weapons program"
as well as "the complete and verifiable cessation
of testing, production and deployment" of long-range
missiles and complete cessation of long-range missile
exports. If this path were to be chosen, he
said, “the United States and its allies would, in
a step-by-step and reciprocal fashion, move to reduce
pressures on the DPRK it perceives as threatening.”
Specifically, he said, the United States would normalize
relations with the DPRK, and take other positive
steps. He said South Korea and Japan had indicated
they would do likewise.
The
other path, if North Korea should reject these proposals,
he mentioned only briefly. In this case, "the
United States and its allies would have to take
other steps to ensure their security and contain
the threat," Perry said. He did not spell
out what he meant, but it was not lost on his audience
that he was a former U.S. defense secretary.
The
North Korean officials took the Perry report seriously
but did not respond immediately. Coming out
of P'yongyang on a U.S. Air Force plane, the members
of Perry’s team debated what they had heard.
Some officials felt that North Korean officials
had merely stuck to their rhetoric and were not
likely to respond positively. Another group,
including most of those with extensive previous
experience with North Korea, were encouraged that
the proposals had not been rejected and saw signs
they might be accepted in the end. The latter
group was right. In a Beijing meeting in June,
one month after the Perry visit to P’yongyang, American
officials received clear signals that North Korea
was interested. Three months after that, in
mid-September, North Korean negotiator Ambassador
Kim Gye Gwan officially told U.S. Ambassador Charles
Kartman in a meeting in Berlin that North Korea
would agree to a moratorium on long-range missile
flight tests in return for lifting of substantial
U.S. economic sanctions. The deal was done,
and on September 17 Clinton announced the lifting
of most sanctions against North Korean products.
Perry and his aides breathed a sigh of relief, believing
that North Korea had accepted the first path and
was now headed toward a cooperative relationship.
At
the next U.S.-North Korean diplomatic meeting, in
Berlin in mid-November, North Korea proposed and
United States accepted the idea of sending a high-level
emissary from P’yongyang to Washington to codify
the missile moratorium and take the next steps toward
mutual engagement. The American suggested
sending the emissary as quickly as possible, so
that the issue would not become involved in a political
debate in the U.S. presidential election year.
The North Korean negotiators seemed sympathetic
to that plea, as they were in subsequent meetings
in January and March 2000. But as the months
rolled on, each time the North Korean diplomats
were unable to set a date.
Why
P’yongyang stalled on naming its "high-level emissary"
in late 1999 and early 2000 remains something of
a mystery. Perhaps it was because Clinton,
after announcing the lifting of sanctions in September
1999, did not actually do so until after the North-South
summit in June 2000. Perhaps it was because,
as North Korean diplomats said, P'yongyang did not
wish to send an emissary who would arrive in Washington
while his country was still officially designated
a terrorist nation. Perhaps it was because
in the meantime Kim Chong-il for reasons of his
own had decided to move first with South Korea.
Or perhaps it was, as some U.S. officials have guessed,
because of internal jockeying in P'yongyang between
Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju and the Foreign
Ministry, in charge of negotiations with the United
States, on the one hand, and Workers Party Secretary
Kim Yong Sun and his Asia-Pacific Peace Committee,
which is in charge of dealing with the South, on
the other. By early 2000 it seemed clear to
P’yongyang that quick money was not likely to come
via Washington, and the Americans began to sense
that North Korea had turned its attention to relations
with the South.
Closing
the Summit Deal
Just
before Christmas 1999, North Korea sent a signal
of sorts by participating in North-South basketball
matches in Seoul, the first such sports exchanges
in eight years. Particularly significant was
the attendance of Song Ho Gyong, the senior deputy
to Party Secretary Kim Yong Sun and a well connected
veteran diplomat. A knowledgeable South Korean
official denied that Song met any government officials
while in Seoul, but suspicious U.S. experts expressed
doubt Song had come south only to witness a basketball
game, even though Kim Chong-il is reputed to be
a basketball fan.
The
first clear-cut evidence that something was changing
in P'yongyang came on March 5, 2000, when Kim Chong-il
traveled to the Chinese embassy for a five-hour
dinner with the departing Chinese ambassador.
The remote North Korean leader rarely received ambassadors
under any circumstances; for him to visit an embassy
was astonishing in North Korean terms. In
retrospect, it appears that Kim used the occasion
to prepare the way for the secret trip he made to
see Chinese leaders in Beijing May 29-31, on the
eve of the North-South summit.
In
Seoul, Kim Dae-jung was heartened by a variety of
signals from P’yongyang suggesting it was time for
government-to-government talks about economic cooperation
and peaceful coexistence. A decision was secretly
made in Seoul to try for a summit meeting with Kim
Chong-il on grounds that negotiations with a dictatorial
government can only succeed if they start at the
top. After learning that the North Korean
leader was anxious to find out what he might obtain
from such a summit meeting, Kim Dae-jung put together
a list of incentives that he announced on March
9 as a "Berlin declaration" during a previously
scheduled visit to the German capital. The
initiative was so hastily prepared that American
officials were not informed until hours before the
announcement, even though U.S.-North Korean diplomatic
meetings were taking place simultaneously in New
York. ROK Foreign Ministry officials responded
to U.S. dissatisfaction by saying the declaration
was still being formulated even as Kim Dae-jung
was en route to Berlin.
Although
private sector economic cooperation was underway
due to his policy of separating politics from economics,
Kim Dae-jung declared in Berlin, "the time is ripe
for government-to-government cooperation" on much
larger projects of the “social infrastructure,”
including expansion of highways, harbors, railroads,
and electrical and communications facilities.
Moreover, he said the solution to the North's chronic
food shortages would not be yearly food aid from
outside but "comprehensive reforms in the delivery
of quality fertilizers, agricultural equipment,
irrigation systems, and other elements of a structural
nature." He pledged that the ROK government
"is ready to respond positively" to DPRK requests.
To make sure that North Korea paid attention, Kim
reiterated the Berlin offers in secret talks in
Singapore between aides of the two governments and
in a message delivered to officials in P'yongyang
by a visiting American academic.
North
Korea's response was quick. Even before he returned
home, according to an ROK diplomat, Kim learned
that the DPRK wished to explore his offers.
On March 15, Kim assigned Culture-Tourism Minister
Park Jie-won, one of his closest aides, to meet
secretly with North Koreans in pursuit of a summit
meeting. Park was chosen rather than the Unification
Minister or others who would be expected to work
on such matters because they would be more closely
watched by the press and the bureaucracy.
Two days later, Park met secretly in Shanghai with
Song Ho-gyong, the veteran diplomat and senior aide
to Kim Yong Sun who had come south in December.
After several further contacts, Park and Song reached
full agreement on April 8 in Beijing on the summit
meeting to be held in mid-June in P'yongyang between
Kim Dae-jung and Kim Chong-il. The news was
announced April 10, just three days before nationwide
parliamentary elections in the South, leading the
opposition Grand National Party to condemn it as
"obvious politicking to grab votes."
This
is not the place to recount the fascinating interplay
at the June 13-15 summit meeting in P'yongyang.
One point, however, should be borne in mind: the
North Korean leader, who had been depicted as an
enigmatic and eccentric playboy shrouded in mystery,
with his finger irresponsibly on the military trigger,
emerged in the light of day as a sensible and even
appealing ruling figure. After considerable
interaction with Kim, a senior South Korean official
described Kim as "a strong dictator" but also as
"open-minded and pragmatic…a good listener… decisive
when he is persuaded…polite to older men around
him" and with an unexpected sense of humor. An American
official who accompanied Secretary of State Albright
later in the year described Kim in remarkably similar
terms as "amazingly well-informed and extremely
well-read… practical, thoughtful, listened very
hard…[with] a sense of humor… not the madman a lot
of people portrayed him as."[33]
Both the Korean and American official were impressed
that Kim Chong-il took notes himself in important
meetings.
Although
the North-South summit meeting was primarily a festival
for the two Koreas, U.S. interests were not ignored.
Kim Dae-jung handed a written document about the
missile issues to Kim Chong-il, and told him that
the missile negotiations with the United States
must be brought to a smooth and satisfactory conclusion.
Otherwise, he said, you cannot expect the North-South
accords to go ahead. The South Korean president
also spoke to his counterpart about nuclear issues,
saying that the Agreed Framework must be strictly
adhered to.
In
perhaps the most interesting exchange, according
to Kim Dae-jung, the North Korean leader said he
agreed it was desirable that U.S. troops stay on
the Korean peninsula for stability and peace against
big powers even after an accord between the two
Koreas. This statement was startling to many
people when it was revealed by Kim Dae-jung in interviews
with The Washington Post and The New York
Times in September. However, North Korean
officials had been saying in private talks since
1995 that American forces might remain indefinitely
under "new peace arrangements" involving both the
North and South, in order to bring confidence and
stability to the Korean peninsula.[34]
At the same time, though, the official position
of the DPRK in the Four Party Talks has consistently
been that the departure of American troops must
be on the agenda for peace talks.
Until
the June summit, U.S. diplomats often passed along
messages from Seoul to the North Koreans in their
regular diplomatic meetings. In a turnabout
in June, Kim Dae-jung passed along messages from
Washington to his North Korean counterpart.
Seoul was unhappy with Americans taking the lead
in talks with North Korea; despite their rhetorical
fealty to direct negotiations between the two Koreas,
Americans were edgy about being left out of their
dialogue.
Reentry
of the United States
It
did not take long after the June summit and the
flurry of immediate North-South meetings that followed
for the United States to be back in the game.
On the first day of the next round of U.S.-North
Korean diplomatic talks, in New York on September
27, North Korean ambassador Kim Gye Gwan announced
that P’yongyang was ready to send Vice Marshal Jo
Myong Rok, the number two person in the ruling National
Defense Commission, to Washington as the long awaited
"high level emissary.” The Americans were
surprised and pleased. They had not expected
such a high-ranking visitor, nor one who was so
well situated to discuss the security issues that
are the United States’ most important concerns.
Was
the resolve by Kim Chong-il to engage South Korea
and United States a single decision or two separate
decisions? This is a fascinating question
whose answer might suggest the degree of the comprehensive
planning or of impromptu maneuver on the part of
the North Korean leader. As early as June
30, Kim Chong-il told the visiting Korean-American
correspondent Julie Moon that he would send to Washington
as his emissary a higher ranking figure than was
under discussion in western capitals. [35]
North Korean diplomats made similar comments to
Americans on several occasions last summer.
Neither Kim Chong-il nor the diplomats mentioned
the name of Vice Marshal Jo, but it is fair speculation
that this is who the top leader, at any rate, had
in mind in June. It so, he clearly made a
single decision to engage comprehensively.
When
Vice Marshal Jo arrived in Washington October 9,
he brought two more surprises: first, that
North Korea was prepared to negotiate an end to
development, production, and sales of long-range
ballistic missiles, and was even willing to discuss
deployments and other issues of concern to the United
States; and second, that his principal objective
was to arrange a visit to P’yongyang by no less
than the President of the United States. Although
he wore civilian clothes during most of his visit,
Jo donned his marshal’s uniform with row after row
of service and battle ribbons for his call on President
Clinton at the White House. Jo handed Clinton
a letter from Kim Chong-il, and expressed the belief
that all difficulties between the two nations could
be worked out in a meeting between the two top leaders.
The high-ranking visitor appeared to be disappointed
when the Americans insisted that Clinton could not
travel to North Korea without extensive preparations,
and suggested that Secretary of State Albright should
go to P’yongyang first to work out the details.
Jo and Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju, who accompanied
him to Washington, were pleased, however, with the
U.S.-DPRK joint communiqué which declared
that "the two sides stated that neither government
would have hostile intent toward the other and confirmed
the commitment of both governments to make every
effort in the future to build a new relationship
free from past enmity." The declared absence
of hostility and enmity is of crucial importance
in the North Korean scheme of things, just as the
declarations that they were no longer enemies were
of crucial importance in ending the Cold War between
United States and the Soviet Union.
Albright’s
two-day visit to P’yongyang October 23-24 made substantial
progress in the discussions about limiting or eliminating
missiles, but they fail to solve all the issues
at hand. Lower-level negotiators were unable
to close the gap in subsequent meetings in Kuala
Lumpur. It was finally decided over New Year's
weekend that not enough time remained for a deal
with sufficient importance to be struck to justify
a trip by Clinton before he left office January
20.
With
North-South discussions and movement continuing,
European relations with P'yongyang developing rapidly,
and North Korean normalization talks with Japan
on a slow-moving track, the U.S.-DPRK negotiations
on missiles and full normalization are currently
in limbo, awaiting decisions by the Bush administration.
After the rapid changes that took place in Korea
in the year 2000, a new situation has dawned.
Summary
and Outlook
Who
and what are responsible for the great change on
the Korean peninsula?
Kim
Dae-jung and his policies in South Korea were key
factors in enticing North Korea to engage on a grand
scale. In the United States, William Perry
provided a practical route for North Korea to follow,
opening the way to cooperation with the leading
nation of the post-cold war international community.
Japan, China and other nations also played useful
roles.
It
is undeniable, though, that the crucial decisions
were made in the North and were made by Kim Chong-il.
It is my belief that his decisions flowed from tendencies
and objectives that have long existed, but that
only now have coincided with circumstances that
provide a reasonably good chance for fulfillment.
In other words, I believe that what has developed
in North Korea is a not a ruse or aberration but
is the consequence of possibilities with roots in
the past.
The
historical record suggests that despite the ages-long
fear by Koreans of being overwhelmed by its stronger
neighbors and despite the sometimes belligerent
talk of self reliance, the regime of the Kim Il-sung
and Kim Chong-il was well aware since its inception
of the necessity to court the big powers that could
strongly influence its future. Thus Kim Il-sung
was forever seeking to maneuver between the two
great powers of communism, the Soviet Union and
China, while seeking in modest fashion, at least
since 1972, to forge a connection with United States.
When the Soviet Union collapsed and China emphasized
markets over Marxism, thereafter establishing formal
and increasingly close relations with South Korea,
Kim Il-sung placed growing emphasis on a potential
U.S. connection, even while initiating nuclear and
missile programs to deter his enemies and protect
North Korea in case of a clash. The weapons
programs had the added advantage of seizing the
attention of the United States. In the month
before he died in June 1994, Kim also decided to
undertake a summit meeting with South Korea, which
clearly would have had an impact on the American
connection. In fact it was an American, former
President Jimmy Carter, who obtained the news of
his Kim’s willingness to stage a North-South summit
and brought it to Seoul.
After
inheriting the regime from his father, Kim Chong-il
initially was unable to move on the North-South
front because of an antipathy to the South Korean
President, Kim Young Sam, and due to the unproven
state of his authority and the dire state of his
sinking economy. He had made a deal with the
Americans on the nuclear program in the 1994 Agreed
Framework, but it had brought him neither the legitimacy
nor the economic gains he had sought and perhaps
expected. After cementing his authority and
witnessing at least a modest upturn in his economy,
Kim appears to have decided in the second half of
1998 to explore a new path with the more-willing
South Koreans and with the Americans. The
events of 1999 and 2000 flowed from that exploration.
For
Kim Chong-il, the most important immediate objective
appears to have been economic assistance bringing
the stabilization and permanent improvement of North
Korea’s economy, leading to the survival of his
regime. In the final years of the twentieth
century, the right circumstances seemed to come
together–greater assurance of his position as national
leader, a modest improvement in the sinking economy,
and receptive partners in Seoul and Washington.
Since early last year, at least, he has been trying
to make the best of these opportunities.
It
is well to remember that twice before North Korea
has taken major steps toward engagement with the
non-communist world, only to turn back when conditions
darkened. In 1972, the opening to Park Chung
Hee’s South Korea was followed by new contacts abroad
and the extensive acquisition of European machinery
and equipment intended to bring North Korean industry
into a new era. The 1973 Middle East war and
oil embargo, which were not foreseen, unbalanced
the international economy and made it difficult
for North Korea to pay for the industrial machinery
it had imported. Instead of paying or agreeing
to participate in an international committee to
oversee its debts, North Korea defaulted and refused
to speak to its creditors, placing itself outside
the pale of the international economic life for
decades to come.
On
a second occasion, as the Soviet Union was collapsing
in 1991, Kim Il-Sung followed the advice of Chinese
leaders in seeking a rapprochement with the South
and the United States. A wide-ranging basic
agreement with Seoul was signed at the end of that
year, and Kim Yong Sun went to Washington to begin
a process of reconciliation early in 1992.
The favorable portents were short lived. North
Korea’s refusal to submit to inspections of its
nuclear program, to which it had previously agreed,
led to escalating conflict with the United States
and almost brought the two countries to war in 1994.
What
is the likelihood that the policies of South Korea,
the United States and other key actors will remain
favorable to Kim Chong-il’s engagement policies?
This is an imponderable beyond the scope of this
paper. If the weather outside remains suitable,
what are the chances that Korea will consistently
pursue the current opening despite any difficulties
which may arise, and in so doing, successfully secure
the existence of the regime into the foreseeable
future? Any answer to this must be highly
speculative, but I would rate the chances as less
than 50-50. The experiences of the former
communist states in the post- Cold War era suggest
it is exceedingly difficult, although not impossible,
to make the change from a centrally directed economy
to some form of a market economy, even a guided
market economy, that can thrive in the contemporary
world. China has done it, although daunting
problems remain, but other states have done less
well. No doubt Kim Chong-il’s recent trip
to Shanghai was an object lesson for him in what
can be done with strong leadership, the right policies
and favorable circumstances. It is equally
difficult, if not even more difficult, to convert
a dictatorship to a stable political system resting
on the foundation of the consent of the governed.
Historically, North Korea is an extremely negative
example in both the economic and political realms.
Having
said this, I must add that Kim Chong-il has turned
out to be a leader very different from previous
depictions and that he has done much more, more
quickly and more smoothly, to create favorable new
conditions than anyone had expected. This
time last year, no one dreamed of the developments
which have taken place in recent months on the bitterly
divided peninsula and which, in my view, represent
a turning point to a future still unknown.
As I wrote in the last lines of my book, The
Two Koreas, “Hold on to your hats. Korea is
a land of surprises.”
North
Korea’s Engagement:
Implications For South Korea
Kongdan
Oh
Institute for Defense
Analyses
Engagement
Standards
How engaging is North Korea? The answer depends
on how engagement is defined. Much of the
excitement generated by North Korea’s recent outreach
efforts should be attributed not to what the Kim
Chong-il regime is doing now but to what it has
failed to do in the past. For a modern-day
hermit kingdom the changes are almost startling.
For a normal state, they hardly deserve notice.
Engagement
can be defined in at least three ways: by
process or events, by goals or intentions, and by
consequences. [36]
As a working definition, engagement can be understood
as a process of non-punitive interaction designed
to elicit cooperation.[37]
This definition includes reference to both process
and goals. Defining engagement in terms of
process or events is relatively easy to do, but
not especially useful in terms of predicting future
policy, since process can serve any number of purposes
besides the desire for cooperation. The Joint
Declaration signed at the conclusion of the 2000
inter-Korean summit may be intended by the two Koreas
in very different ways, and if this is the case,
it is likely to prove as futile a means toward reconciliation
as the 1972 and 1991 agreements. Engagement
events can take many forms: economic, political,
military, or social; bilateral or multilateral;
governmental or nongovernmental.
