"Alternate Security Strategies: The Strategic Feasibility of Various Notions of Security"

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From "Security" to "Security Strategies"

a. Not as easy as it looks

b. Linkage is unclear

c. Strategy is difficult – or impossible

d. Key question: will it work? (prescription vs. description, explanation)

e. Start at end and work backwards: **what works strategically?**

Strategy Defined

a. A plan for matching means to ends

b. Increasing capabilities and defining and prioritizing goals

c. Adjusting to changes on either side of the means-ends equation

d. Dynamic, sophisticated plan

e. Requires the management of complex organizations

f. Multiple audiences (public, bureaucratic, allied, future legacy)

g. Multiple executors (military, national, grand, international

Strategy is Difficult

a. Impossible to judge costs and risks ahead of time

b. Policymakers and publics are not rational

    i. Cognitive and emotional limitations

    ii. Ignorance and lack of information

c. Operational and organizational hindrances

d. Democracy works against strategy

    i. Clear preferences, calculations and consistency of choice v

    ii. compromise and consensus-building

[Jablonsky, Betts]

Relevance to Re-conceptualizing Security

a. Targets (Effectiveness)

b. Coherence (Effectiveness)

c. Audiences (Resources): Ability to unify…

    i. Governments

    ii. Sub-national groups

    iii. International organizations

    iv International society

Relevance to Re-conceptualizing Security

. Who makes "new" security policies? (What level?)
    i.   Individuals
    ii.   Bureaucracies
    iii.   Governments
    iv.   International Organizations
    ✍   Transnational/Global Public

. Whose consciousness must change?

Traditional Notions of Security

a. Sovereignty, protection of citizens and territory
b. National in focus
c. State executes strategy
d. Targets: clear, persistent
e. Coherence: mixed
f. Audiences: domestic coalitions possible

Human Security

a. Rights
b. Individual/ group focus
c. Identity, development
d. Targets: how clear and persistent?
e. Coherence: mixed and contingent upon normative hold
f. Audiences: are coalitions possible? National or global?

[Liotta and Rogers, eds.]

Ecological Security

a. Global sustainability and related goals
b. Ecosystem is focus
c. Global action
d. Targets: global vs. transnational vs. national
e. Coherence: high but science (information) dependent
f. Audiences: are coalitions possible?

Re-conceived Security: An Idea or a Norm?

a. Ideas
   i. Powerful but sticky
   ii. Social psychology
   iii. IR theory/ foreign policy studies
b. Norms
   i. Weber, Durkheim vs. Marx, Mannheim
   ii. Norm diffusion
   iii. Normative "staying power"

Indicators of Effective Global/Regional Strategies: Three Examples

a. Realism (Traditional security)
b. Liberalism
c. Security Communities

[Garofano,   ]

Realism

a. Process
   i. Leaders are concerned with relative gains
   ii. Leaders do worst-case scenario development and procure accordingly

b. Outcomes
   i. Policies aim at maximizing power and traditional conceptions of security
   ii. Cooperative acts are narrowly self-interested

Liberalism

a. Motivating Perceptual Factors

   i. Evidence, and shared views, that conflicts of interest can b[e] ameliorated through shared information

   ii. Evidence of a concern among leaders for the shadow of th[e] future

b. Outcomes

   i. Evidence that new information alters prior perceptions, policies or behavior in the security realm

   ii. Evidence that regime- type arrangements effectively lower[s] the costs of acquiring critical information

   iii. Evidence of regime- constraining effects on traditional behaviors and interests

Security Community . . .

a. Consciousness
   i. Density of transactions
   ii. Extent of transactions
   iii. Evidence of "we- feeling"
   iv Evidence of Trust
   v. Evidence of shared images

a. Impact on Significant Groups
   i. Evidence of these issues revealing themselves in key policy making groups or in public
   ii. Evidence of changes in self- conception, conceptions of others, and conceptions of future relations with others.

. . . Security Community

a.   Outcomes

    i.   Evidence of convergent interests

    ii.   Evidence of spillover when agreement is not reached in on area

    iii. Overall decrease in tensions

Human Security: What should we see?

- Growing normative concerns
- Among which polities, publics, international institutions
- What kind of policies
- What kinds of progress, where
- Whose consciousness must change?

Conclusions . . .

a. History of strategy has implications for re-conceptualizing security

b. Targets, Coherence, and Audiences are critical and closely related

c. We need metrics for gauging progress

d. How are we doing re: human security, environmenta security etc.?

. . . Conclusions

a.   What other conceptions have "strategic value?"
    i.   Security "Insurance"
    ii.   Long-term security
    iii. Social Security

b.   Advantages and Disadvantages of Dropping "Security" Label
    i.   Human Rights
    ii.   Slavery
    iii. Civil Rights