


Intelligence

*Gathering, Analysis
& Dissemination*



Proceedings from
the 2008–2009 Forum Series



MILLER CENTER
of PUBLIC AFFAIRS
UNIVERSITY of VIRGINIA

Copyright © 2009
by the Rector and Visitors of
the University of Virginia

www.millercenter.org

Intelligence

Gathering, Analysis & Dissemination

George H. Gilliam &
Cristina Lopez-Gottardi Chao,
editors

Proceedings from the 2008–2009 Forum Series
Presented by



MILLER CENTER
of PUBLIC AFFAIRS
UNIVERSITY *of* VIRGINIA



CONTENTS

- 4 **Acknowledgements**
- 6 **Introduction**
- 12 **A Short History of the Business of Intelligence**
Frederick P. Hitz
- 32 **The Complexities of Intelligence**
Robert Kennedy
- 52 **Intelligence Analysis and Dissemination**
Thomas Fingar
- 74 **Interagency Relationships in the Intelligence Community**
Philip Mudd
- 96 **Intelligence and Espionage: The Lessons of Tehran and Afghanistan**
Howard Hart
- 118 **The NSA from 9/11 to the Eavesdropping on America**
James Bamford
- 138 **Suicide Terrorism**
Assaf Moghadam
- 160 **Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower**
Robert Baer

*Miller Center of Public Affairs,
University of Virginia,
Charlottesville, Virginia.*

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The events of 9/11 which led to a restructuring of the nation's intelligence community inspired scholars at the University of Virginia's Miller Center of Public Affairs to assess U.S. national security and intelligence capabilities. The Center's scholars are deeply indebted to the contributors of this volume for giving of their time, valuable insights and for sharing their varied and rich experiences with us. In particular, we thank Frederick P. Hitz and Howard Hart who each played an integral part in the development of the series, and—more importantly—for their years of service and sacrifice to our nation. We also thank the Miller Center's Director, Governor Gerald L. Baliles, for his intellectual curiosity and constant support of the Forum program.

The Miller Center of Public Affairs is a leading public policy institution. Through its many academic, public and policy programs it serves as a national meeting place where engaged citizens, scholars, students, policy makers and media representatives gather to research, reflect and report upon issues of national importance to the governance of the United States, with a particular emphasis on the role of the Executive Branch. This volume, focused on the business of intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination, is a product of this process. Its contributors offer thoughtful reflections and policy recommendations regarding the challenges that have faced the U.S. intelligence community since 9/11.

Converting the program agenda suggested by Hitz and Hart to Forums, and, finally into this published volume took the effort and coordination of numerous individuals. We are grateful to Shirley K. Burke of the Miller Center for her assistance coordinating all logistical aspects of the Forum program. We thank Anne Chesnut for the publication design, and Rebecca Barns and our student assistant Sarah Koczot for their careful eyes in editing the finished product. Finally, the Miller Center Forum program and



*The John and Rosemary
Galbraith Forum Room*

the publication of this volume would not be possible without significant financial support, and for this we thank the Miller Center Foundation and our loyal friends whose generous philanthropy supports all that we do.

George H. Gilliam
*Assistant Director for Public Programs and
Chair of the Forum Program*

Cristina Lopez-Gottardi Chao
Assistant Chair of the Forum Program

Miller Center of Public Affairs
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, Virginia
Fall 2009

INTRODUCTION

*I*n the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (“9/11 Commission”) released a critique of the U.S. intelligence community which brought to light the complexity of the business of intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination. It also outlined a number of areas that required restructuring to meet the demands posed by terrorism and the broader range of national security concerns made evident by the 2001 attack. Given the devastating failure to warn about 9/11, the Commission’s aim was to provide a detailed account of the circumstances related to the attacks and to assess the nation’s preparedness to safeguard against future threats.

Among its many findings and recommendations, the 9/11 Commission Report highlights two important areas of concern which are the focus of this volume: 1) intelligence community architecture, and 2) U.S. foreign relations with the Muslim world. Robert Kennedy, Professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology and a contributor to this volume, captures the Commission’s sentiments stating that, “in the United States the intelligence community is a confederation of sometimes competing, sometimes cooperating, sometimes conflicting Executive Branch agencies and organizations that work both separately—sometimes at cross-purposes and, at times, together to conduct intelligence activities.”¹ Kennedy further notes how the “fragmented and decentralized nature” of their associations can sometimes compromise the quality and timeliness of producing effective intelligence.

As a result, in 2004 Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act which outlined a number of sweeping structural changes. The most significant modification called for the establishment of the position of Director of National Intelligence to oversee all 16 intelligence agencies of the federal government, replacing the Director of Central Intelligence. As such, this position now serves as the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council and the Department of Homeland Security on matters relating to intelligence and national security.



*The Scripps Library at the
Miller Center of Public Affairs*

In a further attempt to streamline the bureaucratic process, the Commission also called for the establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to be staffed by members of all 16 agencies and to serve as a center for joint operations and planning. In addition, the Commission pushed for increased information sharing within and between agencies, as well as greater coordination between local, state and national law enforcement.

The 2004 Intelligence Reform Act mandated the first major shift in the structure and coordination of the nation's intelligence community since 1947. That year, President Harry Truman signed into law the National Security Act requiring a major restructuring of the nation's military units and intelligence capabilities. In particular, two major changes were implemented—the establishment of the National Security Council, creating a centralized coordinating body for national security policy within the Executive Branch and concurrently, the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which replaced the Office of Strategic Services that emerged during the Second World War. Prior to this time intelligence was conducted as needed on demand by the various departments within the Executive Branch, however, they shared no common direction or coordination. Thus, the CIA became the first and only civilian intelligence agency within the government, bringing greater coordination and strategy to intelligence matters.

The end of the Cold War marked another important shift in the focus and direction of the intelligence community. In the years immediately following the Cold War's end, the nation's national security concerns were sidelined by the euphoria unleashed by America's assumed victory in this struggle. President George H.W. Bush's declaration of a "new world order" in September 1990, falsely led the nation and policy makers to assume that the end of the Cold War heralded the beginning of a new era characterized by declining global conflict. Bush said,

Until now, the world we've known has been a world divided—a world of barbed wire and concrete block, conflict and cold war. Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a "world order" in which "the principles of justice and fair play... protect the weak against the strong..." A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations.²

This vision, however, proved to be short lived as crises erupted in Kosovo and Somalia, among other places. The series of terrorist attacks that began with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and continued several years later with U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and the attack on the *USS Cole* in 2000, served as further warning signs of a world in transition. It was not until 2001, however, that the nation was decisively forced to face a more elusive, diverse, and complex range of adversaries. Shifts in the geopolitical landscape, the rise of extremism, and the emergence of al-Qaeda as a global terrorist organization made plain the need to transform the focus and structure of the U.S. intelligence community. The challenges posed by the "war on terror" reminded policy makers that intelligence agencies and structures had been developed during a time vastly different from the present. Change was necessary to ensure domestic security.

A second major focus of the 9/11 Commission Report concerned America's relations with the Muslim world. In particular, the Commission called for greater U.S. support to Pakistan against the nation's extremists in the form of both military and development aid; a commitment to a stable Afghanistan; greater diversity and clarity regarding the U.S.-Saudi relationship; and an enhanced multilateral effort against Islamic extremism. The report also noted significant concern regarding the rise of suicide terrorism around the world, and the potential threat from Iran based in part on its association with al-Qaeda.

This volume shines light on these pressing issues. In particular, its contributors examine the strength of U.S. intelligence capabilities and the effectiveness of changes made to the community's structure in the aftermath of 9/11. In doing so, the volume traces the historical evolution of the nation's intelligence enterprise and the myriad of actors and organizations that compose it. It explores some of the current challenges confronting intelligence officials including officer recruitment, training and preparedness, interagency coordination and cooperation, information sharing, and interagency politics. The volume also assesses some of America's adversaries and includes suggestions regarding foreign policy formation. Finally, our contributors discuss the post 9/11 struggle to balance the need to protect the nation while maintaining respect for civil liberties. For future scholars, this volume provides a snapshot of the most significant intelligence challenges of our time.

Conducted at the University of Virginia's Miller Center of Public Affairs during the 2008–2009 academic year, this volume is a collection of edited Forum transcripts. The contributors include practitioners from various units within the U.S. intelligence community including the National Intelligence Council, the National Security Branch of the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], and the Central Intelligence Agency. This volume also includes contributions from leading journalists and academics specialized in these issues. The contributors were selected based on their specific expertise in addressing the many aspects of this subject.

Frederick P. Hitz, former CIA Inspector General and currently a Senior Fellow at the Center for National Security Law at the University of Virginia School of Law, sets the tone for the series providing a brief history of intelligence gathering beginning with the birth of our nation. In particular, he discusses the politics surrounding passage of the 1947 National Security Act, which serves as a starting point for our understanding of the evolution of the intelligence community's structure.

Robert Kennedy, who served 35 years in various government postings, including Civilian Deputy Commandant at the NATO Defense College, and Dwight D. Eisenhower Professor of National Security Studies at the U.S. Army War College, discusses his most recent book, *Of Knowledge and Power: The Complexities of National Intelligence* (Praeger Publishers, 2008). In it he examines the many challenges facing the intelligence community in trying to provide quality intelligence to support American national security interests. Kennedy is particularly critical of the lack of congressional oversight on matters of national intelligence.

Kennedy's research is also useful in outlining the various stages of the intelligence cycle which include: 1) the identification of needs by public officials including the President,

and the National Security Council, among other high-ranking policy makers, 2) the collection of intelligence from a variety of sources and obtained through a variety of means, 3) analysis, and finally 4) dissemination of intelligence.³ As such, Kennedy's book and chapter in this volume serve as an excellent primer on the politics of intelligence, the cycle of how classified information is sought and ultimately utilized, and the often complex relationship that exists between the myriad of intelligence agencies.

Howard Hart offers an “on the grounds” perspective having served as a career officer in the CIA's Directorate of Operations. He was Chief of Station in Islamabad from 1981–1984 where he coordinated resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and in Germany from 1987–1988 when the Berlin Wall fell. Hart addresses the particular challenges of collecting human intelligence and in doing so, related his involvement in the Tehran rescue mission. He stresses the need to maintain a robust human intelligence capability and worries about the CIA's current proficiencies in this regard.

Thomas Fingar, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, addresses the complex process of intelligence analysis and dissemination, and reflects upon changes resulting from the end of the Cold War. In contrast to the Cold War days, Fingar argues that there has been an explosion in the number of customers and issues the intelligence community now addresses. He also explains how the decision cycle regarding matters of intelligence has shortened. While the Cold War forced the U.S. to grapple with an enemy that was capable of enormous destruction, the Soviet Union could largely be expected to operate in a rational manner and thus major decisions of intelligence could often be made in a time frame of months and years. The post 9/11 environment, and the more elusive and fragmented nature of America's current adversaries, however, often force action within a matter of hours and days.

Philip Mudd, Associate Executive Assistant Director of the National Security Branch of the FBI, furthers this discussion by addressing the particular challenges posed by globalization and the extreme complexities required to coordinate between domestic and international agencies. Having previously held positions at the CIA, the National Intelligence Council and the National Counterterrorism Center, Mudd shares his unique and varied interagency experiences.

James Bamford, author of a number of books on the National Security Agency (NSA), including most recently *The Shadow Factory: The Ultra-Secret NSA from 9/11 to the Eavesdropping on America* (Anchor, 2008), also joins the conversation. A former Washington Investigative Producer for *ABC News' World News Tonight with Peter*

Jennings, Bamford has written investigative cover stories for the *New York Times Magazine*, and the *Washington Post Magazine*, among others. Bamford's findings uncovered the NSA's role during 9/11 and the deregulation of eavesdropping during this time. According to Bamford, the NSA was ill-equipped to deal with such issues, resulting in a poorly devised solution to the challenges posed by 9/11 and the effort to safeguard against a future attack in the U.S.

The final two Forums in the series examine specific threats to the U.S. **Assaf Moghadam**, Assistant Professor at the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and an Associate with the International Security Program's Initiative on Religion at Harvard University, speaks about the challenge posed by suicide terrorism. Taking a historical perspective, he discusses the unprecedented proliferation in the number of suicide attacks in the last decade that have resulted from the transition of al-Qaeda as a global actor and the growing ideological appeal of Salafi Jihad. He closes with important policy implications for the U.S. and its allies including the need to expose contradictions posed by Salafi Jihad.

The final Forum of this series was presented by **Robert Baer**, a former CIA case officer in India, Beirut, Tajikistan, and Salah-al-Din in Kurdish northern Iraq. During the mid-1980s, Baer was sent to Iraq to organize opposition to Saddam Hussein, but was recalled and investigated for allegedly conspiring to assassinate the Iraqi leader. Baer discusses his new book, *The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower* (Random House, 2008), which is based on extensive interviews, and reveals the danger posed by Iran to both the West, and with regards to the country's growing influence in the Middle East.

Further research materials on the subject of intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination are available on the Miller Center website—<http://millercenter.org/public/forum/series/intel>. This site includes archived video of the complete series, an extensive bibliography on the subject and related Miller Center research and sources for further study. Conference transcripts have been edited and corrected for accuracy and clarity.

Endnotes

1. Kennedy, Robert. 2008. *Of Knowledge and Power: The Complexities of National Intelligence*. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Press.
2. Excerpt from address before a joint session of Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit in Washington D.C. on 11 September 1990.
3. Kennedy (2008), pgs 2–3.

A SHORT HISTORY *of the* BUSINESS *of* INTELLIGENCE

Frederick P. Hitz

George H. Gilliam. There is no one better qualified and positioned to open the Miller Center Forum series on intelligence. Fred Hitz graduated from Princeton University and Harvard Law School, and then went into the clandestine service for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), serving first in Africa. After a stint in private law practice, he returned to public service at the State Defense and Energy Departments before resuming his CIA career in 1978 as Legislative Counsel to the Director of Central Intelligence. In 1980 he became Deputy Director for Europe, in the Directorate of Operations, and after a second tour of duty in private practice, in 1990 was appointed by President George H.W. Bush as the first statutory Inspector General, a position he held until his retirement in 1998.

For his service to our nation, he was awarded the Secretary of Defense Medal for outstanding public service, and the Distinguished Intelligence Medal by the Director of Central Intelligence. On the occasion of Fred Hitz's retirement, Senator Arlen Specter said this in the Senate: "Fred Hitz was nominated by President Bush in 1990, confirmed by the Senate in October 1990, and sworn in in November 1990. The Congress wanted a strong-willed and independent individual who is knowledgeable of CIA's mission, history, and activities, and who had the fortitude and skills to identify, investigate, and report wrongdoing when he saw it and how he saw it. Over the past seven years, Fred Hitz has accomplished this mandate with honor and diligence in a sea of Congressional and controversial investigations."

Since his retirement, Fred Hitz has taught at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University and at the University of Virginia Law School, and has published two books: *The Great Game: The Myths and Reality of Espionage*, and this past year, *Why Spy: Espionage in an Age of Uncertainty* published in May. Please welcome Fred Hitz.



MILLER CENTER
of PUBLIC AFFAIRS
UNIVERSITY *of* VIRGINIA

Frederick P. Hitz. Thank you for that very friendly and much too full an introduction. I appreciate it, and I'm happy to see so many faces known to me, good friends and students. This is a labor of love.

CIA as an organization has had quite a remarkable history. We tend to think of the CIA and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), its antecedent, as the beginning of intelligence in the United States, and that really is not the case. George Washington ran the Committee on Foreign Intelligence supported by unvouchered monies that permitted him to gather information. He was a great believer in intelligence as a military officer, and it continued during his time as President. That fund continued for successive Presidencies. Thomas Jefferson, our own TJ, used it in keeping track of what the Spanish were doing in Florida, for example, but we'd never had an established civilian intelligence service.

The Army and the Navy established departmental intelligence competencies during the latter part of the 19th century, and we know that Abe Lincoln was wrapped around the Western Union telegraph office in Washington, trying to see if [George B.] McClellan would ever agree to fight. But we never, as I say, had a civilian intelligence capability during this whole period; and it's important to try to figure out why. I think there was perfect support for it during a time when America's security was challenged, but there was also an undercurrent of feeling that spying was an un-American kind of thing to do.

Espionage was mounted against us, even by our allies, over a period of time. Britain, for example, was very cagey in the way it sought to cadge Woodrow Wilson and the United States into coming into the First World War. Blinker Hall, who was the head of signals intelligence for the British, was involved in the [Arthur] Zimmermann telegram episode that our history books have always told us was significant in bringing the United States into World War I against Germany.

Although we had established a fairly good signals intelligence capability in the State Department during the '20s, it was shut down by the Secretary of State, Mr. [Henry] Stimson, in 1930: "Gentlemen don't read other gentlemen's mail." That situation continued until the onset of World War II, when General William J. Donovan revived the idea of an American intelligence service. General Donovan had been the most decorated American soldier in World War I and an enormously successful legal practitioner afterwards. He was one of the early Antitrust Division Chiefs in the Department of Justice, a named partner in his own law firm and, as it turned out, a law school classmate at

Columbia of President [Franklin D.] Roosevelt (FDR). He began to agitate with Roosevelt for the creation of a civilian intelligence agency as the war began.

Although it didn't happen, it was not for want of the British trying to support General Donovan's efforts. [Winston] Churchill, you'll remember, gave the United States access at the highest level to the product of the enigma machine, the German secret code machine that the British had captured with help from the Polish, and had broken out by 1939–40, with the enormous brainpower assembled at Bletchley Park in the UK. They were able to read a lot of the traffic running from the high command in Berlin to the troops. That was shared with President Roosevelt as an indication of the importance which Churchill ascribed to intelligence.

In time, Donovan, with the help of William Stephenson (*A Man Called Intrepid*) beefed up his lobbying for getting an intelligence service created in the U.S. The Office of Strategic Services was thus founded, and because it was war-time, it did not report directly to the President of the United States. Although its head, General Donovan, had a personal relationship with FDR, he reported through the Joint Chiefs, and through the Chief of Staff of the military. But it had an enormous responsibility, and this is where the first impressions of American intelligence, and its reputation for elitism was first established—OSS, Oh So Social.

Quite rightly, General Donovan looked around at who might be the raw recruits for the espionage arm of the new intelligence agency and said, “Surely we've got to choose people who speak a foreign language, a second language, and speak it well. We've also got to get people who have traveled, who have lived in foreign environments. A lot of my colleagues on Wall Street, lawyers and investment bankers, meet that requirement.” So, as he reached out to try to build a cadre of operations officers, it was natural to go to the Wall Street people he knew.

On the analytical side, he reached out to William Langer, a well-known professor of European history at Harvard University, to organize the academic world, to come to Washington and help. So you had young scholars, post docs or newly minted PhDs, taking leave from their assignments, if they had them, and coming down and leaving the rigors of medieval history for the business of counting ball-bearing production in Eastern Germany.

They did a remarkable job. They were given credit for creating the notion of “all source intelligence,” and there was something to that. They brought in information from the private sector, information collected clandestinely abroad by the new OSS spies, from embassies, from military attachés, from academic sources, to give an analytical product to the President when he needed it.

At the same time, Britain was an enormous influence on us, as you can imagine, and they taught us the tricks of the Special Operations Executive, the derring-do boys that jumped in behind enemy lines. William Colby, a later Director of Central Intelligence for example, had been dropped into Norway during the war. A number of others had had a similar experience, making contact with local resistance movements. And so, coming out of World War II, where

nobody would have claimed that OSS necessarily made a major and material contribution to the victory, they were certainly an active part of it.

President Truman quite clearly mistrusted the clandestine service. ... it was a hard sell for him, and in 1945, he chose to disband oss.

After President Roosevelt's death, there arose the question of what was to become of OSS, now that the war was over.

President [Harry] Truman quite clearly mistrusted the clandestine service. He felt that he had enough trouble trying to

keep J. Edgar Hoover on the reservation, and as he said often, "I don't want to create another Gestapo." So it was a hard sell for him, and in 1945, he chose to disband OSS.

Despite Donovan's distinguished career, it appears President Truman also had a bit of personal difficulty with him. He considered Donovan to be a rather spoiled Republican Irish pol. There weren't many of Donovan's stripe out in Truman's part of the world, so the two of them never worked it out.

But more to the point, times had changed, and were changing, as President Truman reached out—remember, he was kept in almost complete isolation by President Roosevelt—to get abreast of some of the most critical things that were taking place in the administration. For example, it is fair to say that Joseph Stalin knew more about the status of the American atomic bomb program at Potsdam than did President Truman. So as Truman reached out to see if he could get along with Uncle Joe and they could do something about post-war Europe and the Far East, and the door was shut in his face, he began to think, *Yeah you know, this is going to be a difficult period and I'm going to need to have intelligence information about what is going on.*

Also, there were the lessons of Pearl Harbor, which, you'll remember, weren't studied assiduously until after the war. First, it had been necessary to defeat

the Japanese, and then there would be plenty of time to look into what had gone wrong. The causes and the nature of the Pearl Harbor attack were just coming to the fore as a subject of study in 1946, and it was clear that the United States could never afford again to face a situation where we had a total lack of warning as we had on December 7, 1941.

Therefore, with help from some of his senior advisors, President Truman fastened on first the Central Intelligence Group and then the Central Intelligence Agency. It was created in 1947, along with the Department of Defense and the National Security Council, in the National Security Act of that year. It had, as its first focus, not the collection of intelligence information on its own so much as the gathering together of information that was being reported by the military departments; by the Department of State; and by the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation]; and presenting it to the President in an organized and analyzed fashion. In time, however, that proved not to be enough.

Here is the critical thing—and I'm offering this as sort of a counterweight to *Legacy of Ashes*, which I know many of you have read. Tim Weiner has written an extraordinary book here, but one that the critics have concluded was a little bit too one-sided. Tim's book is really not a history of CIA so much as a history of covert action—the political actions we took in the early days of the Cold War and continued right up until the effort to drive the Soviet Union out of

Afghanistan in the '80s. In covert action, the hand of the United States

Government was intended not to show, but we were prepared to do anything, from managing political operations, sabotage, war, whatever was needed to advance a political goal. Those are the operations that *Legacy of Ashes* focused on, and to be sure, a number of them did not work out as well as their originators had hoped. This is an important point to note historically.

This is nothing that the CIA volunteered for. In fact, the first lawyer at CIA, a graduate of the University of Virginia School of Law, opined that the 1947 act

The causes and the nature of the Pearl Harbor attack were just coming to the fore as a subject of study in 1946, and it was clear that the United States could never afford again to face a situation where we had a total lack of warning as we had on December 7, 1941.

never intended for CIA to be involved in covert action. Nonetheless, there was a clause in that bill that directed the CIA to “...perform such other operations as the National Security Council should decide upon.” That was the sort of catch-all clause that covert action sneaked through. That and the clear-eyed witness of George Kennan, the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Moscow who wrote in ’47 that extraordinary telegram to Washington describing the Soviet game plan to advance relentlessly west, across the European continent, to try to protect its own security, as they saw it, and to communize Western Europe.

It inspired the Marshall Plan, the aid that we chose, thank goodness, to give the Europeans to build their economies back up, but it also inspired the need to perform covert action operations—for example, to prop up the Christian Democratic Party in Italy or non-communist trade unions in France. Italy and France didn’t have any money. They didn’t have any way to raise money; but they were being challenged at the ballot box by local Communist parties. As you recall, the Communist party in France came out of the Second World War in a very strong position. They had infiltrated the resistance movements, and especially in Southern France, they were strong. So we needed to do that.

We had to make sure that if Marshall Plan aid was going to be landed in Marseilles that it would be unloaded by trade unions that were not controlled by Communists that would try to sabotage the effort. The State Department didn’t want to do covert action. It interfered with their diplomatic responsibilities. The military departments had other fish to fry as well. They were demobilizing. They had a lot of mechanical problems to deal with. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had been brought back to deal with domestic counterintelligence questions. CIA was the new kid on the block that was charged with these functions; and the responsibility for them was so important and sensitive, they were located in another building apart from the main headquarters of CIA in Washington.

For those of you old enough to remember, CIA inhabited those ramshackled buildings on the Mall, near where the Vietnam Memorial is today. They were temporaries built during the war. There were rats running through them. I remember one jumped over my foot when I was taking my interview there. I kind of laughed. But it was close to the center of power, and so the early Directors of Central Intelligence who worked in what is now the Navy Surgeon General’s office, directly across from the State Department—were close to the White House and State, where they could consult on matters conveniently; and could rub shoulders at lunchtime with State Department officials or go across the river to meet easily with Pentagon people, from a downtown location.

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), the entity through which CIA was going to run these covert actions, was located in State Department quarters, and it was run by an illustrious University of Virginia college and law school alumnus, Frank Wisner, whose son, incidentally, was my classmate in college. Frank Wisner was a very clever Wall Street lawyer who came to work for the OSS during World War II, and as he took on this new responsibility to covertly build up political parties and trade unions and cultural organs to fight the Communists, he needed a source of money.

He did a little research and he discovered that there was a stabilization fund in the Department of the Treasury, which was needed to keep our currency in line with the British pound and the French franc, et cetera, in moments of financial crisis, but it otherwise lay dormant. He said, “Well, I’m going to use some of that for my covert action operations.” If you’ll remember, the Marshall Plan also had a requirement that recipient countries pay back some of the loans that America had made to them in their local currency. What better than to have access to French francs or Italian lira that were on deposit with the State Department as the local currency payback for Marshall Plan aid, monies that might otherwise not have been used?

So you saw in covert action activity a pretty good bankroll and a rather exciting mission—a mission that as far as American intelligence is concerned, responded to the strength of the American character. Don’t stand there, do something! Make a difference! The budget for the OPC just jumped enormously during this period of time. Tim Weiner chronicles a number of those actions, successful and unsuccessful, in his book.

As time passed, however, the President of the United States began to wonder how our espionage agents were doing against the Soviet Union, which after all was the most important assignment for American intelligence. We didn’t have any penetrations of the Soviet state. We had the occasional volunteer, but the Soviets ran a very tight police state, and we didn’t have the kind of information coming out of the Soviet Union that they had coming from our side, through our allies in Berlin and elsewhere.

The rubber really hit the road in 1948 with the Berlin airlift, when Stalin said, “Hey, I am tired of Berlin operating on a four-power basis behind the lines of occupation. I’m going to close them down.” So he cut off the autobahn traffic, he cut off the air traffic, he cut off the train traffic, and the question for the President of the United States, and for the Chief of Mission in Berlin was,

What's happening here? Are we going to see the Red Army on our doorsteps? Has the Soviet Union decided to start World War III?

Frankly, with very little intelligence information, very few agents in the midst of what was going on to report on this, to its great credit the CIA looked at the numbers and said, "They're not coming, and the reason is quite simple. Stalin has made up his mind that until the correspondence of forces are in line—in short, until the Soviet Union has an ability to believe that it can win such a war, after what they've been through from 1940 on, they're not going to take us on." That turned out to be the way it finished, but it caused President Truman to think that we had to look again at our intelligence function and try to strengthen it.

Allen Dulles and General [James H.] Doolittle and several others got that assignment, and what they concluded was that the covert action arm, OPC, ought to be lined up with the traditional foreign intelligence gatherers. The spies, the genuine spies, shouldn't be operating on their own. And secondly, it concluded that we needed a more determined effort at predicting future happenings. We certainly needed penetrations of the Soviet Union, and we had to work particularly hard on that, but we also needed a little more crystal-ball gazing. We needed more estimative intelligence. We needed to begin to take what was going on at the present time and try to look down the road. Hence, the Board of National Estimate, that's what it was called, was to be recreated, and the person to do this was General Walter Bedell Smith, who had a strong relationship with President Truman, as he clearly did with General Eisenhower, for whom he was the Chief of Staff during the Second World War.

...we needed a more determined effort at predicting future happenings. We certainly needed penetrations of the Soviet Union, and we had to work particularly hard on that, but we also needed a little more crystal-ball gazing. We needed more estimative intelligence.

I've always found Bedell Smith to be a fascinating character. When he came to CIA he had half a stomach. He'd been sick as hell and he'd been in the hospital for ages, so he had a highly irascible temper. I suppose all of us would if we were in that shape. He wasn't a young man either, and he was very stern around the office and brooked no opposition. When he saw that the OPC, for example, was operating outside of his dominion, but his organization was being held accountable for what they did, he stopped it. "You're working for me now," he said.

Frank Wisner duly brought his group in, which created a problem, because the OPC and the real spies were working the same terrain, and they had to do it in coordinated fashion. Oftentimes they were seeing the same people. Secondly, to recreate a Board of National Estimate, he got hold of Langer again and said, “Let’s

This was a time when just a few senior members of the Congress knew what money was being spent on intelligence and where; and in terms of U.S. policy, everybody in the Executive and Legislative branches was united. The game was the Soviet Union and stopping its expansion, containing it.

gear this up. It worked very well during the war.” Sherman Kent, then a young history professor at Yale, was recruited, and they began to bring things back.

To his credit and to the end of his term, Bedell Smith believed that the United States was spending far too little effort on penetrating the Soviet Union and really getting the secrets of the Kremlin, which is what they were set up to do. The result, of course, was that the Soviets were able to build an atomic bomb sooner than we had predicted. We said mid-’50s; it was more like the end of the ’40s. China fell

to the Communists without our having known it, and also the north attacked the south in Korea. Just one Bedell Smith story: he was known to turn to a subaltern of a group advising him from time to time, and he’d say, “Everyone around here is entitled to one mistake, and son, you just made yours.” Can you imagine what that would do for your morale in this day and age?

Before I leave entirely this period of the ’40s and ’50s, I also want to make the point that the CIA, in prosecuting the “culture war” in devastated Europe, in trying to win hearts and minds (that over-utilized phrase these days), it was a hell of a lot more subtle than perhaps we would be today. Remember, this was before meaningful Congressional oversight. This was a time when just a few senior members of the Congress knew what money was being spent on intelligence and where; and in terms of U.S. policy, everybody in the Executive and Legislative branches was united. The game was the Soviet Union and stopping its expansion, containing it. So we were able to fund activity without a line-by-line description of what precisely the CIA and the intelligence community were doing.

The CIA operatives and the U.S. Government involved in this intellectual struggle realized that you weren’t going to sell garden-variety American capitalism to Europeans after the Second World War. It was their capitalist

governments that in their view as voters had let them down, first in their response to the Great Depression, and then in their failure to stand up to [Adolf] Hitler as he built up his power in the 1930s. The only way you were going to be able to work to influence them was by espousing a socialist, a leftist point of view, but one that was clearly non-Communist. So the whole idea that the non-Communist left underwrote all of our policy, and we were able to find an enormous grouping of intellectuals who recognized that the role of government in these countries would be a lot greater than would be tolerated in the United States, but it wasn't going to be in the back pocket of Joseph Stalin.

Let me review quickly what went on. The National Security Act of 1949 fleshed out the powers of the Director of Central Intelligence that made it such a unique agency. It gave the Director absolute authority to hire and fire its employees. None of the civil service regulations applied, unless the Director chose to apply them, and more to the point—and here's the thing that really gave CIA an advantage—it could spend money without benefit of a year-by-year appropriation. As you know, the Congressional appropriations process is keyed to the fiscal year.