Defining
engagement according to a country’s intentions is
more satisfying, since intentions explain present
events and predict future ones. But intentions
are often difficult to determine, especially on
the part of secretive actors such as the North Korean
regime. A single engagement event can realize
multiple intentions: the desire to communicate,
to provide aid, to teach by example, or to undermine
through increasing dependency. Students of
North Korea are understandably reluctant to attribute
North Korea’s engagement intentions to peaceful
purposes, given its history of using engagement
as a cover for aggression and united front tactics.
But history should not blind us to changes.
The tendency to attribute ulterior motives to North
Korean initiatives may be an example of the “hostile
attribution bias” as described some years ago by
Ole Holsti, who cited the example of John Foster
Dulles’ refusal to attribute Soviet actions, no
matter how peaceful, to anything other than an underlying
aggressive intent.
Defining
engagement by consequences, regardless of the magnitude
of events or seriousness of intentions that lead
up to them, is a pragmatic approach that is most
closely related to the concept of “implications
of engagement.” A handshake or conversation
between leaders may yield far greater consequences
than a formal treaty. Or to take another example,
the act of opening to the outside world, which North
Korea intends as a means of inducing foreign direct
investment and aid, may subsequently trigger events
that fully engage the country in the international
community. The tricky thing about defining
engagement by consequences is that consequences
are often substantially shaped by other countries’
responses to engagement initiatives. How South
Korea responds to North Korean engagement overtures
will ultimately determine the consequences of those
overtures, regardless of North Korea’s original
intentions.
North
Korea’s diplomacy has become more active in the
closing years of the 20th century. The question
that presents itself to foreign governments and
potential investors is whether this flurry of North
Korean activity signals a decision to join the international
community (on the community’s own terms) or whether
it is an effort to replace lost support from fellow
communist regimes with new support for the dictatorial
political methods and autarkic economic policies
of the Kim Chong-il regime.
This
discussion of the background and implications of
North Korea’s engagement of South Korea begins with
a brief overview of recent instances of engagement,
which form the necessary basis for drawing implications.
The discussion then turns to South Korea’s responses
to this engagement, which will materially influence
the course of engagement, and finally considers
implications of engagement according to two scenarios:
first, that North Korea’s engaging behavior is an
indication of its willingness to reform its political
and economic system; or alternatively, that engagement
is intended to fortify the Kim regime and its “socialism
in our own style.”
Instances
of Engagement
Pre-Summit
Events
The inter-Korean summit meeting of June 13-15, 2000,
was a watershed in South-North relations.
But historic as it was, it was certainly not the
first time that North Korea had agreed to high-level
meetings with the governing authorities of the South.
The two Koreas have a long history of contact against
a background of hostility and violent acts.
Notable examples of government and business engagement
include a series of Red Cross meetings culminating
in the July 4, 1972, North-South Joint Communiqué,
eight high-level meetings leading to the adoption
of the North-South Basic Agreement on December 10,
1991, Hyundai Chairman Chong Chu-yong’s visit to
North Korea to inspect the Mt. Kumgang area for
development in January 1989, and the Kim Young Sam-Kim
Il Sung summit talks scheduled for July 25,1994,
but cancelled after the death of Kim Il Sung on
July 8. It should be asked how these contacts,
which failed to bear fruit, differ from today’s
engagement proceedings. Did they provide a
foundation for the present engagement, despite an
interval of hostility in which the North Koreans
twice (in March 1994 and June 1999) threatened to
turn South Korea and Seoul into a “sea of fire,”
or is the present engagement built on a newer foundation
of circumstances in and around the Korean peninsula?
The
election of President Kim Dae Jung did not seem
to melt the ice in P’yongyang. At the center
of Kim’s engagement strategy were the three sunshine
policy principles: “not to tolerate armed
provocation by North Korea,” “not to attempt a takeover
or absorption of North Korea,” and “to broaden reconciliation
and cooperation.” [38]
North Korean criticism continued until just before
the summit talks were announced. Thus for
the first two years of Kim’s tenure most North-South
contact was of a non-government nature, primarily
through business contacts. Most notably, ten
years after his first visit, Hyundai’s Chong Chu-yong
finally succeeded in negotiating a contract to open
Mount Kumgang to tourists, with the first tour arriving
in November 1998.
In
February 1999 North Korea convened a “meeting of
the government, political parties and organizations
of the DPRK” at which Secretary Kim Yong Sun offered
to hold “a wide-range dialogue between the north
and the south, including the talks between authorities.”
The catch was that the South Korean government first
had to meet North Korea’s long-standing demands
to end cooperation with outsiders against the DPRK
(i.e., end security cooperation with the United
States), abolish the National Security Law, and
permit pro-North Korean organizations full freedom
of activity. [39]
On
March 9, 2000, Kim Dae Jung, speaking at the Free
University of Berlin, made three promises to the
North Koreans: to “guarantee their national
security,” “to assist in their economic recovery
efforts,” and to “actively support them in the international
arena.” In return, Kim asked that North Korea
guarantee to “abandon any armed provocation against
the South once and for all,” to “comply with its
previous promises not to develop nuclear weapons,”
and to “give up ambitions to develop long-range
missiles.”[40]
The day before the speech, South Korea had delivered
a corresponding four-point proposal dubbed the “Berlin
Declaration” to the North Koreans at Panmunjom.
In addition to offering to aid the North’s economic
recovery and asking for the realization of peaceful
coexistence, the Declaration proposed to resolve
the issue of separated families and hold talks between
South and North Korean authorities.
On
March 15 Radio P’yongyang rejected the Berlin Declaration
as offering nothing new, reiterating that North
Korea was prepared to engage in talks as soon as
the South complied with preconditions announced
in the joint meeting of February 3, 1999. [41]
The next day the North’s Committee for the Peaceful
Reunification of the Fatherland (CPRF) issued a
broadside against South’s National Intelligence
Service (NIS) citing the same preconditions, and
adding that the North would never have any dealings
with the NIS. [42]
But
in the background the Kim Chong-il regime was approaching
the South. As is now known, in response to
a North Korean proposal of March 14, President Kim
sent his Culture and Tourism Minister Park Jie-won
on clandestine trips to China for four rounds of
talks on March 17 and 18, another round of talks
in Beijing on March 22, and a third set of talks
in Beijing on April 8 and 9, which produced the
summit agreement that was announced on April 10,
three days before the South Korean election for
the National Assembly. [43]
An answer to the question of why the Kim Chong-il
regime reversed its position on government-level
talks at this time would go far in explaining North
Korean motivations for engagement.
The
summit, at the last minute delayed one day at North
Korea’s request (citing “problems of technical preparedness”),
was a personal triumph for both Kims, but particularly
for the reclusive Kim Chong-il, who surprised and
charmed his South Korean guests (and apparently
his own people) from the moment he appeared at the
airport to greet President Kim and his entourage
(including President Kim’s right-hand man, Yim Tong-won,
head of the NIS). The full extent of the topics
and informal agreements discussed was not disclosed.
On his return, President Kim declared, “There are
[a] number of good things that were understood,
but it is not [the] proper time yet to reveal them.”
[44]
The
South-North Joint Declaration issued at the conclusion
of the talks on June 15 is taken by both Koreas
as the new cornerstone for engagement. [45]
Like the previous agreements, the Joint Declaration
opens with a call for the two Koreas to “independently”
achieve reunification, a phrase interpreted by the
North Koreans since 1972 as calling for the end
of the ROK-US security alliance. According
to the Declaration, the two leaders find a “common
element” in their governments’ respective models
of reunification (the South’s confederation of two
politically independent states and the North’s federal
government overseeing national defense and foreign
affairs); pledge to “promptly resolve humanitarian
issues” including visits of separated families and
the return of unconverted North Korean prisoners
held in the South; will promote “balanced development
of the national economy through economic cooperation
and exchange,” and will pursue further government-level
exchanges to implement the Declaration, including
a promise by Kim Chong-il to visit Seoul “at an
appropriate time.”
Post-Summit
Events
Having secured what they consider a beneficial agreement
in terms of promised economic cooperation (i.e.
aid) and independent reunification, the North Koreans
have persistently called for the two sides to implement
the Declaration “to the letter.” [46]
The summit meeting and Joint Declaration initiated
a flurry of government-level engagements, as summarized
in Figure 1.
The
implementation of post-summit engagement is guided
by agreements reached in the Ministerial Talks lead
by South Korean Unification Minister Park Jae-kyu
and North Korea’s Senior Cabinet Councilor Jon Kum-jin.
These talks prepare the way for discussion of more
specific matters handled by the Red Cross talks,
the military talks, and the economic talks.
The
highest profile contacts are the Red Cross talks
to arrange family reunions. At the first round
of talks the two sides agreed to hold the first
family reunions in August, and South Korea agreed
to repatriate unconverted prisoners (i.e., spies).
The talks were reportedly stormy at times.[47]
At the second round of talks an agreement was reached
to hold second and third rounds of family reunions,
to begin exchanging names of Koreans to confirm
family survival and addresses, and to exchange letters
between 300 separated persons on a trial basis.
The talks were criticized by the South Korean press
for failing to address the issues of the return
of hundreds of South Korean prisoners held in the
North and the establishment of a permanent family
reunion meeting place.[48]
The third round of Red Cross talks, postponed from
mid-December 2000 to the end of January 2001, agreed
to another family reunion, the exchange of letters
and “one or two photographs” for 300 separated family
members, to expand the size of the family search
and letter exchange programs in the future, and
to continue to discuss the establishment of a family
reunion center. The talks were reportedly
difficult, and not only did the two sides fail to
address the issue of the return of South Korean
prisoners, but the North demanded that remaining
unconverted prisoners held in the South be returned.
By the end of the third round of talks North Korea’s
dialogue strategy was becoming clear: delay
and limit social reunification projects as much
as possible.
The
August family reunion arranged by the first Red
Cross talks moved the entire South (and North?)
Korean people with its heart-rending meetings of
long-lost family members and relatives. Held
in Seoul and P’yongyang, it cost the South Korean
government and families $2.69 million.[49]
For the lucky participants, the reunion experience
was mixed. According to one poll, 52 percent
were happy with the meeting, 48 percent were more
concerned about their northern relatives than before,
and 47 percent did not expect to have another chance
of meeting them.[50]
The second reunions in late November did not command
as much public attention as the first. Political
statements made by North Korean family members annoyed
their South Korean kin and the South Korean press.
Talks
between the North and South Korean military organizations
were also high on the agenda of security-conscious
South Koreans. The two defense ministers,
meeting on Cheju island on September 25-26, issued
a communiqué in which the two sides agreed
to ease military tension in unspecified ways and
permit entry into the DMZ for the purpose of reconnecting
rail and road links. By early February 2001
five working-level military talks had been convened
to discuss the issue of handling security in the
DMZ during the reconnection of road and rail lines,
with only vague reference to other tension reduction
measures.
The
first meeting of the Inter-Korean Committee to Promote
Economic Cooperation was convened December 27-30
in P’yongyang, preceded by working-level contacts.
The two sides discussed power industry cooperation
(i.e., providing electricity to North Korea), connection
of the Kyongui rail line, Imjin River flood control
programs, the creation of an industrial park in
Kaesong, and the adoption of trade and investment
agreements. The North’s chairman announced
that, “Now that our side made a sweeping concession
over issues like the formation of survey teams,
we expect that there will be concessions from the
South at the time of the second meeting to be held
in Seoul.”[51]
In
addition to these on-going meetings a number of
one-time engagements occurred in 2000. On
August 12, the heads of most of South Korea’s leading
media organizations visited P’yongyang and enjoyed
a luncheon meeting with Kim Chong-il. A September
11-14 visit to Seoul and Cheju island by Secretary
Kim Yong Sun was seen as a preparatory step for
a Kim Chong-il visit to South Korea. Secretary
Kim was accompanied by the North’s General Pak Jae-gyong,
who presented three tons of North Korean mushrooms
(valued at $800,000) as a gift from Kim Chong-il
to designated South Korean recipients, as originally
offered at the summit talks. The general then
hastily returned to North Korea without meeting
any South Korea military officials, thereby puzzling
and disappointing his hosts. [52]
After
a fast start, inter-Korean contacts began to slow
in the last months of 2000. Meetings and family
reunions were postponed. Kim Chong-il’s trip
to Seoul remained unscheduled, making President
Kim’s trip look more like a tributary visit than
an engagement visit. The North Koreans put
off discussions over setting up a permanent meeting
place for family reunions, and said they would have
to delay efforts to locate family members because
of a shortage of computers. The theory that
North Korea had decided to switch its attention
to relations with the U.S. highlights the importance
of the international engagement context in explaining
inter-Korean engagement.
South
Korea’s Role in Inter-Korean Engagement
South
Korean Proposals and North Korean Rejections
How much is North Korea initiating engagement for
its own purposes and how much of its engagement
is a response to South Korean overtures? North
Korea showed little interest in implementing the
engagement provisions of the 1972 and 1991 inter-Korean
agreements. With North Korea’s economic and
political fortunes declining even further by 1998,
Kim Chong-il initially rejected Kim Dae Jung’s engagement
proposals as well. But the North Korean press
has repeatedly called for the implementation of
the Joint Declaration, and to date both sides have
met the minimum requirements for upholding the agreement.
In fact, many of the voices counseling caution in
implementing the agreement are from conservative
security-minded and economy-minded South Koreans,
who are concerned that the reconnection of road
and rail links will make the South more vulnerable
to an invasion from the North, and that economic
aid and investment will strengthen the Kim Chong-il
regime and its military while draining the battered
South Korean economy.
[53]
South
Korean Aid
The path for North Korean engagement was smoothed
if not paved by South Korean aid. South Korean
government aid to North Korea totaled $232 million
in 1995 (the high cost attributed to the use of
domestic rice), $3 million in 1996, $27 million
in 1997, $11 million in 1998, $28 million in 1999,
and $79 million in 2000 (plus in 2000 another $98
million of food aid as a “loan” and $35 million
from NGOs). [54]
The 2000 aid included 200,000 tons of fertilizer
announced on May 6, a month before the summit meeting;
and 100,000 tons of fertilizer announced on July
26, a day before the first minister’s meeting.
Also, 600,000 tons of food (100,000 tons through
the WFP and 500,000 treated as an unsecured loan)
agreed to during the second working-level economic
meeting in late September and announced on October
4. In 2000 South Korean aid surpassed in value
aid from the rest of the world.[55]
In January 2001 the South pledged another 100,000
tons of grain to North Korea.
Inter-Korean
Trade and Investment
Until 2000, most inter-Korean engagement was of
a business nature. In 1989 inter-Korean trade
(through third countries) totaled $18 million.
In 1990-1992 the South passed a series of “Laws
on South North Economic Cooperation,” prompting
the cautious inauguration of chaebol investments
in processing-on-commission (POC) trade; trade jumped
to $111 million in 1991 and $173 million in 1992. [56]
The North Korea nuclear controversy poisoned the
business atmosphere until the controversy was resolved
by the October 1994 Agreed Framework. On November
7, 1994 the South Korean government lifted its ban
on direct business contacts with North Korea.
In 1995 trade reached $287 million but then leveled
off for the next several years, constrained by the
lack of improvement in North-South relations under
the Kim Young Sam government.
Kim
Dae Jung’s proposal to separate politics and trade
enabled South Korean companies to do business in
North Korea without waiting for the government-level
contact that North Korea continued to avoid.
Unfortunately for the sunshine policy, the financial
crisis that struck South Korea in 1997 restrained
companies from entering new business ventures.
Inter-Korean trade in 1998 was down to $221 million;
in 1999 it bounced back up to $333 million.
These
trade figures cover different kinds of economic
transactions, only some of which are strictly business.[57]
To take an example, in 2000 inter-Korean trade totaled
$425 million,[58]
but this figure includes economic aid from the South,
trade involving the KEDO project, and Hyundai payments
for permission to conduct its money-losing Mount
Kumgang tours. Subtracting these substantial
sums, the estimated inter-Korean trade in 2000 is
only $228 million.
[59]
The
lack of growth in inter-Korean commerce reflects
business uncertainty about the health of the South
Korean economy and the fact that without government-level
connections and guarantees, business transactions
between the two Koreas entails unbearable risk.
The North Koreans are known for their short-term
business practices, taking as much as they can with
little regard for establishing good will.
They have been told that this is how business is
done in the dog-eat-dog world of capitalism.
Estimating the mood of South Korean business interest
in North Korea is complicated by the fact that the
Kim Dae Jung government, in its desire to bolster
its engagement policy, puts a positive spin on inter-Korean
business prospects. On the eve of the summit
meeting announcement, President Kim (with the foreknowledge
of the meeting) predicted “an immense North Korean
business boom, which would dwarf the business boom
the country enjoyed with the Middle East countries,
and small-to-medium-sized businesses will be granted
opportunities to invest in North Korea on an unimaginable
scale.” [60]
Hyundai,
the leading investor in North Korea, is motivated
primarily by the patriotic sentiments of its founder.
From November 1998 to the end of 2000, Hyundai’s
Mount Kumgang tourist business had attracted over
372,000 visitors.[61]
Unfortunately, Hyundai’s upfront costs and fixed
payment rate of $12 million a month to North Korea
have resulted in losses through 2000 of almost $400
million ($624 million in investments, including
$324 million to North Korea, versus $233 in revenue)
, with no prospect in sight of recovering them by
2005, when by the end of the contract Hyundai will
have paid the North Korean government $942 million
for its exclusive tourist rights.[62]
Hyundai has also reached agreement with North Korea
on setting up a gigantic industrial park in Kaesong
to produce goods valued at $20 billion a year when
it is fully operational, but lacks financial resources
to develop the site.[63]
Other chaebol have been much more cautious in their
North Korean investments. The Kim Dae Jung
government has been criticized for pushing large
businesses into North Korea. [64]
It is rumored that the government has been particularly
solicitous of the financial health of the ailing
Hyundai companies.[65]
Medium
and small-size businesses that have invested in
North Korea have been hurt by management problems,
poor infrastructure, and inter-Korean shipping problems.
In early 2001 North Korea blocked the major shipping
route for POC trade owing to a disagreement with
the major inter-Korean shipping company, which refused
to use North Korea’s higher-priced shipping containers.
In
addition to taking the burden of financing North
Korea’s development off the shoulders of the government,
business investment is seen as a way to increase
social contact and to make North Korea economically
dependent on South Korea and the outside world,
thereby making it more difficult for the Kim Chong-il
government to revert to its hermit existence.
In 2000 a total of 7,280 South Koreans visited the
North (not counting 213,000 tourists to Mount Kumgang),
including 543 traveling for business purposes).
[66]
South
Korean Popular and Political Response to Engagement
South Koreans want peace with North Korea in order
to pursue their middle-class dreams. Except
for a brief period during the family reunions, when
South Korean society became a “sea of tears,” South
Koreans have learned to live without the North.
The
public was firmly behind the idea of the June 2000
summit, with 89 percent favoring the idea.[67]
The summit exceeded the expectations of most Koreans
in terms of the cordiality of the meeting, leading
97 percent of a post-summit survey sample to dub
it “successful,” 75 percent to expect the Joint
Declaration to be implemented, and 73 percent to
expect that the meeting would change North Korea
for the better, a level of optimism that might be
characterized in the words of Samuel Johnson as
the triumph of hope over experience.[68]
Some 76 percent said they were willing to pay more
taxes to aid North Korea, a figure that has been
fairly constant in recent years (73 percent in 1996
and 75 percent in 1999). [69]
The most urgent issue was considered to be the reunion
of separated families, which most concerned 50 percent
of the respondents. Yet in another poll taken
at the same time, although 90 percent expected the
summit to change North Korea, 20 percent of the
respondents still considered North Korea to be an
“enemy” (although 17 percent qualified this by agreeing
that the North had the potential to become a reunification
partner), 43 percent viewed North Korea as a partner,
and 35 percent as a partner who could potentially
become an enemy. [70]
The
public pessimism over engagement that appeared in
the autumn of 2000 can be attributed both to North
Korean foot dragging in the implementation of the
social and security aspects of the Joint Declaration
and to a slowdown in the South’s economic recovery.
