



International Civil Aviation Organization

WORKING PAPER

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ASSEMBLY — 36TH SESSION

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Agenda Item 15: Aviation Security Programme

**A Global Solution to the Problems Associated with the
Additional Security Restrictions on the Carriage of Liquids, Aerosols & Gels (LAGs)
in Hand Baggage – Recommended Further Action**

(Presented by Airports Council International)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The additional security restrictions on the carriage of liquids, aerosols and gels (LAGs) in hand baggage have had a serious effect on passenger facilitation and on the day to day management of airports. The impact has stemmed from the need to implement the additional measures themselves and a lack of harmonisation internationally.

The industry appreciates the good work done by the ICAO Council and Secretariat. The organisation has issued three State Letters which have established the framework arrangements for a global solution. However, the industry believes that further leadership and urgent action will be needed to achieve a global solution to the problems outlined in the paper.

Action: The Assembly is invited to:

- a) establish a recommended time frame in which Contracting States should fully implement the framework arrangements in the State Letters (e.g., by 1 Jan 2008) and establish a process to coordinate their implementation internationally;
- b) provide a template and process under which States can declare their compliance with the recommended measures in the ICAO State Letters² and facilitate mutual validation by making such information available to other States on request; and
- c) consider in conjunction with the Secretariat Study Group the other suggestions for the more effective implementation of a permanent global solution, contained in this paper.

<i>Strategic Objectives:</i>	This working paper relates to Strategic Objective B (Enhance global civil aviation security)
<i>Financial implications:</i>	Not applicable
<i>References:</i>	Nil

¹ English, French and Spanish versions provided by ACI

² The validation process (para. 5.1.(d) of State Letter AS 8/11-07/53 Confidential (6 July 2007) provides for States to make such a declaration but is silent on how this would be done and how this information would be made available on request to other States.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Additional security measures were introduced on 10 August 2006, in response to the foiling of an alleged terrorist plot in the United Kingdom against aviation using improvised explosive devices containing home made liquid explosives. An initial ban on the carriage of all hand baggage on flights leaving the United Kingdom was subsequently modified to a restriction on the amounts of liquids, aerosols and gels (LAGs) which were permitted to be carried by passengers through screening points.³ These restrictions were adopted elsewhere in Europe and in North America. They were subsequently harmonised within the European Union by an amendment to the European Commission regulations which came into effect on 6 November 2006. ICAO then recommended their universal adoption (not later than 1 March 2007) in a State Letter.⁴

1.2 ICAO also reacted to the new threat with urgency and efficiency in calling a special meeting of the Council on 17 August 2006 to explore ways of countering the new threat. ACI would like to place on record its appreciation to the President of the ICAO Council for inviting ACI to present the issues and concerns of airports world wide in confronting this challenge to security and operations.

1.3 The industry has also recognised the need for additional security measures and has worked tirelessly with regulatory authorities and ICAO to implement them effectively, while at the same time trying to minimise the impact on passengers, airports, airlines, service partners, the travel retail trade and staff working in the industry.

2. THE IMPACT OF THE RESTRICTIONS

2.1 The impact of the enhanced security measures has had a serious effect on the day to day management of airports and has created serious difficulties especially in passenger facilitation, operational and financial terms. The impact has stemmed from the need to implement the additional measures themselves and a lack of harmonisation internationally.

2.2 *Passenger Facilitation Impacts*

2.2.1 Since the introduction of these restrictions, the industry has gone to great lengths to raise the awareness of passengers in advance of their journey, so that they could prepare accordingly. While frequent flyers adapted quickly to the new regime, infrequent flyers continue to arrive at airports with LAGs exceeding the restrictions. This has led to large quantities of personal items being surrendered by passengers at the departure screening points, with the consequential inconvenience, frustration and financial loss. Furthermore, the quantities of items surrendered are not abating, even in airports where the restrictions have been in place for almost a year. Moreover, there are worrying signs which suggest that some passengers are trying to travel with non-compliant items, not with any malicious intent but because they view the restrictions as nonsensical and do not support their imposition.

2.2.2 Passengers that have transferred at other airports on their journey have been additionally impacted, particularly where they have purchased travel retail items (such as wine, liquor or cosmetics) at the airport of departure or in flight on the first leg of the journey. This has been the case of passengers on

³ Liquids, aerosols and gels should be in containers with a capacity not greater than 100ml each and placed in a transparent re-sealable plastic bag of a maximum capacity not exceeding 1 litre, which is to be presented separately for screening.