For example, as time went on and we began to invest in a satellite overhead reconnaissance program, you needed to accumulate monies over a period of time to build these enormously expensive things, and you had to be prepared to replace them if by some chance they were knocked out of the sky or didn't function. You couldn't go to the Congress and say, "I want a line item here, please, to repair this spy satellite so we can take more pictures of the Soviet Union."

This Section 8 authority, so-called because of its position in the 1949 Act, was absolutely invaluable, because it allowed the Director to seek and accumulate monies to spend where there was a need. For a long time he had a reserve fund that put him in an ideal position to respond immediately if a crisis occurred and the President needed to have help in some way or another. The result was that during the Eisenhower years, when we were trying to develop the U2 and the follow-on satellite systems, it was the CIA that could be the banker, and the near-term administrator or manager of the project. Were you to try to do the same thing through the Department of Defense procurement process, the bureaucratic hoops that you would have to go through would have been too cumbersome and would take too much time.

Hoyt Vandenberg, the second Director of Central Intelligence and a cousin of Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, was the person who brought about a number of these miracles. He was on his way up; he was an Air Force General.

The Air Force had just been created, and he eventually became Air Force Chief of Staff. He was the one who saw what CIA had to do, and he got the money.

As we moved into the '50s and as President Truman's term gave way to President Eisenhower, the theme developed in the United States that we were not going to just contain the spread of Soviet Communism, we were going to try to roll it back. If you remember from your reading of *Legacy of Ashes*, Tim Weiner spends a lot of time on this issue. It was a feckless effort, and one very costly in terms of lives, as we tried to put people over the border into Eastern Europe. They were rolled up pretty quickly by the Soviets. The same thing in Asia. So there came a time when President Eisenhower, as frustrated as he was about the lack of information coming out of the Soviet Union, decided we would have to go technological.

What we did then was devote monies to solving the problem—and this is one of the great things that I think will be important for CIA in the out years—the combination of academia, the business world, and government working together tightly, without a lot of bureaucratic back and forth, created for us the “Eyes in the Sky,” which we absolutely depend on now. We depended on it even more during the Cold War, because we were trying to follow developments in the missile test ranges in Central Asia. This was all brought about by President Eisenhower's senior scientific advisor, George Kistiakowsky of MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology]; Edwin Land of Polaroid for the cameras and photography from high altitude; and Richard Bissell, a bureaucratic wizard who had helped run the Marshall Plan, and they did it. They created the U2 and then, eventually laid in the building blocks for the satellite overhead program.

The National Security Agency, which dealt with signals intercepts, had been created in the last days of President Truman, in 1952, by Executive order. It joined the separate signals intelligence capabilities of the military departments with the CIA, and continued the cooperation that had existed since World War II, with their counterparts in the UK and Canada and Australia. So these were the ways we adapted to get around the fact that we were having difficulty recruiting Russian spies.

I call this period the era of the great covert actions. Iran, in 1953, has been criticized by the theocrats in Teheran recently. At the time that President Eisenhower determined to remove Prime Minister [Mohammad] Mosaddegh and bring back the Shah, it looked as if the Soviets, through the Tudeh party, were beginning to advance on Iran. The map was already being colored

communist red, so it was decided that that was a good thing to do. In the end, after a false start, it went extraordinarily well. Guatemala in 1954 was considered to be the precursor of Cuba, a communist state in the western hemisphere, regardless of the Monroe Doctrine. It will always be debated. There was an excellent study done by a University of Virginia politics graduate student several

Ironically enough, if the Bay of Pigs was the nadir of support for CIA or CIA's ability to support the government during the Cold War, the 1962 missile crisis was the high point. There you had a combination of U2 photos that had permitted us to know that the Soviets were introducing IRBMs into Cuba, and evidence we could use and did use in the UN.

years ago that dealt with the fact that we didn't have much evidence that the then President of Guatemala was a communist. The only Russian delegation that had come to Guatemala on his watch was seeking to buy bananas. But nonetheless, we weren't going to take a chance, and so he was chased.

The real issue was what we would do to deal with [Fidel] Castro when he appeared on the scene in 1958, and that of course led to the Bay of Pigs fiasco, followed by the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, when, thank goodness, President [John F.] Kennedy had the wit to bring in more than just the inside operatives to

advise him on how to react. Ironically enough, if the Bay of Pigs was the nadir of support for CIA or CIA's ability to support the government during the Cold War, the 1962 missile crisis was the high point. There you had a combination of U2 photos that had permitted us to know that the Soviets were introducing IRBMs [intermediate range ballistic missiles] into Cuba, and evidence we could use and did use in the UN.

We intercepted a host of signals that captured the traffic as these missiles were being unloaded in Havana, but more to the point, we had the advantage of the humint of our spy, Oleg Penkovsky, who was a high-ranking member of Russian military intelligence and was telling us about [Nikita] Khrushchev's character as a leader—the fact that he responded impulsively to strategic opportunities, and that the Politburo was not on his side in locating these missiles 90 miles from our shore. The Soviet General Staff thought that the missiles were vulnerable and their capabilities would become known and the information stolen. Along with former Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, Penkovsky was able to convince President Kennedy that instead of doing what the military quite naturally wanted to do—bomb the missiles back into the

stone age and end the threat that way—see if we could get Khrushchev to pull back from what he had done. And we were able to do that.

Now we know that World War III was just a snap of the fingers away, because the Soviets on the island were more numerous than we thought, and they had tactical nuclear weapons which they could have used to strike Miami if they had been attacked.

Let me move ahead here. The war in Vietnam that followed was a difficult time, but what you should know about Vietnam is that there, the CIA got it right. There were a lot of things that went wrong, depending on your point of view, the assassination squads, et cetera. But the CIA had always insisted that the only way Vietnam would work out properly is if the government of South Vietnam assumed the burden of the fighting and was able to get the South Vietnamese people to support the effort. As a result, and I remember those days, we at CIA were regarded as pariahs.

I remember going down to the White House with some analysts and being told by the then head of the National Security Council, “You guys sit over in the corner table. We know what your point of view is, and wouldn’t it be nice if you got on the team.”

After Vietnam, or during that period, Watergate and [Richard M.] Nixon and [Salvador] Allende spilled out. I want to make sure I cover this, because that set the backdrop for the creation of meaningful Congressional oversight of the intelligence community. Seymour Hersh wrote articles in the *The New York Times* during 1974 revealing the “family jewels,” describing all the ways in which

The war in Vietnam that followed was a difficult time, but what you should know about Vietnam is that there, the CIA got it right.

the United States had intercepted letters going to the Soviet Union over a 25-year period; the ways in which we had surveilled peace groups during the Vietnam War; the misuse of experimentation on mind-expanding drugs; and the myriad assassination attempts that had gone on. That sparked a massive uproar. Having been frustrated by the imperial presidency of Nixon and the secrecy that surrounded

the White House at the time of the Watergate affair, the Congress just went to town, and we were part of the ham in the sandwich.

The Hughes-Ryan Act was passed in 1974, which required that for any intelligence activity not intended for the collection of espionage information, a Presidential finding would have to be made. Now, funny enough, this particular provision was welcomed by the rank and file at CIA. We did not like being called, as Senator [Frank] Church called us, “the rogue elephants,” operating on our own. We wanted to make it clear that everything we got involved in was directed by the President of the United States.

The Church Committee investigation followed Hersh’s revelations. It went on for about a year. It led to the promulgation of draft legislation, which would have created charters for CIA, the FBI, and all the other intelligence agencies, a series of dos and don’ts that would have just been ridiculous, making meaningful intelligence gathering impossible. To his great credit, President [Gerald] Ford said, “All right, if that’s what they want, I’ll give it to them, but I’ll give it to them in an Executive order. We, the administration, the Executive Branch, will be able to control it.”

So the Ford Executive order, which bans political assassinations, for example, was created at that time, and it was looked over and pawed a bit by President [Jimmy] Carter, who succeeded Ford, and by President [Ronald] Reagan, who succeeded Carter. Each of them made minor revisions in the Executive order, but it has continued pretty much in force as it was drafted. And I think it was the way to go, in the sense that there are certain expectations for the intelligence community set forth in the order and certain things are off limits, but since it is an Executive order, it is capable of being changed by the President if new circumstances present themselves.

President Carter had a Vice President who had been on the Senate Intelligence Committee and on the Church Committee. Walter Mondale came into office really thinking that the CIA was anathema. The U.S. didn’t have to gather intelligence in the raw-boned way it had been doing it. Then President Carter became acquainted with the way the Soviet Union operated, in Afghanistan in particular, and changed his spots almost immediately. People forget that it was President Carter who originated the covert action plans to support the Mujahideen in Afghanistan against the Soviet invasion.

President Reagan followed and felt about intelligence the way he felt about the military, that it had been neglected for far too long and he wanted to beef it up. He chose his campaign manager, Bill Casey, as the Director of Central Intelligence. Although I admired Mr. Casey personally very much-how could

you not? He was bright as a button. He'd devour books. But he had difficulty speaking the English language because he'd been punched in the throat in school as a youth, so he'd sort of mumble and look like he was chewing on his necktie, but some of that was extremely artful. He had a mind that got to the point very quickly, but he was thinking in World War II terms, and in addition to strengthening the Agency and shepherding the covert action in Afghanistan that drove the Soviets out, he also got caught in Iran-Contra.

That pretty well takes us up to the point at which the Soviet Union fell apart. It was ironic that George Herbert Walker Bush (the person who appointed me to the job of Inspector General, and a former DCI himself) when he came in, he was presented with two matters that he might have used CIA to help with, namely the [Manuel] Noriega business in Panama, and then in '91, the first Iraqi attempt to break out of the box. But he chose to do it another way. So CIA was really beginning to lose its mission. We have gone through an enormous period of transition since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and we've been trying to figure out what our new mission is going to be. Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden supplied that answer with the bombing of the African embassies in '98 and some other events prior to that, and the *USS Cole* in 2000.

Terrorism became the primary target for American intelligence activity, and in the wake of 9/11, a number of the authorities of American intelligence were strengthened. Grand jury testimony can be shared—the FISA, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, was amended to give us the power to go after terrorists. But frankly, we've gone into a bit of a dither since then. We've really not been able to make the transition to a time where we possess unrivaled competence in the speaking of difficult languages, with the knowledge of foreign cultures that allows us to use them.

Let me finish by giving you a few stats, and that ought to open up some areas of questioning. I heard the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Air Force General Michael Hayden, say several months ago, when the Wisner papers were being transferred to Georgetown University, that last year CIA received 130,000 completed applications to join the organization. I'm not talking about hits on the computer at the CIA website. I'm talking about completed applications. And let me tell you, I filled out that application on several occasions. It's not something you can do casually in an afternoon.

So you've got 130,000 serious people wanting to sign up. But 50 percent of CIA's current on board strength has been hired since 9/11, and 50 percent of the intelligence analysts have been working on their specific accounts for two years

or less. So what we have seen is an enormous experience drain, and we can talk about that. A lot of people bailed out at the end of the Cold War. “I’ve done my time. We won. We beat the Soviets. I’m going off to make a living.”

The opportunities to do security work, do security analysis, risk analysis, has grown as a profession in the private sector. So people don’t have to sit around as successful case officers, intelligence officers, overseas and live on a government salary. They can do it for the private sector and not feel that their activity is going to come out in tomorrow’s *New York Times*. Combine that situation with the overall problem that all of us in this room are conscious of—that public service is hurting. We’re not getting people like the wonderful graduates of this institution, in all of its departments, to go into the federal government and help in the ways that they did in generations before. We’ve got a real problem, and let me tell you how it shakes out in my own particular experience.

I have the good fortune of teaching third-year students in the law school. I have one with me today. They can count on a starting salary of anywhere from \$175,000 to \$180,000 a year in America’s principal cities. Some of them have never even been in the clerk’s office of a local court, but that’s what the going tariff is. If that same individual turned around and wanted to join, let’s say, the General Counsel’s office at CIA, we could pay them \$50,000 at most, and that’s not going to change radically.

So ladies and gentlemen, I am sorry for rattling on. There are many more war stories to tell, but the point is that CIA is a wonderful organization; it has been a wonderful organization. It may have lost its way in the last year or two, but the need for good intelligence is there, and I feel certain that under appropriate leadership it will measure up again. We’re going to have to do something about the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 which created this rather misconceived notion of a Director of National Intelligence.

You’ll have to realize I’m a CIA old boy, and we’re the guys that really lost in the effort to create a DNI. It seems to me, the DNI’s done what many of its critics said it would do. It’s become just another layer of management at the top, and instead of really helping us to solve the problems, the DNI cherry-picked at some of the good assignments and has taken them on. There are things we can do to adjust, but there you have it.

George H. Gilliam. We have increased our signals intelligence enormously over the past few years. We’ve all seen stories about how much information the NSA and

others are pulling down out of the sky, off cables and so on. Do we have the capability, do we have the resources, to analyze all the data that we're pulling down? And if not, how long do you think it will take, at the present level of commitment of resources, to be able to analyze adequately everything that's out there?

Frederick P. Hitz. I think for a long time, NSA, the National Security Agency, that does our signals intercept work, was slowed down by the fact that communications had moved toward fiber optic transmissions that required us to go back to the old form of tapping lines at the transmission center to gain conversations that came over landlines. But as the question assumes, most of the transmissions we're interested in now are messages on the Web, on the Internet, and cell phone calls. He has identified the real problem. It's not that we can't suck all of this information out of the air. We can vacuum clean it up. It's a question of who will get to what important message when.

This is a problem that faces every analyst in intelligence work in our government, or in work generally. There are so many outlets out there now. Every nation, every tribal group, it seems, has its own website or means of communication. Al Jazeera has been followed, as you know, by a number of other outlets, and that's why that figure that I cited to you—50 percent had been working on their current analytical assignments for two years or less won't work. You're going to have to have somebody who has been at this stuff for a long, long time and who knows when a blivit comes in over the screen, whether it's a serious bit of information or just something that's coming out of thin air. You're not going to do that unless you have a strong basis of expertise.

The nub of your question, do we have the resources now to properly examine all of the information we are collecting in a timely fashion, I don't know, but I suspect it's a difficult chore. I remember the current Director of the National Security Agency saying a year ago, when they were trying to pinpoint the precise location of Osama bin Laden, "It is exactly like the proverbial search for the needle in the haystack." Those were his words.

Question. The Soviet Union and the Cold War was clearly an all-consuming and critically important existential threat to us. How did you personally react and feel in '89, when the Soviet Union evaporated?

Frederick P. Hitz. Well, I frankly did not have a different reaction from most of my colleagues, which was that it was extraordinary, that it was unbelievable. And you'll remember that CIA, for a long time, dragged its feet on this.

We were not sure if the forces of reaction would reach out and take [Mikhail] Gorbachev down. His position was not unassailable, and you'll remember he almost didn't get back from his holiday in the Crimea to resume control. So we were naysayers for a time. We knew that the Soviet Union was not doing well. There's been a lot of criticism of CIA, saying, "You didn't understand and you didn't warn us that internally the Soviet Union was as badly off as it was." Well, our job obviously, was to follow their progress in building new missiles and weaponry that they could use against the United States. That was our primary responsibility.

The ground truth became abundantly clear, though, as Gorbachev began to loosen things up, that things were not at all good, and we knew from the period of the Afghan war that the Soviets were having a hell of a lot harder time getting young recruits to go down there. The same kind of mail, I suspect, that the Department of Defense is getting today about Iraq and Afghanistan from families saying, "My son has been sent to Afghanistan and his whole detachment has been attacked, and most of them have died and what's it all about and can't you get them home?" was going on in the Soviet Union. So it was a pleasure to see that the threat we had been working on so hard since 1945 to try to understand and contain was at an end, but maybe it took us a little bit longer than it should have to get off one foot and get on another and start thinking about things coming down the road.

Question. You've explained the difficulty of information overload in the first question that was asked of you. I'm wondering, to follow up on the 2004 realignment of the intelligence community within State and elsewhere, is there more of a sense of cooperation and coordination with all of this information that we have coming in, and the tremendous information overload, to be able to use the expertise and the services of other agencies to better coordinate all of the information that we have?

Frederick P. Hitz. I hope so. I would look at one of the creations of the Reform Act of 2004 as something that is absolutely critical that it be fleshed out and work properly, and that's the National Counterterrorism Center. Remember, that had a provenance from the late '70s of a counter-terrorist nature. It was a Director of Central Intelligence organization or center, so it didn't get cooperation from other entities at the level we need, but the idea is very good, because it gets the military departments, it gets the Immigration and Naturalization Service,

Customs, the Department of Homeland Security, appropriate people, the CIA, the FBI, all around the table to deal with a given problem.

There is a freighter that has left Hong Kong with a load of munitions that we think is headed towards Lebanon, let's say. What is it? Where is it headed? How can we derail it? How can we detour it? That sort of thing. And all those specialties, all those skills, in principle, are brought together to try to solve that problem. That makes sense to me.

The other kinds of things that have grown out of the 2004 Act—that if you're a CIA officer and you want to get to the top, you'd better count on spending a couple of years in the Bureau and maybe over at Defense, or you won't get those top promotions. You've got to get experience in understanding how the other half lives. But it's very hard to break down the culture of a lifetime, and that's what I try to tell my students.

If you've been raised as an intelligence officer with its need to know and compartmentation, and you've worked at the Bureau your entire career in law enforcement, and you have a U.S. attorney breathing down your neck who says, "That's evidence, and we don't share that with anybody until we go to court and introduce it—" you know these people have been on that point of view for some period of time and they're going to need very intense direction to say the ballgame has changed. In my latest book, *Why Spy*, I say the answer to this is not the military alone or law enforcement alone or the intelligence world as we know it alone. It's going to be groups from all of these entities working together, whether in an NCTC [National Counterterrorism Center] or something else, and that takes time, time maybe we don't have.

One of the disturbing things that's going on, and perfectly understandable perhaps, is where we have not had the resources developed to deal with all these issues at the present time, with this loss of personnel I was talking about, we've gone to the contractor community to try to get it. A recent Director of National Intelligence study says that 27 percent of the jobs in the intelligence community are held by contractors outside. I think that's a hell of a big number, and I think it's regrettable. You can do it for a couple of years, but you've got to find a way to replace those temporaries with people whose loyalty is to the career service and who want to get it done.

OF KNOWLEDGE *and* POWER

THE COMPLEXITIES *of* NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Robert Kennedy

George H. Gilliam. Today we welcome Robert Kennedy, a Professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech who received his undergraduate education at the Air Force Academy and his masters and doctorate in Political Science at Georgetown. Robert Kennedy has served as Director of the Joint German-American George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Germany. In his nearly 35 years of government service, he's served as Civilian Deputy Commandant of the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] Defense College in Rome, a very tough duty. He's served as the Dwight D. Eisenhower Professor of National Security Studies at the U.S. Army War College and as the Foreign Affairs Officer at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in addition to other postings.

His new book, *Of Knowledge and Power*, is as good a primer on the organization and functioning of the intelligence community as anything I have read. He has a great story to tell.

Robert Kennedy. Thank you for that very kind introduction and thank you very much for the opportunity to talk a little bit about this book.

Let me tell you, before we begin, a little bit about how I got involved in this. I had never been a part of the intelligence community, but having worked for nearly 35 years with the United States government, usually dealing with issues associated with intelligence, I became quite familiar with the problems of intelligence. In my early career I was an Air Force officer. I knew the importance of intelligence in terms of knowing when we flew our aircraft what enemy defensive capabilities we might encounter, the nature of targets we were to attack, and how difficult they might be to attack and I knew what it might mean, in terms of mission accomplishment, my own safety, and the safety of others if we didn't have that information.



MILLER CENTER
of PUBLIC AFFAIRS
UNIVERSITY of VIRGINIA

Later, when I left the Air Force, I went to work for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and had the opportunity to learn how important it is to ask the right question. At that time the U.S. was engaged in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I, mutual balanced force reductions in Europe, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. I was in the military affairs division and had all three portfolios.

One day, the then Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Fred Iklé, called me in and said, “I have to brief Congress tomorrow on the number of aircraft the Soviet Union has in Europe that are nuclear capable?” Well, that was an interesting question, so I went back to my office and started thinking about it and called several agencies in town. “What kind of information do you have? Can I come over and take a look at what you’ve got?” All of a sudden the questions started coming, like, “Well, what do you mean by a nuclear-capable aircraft? Do you mean an aircraft that is physically in Eastern Europe, wired for nuclear weapons delivery, and manned by a Soviet pilot who has been trained to deliver a nuclear weapon? Or do you mean an aircraft that has all the wiring but the crew isn’t but could be trained to deliver a nuclear weapon? Or do you mean one that’s in the western military districts of the Soviet Union?” And so on. All of a sudden it became quite clear that how you ask the question is very important. What do you really want to know, Mr. Iklé? What is it that Congress might want to know?

Shortly after that I took a position at the U.S. Army’s Strategic Studies Institute located at the Army War College. There one of my responsibilities was assessing the strategic nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the balance of forces in Europe. One of the issues that came up was what is the deterrent effect of the neutron bomb, what we call the “reduced blast, enhanced-radiation weapon,” which at the time, the President had decided not to deploy to Europe. Some of our military people were arguing that the Soviet Union would be much more deterred if we had the neutron bomb in Europe.

I quickly learned that not only do you know that you have to ask the right question, but you have to ask the question. When we went to the intelligence committee for answers we found out that nobody had ever been tasked to determine what the Soviet Union’s leaders thought about the neutron bomb. So there we were, already briefing Congress on why we needed this weapon in Europe, but we’d never asked the question to our intelligence community to find out what [Dmitry] Ustinov, the then Minister of Defense, might have

said to [Leonid] Brezhnev, the then Secretary General or what one general had said to another general in European Command about the neutron bomb.

I also learned how worst-case planning can get in your way. At the same time I was assessing the capabilities of Soviet strategic systems, trying to ascertain how vulnerable the United States was to improving Soviet capabilities, the intelligence community was in the midst of preparing a National Intelligence Estimate on the same subject, which was completed in 1976.

Some of you here I sense are old enough to remember that the concern was that the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] was underestimating Soviet capabilities, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board requested a Team B of outsiders examine the problem. Now I think it fair to say Team B had two failings. They were worst-case planners and also were predisposed to a particular outcome. Thus their findings stood in counter distinction to Team A, which had been composed of professionals within the intelligence community. From my perspective, unsurprisingly, Team B's findings distorted reality.

So when the failures of intelligence prior to 9/11 and in the lead-up to the Iraqi War were uncovered, I began to think that it really is important for people to understand just how complex the intelligence process is. And it wasn't clear to me as I looked out on what had been written, even in all of the Congressional reports, that they were highlighting that this is an incredibly difficult business. It is in the nature of things that the intelligence we gather is neither perfect nor something that everyone in the intelligence community agrees on, even when the information comes from sound sources. The business of intelligence is a complex undertaking, fraught with a host of problems. So I decided to write this book to help inform those outside of the intelligence community just how incredibly complex the gathering, analysis, dissemination, and use of intelligence can be.

The book examines some 40 or so impediments that the intelligence community confronts as it attempts to gather, analyze, disseminate, and in fact use intelligence. I won't go into all of them. Some of them are things like tendency to focus on the near term as opposed to the more distant problems. Credibility of the sources that you're getting your information from, the tensions we have within a bureaucracy that sometimes preclude us from passing information from one department to another department, and the role of deception, and its effective use.

All of you know how well the United States used deception before the Normandy invasion—it was very successful. Another problem is ill-defined priorities. Somehow the President and his senior advisers always think that the intelligence community knows exactly what they should be collecting. After all, the President has made many statements about his objectives, senior advisers have made similar statements, they therefore assume the intelligence community must know what they want. But priorities are not always clear to those who are gathering information, and additional tasks fall on top of information they've already specifically been tasked to gather. Other problems the intelligence community confronts are budget constraints—you're familiar with those; and lack of information—or maybe too much information. You can only swallow so much with the personnel on hand, and of course I mentioned the problems of worst-case analysis.

What I'd like to do is focus on a few, with some historical examples, that I think are among the more important problems faced by the intelligence community. The first one is lack of strategic vision. At the end of the Cold War, it seems to me, we were caught by surprise and we really did not understand where we wanted to go; what kind of post-Cold War world would we like to see emerge. What role should we play in encouraging that world to emerge? What challenges are we likely to confront as we try to move ahead, advancing our interests, simultaneously advancing the interests of our friends and allies

around the world? What resources might we need to do that? How should we relate to the other actors in the international arena—our allies, our friends, our potential friends, newly independent states in Eastern Europe, Russia, China, other countries? What roles might we conceive of them playing in helping us shape this new international environment that we were trying to create, and how could we encourage them rather than dissuade them by our own policies—to

...priorities are not always clear to those who are gathering information, and additional tasks fall on top of information they've already specifically been tasked to gather.

act in what we would hope they would see is also in their interests? In short, we were confronting a new world with new levels of complexity.

Even after 9/11 we lacked a strategic vision, we focused on a global war on terrorism. But terrorism isn't an enemy, terrorism is a means, and all those

same questions I mentioned earlier seem to have gone unanswered as we approach dealing with the problem of terrorism.

So with this new world, with these new levels of complexity, what do we do? Immediately at the end of the Cold War, we cut the State Department's budget,

Even after 9/11 we lacked a strategic vision, we focused on a global war on terrorism. But terrorism isn't an enemy, terrorism is a means, and all those same questions I mentioned earlier seem to have gone unanswered as we approach dealing with the problem of terrorism.

we cut the intelligence community's budget, we cut the defense community's budget, we cut the Agency of International Development's budget; all of those instruments of national power that might lead us to gather the kind of information necessary to shape a new world that we might have in mind.

The reason the book is titled as it is, *Of Knowledge and Power*, is simply because as an Air Force Academy graduate, I used to walk outside of the dining hall of Mitchell Hall every day, and in front of the dining hall in Mitchell Hall is an

eagle, and the inscription on the eagle is, "Man's flight through life is sustained by the power of his knowledge." And it's not just man's flight, it's a nation's flight, and we need to invest in and monitor the intelligence community so that we produce the absolute best intelligence to sustain this nation in the future.

So the first problem we have at the national level is lack of vision, if you don't have a vision of what you wish to accomplish, you won't know what to ask. You will have an intelligence community operating ad hoc on a variety of issues, but you never know exactly what information you really need to sustain the new environment you hope to create. The second thing I think is very important, is the absence of critical thinking. This perhaps is the greatest challenge to management in the intelligence community, as well as management at senior levels of decision making. Analysts need to be trained, but also encouraged, to think counter-intuitively. They need to ask what information they should challenge, not what the information is. However, very frequently you find in bureaucratic environments that bureaucratic pressures exist from senior policy makers all the way down to the analysts, to confirm senior policy predispositions, not to think counter-intuitively, not to ask what the information says, but what the information may not say; to examine every bit of information from every possible perspective, not every reasonable perspective. If I examine

it from every reasonable perspective, sometimes it's pretty easy to confirm policy predispositions. If I examine it from every possible perspective, I raise questions that need to be answered by perhaps additional intelligence that might suggest something quite contrary to what we think happens to be the case.

Some of the greatest failures of intelligence have been the result of reasonable reasoning. In 1941, Japan, it was reasoned, wouldn't start a war with the United States it couldn't hope to win. Why that's reasonable. Why would they attack at Pearl Harbor? They can't win this war. In June 1944, the Allies would cross the channel at Pas de Calais. Everything pointed to it. For the Germans, that was reasonable thinking: the shortest way across, that fictitious army on the other side under General [George] Patton's command. In 1961 in Cuba, Moscow wouldn't risk putting missiles in Cuba? That was reasonable. In 1973 the Arab-Israeli War, Arabs would not attack Israel in a war they couldn't hope to win. All of these are examples of reasonable analysis. So perhaps the conclusion that we reached prior to going into Iraq in 2003 was the result of reasonable reasoning. I mean, after all, we knew Saddam [Hussein] had had chemical weapons. He'd used them. We knew he had biological materials; we gave them to him.

The third thing I'd like to point out is cognitive bias, a couple of examples. Pearl Harbor, in 1941, a whole host of factors of course contributed to our being caught by surprise, but I would argue that cognitive bias—predisposition, so to speak—was very high on the list, predisposition of the army command at Pearl Harbor to view the Japanese threat as one that was primarily sabotaged. So we lined up our aircraft in nice rows, protected them very carefully on our airfields. Predisposition that the chance of an air attack was negligible, that Pearl Harbor's harbor itself was too shallow for an aerial torpedo attack. If the United States didn't have the capability to do shallow torpedo attacks, then surely the Japanese didn't have that capability. And then there was racial prejudice and cultural arrogance, together with a limited knowledge or an understanding of the Japanese. Many thought the Japanese lacked inventive powers, they could only imitate. Many were captive of the cognitive bias in believing that those "little yellow men," as [Winston] Churchill sometimes spoke of them, were certainly incapable of accomplishing such an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Another example of cognitive bias: 1941, Operation Barbarossa. In August 1940, Germany redeployed its forces eastward, toward the Soviet Union. On the eve

of the attack there were 123 German divisions facing Russia. There was an increase in sabotage, increase in aerial reconnaissance. German deserters were reporting of an impending attack on the Soviet Union. The Soviet military attaché in Berlin had received copies of the attack order that he had passed on, but [Josef] Stalin, serving as his own analyst, absolutely refused to believe that [Adolf] Hitler, after signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, would attack Russia.

1942—I love this one—Singapore. Perhaps the single most important factor in the ugly defeat of the British in Singapore was cognitive bias. Since the turn of the century, Japan had been a rising power in Asia. Japan had surprised the world with its defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–05. In the 1920s and 1930s the world saw a rise of Japanese militarism. For the continued development of Japan, they needed the resources of Asia: coal, tin, iron, rubber. They had successfully, very successfully, invaded China in 1937. In September of 1940 they had aligned themselves with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. In 1941, they were bluntly spying on British military installations and exercises.

On December 4, 1941, a drunk Japanese soldier, in a bar talking to a Royal Air Force serviceman, mentioned the fact that the Japanese had planned to attack simultaneously Singapore and Pearl Harbor. The information was passed on to British intelligence the next day. The British simply refused to believe that those “tiny men” from Asia could defeat a superior, white force. Many believed the Japanese had poor vision; they were incapable of fighting in the dark or operating sophisticated machinery. One naval expert wrote, “Every observer concurs, the Japanese are daring but incompetent aviators. They are a race of defects in tubes of their inner ears, just as they are myopic. This gives them a defect in the sense of balance, moreover they could not fire rifles because they can’t close one eye at a time.”