The public expected reciprocity and gratitude for
aid, but the North Korean government accepted the
aid as its due and always asked for more.
In a poll conducted in September 2000, 55 percent
of respondents approved of the government’s food
aid to the North, 90 percent favored a return trip
to Seoul by Kim Chong-il, and 80 percent supported
President Kim’s engagement policy. But only
56 percent believed that North Korea would implement
the Joint Declaration (down from 75 percent immediately
after the summit), and 60 percent felt that the
pace of North-South engagement was too rapid. [71]
In a poll conducted two weeks later, Kim Dae Jung’s
approval rating had slipped to 47 percent (down
20 points from the previous October), 93 percent
of respondents were concerned about the condition
of the economy, 57 percent supported the engagement
policy, but 75 percent believed that the government
was making too many one-sided concessions to North
Korea.[72]
A poll taken in the middle of December 2000 found
72 percent of respondents complaining that the government
had shown a “servile attitude” in its negotiations
with the North.
Inter-Korean
relations are a new experience for the South Korean
people. The norm of reciprocity is strong,
but the North Korean government, by refusing to
admit its mistakes and blaming the outside world
for its misfortunes, shows little appreciation of
how the South Korean people feel. President
Kim, caught in the middle, is forcefully pursuing
a long-range strategy which tolerates this North
Korean attitude in the short term. But publics
are notoriously short-term in their thinking, and
the engagement policy is bound to raise more hopes
than it fulfills. The Kim Dae Jung administration
has not been transparent in its conduct of engagement.[73]
In difficult times leaders often take a position
considerably ahead of the public, but in doing so
risk a backlash of public opinion if their policies
fall short of success. President Kim may have
overreached himself.
President
Kim’s engagement policy initially received considerable
bi-partisan political support, reflecting the overwhelmingly
positive public response to the summit. But
with Kim’s Millennium Party a minority in the National
Assembly, and Kim in his last two years of office,
politics is emerging from the background.
As the public becomes more skeptical of the prospects
of a fundamental change in North Korea, Kim’s policies
will look increasingly like appeasement. And
if Kim has engaged in irregular or extra-legal deals
to forward his policy, his well-meant efforts may
come back to haunt him and the engagement policy
in the years ahead.
Implications
of Engagement
What engagement means to South Korea depends upon
how engagement is defined. If defined as contact,
then engagement to date must be rated a great success.
If defined by its consequences, the results have
been encouraging compared to past engagement efforts,
but meager by the standard expected for relations
among a homogeneous people. If judged by intentions,
it is hard to say that the evidence suggests any
change in the Kim Chong-il regime’s commitment to
keeping up the barriers around its totalitarian
socialist system.
Future
consequences of North Korea’s engagement depend
upon whether the engagement events to date reflect
a North Korean policy of shallow and limited engagement,
or whether they signal the beginning of a deep and
total engagement. Engagement according to
the first scenario is built on North Korean government
distrust of and hostility toward South Korea.
North Korea would be expected to address engagement
issues in the following order: economic, political,
social, and finally military. Aid agreements
will dominate engagement in the early years.
Political destabilization will also be high on P’yongyang’s
agenda, for old communist habits die hard.
Social and military engagement will be used as rewards
by the North Korean regime to maintain the flow
of economic aid that supports the Kim Chong-il government
and pacifies its people.
Engagement
according to this scenario is likely to become embroiled
in South Korean politics. Opposition parties
will make hay from public disillusionment with the
lack of progress in social contact and threat reduction.
The prospects for Kim Dae Jung’s Millennium Party
will be dim. On the economic front, limited
and sporadic government aid, supplemented by increasing
amounts of NGO aid from those South Korean constituencies
that value their ties to relatives in the North,
will keep North Korea on life support. Trade
and investment will grow slowly. Social contact
will remain at the level of several hundred to a
few thousand controlled personal and mail contacts
a year, a level the Kim Chong-il regime will consider
to be sufficient to uphold its end of the Joint
Declaration agreement.
Even
though limited, this level of engagement will convince
the South Korean public that the threat of invasion
from the North has virtually disappeared.
The South Korean military will begin re-aligning
its forces to cope with threats from larger neighbors
by putting more money into high technology weapons
systems and drawing down its infantry forces. [74]
In its foreign policy, Seoul will gradually reduce
its security ties with the United States, especially
those aspects of the alliance targeted at North
Korea, such as U.S. Army troops stationed in Korea.
South Korea will become more active in dialogue
with its neighbors to coordinate efforts to cope
with North Korea.
On
the other hand, deep engagement, springing from
a new-found trust and acceptance of South Korea
by the Kim Chong-il regime, will simultaneously
pursue military, political, social, and economic
engagement, leading in the direction of complete
reunification. The focus will be on results
rather than process.
Engagement
will receive the support of all South Korean political
parties, although there will always be room for
jousting over specific engagement programs.
Pleased by the changes taking place in North Korea,
the South Korean public will accept higher levels
of taxes to support North Korean aid programs.
Since the South Korean economy alone does not have
the resources to turn around the North Korean economy,
international financial institutions and wealthier
nations, particularly Japan, will be asked to open
their purse strings, and will probably do so.[75]
Trade and investment from the South will rapidly
increase, although the economic “complementarity”
of the two Koreas will not be realized in the form
of company profits for years to come.
The
opportunity for extensive inter-Korean social contact
will be the most dramatic, and the most threatening,
aspect of full engagement. Thousands of families
will be re-united. Tens or hundreds of thousands
of North Koreans will try to move to the South.
The social control and legal aspects of the border
breakdown will threaten overwhelm the South Korean
government, which has to date taken a very cautious
approach in its acceptance of North Korean defectors.
The
military trends accompanying limited engagement
will be magnified in the full engagement scenario.
The South Korean defense budget will plummet.
U.S. forces will be phased out. In foreign
policy, South Korea will begin to turn away from
its security relationship with the United States
and explore new relationships with China, Japan,
and perhaps Russia. The cultural identity
of Koreans will draw them into Asian relationships,
although continued globalization will keep the door
wide open to American influence.
These
are mere speculations. It is too early to
predict with any confidence which of these two scenarios
is more probable. Evidence favoring the first
scenario includes the fact that previous inter-Korean
agreements have after all amounted to very little,
and that in the current engagement North Korea is
eager for economic talks but stalls on social and
military talks. Evidence for the second scenario
is found in the fact that engagement contacts have
been far more extensive this time around, and the
North Korean economy is in much greater need than
it was at the time of previous engagements.
Whether or not to factor in the recent pronouncements
of Kim Chong-il regarding the need for “new thinking”
is a moot point, since these pronouncements are
exceedingly vague (he says he wants to remake North
Korean industry with all new technology, but gives
no indication how he could afford to do so), and
in any case are almost swallowed up by the usual
flood of propaganda extolling the importance of
absolute obedience to Kim and sacrificial support
for the North’s military first policy. In
reality, the most likely course of events will lie
somewhere between these two scenarios.
Inter-Korean
engagement is complicated by the impact of the Korea
policies of the United States, Japan, and China.
For example, while South Korea may be satisfied
to pursue a controlled engagement process even if
it does not yield substantial social consequences,
the status quo will not satisfy the United States,
which seeks to turn back North Korea’s nuclear and
missile capabilities. As President Kim Dae
Jung’s influence wanes, inter-Korean engagement
may come under greater control of the United States.
Engagement
as a process is a fact. The South Korean people
have gained tremendous confidence in their ability
to lead Korea along the path of reunification, even
though some of this confidence may be misplaced.
The two Koreas have taken an irrevocable step toward
reconciliation, and barring outside-initiated events,
it is almost inconceivable that they will ever again
sink to the level of fratricidal warfare.
This is something that President Kim Dae Jung can
honestly boast about, and to Koreans, it is the
single most important goal that could be achieved.
Figure 1
Korean Engagement, January 2000-March 2001
2000
March
10 Berlin Declaration
March 14 North Korea proposes first in a series
of meetings, China
April 9 South Korea announces potential of
600,000 tons of fertilizer aid
April 10 Summit meeting announced
May 6 South Korea announces 200,000
tons of fertilizer aid
June 13-15 Summit Meeting, Joint Declaration, P’yongyang
(postponed 1 day)
July 26 South Korea announces 100,000 tons
of fertilizer aid
June 26-27 First Red Cross Talks, Mt. Kumgang
July 29-31 First Ministerial Talks, Seoul
Aug. 12 South Korean media heads visit P’yongyang
Aug. 14 Liaison offices re-opened, Panmunjom
Aug. 15-18 First Family Reunions, Seoul and P’yongyang
Aug. 23 Hyundai and North Korea agree to launch
Kaesong industrial park
Aug. 29-31 Second Ministerial Talks, P’yongyang
Sept. 2 Return of unconverted prisoners to
North Korea
Sept. 11-14 Kim Yong Sun visits Seoul and Cheju
Sept. 18 South Korea
begins preparations for rail connections
Sept. 20-23 Second Red Cross Talks, Mt. Kumgang
Sept. 25-26 First Defense Ministers meeting, Cheju
Sept. 25-26 First working-level economic meeting,
Seoul
Sept. 27-30 Third Ministerial Talks, Cheju
Oct. 4 South Korea announces 600,000 tons
of food aid
Oct. 10 40 South Korean civic and religious
leaders attend 55th anniversary of WPK
Nov. 8-11 Second working-level economic meeting,
P’yongyang (postponed from Oct. 18)
Nov 30-Dec 2 Second Family Reunions, Seoul and P’yongyang
(postponed from Nov. 2)
Dec. 12-16 Fourth Ministerial Talks, P’yongyang
(postponed from Nov. 28)
Dec. 27-30 First Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation
meeting, P’yongyang
2001
Jan.
25 South Korea announces 100,000 tons of food
aid
Jan. 29-31 Third Red Cross Talks, Mt. Kumgang (postponed
from Dec. 13)
Jan. 30 North Korea provides information on
whereabouts of 375 family members
Feb. 7-10 Power cooperation subcommittee meeting,
P’yongyang
Feb. 26-28 Third family reunions (postponed
from Dec. 5)
March 15 Letter exchanges (postponed from
November)
Scheduled
But Unrealized Contacts
(Middle
Sept.?) Exchange of tour groups, Mt. Paektu and
Mt. Halla
(Middle Nov.?) Second Defense Ministers Meeting
(Feb. 6-8?) Second Inter-Korean Economic
Cooperation meeting
The
Ultimate Oxymoron:
Japan’s Engagement with North Korea
Victor
D. Cha
Edmund Walsh School
of Foreign Service and
Department of Government
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C. 20057
Theoretical
Overview
Over
the past 12-18 months, a dizzying array of countries
have embarked on a path of engagement with the reclusive
Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK).
At the front of this list of countries, which started
with Italy and includes Britain, Australia, Canada,
Belgium and most recently Germany, stand the United
States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan.
Given the half-century of Cold War conflict in which
the three allies’ relationships with North Korea
were constructed, and the crises in 1994, 1998,
and 1999 over nuclear weapons and long-range missile
tests, the notion of engagement with the DPRK appears
almost oxymoronic.
In
part, this assertion derives from the nature of
engagement as a diplomatic tool. Engagement
is a strategy that employs positive incentives to
achieve peaceful change when an existing power structure
or hierarchy is confronted by challengers. [76]
The use of engagement, therefore, historically and
theoretically presumes at least three things:
•
Some confidence that interests and intentions
between the “engager” and target state are somehow
mutually compatible (i.e., not a game of deadlock
but a coordination game where engagement plays
important enabling functions [like transparency
and communication])
•
Some confidence that the target state’s intentions
are indeed engageable—i.e., seeks non-revisionist
or non-revolutionary outcomes, and a degree of
opening; otherwise, engagement is ultimately a
costly and futile exercise.
•
If not #1 or #2, then some level of confidence
that engagement can create the conditions for
#1 or #2—i.e., the hope that the benefits accrued
to the target state as a result of engagement
can have a transforming effect on its underlying
preferences and intentions. [77]
None
of these conditions have been established in the
DPRK case, yet engagement continues, largely led
by the political successes in the North-South dyad
created by the ROK’s sunshine policy.
I
am not opposed to engagement. As I have argued
elsewhere, I see engagement as the necessary current
strategy with North Korea even if one is a hawk. [78]
Engagement and certain instruments associated with
the policy (most notably the Agreed Framework),
absent conditions 1, 2, and 3 above, provide the
best (or only available) window on whether DPRK
intentions are ultimately amenable to peaceful resolution
of conflict on the peninsula. However, of
the “big three” currently seeking engagement with
the North, I believe Japan’s engagement with the
DPRK is the most contradictory and therefore the
least likely to be successful.
As
argued in this paper, three reasons substantiate
this claim. First, Japan has fewer opportunities
than Seoul or Washington to distinguish DPRK tactical
behavior from the underlying intentions. Second,
if the South Korean case is any indication, historical
reconciliation remains an almost immoveable obstacle
(i.e., the modest advances in Japan-ROK interaction
over history offer a positive example what is absent
in the DPRK case). And third, the strategic
priorities that inform Seoul and Washington’s engagement
policy are not necessarily in tune with that of
Japan; and this, in turn, could isolate Japan even
in a best case scenario of engagement bearing fruits.
I begin with a short empirical overview of Japan-DPRK
normalization talks. I then offer the three
reasons that make engagement most problematic for
Japan and evidence in support of the argument.
I conclude with observations about the future and
the implications for trilateral coordination.
Empirical
Overview
History,
Events, and Issues
[79]
There
have basically been four attempts by Japan at engagement
with North Korea. Efforts at improving relations
took place during the detente years (1971-1974)
when a train of Japanese officials went to P’yongyang
(most notably Tokyo Governor Minobe Ryokichi in
1971), the Japanese Diet established a League for
Promotion of Friendship with North Korea, and memorandum
trade agreements were signed. In the early
1980s, additional high-level initiatives were made
through personal emissaries of Prime Minister Nakasone
Yasuhiro. Finally at the end of the Cold War,
a delegation led by then LDP strongman Kanemaru
Shin returned from P’yongyang in 1990 with grand
aspirations for normalization that led to talks
in 1991-1992. [80]
The
fourth and current period began with the resumption
of preliminary normalization dialogue between Tokyo
and P’yongyang in December 1999.[81]
Two sets of talks (foreign ministry and Red Cross)
took place in Beijing with the latter producing
a “humanitarian cooperation agreement” in which
the two sides agreed to resume home visits for Japanese
spouses of DPRK citizens. [82]
The two delegations also committed to advising their
respective governments to address in prompt fashion
each side’s key humanitarian concern – i.e., for
Japan, the alleged abduction of citizens by the
DPRK; and for P’yongyang, the provision of food
aid.
Japan
and the DPRK followed through on the December meetings
enabling the opening round of formal normalization
talks in April 2000 (4-8). [83]
However, any hopes of success were quickly dashed
as both sides laid out their terms of negotiation.
Kojiro Takano, Japan's ambassador to KEDO and chief
negotiator to the talks, and Foreign Minister Yohei
Kono emphasized the criticality of resolving the
abduction issue, while DPRK counterparts firmly
entrenched themselves in an immoveable negotiating
position demanding colonial apologies, $5-$10 billion
in material compensation, and dismissing Japanese
counter-demands for addressing of the ballistic
missile threat and abduction issues. Another
set of talks in May were scheduled but later indefinitely
postponed by P’yongyang in spite of a goodwill gesture
by Japan to deliver the first installment of the
100,000 ton commitment of humanitarian rice aid
to the DPRK.
After
a four-month hiatus, Japan offered token amounts
of aid through international channels to help jump
start another round of normalization dialogue.
The aid was offered after the normalization talks
but the pattern of what Bob Manning has termed in
a US-DPRK context as “food-for-meetings”—either
in advance or retroactively--was clearly set in
the Japan-DPRK context. Talks resumed in August
2000 with some encouraging signs, producing agreements
in principle on timelines for the return of cultural
assets. Most important it also appeared to
produce an implicit DPRK acceptance of a formula
on the difficult issue of compensation. Following
the model of the 1965 pact with South Korea, Japan
proposed to offer not historical compensation but
“economic aid” (the North could call it whatever
it wanted to its domestic audience). The North
did not outright reject this idea which gave optimists
the impression that they may be amenable to the
formula. In addition, optimists hoped that
the aid package to come with normalization would
then prompt the North to resolve the abductions
issue in some political fashion.
Pursuant
to the meetings, confidence in Japan was bolstered
by a third round of homecomings for Japanese wives
(residing in North Korea) in September--arguably,
a new bargaining chip for the North (i.e., politically
important for Japan and relatively costless for
the DPRK). Premier Mori and Kim Yong-nam agreed
to meet at the UN Millennium summit in New York
(before the North’s much publicized problems at
Frankfurt airport). Japanese investors expressed
interest in Hyundai projects in North Korea (the
Mt. Kumgang tourism complex and the Kaesong industrial
park). And as a new turn in the path to normalization,
pro-North Korean residents in Japan were allowed
to visit relatives in the South for the first time
and resident associations in Japan representing
the two Koreas began talks.[84]
However, just as momentum appeared to be building
with a string of positive outcomes, another round
of talks in late-October brought the process to
a screeching halt as the North rejected out of hand
Japanese attempts to elaborate on the proposals
made in August.
Japan’s
Engagement Dilemmas
The last round of normalization talks made explicit
the material quid pro quos that were in play for
the two sides. Tokyo wants satisfactory resolution
of the abduction issue and some assurances on DPRK
missiles that might come with the establishment
of normal diplomatic relations. It is willing
to provide occasional disbursements of food aid
as goodwill gestures to bring the North to the table.
P’yongyang seeks the large influx of funds to come
with normalization settlement and is willing to
grant temporary homeland visits for wives as goodwill
gestures.
To
an objective observer, these two positions may not
appear irreconcilable, and indeed, there may be
a narrowing of the gap in the near future.
However, the problems for Tokyo with regard to engagement
with P’yongyang run deeper than the stated issues.
In short, these problems have to do with DPRK intentions,
history, and subtle differences in the security
concerns that inform Japanese investment in engagement
vis-à-vis the ROK and United States.
Tactical
Behavior and “Baskets” of Transparency-Building
issues
The first deeper problem for Japanese engagement
is the inability to distinguish clearly between
DPRK tactics and intentions. As noted above,
engagement strategies conceptually are likely to
be successful if there is some sense on the part
of the implementer that the target state’s intentions
are amenable to reform and opening. Engagement
will not be successful if the target’s intentions
are revisionist or aggressive. The most dangerous
and costly engagement policy is one in which the
implementer goes forward despite uncertainty about
the target’s intentions, or simply assumes that
engagement will transform those revisionist intentions
(e.g., Chamberlain’s Munich Pact).
In
the case of the DPRK, the future greatly hinges
on the extent to which DPRK intentions have changed
fundamentally from revisionist and aggressive ones
to a more cooperative and moderated outlook.