⁴ AS 8/11-06/100 Confidential (1 December 2006).

journeys originating from elsewhere and transferring through an airport in the European States⁵. The problem has also manifested itself in other regions of the world where a State has applied the restrictions on the carriage of LAGs, without a mechanism for facilitating transfer passengers with travel retail items. As an indication of the impact worldwide, at one European hub airport⁶ alone, it is estimated to exceed €2,000 per day.

2.3 *Operational and Financial Impacts*

2.3.1 The implementation of these restrictions has increased the number of tasks in the screening process at airports, both for the passenger and the screening personnel. This has lengthened the time required to process a passenger, which has reduced (by as much as 25 per cent) the hourly number of passengers that can be screened at the typical airport screening channel. This loss in efficiency has impacted on other parts of the facilitation process, increasing queue times and affecting transfer connections and on-time performance. Passenger volumes, on the other hand, have continued to grow and airports have had to respond by building and equipping additional screening channels. Airports have incurred the cost of construction and additional screening equipment. Airports have also had to employ on average 10% more screening staff to manage the additional workload and to prepare passengers for screening, increasing airports' operating costs. Since these additional screening facilities have often been constructed in areas of the terminal previously allocated for retail activities, many airports have also incurred a loss in revenue generating potential as a result.

2.3.2 Airports also have to shoulder the burden and cost of handling and destroying the large quantities of surrendered items, which typically at the large hub airports can amount to 2 tonnes per day. As these items cannot be reused or recycled they invariably end up as waste in landfills, a situation which has led to public criticism of the restrictions and the airports which are required to implement them.

2.3.3 These extraordinary security measures have increased the financial burden on airports, which as an industry continues to disproportionately fund aviation security. This is an unfair burden since the responsibility for protecting citizens from terrorist attack must primarily rest with the State. ICAO and Contracting States are urged to recognise that a more equitable and sustainable mechanism for funding extraordinary aviation security measures needs to be established.

3. **THE FRAMEWORK ARRANGEMENTS FOR A GLOBAL SOLUTION**

3.1 The airport industry appreciates the efforts of the ICAO Council, the ICAO Secretariat and regional and national regulatory authorities to devise and implement solutions to the problems. These have focussed on harmonising the implementation of the restrictions on the carriage of LAGs internationally and facilitating passengers transferring at airports with travel retail items.

3.2 ICAO, in issuing its three State Letters⁷, has established the framework arrangements for a global solution. Specifically, the organisation has:

- a) Defined the recommended restrictions (and exemptions) on the carriage of LAGs;

⁵ States in the European Union plus Switzerland, Iceland and Norway.

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Unique (Flughafen Zürich AG)

⁷ AS 8/11-06/100 Confidential (1 December 2006), AS 8/11-07/26 Confidential (30 March 2007) and AS 8/11-07/53 Confidential (6 July 2007)

- b) Indicated the recommended technical specification for the Security Tamper Evident Bag (STEB) for use with travel retail sales;
- c) Defined recommended basic security principles to be applied to the LAG and STEB supply chains; and
- d) Identified different ways in which States could validate arrangements in other States, which in turn would facilitate recognition of LAGs in STEBs from those States.

3.3 However, this global solution can only be achieved if the framework arrangements are implemented in a harmonised fashion and by all ICAO Contracting States. To date implementation of these restrictions has not been universal and international coordination has been lacking. Considerable confusion remains within the industry and among the travelling public about when and how States are intending to apply the restrictions. This has served to exacerbate the problems. It is recommended that ICAO establish a recommended time frame for States to fully implement the framework arrangements.

3.4 With regard to the validation of arrangements in other States, it is felt that some States might wish to seek on-site verification but they may not have the resources to undertake the audit themselves. Accordingly, consideration needs to be given as to how validation could be facilitated in such circumstances. It is suggested that the provision of an independent verification mechanism, either using ICAO technical experts (e.g., USAP auditors or regional officers) or through an ICAO accredited 3rd party⁸, could facilitate such States.

3.5 The industry emphasizes its view that the framework arrangements must be seen as an interim solution. The permanent solution will require the development and deployment of screening systems that can routinely detect and discriminate between liquid explosives and the harmless LAGs carried on passengers and in hand baggage (i.e., personal toiletries, foodstuffs and travel retail products). Such systems will provide for more effective security screening and will also reduce the impact on passenger facilitation. However, there is concern that not enough priority and funding is being given by governments to the development of these new screening systems. It is suggested that there is an opportunity for ICAO to drive and coordinate the development and evaluation of such systems internationally.

3.6 Accordingly, the industry believes that further leadership and urgent action by ICAO will be needed to make the global solution a reality.

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⁸ ACI is prepared to establish an audit programme for this purpose, if so required.