Air Chief Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham, who happened to be the Commander and Chief of British forces in the Far East at that time, perhaps best summed up the British attitude toward the Japanese on a visit to Hong Kong in 1940. Speaking of the Japanese guards that he saw across the border he said, “I had a good look at them close-up, across the barbed wire, of the various subhuman species dressed in dirty gray uniforms; if they represent the core of the Japanese Army, I cannot believe that they would form an effective fighting force.” Within a few days of their attack in Singapore, following the attack on Pearl Harbor, they sank both of Britain’s major warships, landed north of Singapore, on the Malay Peninsula, came down through an incredible

mishmash of jungle and trees, on bicycles, on whatever it took, and within a few days captured Singapore. One report says they captured Singapore, still defended by about 130,000 British, Indians, and others, with a final arriving force of about 30,000 Japanese. This was a failing of predisposition in the first order.

Iraq surely had chems... They had used them in the '80 to '88 war with Iran. We had reason to believe they still had some, if not quite a reasonable number. They had imported biological agents from the United States, so we knew they had biological agents. We knew they had established a nuclear program.

Let's move to 1973, the Arab-Israeli War. After the 1967 war, Minister Moshe Dayan was asked how he was able to defeat three armies in six days. He said, "Fight Arabs." In other words, the Arabs don't have a military culture and therefore can easily be defeated. Moreover, prior to the '73 war, the balance of forces favored the Israelis. Major General [Eli] Zeira, the Chief of Intelligence, was convinced that Syria and Egypt in fact were simply engaged in saber-rattling; they would not attack. Major General [Shmuel] Gonen, the

guy who was commander of the southern region of forces, received information two days before the attack that the possibility of war was at the lowest of lows. Abraham Rabinowitz wrote sometime afterward, "The intelligence chiefs believed that they knew a deeper truth that rendered irrelevant all the cries of alarm going on around them. Zeira and his chief aides were to demonstrate the ability of even brilliant men to adhere to the *idée fixe* in the face of mountains of contrary evidence, explaining away every piece of information that conflicted with their thesis and embracing any wisp that seemed to confirm it." Sound familiar ladies and gentlemen? Sound familiar, perhaps, of recent events? This was, and perhaps recent events were, cognitive bias at its best.

To mention the 2002–03 period with regard to Iraq: Iraq surely had chems, as I mentioned. They had used them in the '80 to '88 war with Iran. We had reason to believe they still had some, if not quite a reasonable number. They had imported biological agents from the United States, so we knew they had biological agents. Even anthrax bacillus and other biological materials had been imported. We knew they had established a nuclear program. In the 1990–91 timeframe, after the '91 war, we realized they had a significant nuclear program. We were hearing reports of biological activity, biological labs, that they were supposedly seeking nuclear materials in the form of "yellow cake"

from Niger. They had purchased aluminum tubes that some elements within the intelligence community thought could be used in centrifuges. The United Nations inspectors couldn't find a thing, but we discounted that completely.

Hans Blix, in his book, writes, once the United States deployed forces to the region, Saddam Hussein became incredibly willing to open up facilities, though there might be a 10 or 15 minute delay. But he'd open facilities to us. We couldn't find a thing, with the best intelligence that the United States was able to give him. We had people on those teams who were very knowledgeable, but we weren't going to listen. It didn't fit our predispositions.

I'm going to jump over access and sharing because I'm afraid we're running out of time here, but let me talk a little bit about politicalization. During almost any phase of the intelligence processes, we can be troubled by the problem of politicalization. From the very asking of the question, I can slant the question so that I get the information that serves my needs, but we also have it within the intelligence community. Let's face it. There's careerism—people know that the President wants a certain outcome. I'm running a particular part of the intelligence community, I feel the pressure to produce the kind of information that the President or senior decision makers want, so I go to my analyst and I ask them to analyze what needs to be analyzed. I ask the question in a certain way so that I get the kind of answers that might advance the argument that's

trying to be made. This is done for reasons of promotion, maybe favorable ratings from your superior, feeling a part of the team.

During almost any phase of the intelligence processes, we can be troubled by the problem of politicalization. From the very asking of the question, I can slant the question so that I get the information that serves my needs, but we also have it within the intelligence community. Let's face it. There's careerism—people know that the President wants a certain outcome.

I must say I've dealt with a number of analysts over the years in the intelligence community. My sensing is they really fight this tooth and nail, they really do try to prepare information that is balanced in its approach. I'm not totally convinced, from my experience within the military, that's true of the Defense Intelligence Agency. It may be, but my sensing is that there is a lot of pressure and their focus is a little bit different. There is a lot of worst-case planning, and they tend, in

many respects, to look at the information and come up with worst-case planning. Since I've not served with the Defense Intelligence Agency, it may be unfair.

Let me just point out a couple of historical examples of politicalization, because it's not just Republicans, it's not just Democrats, it's across the board. Let's begin in 1965 in the Dominican Republic. In January of '61, [Rafael] Trujillo was assassinated, and it followed a long period of political turmoil. In February of '63, a fellow by the name of Juan Bosch became president. Many people were concerned that he was allowing the Communists too much room, and seven months later he was overthrown by a military coup.

In April of 1965, a group of army officers rebelled in an attempt to reinstall Juan Bosch to the presidency, and we had turmoil and battle in the streets in Santo Domingo. Tap Bennett, our Ambassador then, recommended that we send in the Marines. [Lyndon B.] Johnson, concerned about the growth of communism, involved in Vietnam—we didn't want any more problems, particularly in our hemisphere, sends in the Marines, supposedly to protect American interests and the interests of others. He didn't consult the CIA, but he thought that the Cubans were involved, and he demanded the CIA provide evidence of [Fidel] Castro's involvement in the unrest, turmoil, and attempted coup. He didn't ask them; he demanded. Johnson also claimed publicly that there were headless bodies lying in the streets of Santo Domingo, and he asked Tap Bennett to find some headless bodies to support his view.

In 1969, the Soviet Union develops a ballistic missile called an SS-9 and Johnson had approved a sentinel missile system to defend our cities. A lot of people thought, *We don't want a system that defends our cities, that's going to wind up drawing additional Soviet attacking warheads to our cities.* It was an issue during the elections.

When [Richard] Nixon comes to office, he orders a change to a safeguard system that is going to be designed to protect our missiles so that we'll have the capacity to retaliate against any Soviet attack. Our own ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] would be protected. But many people, particularly in the scientific community, did not think the safeguard system would work. They argued that the radars were vulnerable, that the command and control system was vulnerable, that the system itself was not really able to deal not only with a missile, but potential decoys, that it could be easily overwhelmed by multiple missile attacks, but Nixon wanted this safeguard system to get through the legislature.

So then Melvin Laird, the Secretary of Defense, dropped the bombshell in order to overcome opposition to the safeguard system. He said the Soviet Union is seeking a first-strike capability with a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle. That is, a missile that actually contains many warheads that can be spun off within a footprint to hit different targets. Up until then, all that was available were multiple reentry vehicles, that is, the Soviets would put three warheads on some of their missiles, and these then would land in a pattern around a single target to increase the prospect of destruction. But now multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles meant they could hit different U.S. missile silos through cross targeting, which represented a significant improvement in their capabilities. Therefore, according to Laird, we definitely needed a safeguard, to defend against such new Soviet capabilities. The only problem with this was that the intelligence community had already clearly concluded that the SS-9 didn't have MIRV capability, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle capability—already concluded before Laird goes to testify before Congress. Now he had other sources of intelligence that were helping him confirm what he thought he needed, including the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Let me finish here by talking a little bit about the 2003 Iraqi War. President [George W.] Bush, October 22, 2002. Iraq, he says, “possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. We know Iraq is engaged in high-level contact with al-Qaeda. Evidence indicates Iraq is reconstructing its nuclear program. Given that evidence, we cannot wait for final proof that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.” [Richard] Cheney, August 7, 2002, “We know Saddam Hussein continues to pursue nuclear weapons.” August 26th, in front of the VFW [Veterans of Foreign Wars] convention, “Iraq regime is busy enhancing capabilities in chemical and biological warfare.” He engaged in this consistent drumbeat. “There is no doubt that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. We know he has a longstanding relationship with various terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda.” [Condoleezza] Rice: “We know Saddam Hussein is actively pursuing nuclear weapons. We know he has stored biological weapons. There is certainly evidence that Saddam Hussein is in cohorts with terrorists.”

The reality? None of that was true. So how did it happen?

Certainly the intelligence community bears a measure of blame, although I would argue that the Congressional reports on this went far further than they should have. The executive summary clearly glossed over many of the important disagreements that existed within the intelligence community.

You also have to remember that the director at that time—now Director of National Intelligence, at that time Director of Central Intelligence—ultimately decides what goes into the summary of the National Intelligence Estimate.

The President was in fact predisposed to believe the worst. He believed Saddam Hussein, in my view, needed to be removed. In his first NSC [National Security Council] meeting in 2001, as is well depicted by the former Secretary of the Treasury, one of the first issues is Iraq, out of the blue. After 9-11, [Donald] Rumsfeld raised the question, was Iraq involved in this? On July 2nd, Richard

Dearlove, head of the British MI, Military Intelligence, informed the British Prime Minister that Bush wants to topple Saddam Hussein and warned that in Washington, D.C., intelligence is being fixed around policy.

The President was in fact predisposed to believe the worst. He believed Saddam Hussein, in my view, needed to be removed. In his first NSC meeting in 2001, as is well depicted by the former Secretary of the Treasury, one of the first issues is Iraq...

In the August press conference, Bush said ousting Saddam Hussein was one of his top priorities. In January of '03, in his State of the Union message, he said, "Saddam Hussein, for the past 12 years, has been pursuing weapons of mass

destruction." But the reality was the intelligence community had long noted Iraq had *not* been working with al-Qaeda. The intelligence community knew the case on biological and chemical weapons was on thin ice.

In 1995, General [Hussein] Kamel, one of Saddam Hussein's son-in-laws, reported that he had destroyed all the chemical and biological warfare weapons. The case on the nuclear rearmament of Iraq was also on thin ice. The aluminum tubes, supposedly to be used in centrifuges, were judged by that organization in the United States that has the most knowledge of this, the Department of Energy, as not well-suited for use as centrifuges and more likely to be casings for artillery shells, which they turned out to be. The yellow cake had already been debunked by Joe Wilson, confirmed by our Ambassador in Niger, and confirmed by the Deputy Commander of European Command, who happened to be in Niger at the time of the inquiry, since he had responsibility for Africa. Bush had had regular updates from the UN inspectors. But, in my view, those reports didn't fit the predispositions of the leadership in the United States. So predispositions of national leaders are, one of the most important problems that

we confront. There is clear evidence, in my view, in the last case and in all the others, that policy trumped intelligence and intelligence was cherry picked to provide information necessary to support policy.

George H. Gilliam. Dr. Kennedy, we have learned, a number of times, the hard way, that the financial markets don't always behave rationally, that occasionally there are interventions of people who cause the markets to act in irrational ways. We were stunned to learn this in the '20s, 30s, '40s and the '50s. Franklin Roosevelt responded, many would say, by installing a thief to catch a thief, as the head of the SEC [Securities and Exchange Commission], when he put Joseph Kennedy in. Now we're stunned to learn, again and again, that perhaps our intelligence services or those who are interpreting their output, their product, don't always behave rationally, and we are stunned and surprised to learn that repeatedly. How are we to get intelligence that isn't cooked?

Robert Kennedy. There are two chapters in this book that I did not address, Executive Branch oversight of the intelligence community and Congressional oversight of the intelligence community. It is reasonable, in the area of predispositions, for people to act on those predispositions. The intelligence community does a pretty good job of trying to train its people not to do so, but you always have pressures from decision makers. It is the responsibility of Congress primarily to make sure that we get accurate and effective intelligence. It is the responsibility of Congress to decide whether that information is sufficient to go to war.

I would contend that Congress has abdicated its responsibility. I have done a few interviews on the Hill. I have read a great deal of what's gone on on the Hill. A very senior person on the Senate Intelligence Committee had this to say essentially, "Well we all knew Saddam had weapons of mass destruction." I was polite and didn't respond. Had I been less polite, I would have said, "That's exactly the problem, Senator, that you did not all know, you didn't know at all what Saddam Hussein had. Did you read—" and I did ask this question—"Did you read the National Intelligence Estimate? Did you read the executive summary?" At which point the Senator turned to his aide and he said, "We did look at that, didn't we?"

Dana Priest said, from her research, only six, not more than six members of Congress looked at the National Intelligence Estimate. But going to war is their business. We were going to go war, we were going to kill people.

Congress, in my view, abdicated its responsibility in terms of war powers, and in abdicating its responsibility in terms of war powers had turned the whole thing over to the Executive Branch. Then, when things went south, they investigate the Executive Branch, when in the first place they should have been holding the intelligence community's feet to the fire in terms of the quality of intelligence upon which they must depend before making decisions of war or peace. They should have been demanding all of the information available along with detailed and intense briefings, and asked tough questions before voting on sending Americans into harm's way. They should have been saying to themselves, that's my obligation, that's my responsibility.

So I think the first way you fix this problem, is you hold Congress's feet to the fire. I expect the Executive Department to try to do things that they think they'd like to do. That's why we have a separation of powers, that's why we have balances and checks, which are not apparently working.

Question. It seems that one of our problems is effective communication between all of the agencies that collect and analyze intelligence, and the more we have of these agencies, the more challenging this gets. How many agencies do we have in this business, and could we do with a dozen or so less and be more effective?

Robert Kennedy. I'm not one who likes to see a shrinking of the agencies, because many of them have very different functions. I would like to see it better organized. I think right now the Director of National Intelligence does not have sufficient authority or control over the intelligence community—at present eight of the fifteen of America's intelligence agencies are controlled by the Department of Defense. Guess whose priorities get answered first? For the most part, in the past they have been those of the Secretary of Defense. We'll have to see how it works with a new Director of National Intelligence, which has been given mildly more authority. But still, those eight agencies, including defense and service intelligence agencies and the National Reconnaissance Office remain under the control of the Secretary of Defense. I don't think collapsing them will necessarily solve the problem. I think a little greater authority given to the Director of National Intelligence would solve some of those problems.

Question. Professor Kennedy, my background has been in human-source intelligence collection, and as I look at the two intelligence failures that you addressed and that seem to be on most people's minds in the recent period, a failure to

have a penetration of Saddam Hussein's entourage and a failure to have a penetration of Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda group—much mention has been made of the fact that we don't have human source intelligence in some of the areas where we need it most. I happen to believe that that is a very, very tough assignment, but one that the United States has to master. What's your take on this, and how would you go about improving our human source collection capability if we're right in saying that it's not up to snuff?

Robert Kennedy. I agree with you one hundred percent. We have consistently denuded our intelligence capability in the area of human intelligence. Ever since the '60s, we've been drawing it down, and then with the advent of all these nice technologies that can sit up there in satellite form and look at all the missiles down in the holes, we've moved away from investment in human resources. As a matter of fact, when the Indians exploded their nuclear weapon, we had hardly anybody in India that was looking at these issues; we had no human sources. So I think it's very important that we rebuild that.

It will not be an easy task. It takes a long time to train these people with language capabilities, with knowledge of the culture. It takes a long time to build sources in countries, which I'm sure you are very familiar with, so that those people will serve our interests. After all, we're asking people, in many instances, to provide us intelligence—if they're caught at it, they will be killed—to give their lives up. This is not easy, and it becomes less easy when the rest of the world no longer thinks that you're the kind of power they want to follow.

Now, a lot of people have made comment about the decline in America's prestige abroad, and there have been a lot of responding comments to that. My personal experience has been with people in friendly countries in Western Europe, as well as countries like Russia, where at the end of the Cold War, many held us in high regard. In many instances this country is no longer held in high regard. For example, many Russians now simply believe we're just another power out for our own interests. It's hard to recruit people under such a situation. We have got to be firm in our values. This is something that goes back to [Dwight D.] Eisenhower. We have got to stand by our values as a nation.

There was an interesting comment made as Ben Franklin was leaving Independence Hall, in Philadelphia, where our Constitution was drafted. He was supposedly confronted by a lady who asked, "So what did you do in there?" And he answered, "Madam, we've constructed a republic, if you can keep it." And the only way we can keep it is with our values, and the only way we can

recruit people abroad willing to sacrifice their lives, is if they believe that this nation is a nation of values, and those are values that they want to follow.

So one of the ways is to adjust our foreign policy, not to be appeasing, but to be firm. Be firm in what we believe in and follow through as best we can. And in so doing, it will help us rebuild the human intelligence part of our national security apparatus.

Question. Professor Kennedy, I would like to ask a process question if I might. Even with all the changes in U.S. intelligence after 9/11, we still are highly structured, formally tasked, and asked to find the answer. This goes on while the rest of the world's intelligence groups are networked and work as team clusters on asymmetric solutions to rapidly changing social and cultural processes. Now, can you talk a little bit about the fact that we're still in lockstep and not responding to what's going on in the world?

Robert Kennedy. Well, you've asked a huge question that has many aspects and ramifications. Let me just address a couple issues there. There is usually not one answer. Intelligence, depending on what sources you have, how good these sources are, there is seldom a single answer, and we should eschew efforts to provide a single answer. Decision makers like a single answer. Well, tell me whether they can do this or they can't do this. Tell me whether they're going to do this or they're not going to do this. The answer to a question like is a country going to do something or not, is an unanswerable question. The leaders of that country might not know, at the moment you ask the question, what they would do. How could I, as an American, even in the Defense Department, respond to a question that said would the President, if one nuclear weapon went off in New York City and we knew it came from the Soviet Union, initiate a full counter-strike? How can I answer that question? Maybe the President couldn't answer the question until it happened. So the type of question you ask is very important in that, and understand that there's usually no single answer.

The importance of oversight, whether it's at the Executive Branch level or the Congressional level, is to ferret out the ifs, ands, or buts, to ask, "Well, what if that information is wrong? What other information do we have?" And then attempt—in the end, to come to some decision. It may not be the right decision, but at least you've gone through the process. My concern is we haven't gone through the process.

Question. I've been perplexed for a while as I've researched the period of January through March of 2003, as to why Colin Powell became a spokesman for the administration's point of view, when this is a man who had risen through the military, was totally familiar with the intelligence community, and according to him, had spent three days at CIA, actually talking to analysts all the way down. Why did Colin Powell do it?

Robert Kennedy. Of course you're asking the wrong person that question. I was following events at that particular time, very carefully following them. As a matter of fact, I had a class on international relations where we were addressing those questions and indeed one day, I asked my students in the class, "Does Saddam Hussein have weapons of mass destruction?" Actually, I asked the question, "Should we go to war against Saddam Hussein?" Students raised their hands. One student said, "Yes. He has weapons of mass destruction." Another said, "No, we shouldn't go because the UN hasn't found any of these." All those different aspects.

Finally, at the end of the period I turned to the student who had first said we need to go to war against Saddam Hussein because he had weapons of mass destruction and I said, "I know you took the pen from the student next to you in a previous class. It's a very expensive pen and I want you to return it to him or I'm going to flunk you." He says, "Well, I didn't take the pen. I said, "No, no, no, I know you took the pen and you have to return it, or I'm going to flunk you." And all of a sudden the light went on and the rest of the students just started to laugh. Well, we know he has weapons of mass destruction, but we can't find them.

Why he came to that conclusion I don't know. We can all speculate on a variety of reasons. One, perhaps some of the information that was provided to him by people in the intelligence community was such that they knew he wanted that information. They were ceding to policy requirements, they were bringing—I don't know those answers. Maybe it was because he's a loyal guy, a military officer who was there to serve his President, and he decided to stand behind his President. I don't know the answer to that. He's the guy you'd have to ask.

Question. To some of us, the intelligence agency community is a black box—big, mysterious and expensive. We are steadily told that it scored successes in thwarting various plans against us. At the same time, we're told that no details can be divulged. Do you have any stories to tell us about this, and do you believe further that there should be some kind of Freedom of

Information Act, sooner rather than later, about what is actually happening inside these agencies?

Robert Kennedy. Well, having dealt with highly classified information throughout much of my career, I'm not certain that many aspects of what goes on needs to be divulged to the average citizen. I think it really is for committees in Congress to exercise their prerogative in making sure that the right information is available to them, that the intelligence community is doing its job, and then for the American people to hold them responsible. I will tell you, after the Iraq War, I'm usually not too volatile. I'm shouting a lot so it might sound like I'm volatile, but after the Iraq War, I felt like I should vote every single one of those Congressmen who voted in favor of the resolution out of office. They didn't do their job. Now, I understand that Congress is busy and I understand that people outside of the intelligence community run over and find out how they should vote from people who supposedly know. I understand that happens all the time. But certainly, members of the Senate Select Committee, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, should have done their job. They didn't, in my view. A few of them did, very few of them.

Question. I appreciate the opportunity to ask a couple of questions that I've been pondering since 2003. They are rather specific. Several days before the invasion, there was a large convoy headed for the Syrian border, reportedly with perhaps a lot of cache, certain high-level individuals from Baghdad and perhaps WMDs—chemical, to be specific. And then several years later, at the border between Jordan and Syria, a large cache and several trucks of chemical weapons was headed for Amman, Jordan, specifically designed to eviscerate the intelligence and also perhaps governmental functions. I was just wondering if there was any specific connection there that you had ever pieced together or heard of. And the second part of the question. I understand there were several hundred nuclear scientists under the auspices of Baghdad and Saddam Hussein who were in fact working in Libya, not Iraq. This was supposedly shut down several years later. Can you share your thoughts on this?

Robert Kennedy. Well, there's a whole host of aspects to the question you asked. First of all, I heard the same stuff constantly, in unclassified form, from Neal Boortz and Rush Limbaugh and others. I have not seen the intelligence on that. Whatever it happens to be may well have been classified. All I can say is that the inspectors who went through everything that we could give them didn't find anything. It's a very interesting question to ask Hans Blix

when he visited [Jacques] Chirac, he said to Chirac, “I can’t find a thing, no matter what intelligence I get, yet all of the Western intelligence agencies are saying that Saddam has chemicals and biological weapons, has a nuclear weapon program. Why is that the case?” Chirac says, “Because we all talk to each other.” So you have a lot of that kind of comment.

I have not seen any intelligence—because I’m not in that business—that said, those trucks going there had chems, bios, and nukes. I would not be at all surprised that Saddam may have had some people outside the country working on projects. That wouldn’t surprise me a bit. Would that result in a mushroom cloud tomorrow? Was this an eminent danger that required us to throw troops into the region? Now that we were getting all sorts of opening sthrough the inspections of the UN, why did we discount them, why did [Richard] Cheney make them look like they were serving Saddam instead of perhaps finding out what are the weaknesses, where are the problems, what more do we need to do? No, we had to leap to war. That’s what I object to.

Maybe there were some weapons, I don’t know, but I have not seen any evidence. I haven’t asked anybody in the intelligence community, because the methods might be revealed, so they can’t reveal to me one way or the other because it might compromise the methods they’re using. But I have my suspicions that that’s all bull. That’s just a suspicion though, and I may be wrong.

I do know and we do know now from the facts that the United States was not posed with an eminent threat from Iraq. Even if he had some chems, he had some bios, and he had some kind of nuclear program, he had no means to deliver it against the United States. Could they have been weaponized, perhaps to be used against Israel? It’s possible. But in terms of us waking up to a mushroom cloud, which is what got the Americans animated, “Oh well, we’re going to wake up to a mushroom cloud, let’s do something.” That was policy trumping intelligence. That was politicalization of intelligence. That was cherry-picking information and not taking what was really available and using it in an effective way to insure America’s national security. The consequence is we own Iraq. The consequences are that in my view, we have lost a lot of authority in the international community, and we didn’t have to do that.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS *and* DISSEMINATION

Thomas Fingar

George H. Gilliam. The National Intelligence Council is the intelligence community's center for mid-term and long-term strategic thinking. Its primary functions include the production of National Intelligence Estimates. National Intelligence Estimates are the Director of National Intelligence's most authoritative written judgments concerning national security issues. They contain the coordinated judgments of the intelligence community regarding the likely course of future events. Today's guest is the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, Dr. Thomas Fingar.

Dr. Fingar is a graduate of Cornell University and received his graduate education at Stanford University. His principal languages are German and Chinese and he has published widely, mostly on aspects of Chinese politics and policymaking. Dr. Fingar began his intelligence career in 1970 as a German linguist. Between 1975 and 1986, he held positions at Stanford, including serving as Director of Stanford's U.S.-China Relations Program.

In 1986, he returned to public service at the State Department where he had responsibility for analysis on China and East Asia before adding all other countries to his portfolio when he became Deputy Assistant Secretary for Analysis in 1994. Dr. Fingar was Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research when he was asked to serve as the first Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, the positions he has held since May 2005. Please welcome Dr. Thomas Fingar.

Thomas Fingar. Thank you for giving me a portion of your day. I am grateful to the Miller Center for this opportunity to talk to you about the role of analysis in the intelligence enterprise.

By focusing on analysis, I know, and you should understand, that I will slight a number of other, equally important, dimensions of the enterprise. We can deal with collection and other dimensions of intelligence during the question and



MILLER CENTER
of PUBLIC AFFAIRS
UNIVERSITY *of* VIRGINIA



answer session if you wish to do so. My talk today will be at a high level of generality. I will speak in very general terms not primarily to obscure classified information, but because to do otherwise would make it necessary to discuss specific types of collection and analytic techniques because each target or topic requires customized attention. Again, I would be happy to address specific issues during the question and answer period but will set the stage by giving you a generic description of how we approach problems and how we interact with the people we support.

The first point that I would like you to bear in mind is that intelligence is a support activity and that our number one priority is to be useful to those we support. We do not have a separate agenda of our own and, by and large, what we do is undertaken in response to the information and analytic needs of the people who count on the intelligence community for information and insight. Our “customers” are many and varied. They include, of course, the President, Vice President, and members of the cabinet, but they also include subordinates with narrower portfolios working at all levels in an increasing number of departments. The list also includes our foreign partners and, especially since passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act in December 2004, state, local, and tribal law enforcement public safety officials.

In a bumper sticker-like phrase, our overarching responsibility is to provide decision advantage to those we support. Decision advantage means giving those we support the information and the insight they need to make well-informed decisions. There is an article of faith in this formulation, namely, that better information, better analysis, and greater insight will lead to better decisions. The intelligence community does not decide or recommend what to do with the information we provide; that is the responsibility of policymakers and military commanders. Making recommendations would violate the law, but it would also raise questions about our objectivity. Policymakers receive input from many sources and know—or certainly should recognize—that the information and assessments provided by virtually every one of them is intended to further some special interest. The intelligence community is expected to be a source of unbiased and objective information. If we are thought to be no more objective than others, we cannot play the role we have been assigned in the national security enterprise. Stated another way, our role and goal is to inform decisions, not to promote any particular outcome.

My goal today is to explore some of the ways that analysts support the national security enterprise. A portion of the talk will describe what we do and why we

do it in order to provide a partial answer to the questions, “Why do we have an intelligence community and why do we need analysts?” I will also describe, again in generic terms, how we do what we do to acquire, assess, and interpret information to make it useful to specific customers with specific responsibilities and timelines. Before doing so, however, I have one more point to add to the prologue. The intelligence community has been around for a very long time—since the Revolutionary Army—but our responsibilities have changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. For decades, we focused on one clear adversary and one clear set of priority concerns. Essentially, we wanted to know what the Soviet Union was doing and what was required to persuade as many people and countries to line up on our side of the field. In retrospect, it was a wonderfully simple time. Dangerous and scary, but much simpler, in many respects, than our current situation. Now the intelligence community supports not just our traditional military and national security customers, but also a wide array of new customers with new issues. For example, we’re now asked—and expected to provide—assistance in anticipating likely routes for the spread of an influenza outbreak, and to assess the national security implications of global climate change and other non-traditional intelligence questions. The array of issues and customers has expanded greatly in the last 15 years. Even though many of the new questions do not require the use of secret information, they all require or can benefit from rigorous analysis designed to enhance understanding of both problems and possibilities.

Most of the new issues are more perishable than were those we wrestled with during the Cold War, and many have a decision cycle that is much faster. For example, during the Cold War, we might learn about and start to monitor preparations to build a new type of Soviet submarine at about the time our kids were born and still be working on questions related to its deployment and operational parameters when the kids went to college. Many such cycles were measured in decades and years; now they are often measured in months, days, and hours. We have to be a lot more nimble. If we’re going to be useful, we must be able to find relevant information, process that information, and render judgments about it very quickly. Chasing fireflies can be harder than tracking a bear.

I will turn now to a question posed earlier: “Why do we have the intelligence enterprise?” Or, put another way, “What do the American people get for the roughly \$47.5 billion that was spent on intelligence last year?” The intelligence enterprise is very expensive and very big. I will simply note in passing that most of the expense is associated with technical collection capabilities; analysts are

comparatively cheap. This big enterprise has three broad objectives. The first is to provide information. Intelligence is a subset of information. Some information acquired and used by the intelligence community is distinctive because of the

...providing useful information to people who need it is one of the primary objectives and responsibilities of the intelligence enterprise. Information per se is helpful, but to be truly useful requires judgments about what it means...the facts must be analyzed and interpreted if the information is to help a decision maker to understand his or her problem, a military commander to decide how to deploy, or an equipment developer to decide what kind of electronics or capabilities to build into a weapons system.

way it is acquired, but information acquired by journalists is also a type of intelligence, and so are the insights of scholars. Stated another way, providing useful information to people who need it is one of the primary objectives and responsibilities of the intelligence enterprise. The second broad objective or mission is to provide insights that will help decision makers to understand the issues they face. Information per se is helpful, but to be truly useful requires judgments about what it means. “Just the facts, ma’am” input isn’t good enough; the facts must be analyzed and interpreted if the information is to help a decision maker to understand his or her problem, a military commander to decide how to deploy, or an equipment developer to decide what kind of electronics or capabilities to build into a weapons system.

The third broad objective is to provide warning. Intelligence exists, in part, to prevent surprise, but it also exists to give decision makers as much time as possible to solve problems and seize opportunities. I’ll have more to say about warning in a moment but first I want to set the stage by saying a bit more about information and insight, both of which are necessary in order to provide warning.

Providing information involves a lot more than just stealing secrets and most intelligence professionals are not spies. One of my pet peeves with the media is that every time we testify publicly or release intelligence judgments, most media describe what we say as “the coordinated (or, worse, consensus) judgment of the 16 spy agencies.” I have two problems with this characterization. The first is that it conflates analysis and espionage. “Spies” and technical systems collect data; analysts transform data into meaningful information. The second is that it suggests excessive duplication of effort rather than, as is appropriate, that

analysts with different expertise who work in different components of the intelligence community pool their insights as well as their information in order to ensure that alternative explanations are considered and that the results address questions of concern to their primary customers. A simple example will clarify what I mean. “One size fits all” intelligence really fits no one. What the Marine Corps requires from the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity is very different from what the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Treasury need to perform their very different missions.

In other words, there is specialization within a large and complex organization that to many on the outside often looks like a rather chaotic and duplicative enterprise. Specialization is necessary because of the need to support very different missions with different requirements that, in turn, require different types of expertise and different types of information. Our task—and responsibility—is to do the best we can to ensure that we have the right skill mix, capture synergies, take advantage of necessary duplication in order to ensure “second opinions” on difficult problems, and eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort.