Both skeptics and optimists would agree that the
recent spate of “smile” diplomacy conducted by P’yongyang
reflects a change in tactics largely for the purpose
of regime survival. The as-yet unanswered
question is whether there is more behind the smile.
In other words, all that the North has undertaken
in terms of opening—the June summit, family reunions,
normalization with some European countries, and
Kim Chong-il’s trip to Shanghai—is consonant with
nothing more than tactical changes in behavior.
There is no sense in these actions that a fundamental
change in underlying preferences is driving the
new policies. [85]
Proponents
of sunshine respond by arguing that encouraging
tactical opening and spurring some economic growth
in the North will in effect start a process of change
that will have a moderating effect on DPRK intentions.
Such a classical liberal interdependence argument
may be true. At the same time, there is little
in the past history that makes one confident about
such lessons applying to North Korea. The
periods in history when the DPRK has been economically
strong have been exactly those periods when its
external behavior vis-à-vis the ROK was far
from moderate.
The
inability to distinguish between tactics and preferences
is a problem faced by all three allies’ engagement
policies with the North. Indeed, all three
have been willing to risk some opacity on P’yongyang’s
underlying preferences and pursue engagement as
a window on these intentions. The dilemma
for Japan, relative to the other allies, is that
there are arguably fewer “baskets” of transparency-building
issues on which to engage in order to get a better
sense of DPRK intentions. For example, all
three allies could gain a better sense of DPRK intentions
through implementation of the Agreed Framework or
through tension-reduction in the conventional military
balance.[86]
In addition to this, Seoul has a weighty basket
of issues, including family reunions, infrastructure
rejuvenation projects, ministerial meetings, and
summits, on which to gauge further DPRK intentions.
To a lesser extent than Seoul, Washington too has
a basket of issues including MIA remains and terrorism
where DPRK concessions offer a window on whether
intentions rather than tactics are changing.
However,
for Japan, the basket of transparency-building issues
is substantially lighter. Home visits for
Japanese wives is a potential vehicle by which to
communicate political goodwill, but even with DPRK
concessions, there is little value-added in terms
of understanding preferences. Similarly, the
abduction issue has been a major impediment to normalization
talks, but actions by P’yongyang to resolve this
issue, again, do not convey a sense of “costliness”
on P’yongyang’s part and create confidence that
preferences or aggressive intentions vis a vis Japan
are changing (missiles are dealt with below).
The North arguably could communicate its good intentions
by acknowledging that Japan is no longer a target
of its nuclear deterrent.[87]
However such a hypothetical presumes that P’yongyang
would admit that it had a strategic doctrine and
possessed nuclear weapons, neither of which seems
likely in the current situation.
Historical
Animosity
One response to the above discussion might be to
advocate that Japan expand the list of issues on
which it could engage the DPRK. In other words,
create new avenues by which to build transparency
and confidence that the DPRK’s recent opening is
well-intended. However, the problem here is
that historical animosity places inherent limits
on the range of available issues.
As
is well-known, while historical animosity between
the two Koreas and Japan date back to the late sixteenth
century Hideyoshi invasions, the defining event
in a modern context was Korea's colonial subjugation
to Japan from 1910 to 1945. In the Japan-ROK
case, the relationship, although plagued by history,
did have elements of admiration that are completely
absent in the DPRK case. Enmity stemming from
the colonial period dominates, and has become deeply
ingrained in the Korean mindset through a variety
of formal and informal institutions. Antagonistic
images are passed down generationally through family
folklore, chauvinist histories taught in secondary
schools (probably exponentially more so in the DPRK
than in the ROK and Japan), and government propaganda-perpetuated
stereotypes such that the negativism becomes a part
of one’s identity. North Korean self-identity
becomes constructed in linear opposition to Japan.[88]
Moreover,
North Korea’s thaw in relations with the United
States and ROK have counterintuitively increased
history-based invectives against Japan. For
example, in spite of the positive atmosphere after
the June summit, which Japan supported whole heartedly,
one cannot help but think the Japanese were a bit
uneasy with the emerging constellation of relations.
Because DPRK rhetoric with regard to the United
States and Seoul moderated after the summit, the
result was that Japan became the target of propaganda
with laser-beam intensity.
The
likelihood of this situation being rectified is
low. First, one can assume that the DPRK is
undergoing significant internal adjustment as the
domestic images of Seoul and Washington are probably
undergoing a process of rapid reconstruction.
To effect a similar transformation with Japan would
appear to be difficult, particularly if DPRK identity
and national purpose needs to be constructed negatively
(i.e., against an adversary).
Second,
Japan’s relations with the ROK offer a positive
example of the missing elements to any form of Japan-DPRK
historical reconciliation. Historical enmity
has certainly not been eradicated from Seoul-Tokyo
relations, but the relationship has progressed to
the point where historical issues do not persistently
lead to diplomatic breakdowns and political crises
as was the case in the 1950s through 1980s.
In part this process of reconciliation and closer
relations was spurred on by basic security threats
in the post-Cold War (i.e., DPRK), but also critical
to the process was a demonstrated willingness on
the part of South Koreans to look forward and stop
dwelling on the past. This was particularly
evident at the Kim-Obuchi summit in October 1998.
What was impressive about the summit was not the
colonial apology, the fishery zones agreement, the
commitment to joint naval exercises, or the joint
action plan, all unprecedented accomplishments of
their own merit.[89]
But particularly telling was how Kim Dae-Jung spoke
of Koreans as equally responsible as Japanese for
putting the history issue to rest and moving forward.
Kim called “infantile” the fixation on 50 years
of negative Japan-ROK interaction at the expense
of 1500 years exchanges and cooperation, and praised
Japan’s peace constitution and role as an ODA provider.
These were extremely important signs of a willingness
in the South to change the terms of the relationship
in their own minds and to move beyond demonized
images of Japan as a former colonizer.
This
ability to “move on,” in my opinion, was directly
linked to two trends–democracy and development.
As South Korea embraced democracy and progressed
toward economic prosperity, its enhanced international
prestige (reflected in events such as the 1988 Seoul
Olympics, UN membership in 1991, OECD membership
in 1996, and 2002 World Cup with Japan) fostered
a growing self-confidence among Koreans that reduced
national insecurities and xenophobia, and nurtured
a less petty, less emotional attitude in dealings
with Japan. As generations of Koreans continue
to live under a democratic and developed society,
they cultivate norms of compromise, nonviolence,
and respect for opposing viewpoints that become
externalized in their attitudes toward Japan.
In addition, future Korean leaders not having experienced
the occupation are less apt to carry the historical/emotional
baggage borne by their predecessors, and more apt
to engage in rational and logical dialogue.
Japan-ROK
relations therefore offers one of the best examples
of historical reconciliation in the region (e.g.,
juxtaposed to Japan-China relations), and if the
factors responsible in ROK case are at all able
to be generalized, this augurs extremely poorly
for achieving similar results in the DPRK case.
None of the factors in terms of democracy, development,
or leadership are present in the North Korea case.
This assessment does not deny that a normalization
settlement may still occur between Tokyo and P’yongyang,
but it does mean that historical reconciliation
under current conditions will not occur in spite
of any material agreement. Hence a normalization
settlement would result in a situation similar to
1965 where material incentives (security and economics)
pressed a settlement, but perceptions and attitudes
remained highly antagonistic. From the Japanese
perspective, this then begs two questions: why press
for normalization, if Japan will still remain demonized
in DPRK rhetoric; and why press for normalization,
if residual historical enmity ensures that a settlement
will provide little in terms of a window on DPRK
intentions?
Misaligned
strategic priorities
The third obstacle to Japanese engagement is perhaps
the most problematic. This has to do with
ensuring that Japanese security interests do not
get obscured by the whirlwind of activity on the
peninsula. While Tokyo fully supports the
sunshine policy, conservative circles in Japan are
rightfully worried about being entrapped in a position
where the thaw on the Peninsula gives rise to three
negative dynamics: (1) greater DPRK obstinacy
in talks with Japan; 2) ROK aid that may bolster
the North’s missile threat; and 3) ROK requests
for Japanese assistance to North Korea.
The
third negative is problematic barring any movement
on the missile issue as Japan cannot simply dismiss
ROK requests given the priority placed on maintaining
trilateral policy coordination over the past two
years. Moreover, meeting these requests from
allies without any tangible improvements in normalization
dialogue or moderation of the DPRK threat are not
only domestically anathema but also could be self-defeating
for the dialogue itself (in that P’yongyang can
get something for nothing). This complexity
of this mixed motives were reflected in Japanese
government reports on the DPRK in the middle of
2000 from the prime minister’s office, foreign ministry,
and JDA each trying to reconcile competing imperatives
of dialogue, deterrence, engagement, and support
of trilateral policy coordination with the allies
In
the context of trilateral policy coordination, what
is perhaps most concerning as one looks down the
road of Japan-DPRK dialogue is that even best case
scenarios appear somewhat unsettling from a Japanese
security perspective. As noted above, the
engagement dilemma for Tokyo is uncertainty over
whether DPRK opening is tactical or represents deeper
transformation of preferences toward reform.
Among the three allies, one imagines a spectrum
of views on this issue: At one extreme, the Kim
Dae Jung and the ROK sunshine policy banks on a
transformation of preferences; in the middle stands
the United States which hopes for the same but the
skepticism is palpable; and at the other end stands
Japan. The latter statement may sound strange,
given that Japan has remained in line with the Perry
process of trilateral coordination and supports
the engagement policy. But how much of this
support stems from a belief in engagement per se
and how much stems from Japan’s dutifully being
a good ally?
One
could argue that Tokyo sits at the farthest end
of this spectrum not because it is inherently more
pessimistic than its allies, but because even in
an optimistic extrapolation of the current situation,
it may end up in the worst-off position.
In other words, the critical fork in the road that
will prove the current worth of these engagement
initiatives is whether DPRK cooperation will move
beyond the economic issues to the harder military
and security issues. In a best case
scenario, one might imagine the North forgoing development
and testing of the longer-range ballistic missile
programs (i.e., Taepo-dong I and II) because these
have the highest value-added for the P’yongyang—the
North can expect asymmetric returns and/or compensation
for giving up a “potential” program (TD-I) and a
future one (TD-II). In a best-case scenario,
the North might even agree to military hot lines,
advanced notification and observation of troop movements
and exercises, regular meetings of a military committee,
and even some mutual conventional force reductions.
These sorts of concessions (admittedly very optimistic)
by the North would satisfy South Korean, Japanese,
and US concerns regarding peninsular security and
nonproliferation, but what they would not address
are Japanese concerns about the North’s medium-range
missile arsenal.
With
an estimated range of 1000-1300 kilometers and payloads
of 700-1000 kg, the No-dong is among the North’s
most developed missile programs after the Scud B
and Scud C missiles. In 1999, it is estimated
that the DPRK produced between 75 and 150 missiles
of which one-third were sold to foreign countries.
Unlike the Taepo-dong program which is still in
the development and testing stage, experts estimate
that the No-dong became operational in 1994 and
that the North has deployed between four missile
battalions (about nine to ten launchers per battalion)
to as many as 100 missiles since 1998 at various
sites inland and along the northern borders. [90]
Arguably these deployed capabilities are the most
immediately threatening to Japanese security.
At the same time, they also constitute the demonstrated
operational security capabilities that P’yongyang
is least likely to part with. Japan may therefore
be stuck between a rock and a hard place.
The “final bargain” for the DPRK in the future may
be to trade some conventional arms cuts and its
potential long-range ballistic missile aspirations
for money and the guarantee of regime survival.
This may bring a moderation of nonproliferation
and peninsular security threats for the US and ROK,
but it will not bring security to Japan as fully
as one would hope because of the residual and real
No-dong threat.
Such
hypotheticals about the future may be farther forward
than people like to think. After all, there
is enough uncertainty regarding North Korea in the
present. Nevertheless, this is a very real
problem down the road, and it is one that will test
the trilateral coordination process among the allies.
Perhaps most problematic, it is a dilemma that arises
for Japan if things with North Korea go the way
we want them to. “Be careful what you
wish for” must be in the minds of some far-sighted
Japanese strategists as they adhere with trepidation
to the trilateral process of engagement.
Dilemmas
of Engagement
To sum up then, there is no denying the Japan-DPRK
normalization dialogue will continue, and indeed,
there may even be a settlement in the future.
But such progress only would mask what are some
intractable dilemmas for Japan.
Dilemma
#1 - Engagement’s value-added?
• The benefits of Japanese engagement with
the DPRK are unclear. DPRK acts of cooperation
and reciprocity based on the current set of quid
pro quos in the normalization talks would not
offer sufficiently convincing evidence that DPRK
intentions have changed (versus merely tactical
behavior).
• Even if a normalization settlement were
reached, such a settlement would be would be pragmatically-driven
and effect no real change in the level of animosity
given residual historical issues -- again, meaning
from Japan’s perspective that the critical question
of DPRK intentions still remains unanswered.
Dilemma
#2 - Defining engagement’s successes?
• As noted above, this dilemma is the counterintuitive
regarding engagement’s success. Even if
US-Japan-ROK engagement results in a missile deal
with the United States and conventional force
reductions on the peninsula, there is the distinct
possibility that such a deal will not address
with equal expedience the deployed No-dong threat
on the ground and therefore still leave uncertain
DPRK intentions to Tokyo (while perhaps making
them at the same time more positively transparent
for the US and Seoul).
Dilemma
#3 - Engagement’s vicious circle?
• The more US-ROK-Japan engagement is successful
at achieving progress vis-à-vis US-DPRK
and DPRK-ROK, the less likely there will be parallel
progress on the Japan-DPRK dyad.
•
Moreover, the more engagement succeeds in thawing
relations with Seoul and Washington, the more
likely that residual historical enmity will focus
on Japan as the primary adversary. A vicious
circle results where Japanese support of engagement
could be conceivably self-defeating.
The
Dead End at the end of 2000
A microcosm of these problems were evident at the
end of 2000. Japan approached the October
2000 round of normalization talks with the determination
to achieve a breakthrough. Prime Minister
Mori Yoshiro (at the advice of Kim Dae Jung) sent
a personal letter to DPRK leader Kim Chong-il requesting
summit talks (revealed October 6). In advance
of the October-end normalization talks, Tokyo announced
a contribution of 500,000 tons of rice to the North
(a five-fold increase over past contributions).
Having greased the wheels, Japanese negotiators
then put forth the proposal for a purported $9 billion
(60 percent in grant aid and 40 percent in loans)
as a quid pro quo for North Korean moderation of
the missile threat and satisfactory resolution of
the alleged abduction of Japanese nationals, which
would lay the groundwork for a move to political
normalization of relations. Despite Japanese
hopes of ending the year 2000 with any progress,
P’yongyang’s continued intransigence dashed all
such aspirations.[91]
While Japanese negotiators did not expect their
counterparts to outright accept this idea, there
were indications based on the last round of negotiations
that P’yongyang would show a “positive attitude.”
Instead, the North responded that such attempts
to side-step an admission of colonial repentance
was logically inconsistent with the notion of opening
a new era of cooperation (which in no uncertain
terms also criticized the South for “selling out”
in its 1965 settlement). As some observers
noted, the North was also clearly abstaining from
any commitments with Japan while the possibility
of a U.S. presidential visit hung in the air. [92]
The disappointment among Japanese officials at this
outcome was palpable and manifest in very frank
public statements that talks would not restart until
sometime in 2001 in part because as one official
put it, “...we have exhausted what we have in our
pockets.”
Conclusion
The current constellation of forces suggests that
despite all of these seemingly insurmountable problems,
Japan-DPRK talks will be a likely focus of activity
in 2001. In Japan, Tokyo probably took their
best shot at reaching a breakthrough as a weak Mori
government, surviving a no-confidence vote in late
November, now faces mounting criticism from the
domestic opposition at its overly conciliatory efforts
to woo P’yongyang. [93]
In Seoul, what is certain to be more difficult economic
times in the new year will increasingly make it
difficult for Kim Dae Jung to continue financing
the sunshine policy with the North off the backs
of the South Korean taxpayers. And in the
US, Clinton’s non-visit and the transition to a
new Bush administration means that Washington will,
at best, reluctantly continue pursuing engagement
with the North.
If
one believes that the North pursues only one bilateral
channel at a time (to maximize leverage by playing
the others off the chosen channel), then this confluence
of factors suggest a new algorithm in 2001.
While 2000 saw activity on the North-South and US-North
Korean channels with the Japanese nervously trying
to keep pace, lack of movement on the Seoul and
Washington channels in early 2001 may incline P’yongyang
to focus more on Tokyo. At the same time,
a Mori government (if it is still around) will need
to appease a domestic opposition impatient with
“soft policies” toward the North. Whether
this new algorithm creates opportunities for progress
in Japan-DPRK relations is, frankly, anyone’s guess
but not an optimistic proposition given the deeper
dilemmas that Japan faces with engagement.
China
And A Changing North Korea:
Issues, Uncertainties, And Implications?* [94]
Jonathan
D. Pollack
US Naval War College
The
major developments in North Korean diplomacy and
external relations over the past year have required
all outside actors to reassess their policy assumptions
and expectations with respect to the Korean peninsula.
Among the outside powers, the developments in Chinese-North
Korean bilateral relations seem second in consequence
only to the North-South summit and subsequent negotiations
between P’yongyang and Seoul. The pivotal
talks that resulted in President Kim Dae-jung’s
visit to P’yongyang were conducted in secret in
Beijing and Shanghai, suggesting a highly discreet
facilitating role by Chinese officials. Kim
Chong-il’s late May 2000 visit to Beijing only weeks
prior to the inter-Korean summit indicated a degree
of consultation and coordination in Chinese-North
Korean relations rarely seen in the past, and far
in excess of the prior uneasy relations between
the younger Kim and his Chinese counterparts.
Subsequent developments, including Kim’s January
2001 visit to Beijing and Shanghai and his readiness
to identify much more explicitly with China’s economic
strategies, further confirmed the changes in Sino-North
Korean bilateral relations. Though none of
these developments ensure a smooth evolution in
future ties, they bespeak a major change in the
atmosphere and potentially the substance of Beijing-P’yongyang
relations.
To
further consider these trends and possibilities,
this paper will seek to place Chinese-North Korean
relations in their larger context. Although
the Chinese have long considered security and stability
on the peninsula very important to Chinese interests,
Beijing has generally preferred to wield influence
quietly and indirectly. For much of the 1990s
this was making a virtue of necessity. There
seems little question that the major breakthroughs
in Chinese-ROK relations over the past decade were
deeply alienating to the North Korean leadership.
As Chinese leaders (most notably, Deng Xiaoping)
with long standing personal ties to Kim Il Sung
and his close subordinates withdrew from leadership
roles or passed from the scene, relations between
the two capitals seemed increasingly tenuous.
The highest ranking Chinese official to visit the
DPRK over the entire decade was Minister of Foreign
Affairs Qian Qichen in 1992, and only then to notify
Kim Il Sung of China’s impending diplomatic recognition
of the ROK. By contrast, a full array of ranking
Chinese leaders (including President Jiang Zemin)
visited the South over the course of the 1990s.
Indeed, China’s Minister of Defense Chi Haotian,
a veteran of the Korean War, paid an official visit
to the ROK in January 2000, nearly, a year prior
to visiting the DPRK, still ostensibly a PRC ally.
These diplomatic slights were powerfully underscored
by the cessation of heavily subsidized largesse
that Beijing and Moscow (but especially Moscow)
had long provided the North. With China moving
ever closer to the ROK despite heated North Korean
objections, relations with the North became a subordinate
factor in Chinese foreign policy, with P’yongyang
relegated to a marginal role in Chinese regional
policy calculations.
However,
the nuclear crisis of 1993-94 and the intensive
diplomacy evident since that time inescapably returned
North Korea to the Chinese policy agenda.
But there is little first-hand knowledge of interactions
between Beijing and P’yongyang during the mid- and
late 1990s. Indeed, much of what is known
or inferred about Chinese policy calculations toward
the North derives from consultations between Chinese
officials and American and South Korean counterparts
during the latter half of the 1990s, when the United
States sought to induce North Korea to freeze or
sharply curtail its nuclear and missile activities,
and when the ROK sought a direct dialogue with P’yongyang.
But these exchanges reveal far more about Chinese
evaluations of U.S. and South Korean policy initiatives
that they do about China’s readiness and capability
to exert influence over North Korean policymaking.
Thus,
the extent of Chinese leverage over North Korean
decision-making and the willingness of China to
expend political capital in dealings with the North
remain the subject of ample debate among analysts.
Many observers assert that China has been able to
wield influence over North Korean policy at various
critical junctures, while still retaining a measure
of plausible deniability over its actions.
For example, even during the deep chill in bilateral
relations evident during the 1990s, the Chinese
and North Korean military establishments maintained
intermittent contact and exchanges, befitting their
status as past allies and neighbors. There
are also commonalities in the design of the failed
North Korean satellite with early version Chinese
satellites, suggesting a degree of unreported scientific
collaboration, much of it with important national
defense implications. Others, however, have
remained highly skeptical of the extent of Beijing’s
involvement in North Korean affairs, even when various
issues seemingly touched on critical Chinese security
interests. Even in the aftermath of Kim Chong-il’s
long awaited visits to China, there is skepticism
that the Chinese are prepared to do more than extend
the North Korean leader an extra measure of courtesy
and leadership attention. Thus, some see China’s
readiness to host Kim Chong-il as an effort to propitiate
the North Korean leadership, rather than a fundamental
effort to reshape political and economic developments
in the North.
But
numerous observers believe that Kim’s open endorsement
of Chinese economic reform presages an effort by
P’yongyang to remake North Korea along comparable
lines. According to this interpretation, North
Korea hopes to achieve an economic transformation
through domestic economic reform and infusions of
foreign capital while retaining absolute power in
the hands of Kim and his key lieutenants.
Under such conditions, China could potentially wield
decisive influence over future policy choices in
the North. It bears emphasis, however, that
these are inferred North Korean policy objectives,
rather than Chinese commitments. Thus,
there are continued asymmetries between P’yongyang’s
needs and expectations, and what Beijing may feel
is in its interest to undertake.
However,
without understanding the larger context of Chinese
policy deliberations, analysis of likely Chinese
policy calculations remains highly speculative.
There is little consensus among analysts about why
and how much North Korea matters to China (especially
in comparison to China’s burgeoning ties with the
South), whether and how the developments of the
past year have altered Chinese policy assumptions,
and the readiness of Beijing to incur significant
political and economic commitments to the North.
Equally or more significant, the Chinese recognize
that the prospects for change in the North will
affect a much wider range of Chinese political and
security interests. Indeed, it seems quite
likely that the Chinese view their stakes on the
peninsula more in terms of their ramifications for
regional security as a whole, including critical
issues in U.S.-China relations. Should North
Korea sustain its accommodation with the South (including
steps to reduce the risks of renewed warfare) and
exercise credible longer term restraint in its missile
development, deployment, and exports, this could
induce significant changes in longer term security
trends on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia as
a whole. These trends would be broadly supportive
of Chinese regional security objectives, and might
persuade Beijing to lend fuller support to North
Korea’s domestic goals. Contrarily, the North’s
unwillingness or inability to sustain meaningful
policy change, including credible threat reduction
toward the South, would sharply diminish the prospects
for improvements in U.S.-North Korean relations,
narrowing China’s room for policy maneuver, and
reducing Beijing’s incentives to devote renewed
attention to relations with the North.
But
officials in Beijing also recognize the depths of
the domestic crisis that North Korea continues to
face. Though the Chinese have rarely discussed
North Korea’s internal development in much detail,
the basics seem beyond dispute. Notwithstanding
its modest economic recovery of the past year, North
Korea represents a system and society in paralysis
and acute decline. Without major energy, food,
and humanitarian assistance from the outside world
(including from China), North Korea’s prospects
appear decidedly grim. Its agricultural base,
while always problematic in the past, seems unable
to rise above subsistence levels, and its education,
public health, and social welfare functions are
in utter shambles. The stripping of the North’s
industrial base has been equally pronounced; grievous
energy shortages make the prospects for any sustained
economic recovery in the absence of massive external
assistance highly uncertain. Chinese scholars
in private conversation draw obvious parallels to
the disasters that befell China in the aftermath
of the Great Leap Forward; the Chinese readily recognize
the social and political pathology of a regime still
in the pervasive grip of the cult of personality.
The
Chinese are therefore heartened by the seeming interest
shown by Kim Chong-il and his closest subordinates
in exploring the possibilities of economic change
in the North, with China presumably seen as a relevant
example. Beijing is equally gratified by the
North’s willingness to enter into direct negotiations
with the South and to sharply curtail its half century
of ideological and military hostility directed against
the ROK. For reasons that we will explore
subsequently, the Chinese leadership sees such changes
as substantiating its preferred outcomes in relations
between the two Koreas and in regional politics,
economics, and security as a whole. The interconnectedness
of Chinese policy objectives at these levels warrants
particular mention. But it remains less clear
how the Chinese are likely to balance their various
interests and prospective policy opportunities in
coming years.
At
the same time, the Chinese very likely entertain
few illusions about the prospects for an early and
easy transition in the North. Kim Chong-il
may have indeed concluded that there is no alternative
for regime viability than to accommodate to the
outside world, which in turn is expected to yield
extensive assistance from external powers.
But there is little reason to believe that the North
Korean system is even remotely prepared for the
stresses it will experience should meaningful change
be attempted, including major alterations in the
scope and magnitude of foreign involvement in the
North. It is telling that neither of Kim Chong-il’s
visits to China has included a significant complement
of economic advisers, with the delegations weighted
heavily toward senior generals and party and government
officials. However, some reports suggest that
Kim will undertake a third visit to China in the
spring of 2001, with his delegation expected to
include a number of senior economic advisors.
Despite such indications, it is highly unlikely
that the Chinese are prepared to seek a highly interdependent
relationship with Kim Chong-il. They do not desire
an overly encumbered relationship with the North,
but rather one that will improve the prospects for
normalcy, predictability, and incremental accommodation
between North and South. Such a pattern would
permit China to advance its larger goals in regional
security and regional economic interdependence,
while enabling simultaneous if asymmetric ties between
China and the two Koreas. A much fuller relationship
with P’yongyang would in all likelihood have to
await far more definitive indications of policy
change in the North.
But
the Chinese are also seeking to ensure that major
changes in North Korea’s external strategies are
not undertaken to the detriment of Chinese interests.
In this regard, the Chinese would seem likely to
prefer that North Korea undertake a balanced relationship
toward the various major powers, thereby precluding
any state from wielding disproportionate influence
over the North. In view of the intense nationalism
that pervades North Korean political life, the notion
of any external actor exercising preponderant influence
over decisionmaking in the North seems almost laughable.
Indeed, the Chinese may well feel that their current
position on the peninsula (though not optimal) is
far stronger than that of any other major power.
An active effort by North Korea to curry increased
favor with China provides Beijing with ample flexibility
and latitude in its relations with Seoul.
Indeed, as the negotiations of the past year demonstrate,
the Chinese are better able to exercise a role between
the two Koreas than anyone else, and this appears
to be a role that Seoul especially has grown to
value. Though P’yongyang’s prior negotiating
behavior (to be briefly examined below) provides
ample evidence of brinksmanship as a negotiating
tool, the returns on such an approach have diminished
over time. Thus, a North Korean leadership
less inclined to perturb or threaten the status
quo is far less likely to create major complications
for Chinese regional security strategy, and may
also inhibit future U.S. policy options, including
accelerated pursuit of ballistic missile defense
in East Asia or plans for national missile defense.
Beijing may well be counseling North Korean restraint
in this regard, in that neither has incentives to
provide the Bush Administration with additional
justification for some of its proposed defense programs.
That said, neither has an effective means to prevent
unilateral pursuit of such programs.
But
Beijing has consistently had to react to activist
U.S. strategies toward the North, hoping to inhibit
courses of action could undermine China’s security
interests. The Chinese can point to the extraordinary
gyrations in U.S. policy toward the North during
the mid and late 1990s to illustrate this phenomenon.
On repeated occasions, the United States sought
Chinese support for programs to curtail North Korean
nuclear and missile development, with the Chinese
consistently demurring from any options that tilted
toward the coercive end of the spectrum. It
was only following protracted negotiations (i.e.,
the Agreed Framework) and a subsequent policy reassessment
and proposal to the North (i.e., the Perry report)
that the United States decided to forego or at least
defer more coercive strategies. Somewhat paradoxically,
however, the repeated twists and turns of U.S. policy
enhanced P’yongyang’s bargaining power.
It
was widely assumed by American policymakers that
the Chinese saw the prospect of a North Korean nuclear
weapons breakthrough as profoundly destabilizing
to peninsular and regional security. It is
far less certain, however, that the Chinese were
ever persuaded that North Korea was embarked on
such a program, perhaps explaining the seeming equanimity
with which Beijing viewed many of North Korea’s
actions. Still unresolved, however, is whether
China sustained a credible enough relationship with
North Korea during those years to secure direct
assurances from P’yongyang on this fundamental question.
Regardless of the answer, some Chinese analysts
viewed the North’s threatened withdrawal from the
Nonproliferation Treaty and its subsequent efforts
to defy the inspections regime as designed principally
to exploit one of its few sources of meaningful
leverage. As a consequence, the Chinese repeatedly
counseled diplomatic negotiations as the preferred
means to restrain North Korean activities, simultaneously
warning of the major risks posed by more coercive
strategies.
Even
as the United States has subsequently acknowledged
Chinese assistance in defusing the nuclear crisis,
few officials have ever characterized this role
in any detail. Repeated American urgings that
Beijing take steps commensurate with what U.S. officials
deemed the gravity of developments on the peninsula
fell largely on deaf ears in Beijing. All
too often, the tenor of U.S.-Chinese exchanges seemed
formulaic and unsatisfactory, with the Chinese repeatedly
counseling patience and urging the actions of all
sides to conform to unspecified actions conducive
to ensuring stability. Chinese officials seemed
especially insistent that no undue pressure be brought
to bear on North Korea, even when P’yongyang was
especially defiant on matters related to their nuclear
weapons and missile development programs.
Though Beijing at times voiced indirect criticism
of the North when P’yongyang’s negotiating behavior
seemed especially egregious, the Chinese often seemed
more concerned that U.S. actions might induce an
even larger crisis.
During
the mid to late 1990s, U.S. worries about P’yongyang’s
nuclear and missile programs were abetted by widely
expressed fears of the prospect of a systemic meltdown
in the North that might trigger a larger regional
crisis. Here as well, most Chinese expressed
comparable skepticism about U.S. concerns, arguing
that the North was prepared to tolerate unspeakable
privation among its citizens (including, for example,
widespread malnutrition and starvation) without
modifying its regime goals. Although the Chinese
did concur in various multilateral initiatives in
pursuit of enhanced normalcy on the peninsula (in
particular, the four party talks in Geneva), such
a facilitative role did not constrain China from
reserving its own options in a crisis-even as its
officials remained highly elusive in characterizing
their potential behavior and policy objectives under
more stressful circumstances.
Despite
China’s seeming detachment during much of the diplomatic
maneuvering of the mid to late 1990s, this may well
have reflected China’s judgment about the efficacy
of seeking to compel North Korea under duress, rather
than a true reflection of China’s abiding concerns
about instability on the peninsula. Indeed,
even as China routinely dismissed the prospects
for internal unrest or systemic meltdown in the
North, Beijing as well as Washington opted to increase
their food and energy assistance to the North, presumably
in the interests of avoiding a much more substantial
crisis. In retrospect, this may also have
been a means for the Chinese to quietly rebuild
their diminished political capital with the successor
leadership in P’yongyang, without China foregoing
its increasingly consequential relationships with
the ROK. Thus, Chinese leaders may now believe
that North Korea sees no practical alternative to
enhanced economic and political engagement with
the outside world. South Korea and China appear
to wield enhanced influence in this altered policy
environment, while also enabling Beijing to fashion
a far more coherent policy toward both neighboring
Korean states.
Under
these circumstances, Chinese policy objectives on
the peninsula seem likely to reflect a balance among
four separate but overlapping considerations:
(1) the management of bilateral relations with the
North, in so far as North Korean policy permits
an active Chinese role; (2) ensuring a credible
and growing relationship with the ROK for both developmental
and security reasons; (3) a complex mix of collaboration
and competition in relation to U.S. regional policies;
and (4) indirectly encouraging a more limited role
for other major powers (i.e., Russia and Japan).
The Chinese do not believe it is practicable or
advisable to exclude any of these outside actors
from a role on the peninsula or in regional diplomacy
related to Korea. However, Beijing has reason
to believe that it enjoys substantial political
advantage in comparison to other major powers.
This judgment reflects Beijing’s geographic proximity,
its growing links to the South Korean economy, the
increasing closeness of Chinese-South Korean relations
in the aftermath of inter-Korean summit, and the
evident receptivity of North Korea to an enhanced
Chinese political and economic role in peninsular
affairs.
But
it seems highly doubtful that the Chinese feel fully
confident of the sustainability and predictability
of long term ties to the North and to the Kim Chong-il
leadership. Beijing recognizes that P’yongyang’s
negotiating strategies often favor sequential approaches
toward different major powers, with alternating
periods of cultivation and disengagement.
North Korea may recognize that it has entered a
much more problematic period with the United States,
thereby underscoring the need to shore up other
sources of support. The logic of accelerated
ties with China partly emerged out of these concerns,
but this implies that North Korean policy calculations
are predominantly tactical rather than strategic.
Some of this adjustment could also extend to relations
with South Korea, which seemed relegated to a sideline
role following the inter-Korean summit, as P’yongyang
assiduously curried favor with the United States
in the waning months of the Clinton Administration.
Although
it is not possible to discern the full scope and
character of current bilateral ties between Beijing
and P’yongyang, press coverage of Kim Chong-il’s
January visit suggested an appreciable warming of
relations among senior leaders. The available
evidence suggests that the visit was arranged either
in great secrecy, in great haste, or both.
Though the Chinese appear disinclined to chase after
Kim Chong-il, they clearly recognize the possibilities
for exploiting Kim’s evident interest in Chinese
economic development. However, it is possible
that Kim might misconstrue what he observed in Shanghai
and Beijing, which represents the cumulative results
of two decades of economic reform and a decade of
greatly accelerated development in both cities.
If Kim believes that North Korea could rapidly undertake
a comparable plan, he is certain to be disappointed.
In this regard, the Chinese have undoubtedly emphasized
that autarkic economies must walk before they can
run. The question is how much effort China
is prepared to undertake with the North. Beijing
can be expected to counsel patience, prudence, and
practicality as the watchwords for achieving economic
change in the North; the question is whether North
Korea is prepared to listen and is able to implement
meaningful policy change. Such interactions,
assuming they develop further, will reveal a good
deal about the potential for Beijing to exploit
its current opportunities with the North Korean
leadership.
On
balance, however, the Chinese seem inclined to lead
by power of example, rather than undertaking a major
role within the North Korean economy. This
could extend to a heightened Chinese role in training
North Korean managers, and in otherwise seeking
to facilitate the North’s economic recovery.
But it seems highly unlikely that the Chinese will
undertake major investments in North Korea.
Limited numbers of Chinese have had significant
“on the ground” experience in the North, and if
anything this is likely to caution the Chinese from
substantial direct involvement. But such speculations
are necessarily conjectural. North Korea’s
current needs are profound. Its economy and
society are functioning at minimal capacity.
Despite South Korea’s incentives to help stimulate
at least a modest economic recovery in the North,
P’yongyang may soon confront the upper limits of
an “aid based” foreign policy. Except in certain
areas such as food and energy supplies, the Chinese
are very unlikely to undertake a major assistance
role. What might happen if conditions go from
bad to worse takes us beyond the scope of this paper,
but it should not be excluded as a relevant concern.
Relations
with the South, therefore, will continue to remain
a far more compelling priority for Beijing, both
with respect to economic development and in terms
of regional politics and security. The Chinese
may indeed perceive some common ground with the
North on specific security concerns, but larger
stakes exist with the South, especially in terms
of potential transitions in the scope and character
of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Although President
Kim Dae-jung has repeatedly emphasized the singular
importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance and a U.S. military
presence on the peninsula, a more definitive movement
toward non-adversarial relations on the peninsula
would heighten calls for a redefinition of the bilateral
alliance. A refashioned alliance would seek
to conform to the new security landscape that might
ultimately emerge on the peninsula, with or without
unification. There is every reason to believe
that the ROK leadership will be highly attentive
to China’s security equities and that the Chinese
fully recognize this essential fact. In the
absence of a profound deterioration of Chinese-ROK
relations, a regionally configured alliance that
either sought to exclude China from its consultative
framework or that presumed the prospect of future
adversarial ties with China would elicit little
support among South Korean policy makers.
There seems little doubt that China remains quietly
but seriously focused on these larger issues, even
as it recognizes that such possibilities will ultimately
depend on the elimination of the North’s capacity
to threaten the South, or the ultimate unification
of the peninsula.
China
and the United States are both highly attentive
to how the postulated North Korean threat continues
to shape U.S. regional security strategy.
Korea remains the final Cold War frontier, where
the threat of large scale armed conflict directly
involving U.S. forces remains essentially undiminished
from decades past. North Korean conventional
and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities
constitute the central concerns and underlying rationale
in planning for a major theater war (MTW) in East
Asia. A hypothesized future North Korean ICBM
capability constitutes the principal justification
for movement toward national missile defense (NMD)
as well as an array of theater missile defense (TMD)
programs. These factors would seem to provide
ample incentive for China to encourage internal
change in the North and a tangible degree of threat
reduction.
But
the Chinese are realists: they recognize that military
power constitutes the principal foundation of the
power of the North Korean state, with the North
Korean People’s Army the most powerful institution
within the DPRK, and the ultimate guarantor of the
power and prerogatives of Kim Chong-il. No
matter what the prospects for economic change in
the North, the underlying power structure persists
as an enduring element in the North Korean system,
and is unlikely to be modified in significant fashion
at an early date. At the same time, the Chinese
recognize a fundamental strategic divergence:
the United States, the ROK, and China all seek a
formal peace agreement that would ratify the end
of the Korean War, whereas P’yongyang continues
to seek a bilateral peace agreement with Washington
that would provide the North the separate security
guarantee it desires from the United States.
It remains very difficult to see how these views
can be reconciled. But there seems little
doubt that North Korea’s longer term political,
economic, and military evolution assumes central
importance in the future geopolitics of Northeast
Asia, and that the Chinese will continue to seek
opportunities to fashion such an evolution to Beijing’s
advantage. The question for the Chinese is
how realistic they judge the prospect for meaningful
change that does not generate instability within
the North, and whether they can pursue such a goal
at acceptable cost and risk. The answers to
these questions remain far from clear.