Collecting data. One of the reasons that we cost so much is that we are a very large vacuum cleaner. We ingest tremendous amounts of information from things that fly in the sky, from the Internet, from international broadcasts, and many other sources. The magnitude is overwhelming. We can collect a Library of Congress every day. One of my deputies, in a back of the envelope calculation

Our task—and responsibility—is to do the best we can to ensure that we have the right skill mix, capture synergies, take advantage of necessary duplication in order to ensure “second opinions” on difficult problems, and eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort.

intended to make an important point in an outrageous way, found that if we want to fully process what we collect, we need about ten million more analysts! We are not going to get ten million additional analysts so attempting to read through the haystack of information in order to find useful needles is not the best way to proceed. Nevertheless, it is very important that we collect extensively, in part because it is often impossible to know what is important until you attack a specific question and pull the pieces together. In the search for specific kinds of information, it often is necessary to cast the net widely.

To make this process workable, we must provide guidance to collectors. We can no longer follow the paradigm that we used during the highly secretive years of the Cold War when most of our efforts were designed to ferret out secrets and we were thankful for whatever we were able to steal, buy, find, or obtain in some other way. The volumes now are overwhelming. Now we have to proceed in a different way. Now we begin by asking, “What’s the question that we want to answer?” Having defined the question, the search can be narrowed to the pursuit of information that will help us to answer or redefine the question. Over the last four years, we have devoted substantially more attention to defining what we want to know and what we should go after. I’ll have more to say on this point in a moment.

Finding and nurturing people with the right expertise is as important as asking the right questions and getting the right information. Transforming factoids and data points into insight requires expertise. Expertise must be developed inside the intelligence community, but it must also be identified and tapped regardless of whether the experts are in the intelligence community, elsewhere in the United States government, somewhere in the United States, or, at times, outside of the United States. The goal is to find the persons who can best provide understanding and insight into a specific question. For example, if you want to determine whether the principal cause or dynamic at work in civil disturbances in a particular African country is religious cleavage, tribal cleavage, ethnic cleavage, economic class warfare, or externally fomented, you need to know an awful lot about the subject, or know how to find people who do have that knowledge. Please recall the point I made earlier about the pace of decision. If analytic input is to be useful, it must be timely and we cannot begin the search for appropriate expertise when somebody asks the question. To be adequately prepared requires anticipation of what might be needed—a form of warning—identification of persons with appropriate expertise, and nurturing of relationships with experts so that they understand what we do sufficiently well to provide useful input in a timely manner.

We do this in order to provide insight. It’s been my experience during 38 years in the intelligence community, and longer than that as an analyst, that very little data is self-explanatory. After you have discovered it, stolen it, had it handed to you, or in some other way obtained information on a given topic, the next step is to address the “what does this mean” question. That requires work. But, as I frequently remind my analysts, until information goes through the head of an analyst, it’s just data. What it means and how important it might

be to specific decision makers or issues are analytic judgments. Without analysis, it isn't very useful, most of the time, to the people that we support. Putting information in context, considering alternative hypotheses to explain why events transpired in a particular way, and explaining what it might mean or what is likely to happen next are central to the role of the analyst.

Producing good analysis requires using good analytic tradecraft to evaluate what we have and fill gaps where they exist. The methods or tradecraft used by intelligence analysts isn't significantly different from that used by academics and other professional analysts. Researchers never have all of the information they want and the intelligence profession exists to address critically important questions that must be answered despite the paucity of data and the existence of unreasonable deadlines. Aspects of good tradecraft include making judgments about the value and validity of the information we do have, being explicit about assumptions used to close information gaps, consideration of alternative hypotheses. This means being very explicit about what we know, what we don't know, why we think what we think, how confident we are about the accuracy of our information, and how confident we are about the judgments we have reached. We want to be as transparent as we can be to the people that we support. We're looking for reproducible, analytic results. The people we support must understand what we did as well as what we conclude. We did not do all of these things consistently before 2005. It wasn't the case that we never did it, but we didn't do it as rigorously as we should have and we were justly criticized for our tradecraft by all who dissected the now-infamous 2002 Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Estimate.

In order to know what questions to ask and what kinds of insight would be most useful, it is helpful, indeed necessary, to really know your customer. To do so, it is necessary to be up close and personal with the military commander, the police officer, the assistant secretary, the desk officer, or any other primary customer in order to know, to really know, what they are working on. You need to know what are they worried about, what they want to know, what they already know, and what they think they know. Most important of all, what is it that you haven't been asked but think, if addressed, could provide useful insight to those making decisions? Our business involves more than just responding to questions. Indeed, the most important part of the job is often the ability to determine what is already well understood, to hear what the objectives are and what customers say they need, and then to step back and ask what else would be useful.

The analyst's job and responsibility involves more than simply providing what might help customers to achieve their announced objectives; sometimes it also requires finding a way to warn them when they're about to run off the cliff, or that a particular course of action could have unintended consequences. In providing this type of warning, it is important to do so in a way that doesn't cross the line between analysis and policy advocacy. For this work, both sides need discretion and trust. Sometimes this requires being included in meetings in order to provide intelligence and analytic judgments on the topics. At other times, the role is more akin to that of a "fly on the wall" authorized to hear the discussions. Both modalities require a relationship in which the intelligence analyst and the customer feel comfortable revealing that they don't actually know everything about the issues in their portfolios and are willing to ask for help and be receptive to the response.

One of the things that I have learned is that every policymaker is also an analyst, usually a pretty good analyst. They will, and must, make decisions even if the analytical input from their intelligence team is not very helpful. They are often

more receptive to "information" or "intelligence" than to analytic judgments.

If intelligence analysts are to gain the confidence of those they support, what they do must provide value. Value can take many forms, such as corroborating the judgments of a customer's own analysis, challenging an interpretation of developments espoused by a pundit or foreign official, or providing additional information on a subject mentioned during a previous meeting. I often tell analysts that they should not expect credit for changing the view of a customer—few that I have known were prone to say, "Thanks, you caused me to change

my mind about that." That's OK; the important thing is that we have helped an official to make a decision. They will know that we helped them and, unless the decision proves bad and scapegoats are needed, will reward such help with greater access and receptivity.

If intelligence analysts are to gain the confidence of those they support, what they do must provide value. Value can take many forms, such as corroborating the judgments of a customer's own analysis, challenging an interpretation of developments espoused by a pundit or foreign official, or providing additional information on a subject...

Now we are ready to return to the topic of warning. Decision makers want to know what might sneak up and bite them, what they should expect, and where there might be opportunities. Warning subjects range from the likelihood of a terrorist attack or advance notification of plans for a missile test, to the possibility that a frail and flailing government might crumble with economic or humanitarian consequences that would affect U.S. interests. It might be warning of a flawed election that is going to lead to dissent at a minimum, and possibly to serious political instability.

Contrary to what many suggest, simply sharing “all” the information we collect with “everybody” will not solve any known problem and can only have the consequence of making it impossible for anybody to find and connect the right needles in an almost infinitely tall haystack.

There are two general types of warning, strategic and tactical. Strategic warning involves mid- to long-range forecasts of trends and developments. The National Intelligence Council study entitled *Global Trends 2025* is a good example of strategic warning. Its purpose is not to predict the future, but to stimulate strategic thinking. The November 20 publication date was selected in order to ensure that it would be available to members of the new administration while they still had time to think in

broad terms, but there is also a much wider audience for this report. The basic objective of the report is to stimulate strategic thinking by positing where we think developments are headed, what’s driving those developments, and how one might know if events are actually moving on the projected trajectory, or if the trajectory has changed. The explicit message in the introduction is that our future is neither inevitable nor immutable and that there is wide latitude for political leaders to shape what happens. It also suggests points of potential leverage to sustain positive developments and redirect those moving in unfavorable directions.

Tactical warning is much more immediate. For example, policymakers may be alerted to an upcoming military exercise and told that it happens every year at this time, so there is no need to get excited about it. Another example of such warning is to report preparations for an upcoming missile test on a designated test range are probably exactly that, a test. The intelligence community provided both strategic and tactical warning of the August 2008 movement of Russian

troops into South Ossetia. In other words, warning runs the gamut from big strategic concerns to developments in the “this might happen tomorrow,” or an even shorter timeframe.

Turning from what we do to how we do it, the first point I want you to remember is that it involves a lot more than connecting dots. That imagery drives me crazy because it suggests that all of the answers are out there and need only to be discovered. I hope I have convinced you that there are literally millions of dots that can be connected in millions of ways, most of which would be wrong. In the real world of intelligence, there are also many gaps—dots that have not yet been discovered or recognized for what they are. Unfortunately, unlike the connect the dots exercises I do with my grandchildren, the dots in the real world do not have numbers beside them. Amassing more and more information—dots—makes the problem worse rather than better unless one has theories or hypotheses suggesting how to connect them. Contrary to what many suggest, simply sharing “all” the information we collect with “everybody” will not solve any known problem and can only have the consequence of making it impossible for anybody to find and connect the right needles in an almost infinitely tall haystack.

I want to return to the importance of knowing what customers need and when (and often why) they need what we can provide. As noted previously, “one size fits everyone” analysis is adequate for nobody. If analysis is not tailored and timely, it’s simply not very helpful. It may be the greatest piece of analysis that ever was done, but if it hits decision makers two weeks before the issue is ripe or two minutes after a decision is made, it doesn’t matter how good it is. Being continuously aware of why we are doing what we do, who we support, and how they best assimilate information is essential. This requires earning the trust of our customers and confidence in the quality of our work. Indeed we have done a great deal of work in the last three years to restore confidence in the quality of our tradecraft, and the quality of our products. I am not an unbiased observer, but I think we have been quite successful in our effort to regain the confidence of customers and critics who felt betrayed by the Iraq WMD Estimate. Restoring the confidence of others is also important to restoring self-confidence in the analytic community—a morale problem—and confidence in the quality of work done by colleagues in other components of the intelligence community. In order to have a sensible division of labor and genuine collegiality, analysts must have confidence that their colleagues are adhering to the same rigorous professional and tradecraft standards that they are. This is both an individual and an institutional concern.

Close contact with our customers provides specific guidance but these myriad separate streams of requests and requirements must be integrated into an enterprise-wide plan of attack. We use two broad approaches to decide what to collect and what to analyze. One approach, known as the National Intelligence Priorities framework, is highly structured. This approach aggregates the requests and requirements collected by analysts and arrays them in a matrix with approximately 280 state and non-state actors on one axis and 33 intelligence topics on the other. Each cell is assigned a numerical priority from one to five with one being the highest. Ultimately, the framework is reviewed by the National Security Council, and approved by the President. This process, which takes place twice a year, attempts to capture what policy-makers most want to know and most want the intelligence community to follow. This tells us, at least in broad terms, how to assign priorities and allocate resources. The process is very important for our collectors because it helps answer questions such as, “Which way should the satellite look or how many people should monitor particular types of websites?”

The National Intelligence Priorities Framework is not as important for analysts as it is for collectors. At the margins, it helps to determine how many people should be assigned to work on a particular intelligence problem, but analysts can and often must shift gears very quickly in response to changing events. It takes time to work up collection strategies, but to be responsive to our demanding customers, analysts often must be able to turn on a dime. It is not at all unusual to receive a request of the “Give me what you can in 20 minutes” variety. Our approach is, and must be, “If you need it by tomorrow afternoon, we’ll have it for you.” The response to such requests is seldom a complete answer but it will be sufficient to make clear what we know, what we don’t know, and what our experts think about the issue. We may also be able to estimate how much longer it would take to obtain a better or fuller answer on the chance that the matter is less urgent than originally depicted.

The second broad approach depends even more heavily on having close and continuous contact with those we support, including policy discussions up to and including meetings of the National Security Council. This enables analysts to hear what is needed and to translate what they hear into guidance to the analytic community and the collectors. The guidance we give to collectors is much different now that it was in the past. The approach or model that we used for many years was roughly analogous to a child’s letter to Santa. In other words, we treated collectors as if they were Santa Claus by saying, in effect, “Dear

Santa, here is my wish list of all of the things I want to know about Ghana,” or everything I want to know about mini-submarines, or whatever it is. Inherent in this approach was an assumption that we didn’t know what we might get, so we should collect what we could because anything would be better than nothing. When something was collected, the role of the analyst was to figure out what it meant. That approach actually worked pretty well during the Cold War when

we had slow moving targets and much was secret. It doesn’t work as well with the short decision cycles and operational requirements we have today.

Timely answers are critical because... it doesn't matter how good an analysis is if it is delivered too late or when busy decision makers have not yet focused on the issue.

In response to the need for a new approach, we’ve adopted an Aladdin model: you get only three wishes. How do we determine the three wishes? First we assemble the analysts working on whatever the subject is and, together,

they define the analytic problem and determine what questions, if they can be answered, will give our customers and us the most insight regarding that problem. The next step is to specify where collectors might find the answer. The logic behind this requirement is that if those working the problem do not know where to look for the answer they cannot assume that persons without their level of expertise on the problem will know where to look, and that if the experts don’t know where to look for the answer, they need to come up with a different question.

The system is actually pretty nimble. We adjust this type of guidance every two weeks in a formal sense and more often as appropriate. This enables us to produce analytic judgments on the timelines and with the targeting that we are expected to achieve. Timely answers are critical because, to repeat, it doesn’t matter how good an analysis is if it is delivered too late or when busy decision makers have not yet focused on the issue. And if we’re not timely, people are going to make the decisions anyway. If a commander thinks the tanks are coming over the hill, he or she’s going to make decisions. If a negotiator is going into trade negotiations, he or she cannot wait for us. If they do not hear from us, they will turn to other sources of information and insight. People make decisions all the time without benefit of what the intelligence community can provide. Like you, other decision makers listen to the TV news, read newspapers, or call a friend they trust. If you’ve been around long enough to be a decision

maker in our system, you have networks of people. We need to be part of their networks and make their networks a part of our network. We need to recognize, however, that we are to some extent in competition with these other sources of information. The goal, for us and for those we support, is for decisions to be informed by the best expertise and judgments we can bring to bear on a problem.

I will close with two final points. The first is to note some of the things we do to increase the accuracy and utility of what we provide to customers and to ensure that it reflects the best thinking in our community. One important measure is to identify significant analytic differences as early as possible. We do not drive for consensus, as was done in the past. Now we seek early on to identify where analysts with access to the same information are coming to different judgments. That's important. The *President's Daily Brief* is within my job jar of responsibilities. Items prepared for the President and other senior officials and briefings prepared by the National Intelligence Council flag significant analytic differences as soon as we understand them. At times, it may be less important which assessment is right or wrong than it is to say, in effect, "Mr. or Ms. Decision Maker, you need to understand that the information in the analytic ice under this problem is thin as you decide what to do."

Another requisite for providing the best possible support on complex issues is to tap expertise wherever it can be found. This means consulting colleagues in the intelligence community and reaching out to experts in academe or elsewhere as time permits. We now have a number of tools to facilitate consultation and collaboration at a distance. I'm extremely pleased that one of our most innovative "tools," called "A-Space," was named one of the 50 best inventions of 2008 by

We do not drive for consensus, as was done in the past. Now we seek early on to identify where analysts with access to the same information are coming to different judgments.

Time magazine. Tools help, but the real key to success is changing attitudes and increasing confidence in the quality of input from persons outside of one's home organization. More specifically, we have to change a culture that has long interpreted "competitive analysis" as a quest to "scoop" the "competition" by being the first agency to provide an assessment of developments to senior officials. This model, similar to the competition between newspapers at the start of the last century, created a

situation that I have described as a race to be the first to misinform senior decision makers. Getting it right is far more important than getting there first. We increase the chances of being right if we make broad consultation and honest depiction of analytic differences central to the way we do business.

My very last point is to comment briefly on the current state of the intelligence community, especially the community of analysts. It is not quite four years since passage of the legislation that created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and mandated a number of changes, including breaking down barriers between law enforcement and foreign intelligence.

I am not a completely objective observer because I have been at the center of the action and probably judge my own efforts and those of the ODNI writ large to be more successful than may actually be the case. That said, I really do believe that we have scored many real successes, especially within the realm of analysis, and that we are on the right track. We need time to implement the new policies and procedures we have developed, to change the culture of the community from competition to collaboration, and to reap the benefits of changes made possible by the intelligence reform legislation. The worst course of action would be to upend the game board once again to initiate another wave of reorganization. Doing so would damage our ability to provide continuing support and drive out of the community many of the talented young people who have joined since 9/11 and the graying veterans of the baby boomer generation who could retire at any time. More work is needed to enable the intelligence community to attain its own high standards, but I hope I have persuaded you that we are well launched in the right direction.

George H. Gilliam. Dr. Fingar, let me open the conversation by going back and quoting from the National Intelligence Estimate that was done 11 years ago. Looking forward to global trends in the year 2010, your group said three things: first, most conflicts today are internal, not between states. Second, some states will fail to meet the basic requirements that bind citizens to their governments—essential services, protection, and an environment conducive to stability and growth. Third, governments whose states are relatively immune from poverty and political instability, will still find that they are losing control of significant parts of their national agendas, due to the globalization and expansion of the economy, and the continuing revolution in information technology. As a result of that, your group said increasingly the national security agendas of policy-makers would be dominated by five questions—whether to intervene, when,

and with whom, with what terms, and to what end? As you're looking forward 15 or 20 years out, how would you reframe the questions that the national security agendas of policymakers will be dominated by in the years ahead?

Thomas Fingar. First, thanks for reading the portion of a document that actually makes us look smart. I've become quite accustomed to having people rehearse lines out of the infamous Iraq WMD estimates from 2002. The question is one that I'm prepared for, not because we worked it in advance, but because we are finishing up *Global Trends 2025*, the third iteration of this effort since the one that was quoted. Among the drivers that we focus on is the decreasing capacity of international institutions created after World War II—the United Nations and its organizations, the IMF [International Monetary Fund], the World Bank, GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and the World Trade Organization, and the like—to manage today and tomorrow's problems. They were tremendously successful, brought prosperity, a high level of peace around the world, and greater integration, but they're beginning to get a little long in the tooth and, to cite one obvious example, the composition of the Security Council reflects the 1945 division of power, not the 2010 division of power and influence.

These institutions are in need of rehabilitation or reinvention. The first effort to do so will occur on the 15th of November in a summit meeting proposed by the French President and convened by President [George W.] Bush to examine financial institutions. The world has changed so much, through globalization and the rise of other powers that, to over-state the matter, the United States does not have the same capacity to formulate arrangements for the world as did the United States plus Great Britain in 1945.

The gap between the United States and the rest of the world has narrowed as a result of the success of institutions and policies that the U.S. government has championed. So on the one hand, we have an obvious need to remake institutions. We saw the waning utility of the financial system, but it got to a crisis point faster than we thought it would. Take that kind of breakdown and multiply it several times, and you get a sense of what we see as the driving challenge of globalization in conjunction with the diminution of the magnitude of U.S. preeminence, the rise of other powers, and the decreased capacity of governments to manage what goes on inside their own borders. These challenges take on greater urgency because of the interconnected character of the world. For example, political instability in Nigeria that partially shuts down oil production

affects roughly 9% of the oil coming to the United States. You don't have to work through very many steps before problems anywhere reach our borders.

Question. Although Congress is often able to rise above partisan politics, they sometimes get mired in it, even in the oversight committees. Can you talk about some of the interactions you have to have with Congress?

Thomas Fingar. Dealing with Congress is sometimes more fun than it is at other times. The serious aspect here is that there is a difference between open hearings and closed hearings, and fortunately for me, I am in the intelligence community. Most of the time, we're in closed session, which means no cameras, no audience, and little incentive to grandstand, not that I think politicians would ever do that. So there is at least the opportunity for serious dialogue on the issues.

I think the general point I was making about recovering a sense of confidence in us, in our credibility, and confidence in our capability, is in part a product of these serious interactions. I've been around Washington for a while and the last five years have been the most politicized that I have experienced. Moreover, the reverse side of the coin of increased credibility for the intelligence community is that we are increasingly used as a stick to whack political opponents. The subjects we are asked to write on and to testify on, sometimes in open session, have a large dose of political theater.

Often the issues are important and so is serious oversight. Congress is one of our most important customers but operating in the political arena makes serious oversight more difficult to achieve. The final point I want to make is that the 9/11 Commission recommended a number of changes, many of which were adopted, but it stated explicitly that for the reform effort to succeed, Congress must change its committee structure. That has not happened. As a result, there is a misfit between what the law has instructed by way of integrating law enforcement, domestic and foreign intelligence, and the oversight committees responsible for us.

Question. I want to ask you about the intelligence estimate with respect to Iran and the making of a nuclear weapon. Last year you reported that information that you'd had from several years previously that indicated that the Iranians were engaged in a program to build a bomb couldn't be substantiated any longer.

But since that time, Iran has brought on line a number of centrifuges and now there are some who believe that Iran has the capability in the not too distant future of building a bomb, should it choose to do so. Do you agree with that

view? Can you help us understand what the intelligence community believes about this now?

Thomas Fingar. Sure, let me correct or clarify one portion of the premise in terms of the judgment that we reached in November. It wasn't that the information that we had previously about Iran's desire to have a weapon could no longer be substantiated. It was new information that we judged to be compelling, that indicates they had discontinued a portion of the program, the weaponization portion of it. You need three things for a nuclear weapon. You need fissile material, and Iran continues to spin centrifuges to enrich uranium up to the low percentages that are needed for use in a power plant. Once you have mastered that capability, you can make highly enriched uranium for a weapon by making changes to the plumbing and letting it run longer.

The determining leg of the triad is when the country, in this case Iran, acquires sufficient fissile material; our judgments on that timeline have not changed. It's into the next decade. A second requisite is having a way to deliver a weapon. Iran has a missile program and is developing missiles capable of delivering a weapon, should it acquire fissile material and build a bomb. Just having the enrichment capability does not equal having a bomb. For example, the Japanese have a tremendous amount of plutonium and enriched uranium. They use it for power generation. Japan could use it to build a bomb, but to do so, it would have to have a weapons program, which it does not have.

Iran was pursuing work on the third leg of this triad, weaponization, but it halted that part of the program. We found the evidence to be compelling—and I should add that everybody who checked our homework and worked through the evidence has agreed with us on this—that Iran terminated that aspect of the program. We also said it's a political decision away from being turned back on. Weaponization wasn't the element that would determine the timeline. It takes less time to build a bomb than it does to produce fissile material, and the weaponization part of the program could be turned back on. Our judgment is that we do not have evidence of the weaponization portion being restarted, but that nuance was washed out in the political storm triggered by the estimate.

Question. The [George W. Bush] administration went to great lengths to exempt the CIA from its restrictions on interrogation methods. Does that imply that the intelligence community believes that information obtained by torture is accurate?

Thomas Fingar. There are two related questions in there. One is, “Should the CIA have different rules for interrogations than are applied to the military in the Army Field Manual?” This involves decisions of which I happily was not a part. I’ll hide under my analyst hat here. But if we think about what is permitted as the space defined by what is permissible under U.S. law, that space is bigger than what is allowed by the Army Field Manual. Having been in the Army, I understand the danger that other people will do to our guys, what we do or have done to theirs.

But there’s space between enlightened self-interest for the military and what is allowable. At least as I understand it, the different rules for the CIA take more of the space permitted by U.S. law. One can argue about specific techniques and how this was handled in the White House, the Justice Department, and the Agency, but conceptually, there is room for the use of techniques by the CIA different from those allowed by the Army Field Manual.

The second question concerns the reliability of information obtained through extraordinary techniques, or torture. There, I don’t know of very much disagreement with the premise that torture increases the likelihood that people will give erroneous information in order to stop the discomfort. Work is being done on other ways of eliciting information but my answer to the question asking whether I have concerns about information obtained under duress is yes, absolutely.

Question. Dr. Fingar, you paint a very formidable project or endeavor for the future. In picking up on your comments about your deputy’s estimate of 10 million analysts, my question to you is how effective is the intelligence community at recruiting bright young people in this generation to your activity, or is this a problem?

Thomas Fingar. It is not a problem. The folks who are joining today and have joined over the last six-plus years are extraordinary. Sixty percent of my analytic cohort has joined the government since 9/11. This is partly due to the fact that baby boomers are going off into retirement, part of it is the missing generation that wasn’t hired or was let go during the downsizing, right-sizing, peace dividend period after the fall of the Soviet Union. We’ve needed a lot of new people. The pool of recruits has been extraordinary. The ability to pick really outstanding candidates has been unprecedented according to people who have been around longer than I have, which is 38 years. The real challenge is to keep them.

If caricatures of the generations are even remotely right, we'll lose a lot of those who joined the intelligence community in order to try government service but plan to move on to do something different unless we make it professionally rewarding for them to stay. Another factor is the disruptive character of institutional change. Part of the reason I am as passionate as I can be when saying, "We're not broken, don't fix us" is that the two most critical pillars of this community are the grey-haired veterans who are a couple of tuition checks away from departure but hang on because of commitment to what we do and the newly hired. The veterans are not going to put up with another Monty Python moment of "now for something completely different," and the young folks who have plotted out a career in anticipation of a certain degree of predictability will not stay. With more disruptive change, I fear that we will lose too many of the best and the brightest.

Question. Before I ask my question I want to preface by saying that the most famous basketball metaphor in my opinion is "Mr. President, it's a slam dunk." Now my question is, in your admittedly general talk, it seems to me there's a studied and continual ambiguity in much of what you said. You talk about useful information. Well, for whom is it useful? Is it your judgment that it's useful, or do you set it up so that the politician who's running the show will find it useful?

Thomas Fingar. I agree with that. It doesn't matter if I find it useful. It matters if the people we support find it useful. It matters that I can be very proud of the quality of what we are producing, and I am not just talking about the National Intelligence Council but across the community. We do extraordinarily fine work day in and day out on a tremendous range of issues, but if it's work on a problem nobody cares about, if it's work on an issue that's already been decided, if it comes in at a level of classification that can't be shared within the U.S. government or with a partner from another country, it's not useful. So we have to be attentive not just to the questions being asked, but also the way in which we pose the insight, the timing, the level of classification, how much is written, how much is oral, whether we tailor it for people who take the information through their ears, rather than through their eyes, etcetera.

I am encouraged, because the feedback we have gotten from the folks we support is that we are more useful. That may sound like faint praise, but remember that I am peddling a free good. Intelligence costs a great deal to produce but it costs those we support exactly zero. So for decades, the answer to the question of what do you think of the intelligence you get is that it's pretty good. Most

of the time it is pretty good, but because it's free, they don't want to run the risk that if they say it's terrible, we'll stop giving it to them, because sometimes it is useful. We've tried to raise the percentage that is truly useful and get people to ask us for more.

Actually, I'm a little worried that the balance has tipped too far in the direction of coming to the intelligence community for insight and information. We are asked because we're trusted, and because we are line-of-sight available. I get questions every day that I think really should be directed to one of the cabinet departments where there is a store of expertise.

Great, it's a good question.

Question. The question I have concerns Pakistan and Iran. How do we solve this problem when they're over in another country, and they are coming across the border to fight our people?

Thomas Fingar. You have raised a serious question about the safe haven in Pakistan in the federally administered tribal areas near the Afghan border, where al-Qaeda and other extremist groups are able to train and be relatively secure. Our UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] have decreased their security lately, but they are still able to cross the border to support the Taliban. The Taliban is not a terrorist organization in the sense that al-Qaeda is but having that safe haven is valuable to them. The ability of Iran to operate across the Iraq border and the Taliban to operate from Pakistan make the border areas somewhat similar to the role of Cambodia during the Vietnam War, albeit on a much smaller scale. Iran's cross-border activity in Iraq centers on the provision of explosive devices and arms rather than fighters. This poses a classic dilemma of deciding how to manage the problem without expanding the conflict and making it a bigger challenge. Sometimes you have to expand it in order to deal with it, but in the case of Pakistan, it's compounded by the fact that this is a country that is, shall we say, not the most stable in the world. It's had a history of several military coups and has never had control of the area up in the Northwest. The Brits didn't control it, and to put this into perspective, I'll give you an anecdote. A decade ago I was preparing to meet with folks in that region, and asked colleagues what I should read. They said, "Read *Kim*." I said, "Rudyard Kipling?" They said, "Read *Kim*." I read *Kim*. They were absolutely right. The border region is poorly governed and the Pakistan government and military have only limited ability to control it. Pakistan's military is equipped with tanks and other heavy equipment designed to prevent Indian troops from

coming across the border; it is not equipped or trained to operate in inaccessible mountain ranges or to deal with guerilla fighters. Their strategy seems to be one that tolerates the insurgents so long as they direct their efforts elsewhere and refrain from poking the beehive in a way that might cause them to turn against Pakistan.

In the last year, the Taliban have been coming into Pakistan. The assassination of Benzie [Benazir] Bhutto and other assassinations and bombings in the heart of Pakistan show that the problem is spreading southward. We cannot fix this problem for the Pakistanis because if we cross the border from Afghanistan, it undercuts their sovereignty. There are clear rules governing U.S. military activity in this region. Iran poses a different problem. The Iranians are perfectly happy to see us bogged down in Iraq. If we're bogged down in Iraq and Iraq is unstable, we can't use Iraq as a base from which to attack Iran. Now whether we would ever do that is a different question, but the Iranians think we might and are doing just enough to sustain the ferment in Iraq without causing us to take action against them directly.

Although both Iran and Iraq are Shi'a majority countries, nationalism and ethnicity trump religion. Most of the Iraqis who died fighting Iran during the eight-year gulf war were Shi'a. Moreover, Tehran maintains proper relations with Baghdad. The Iranians are trying to play all possibilities. They assist groups that fight with one another and they assist Sunnis as well as Shi'a. They fuel the struggle against U.S. troops in a way that has enough plausible deniability to limit international support retaliation against them.



MILLER CENTER
of Public Affairs

UNIVERSITY of VIRGINIA
MILLER CENTER
of Public Affairs

INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS *in the* INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Philip Mudd

George H. Gilliam. Coordination and cooperation between and among the members of the intelligence community has been a subject of some discussion in the past few years. Some have blamed failures of communication between the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] and the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], for example, for lapses in not picking up the 9/11 suspects who were living openly in this country during the months before those attacks. No one is more qualified to address these issues than Philip Mudd. Philip Mudd has been an officer of the intelligence community since the mid-1980s. He worked first on South Asian issues, then on counterterrorism. He was Deputy Director of the Office of Terrorism Analysis, the analytic arm of the Counterterrorism Center at the CIA. In 2005, FBI Director Robert Mueller appointed him to a senior position in counterterrorism at the National Security Branch of the FBI. Now, how does one prepare for a career like Phil Mudd's? Phil Mudd earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in English literature from Villanova University, and then a Master of Arts in English literature, with a specialty in Victorian-era fiction from the University of Virginia. Please welcome Philip Mudd.