The
Chinese also recognize that there are ample risks
and uncertainties posed by the prospect of major
change in North Korea. Beijing above all seeks
incremental movement that does not induce abrupt
disequilibrium or acute internal conflict.
At a time of continued uncertainty about the North’s
longer term directions and prospects, Beijing will
seek to facilitate development and economic recovery
where possible, keep North Korean expectations realistic,
and limit the possibilities of unanticipated change.
To the extent practicable, Beijing will also seek
to coordinate its strategies with the ROK, which
it tacitly recognizes as a far more viable and meaningful
partner on the peninsula. Though the Chinese
will likely remain wary of becoming overly enmeshed
in U.S. strategies toward the North, they also seem
likely to test the possibilities to work with a
new administration toward complementary objectives
on the peninsula. Multilateral coordination
involving Japan and Russia may also emerge as a
policy option under some circumstances.
However, the ultimate determinant of future outcome
rests with the North Korean leadership, and whether
it will prove capable of capitalizing on its current
opportunities to advance longer term stability and
security on the peninsula.
Engagement
With North Korea: Implications For
The United States
Michael
McDevitt
Center for Strategic Studies of the CNA Corporation
Introduction
This paper addresses the implications for the United
States of engagement with North Korea by looking
at three facets of the issue: overarching policy
perspectives, security policy implications and military
presence and command implications. Before
coming to these points it is important at the outset
to appreciate what a conceptual departure the notion
of engagement with North Korea is for two generations
of American policy makers.
Since
its June 1950 surprise invasion of South Korea,
North Korea has been considered an “enemy” and likely
military foe of the United States. This characterization
has never been uncertain; a subject of speculation
or hypothetical scenario creation that often characterizes
discussions of potential threats. No, North
Korea has been a “dead certain,” “no doubt about
it,” “no further discussion necessary” enemy.
•
Being an “official” enemy means, among other things,
that the nation in question is the object of deliberate
war planning, is the focus of deterrent deployments
of U.S. forces, is used publicly to argue for
certain size and capabilities in the armed forces,
is commented upon in the most negative terms in
open Congressional testimony, and becomes the
object of intense sustained intelligence scrutiny.
•
Because North Korea is an “official” enemy, it
is not considered provocative or undiplomatic
to refer to North Korea as such, or to hold open
hearings on Capitol Hill discussing the probabilities
and implications of war with North Korea. Over
time North Korea has come to hold a unique place
in the pantheon of American enemies that US officials
mention when conducting a tour de horizon of where
the United States might be forced to fight —a
sort of security danger equivalent to the FBI’s
“10 most wanted list” in which P’yongyang was
either number one or two. It is startling
to realize that North Korea has been on this list
longer than any other country—50 years and counting.
North Korea has the dubious distinction of being
America’s longest running enemy.
When
talking about “engagement” with North Korea, the
most fundamental implication has to do with the
security paradigm that has shaped thinking about
North Korea for decades. Does it remain remains
valid? The overarching assumptions that American
policy makers embrace will shape the course, nature
and degree of an engagement policy with North Korea.
Some of the obvious considerations are: should North
Korea be considered an aggressor state, is America’s
relationship with P’yongyang really shifting from
confrontation to coexistence, and finally has the
United States reconsidered its vision of the future
of the Korea peninsula to include the possibility
of two Korean states peacefully coexisting for an
indefinite period of time?
The
Overarching Assumptions
North Korea: An Aggressor State?
Virtually
all U.S. experts have approached the issue of dealing
with North Korea with caution given the bloody history
of the past 50 years, the near hair-trigger military
posture on the peninsula, and the need to ensure
that Washington and Seoul, and now Japan as well,
are in step regarding any policy initiatives toward
the North.
One
need only read recent Posture Statements from General
Schwartz, Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea and
the Combined forces Commander (CFC) to be reminded
of the continued military threat posed by the North.
Military professionals in Korea responsible for
its defense pay close attention to the military
capabilities of the Democratic Peoples Republic
of Korea (DPRK). Examining North Korea from
a strictly capabilities point of view is reason
for concern. The forward deployment of North
Korean forces along the DMZ with long- range artillery
and rockets dug in close enough to the DMZ to be
able to reach Seoul create real problems for officers
and officials responsible for the lives of Americans
and South Koreans under their command—officials
who are accountable for the successful defense of
the South. Although determining capabilities
is not a precise art, it is a finely tuned intelligence
gathering and estimating process that provides a
reasonably accurate judgment on North Korea’s military
muscle.
Far
more difficult is trying to discern North Korean
intentions. Does North Korea still have the
desire to reunite the peninsula by military force?
Has it forward-deployed its forces so that it is
optimally positioned to launch a short notice invasion?
Or is its forward deployment a defensive concept
of operations designed to try to halt an invasion
in its tracks. In plain words, is North Korea’s
deployment positioning for an offensive or forward
defense intended to deter the United States and
ROK from moving North?
A
growing consensus in Washington seems to be that
P’yongyang’s intentions carry more weight than P’yongyang’s
military capabilities; probably because observers
believe that North Korea’s economic mess has undermined
its military readiness. Furthermore judgments regarding
North Korean leadership have been transformed.
Far from the buffoonish portrait of 1994, Kim Chong
il is now assessed as a shrewd politician who has
closely examined his situation, forsworn reunification
by conquest, and concluded that the only way to
save his regime, other than through genuine reform,
which would probably unseat him, is to engage the
United States, South Korea, and others to bail out
the economic mess North Korea is in. But,
as individuals who worry most about North Korean
capabilities are quick to point out, “Chairman Kim,”
as ROK officials now call Kim Chong-il, has not
to this point done anything to reduce his own military
potential, and may in fact, not be free to do so.
This
is simply not an intellectual exercise, trying to
parse capabilities versus intentions. To individuals
who must determine the pace and scope of engagement,
if any, this is a central issue. If one makes North
Korean intentions the most important determinate
of policy and conclude those intentions are survival
and defense, the paradigm one uses to think about
shaping policy is very different from the one that
assumes that North Korea’s recent opening is simply
a tactical ploy based on survival and ultimately
forceful reunification remains P’yongyang’s ambition.
The tolerance for risk is much higher in the former
case. In the later case, policy options one
might feel comfortable in advocating tend to be
strictly bounded by considerations of North Korean
military capability. The range of options
available to the policymaker and the degree of tolerable
risk decisionmakers are willing to accept in the
military dimension, particularly changes advocated
as unilateral indications of good faith by the United
States and the ROK, dramatically narrow unless North
Korea’s military undertakes similar and verifiable
actions.
On
the other hand, if officials in Washington and Seoul
conclude that the North has neither the desire nor
intent to invade the South, even if its economy
begins to turn around, then it is reasonable to
speculate that an “engagement” policy could lead
to adjustments in U.S. military posture without
insisting on some form of North Korea military reciprocity.
In such an event, policymakers would be more apt
to countenance unilateral redeployments or even
removal of some U.S. forces without a North Korean
quid pro quo.
Recent
history suggests that such a course of action is
neither far-fetched nor out of the question.
Recall in 1990, the US Department of Defense announced
plans for a phased downward adjustment of U.S. presence
in Asia, especially Korea. A central element
of that adjustment involved a unilateral reduction
(not elimination) of U.S. ground combat presence
in Korea. The ROK Army was judged strong enough
to hold the line on the ground. The focus
of U.S. presence in Korea was to be concentrated
in airpower and the ability to reintroduce U.S.
ground forces that were dispatched from the United
States. The South Koreans were to assume the
“leading role” in their own defense.
The
fact that this plan was never executed in full was
not because policymakers had misjudged risk or that
North Korea’s intent to invade was reevaluated.
Concerns surrounding the North Korean nuclear program
brought it to a halt. Then Secretary of Defense
Cheney judged that withdrawing conventional military
forces from Korea at the same time the USG was attempting
to heighten Congressional and international concern
regarding North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons
appeared inconsistent and sent confusing signals
to Capitol Hill and friends and allies whose support
the United States sought in the United Nations.
As a result, the U.S. plan was “frozen” in place—a
decision that the newly elected Clinton administration
validated in 1993.
Could
such an approach become one of the implications
of an engagement policy? Possibly. Many factors
would have to be taken into account, especially
unilaterally giving up the leverage of using U.S.
reductions to force North Korean reductions along
the DMZ, and the overall impact on U.S. strategic
interests in Asia. Also, as in 1990, domestic
factors related to the overall size of the U.S.
military could also play a role.
This point is not raised to advocate this particular
policy line. Rather it is made to highlight
an important implication of a policy of engagement.
Does engagement contribute to a perception that
North Korea longer harbors aggressive intent against
the South? If that is the case, a range of
security policy options regarding conventional force
evolution, that for years have been overshadowed
by concerns with nuclear weapons developments and
long-range missiles, could once again become prominent.
From
Confrontation to Coexistence
Closely
related to perceptions of aggressive intent is the
overall categorization of North Korea in the hierarchy
of threat, which is mentioned in the introduction.
Engagement is likely to change threat perceptions.
North Korea could easily lose its place as an official
or “certain” enemy and slip into the shadowy uncertainty
of “potential threat.” Assuming that North
Korea will do the minimum necessary in terms of
reciprocity to keep the United States and ROK from
throwing their hands up in disgust, it is easy to
forecast a U.S. policy approach that is less concerned
about the threat posed by the possibility of North
Korea’s aggression and remains more focused on North
Korea’s long-range missile development and “halted”
nuclear weapon program. This is what has been
U.S. policy for the past several years.
Ever
since the Nuclear Framework Agreement was concluded
in 1994, our policy toward North Korea has assumed
two parallel tracks—on one, ensure deterrence by
maintaining a strong military position in the ROK
and on the other deal with the nuclear and missile
threats by what could be called “payoff” diplomacy.
I hasten to add, I use this characterization in
a descriptive rather than pejorative sense.
This diplomatic approach falls into the realm of
“least bad” choices since there are no viable coercive
options that make sense.
In
Washington, the imminent collapse of North Korea
scenario so popular only a few years ago is today
scarcely discussed. The resilience of the
North Korean state, the massive infusion of aid,
and most of all the realization that China is willing
to do whatever possible to keep North Korea afloat
have combined to create a new consensus in Washington.
North Korea will not collapse; as a separate state
it is going to be around for many years. The
so-called Perry Initiative (led by former Secretary
of Defense William Perry), instigated by a Congressionally
mandated review of U.S. policy toward North Korea,
has reached the conclusion that the United States
must engage North Korea, live with it, and not hasten
its demise. Perry represents mainstream, but
certainly not all, opinion in Washington that the
best policy is a step-by-step process that leads
to normalized relations with North Korea in return
for a North Korean rollback of its long-range missile
and nuclear program.
One
of the major implications of an engagement policy
is the implied judgment that North Korea’s nuclear
program and long range missiles are intended as
defensive capabilities being assembled at great
economic sacrifice as a guarantor of last resort
for regime survivability. The nuclear program
and long-range missiles are manifestations of a
weak and insecure North Korean regime and therefore
can be bargained away once an engaged North Korea
feels that regime survival can be assured through
diplomacy, international agreements and economic
development. One of the potential contradictions
of engagement is the belief by many that these rudimentary
capabilities are the only leverage P’yongyang has
to “force” engagement and that without these threats
the international community would be largely indifferent
to the fate of North Korea. As a result North
Korean will never bargain them away—at least in
a verifiable way.
The
balance of this paper assumes that the Perry formulation
is the most viable course of action, and engagement
is the way in which this approach can best be operationalized.
Rather than confronting, or ignoring, North Korea,
the only hope the USG has for achieving U.S. objectives
is to coexist with North Korea, thorough engagement
work to reduce its sense of insecurity, and eventually
through the process of engagement convince North
Korea it can ensure its future without the threat
of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.
I am going to assume that North Korea has forsworn
military aggression as a reunification strategy
and is much more concerned with stepping back from
the brink of collapse and working to ensure the
DPRK survives as a separate sovereign entity.
While not absolutely convinced this is the case,
to do otherwise would not allow a full exploration
of what an engagement policy that seeks coexistence
might mean for the United States.
“One
Democratic Korea or two Koreas?”
For decades, official U.S. policy regarding reunification
mirrored Seoul’s. Specifically, we opined
that the United States favored peaceful reunification
that resulted in a “democratic Korea,” diplomatic
code for reunification on the ROK’s terms.
While equating the ROK with democracy was, for many
years, a policy of hypocrisy, at least Seoul had
some of the trappings of democracy and was infinitely
preferable to the communist dictatorship in the
North, which had no prospects whatsoever for becoming
a democratic state. What U.S. policy really meant
was that reunification would take place under South
Korean auspices, with the P’yongyang regime disappearing.
Because no one expected that P’yongyang would be
intentionally complicit in its own demise, and the
United States was unwilling to countenance two Korean
states as a possible outcome, US policy options
were severely limited in dealing with the North—even
had we wanted to.
But
now, if “engagement” becomes official policy, decades
of “one Korea with Seoul as the winner” will be
jettisoned. Actually, this evolution has been
going on for some time. In a series of incremental
steps since the Nuclear Framework Agreement in 1994,
the United States has been pursuing a de-facto “two
Korea” policy. It has been working to keep the P’yongyang
regime afloat, rather than taking opportunities
to hasten its demise.
An official policy of engagement would merely validate
what has been going for six years, and, since Kim
Dae Jung became President of the ROK, keep us in
step with Seoul. The mutual objective is no
longer reunification, but coexistence—two Korean
states peacefully sharing the Korean peninsula.
Within
the context of U.S. objectives and a post-Cold War
environment that is no longer zero-sum based, this
policy transition makes perfectly good sense with
one disturbing exception. The regime that
we propose to coexist with, and actually help to
survive, is one of the most dictatorial, benightedly
repressive regimes on the face of the earth.
It is regime that has killed or let die hundreds
of thousands of its own citizens and, over the years,
has sponsored horrendous acts of terrorism and criminal
behavior. Also, a nagging concern remains;
helping this regime to survive, U.S. policy may
actually be allowing this incredibly militarized
society to catch its breath, reinvigorate its military
readiness and become an even more dangerous state
in the future.
So,
as it happens, one of the biggest implications of
an engagement policy is that we compromise our own
ideals to deal with a reprehensible regime and hope
that this compromise will lead to the greater good
of removing once and for all the prospect of a war
of reunification on the Korean peninsula as well
as removing the potential threat of North Korean
nuclear-tipped ICBMs that could hit the United States.
Security
Policy Implications
Shifting to implications for security policy a key
assumption is that should engagement lead to any
political change for the better between the two
Koreas that also reduces the risk of surprise
attack from the North this will have a profound
impact on the strategic situation in both Korea
and the whole of Northeast Asia. Such a change
in the strategic environment in Korea would trigger
a major reevaluation on the part of the United States
and its allies of what the mission, overall size,
military composition and location of U.S. forces
stationed in East Asia—especially Korea—ought to
be.
The
United States has indicated on a number of occasions
that it would prefer to retain U.S. forces in Korea
after a political settlement between the two is
reached. From the U.S. perspective the key
issue has always been whether the government of
the ROK would continue to welcome U.S. presence
after rapprochement. Would Seoul be able to
diplomatically accomplish North-South reconciliation
without giving ground on U.S. presence? Or
would U.S. presence be the major stumbling block
on the way to permanent reconciliation?
This
author has heard in conferences and other interactions
with colleagues from both Korea and China that the
United States does not favor inter-Korean coexistence
because it would necessitate a change in military
posture in Asia. The hypothesis behind these
assertions is that the United States is worried
about a loss of political influence in the region
if U.S. military presence were diminished because
of a draw down or withdrawal from Korea. As
a result, the United States would somehow seek to
interfere with or slow down efforts to achieve reconciliation.
One of the important implications of a policy of
engagement would be that it would put this line
of speculation to rest. Furthermore, uncertainty
surrounding the rise of China among most of the
countries of Asia makes it unlikely that U.S. influence
in the region will wane no matter what the outcome
in Korea.
Presence
in Korea in the Context of East Asia
When
considering the implications of engagement with
North Korea on U.S. presence in Korea, U.S. forces
there must not be considered in isolation.
If the risk of war in Korea dissipates, the United
States would still seek to maintain U.S. forces
in East Asia to maintain regional stability—this
is a mission that transcends events in Korea.
The larger context of region-wide presence must
be a point of departure for considering options
about the future.
Over
the past decade, the question of U.S. forces stationed
in East Asia—so called "forward presence"—has been
a central, if not the central, focus of U.S. security
policy in the region. Two interrelated issues—whether
there should be any permanent forward presence at
all, and, if so, what the number and military nature
of those forces should be—have been the thematic
centerpiece of U.S. regional strategy and dialogue
with East Asian nations. Besides deterring
war in Korea, U.S. forces are welcomed by most of
the countries in the region as a balancing or countervailing
presence to the uncertainty created by a China that
is modernizing militarily, and as a hedge against
the remote possibility of a militarily assertive
Japan.
Today,
U.S. forward-presence forces are both a force for
regional stability and a force for deterrence because
they blend multi-service capabilities well tailored
to address the three most dangerous security uncertainties
found in Asia: the possibility of war in Korea,
the possibility of military conflict over Taiwan,
and the conflict over sovereignty claims in the
South China Sea. Forward-deployed forces are
relevant because they have the proper blend of capabilities
to deal with the most credible military problems
in the region—not all of the problems, but
the most likely problems.
A
quick survey of the major elements of U.S. forces
illustrates this point. The ground forces in East
Asia—located in Korea (8th U.S. Army) and Okinawa,
Japan (III U.S Marine Corps Expeditionary Force)—are
largely oriented toward Korea. In addition
to their major role in any Korean contingency, the
Marines stationed in Okinawa also play a regional
crisis-response role when they are embarked in the
Amphibious Task Force located in Sasebo, Japan.
The U.S. Seventh Fleet, whose flagship and aircraft
carrier battle group are in Yokosuka, Japan, would
also play a key role in any Korean contingency.
But because of the maritime nature of the vast East
Asian region, the inherent mobility of the fleet
results in a decidedly regional rather than peninsular
operational orientation. The numbered U.S.
Air Forces in Northeast Asia, the 7th in Korea and
the 5th in Japan, are largely focused on Korea as
well. But, air forces also are inherently
very mobile, and the tactical aircraft located in
Japan could be employed region wide.
As
practiced today, the mission of deterrence in Korea
combines a militarily credible land and air force
physically stationed in Korea with the promise of
swift and massive reinforcement from the United
States. That mission also counts on having
a small but militarily significant force (those
that are oriented to regional stability) elsewhere
in East Asia, available for rapid introduction into
a Korean campaign, to diminish the possibility that
a surprise attack could succeed before reinforcements
from the United States arrive.
As
a general proposition, almost all military forces
are conceptually fungible, in that they can be shifted
between missions. However, reality imposes
real restraints. Primary mission tasking commands
the bulk of training time and readiness focus.
In Korea, for example, a single-minded preparation
for war in Korea is manifested by established lines
of communication, in-place logistics support, and
administrative arrangements that include integration
of ROK draftees into U.S. units, and command relationships
that include integrated ROK-U.S. staffs. It
would be very difficult today to employ U.S. forces
in Korea on an off-peninsula regional basis even
if all political and policy-level impediments and
treaty obligations could be overcome.
Necessary
Conditions for Evolutionary U.S. Force Changes in
Korea
A
central promise of a policy of engagement is that
it will lead to the necessary precondition for U.S.
force evolution, that is, military security
for the ROK. If engagement facilitates coexistence,
U.S. presence could be reduced when the ROK felt
itself strong enough to manage its own defense without
foreign assistance.