Philip Mudd. Thank you. So my father called me one day—I've told this story many times, but it's so remarkable, it's one of those stories that you hear about but don't believe, you can't write it. My father called me one day and said the man who sat next to him at Miami Dolphins games—that was when the Dolphins used to win—said that the CIA was advertising in the *Wall Street Journal*. And obviously knowing nothing about foreign affairs, and having even less interest, I got my resume, which had a brilliant degree—it doesn't say on the resume "could not continue studies"—from the University of Virginia. I got in my Chevy Chevette, the worst car ever. Literally drove on the GW [George Washington] Parkway in Washington to the front gate of the CIA, where the security guard looked at me as if I should be committed. And I said,

in the pre-Internet days, “What do you want me to do? You guys advertised in the *Wall Street Journal*. You’re not exactly listed in the White Pages. What’s a kid supposed to do?”

So that was 24 years ago. I feel like I’m an old man. And a career in foreign intelligence—but three years ago I came to the domestic side, and I guess the story I have for you today is to give you a bit of an inside look about how the intelligence community works cooperatively, and sometimes what our frictions are. I’d like to be open about that.

I did think, when I was driving through the rolling hills of Culpeper down here today, after getting off the pain of the beltway, that this should be a heartening story for a Monday morning, as the week starts, and I don’t know if I can make it that way. I went over last night to see my little brother—he’s just a couple years younger than I—with his wife. They, much to her distress, live across from the brother-in-law, and that’s me. I went to see my nephew, Jacob. Jake’s ten days old. And I wondered what world that child would live in, and whether people like me in my generation would bequeath a better world, and I’m not sure we will. Let me talk to you about what I mean, and maybe give you a picture, not just of how government and the intelligence community works together, but of why. So let’s start with the why. Take yourself back to the 1930s and make yourself Melvin Purvis. Everybody is saying, “This is going to be a long presentation. Who the heck is Melvin Purvis?”

He was one of the Bureau field managers in charge of the rise of people like the [John] Dillinger gang in the Midwest. And think of the world he lived in as the Bureau expanded back then—a world that was driven partly, after its establishment in 1908, by the rise of the Model T. You didn’t have a local sheriff who could handle interstate bank robberies, so you had to have a federal response to that. And then you had the regionalization of violence. Think again of Ma Barker and Baby Face Nelson and John Dillinger. Melvin Purvis was front-and-center, working that in the 1930s, early ’30s especially. He was one of our special agents in charge.

Fast forward to today and think about the problems Melvin Purvis would have to face, aside from gangs driving cars in an age that pre-dated our ability to manipulate data and fingerprints and phone intercepts. Right now, Melvin is going to have to think about a cell operating overseas that maybe supports the Dillinger gang. He’s going to think about cooperation with foreign

services. He's going to think about how to coordinate with the U.S. military and the CIA overseas, because we all work collectively with those foreign services. He is going to think about whether that gang has access to false documentation that would allow them to get in from Canada or Mexico, or God forbid, fly a plane in from visa-waivered countries in Western Europe. He is going to have to think, in this country, about cooperation across agencies, such as the DEA [Drug Enforcement Administration], and DHS [Department of Homeland Security].

The world that I see, in contrast to the world that Melvin Purvis might have seen 70 years ago, is remarkably more complicated, and I guess every generation says that. My life is harder: it's uphill both ways to school and I was walking through three feet in August—which is what my Dad still tells me. But as I looked at my young nephew last night, and think about what world he is growing up in, and I think about the life my father has led, I think about a world that looks increasingly complex to me, and I think that's the first major message I give you. You all pay taxes, you hope you serve a government and pay for a government that uses those tax dollars wisely, and that always does the right thing, and I hope that's true, because I have only served in the federal service.

But I think part of the story is that the world changes, and organizations are forced to change with it or die. The world that I see has forced us and the Bureau, the CIA, the Department of Homeland Security, state and local law enforcement, the CIA overseas and the U.S. military to work more closely together, because while globalization helps us day to day—we get cheap clothes because they are made overseas, we get cheap furniture because it is made overseas—globalization during my day job is an enemy. I talked about the world of Melvin Purvis; he'd be about 110 today I guess. If he were working the problems we see today, he would see how much more complicated the world would be on the counterterrorism side. Think about some of the things we deal with day-to-day, and globalization and the impact on government and security, and how it forces us, as agencies, to work together.

Virtually every part of the world that I see has a downside related to globalization. Organized crime, the wall falls. After President [Ronald] Reagan says, "Mr. [Mikhail] Gorbachev, bring down that wall." We have significant Russian and Albanian organized crime in this country. Think about cyberpornography, one of the worst and most disturbing things as a counterterrorism expert

I've seen in the FBI. Not an area that I'm focused on, but I hear in briefs now and then, is cyberpornography. A lot of this is coming out of Eastern Europe because of ease of access to the Web. I used to think of pornography as a man in a trench coat on a corner. Criminals think of it as one of the easiest ways to make money there is. Put photos on the Web and you can make a lot of money—again, emanating from Eastern Europe. International problem.

Think, obviously, about the counter-intelligence problems we face. From countries around the world that come to the center of technology and not only steal hardware, but place students so they can steal research before it becomes hardware. Virtually every problem you look at—criminal, counter-intelligence, technology—in the world I live in is threatened because of globalization. So again, my first message to you is that the organizations I see operating at an interagency level, day-to-day, are operating that way not just because of good will and because we want to spend your tax dollars wisely, but because the world is forcing us in that direction.

So how do we deal with this? Let me talk about architecture for a moment, and talk about how we organize and how we handle these problems so that we don't have seams. I use that word 'seams' advisedly. Again, if you look at the establishment of the national security apparatus, starting really in the 1940s, post-World War II. Tremendous seams—the DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], when it was working against the Soviet Union in Russia, didn't have to think a lot about the FBI, except in terms of embassies

and consulates here in the United States. In terms of thinking about criminal problems here in the United States; we didn't have to worry too much about seams in the 1940s. You weren't worrying about Albanian, Romanian, Russian organized crime; you weren't worried about human trafficking from Southeast Asia, or trafficking in children. Seams are getting smaller again because the world is getting smaller. So first, you have the evolution, I think, of the way we are driven by the topmost policymakers.

Virtually every problem you look at—criminal, counter-intelligence, technology—in the world I live in is threatened because of globalization. . . .the organizations I see operating at an interagency level are operating that way. . . .the world is forcing us in that direction.

National security in the 1940s creates, in part, the National Security Council. Now you have a Homeland Security Council because the architecture, at the federal level, I don't think was designed to look at problems that are transnational in the way that we have to look at them today.

The Homeland Security Council and the National Security Council bring our officers together every week to talk about threat. This is increasingly

...you have direction at the federal level that's increasingly interagency, international, federal, domestic, and you have joint operations in the field across the United States that include members from not only state and locals..., but include members from overseas because that's how the threat has moved.

a foreign-domestic crowd. When you think about terrorism, even when I was working terrorism in the mid-1980s, you thought about Hezbollah in Lebanon, you might have thought about it a bit in Michigan or California or Florida, but your focus would have been on Lebanon, no more. So when you sit down at the White House today, even in the relatively short career I've had, you see a White House that includes more and more elements of a community like Homeland Security and the FBI.

If you look at how we are operating, then, at the other end of the spectrum in the field, FBI has 56 field offices. Now we have a mushrooming of what we call Joint Terrorism Task Forces, JTTFs, 100-plus across the United States, because again, these Joint Terrorism Task Forces include elements that allow us to reach across seams. DEA, CIA, FBI sitting together in field offices across the United States because when we get a lead in, more than likely that lead is not going to be limited to Arizona or California or New York. You are going to have to turn to the next cubicle and say, "This lead is reaching into the tribal areas of Pakistan." We have to work together. So you have direction at the federal level that's increasingly interagency, international, federal, domestic, and you have joint operations in the field across the United States that include members from not only state and locals as we've done since 1908, but include members from overseas because that's how the threat has moved.

You also think about the kinds of people we bring into the service, and how we grow people into the service. I got a call from Director Mueller, I believe

it was July of 2005, after 20 years at the CIA, saying why don't you join the FBI and come help us bring the national security program forward? There are several dozen FBI employees at CIA today. There are CIA employees at FBI. We have people with the Department of Homeland Security. When we do security briefs for the Director, often there is a Homeland Security person in the room. The briefer who comes over to brief is often a CIA officer who is designated by the DNI—the Director of National Intelligence—to brief a domestic audience.

Think of how different this is even within a decade. Briefing foreign intelligence to the Attorney General and the FBI director every morning. Fascinating. You also think about how the Bureau has expanded overseas, again because the seams are getting smaller and smaller with globalization. We have more offices overseas now, the Bureau does, than we have field divisions in the United States. Offices in Southeast Asia, Saudi Arabia, Europe. I think, from the outside, and this was the bias I had coming in—this is why these interagency assignments are so important. From the outside I thought, “Oh, the Bureau is expanding.” Sort of a Hooverian memory, I guess, of when the Bureau owned intelligence in Latin America in the 1940s. “The Bureau is expanding because they want to do intelligence overseas.” Incorrect.

What I learned was increasingly as crime or counterintelligence or counterterrorism has a foreign nexus, when we have a lead that reaches overseas, we have to have someone who coordinates with the locals. For example, if I'm looking at a cell in Minnesota that is recruiting people to travel overseas to Somalia, I had better have somebody at the other end in East Africa who can help me pick up the thread with the local service. What if that person gets on a plane from Minneapolis and goes to fight overseas in something he or she views as an Islamic war? I need to have somebody at the other end, not just to collect intelligence—that's really the CIA's mission—but to work with the local service saying, “Do we want to pick this guy up, do we want to let him go?” Because we want to see what he does and collect the intelligence. On the way back, what are we going to do? Are we going to let him in? Are we not going to let him in? Are we going to stop him at the border? Are we going to stop him from buying a plane ticket?

So increasingly, when we see problems or threat threads or criminal activity in this United States, we need to have somebody present on the other end of the phone overseas because the threads often reach there in ways that you

would not have anticipated 15 years ago, so you have a change in the federal apparatus. Overseas, we have increasing Bureau presence because so many of our problems are no longer limited to these shores. And then people like me in what we call joint-duty assignments, trying to learn about other areas of the business.

So, architecture is changing not because I hope we are using your tax dollars well, but because everywhere I look, from ordering books to clothes, every item of clothing I have says, “Made in China,” “Made in Bangladesh,” “Made in Sri Lanka.” It is the same way in the world of threat. So let me spend a moment now talking about, tactically, what it looks like. I gave you a picture of a mission that is increasingly international. I gave you a picture of federal and state and local architecture that reaches from the White House down to state and locals in places like Minneapolis that reaches overseas through our legal attachés. Let me give you a sense of how it looks. And this is where I worry about my ten-day-old nephew. Every morning, we sit in a threat brief. That brief begins anywhere between 7:00 and 7:10 in the morning. We get in earlier to prep it, but that’s the first conversation we have with the Director of the FBI. We talk to him about what’s happening in the most significant cases we have in the United States.

After 37 months, those cases are in places like Miami, Atlanta, Chicago, New York, Washington, Los Angeles, San Diego, Minneapolis, Phoenix, Seattle, Portland. They are everywhere. Many of them, especially in the world I live in, which is counterterrorism, are amorphous. This word “cell” is misleading. In the world of terrorism in the United States, I don’t see cells; I see clusters of kids who are thinking about doing some act of terrorism, who may not themselves be terrorists yet but are talking about acts of violence that might lead to terrorism. They don’t know what they are going to do. They are not organized into cells, and they are not even certain they are going to do anything yet. I can recollect one case, two and a half, three years ago. It began with a few kids who were talking on the Internet. Eventually it reached to about 15 countries—globalization because they could talk over the Internet. It is remarkable. In many of those countries, we had legal attachés who were trying to work the other end of the case to ensure we didn’t drop the ball, not only with the local service, but also with our local CIA partners. Obviously, if we are working those cases in a war zone, we are dealing with the U.S. military as well.

I was out in Baghdad about six weeks ago. If you look at how we are dealing with problems in Iraq, counterterrorism problems—you sit in the room together with the U.S. Army, U.S. Marines, Special Forces, FBI, CIA—remarkable, because that’s how the threat has evolved. So when we sit in the morning—in my three

If you look at how we are dealing with problems in Iraq, counterterrorism problems—you sit in the room together with the U.S. Army, U.S. Marines, Special Forces, FBI, CIA—remarkable, because that’s how the threat has evolved.

years, I’ve seen cells from across the United States. Some are domestic, many reach overseas, very amorphous. The threat brief runs through these kinds of clusters of activity of what we’re seeing. And you think about the responsibilities we have, and the pressure we have for interagency cooperation. I use the word “pressure” advisedly. Federal bureaucracies don’t evolve very quickly, and federal bureaucrats sometimes are turf-conscious. I know this is news, it’s probably a headline, but after 23 years I’ve seen it happen all the time. But it’s remarkable

how sobering dealing with threat face-to-face is. You are an American first and a bureaucrat second, and threat forces us together, so when we see those threats come in, some of the tactical questions that come up are pretty interesting.

I imagine most of you probably think of the FBI as a law-enforcement organization, but our first mission is not prosecuting someone. It’s not, believe it or not. Our first mission is to understand the problem well enough to dismantle it. This is a critical point as I go into giving you a tactical picture of how we handle these problems. Years ago, you would have said, “How well did Melvin Purvis investigate the Dillinger gang after the Dillinger gang committed crimes?”

Notice what has happened in the evolution of Americans’ understanding about the responsibility of their Federal Bureau of Investigation. Post-9/11, people don’t always ask how well did you investigate it. They want to know why it happened. And so when we look at threat information in the morning, our first question is, “Do we understand what is going on with this cluster of kids, this cluster of adults, whoever it is, well enough to ensure that if we take it down, we get it all?” Our first question is not a law enforcement question; it is an intelligence question. We are an organization increasingly that is evolving

toward being the Federal Bureau of National Security, combining knowledge of a problem, knowledge of a cluster of potential terrorists with the capacity to do something about it.

Knowledge is intelligence; the capacity to do something about it is law enforcement. Fused together, we provide security. So in the morning, when we see the brief, first at 7:00 with the Director, 7:10, and then at 7:30 we go down and talk to the Attorney General. Our question is—“What do we have here?” Our question is never—let me be clear about this—it is never, at least initially, “Are we over the bar for prosecution? We could be over the bar for prosecution. What if we don’t know where the funds for that cluster of people came from? What if we move too quickly to realize they have an overseas connection? What if we move too quickly to realize, had we waited another week, they would have met someone else on the street corner who would have been the key to a cell?” So our first question is one of patience, it is one of security, it is one of intelligence: “Do we understand this cluster of people well enough not to disrupt them?”

We are not in the business of disruption unless we have to be to dismantle them. Disruption to me is when a threat is imminent and I haven’t collected enough intelligence, but I can’t let the plot continue, taking it down, taking

I imagine most of you probably think of the FBI as a law-enforcement organization, but our first mission is not prosecuting someone. Our first mission is to understand the problem well enough to dismantle it. We are an organization increasingly that is evolving toward being the Federal Bureau of National Security, combining knowledge of a problem, knowledge of a cluster of potential terrorists with the capacity to do something about it.

three people down and thinking maybe there’s another two. That’s disruption. Dismantlement is allowing ourselves to be patient enough to understand, “Boy, I’ve been looking at this cluster so long. There are five people involved; I can pretty much guarantee you there’s nobody else.” Now we provide security by first allowing the investigation to run long enough to ensure that those are the only five, and then using our law enforcement tools, whatever they are—immigration, fraud, marriage fraud, all the way to the other end of the spectrum, counterterrorism prosecution to dismantling an entire cluster. I don’t want to leave anything on the floor when we move.

So when we see threats in the morning, those are our questions: “Who are they? Where is their money from? Who are their friends? Who are they talking to? Who is their support network? Do they have overseas connections, are they going to travel? If they are going to travel, who is going to get the tickets?” This can often take a year, two years. I mentioned one of the clusters we looked at reached into something like 15 countries overseas. This is very patient work. And those questions—I sort of led you down the garden path here—lead across the American intelligence community.

For example, dealing with those cells overseas, we are not only dealing with law enforcement services, that is why we use legal attachés—we are dealing with the CIA. What if we want to run a member of that cell overseas? That requires CIA coordination and cooperation; it requires unity of effort. What if we want to bring that person back into this country? Again, it requires cooperation with overseas security services in the CIA. In that case, it also lets us bring in a third element which requires cooperation with DHS because when that person gets to the border, if he is on a watch list, we have to be very closely coordinated. First we have to figure out if we want him off the list, and second, to ensure that the person at the border is not going to tip our subject to let him know we are watching because if you take back what I said earlier, we may want to watch him for a long time, even if we can prosecute him.

I want the bad guys to come to our borders because I want to see what they do when they get here, and who they meet. Was that person on the scope already? Did we grade the person they just met as a third-rate operative? All of a sudden we say, “Oh, maybe there is something we missed there.” Where are they going to get their money here? Do they have set contacts that someone overseas gave them? Who are they going to call? Who overseas stays in touch with them? If they are staying in touch with someone overseas, maybe that overseas person has different cells we should look at. Think of these as network investigations, not investigations of a subject the way Melvin Purvis did in the 1930s. We are a service that is evolving in a revolutionary way—in ways I think most Americans do not understand. Evolving from law enforcement investigations to providing security by fusing knowledge of a target—built sometimes over several years—with the ability to use a law enforcement tool to destroy the target once we understand fully what we have on our hands.

When we are looking at that threat in the morning, looking at overseas operations, looking at border operations with DHS, if it is a narcotics issue, obviously we are working with DEA. And then, if the subject is moving downstream to New York or Charlotte or Miami, we work with the group I mentioned earlier, the Joint Terrorism Task Forces in our office to ensure that state and local police, sheriff, and tribal folks understand what we have going on. We don't want them to pick that guy up either.

Melvin Purvis was cooperating with sheriffs. We are cooperating with ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence], the security service in Pakistan, CIA stations overseas in South Asia, the U.S. military in Iraq because we have kids in Iraq who want to come here. We are cooperating with security services in Europe because they have visa waiver programs for the United States, and if they have a bad guy getting on a plane in Europe who doesn't require a visa here, we need to know. We are cooperating with border control here in airports because we want to know who gets off a plane. We are obviously cooperating with TSA, Transportation Security Administration, because you want to know who is on a plane. If it is a bad guy who is on a list, when he gets here, you've got to cooperate in the field with sheriffs and police departments, and others. If it is a nuclear threat, obviously we are working with our friends over at energy. The world has changed so much that we have struggled to keep up with it, and it is a world that has changed as a result of globalization. So one last comment: Where do we go?

I think the Director of National Intelligence has headed us in one good direction. Underreported, but something I think is critical, is pressing more people like me to serve in more organizations, pressing senior executives across the U.S. government to guarantee that they have experience in different agencies. All agencies have their own cultures—as we deal with globalization, we have to be able to speak with each other across the Potomac and across the United States, and across the Atlantic and the Pacific, so an increasing number of people are being pressed into, required to, and some of them want to, perform joint duty. We have an increasing number, for example, of CIA officers, working with us in the United States, not because we want to spy on the United States, but because there may be someone in the United States we want to send overseas, and we need that seamless cooperation with the CIA to help us.

So when I look at my little nephew Jake, the world I see—if he ever sits in a threat brief down the road, God forbid—I'd encourage him to go into English

literature and maybe study. But I fear that his generation, like mine, is going to look back—as you look at the spread, for example, of video technology that can take you over the Internet. People won't only be able to chat, they will be able to talk internationally, multi-laterally, real-time as they can do today by video. Travel will change, I believe, and this is a phrase I'd like to patent, but I think it is probably illegal for a U.S. government employee. I believe that there is something I call the globalization of identity that measures identity with international business breaking down barriers, with international marketing breaking down barriers. How many bags do you see now that have French, Spanish, and English on the same bag? How many businessmen are operating in London and Tokyo and the United States and now Beijing?

I think he will be seeing a world that his generation will say is increasingly complicated. He will look back on Melvin Purvis, Mudd, and say, "Boy, did he have it easy." Thank you so much.

George H. Gilliam. Let me start the conversation by asking about what is going to happen with the change of administrations. There is always a great opportunity when there is a change of administrations to make changes that those within the bureaucracy would like to see made, and there is the opportunity for those in the incoming administration to make transitions. What, from the inside, do you see as the most urgently needed changes, either in organization or in law, and what advice would you give to the incoming administration about some of the changes that were talked about during the recent campaign?

Philip Mudd. I'm not sure it's my role to squeeze an incoming administration with the hope that America has by saying what I think they should change. I will offer a couple of thoughts on some of the questions I think they will face. The first is, until you sit doing this every day—and I think this is one of the luxuries of living in this country—until you sit watching this every day, I think gaining a tactical understanding of the threat we face from Somalia to Afghanistan to Iraq to Southeast Asia, to the borders, to within this country, West Coast, East Coast, I think it takes a while to understand threat at a tactical level because you don't see it in newspapers everyday. We still face an intensity of threat that I think if you sat in the briefs through the rest of the week with me, would surprise you. The government has expended a great deal of resources and capability to fight this threat, and it still seems to me—maybe because I do it every day—that it is intense and that we need to talk to people



*Philip Mudd at the
Miller Center of Public Affairs
November 17, 2009*

coming in who maybe haven't experienced this intensity over the past eight years about what we face.

The second is I think it is safe to say, with great resources—and this country has great resources—comes great capability but also comes sometimes inefficiency. Shocking, again, from a federal bureaucrat. But we built up so quickly and so broadly to ensure that we try to keep this country safe that anybody coming in has to look at this massive federal architecture and say, “Is this the best way to operate?” FBI, CIA, military, DHS, Joint Terrorism Task Forces, state and locals—we have homeland fusion centers in many states now. I suspect there are going to be some questions, as there should be, about when do you recalibrate, step back and say, “Is this architecture as efficient as it could be?” I suspect that it is not.

Two more things. First, I think that there will be discussions, and I think this debate has been sort of simmering for some time, about what national security is. You hear it both ways. The first way you hear it is we are responsible, as a

federal organization, to ensure that we do not look at people who have not done anything wrong. People ask me what it's like to be a CIA officer working on domestic security. I tell them that's the wrong question. I'm an American. Every time I see a plot, when I walk into the Hoover building, you say, are we sure this is a plot? We are not supposed to look at people before we have some information that suggests they've done something wrong. And we've made mistakes—you've read about them in the newspapers. But balance between ensuring we provide the right protections and ensuring that Americans feel safe is very difficult, and I think the sands change over time depending on how much threat people feel. So I think there will be some discussion about what that right balance is—between ensuring that we protect the values that make this country what it is and ensuring that kids like my ten-day-old nephew feel safe.

Last thing I would say, and this is a bit further down in the weeds—increasingly, I look at problems overseas of ungoverned spaces. Spaces in the Horn of Africa like Somalia. Spaces in Afghanistan, in the Pakistani tribal areas. Spaces in the Sahel, Mali, Mauritania, down in southern Algeria, where governments can't project power and where militants fuel the capacity not only to plot locally but to plot nationally and internationally, and I think some of those places, like Afghanistan was in the '80s or '90s, are magnets for people from this country and Europe to go train, and I worry about that. The inability of governments to project power in places where kids can now easily travel, read about them on the Internet, and maybe come back to this country infected with ideas of jihad. That's a first thought, but no advice. They've got a tough job. Have at it.

Question. I'm curious, what are some of the characteristics of the clusters of people you mentioned and the characteristics of their overseas contacts?

Philip Mudd. Let me give you two major asterisks before I answer your question. First is what we have in this country differs substantially from what you would see in other places in Western Europe and Britain. People often conflate us, pull us together. This is an area where we look a lot different. I was just in Britain about two weeks ago talking to our partners there, and we face very different threats. And second, I think when you look at threat—there are two very different pieces of it. The first is any time you have a cluster of people touch foreign terrorists—especially terrorists, for example, at the heartland of our problem, which is in the Pakistani-Afghan tribal area—the threat goes up substantially. The difference between the very small sliver of people we have who have connectivity into what we call core al-Qaeda and the vast majority of people who have limited or no

connectivity is substantial. As soon as that small sliver touches the al-Qaeda core, the level of threat—by that I mean operational security, patience, operational planning, expertise on explosives—night and day. Most people we face don't have that.

So let me just talk about that vast second category, the category of what I would call like-minded people who are thinking that they want to join this global movement but don't really know what to do. Typically you are talking, obviously, about relatively young people. It is hard to geographically isolate this problem. We have seen cases across the United States, Midwest, West, East coast, Southeast, Southwest. You can't generalize by identity. For example, if you looked at Britain, many of Britain's problems would be second-, third-, or fourth-generation Pakistani or Bangladeshi Brits. I don't think this is any secret. I don't think it is that easy to look at in this country. Often there is a galvanizing force—not a terrorist but an older brother or father figure who can take them down a path. Once you get in this kind of group, it's like all kids, or all youth, I would say. Sometimes—and I know if Dr. [Robert] Sadoff, who is a psychiatrist was here—sometimes psychologists would call these “exclusivist circles.” That is, they talk among themselves and other information doesn't come in, so they start pinging off of each other, and start saying, “Why don't we do something?” “Why don't we do something?” And slowly but surely they coalesce. Often the coalescence includes some kind of act that starts to cement them as a group. Paintballing, adventure camping—those are the kinds of things we have seen.

And the last thing I would say—let me be clear on this. This is not about religion. I'm not saying that to be politically correct. I'm saying it because most of our subjects, most of the people we look at, know very little about religion. They are angry. They are sometimes socially dispossessed. They're sometimes thinking that they're ostracized in their community. They are not well-trained in religion. They think they know about religion; they do not. This is not a war of religions. It is a war of clusters of people who want to commit acts of violence and who think they are motivated by religion but are not.

Question. On a different subject, the subject of piracy off the Horn of Africa: just this morning, I heard that they hijacked a supertanker. In the past, they hijacked freighters. They have tried to hijack cruise ships. This appears to be a very profitable criminal enterprise. My question is who should be doing something about this? Should it be the United Nations? Should it be NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], individual countries' navies? Who should it be?

Philip Mudd. I'm not an expert on naval piracy, but I know there is an international coalition. I don't know if coalition is the right word. A large collection of ships around the world trying to stop piracy off Somalia, and you're right, there was a major instance of piracy over the past day. I would reinforce a point I made earlier, and that is, with this spread of ideas and particularly the idea that in the service of this concept called jihad, you can call innocents. I see a world of spaces where people can't project force or power, as increasingly a problem. I know I said that earlier, but I want to reinforce it. You look at where this problem emerged for us in the 1980s and 1990s. The heyday for al-Qaeda was in the mid-'90s in Afghanistan when you had the Taliban controlling territory, and the West, obviously after the 1998 bombings in East Africa for example, unable to project power in a way to disrupt the Taliban and al-Qaeda. You have that now in the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan. You have plotting by al-Qaeda because political and military power can't be projected there. You have lawlessness in Somalia that has existed for many years now, and it has clearer, I would argue, implications for us because we have problems emanating from Somalia in this country and in Western Europe. It is not just an issue of the far shores of Mogadishu.

There have been problems with lawless areas in the Southern Philippines with the rise of Islamic militants there, people we call the MILF [Moro Islamic Liberation Front] and some of their offshoots. The rise of terrorist groups in Algeria in the early 1990s, militant groups that massacred, murdered more than 100,000 civilians. They now operate out of lawless areas in the Sahara, the Sahel because people can't project power there. When you get these significant areas where you have an overlap of ungoverned space with people with radical ideas, you get a problem, and we not only see it in the world of terrorism, you're seeing it off the coast of Somalia in international piracy. I don't know what we do about these. This is why I have the luxury of being an intelligence officer and not a policymaker. You don't want to project power everywhere; we don't have interests everywhere, and we don't have the capacity to project power in a half-dozen places simultaneously. But it is a problem for security in ways that fifty years ago we would have said are offshore, and today all of these problems reach to our shores. Philippines, Somalia, they all reach here.

Question. I want to give you an opportunity to expand a bit on your comment about the need to rationalize the U.S. effort to oppose terrorists, and I am of

course asking the question, do we need 16 individual intelligence agencies with the budget that we currently have? I think, for many of us, the whole issue of homeland security and the creation of that department is sort of like an impenetrable web. How do we rationalize this?

Philip Mudd. This is a pretty tough question. I don't think of rationalization in terms of agencies, I think of it in terms of mission: What do you want to accomplish? I think we have the luxury now to be proud because security services like the Agency, like the Bureau, like the U.S. military, which has done brilliant work in Afghanistan and Iraq and with foreign partners overseas that have a mixed record but nonetheless have lost many people themselves, the Saudis, the Pakistanis, etcetera, are criticized, sometimes rightly so, but they have lost many, many officers in this fight.

But I look at it in terms of mission. We have a mission we have to close out in the Pakistani tribal areas. As long as core al-Qaeda is there, they have one mission in life, and that is to plot against us. We are the head of the snake. They will never go home again, and they are going to come after us as long as we let them live there, so the first question in terms of mission: How do you work on that problem? How do we think about working with our European partners who increasingly have common commercial interests, common business interests, common passport controls? I talked about visa waivers earlier. But at the same time, we see the rise of extremism in Europe. I think Europe is going to be a problem for us for years. You see these problems in Denmark, in France, in Germany, in Italy, in Spain. I'm worried about what will happen in Europe, so how do we make sure we partner with people in Europe to ensure these issues do not come to our shores? What do you want in this country? How much security do you want? Do you want security at every port, or some ports? Do you want security so that we have more checks at airports or less? What kind of balance do you want, and it's as much a political question as a security question, between ensuring that people live freely in this country and ensuring that bad things don't happen.

I always tell folks my definition after only three years in the Bureau, that the mission of the FBI is to ensure bad things don't happen in this country. Well, what sacrifice do you want to make to ensure that happens? Do you want more stuff checked, or do you want us to look at more people or fewer? And if you want us to look at fewer, we have to have a public dialogue that says there is a prospect that there will be some other event in this country.

But understand, this is a powerful country, not just in terms of military but in terms of values. No person who ever attacks a city in this country will undermine the values of this country, and therefore we do not need to overreact. They will not hurt us. Things that hurt us are gangs and drugs and pornography. These people that we face, that I see every morning, are a formidable adversary, but they are also criminals who have a vision of life that will never prevail unless we let it, so I would argue you take a step back and you say, “What pieces of the mission do we have to accomplish? Are there better ways to accomplish it? We’ve had seven years to work on it, and what do you want us to do? More or less?”

Question. You have referred to threat all morning, but you’ve really not supplied any examples of the kinds of threats that we are talking about. Are you willing to briefly review a range of threats and to tell me how you all are prioritizing these threats from a small explosion on a railroad track, which is not existential, to a major nuclear event? And my second question is when you first make contact with clusters, are you keeping good track of how these turn out? Are you developing algorithms to decide when you’ve got a group you don’t need to follow and which ones you need to?

Philip Mudd. Yes, yes, no, yes... Can I get off the hook soon? We talk about prioritizing threat because that’s how we have to think about this. The smallest sliver is the biggest threat, and that is, again, people who touch core al-Qaeda. If we have anybody who gets anywhere near them, that’s at the top of the list by definition. And we put tremendous resources on people like that.