The
most immediate security concerns in Seoul are reducing
the risk of surprise attack and the vulnerability
of the capital to bombardment. Force reductions,
thin outs of North Korean artillery tubes, elimination
of ballistic missiles, reduction of reinforcement
capabilities, verifiable bans on various forms of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and continued
successful inhibition of the DPRK nuclear program
all help with these goals.
But surprise or short warning attack is the central
military issue. As long as North Korea’s army
remains postured very close to the DMZ it could
conceivably launch an invasion with little detectable
preparation. Therefore, the warning time necessary
to ready defensive forces can be defined in terms
of hours or, at best a few days. The only
militarily practical way to reduce the possibility
of a surprise invasion or attack would be a substantial
withdrawal of military forces to some considerable
distance from the DMZ. They would have to
be moved far enough back from the DMZ that intelligence
officials be confident they could detect the movement
and preparation of North Korean forces for an invasion
far enough in advance to permit raising the readiness
of ROK and any U.S. forces in Korea, as well as
initiating the process of reinforcement before an
actual attack.
Therefore,
one important implication of engagement would be
a policy focus on creating the circumstances necessary
for confidence building measures to be put in place
that reduce worries about surprise attacks.
Off-Peninsula
Missions for Forces in Korea
Because
change in the security situation in Korea will probably
come slowly, it is likely that changes in U.S. posture
would also come slowly, in an evolutionary step-by-step
process. An early step would be a mutually
satisfactory agreement between the ROK and the United
States that U.S. forces stationed in Korea would
be available for regional missions. The United States
would want to be confident its forces based in the
ROK would be available for deployment elsewhere
without ROK agreement about such redeployment.
This
is another central issue. If the ROK could
not commit to such an agreement, the United States
would have to face some difficult considerations
even if the ROK government was willing to have U.S.
forces in Korea only for a vaguely defined mission
of Korean defense.
One
such consideration would be the overall security
situation in East Asia, especially the way in which
China was perceived by the nations of the region.
If China loomed as a latent threat, or became particularly
assertive, that would be the major factor.
Sustaining forces in Korea solely in defense of
Korea would have some continued credibility.
Absent
a China that makes the rest of the region nervous,
the impact a total withdrawal from Korea would have
on the willingness of the people of Japan to continue
to host U.S. forces would also be a serious consideration.
Would a lack of flexibility in the use of U.S. forces
in Korea be an acceptable trade-off for continued
access to facilities in Japan? Possibly; but
domestic factors in the United States would also
be a consideration.
The
U.S. services involved—the Army and Air Force—could
want to have greater flexibility in meeting worldwide
commitments and not be willing to tie down forces
in Korea that was not under some threat of aggression.
Congress might balk at perpetuating a commitment
of U.S. forces to Korea, that could not be employed
elsewhere, absent a compelling threat.
For
its part Seoul has a potentially serious problem
with allowing forces stationed on its territory
to leave on missions conceived by the United States
alone. Because of geography and history Seoul
will certainly be very attentive to its relationship
with Beijing. China might insist that if the
ROK wanted some U.S. forces to remain, they could
not be available for missions outside Korea, such
as protecting Taiwan. Since China has been
clear that it opposes U.S. forces in East Asia “aimed
at China,” it is likely this would be a major issue.
The point being that despite the declaratory policy
of both the United States and the ROK that both
capitals want U.S. forces to remain, even after
reunification, circumstances and geopolitical considerations
may frustrate today’s best intentions.
Military
Implications
Hypothetical Off-Peninsula Force Structure
If
we assume however that all of these issues can be
resolved, what might a residual Korean-based U.S.
force with a regional mission look like? As
a point of departure the conceptual relationship
between forces in Korea and forces in Japan and
elsewhere in the region would be reversed.
Forces in Korea would have to be considered as a
supporting component of all the U.S. forces stationed
in East Asia, including obviously, those stationed
in Japan. As opposed to today where the forces
outside Korea are considered a supporting component
to the forces in Korea. As a component of
a larger force whose potential area of operation
is throughout East Asia, forces in Korea must be
configured in such a way that they can be moved
rapidly off the peninsula by either air or sea.
In
practical terms this suggests Air Forces—perhaps
an Air Expeditionary Force (AEF)—either permanently
assigned to a base in Korea or one that rotationally
deploys from the United States. It also means
that any ground forces would have to be equipped
with tanks, artillery, and other vehicles that are
light enough to be moved easily. Today the
US Army has airborne and light infantry forces that
fit within this category. The Army is also
experimenting with differently sized and equipped
mobile forces—based on a brigade-size organization—that
at least on paper, would appear to be suitable for
a regional mission originating from a base in Korea.
Finally, in terms of land forces, U.S. Marines also
fit the category of mobile forces. It is certainly
conceivable that a portion of the U.S. Marines currently
in Okinawa could be relocated in Korea and conduct
regional missions from Korea. Any military forces
based in Korea that have the capability to conduct
combat operations beyond Korea would also have the
capability to conduct those operations in Korea
in the defense of Korea. Thus, even if the
primary mission was off-peninsula these forces would
also contribute to the overall security of Korea—against
no specifically singled out enemy.
Changed
Command Relationships
One
of the major implications of an engagement policy
with North Korea would be the ripple effects it
would have on the existing U.S. military command
structure in East Asia. Changes in the U.S.
presence in Korea, and indeed probably in forces
in Japan as well, would also trigger changes in
command arrangements both within Korea as well as
among all U.S. forces in East Asia.
The
command structure in Korea is integrated—or, in
official parlance, combined—through the device
known as the Combined Forces Command (CFC), which
is charged with fighting in the defense of the ROK.
The Commander of CFC is a U.S. Army four-star general
who heads a staff composed of ROK and U.S. officers;
they are totally integrated, in that United States
and ROK officers serve side-by-side, and each country
has officers who are in charge of various elements
of the staff. This is similar to the NATO
military staffs in Europe.
The
concept behind an integrated command is the military
doctrinal imperative of “unity of command.”
A single operational commander must be responsible
for all the forces likely to be engaged in combat.
This sort of command arrangement is especially well
suited for defensive alliances in which the forces
have as their primary mission repelling an invasion.
Since off-peninsula missions would probably be at
the initiative of the United States, in pursuit
of objectives that might only be in the interest
of the United States, an integrated staff could
create serious difficulties. (As we have witnessed
recently in the Balkans when the mission is offensive
or “out of area” in nature, combined staffs require
a solid political consensus regarding campaign objectives
and the military means to be used in accomplishing
those objectives.)
If,
in the case of Korea, the mission of US forces is
split between defense against a less well-defined
threat to the ROK with no specific designated enemy
and a U.S. regional presence mission beyond the
Korean peninsula, does perpetuation of a combined
CFC command structure make sense?
Some
would argue yes, an integrated command structure
for Korea and eventually perhaps for all of Northeast
Asia, would be one way to preserve regional stability
and act as a catalyst for bringing the militaries
of the region together. But, because China
continues to oppose military alliances as “relics”
of the Cold War, and would be concerned that any
such command arrangement would be “pointed at China,”
the implementation of such an arrangement would
probably come over the strong objections of China.
That
may not matter if China is so assertive that the
other countries of East Asia feel threatened.
But if China remains focused on economic development
and shows every indication of being a stabilizing
force in East Asia, it seems doubtful that such
an integrated command structure would be politically
possible.
However,
others could argue that an integrated command could
easily encumber unilateral U.S. action, especially
in a Taiwan crisis. It is an article of faith
among U.S. commanders to want a maximum amount of
flexibility in force deployment and operational
decisions. An independent U.S. command in
Korea would be the best way to enable flexibility.
From
an ROK perspective, having a U.S. officer in command
of both ROK and U.S. forces when the threat from
the North has abated is probably politically impossible.
A transition to an ROK general officer in command
of CFC would solve ROK sovereignty concerns, but
raise additional issues for the United States—specifically,
the issue of U.S. forces under foreign command.
In such a circumstances this issue could be avoided
by simply not assigning forces in Korea to CFC—neither
U.S. nor Korean. CFC would survive as a planning
headquarters whose staff and facilities would focus
on Korea-defense related contingencies.
To
execute regional missions, today’s existing stovepipe
command arrangements—one command for the U.S. forces
in Japan and a separate one for the U.S. forces
in Korea—could be modified, and a single U.S. officer
responsible for “regional stability” put in command—in
U.S. parlance a sub-unified commander reporting
to CINCPAC. Alternatively, the current stovepipes
could be preserved and each command redesigned as
a Joint Task Force commander, each reporting to
CINPAC. The result of this arrangement would
be Commander Joint Task Force Korea and Commander
Joint Task Force Japan.
The
United Nations Command in Korea is the other major
command that would be affected by change in Korea.
Its mission today is armistice maintenance.
Once the Armistice Agreement is superseded by a
peace treaty, it is difficult to imagine the UN
Command—as it currently functions with the United
States acting as the surrogate for the UN, and the
United Nations in New York studiously ignoring Korea—could
continue to exist.
Some
sort of reconstituted UN authority over U.S. forces
in Korea could become an issue for the North Koreans.
North Korea may press for UN involvement to reassure
themselves that U.S. forces remaining in Korea would
not have freedom of action, or it could totally
oppose any continued involvement of the UN as an
affront. There are so many variables on this
issue that it is beyond the scope of this paper
to explore them. The main point is that the
current UN Command is unlikely to survive a peace
treaty.
In
sum, there are many alternatives to existing command
arrangements, but three main points seem clear.
One, the United States is unlikely to have any command
authority over ROK forces; two, the UN Command as
it exists today is likely to disappear when a political
settlement replaces the armistice; and three, whatever
arrangements are made, they will be evolutionary
and suited to the political and strategic realities
existing at the time. The current arrangements
have remained in place for so long because the strategic
situation in Korea has remained static for a long
time. For command arrangements to be effective
and satisfy both the military and political requirements
of alliance warfare, they must be based on the realities
of the moment; not on an uncertain future.
The Impact on National Military Strategy
Today,
the requirement to deter North Korea makes
it difficult to justify a major change to the overall
size and composition (the balance of Army, Air Force,
Navy, and Marine Corps) of U.S. presence in the
region. But, an engagement policy that that
created an atmosphere in which Seoul and Washington
base calculations more on P’yongyang’s intentions
than on its military capabilities could lead to
unilateral changes in U.S. presence. Certainly
an engagement policy that led to a mutual pullback
from the DMZ or other verifiable confidence-building
measures that make the prospect of North Korean
aggression remote would be sufficient to trigger
a major reevaluation of the roles and missions of
U.S. forces in East Asia.
In
fact, such a reevaluation would encompass the whole
of U.S. military strategy. Ever since the
1992 Bottom-Up Review conducted by Secretary of
Defense Les Aspin, America’s armed forces have been
sized and organized to be able to respond to two
nearly simultaneous “major theater wars (MTWs)”—a
characterization intended to capture the idea of
a conflict on the scale of Desert Storm. From
the beginning, Korea has been considered one of
the two-theater wars planning cases, and fully 50
percent of U.S. military power is earmarked for
Korea if conflict breaks out. (Conflict in
the Persian Gulf is the other canonical scenario.)
Absent another plausible “theater war” scenario,
peace in Korea could have a dramatic impact on the
size and composition of the entire U.S. military—especially
the ground forces.
Once
the prospect of war in Korea is perceived to be
remote, U.S. security strategy for East Asia will
require a fresh publicly coherent case for continued
presence that makes sense in the capitals throughout
Asia as well as in Washington. Declaratory
U.S. policy regarding U.S. presence would no longer
include deterring conflict in Korea, nor presumably,
at least in the near term, containing China.
A
new rationale for U.S. military presence in East
Asia will probably revolve around the idea of "regional
stability." Actually, sustaining stability
is not a new idea or rationale for U.S. presence.
Preserving stability has long been an avowed rationale
when discussing America’s military role in East
Asia. What is new is that sustaining regional
stability would become the primary mission focus
for U.S. presence and no longer share pride of place
with the easily comprehended mission of deterrence
in Korea, or, during the Cold War, containing the
Soviet Union.
It
is fair to pose the question why could not the public
rationale also include deterring conflict
in other potential hot spots in East Asia; especially
across the Taiwan Strait and in the South China
Sea? Without becoming entangled in a long
digression about deterrence; the difference between
deterrence in Korea and deterrence across the Taiwan
Strait is in declared U.S. policy. In Korea
the U.S. has a treaty obligation and a firm commitment
to respond to a North Korean attack with overwhelming
force. No such treaty or explicit obligation
exists regarding Taiwan or the South China Sea.
The United States has been insistent that these
issued be resolved peacefully, but for good reasons
has not elected to commit the United States
to a guaranteed military response. Without
such a commitment, an avowed and openly planned
for deterrence mission in these two cases is not
diplomatically wise as it would almost certainly
introduce a militarily confrontational aspect to
our relationship with China. Some things are best
left unsaid.
A
policy of engagement with North Korea seems likely
to lead to a major reassessment of U.S. security
strategy in East Asia. Not only will a new
rationale for continued U.S. presence be necessary,
but once that rationale is decided upon, the next
step will be to “translate” that rationale into
a proper forward presence force structure that makes
good military sense. For example, should “stability”
become the rationale for presence, how is this vague
notion transformed into the proper mix of Army,
Navy, Air Force and Marines that yield a “combat
credible” force able to accomplish the stated objective?
Forces
that are responsible for tasks throughout all of
East Asia, beyond but not excluding Korea, must
have flexibility in administrative and support arrangements.
These forces would have responsibility for maintaining
stability throughout the region. This is why
forces would remain in Korea after some sort of
political settlement—to make a contribution to maintaining
regional stability. Translating the vague
notion of stability into specific military requirements
is necessary to determine the precise mix and size
of U.S. armed services that would constitute a future
residual force in Korea. But, in general the
main criteria are:
•
They must not be tethered to specific crisis scenarios
so they can respond quickly throughout East Asia.
• They must have the political or policy
freedom from the host country that permits them
to use bases for contingencies not directly associated
with the defense of the host country.
• They must be agile enough to carry out
a wide range of tasks anywhere in the region.
This agility is a combination of the characteristics
of the forces themselves as well as their training
and command arrangements.
Because
they are not “tethered” to Korea, the forces that
today are located in Japan—particularly the Navy,
the U.S. Army Special Forces in Okinawa, some of
the Marines, and some of the Air Force—perform what
could be termed “the regional stability mission.”
In the future, any forces in Korea with regional
responsibilities would need similar flexibility.
This is a task for the Joint Staff and Pacific Command
to puzzle over, because it is on of the logical
consequences of engagement.
Conclusion
This paper has discussed many, but certainly not
all, of the implications that an engagement policy
with North Korea could precipitate.
Over the short term it seems likely that an engagement
policy would continue to focus on stopping the development,
testing and export of long range missiles and keeping
the North Korean nuclear program in its current
state. But, this near-term focus ought not
be allowed to blind policymakers to the essential
longer term payoff of an engagement policy; specifically
reducing the threat of North Korean surprise attack,
getting Seoul out from under the gun of artillery
and rockets, rolling back the North Korean long
range missile program and accounting for the still
unaccounted for reprocessed plutonium that the IAEA
found missing in 1993-4. This is an ambitious,
and perhaps unrealistic long-term agenda. But, unrealistic
or not, it needs to be pursued if there is be long-term
peace and stability in Korea.
For
the United States, reconciliation and peaceful coexistence
in Korea would mark a major shift in the strategic
landscape of East Asia. After almost 50 years
of being “frozen-in-time,” change in Korea will
precipitate a major reevaluation of the rationalization,
size, and mix of U.S. forces stationed in East Asia.
Because the United States has maintained some sort
of military presence in East Asia dating back to
the formation of the U.S. Navy East India Squadron
in 1835 it does not seem unreasonable to believe
that Washington will continue to place a high value
on sustaining presence in the region under any circumstances.
Losing
the “figleaf” of deterring war in Korea after 50
years of using it as one of the principle rationales
for that presence will almost certainly bring the
relationship between forward presence and China
into sharp focus, even if in the unlikely event
Taiwan is no longer an issue. The Chinese
grudgingly accept U.S. presence today largely because
they share our concern about instability on the
Korean peninsula. Once that rationale dissipates,
Chinese concerns about U.S. military power “on our
door-step” will almost certainly become more vocal.
Thus, it is incumbent upon U.S. policy makers who
will be narrowly be focused on the Korean peninsula
in the day to day execution of engagement with North
Korea, to step back and take a longer look and think
through the regional implications that such a policy
will inevitably trigger.
Footnotes
[1]
The other preconditions were: (1) ending all
ballistic missile exports, (2) placing its chemical
and biological weapons programs under international
control, (3) regularizing the return of U.S. MIAs
from the Korean War, (4) declaring that it would
not engage in or support terrorism, (5) making "substantial
progress" in North-South talks, and (6) improving
human rights conditions, e.g., allowing the meeting
of divided families. See Mitchell B. Reiss, Bridled
Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear
Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson
Center Press, 1995), pp. 239,293.
[2]
There are some obvious shortcomings to writing about
lessons learned by the United States and the DPRK.
foremost is that neither party is monolithic; it
is likely that certain officials, bureaus, and ministries
have learned lessons that are not understood or
even communicated to some of their counterparts.
It is perhaps more accurate, then, to state that
this paper presents lessons that should have
been learned by al the major actors in both the
United States and DPRK.
[3]
The U.S. intelligence community had "underestimated
the capabilities of the Taepo Dong-I by failig to
anticipate the use of a third stage." National
Intelligence Council, "Foreign Missile Developments
and the Ballistic Missile Treat to the United States
Through 2015," September 1999, p.9. See also,
Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission
to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United
States (the Rumsfeld Commission Report), July 15,
1998, http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/105thcongress/BMThreat.htm.
[4]
See, for example, Nicholas Eberstadt, Korea Approaches
Reunification (Armonk, N.Y.:M.E. Sharpe, 1995);
and "Hastening Korean Reunification,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No.2 (March/April
1997), pp. 77-92. A notable exception to the books
that purport to "know" North Korea is
Helen Louise Hunter, Kim Il-sung's North Korea
(Westport, Ct.:Praeger, 1999). Hunter was a CIA
analyst whoe work focused on DPRK society.
[5]
On the difficulties of negotiating with the North
Koreans, see Scott Snyder, Negotiating on the
Edge: North Korean NEgotiating Behavior (Washington
D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1999); Mitchell B.
Reoss. "How to Handle A Rogue Regime,"
Asian Wall Street Journal, Feb. 17,2000.
See also Steven Linton, "Understanding North
Korea," May 1999. manuscript provided by the
author.
[6]
Leon V. Sigal examines how the North Koreans have
adopted this approach in Disarming Strangers:
Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998). The classic
text remains, Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of
Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
[7]
This caution is not new. Over 100 years ago, Rudyard
Kipling captured this idea in The Naulahka:
"At the end of the fight is a tombstone white
with the name of the late deceased,/And the epitaph
drear: "A Fool lies here who tried to hustle
the East."
[8]
According to one knowledgeable Korean expert, the
North Koreans are more dependent on personal relationships.
"From a North Korean perspective, human relations
hould never be made conditional to something else.
To suggest that a problem must be solved or an issue
addressed before a relationship is possible is to
demonstrate insincerity. Problems should be portrayed
as annoying obstacles to what is most important:
personal relationships." Linton, op.cit., p.14.