A couple other major issues we look at—the first is people traveling from overseas into this country. The network of security services around the world—we all have different motivations, different interests, but when we all face threats, there is a pretty cooperative network of services. If somebody from overseas has somebody traveling into this country that they tell us is a serious person, we are going to put a lot of resources on them. Obviously the first question is whether we want them in here in the first place. In some cases we may want them strictly for the purposes of intelligence collection: Why are they coming? Are they going to help point us towards somebody we didn’t otherwise know? Third category—something that’s not very well known in this country. People—and there are not that many, but they probably measure in the dozens—people in this country who are traveling overseas for training. Not all of them are terrorists. Not all of them will become terrorists, but when

they travel to an area that is controlled by violent extremists, I can't sit there and guess that they just want to study. So there are a lot of resources expended on what these guys are up to, and again, they are in areas that are pretty difficult to access, so the intelligence architecture you have to have with our friends in Washington and with our friends overseas is heavy investment.

Then there is this large other category. Let me close on that and touch on your point of algorithms. We see a fair number of people in this country who, again, don't know what they are going to do. It is our mission not to look at them if they simply want to talk about radical Islam. It's a free country. You can talk about radical Catholicism. You can talk about radical Judaism. You can talk about radical eco-activity. You can talk about whatever you want, but you can't talk about committing acts of violence to get there, so we spend a lot of time ensuring that we strike that balance—not looking at people who are just talking, but also that if we have people talking about violence, that we look at them to ensure that they are not going to coalesce. That takes a lot of energy, and it takes sometimes more energy than you expect to figure out what the heck they are going to do, if anything. And when we figure out they are not going to do anything, it takes some courage to step back and say, "We are not going to look at them anymore" because one day, one of these guys is going to do something and somebody is going to say, "He was in your database three years ago," and so I'll take that testimony on and say, "Thank you very much." You don't live in this world every day but sometimes we have to drop coverage on people either because we don't have the resources anymore or because you can't simply look at kids or adults who are talking.

Question. My question is about languages. It's extremely important to hire people who speak the languages. I'm not talking about the Romance languages, I'm talking about Arabic, Hindu, all the sub-Saharan and South Asian languages. What are we doing about that?

Philip Mudd. I think I would be misleading this audience to say that this is either easy or that anybody in the intelligence community has done really well at this, not for lack of trying. The folks who have the qualities that we're looking for have a lot of opportunities, and often many of them come from countries where the domestic security service or the federal security service is not a service they want to join. Many leave their countries because they want to avoid those services. So we talk to students, post-graduates who have these skills. Typically, obviously, the best people we want to look at are people who

speaking these languages natively. That also means we have to balance security with recruiting these kids for jobs. Many of them are first-generation or they have families overseas. We've had a few—not many—but a few problems with people we recruited who aren't as trustworthy as we expected.

If you look at the numbers we have, again I would say we're doing okay, but not great, and some of the reasons are the ones I've just mentioned. They have a lot of opportunities—oil companies for example. They don't always look at us as a career opportunity that they hold in great regard. Sometimes when we do try to recruit them, we have a lot of security hoops to get through to ensure we have the right people. This is really, really frustrating because you can see the fruit right there. Why not just go to a campus and say, "Hey, you got a great job. We'll pay you a decent wage but not a great wage to do something really fascinating." It turns out it just doesn't work out that easily. I don't have a great story for you there. I have a decent story, but I'm not here to blow smoke at you. That's how it is.

Question. From your own experience can you talk about what it was like to transition from the culture at the CIA to the FBI?

Philip Mudd. I'm going to sound like a Pollyanna because I guess you don't take one of these jobs and you don't stay in this business for 23 years without being an optimist. I'm an optimist that my little nephew Jacob will grow up in a great world.

I had a good experience with my FBI colleagues. I had a good experience in the limited amount of time I have spent with Director Mueller. My experience in the Bureau, I would never give it back for simple reasons. I think many in the Bureau recognized, especially at the senior executive level, that we had to evolve into a national security service. Not all wanted to recognize that. Let's be honest here. Some recognized it because we had a series of committees and also Congressional pressure and media pressure that said you better evolve. Some recognized it because they said maybe there's a better way to do this business. Over time, I think we in the executive suite learned more and more about what change management is all about. That was very difficult. Not because of cultural issues but because change is hard in any organization, any major bureaucracy. I've often said that the Director might have been better served by recruiting someone who's a specialist in change management instead of someone who's a specialist in intelligence.

I've been accepted in the Bureau I think because people recognize that it's

a good time to evolve, and even if it's not, we have to. I didn't join until 2005. That was hammered so hard for the first four years 2001–05, but let's not be under illusions. I came to a ground that was already a bit tilled. I think it would have been much more difficult in 2001–02. The last thing I'll say—and I hope he's not watching—I work for one of the best men I've ever worked for in my life. Director Mueller is a great guy. He has a vision for what he wants to accomplish. He's a former Marine who operates with integrity every day. I counsel new officers and every time I talk to them, whether it's the Bureau or the CIA I tell them, you can have whatever kind of job you want—if you've got a bad boss, you've got a bad job. I've got a great boss.

INTELLIGENCE *and* ESPIONAGE

THE LESSONS *of* TEHRAN *and* AFGHANISTAN

Howard Hart

George H. Gilliam. For the purpose of introducing today's guest, I'm delighted to welcome a man who needs no introduction at all, to this or any other audience around the world, the 62nd Secretary of State of the United States, Lawrence Eagleburger.

Lawrence Eagleburger. I would suggest, ladies and gentlemen, that you take a hard look at this gentleman who's about to speak before you. You will not see his like again, and I regret that intensely. He is from the days of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) when they did brilliant work, most of it never known, and where it was known, or has become known, usually it is some politician—starting with Senator [Frank] Church some years ago—who drags 'em before some committee and beats 'em up on something that they did or shouldn't have done.

Well, I want to tell you something. During the bad old days with the Soviet Union it is these people, as much as anyone, who knew what was going on there, knew how to predict it, not always rightly, but usually correctly. And most of the time, when the Soviets were playing games with us—illicit games, spying, if you will—it is these people who were able to, one: identify it, and two: give us an opportunity to end it. It was a nasty game sometimes. And it's the nastiness, I guess, that has led our more recent politicians to find that it was a terrible thing they did. But it is in fact what saved our bacon more than once, and this man particularly did more than his share, including practically losing his life in Tehran when he was beaten up on the street, and he's never fully recovered from that physically and he'll never say that to you, but I happen to know it for a fact. That and so many other things that he did specifically make him, as far as I'm concerned, not only one of my best friends, but a real hero. So I would like to introduce to you my hero, and I hope yours. What is your name again, young fellah? Mr. Hart.



MILLER CENTER
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
UNIVERSITY of VIRGINIA

Howard Hart. It's an honor for Larry Eagleburger to be here and introduce me, to say the very least. There's something else I'd like to say. I'm speaking from the heart. There are precious few complimentary statements ever made about my former organization, CIA, which no longer exists. But when they come from someone like Larry Eagleburger, who has been, for many years, one of the most brilliant practitioners of the black arts of diplomacy, that's a terrific accolade, and on behalf of a whole lot of my colleagues, Larry, thank you very, very much.

Lawrence Eagleburger. He had this planned all along, folks.

Howard Hart. And a wonderful American. I'd like you all to join me—we have a great American of a generation that fought for our lifetime and won. Larry Eagleburger. Thank you, for him.

Human intelligence—HumInt, catchy phrase—espionage comes in many manifestations, and one small part of CIA, which part I belong to, practiced that profession. I've been asked to talk about a couple of chunks of what is human intelligence and what it involves. Well, you could write books about it, you could spend hours talking about it. So I've been asked to personalize it, take a couple of incidents that happened in my career and in my life and perhaps paint a bit of a picture. I've got to tell you right away that it's daunting—one, to be able to even try to do that—and second, I hate the use of the first person singular a lot, but I'm telling a story as I saw it, so I'm going to have to pass that on to you.

The first thing that I'm going to talk about—again, to give you a grasp of what is this thing called espionage, human intelligence, meaning on the ground, working with, against, for, in a covert manner, the best interests of this nation. First, I'm sure you're aware that everybody's in the intelligence business. If you read a newspaper, you're in the intelligence business. Espionage is the world's second oldest profession, flat-out, because as soon as somebody had something that was knowledge, or whatever it was, other people wanted to obtain it. If they were trying to defend it, you had to resort to espionage to get it, espionage being the act of obtaining information which is protected by the people who have it, and they don't want you to have it, and you need it. In the matter of national security, espionage probably produces maybe five percent of what is needed. Presumably it's the five percent you can't get any other way. That's the whole premise behind it.

The story I'd like to tell is the business of the Tehran rescue mission. I'm sure everyone in this room remembers the abortive attempt, in early 1980, to go in and rescue the hostages being held at the American Embassy in Tehran. I had just come back from Tehran after a three-year stint in Iran, going all the way through the revolution when the Shah left and staying on past that. Having arrived back in the U.S. hoping never to have to do anything else with Iran—well, the hostage crisis began. I was tapped to run CIA support for whatever that rescue mission was going to turn out to be.

President [Jimmy] Carter said to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "You will start planning a military rescue mission." They didn't have a clue what to do. Nobody did. And for months and months and months, this tremendously difficult project was worked on, and it began with, "We can't do it" to "We can do it with an extraordinary high level of risk, but we can do it." I'll sort of paraphrase what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs told the President: "We can do it because CIA has paved the way and made it possible."

Let me give you some examples. You have a whole bunch of people in Delta Force, the guys who would go over the wall, kill the guards, rescue the hostages, and then get in helicopters and bring everybody out. Well, that's short and sweet. The problem is, we are several thousand miles away, helicopters don't fly several thousands of miles, and on and on and on. So we had to devise a way that we could get Delta Force from a safe haven, in this case Egypt, up against the wall of the American Embassy compound in Tehran undetected. Undetected. Deliver 150 of America's finest fighting men to a brick wall in an enemy town. Okay. Daunting.

The military went through everything. You couldn't go and drop paratroopers into a city, because how would you get out? You must have helicopters. In order to have helicopters, you've got to be able to fly them all the way in the country 1,000 miles and then get them out to some other location where you would join the helicopters with big fixed-wing aircraft and fly out. So the CIA went to Iran, and found a stretch of ground out in the desert, a road, and said, "This will take big airplanes—C-130s, C-141s, those big job engine things which can bring in fuel to gas up helicopters, which are flown in from the ocean off a naval aircraft carrier and landed—a one-way trip. That's all the gas they had, with big spare tanks in them. Kick out the tanks, now you've got room to fly people out of the embassy, not in.

The CIA found the place, and then the military, with very good reason, said, “You think the road’s fine, and it’s at night and it’s out in the desert. How do we know it will take four big engine aircraft? CIA took Mom & Pop Airways, one airplane, stuffed it full of two or three people, a motorbike, and flew under

...it was probably...one of the Agency’s finest hours. And we did this in total secrecy. In the end, over 350 CIA staff personnel were involved in this program, all so compartmented nobody knew what was happening.

the radar from the UAE [United Arab Emirates] 1,000 miles in at 150 feet, landed, got out, went up and down the road thumping with this thumper machine which says it’ll take big airplanes, and flew back out.

That’s not bad. We flooded the country with CIA intelligence officers who were anything but American. The foreign business community, I used to joke, increased by 2,000 percent every time I sent another batch in, because what they had to do was as follows, a very

quick summary. How do you move these fighting guys from the middle of the desert where they have arrived by big airplanes? The plan was for the helicopters to come in from the carriers, and fly the troops to a secret location not far away and hold them all night long. See, everything has to happen at night. Actually, you have to hold them all day long. So CIA rented a huge warehouse, and into that warehouse would be brought Delta Force from the Desert One location, Desert One, by big trucks. Who’s going to get the trucks?

CIA bought trucks in Tehran, brand new Mercedes Benz diesels, had the bodies on those trucks built to the specifications of Delta Force and Fort Bragg, in Tehran, put drivers in them and had those trucks wheel to wheel in the desert waiting when the events at Desert One went wrong. We also had the embassy compound under 24-hour-a-day visual surveillance by American officers with satellite radios, which only CIA had. Nobody else had invented them yet. And on and on and on. The whole story, it was probably, I think, one of the Agency’s finest hours. And we did this in total secrecy. In the end, over 350 CIA staff personnel were involved in this program, all so compartmented nobody knew what was happening.

The mission was probably impossible. We felt it would work, but we needed luck. And because my time is limited, what I have to do is say, “Why didn’t it

work?” The answer is the helicopters flew into sandstorms on the way to Tehran, which weren’t supposed to be there. One of the helicopters had to abort right away and landed in the desert, just across the water. The other ones arrived; only one of them worked right. The mission had to be aborted. We could have taken Delta to the embassy, we could have put them over the wall, we could have done all of that, but then there’d be no helicopters left to extract us to get us anywhere. We had to abort the mission.

Up to this point, nothing has happened, except we have a bunch of helicopters that don’t work and lots of big airplanes on the ground. Remember, the tanker birds were there, big C-130s full of aviation gasoline had just filled the helicopters up. One of those helicopters took off. Those of you who’ve ever seen helicopters operate in a desert, and I’m sure some of you have, you create your own dust storm. You can see nothing. When the pilot lifted off, he was supposed to take the aircraft up and backwards and he took it forward into a C-130 full of aviation gasoline. Bang, bang, bang. People died, planes were burning. It was a hell of a moment.

A vignette. The night before we left, when we were in Egypt, a young trooper from Delta came up to me. The CIA had built, as soon as this crisis started, an absolute detailed model of the embassy compound, each building in it, and Delta had been screaming, saying, “Where is each prisoner, each hostage in all those buildings?” The night before we left, CIA got that information, room

We could have taken Delta to the embassy, we could have put them over the wall, we could have done all of that, but then there’d be no helicopters left to extract us to get us anywhere. We had to abort the mission.

by room. And after briefing them that, a young trooper walked up to me and he said, “Mr. Hart, where will I put the flag?” “The flag.” “Yes, sir. I got it.” I said, “Right. Which building are you assigned to capture?” “The Ambassador’s residence.” The building stood alone near the compound wall. “You know the building—” He’d memorized it. “Go up the stairs into the first doors you see. It’s the Ambassador’s bedroom. Go through those doors, open ’em up. Balcony, there’s the road. Hang the flag.”

The next day, CBS, NBC, Pomeranian television will all be filming that and the street will be full of bodies of Iranians rushing to the rescue of their colleagues

and cohorts in the embassy, and they weren't going to get across that street, trust me. Let 'em know. The vignette is, as the planes were burning—we were picking people up—and this kid came through the door, and it's my sergeant. Tears were streaming down his face. And he said, "Sir, I'm sorry about the flag." Oh. I hugged him and I wept. That's America.

I've got to change horses. Afghanistan. I was Chief of Station, Islamabad in Pakistan, and I was sent out in early 1980 to see if it was credible, possible, to do two things: to secure the agreement of the government of Pakistan, then under martial law, President Zia-ul-Haq, to provide the support base—people, turf, everything—for us to provide covert arms to this bunch of people inside Afghanistan, who, it seemed, weren't prepared to tolerate the Russian presence. Remember the Russians had occupied Afghanistan. They were supported by a Communist Afghan government, and rebellion was already stirring up, but they didn't have any guns to speak of. So my job was to see if the Pakistanis would help, and to determine whether these Afghans were ready to fight? At this time, we were just recovering from the Carter era, where CIA was somewhere down in the basement as far down as you could get, and very timid.

I wrote the first Presidential "Finding" on Afghanistan before I went out to Islamabad. A "Finding" is a Congressionally mandated legal document by which the President instructs CIA to do some covert thing: the famous "Covert Action" role that CIA plays for the U.S. government. The Finding was specifically for "non-lethal" assistance to the budding insurgency—in this case \$500,000 for medical supplies. That was all the Carter administration was prepared to give to the first country since World War II to be invaded and occupied by the Soviet Union.

Pathetic, but it was a start. Soon thereafter the [Ronald] Reagan administration took office, Bill Casey came to CIA, and there was a feeling—supported by Casey—that the new administration would be interested in a far more active role in fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan.

I very much wanted the job of Chief of Station in Pakistan. I was an Asian Studies type in college; had served five years in India, and (sort of) spoke Urdu. I was also a serious student of guerrilla wars, and for years had been fascinated by the history and people of Afghanistan. Breaking my rule no. 1 (never ask for a job), I threw my hat in the ring for the post, which was just about to be open. While too young and too junior for the assignment, I was selected.

My first task was to assess whether the anti-Soviet tribal Afghans would fight the Soviets—in what would doubtless be a long and costly fight against a modern Soviet Army backed by armor, aircraft and artillery. My second task was to establish whether the Pakistanis were prepared to support a major insurgency: which would require very significant manpower assistance by the Pakistan Army, and would risk Soviet reprisals.

After long conversations with tribals on the Frontier, and meetings with senior Pak Army officers and then-President Zia, I was persuaded that the tribes would fight a long term war, and that the Pakistanis would play their indispensable role. I so advised headquarters, and put in the first of a long list of weapons and supplies that would be needed.

Headquarters did its thing, and the necessary Presidential and Congressional approvals were obtained. My job then became one of working with the Paks and the newly christened Mujahadin to create a really major insurgency. Which, years later, forced the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan.

I need to point out that the tribals who fought the war in Afghanistan are a unique bunch. They are bred for fighting: first against each other, then—and even better in their view—against foreign invaders. Better yet: non-Muslim foreign invaders. Afghanistan is not a country by any definition other than it occupies an area defined on a map. People who grow up there have no loyalties to anyone except their own tribes. They regard themselves as the freest of all people, and acknowledge no government beyond that of their own tribal elders. They are savage, duplicitous, physically and mentally tough and infinitely courageous.

When the British invaded Afghanistan on several occasions, their first army of eight or nine thousand people was destroyed to a man in 1843. One guy got out to tell the tale. One man. When I left, three and a half years later, our funding for the insurgency had grown to be in the neighborhood of \$250 million, and the war dragged on until 1989. The key point was that we and the Pakistanis kept it up until then, when the Soviets, weary of incessant casualties and no apparent progress in defeating the Mujahadin, went home.

Early on, however, there were challenges to the wisdom of launching the war. People used to ask me, “are you really just fighting this war to the last Afghan.” In fact, that charge was specifically made to me by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan on a visit to Pakistan. In response, I took the Senator to

one of the large refugee camps which many Mujahadin called home, and suggested, in front of about 4,000 Afghans squatting on the ground in front of him, that he ask them whether we should be supporting them in the war against the Soviets. Through an interpreter, he did just that. The response, to say the least, was loud, affirmative and wildly enthusiastic. The good Senator was instantly converted, and treated his audience to a wonderful arm-waving Irish patriotic rally, in which he did everything but offer them aircraft carriers and nuclear weapons.

These were people who wanted guns to go fight an invader. My final response to the Senator was to remind him of Britain in 1940, when the British were saying “give us the guns and we will finish the job.”

An interesting and important sidelight to the Afghan war was the fact that the U.S. and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] were at the time staring across the line in Europe at a vastly larger Soviet and Bloc army. In Afghanistan we were killing their once-vaunted helicopter gunships (which everyone said could not be shot down) as fast as they could make them: these were a major threat to NATO planners in Western Europe in responding to a potential Soviet invasion. These are the tank killers. We were killing one and then two out of every one produced in the Soviet Union.

The Soviets never announced what their losses were. They would fly their dead out in the dark of night from Kabul, because they knew we were watching, and we were. Their costs were so high that—the guy who said it all was Foreign

Minister [Eduard] Shevardnadze. Remember back in the [Mikhail] Gorbachev era? And Shevardnadze said, after the Soviet Union collapsed, Afghanistan was the last nail in the Soviet coffin. And he didn't say that because he was trying to win friends and influence in the West. It is true. Rudyard Kipling wrote a poem many, many years ago about Afghanistan where he said, referring to an English soldier fighting in Afghanistan, “And when you're wounded and lying on the Afghan plain, and the women come out to cut up remains,

When the British invaded Afghanistan on several occasions, their first army of eight or nine thousand people was destroyed to a man in 1843. One guy got out to tell the tale. One man.

[roll] to your gun and blow out your brains and go to your God like a soldier.” And a lot of Soviets went on to world socialism exactly that way. It was quite a trip.

We have new problems. I would leave you with this thought. The whole Afghan adventure on our part was a gamble, and it was totally supported by Congress,

The new regime turned their back entirely on Afghanistan, could care less, and at the same time turned their backs on the Pakistanis, because they had been working on and had just developed a nuclear weapon, which indeed we reported on in CIA.

not won by Charlie Wilson. Oh my God. You can write anything and make a movie about anything, let me tell you. I knew Charlie. Charlie and I did not like each other. Fortunately, my tour was up when he was really starting to turn up on the scene. I’ve told him all of this. There’s no news here.

Anyway, what started out to be, on the part of the President and others, a way to annoy the Soviets, to make them pay for going out of their turf—and they really did suppress Afghanistan. I mean,

this was a Soviet vassal, do what we want, and the tales of how they took over, they’re wonderful stories. But it grew from that to the liberation of the country. Now the fact is that immediately as that was done, there was a change in the White House. The new regime turned their back entirely on Afghanistan, could care less, and at the same time turned their backs on the Pakistanis, because they had been working on and had just developed a nuclear weapon, which indeed we reported on in CIA.

Once every six months I would be summoned down to see the President of Pakistan, who would say, “Mr. Hart, how dare you provide Washington with this report I’ve just read in *The New York Times*”—true, got to the *Times*—“about how we are building nuclear weapons?” And it was a charade. I would say, “Sir, I would never say that.” That done, we’d go on to other business. But he was punished, and if you’re a Pakistani, trust me, you’d work up a nuclear bomb because you’re looking across a border at India, who has many—turned their backs on Pakistan, put them on the bigoted list, we won’t talk to them, and guess what we got? We got all the stuff that’s happened since in Riyadh, al-Qaeda and all of that stuff, because instead of harnessing the United Nations and driving into a war-torn but now free of Soviets sort of country

and try to help them build, we all walked away. And of course Europe won't take up the slack.

So I'm afraid that's what it boils down to. And what did we get? We reaped the whirlwind. And now here we are out there again. And it's a tough thing because, you know, there is no truth about how to behave, there is no truth. What we try to do, desperately, in the intelligence business, in the HumInt thing, where you're talking to people—human intelligence involves a lot of things, and it's very hard to do. I want to tell you right now that what always surprised me about my service—and I come from the clandestine service of the CIA. If you joined it, we all stayed in. In the old days, when you joined, this was for life. And we had retention rates after 25 years of 95 percent, which means you died or you were still there. This wasn't always the best thing, because we had our share of jerks.

Life is life. But you had to live with disappointment. The government doesn't give you golden parachutes. You may go your entire career and never recruit one agent whose information when he's giving it to you is of critical importance to our republic. You can go your whole life and not be able to do that. But you can never quit. You've got to keep at it. And then, while you're at it, it's the whole business of manipulating people. It's not nice to say that, but that's true. If you're going to find someone and say, "Would you mind giving me the secrets most dearly held by your country?" Well, that's kind of a big thing.

Suppose someone walked up to any of you and said, "Would you mind selling out the United States?" You might get a little annoyed. And the people who have the secrets are a very tiny part of the population of whatever your target is. So it's hard to do. And then people who sort of or really do agree don't want to do it. So how do you do it? Take the situation of the rescue mission. We had agents in Iran, Iranians, who had reported to us before, had watched their country disintegrate, but had done their bit. Now they figured they were done. So you've got to go to somebody like this and say, "Oh, by the way, I've got this other new red-hot idea. I would like you to go buy six of the biggest sixteen-wheelers Mercedes makes, establish a company, you're the front for it, and in the end of this, all those trucks are going to be sitting abandoned in front of the American Embassy, after we've just attacked in an act of war." How likely are they to say, "Oh, happy to do that."

Anyway, that's awfully quick. Before we take some questions, I just want to say this, in a grateful acceptance of Secretary Eagleburger's comments, the old CIA

tried its best. We were pretty stupid sometimes, and we just couldn't do some things. It's gone now, and I don't have any idea what's going to come up next. I can tell you this. The United States at this moment does not have an effective, functioning espionage service. I hope that gets corrected. And I particularly hope—when I say espionage, I mean for the collection of human intelligence. Technical intelligence, whether it is photography, satellite, signals intelligence—these are the most rare kind of intelligence specialties you could ever imagine. But when you get down to the bottom, it's people. And it's intentions. We always used to say espionage, human intelligence, the absolute bottom line on it is intentions. We don't care if the Soviets—well, we do care, but it doesn't matter so much that the Soviet Union has 935,000 tanks. The question is do they intend to use them? That's what human intelligence is about. I'd pause now, and I'd be happy to take some questions.

George H. Gilliam. I thought that one of the most important things we could do at the Miller Center is to bring Howard in to talk about the role that human intelligence has played in some of the major political events of the last two or three decades. And so we're delighted to have you here today.

I'd like to open the question session with this. Can you connect your personal experience and tell us exactly what it was you did once you arrived on the ground in Afghanistan? How did you recruit people? And how did you come up with the plans to supply those who were trying to resist the Soviets? How does this work? In Steve Coll's great book, *Ghost Wars*, there's a lot of attention given to how you organized it, and I think it would be great if you could share exactly what it was that you did to organize the resistance to the Soviets.

Howard Hart. Okay, I'll give it a shot. I was particularly lucky, actually, in responding to that problem, that need. My earliest years were in World War II in a Japanese internment camp in the Philippines with my family. We spent the whole war there, and after we were liberated, we returned to the Philippines eventually, and I grew up, from about age 9, or until I went off to boarding school, maybe 14, along with my peer group. Many of our family members had been in the guerilla movement up in the hills, Americans who had refused to surrender had gone up into the mountains and waged the most effective guerilla war against an Axis nation anywhere in World War II. In fact whole islands in the Philippines belonged to the guerillas, and I listened to the stories from these guys as a young kid, my ears were all open. I just thought it was wonderful.

What they taught me was a lot of the things that you need to know, you need to have, to successfully exist as a guerilla force up against a modern military. I didn't realize it, but it's true. I've often thought that it would have been extremely difficult if not impossible for a classically trained American military officer to wage such a war effectively, because he'd been trained wrong. It's also very difficult to combat such a guerilla war if you're not one. And we've seen that lots. Best intentions, willpower, everything else. Hard to do.

I'd also spent a lot of time in South Asia with CIA before that. When I went out there, and I was something of a very amateur historian, as I still am, particularly of the British-Indian era, where the Brits had to deal with the Afghans and lots of other things in that neighborhood. So I was very familiar with how this all had worked over the past several thousand years, but basically the preceding couple hundred. One of the first things I did is I checked out of the CIA library the memoirs of maybe 25 senior British army officers or British-Indian army officers who'd served on the frontier. I read their memoirs. I felt I knew a lot.

I didn't know much, but I knew enough, and in fact they're very simple people. They love to fight, they hate everybody else except who's in your tribe, they're moderately religious, but only moderately. They love to fight. They'll never let you see their women, and they love to fight. All you had to do was arm 'em and point them in the general direction of somebody else to fight with.

Okay—and frankly, that was about right. I'll tell you a very interesting thing. Every tribe living on the frontier even then, your life's ambition was to have a rifle. You had to have one. I mean, if you didn't have one, you weren't a man yet. So for 100 years, they would get their rifles by stealing—killing British soldiers, or British-Indian soldiers, and getting their rifles. We did provide a few rifles.

My first big buy was to put 400,000 obsolete British rifles into Afghanistan.

We weren't playing. Eight thousand heavy machine guns. We controlled the air, because the Russians and the Afghans would not fly down low enough to be any good for their side, be effective, and way up there in the sky. To hell

One of the first things I did is I checked out of the CIA library the memoirs of maybe 25 senior British army officers or British-Indian army officers who'd served on the frontier. I read their memoirs.

with them, they can't hit anything. And when I told that to President Zia the night I went in to say, "Could we please go buy Chinese communist surface-to-air missiles?" Only CIA could do this. We were buying Polish missiles, we were buying Czechoslovakian rifles, and we were having a great time. Not a single piece of American hardware went in there during my watch. Kind of silly, but it made me feel good. It was a policy matter.

I found that I could tell if enthusiasm for the war was continuing by one simple experiment. I would go up to one of the villages where they made copies of weapons, rifles—and they made some very good copies. You know, here's a little guy in a mud hut using a piece of railroad track stolen from the friendly railway, melting it down and producing a copy of a British 19th or 20th century bolt-action rifle or a Kalashnikov, and then they just sold them. And if the price of those rifles or the new ones that were turning up mysteriously remained the same or went up, guess what? Is that a good measure of an active support for a war? So I would take monthly samples. What are guns going for on the frontier? Price was steady or going up, there's still a market. Have another 2,000 rifles.

Question. Can you speak a little about your experiences working with the Pakistani [Inner] Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) and be willing to share any thoughts you might have on our contemporary, shall we say, difficulties with the ISI?

Howard Hart. Inner Services Intelligence, Pakistan, is a creature of many, many heads and tails and a very difficult bunch. Interestingly enough—we still want to go back to Pakistan, right? Okay. There's not a lot of great thinking that goes behind policy in Pakistan. It's a country bedeviled by the most incredible problems, and forward strategic thinking is not one of them. ISI has always been a creature of whoever the President of Pakistan is. And for all too long, that's been a military guy. On the other hand, someone with a military background is the only person capable of running Pakistan with any semblance of order. Everybody knows that. So today's President will sooner or later be replaced by somebody in the army again.

Now in my day, ISI had to be carefully manipulated. If they were not properly manipulated, you got big trouble. You could not always keep them on the right track. My line to them was they favored, the head of that service favored, arming the big religious leaders up on the frontier, and I told him, "Wrong bet." He continued doing it, but because we were doing our job on the human

intelligence side, we were watching that unilaterally. Because I knew what he was doing, without his telling me. As long as it was a dull roar, that's okay, makes him feel all right. But he gets out of hand, you got to stop that.

As far as I'm concerned, the biggest fluff-ups were after me, and when I left Pakistan in '84, that was it. I didn't ask another question. I went on to other jobs, it's finished. I'd had the best job in the world. I got other good jobs that I loved. But I didn't ask anymore. And I'll never forget the crowning—it gave me a laugh, because one day, when the Soviet Union announced it was withdrawing, my wife and I were overseas in Germany, but we came back and there was an informal ceremony at CIA headquarters with the likes of Charlie Wilson where they were celebrating this great victory over the Soviets in Afghanistan and they forgot to invite me. I was sitting two floors up.

In a way, that's just fine, because from the little scraps I'd heard, I think I wanted to distance myself a bit. ISI, like everyone—Secretary Eagleburger will tell you—allies must be manipulated. Enemies must be manipulated. It's just exactly, as all of you do at your day-to-day things, I don't know whether it's your kids or your bankers or the guy next door, life is that way. ISI is a creature of a very torn-up country. Is that good enough for a quick and dirty?

Question. You touched upon this a bit, but can you expand your thoughts as to why we don't currently have a successful espionage service?

Howard Hart. I want to qualify this by saying I've been out for some time. It's almost 20 years I guess. It's been awhile. And I left when I was 50 because I could tell—we were changing administrations, we'd already started getting a lot of flak from Congress, which is just absolutely ridiculous, and so I haven't been present for a lot of it. But of course the people I left behind were telling me for years, and now they're all gone, too. Let's just say it's done. And it's done by dreadful interference, I think malign, from the Executive Branch, and dreadful interference, and definitely malign, from the Congress, particularly the House. It has driven out career officers, or it did. They're all gone now.

The young people who are coming in now do not think of the CIA as a career. We treated it fundamentally as this is a commitment. I guess the closest parallel is, you went into the United States military through one of the academies, that was going to be your life. In CIA, that was going to be our life. That is not the case, now. From what I'm told, young people coming in don't share the ethic of,

“We’re not in this to make money.” They’re coming in to get a chop in their passport through life when they want to go to work for Wall Street, all too often.

Great many restrictions have been laid out, a great many. For example, in my day—and it had been for decades that the Chief of Station was the senior intelligence man in a country. He was it, and he worked for the Ambassador. And that Chief of Station kept the Ambassador fully apprised, and if he didn’t, the Ambassador would can him, as Secretary Eagleburger did more than once. But the Ambassador and the Chief of Station should have and very often were the two guys in country who were really in a position to do something, but the CIA guy owed it to his Ambassador to make sure he knew what was going on, and everybody was obliged to tell him. If the military was operating in some country, they had to tell you.

I don’t know who’s in charge now. Nobody knows who’s in charge. And you can’t have more than one intelligence guy in a country, even if he’s a quote-unquote friendly American intelligence guy. They don’t talk to each other! Never will, never should! So we have terrible troubles with recruitment, we have desperate troubles with the organization, we have undefined missions. There’s just been a new issuance from the White House, the new truth about who does what in the intelligence community. It’s unclassified. You can get it on the Web. I haven’t been able to read it all yet, but I do know that this whole business of having a Director of National Intelligence—I thought once upon a time that was a great idea, until they crossed 2,500 people on the staff of the Director of National Intelligence. What? Who are they? Well, last week I was working for the Boston police. Now I’m a big dog in the Director of National Intelligence.

I always used to say, and this is the truth, if you hired a young man or woman to go into the CIA’s clandestine service, you trained them for two years in formal training. At least two years, and I’m not including language. Then you sent them out, then you put them on a desk in Washington for one or two years to learn how it worked at the headquarters on the Washington side and got some feel for the complexity of the inter-agency thing, life in the U.S. government foreign affairs community writ large, or small, depending, because you’re very young. Then you go out on your first assignment for two or three years, and that’s when they watch you really hard. And if you don’t cut it, they politely sack you, because you signed a piece of paper saying, yes, I agree to go. But now we’re already at six years, aren’t we? And you haven’t really become a journeyman at anything yet.

After five years in the field, I felt that's when I knew my way around, plus the training, plus the time in Washington. At ten years, I was useful. At fifteen, I should really be able to pull my weight. And at twenty, I was confident that I could probably deal with most things they threw my way, and that's how we grew up. You can't grow any faster. You don't go to the School of Intelligence and Espionage. The skills you need, you have to learn. And if you don't have them inherently, you will never learn them. That doesn't begin to answer your question, but trust me, it's all going in the wrong way, and dear Lord, I mean, I feel, obviously, as just a citizen, we ought to have a pretty good intelligence service, and I'm referring specifically to the human intelligence, the espionage business. And we do not.

Question. I'd like to turn back to Iran in the '70s, a very stable, pro-Western country under a man who was made to be evil, I think, by the American media. There were also advisors to President Carter that [Ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini was a good man—Ramsay Clark and Andy Young and others. I would be very interested in what the role of the CIA was during that very troubled time, because I think the loss of Iran as a pro-Western country is one of the most signal events of our lifetime.

Howard Hart. Well, I was there in those days, and I have to answer your question by just giving you a few bullets. In the first instance, no one was more surprised at the ability of Khomeini and his surrogates, which means all those people of the lower or merchant class in Iran who prevailed in throwing the Shah out. No one was more surprised at that having happened than the Khomeini people and the people who pulled it off, trust me. It was the surprise of all their lifetimes. They never dreamt they could be so successful. They never understood how deep down in the Iranian psyche the perceived problems with the Shah's regime were. And in a way, that's another way of addressing the fact that the Shah became megalomaniac towards the end. He really did. He thought he communed with God.

One of our most terrible failures in the last 18 months leading up to the revolution—mind you, when I got there, I did not want to go to Iran. I'd been serving down in the Persian Gulf and I got told, "We want you to go to Iran." And I said, "Do I have no friends? What have I done wrong?" Because I'd never met anyone who could stand being in Iran. Well, I went to Iran. The depth of animosity towards the Shah, meaning these rascals who are in power, was all exacerbated by the fact that the Shah demanded and received the most

incredible servility from everyone who worked for him. You could not sit in a conversation in Tehran—this astounded me—at a cocktail party and talk about the Shah except by saying, “His Imperial Majesty, comma, who played tennis yesterday—” What? The whole mouthful? We were saying HIM, His Imperial Majesty, and her. Her was ten times smarter than HIM.

But what we didn’t find out was he was desperately ill. He managed to get himself up to a palace, or several palaces he had up on the Caspian Sea and he virtually disappeared. We didn’t have agents who could tell us that, because the job of the Ambassador—we had an absolutely brilliant Ambassador, Bill Sullivan, who right along with Larry Eagleburger represents that generation of our pro-consular foreign service titans, and very few of them. He couldn’t get any guidance from Washington except Jimmy Carter, to whom there were no bad people. I truly believe that was Jimmy’s view of the world. Only the hostage crisis persuaded him there might be a few. And mind you, he’d sent a guy over to run CIA pretty much with the express orders: Tear it down. He stopped us recruiting people for four years.

Iran was a shambles. We also had in Washington, and we could see it in the CIA, on the analytical side, people who did not believe that the Shah could ever be threatened internally. And I was a new boy on the block, because I’d never served there before. We weren’t particularly well endowed with human sources in Tehran, because frankly our Agency and government attention had shifted to other places for a long time. But the Washington analytical establishment, who could tell you down to the 93rd generation the relatives of the Shah who did all this stuff, but it was totally irrelevant. I’d say, “I don’t care. What about this?” And they didn’t know the answer.

I made a mistake. I wrote a piece of paper, as I recall, in October or November of ’78, when the thing was still boiling but the lid hadn’t jumped off the pot yet. I wrote it as you’re entitled to do, which is from me to the Washington analysts saying, “This is worse than you guys think. It’s terrible.” And my Chief of Station refused to release it, to send it out. I should have gone to him and insisted, which we’re entitled to do under very rare circumstances, but I shrugged and I said, “Okay.” He had just come to Iran for the first time after 22 years of very good service in the Far East, and he didn’t want that negative word to go out. I was in charge of the part of the station that was recruiting agents in Iran. That was my job. I sent word back by wire—“Send out your most senior analyst who would like to take a boondoggle and come to Tehran for a week or so. Love to talk to him.”

We got a guy, very nice man. Anyway, so this guy turns up and absolutely fortunately the day he came in and was standing in my office, and I'm hitting him very gently with "I think that—" and I had the officers who work for me in the room, and we were all talking at this guy. We had a demonstration outside. Oh! Lovely. Two or three hundred otherwise unemployed Iranians came down, "Death to the United States," burning flags, doing all those good things. Now we hadn't seen this in many years, and this was the very first one. He regarded it as kind of the end of the world. You know, he lived in McLean, Virginia.

This was a nothing demonstration, but it was a demonstration. He went back and we began to notice a little more interest. But then we had very good intelligence. The problem was, now in retrospect, the very good intelligence was intelligence from people, Iranians, who thought they were managing the Khomeini's revolution. They were the Western-trained intelligentsia who had it worked out they would ride the crest of the common man with Khomeini as a figurehead, and they would create a small-D democratic Iran. And those people are either dead or out of the country, and that all happened within eight months. Again, no one was more surprised than they were. Iran was a toughie.

Question. Can you enlighten us on what the political realities are today in Iran, and what quality of human intelligence we have coming from that population?

Howard Hart. I can't address what the quality of our intelligence on Iran is; I simply don't know. I regret to say, I have a doomsday assessment. Iraq, I guess, we're going to eventually leave. So in no time at all, I guess, we're out of Iraq. Now I hope everybody understands that that's going to mean that we have at least one big chunk of Iraq that is going to be absolutely subordinate to and owned by Iran. You can figure out where Iran stands in life by simply reading the newspapers. Hostile, enemy, vitriolic, needs us to be an enemy, because they need the foreign devil in order to forget the minor problems at home. So you've got Iraq, a large chunk of it is going to be under Iran and doing what it says, and Iran will presumably, in fairly short time, all I know is what I read in the newspapers—may have nuclear weapons. Even one'll do, guys, just one. If it goes bang and it's nuclear, bad times.

And then you have Afghanistan. Now, we have less than 40,000 troops in Afghanistan today, and when you add in a few thousand Brits and Canadians who are the only NATO allies in harm's way there, while the rest of them sort of

guard airports and don't get in harm's way on purpose, the Soviet Union—every day I got up and I looked at the Soviet Union keeping a maximum force level in Afghanistan of 120,000 troops. 120,000 was their absolute maximum. That's all I had to fight. We only have 40,000. That's not enough. And if you're going to win in Afghanistan, you've got to have a whole lot more people, or you've got to make—well, first you've got to make a decision. Are we going to stay in Afghanistan? But if you don't stay in Afghanistan, I give you that half of Iran at least, presuming the Kurds get away with not being occupied, half of Iran, half of Iraq, all of Iran and Afghanistan again, and we have a Pakistan, which is no more stable. It's grim.

Question. Do you think that it's possible to have stability in Afghanistan, period?

Howard Hart. Ever?

Question. Ever.

Howard Hart. Yes. Ever is a long time. Right? Ever? I'm not trying to be cute. It's a very difficult task. There will be no Ahmed Thomas Jefferson Kahn ride in and take over and teach them small-D democracy and all the rest of that, no. But if a patient, thoughtful, reasonably well financed and intelligent multinational force group moves into Afghanistan, understanding that they've got 20 to 25 years there to try to get some sense built up, some concept of stability, some concept of peace—it's a very hard place to work and to be an Afghan is very difficult. And you know, as I said earlier, it's as though you took all of East and Western Europe, put 'em all together, and said, "You're all one country, get along." Right. It's a terrible problem. Can it be done? I think so. Will it be done by what we're now doing? Absolutely not. If we were serious about making a meaningful United States effort in Afghanistan, we would have to quadruple our troop strength. And I say that again with some confidence, because I fought it from the other side. So yeah, maybe.

Question. I was very impressed a year or so ago with the book *Three Cups of Tea*, out of which has evolved the Central Asia Institute, which has a purpose of educating young people in the mountainous regions, particularly girls, the idea being that if you educate a girl, you've educated three generations as opposed to educating a boy. I'm wondering if we can seriously and realistically consider that privately funded activity as a positive factor of hope for the future of the mountainous regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan?

Howard Hart. I would say in Afghanistan if it's given an opportunity to work, yes, it can do a lot, and the same thing in Pakistan. It's breathtakingly ambitious. It must be done. And I think it can be, but it all depends on the background. I mean, is it peace or war? I remember I took my wife to Afghanistan and Pakistan five or six years ago to look up old haunts, and she was fascinated, because you never see a woman. They're all in the huts. You do not see women in the frontier, period. And yet, you know they're 50 percent of all the people around. And so it's a great undertaking. Everything helps. Afghans are not stupid people at all. They are super bright. So there's a possibility that it can be done. But as I say, you cannot have a harvest of good things without putting a lot in it, and there is no way today that we can either prevail in Iraq or in Afghanistan with current force levels. It's just out of the question.

George H. Gilliam. I'd like very much to give Secretary Eagleburger the opportunity not only to have the first word but also to have the last word.

Lawrence Eagleburger. The only thing out of all of this that I would like to comment on is this dilemma that the United States has when you put yourself in debt to or partnership with a dictator, whether it's the Shah or whomever. That works for a while, and then as time goes on, this dictator or whatever collapses and we are all of a sudden out of it, and we get blamed back here for having lived with this dictator. The dilemma is that it is easy enough to criticize our using [Pervez] Musharraf, for example, but it also works for a while. And at the time when you're trying to deal with issues that are important to us, and security reasons that are outside anything to do with his domestic issues—and yes, it is true, we're working with a dictator. Now he goes, we get blamed for all of this, and the question is if at some point we realize he's going to go—your Shah example—where do you go to get off him and onto somebody else? You don't know how to do that. Nobody can figure that one out, and my only point here is please understand that on occasion we don't have much of a choice but to live with this dictator, work with him on occasion—well, more than on occasion. But realizing as well that we're taking on a burden which we're going to pay for later on perhaps.

I spent enough time in Yugoslavia with a dictator named [Marshal Josef] Tito to recognize that as soon as he was gone—you have a difficult situation. Now what do you do in a case like that? The point is there isn't much of a choice available to you, so as everybody then criticizes us, the CIA or the U.S. government, whatever, for living with this guy and working with him, please

understand there is often times either no choice or no choice you can find. Or if you don't work with him, the situation that you're trying to deal with outside the domestic issues of that country but having to do with our security won't be taken care of.

Howard Hart. Dead on. Absolutely.


THE SHADOW FACTORY

THE ULTRA-SECRET NSA *from 9/11 to the* EAVESDROPPING ON AMERICA

J a m e s B a m f o r d

George H. Gilliam. Perhaps no institution of our government has aroused greater curiosity and controversy in the past several years than the very secret National Security Agency (NSA), which collects signals intelligence. Today's speaker, James Bamford, has since 1982 been the leading author and journalist writing about intelligence agencies, particularly the NSA. James Bamford, who was an intelligence analyst in the United States Navy during the Vietnam War used his GI Bill benefits to earn his undergraduate and law degrees from Suffolk University in Boston. He published his first book about the NSA in 1982, *The Puzzle Palace*. This was followed by *Body of Secrets, A Pretext for War*, and most recently *The Shadow Factory: The Ultra-Secret NSA from 9/11 to the Eavesdropping on America*. For nearly ten years he was the Washington investigative producer for ABC's *World News Tonight*. He also now produces programs for NOVA. His list of published magazine articles runs, I think, seven single-spaced pages, and in 2006 he received the National Magazine Award for Reporting, which is the top prize for magazine writing. Please welcome James Bamford.

James Bamford. Thank you. It's a real honor to be at the Miller Center. I've looked at your list of speakers, and I feel humbled to be among them. It's interesting, the topic I've been writing about; when I first started out in 1982, after my first book was published, hardly anybody had ever heard of NSA. Now it's become more of a household word. I remember when I was doing the first book tour after *The Puzzle Palace* came out in 1982, one of the TV shows I had to go to had another guest on there, Senator Bill Bradley, and we shared a car on the way to the studio. He said, "What's your book about?" And I said, "It's about NSA, the National Security Agency," and he said, "What's that?" And when we got on the show, the first question the host asked was, "How secret is NSA?" and I just couldn't resist it. I said, "Even Senator Bradley said he'd never heard of it." He took a separate car back to the hotel after that.



The
Shadow

MILLER CENTER
of PUBLIC AFFAIRS
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Then it got picked for Book of the Month Club, and like all authors I looked at the back of *The New York Times Book Review* to see my little jacket there with all the rest, and I almost fell out of my chair because it said *The Puzzle Palace: A Report on NASA, America's Most Secret Agency*. The publisher or the editor of the ad copy thought I had made a mistake and decided to help me and change it to NASA, so I probably sold a few books to astronauts, but they changed it within a few weeks. But that's an example of how secret NSA was back then. Hardly anybody had ever heard of it, and it's become a bit more known now, but still there are hundreds of books that have been written on the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], and there's only three that have been written on NSA, and I wrote all three, so I've got sort of a monopoly on the topic.

I've also had sort of a love/hate relationship with NSA. When I wrote *The Puzzle Palace*, the first book ever written on NSA, they threatened me twice with prosecution. They were not happy that somebody was actually writing a book on the most secret agency in the country, but luckily you need evidence that somebody committed a crime, and since I didn't commit a crime—I never worked for NSA, I just was a writer—there really wasn't anything they could do about it. When the sequel came out, *Body of Secrets*, back in May of 2001, the attitude had changed. My writing style hadn't changed; it's just the same as it always had been, but the attitude at NSA had changed, and instead of trying to put me in jail they actually had a book signing for me at NSA, and I got invited to parties and so forth.

That all changed on December 16, 2005, when I read *The New York Times* article indicating that NSA had engaged in warrantless eavesdropping for a number of years, and all during that time when I was being interviewed or whatever I would say, "NSA is obeying the law, they learned their lesson from the mid-'70s about illegal eavesdropping and so forth," and they hadn't. So I joined the ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union] lawsuit against NSA trying to force them to comply with the law, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which says you've got to get a warrant from a foreign intelligence surveillance court before you can start eavesdropping. So then again I fell off the A-list at NSA, and I'm back being NSA's naughty boy again by writing bad things about them.

So that's what this latest book is. It's a book that looks at NSA from 9/11 to the eavesdropping on America. In doing this book, it was sort of like the first book, in a sense, where I was exploring brand new territory. It was like being on a lost continent, because with regard to 9/11, the 9/11 Commission never bothered to

look into NSA. It was rather extraordinary to me that you have the largest intelligence agency in the country, actually in the world, yet the Commission charged with looking into what happened at 9/11 actually never looked into it. Phil Shenon, who writes for *The New York Times*, did a book called *The Commission*, and in the book he actually interviewed people about that, and they said that the commissioners and the staff were just kind of—they don't want to drive the 20 miles up to NSA to actually go through their documents, and they thought it was mostly geeks anyway, and they really wanted to just do CIA, so they only concentrated on CIA. Then finally somebody in the Commission brought all the papers down to about two blocks from the Commission headquarters, file cabinets full of documents, so it would be much easier for them to look at, and they still never looked at them. So you go through the entire 9/11 Commission Report and find very little information in there about NSA's role, so that was one of the things I focused on in my new book.

It was not only overlooked by the Commission, it was pretty much overlooked by the press. The press never really looked into NSA's role during 9/11, so I was very surprised at a lot of the things I learned, and that makes up the first section of the book. I'll just briefly go over some of those areas.

What I did in doing this book was I focused on two of the hijackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi; they were the first two [Osama] bin Laden picked to be part of the 9/11 attack, and they were chosen very early on. NSA picked up the very first clue to 9/11, and that was in December of 1999 when NSA intercepted a phone call from Afghanistan, bin Laden's telephone—and if you want bin Laden's phone number it's in my book. You can try giving him a call. I don't think he'll answer at this point, but I've got his phone number in there if you want.

NSA had his phone number, and what bin Laden did was he set up a command center in Yemen. He couldn't do much out of Afghanistan, so he set up a command center in Yemen, and I actually went to this place, this house in Yemen, and that's where he did all his communications in and out of this house in Sana'a, the capital of Yemen. Well, in December of 1999 NSA had been listening to that house for several years, and in December of 1999 they picked up this phone call from Afghanistan to the house in Yemen, and it directed these two people, Khalid and Nawaf, to go to Kuala Lumpur, and that was the very first step in the 9/11 attack. And NSA passed that information on to the CIA, the CIA set up surveillance in Kuala Lumpur, and then they managed

to lose these two people when they flew to Bangkok, and from Bangkok they flew to the U.S. The story about how the CIA missed their visa has been told a lot of times, I won't go into that, but they got into the United States and they moved to San Diego.

Now, while they're in San Diego, they're communicating back and forth to the house in Yemen, and NSA is listening to those conversations. They communicated quite frequently, not only for operational reasons but also because Khalid al-Mihdhar, his wife lived there and she was about to have a baby, and he kept calling back and forth to find out how the pregnancy's going and so forth. So NSA's eavesdropping on these conversations, but they're not passing anything on to anybody else.

The CIA knows that the NSA's eavesdropping on that house, and they were asking for transcripts of those conversations, and the NSA was refusing to give the CIA the transcripts; they'd just give them a little summary every now and then. And it got so bad that the head of the bin Laden unit, Alex Station at CIA, they actually decided that they'd build their own listening post in the Indian Ocean area to try to pick up the conversations going in and out of this house, because NSA wouldn't give them the transcripts. So they built it, and they were eavesdropping on it, but they were only getting one half of the conversations. So they went to NSA and they said, "Could we get the other half?" and NSA wouldn't give

them the other half of the conversations. It sounds absurd but this is all true.

So NSA is listening to them as they're in San Diego, and then they're moving across the country, and they're eventually moving towards Washington. A month before the attack they actually settle in a little town in Maryland called Laurel, Maryland, and that's where they set up their final operational center. There's another organization that's in Laurel, Maryland, that's called the National

Security Agency. So eventually they moved to the Valencia Motel, which was almost across the street from NSA—it's about two miles away—I've been up in the Director's office a number of times on the eighth floor, and you can almost see the hotel from his office, so you have this very odd situation where the NSA

The CIA knows that the NSA's eavesdropping on that house, and they were asking for transcripts of those conversations, and the NSA was refusing to give the CIA the transcripts...

and the terrorists were in the same town, they were going to the same gyms, Gold's Gym, they were shopping at Safeway. On one of the Saturdays there when they were having a summit conference—Mohammed Atta and everybody flew in for this summit conference; they actually took up three hotels there.

They've had a very bad record; they missed the first 9/11 attack, they missed the attack on the USS Cole, they missed the attacks on the East Africa embassies, and so forth.

This was at a time NSA knew that these people were in the United States but didn't know where they were, and so you have this very odd situation.

They're having their final summit conference in Laurel, and they're going to the Safeway to buy all this food for a big party that they're going to have, and it's the same time—on a Saturday—when NSA people were in there shopping, and they go into Safeway and they're

actually sending money back to Dubai and so forth, back to bin Laden's money people at the same time people from NSA are in there shopping. So it's this very surreal situation. You've got NSA there eavesdropping on all these communications, trying to find the terrorists—or actually they had been listening to them—and here they are across the street, basically, making final preparations. And then on the day before 9/11 they left the Valencia Motel and went down and stayed one night in a hotel near Dulles, and then the next day was when the attack took place.

So NSA and General [Michael] Hayden, who was head of NSA, was obviously very chagrined. One of the reasons for this was because General Hayden was very concerned during the period leading up to 9/11 over NSA's position in the United States as being a major eavesdropper. He knew what had happened 30 years earlier, 25 years earlier, in the mid-'70s when the Church Committee looked into NSA and found all this domestic eavesdropping on Americans and it was the biggest scandal in America's history. He didn't want to come anywhere near that. He didn't want to end up sitting in front of a committee being harassed and badgered and made to look like a fool for eavesdropping on Americans, so Hayden basically turned off the NSA's eavesdropping capability in the United States.

I actually interviewed him at one point, as the hijackers were here—of course, I had no idea they were in the U.S. I didn't know anything about it, obviously, but I interviewed him at one of these same points and I asked him, "How

many people are you eavesdropping on in the United States?” and he said less than half a dozen, so a very small number.

Now, obviously, I'm not in favor of eavesdropping randomly on Americans, but I am all in favor of eavesdropping on terrorists in America, in the U.S., and there was a mechanism set up for NSA to eavesdrop on the United States. These are two people, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, who had been sent from bin Laden's operation center. One of them lived there in the operation center. You don't really need much more evidence that there's a connection between bin Laden than that, and Hayden could have easily gone to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which is the mechanism that was set up, and said, "There's two people here I want to get a warrant to eavesdrop on, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi." He should have also said to the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], "There are two people that you ought to know about, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. They're in the U.S." And NSA might say, "Well, we didn't know they were in the U.S.," but they're eavesdropping on their communications, and I know if I pick up my iPhone and I turn it on I'll find out the phone number of who's calling. I just cannot imagine that at \$8 billion NSA can't tell where a phone call's coming from, especially a phone call as important as two people being sent by bin Laden's operations center.

So General Hayden was very reluctant to get involved in any sense in the United States, but at least he should have told the FBI that they were there. Then the FBI could have gotten a FISA [Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act] warrant and eavesdropped on their domestic operations, which they do all the time in terrorist cases. If they had done that, they would have easily picked up both the communications going to Yemen, and the communications going to Mohammed Atta. Nawaf al-Hazmi was a deputy and Mohammed Atta was a chief, and by getting those two communications they would have been able to pretty much unravel the whole plot. But that never happened, NSA never told the FBI, so you have the end result being what it is. And then 9/11 happened. General Hayden must have been tremendously chagrined when he read in the newspaper or gets an intelligence report. Most of what NSA finds out about terrorist incidents apparently comes from the newspaper or CNN. They've had a very bad record; they missed the first 9/11 attack, they missed the attack on the *USS Cole*, they missed the attacks on the East Africa embassies, and so forth. All those they didn't get from signals intelligence, they got from CNN. So when it was revealed that two of the hijackers were Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, two of

the people that they had been listening to for several years, yeah, it must have come as a big shock.

So after 9/11, NSA and General Hayden went to the opposite extreme. At the urging of Vice President [Richard] Cheney, they decided to bypass the one safeguard that the U.S. public has from NSA, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. It's the one buffer between the Agency that does the eavesdropping and the people who are potentially subject to the eavesdropping: the American public. So they bypassed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and that's against the law. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act says if you want to eavesdrop on an American in the United States, you get a warrant. That was passed after the Richard Nixon scandals, and it was passed because of the Richard Nixon scandals and because of NSA's own scandals, and it was passed not just by liberals or Democrats, it was passed by liberals, conservatives, Republicans, and Democrats.

They wanted this mechanism in there because true Republicans or true conservatives don't like the government eavesdropping on them any more than liberals do. So it was passed in 1978, and there were teeth put into that law. It said, "If you bypass this law, you go to jail." Instantly you go to jail for five years, that's the penalty and you pay a big fine. It only applies to two or three people: it applies to the President, the Vice President, the Director of NSA, and I guess the Secretary of Defense. Those are the only four people, really, that can order NSA to eavesdrop without going through the court. So they put teeth into that, saying, "You do that, you go to jail for five years," but regardless of that NSA bypassed the law.

The administration didn't even trust NSA with the legal rationale for doing this. The lawyers at NSA asked, "Well, what is the legal rationale for this?" And the Justice Department, under John Ashcroft, at the orders of Dick Cheney's office, refused to tell NSA what the legal justification was. Even the general counsel couldn't be told what it was, but still NSA went ahead and did the eavesdropping. So that's how we get into the warrantless eavesdropping.

The activity was so illegal that when it was discovered internally by the Deputy Attorney General, Jim Comey, he made a big fuss out of it. He went to Attorney General Ashcroft and said, "Look, we can't be doing this. I'm not going to recommend that you sign this agreement anymore to do the warrantless eavesdropping." Under this warrantless eavesdropping procedure, every 90 days or so the Attorney General had to sign off on it, and Jim Comey, the Deputy Attorney

General, the number two person, said to Ashcroft, “I’m recommending that you not sign this because I don’t think it’s legal,” and Ashcroft agreed. That’s how this whole scene that I’m sure a lot of you have read about came about. When Ashcroft was about to tell the White House, “I’m not going to sign this anymore,” he had a pancreatic attack, and he was taken to the hospital, and he

Congress had to decide what to do, whether they go along with the administration or reject it. They came up with some compromises on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and they did some modifications to it.

was in there at the time when the 90 days expired that he had to sign the form again. Now, the White House is saying, “We need this signature,” and Jim Comey, the Deputy Attorney General, who’s now the Acting Attorney General, is saying, “Well, that’s too bad, I’m not going to sign it.” So the White House goes over to George Washington University Hospital, and goes to Ashcroft’s bed the day after he’s had this huge operation and he was in serious condition, and this is like out of the

movies—but Comey found out that the White House was going to go over there, Andrew Card and [Alberto] Gonzales, I guess, were going to go over there. So he tells the driver to turn the lights on and the sirens, and he races over to the hospital to try to beat the White House people to Ashcroft’s hospital room, and he calls the FBI Director, telling him to get FBI agents over there in case he has to force his way in. I mean, you couldn’t write this up! Nobody believed this in my publishing company!

So Comey gets over there first and tells him what’s happening, and then the White House people come in, and Card says, “We’d like you to sign this form authorizing the warrantless eavesdropping,” and Comey is standing by Ashcroft, and Ashcroft lifts his head up a little bit and says “Not only am I not going to sign it, I’m not the Attorney General right now; Jim Comey is,” and then the White House people just turned around and walked out. And that afternoon or that night, the next day, not only Comey but Ashcroft and the Director of the FBI, Bob Mueller, and probably a dozen other people at Justice, all agreed that they were going to resign within a day. I mean, that’s how illegal this program was, because the President wouldn’t change it. And then finally, about a day before they were going to resign, [George W.] Bush talked to Comey and he talked to Mueller and they agreed to modify the program somewhat. It’s still illegal, but they took some of the worst parts out of it. And he avoided,

a Saturday night massacre, which would've been far worse than what Richard Nixon went through on Saturday night. So that's how you had this warrantless eavesdropping.

Now, Congress had to decide what to do, whether they go along with the administration or reject it. They came up with some compromises on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and they did some modifications to it. The House resisted this for a while; the temporary measure expired last February, and the House refused to renew it from February until July, but then with the elections coming—it's the old fear-mongering they were afraid of being accused of being weak on terrorism, and so they all signed it. And so now it's this sort of gobbledy-gook FISA act that nobody can really understand, but that's the way they sort of neutered the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in this to some degree. So it's better than it was under warrantless eavesdropping, but it's not as good as it was under the FISA.

Now, I think that they should have changed—there was a need to change this. I've been doing this for a long time, and I do know that they did need to change the FISA act, because technology has changed a great deal from 1978 to today, and there's no time to get into it here, but I get into it extensively in the book, and it's very interesting how NSA shifted from trying to eavesdrop on communications in a traditional way, by satellite, to having to shift to the modern way, which is trying to pick up the information as it's going through fiber-optic

...it's very interesting how NSA shifted from trying to eavesdrop on communications in a traditional way, by satellite, to having to shift to the modern way, which is trying to pick up the information as it's going through fiber-optic cables.

cables. It's an extremely interesting story about how NSA had to make this shift, and I'll briefly just explain how it was from the '60s, '70s, 80s, and through the mid-'90s. The way NSA would eavesdrop on communications was with, largely, big dishes. They had several ways, and some were high-frequency communications. They used these giant quarter-mile wide antennas called elephant cages, and then for satellite communications they used these big dishes.