[9]
It is an intriguing if unanswerable question as
to whether U.S. leadership also makes it easier
for North Korea to engage the South.
[10]
Curiously, in its dealings with Capitol Hill, the
Clinton Administration never tried to frame the
North Korean issue as one of national security and
defense. It therefore left itself open to criticism
from Republican members that it was propping up
a failing North Korean regime by providing heavy
fuel oil and humanitarian assistance.
[11]
Perry presented his major findings of his "Review
of United States Policy Toward North Korea"
in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs on October 12,
1999. This can also be found in David Albright and
Kevin O'Neill, eds., Solving the North Korean
Nuclear Puzzle (Washinton, D.C.:ISIS, 2000),
pp. 299-313.
[12]
The Perry Report also used this reasoning in explaining
its "two-path strategy" towards the North.
Ibid.
[13]
See Oh and Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking
Glass (Washington, D.C.:Brookings, 2000).
[14]
The best treatment of this subject is Robert S.
Litwak, Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy:
Containment After the Cold War (Washington,
D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000).
[15]
See Steven Mufson, "A 'rogue' is a 'state of
concern'," Washington Post, June 20,
2000, A16. See also the transcript of the Dept.
of State Daily Press Briefing, Spokesman Richard
Boucher, which can be found at http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/0006/000619db.html.
[16]
At the Munich conference in early February, Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pointedly did not refer
to "rogue" states in explaining the American
rationale for national missile defense. See Alexander
Nicoll, "Defense debate stresses the need for
more talks," Financial Times, Feb. 5,
2001.
[17]
Robert A. Manning, "Will Korea be Bush's
first policy crisis?" Los Angeles Times, January
7,2001.
[18]
Doug H. Paal, "A Korean Peninsula Agenda for
the New U.S. Administration," in The Korean
Peninsula in the 21st Century: Prospects for Stablitiy
and Cooperation, Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies,
Volume 11, 2001, p. 147
[19]
See Marcus Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse: The
Future of the Two Koreas (Washington, D.C.:
Institute for International Economics, 2000), pp.
186-187.
[20]
Personal conversations with DPRK diplomats, Feb.
6, 2001.
[21]
For a good summary of North-South interactions since
the June summit, see Mark E. Manyin, "North-South
Korean Relations: A Chronology of the 'New' Dialogue,"
Congressional Research Service, January 18, 2001.
[22]
Kim Il Sung Works, volume 27, Foreign Languages
Publishing House, P'yongyang, 1986, pp. 141, 266,
340.
[23]
For details, see Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas:
A Contemporary History, Addison-Wesley 1997,
Basic Books 1999, pp. 337-340.
[24]
"Kim Chong-il wants summit with Seoul, U.S.
visit: Park," Korea Herald, July 24,
1994. July 24, 1994.
[25]
For information on his early positions, see
"Kim Tae-chung's Past Policy Positions,"
cable from American Embassy Seoul to Secretary of
State, February 19, 1980. Confidential, declassified
1993. In possession of the author.
[26]
See Marcus Noland, "Between Collapse and Revival:
A Reinterpretation of the North Korean Economy,"
Institue for International Economics, 2001. For
an anecdotal account usind journalistic methods
of North Korea's economic improvement, see Doug
Struck, "N. Korea Back From The Brink,"
Washington Post, Sept. 5, 2000, p. A-1.
[27]
Marcus Noland, "North Korea's External
Economic Relations," Institute for International
Economics (IIE web site), 2001.
[28]
Noland, as cited above.
[29]
Don Oberdorfer, "A Nation With an Iron Fist
and an Outstretched Hand," Washington Post,
March 14 1999, p. B-5.
[30]
For data on Kim's activities, Kwak Seung-ji,
"A Move Toward Normalcy," Vantage Point,
December 2000, p. 4-5.
[31]
Noriyuki Suziki, "North Korea under Kim Chong-il,"
paper presented at the Conference on North Korea
Policy after the Perry report, March 3-4, 2000,
p.7.
[32]
"Review of United States Policy toward North
Korea: Findings and Recommendations," Unclassified
report by Dr. Williams J. Perry, U.S. North Korea
policy coordinator, October 12, 1999 (from State
Department web site).
[33]
For the quotes from the American official, Doug
Struck and Steven Mufson, "N. Korea's Kim Sheds
Image of 'Madman'" Washington Post, October
26, 2000, p. A-1.
[34]
The first known statements along these lines were
reported by Selig Harrison after his meetings with
Kang Sok Ju and DPRK General Ri Chan Bok in September
1995. See Harrison's article, "Promoting a
Soft Landing in Korea," Foreign Policy,
Spring 1997.
[35]
Julie Moon dispatch from US-Asian News Service
datelined Wonsan, courtesy of Julie Moon.
[36]
No good discussion of the concept engagement seems
to exist, although several good papers on engagement
are included in Alastair lain Johnston and Robert
S. Ross (eds.), Engaging China: The Management of
an Emerging Power (Routledge: 1999).
[37]
Victor Cha, Engaging China: Seoul?Beijing Detente
and Korean Security," Survival, Spring 1999, pp.
73?98; see Cha's brief discussion on pp. 78ff. Also
see Cha's chapter in Johnston and Ross.
[38]
The sunshine policy in the South Korean government's
own words can be studied, for example, in The Sunshine
Policy by The Kim Dae?Jung Government (Seoul: The
Society for Northeast Asian Studies and Millennium
Books, 1999).
[39]
P'yongyang Offers High?level Talks with Seoul,"
The People's Korea, No. 1835 (February 13, 1999),
pp. 1/ 2. And KCNA, February 2, 1999; transcribed
on February 3, 1999, by FBIS as Document ID: FTS
19990203000407, sourceline SK0302114399.
[40]
Address by President Kim Dae Jung of the Republic
of Korea at the Free University of Berlin: `Lesson
of German Reunification and Korean Peninsula'; Announcing
a Four?Point Declaration Aimed at Terminating the
Cold War Structure on the Korean Peninsula, Berlin,
March 9, 2000," Korea and World Affairs, Vol. XXIV,
No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 131?137.
[41]
For the North Korean response to the Berlin Declaration,
see Radio P'yongyang, March 15, 2000, broadcast
of a Nodong Sinmun commentary of the same date entitled
"Practice and Behavior Are More Important Than Words,"
translated on March 15, 2000, by FBIS as Document
ID: KPP20000315000057.
[42]
See the KCBN report of a Bulletin No. 805 issued
by the Secretariat of the Committee for Peaceful
Reunification of the Fatherland (CPRF), March 16,
2000; translated by FBIS on March 16, 2000 as Document
ID: KPP20000316000099.
[43]
For a recounting of the talks, see KBS 1 TV, April
10, 2000; translated by FBIS on the same date as
Document ID: KPP20000410000054.
[44]
Yonhap, June 15, 2000; transcribed by FBIS on the
same date as Document ID: KPP20000615000103.
[45]
The South Korean translation of the Joint Declaration
may be found in Korea and World Affairs, Vol. XXIV,
No. 2, pp. 313?314, with text taken from http://www.kois.o,,o.kr/government/president/2000/
The KCNA translation of June 14, 2000, is transcribed
by FBIS on the same date as Document ID: KPP20000614000166.
[46]
For example, KCNA on February 4, 2001; transcribed
on the same date by FBIS as Document ID: KPP20010204000013.
[47]
Yonhap, June 30, 2000; transcribed on the same
date by FBIS as Document ID: KPP20000630000071.
Difficulties with the talks were reported by Yonhap,
June 30, 2000; transcribed on the same date by FBIS
as Document ID: KPP20000630000052.
[48]
Full text of the talks reported by Taehan Maeil
(internet version) on September 23, 2000; translated
on September 25, 2000, by FBIS as Document ID: KPP20000925000028.
Press criticism with the talks is reported by Yonhap,
September 25, 2000; transcribed on the same date
by FBIS as Document ID: KPP20000925000009.
[49]
Yonhap, August 18, 2000; transcribed on the
same date by FBIS as Document ID: KPP2000818000021.
[50]
Choson Ilbo (internet version), August 20, 2000;
transcribed by FBIS on the same date as Document
ID: KPP20000820000026.
[51]
"Yonhap News article: `Joint North?South Survey
of the North's Power Situation To Be Discussed in
January,"' Tong?a Ilbo (Internet version, URL http://www.dongailbo.co.kr),
58 December 30, 2000; translated on the same date
by FBIS as Document ID: KPP20001230000041.
[52]
" See Yonhap's commentary on the mushroom gift as
the "talk of the town," Yonhap, September 14, 2000;
transcribed on the same date by FBIS as Document
ID: KPP20000914000035.
[53]
For a cautionary security note, see the Korea Times
(Internet version), September 4, 2000; transcribed
on the same date by FBIS as Document ID: KPP20000904000075.
For poll results on slowing down contact, see Yonhap,
September 27, 2000; transcribed on the same date
by FBIS as Document ID: KPP20000927000039.
[54]
Monthly Report, Intra?Korean Interchange and Cooperation
and Humanitarian Projects, vol. 113 (November 2000),
Ministry of Unification. p. 93. And The Korea Herald
(Internet version: http://www.koreaherald,co.kr),
February 9, 2001; transcribed on February 8, 2001
by FBIS as Document ID: KPP20010208000088.
[55]
Yonhap, January 4, 2001; transcribed on the same
date by FBIS as Document ID: KPP20010104000046.
[56]
All trade statistics from the following source:
Monthly Report, Intra?Korean Interchange and Cooperation
and Humanitarian Projects, vol. 113 (November 2000),
Ministry of Unification, p. 21.
[57]
See for example Nicholas Eberstadt, Prospects for
Inter?Korean Economic Cooperation in the "Sunshine"
Era, Paper prepared for "New Challenges in Inter?Korean
Economic Cooperation and Integration," a conference
sponsored by the Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford
University, October 9?10, 2000.
[58]
Unification Ministry figure cited in Yonhap, January
10, 2001; transcribed by FBIS on the same date as
Document ID: KPP20010110000065.
[59]
Yonhap, January 10, 2001; transcribed on the same
date by FBIS as Document ID: KPP20010110000065.
[60]
"Controversy over the Hasty Remarks on `North Korean
Business Boom,"' Hangyore (Internet version), April
4, 2000; transcribed on the same date by FBIS as
Document ID: KPP20000404000095.
[61]
Min Pyong?kwan, Chong Kyong?min, and Sin Ye?ri,
"Why As the Mt. Kumgang Tourism Project Been Driven
into This Situation," Chungang Ilbo (Internet version:
http://www.joonganc,,.co.kr), January 6, 2001; transcribed
on January 7, 2001 by FBIS as Document ID: KPP20010107000018.
[62]
Figures vary according to source. These figures
are from Yonhap, January 30, 2001; transcribed on
the same date by FBIS as Document ID: KPP20010130000046.
[63]
Yonhap, August 23, 2000; transcribed on the same
date by FBIS as Document ID: KPP20000823000001.
[64]
Yi Pyong?ki and Ha T'ae?won, "A Snap Shot of North?South
Economic Cooperation: `Lacking Substance' Despite
Trade Volume over $400 Million," Tong?a Ilbo (Internet
version: http://www.don,szailbo.co.kr), December
27,2000; translated on the same date by FBIS as
Document ID: KPP20001227000094.
[65]
See Marcus Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse: The
Future of the Two Koreas (Washington, DC: Institute
for International Economics, June 2000), p. 115.
[66]
Yonhap, January 17, 2001; transcribed on the same
date by FBIS as Document ID: KPP20010117000068.
[67]
Yonhap, April 11, 2000; transcribed on the same
date by FBIS as Document ID: KPP20000411000062.
[68]
Statistics from a Chungang Ilbo poll as reported
by Yonhap, June 16, 2000; transcribed on the same
date by FBIS as Document ID: KPP20000616000011.
[69]
The most recent statistic is from ibid. Earlier
statistics from a report by Kim Haeng and Kim Song?chin
on a Chungang Ilbo?RAND survey as reported in Chungang
Ilbo, March 10, 1999; translated on March 11, 1999,
by FBIS as Document ID: FTS19990311000439 with sourceline
SKI 103110299.
[70]
Statistics from a Unification Ministry poll cited
by Yonhap, June 19, 2000; transcribed by FBIS on
the same date as Document ID: KPP20000619000070.
[71]
Survey by the Korea Research Center at the request
of the Unification Ministry, cited in Chungang Ilbo
(Internet version), September 29, 2000; transcribed
on the same date by FBIS as Document ID: KPP20000929000073.
[72]
Survey by the Kyunghyang Shinmun and Hyundai Research
Institute, reported by Yonhap, October 6, 2000;
transcribed on the same date by FBIS as Document
ID: KPP20001006000011.
[73]
A good discussion of this aspect of engagement and
of the political mood in South Korea may be found
in notes from the second meeting of the Pacific
Council on International Policy's Task Force on
"Assessing Korea and Promoting Change," held at
Yonsei University on December 13, 2000. See the
Special Report on the Northeast Asia Peace and Security
Network, January 4, 2001; http://www.pcip.org/html/studies/studies?current.html
[74]
In early 2001 the Defense Ministry announced plans
to reduce expenditures on personnel and conventional
weapons. See Yonhap, January 9, 2001; transcribed
on the same date by FBIS as Document ID: KPP20010109000050.
[75]
Marcus Noland has devoted considerable attention
to the economic situation of North Korea and the
capacity of South Korea to help. See for example
chapter 8 of his Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future
of the Two Koreas.
[76]
In this sense, engagement is different from containment
which uses deterrence and threats of punishment
(negative sanctions) to deal with the challenger,
and everyday diplomacy.
[77]
For recent conceptual and applied studies of engagement
strategies, see Randall Schweller, "Managing
the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory,"
in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross eds.,
Engaging China (NY: Routledge, 1999); Victor
Cha, "Democracy and Unification: The Dilemma
of Engagement," in The Two Koreas and the
United States (NY: M.E. Sharpe, 20000; Richard
Haas and Meghan O'Sullivan, "Terms of Engagement:
Alternatives to Punitive Policies," Survival
42.2 (Summer 2000); and George Shambaugh, States,
Firms, and Power: Successful Sanctions in US Foreign
Policy (NY: SUNY press, 19990, chs.1,6.
[78]
Victor Cha, "Engaging North Korea Credibly,"
Survival 42.2 (Summer 2000); and Cha, "Is
There Still a Rational North Korean Option for War?"
Security Dialogue (December 1998).
[79]
Portions of the empirical overview are excerpted
from Victor Cha, "Japan-Korean Relations,"
CSIS Comparative Connections www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/004Qjapan_skorea.html.
[80]
Victor Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The
United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Jung-Hyun
Shin, Japanese-North Korean Relations (Seoul:
Kyunghee University Press, 1981); Chong-sik Lee,
Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension
(Stanford: Hoover, 1985); Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo
Sato, U.S. Policy Toward Japan and Korea (NY:
Praeger, 1982); Brian Bridges, Japan and Korea in
the 1990s (Edward Elgar, 1993). For a useful new
study on Japan-DPRK relations, see B.C. Koh, From
Discord to Collaboration (book manuscript, September
2000).
[81] In early
November 1999, Japan partially lifted sanctions
on the DPRK, including the ban on charter flights
and restrictions on unofficial contacts with DPRK
authorities (imposed after the August 1998 Taepo-dong
launch). This was followed in early December by
a suprapartisan Japanese delegation led by former
Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama to P'yongyang.
The three-day visit was both exploratory and goodwill
in nature, largely for the purpose as described
by Japanese officials of cultivating an "atmosphere"
conducive to the resumption of dialogue. The meetings
took place without preconditions on either side,
and the former Premier carried a letter from Prime
Minister Obuchi to DPRK leader Kim Chong-il expressing
hope for improved relations. Japan subsequently
lifted remaining sanctions (the most significant
of which was on food aid) after the Murayama mission.
[82] The MOFA
talks were conducted at the director-general level
(led by Anami Koreshige, director general of the
Asian Affairs Division of Japanese Foreign Ministry,
and the DPRK delegation by Oh Woollok, director
general of the 14th Bureau of the DPRK Ministry
of Foreign Affairs).
[83]
Japan in early-March 2000 lifted a three-year suspension
on food aid to the DPRK and committed to provide
100,000 tons of rice through the World Food Program,
meeting an important pre-condition for the North
to start normalization talks. P'yongyang's reciprocal
commitment to look into the issue of abducted and/or
missing Japanese made it marginally easier domestically
for the Obuchi government to start the talks.
[84]
The latter, while welcome, probably did more for
North-South relations than for Japan-DPRK relations.
[85] DPRK
actions indicative of deeper changes in preferences
over tactics would generally be in the security
arena. Unlike "smile diplomacy" which from a DPRK
bargaining perspective are relatively costless yet
appear to offer significant payoffs in terms of
economic engagement by others, changes in the conventional
military situation or missiles would be an important
indicator. Arguably, the recent set of agreements
between the two militaries to enable connection
of the railway link through the DMZ offers some
positive signs in this vein.
[86] In particular,
whether the DPRK agrees to/requests to amend its
Nuclear Declaration will be an important test of
whether intentions have changed.
[87]
There is no explicit statement of DPRK strategic
doctrine; however, given the range of their operational
missiles, circular probability errors, and interest
in crude nuclear devices, one could deduce that
the North seeks an existential nuclear deterrent
against the US by holding Japan hostage with the
threat of nuclear retaliation. For these arguments,
see Victor Cha, "Hypotheses on DPRK Strategic Doctrine,"
in The North Korean System (Palgrave, 2001 forthcoming).
[88] Negatively-constructed
nationalisms and nationalist myths are not unique
to Korea; however the degree to which this identity
is so viscerally framed against a past aggressor
may marginally distinguish the Korean case. By contrast,
July 4 is a patriotic institution in the U.S. but
its construction is as a pro-American holiday more
than an explicitly anti-British one.
[89]
Choson Ilbo, 11 October 1998; Washington Post, 8
October 1998; New York Times, 8 October 1998.
[90] These
include underground sites at Youngjeodong, Yanagang
province (20 km from the Chinese border), Shinori,
Pyongbuk province and new bases at Yonglim, Jagang
province and Sangnam, Hambuk province (Chosun Ilbo,
2 March 2001 [Yoo Yong?won, "NK Deploys 100 Rodong-1
Missiles"] accessed at the Napsnet Daily Report
March 2, 2001).
[91] At issue
was Japan's proposal of a normalization settlement
formula similar to the 1965 pact with South Korea
which offered economic aid and loans in lieu terming
this explicitly as colonial compensation.
[92]
Interviews,
Tokyo, February 14, 2000.
[93] A February
2001 nationwide opinion poll registered public approval
for the Mori Cabinet at a paltry 8.6 percent (down
from 19.2 percent in January). See Yomiuri Shimbun,
27 February 2001 ("Mori Cabinet's Support Rating
Sinks to 8.6%"). The government's lowest approval
rating since formation of the cabinet in April 2000
is directly a function of scandals involving the
LDP; however, they render virtually impossible any
bold moves by the government on North Korea.
[94]
Paper Prepared for Delivery at Conference on North
Korea's Engagement-Perspectives, Outlook, and Implications,
co-sponsored by the Federal Research Division, Library
of Congress and the National Intelligence Council,
Washington, DC, February 23, 2001. The opinions
expressed in this paper are entirely my own, and
should not be attributed to the Naval War College
or to the U.S. Government.
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