To get all the communications into the eastern half of the United States they have a dish not too far from here in Sugar Grove, West Virginia, hidden in a valley—you can't see it from the road—and then to get the western half of the United States they have a dish in Yakima, Washington, on the Yakima Firing

Range. So they could pick it all up—you don't need any permission from the telecom companies. They don't know it, and there's no reason to tell them, because the signals have a huge footprint that cover a very large area. All that shifted in the mid to late '90s because of the Internet. The Internet became so pervasive that they needed far greater bandwidth, the telecom companies, and the problem with a satellite signal is it goes up 22,300 miles and down 22,300 miles. It causes a small delay in the signal, and so forth. So the bottom result is that all these telecom companies began shifting to undersea cables, fiber optic cables.

Now the NSA was cut out; there were only two ways to get those communications. One is to put a submarine down and tap into the cable, which from what I've heard NSA hasn't. They were able to do it when it was copper cable, but not fiber optic. They haven't really been successful, even though they have a submarine, the USS *Jimmy Carter*, designed to do that. So the only other way to do that is by making secret agreements with the telecom companies, and that's what they did; they made these secret agreements. So with AT&T, for example, they made a secret agreement where they would start building these secret rooms inside AT&T's massive switches, these ten-story buildings that pretty much control a lot of the communications in various parts of the country, and what they do now is they have these cables that come in containing all the communications, domestic as well as international. So the cables come in, and then they were split. There was a thing called a splitter cabinet that has sort of like a prism in it, and it splits the photons from a fiber optic cable, so half of them go, or a mirror image of them goes the normal way to Joe and Sally in Kansas City on the normal path, and then an identical copy, another mirror copy of it goes one floor below to the NSA's secret room, and there it goes through this equipment that's used to sift through it for names, phone numbers, e-mail addresses, whatever, and then it goes on to NSA.

So that's how it works right now. Just two last points and then I'll take questions. Most of the eavesdropping being done now is done in the United States. It's not done overseas. They've consolidated it all, so if you're eavesdropping on the Middle East and North Africa, all that is done from this windowless building in Northern Georgia, just below the South Carolina border. They eavesdrop on all of South America from San Antonio, Texas, and they eavesdrop on Asia-Pacific from Hawaii. I interviewed two of the eavesdroppers, two of the Intercept Operators, they're called Voice Interceptors, at the very

secret facility in Georgia, and they told me about the warrantless eavesdropping, how they were doing it, and they explained how all the rules were thrown out the window after 9/11, and among the calls that they were listening to were Americans talking to Americans: soldiers, journalists, aid workers throughout the Middle East, talking to their families or spouses, and the conversations dealt with personal finance, they dealt with bedroom talk, sexual chatter, all kinds of information, and these people asked, “What are we doing listening to this? We should be trying to find al-Qaeda, or whatever?” And they were told to keep listening, and they transcribed them, and information’s recorded and was never erased. All that should not only not be recorded, but if it was, it should have been erased before the warrantless eavesdropping procedure came.

So we’re not just talking about Americans talking to al-Qaeda. None of the people I talked to ever heard of an American talking to al-Qaeda. They’re all Americans talking to their spouses, journalists talking to their editors and so forth, and it’s very hard to get people from NSA to talk because of all the restrictions and the legal problems, but two of the people that I did talk to—I talked to a lot more—did agree to come forward and become whistle-blowers and talk about what they did eavesdrop on and how it wasn’t what the public was told. And so I have a lot of admiration for their courage. As soon as they came forward, the Senate Intelligence Committee and House Intelligence Committee decided to hold an investigation. Even the White House said there should be an investigation.

So those are the things that you have to worry about. First, NSA is the most secret agency; you can’t always believe what’s being told to you about what they’re doing, and it’s not just somebody who’s Muslim or talking to somebody in the Middle East about terrorism or whatever, it could be anybody that’s being eavesdropped on. When you deregulate the banking industry you have a lot of chaos. When you deregulate eavesdropping, this is what happens. You throw out the rule book and you begin listening to Americans, including Muslims and including just average people, without any warrant, and those are the problems you get into. So the only way this is ever going to change—certainly not by Congress, they just wimp out whenever there’s an issue like this—it must come from the American people. If there’s outrage, they’ll change things. If there’s no outrage, forget it, you’re not going to get any change. So with that enlightening and that very positive note there, I’ll take questions on anything anybody wants to ask.

George H. Gilliam. Mr. Bamford, let me start the conversation by asking about a problem that the Justice Department confronts at this time. As I understand it, they've never publicly acknowledged that they've used these illegal intercepts in any pending criminal or civil action, and there is, however, a pending prosecution for Ali al-Tamimi, who apparently is a very bad guy, and in connection with the defense of that case, the Federal Court has ordered the Justice Department to turn over any information about illegal intercepts. Do we have any notion as to how the Justice Department will handle that? Will they wait for the [Barack] Obama administration to come in and perhaps handle it in a different way than the Bush administration will do it? What do you know about how they're going to respond to that, and what will that do to this program?

James Bamford. Yeah, that's a very good question. Intercepts from FISA communications, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act communications, have been used in court in the past, not a lot, but they have been used in court on occasion, so that wouldn't be totally unprecedented to use information obtained under a FISA warrant in court. However, in this case you're talking about using it at a time when the government was doing warrantless eavesdropping, which makes it far more complicated. There are really two alternatives: the judge can allow that in, and the government can say, "OK, we'll do it," or the government will say, "We're not going to do it," and then they'll drop the prosecution. That's also happened a number of times. That happened in the '60s when a number of national security cases came up and you can use the term "graymail." The attorney said, "We threaten to ask for this information, which will be embarrassing, and you're going to have to reveal information in order to prosecute the case," and the government decided to drop it instead. So it's hard to say. I think they should wait until the new administration comes in. These cases take a very long time, and it should be decided with a new team in place rather than the old team, but yeah, very good question, thanks.

George H. Gilliam. Do you have any indications whether anything that Eric Holder has done in the past gives any insight as to how this issue might be addressed?

James Bamford. I haven't had any time to really look into his background in terms of FISA. I'm not sure. What worries me about the Obama administration is his constant desire to compromise on principles. When the original FISA legislation came up, which offered immunity to the telecom companies for

being conspirators in an illegal act, violation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Obama said that he would filibuster against granting immunity. Well, when push came to shove he compromised and said—he didn't compromise, he completely capitulated—he signed the legislation agreeing to it. So I'm not an optimist. I've always been a pessimist on most everything, so I don't really expect a lot of changes in the new administration. I haven't seen a lot of changes so far, and I don't expect many changes to come.

Question. Do you think that there will be any investigation into Bush administration officials who participated in the program, or do you think that will be seen as simply creating more polarization that President Obama is trying to do away with?

James Bamford. Yes, I mean, if you shoplift something from a 7-11 down here you're guaranteed to be prosecuted, but if you work for the White House and you violate a law that calls for five years in prison, you're guaranteed not to be prosecuted. That's the way things work in the U.S., and they should be—I mean, people who commit crimes should be prosecuted. They shouldn't be granted immunity, as the Nixon administration did and as the Bush administration did. They granted immunity to these lawbreakers because they held a senior position. When I went to law school I didn't see anything in the law books about granting immunity because of a person's job or where they work in an administration. I think they should be prosecuted like anybody else, and I think there should be sort of a truth in reconciliation hearing, or at least a Church-type committee.

Frank Church, Senator, Head of the Intelligence Committee in the mid-'70s, held this big year-long investigation of the intelligence community. I think that's what's really needed. There's been so much that's been going on under this blanket of secrecy. You need somebody to finally throw that blanket off and see what's been going on and prosecute people who did things that were illegal. I think that's the only way you're going to prevent people in the future from doing these kinds of things. But I think the question was do I think it's going to happen, and the short answer is no.

Question. How have you been discouraged from writing this book? And to what extent is our personal data being archived?

James Bamford. Yeah, good questions. Except for the first time when they threatened me twice with prosecution, I've never felt any pressure. Nobody's

put a gun to my head, you know, these images—I've never had anything bad happen to me, so no. And again, I'm just a writer; they have gone after other people, but I've been sort of immune to all that. So I haven't gotten any pressure from anybody. I just write my stuff and they could like it or not like it.

As to the second question, I didn't have time to really get into this, but the problem with that is that, as I mentioned, when these people are listening to these U.S. conversations, American-to-American conversations, those as well as everything else, it's tape recorded, or it goes into a database, and NSA's gathering so much data these days that they've had to build this enormous new data facility in Texas. It's almost the size of the Alamo Dome. And when you figure how much data you could put on a little thumb drive or a flash drive—2 gigabytes—you can imagine how much information they're going to be able to store in there. There's very little restrictions on what NSA stores. They didn't put any of that in the FISA bill, how long they keep it, how much they store. So those conversations I was just mentioning, personal phone calls involving sex and everything else, they're in some data warehouse someplace. They were never erased. And there's an enormous amount of communications.

I've got one little thing I could read here that I think tells the amount of information. It gets into the things like 15 exabytes, which you can't even imagine how many zeroes there are after a one for an exabyte of information. So it's a huge amount of information. In the book, I go into all the exabytes and yottabytes and zettabytes of information, and they've actually run out of prefixes for bytes. I think they've gotten up to zettabyte, and nobody's invented one after that, so it's a lot of information.

Question. You mentioned that the government had identified a couple of people as terrorists or probable terrorists before 9/11. Why did the NSA not go to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Board and request authority to tap their communications?

James Bamford. Well, that was my question! I mean, that's a question I pose in the book: why not? I mean, the FISA court is the easiest court I think in the history of the world in terms of getting a warrant. In 30 years, they've issued almost 20,000, or actually more than 20,000 warrants. In that same time they've only denied I believe three. If you're denied, that's not the last step, though. If you're one of those three out of 20,000 that get denied you can go

to the next level, which is the Foreign Intelligence Court of Review, which is sort of the Maytag repairman of the judiciary. In 30 years they've only had one case, and they decided that case in favor of the government. But if you lose at the lower court, the FISA Court, and the Foreign Intelligence Court of Review, you still have a third bite at the apple. You can go to an immediate in-camera session of the Supreme Court and have them decide, and with the way the Court is now, you're almost guaranteed to get the warrant.

So that's the question: why not? Why not go to the FISA Court if it's so easy to do? And I think the only answer is a one-word answer: it's called arrogance. The Bush administration has turned arrogance into a principle, and rather than just do it the normal way, the legal way, the way it would have been very easy to do, they decided to do it the secret way. They bypassed the court, and they only told the Chief Justice that they were bypassing the court, that they were going to have this procedure bypassing the court, and they made the Chief Justice say he wasn't going to tell any other members of the court. I mean, you're really into the realm of absurdity when you get into this whole area, and what you need is a Director of NSA, not like General Hayden, who caves in the moment—he caved in before 9/11 by being afraid to do what he should have done, which is go to the FISA Court, and he caved in after 9/11 by acceding to these warrantless eavesdropping procedures. So that's sort of a key question.

I'm also doing a PBS NOVA program on this whole issue, which puts a lot of what I've been talking about here in the form of images, so you actually can see this house in Yemen. We actually went there and shot it, and we get into this whole issue of why the administration did not, or why the NSA didn't go to the FISA Court and simply ask for a warrant to eavesdrop on Mihdhar on Hazmi, or tell the FBI, which could have done the same thing. So I'd love to get an answer to that; the only way you're going to get an answer is if somebody from NSA is called before a committee and asked the question, and as I said, the 9/11 Commission never did that. So I'm hopeful in the future.

Question. You have presented a fascinating case of government intrusion into the privacy of the people, and you seem to be very determined to fight it—you've been doing it for a long time. Would you consider a similar crusade to protect the privacy of the people against intrusion by commercial establishments, by companies, corporations? I keep getting these four-page legalese statements of privacy policies from banks and other companies, which I believe 99% of the

people never read, and if they do read it they find a phone number buried in there that they have to call or a letter to write. The protection that exists now, is totally inadequate.

James Bamford. Oh, I agree. I've got a whole chapter in the book on that.

Yeah, as limited as I could get into half an hour of talking here, but in the book I do get into that extensively, and it really is, it's far worse than you even imagine! You know, when I'm talking about AT&T, for example, it's private companies that are building the hardware and the software and putting that in there. Two of the main companies were formed by Israelis in Israel, and you've got to wonder—these were companies hardly anybody's ever heard of. One of those companies, Varint, which does it for Verizon, the head of Varint is now a fugitive wanted by the U.S. government in Africa. He's hiding out in Africa. Two other senior executives are wanted for fraud and theft. Two other executives from the company pled guilty. These are the companies through which all this personal data passes. They're private companies nobody's ever heard of, private companies that have virtually no accountability to the U.S. government.

And in addition to that, you've got enormous outsourcing now. NSA never used to outsource eavesdropping, but now they've got all these companies, Booz Allen and so forth, that are doing a lot of the eavesdropping for NSA, a lot of the analysis. They even put ads in papers wanting signals intelligence people to come work for the company, and so it's almost—I don't think anybody really has a good idea of how extensive the outsourcing of eavesdropping has become in the U.S., and I think it's a very dangerous situation. Congress has no knowledge. I've talked to people up there and they're always just astonished when these things come up, because intelligence committees and Congress started out actually as a protection for the U.S. public. That was the whole idea going out of the Church Committees as this sort of oversight to protect the American public, and in the last decade or so, or maybe even longer, they've become the opposite. They've become cheering galleries for the intelligence community. They want more money for them to do more things.

One perfect example is one of the whistleblowers I interviewed. She didn't think what she was doing was right. She told her boss at Fort Gordon, where the NSA facility is, and he didn't do anything. Then she sent a letter to Senator [Patrick] Leahy, who was a Chairman of the Judiciary Committee and on the Intelligence Committee, explaining what happened. For a year and a half she

heard nothing back, not a single thing, until my book came out, and exposed this, and then all of a sudden she's getting calls every other day now from Leahy's office. But apparently what happened was she sent the letter to Leahy's office. Leahy sent it to the Defense Department. The Defense Department sent it to NSA. NSA supposedly conducted an internal review and said there was nothing wrong during this entire period. Nobody bothered to contact the person who wrote the letter! I mean, can you imagine an investigation where you don't even ask a question of the person who writes the letter? This is the kind of investigation that goes on in the Bush administration.

Question. What seems decisive would be the level of analysis, and how does that work? What are the structures? Do the computers play a great role? And have there been breaches of security, because there was too much confidence in computers? And where do human minds come into play?

James Bamford. Yeah, these are all really interesting questions. I get into these in the book. They're very complex to summarize in a few minutes here, but there's a popular misconception about NSA to some degree, in terms of their capabilities, brought on by movies like *Enemy of the State* and so forth. There's a lot of capability for data mining, but that's only for data, it's not for voice. The people that are doing the listening to phone conversations are doing it the old-fashioned way: they've got earphones on and they've got a little computer in front of them, and they have a queue of phone numbers, and it's been described to be similar to iTunes, where you just click on a song; but instead of clicking on a song you just click on a phone number, and you're listening to the person and you're transcribing it, making a summary or whatever. So NSA hasn't gotten to the capability yet of having effective voice analysis, at least not especially, of some of the languages that they're using. So that's a problem.

People that I interviewed at the NSA listening post for the Middle East said that during that entire period—and the people I interviewed were there from 2001-2007—they said they had nobody there, zero, absolutely nobody there that spoke Pashtun, which is a problem, because we were going to war with a country where that is their principal language, and we had nobody at NSA that spoke it. They tried to bring somebody in that was a Pashtun. They brought a woman in to teach it, but the woman was Afghani and she didn't have clearance, and they couldn't tell her why they were telling these people this, and they were teaching to Arabic linguists, where there's very little con-

nection between Pashtun and Arabic; it would have been better for Farsi linguists, but they did it for Arabic linguists. And she was teaching conversational, “Where is the bathroom?” kind of thing, when they should be learning, “Where is the bomb?” But they couldn’t tell the woman that these are intercept operators you’re teaching. So it’s a real mess.

Another brief comment on the NSA. NSA was never designed for this. It shouldn’t be doing this. It’s a waste of time, it’s a waste of money to have NSA looking for terrorists. It was designed to focus on major countries to prevent nuclear attacks from the Soviet Union, and you just don’t overnight switch this to tracking down guys running from country to country using anonymous calling cards. Getting into terrorism is a whole different topic, but we make so much out of something like terrorism, where we spend all this time and money and wars and all that stuff, when most of it is a waste of time when you’re taking an agency like NSA and trying to turn it into something it’s not supposed to be, wasn’t designed to do in the first place.

Question. Thinking back to the time of the incident of the attack of the *USS Cole* in Yemen, there was an FBI officer who took about 200 members of the FBI down to the area to investigate this, and he was thrown out essentially by our own ambassador at that time during the Clinton administration. I wonder if you could comment on how often this occurred not just in the current administration but in past administrations.

James Bamford. Well, yeah, it’s a difficult situation, you know, when you’re going to a foreign country and you try to conduct an investigation. I mean, in that situation the FBI are not the best diplomats. When you go into countries there are certain things and procedures that you have to observe. You had a clash of cultures there, an enormous clash of cultures. I think the CIA is far more adept at dealing in foreign cultures than the FBI is, but you’re taking paneloads of FBI agents and sending them into Yemen. It’s a difficult situation.

I don’t know where the blame is on that, and this is slightly out of my area, since that’s the FBI as opposed to the NSA, but I don’t put all the blame on the ambassador, and I can see John O’Neil’s dilemma. I mean, they want to find out why this happened, but I think it was sort of a bull in a china shop situation, and you’re dealing with Yemen—it’s not like going into Arizona with the FBI and asking cooperation from the local police department, so you’ve got to be a bit more subtle and a bit more accommodating than I think they were, but that is a really good point.

I think the point is that you can do that effectively if you really try, and that really is how we should be doing terrorism: with the FBI, not with the NSA, and not with the Marines. They weren't designed for these kinds of things; the FBI was, and the FBI has a very good reputation for catching terrorists. They caught the people responsible, or at least they identified the people responsible for the *USS Cole* bombing, and they had some of them put in jail. You could argue that the Yemenis let a few of them out and captured and put them back in and they got out again and put them back in, but they also captured the people responsible for the East Africa bombings, and they caught the people responsible for the first World Trade Center bombings. It took a long time, took maybe a year or so, but they did it and they did it effectively.

I've got a lot of admiration for the FBI, and of all the agencies, they came out actually looking the best in 9/11. And so I think that that's the way to go about it. I think if they had used a little bit more tact they would have gotten more from the Yemeni government, but they did get over there and they were able to interview some people and look through records, and it came out a lot better than declaring war on Yemen or something, which is probably what the Bush administration would have done if it had happened under the Bush administration. When in doubt, declare war! So I think it worked out in the end, and like I said, I have a lot of admiration for the way the FBI handled the situation, and not the way the NSA and the CIA did.

SUICIDE TERRORISM

Assaf Moghadam

Cristina Lopez-Gottardi Chao. Since before 9/11 U.S. intelligence agencies have attempted to understand the actors and motivations that fuel suicide terrorism. Today's guest is a leading expert on this subject. Assaf Moghadam, who earned his bachelor's degree in political science from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a Masters and PhD in international affairs from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, is now an Assistant Professor and a Senior Associate at the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

Professor Moghadam is also a research fellow with the Belfer Center's International Security Program at Harvard University and he's the author of *The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al-Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks*, published in December 2008 by Johns Hopkins University Press. He's also the author of *The Roots of Terrorism*. His articles and book reviews have been published in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *The Boston Globe*, and the *International Herald Tribune*. Today he will discuss the proliferation of suicide terrorism around the world. Please welcome Assaf Moghadam.

Assaf Moghadam. Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to be here. What I want to do today is to talk a little about my book, and specifically make four main points. First, I would like to discuss suicide terrorism and put it in historical context, looking briefly at what history tells us about suicide attacks. Second, I want to talk about the unprecedented proliferation of suicide attacks of the last decade and what that means. Third, I want to discuss what I believe are the causes for this unprecedented proliferation of suicide attacks in the last decade. And finally I'm going to talk about the implications of this proliferation for the United States and for its allies.



MILLER CENTER
of PUBLIC AFFAIRS
UNIVERSITY *of* VIRGINIA



Let me begin by talking about the definition of suicide attacks. Terrorism scholars usually distinguish between two different definitions of suicide terrorism—a narrow and a broader definition. The narrow definition describes a situation in which, for example, a terrorist has strapped a bomb belt around his waist or is carrying a bomb-laden backpack and detonates himself. If you think about the 9/11 attackers, they would also fall into the narrow definition because in that case the death of the perpetrators was the pre-condition for the success of the attack, and that’s really the narrow definition of suicide attacks.

Then there’s the broader definition of suicide attacks, which is exemplified in the recent Mumbai attacks. In those attacks, the perpetrators went out on a shooting spree but didn’t seem to want to survive that act. Eventually most of them died. However, because we can’t really get into the heads of these people, we don’t really know if maybe they did harbor a small hope to survive. That’s why most terrorism scholars don’t usually count those types of attacks as suicide attacks, because it’s hard to gather data on whether the perpetrators wanted to survive or not. It’s really hard for us to know for sure. For that reason, in a data set that I have compiled of almost 2,000 suicide attacks that occurred from 1981 to 2008, I use the narrow definition of suicide attacks.

Let me briefly discuss the historical context of suicide terrorism, and here I want to start with the biblical Samson, because he is one of the most widely known individuals who could be seen as among the first suicide attackers. When Samson was captured by the Philistines in the Temple of Dagon, he asked God to take his revenge, according to the Book of Judges: “Let me die with the Philistines.” That statement of Samson, “Let me die with the Philistines,” captures the essential characteristics of a suicide attack, namely a person’s willingness to kill and the willingness to die, and it’s the combination of the two which makes a suicide attack what it is.

Apart from the biblical Samson, there are, of course, other historical examples of suicide attacks. Between the 11th and 13th century, a Muslim Shiite sect known as the Assassins went on a rampage to kill Sunni rulers in large parts of the Middle East because they wanted to spread their own Shiite version of Islam. They used daggers and they stepped up so close when assassinating their opponents that they did not signal any desire to want to escape the act alive. For that reason, we oftentimes think of these medieval Assassins, or Hashishiyyun as they were called in Arabic, as precursors to the modern suicide bombers.

Suicide attacks were also used by Muslim communities in various parts of south Asia after 1500. In parts of India, Indonesia, and the Philippines, suicide attacks were used to fight foreign occupation and forced conversions by the Portuguese and the Spaniards. More recently, in the late 19th century and the early 20th century, suicide attacks were also employed by Anarchists in Russia; the group Narodnaya Volya, or the People's Will, conducted several suicide attacks. Perhaps the most well-known of these—although we don't usually think about it as a suicide attack—was the killing of Tzar Alexander II in 1882. The Narodnaya Volya had attempted to assassinate the czar eight different times, but failed every single time. The reason that they were successful the ninth time around was that one of the attackers carried dynamite on his body and went in such close proximity to the czar that he ensured not only the czar's but also his own death in the process.

What is of course a very famous and important instance of suicide attacks is the Japanese use of the kamikaze. From October 1944 until August 1945 there were about 3,000 suicide sorties by kamikaze pilots. What is less known is that during World War II the Soviet Air Force, as well as the Nazi Luftwaffe, were also ordered to engage in some suicide attacks. Both [Adolf] Hitler and [Joseph] Stalin instructed their air forces to ram enemy jets in times of trouble. In addition, another not so well-known case is that of Eddie Chapman; he was a British double agent with the code name "Zigzag." Eddie Chapman went to the British and volunteered to kill Adolf Hitler using a suicide attack. The British shrugged him off, however, because as a double agent for some reason he had very little credibility.

These historical instances of suicide terrorism from biblical times until the Islamic Revolution provide us with several important insights. First of all, that suicide attacks have not been used exclusively by religious groups, and thus cannot be explained exclusively by religion. As a matter of fact they have been used for both religious and secular reasons. In addition, today we oftentimes think of terrorist groups when hearing about suicide attacks, but history shows us that this tactic has also been employed by state actors, not exclusively by sub-state actors. As a result, it's not entirely accurate to speak about suicide terrorism, but this tactic should really be labeled suicide attacks or suicide missions, which are much more generic terms.

The history of suicide attacks underwent a fundamental change in 1979, when suicide attacks became suicide terrorism, if you will. The modern phenomenon

of suicide attacks began with the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and especially with the revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, who systemically justified the use of violence in the name of God. Martyrdom was extolled by the Ayatollah Khomeini as the highest possible service to God, and this was

The modern phenomenon of suicide attacks began with the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and especially with the revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, who systemically justified the use of violence in the name of God. Martyrdom was extolled by the Ayatollah Khomeini as the highest possible service to God, and this was manifested most extremely in the early years of the war between Iran and Iraq...

manifested most extremely in the early years of the war between Iran and Iraq, when waves of youngsters detonated themselves as part of the so-called human waves attacks, in which 10,000-20,000 youngsters at a time exploded themselves above minefields in the war against Iraq.

From Iran, the notion of martyrdom in the name of God, and with it the tactic of suicide terrorism, then spread to Lebanon. The 1983 suicide attacks in Lebanon by Hezbollah, first in April against the U.S. Embassy in Beirut and then in October against the U.S. Marine and the French Army barracks, were among the most well-known suicide attacks, which also left a very significant mark for al-Qaeda later on. Al-Qaeda

looked at the October 1983 attacks against the U.S. Marine barracks as a model that it wanted to emulate. From Lebanon the tactic later spread to Sri Lanka. It was used significantly by the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers and then later on by the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the PKK—the Kurdistan Workers Party, and other terrorist groups. Suicide attacks as part of organized campaigns of terrorism is how this tactic was predominantly manifest in the last two decades of the previous century.

Let me turn to the contemporary period, suicide attacks after 2000. This third historical period after the millennium, from 2000 until the present, is the subject of my book and of this talk. Suicide attacks after 2000 are different in many ways. In this period, suicide attacks have been dominated by al-Qaeda and by its affiliates and by its associates, and what unifies all of these groups—al-Qaeda and its associates—is adherence to Salafi-Jihadist ideology.

So let me now move to the second part of my talk by describing the recent unprecedented spread of suicide attacks. Let me give you a few statistics from the database that I collected. From 1981 until June 2008, there have been 1,944 suicide attacks according to my database. I believe that there are actually many more attacks—I would say perhaps as many as 2,500—but my database includes 1,944 suicide attacks in the last 27 years. These attacks were carried out by 51 different organizations and they have caused over 70,000 casualties. Of those casualties, over 21,000 people were killed by this tactic in the last 27 years and over 50,000 people have been wounded.

Let's put the present decade into perspective, so that one can understand how significant this period is in the history of suicide attacks in pure numbers. In the present decade, there have been more than 10 times as many suicide attacks than in the previous two decades combined. In terms of numbers there have been, since 2000, 1,779 suicide attacks versus 165 suicide attacks in the 1980s and 1990s.

Another important indicator of the proliferation of suicide attacks is that from 2000 until 2007 every year has seen more suicide attacks than the previous years. In the present decade, suicide attacks have not only increased in terms of number of attacks but also according to a number of other variables. If we look for example at the number of organizations that are conducting this

To put the present decade in comparative perspective, there have been more than 10 times as many suicide attacks than in the previous two decades combined. In terms of numbers there have been, since 2000, 1,779 suicide attacks versus 165 suicide attacks in the 1980s and 1990s.

tactic in any given decade, we see that there has been a significant rise in the number of organizations. In the present decade, on average, every year over 12 organizations use suicide attacks, compared with only 1.5 organizations that, on average, used this tactic in any given year during the 1980s.

Finally, there's also been an unprecedented rise in the number of countries that are being attacked by suicide attacks. In the first 15 years after 1981, on average, 1.7 countries have been attacked on any given year by suicide attacks. Since 1995 that number has increased by a factor of four; seven-and-a-half countries have

been attacked on average in any given year by suicide attacks between 1995 and 2007.

So what are the causes of this unprecedented global spread of suicide attacks? Let me just briefly review two of the most important explanations that have been put forward to date on the emergence of suicide attacks. The first is the occupation theory, which has been offered by University of Chicago Professor Robert Pape, who says that suicide terrorism is mainly the result of foreign occupation.

Now there are three reasons why I believe that this occupation thesis is not sufficient in explaining the contemporary phenomenon of suicide attacks. The first is that we see suicide attacks occurring increasingly in countries that are not occupied: Bangladesh, Indonesia, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. There are only a few examples of countries that are not occupied, but where we have seen suicide attacks. And let me also just preface these remarks by saying that Professor Pape's definition of occupation is a rather narrow definition of "boots on the ground." There has to be physical occupation of soldiers.

A second reason why I don't believe that the occupation thesis holds as much ground anymore is that many of the attacks that are conducted these days are not against the people who are occupied. Let's take the case of Iraq—clearly, an occupied country; however, if we look at the targets of suicide attacks in Iraq we find that the targets are not necessarily the occupiers. Very few attacks these days target Americans or their Western allies. Instead the main targets in Iraq are Shiites, Kurds, and Sufis. It seems that much of the violence in Iraq today is aimed at causing sectarian strife much more than routing the occupiers.

A third reason why I believe that the occupation thesis has to be amended is that many of the suicide bombers themselves are not the people who are occupied. Again, if we look at the case of Iraq, a country that is occupied, over 90 percent of the suicide bombers in Iraq are actually not Iraqis; they are people who are coming from abroad. They are people who have not suffered from the grievances that are connected to occupation as one could perhaps argue in the case of the Palestinians. I believe that the occupation thesis cannot be entirely dismissed. Defined narrowly as "boots on the ground," however, the occupation thesis leaves a number of questions open. I think that what matters more for suicide attacks today is not necessarily occupation

defined as the presence of soldiers, but the perception of cultural dominance, the perception of economic influence, the perception of political dominance—that's the sort of understanding of occupation that I believe drives many suicide bombers to action.

Let me talk about the causes of what I call the “globalization of martyrdom,” this unprecedented spread of suicide attacks of the past decade. The main argument I make in my book is that the global spread of suicide attacks is the result of two overlapping causes. First, the transition of al-Qaeda into a global terrorist actor, and second, the growing appeal of its guiding ideology, the Salafi Jihad. And let me take each of these two parts of the argument in turn. I will first talk about al-Qaeda's relationship both to globalization as well as to suicide attacks.

Al-Qaeda is linked to globalization in several different ways. First of all, al-Qaeda's core doctrine from the very outset has defined that entity as an international rapid-reaction force of sorts that should come to the aid of Muslims wherever and whenever they are in need. A second way in which al-Qaeda has globalized is through the Afghan-Arabs, those foreign fighters who flocked to Afghanistan beginning in the 1980s. After they received training in these camps they moved back to their home countries or to third countries. By doing so, they became a real transnational force for al-Qaeda. That was another way in which al-Qaeda became a transnational movement which helped spread its ideology across different countries and regions.

A third reason why al-Qaeda is a transnational actor is that in the mid-1990s, when the group was in the Sudan, it has embarked on a strategic shift from attacking the near enemy, i.e. the local Arab and Muslims believed by al-Qaeda to be only nominally Muslim. It has shifted away from a strategy of attacking those local regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan towards attacking the United States and its allies, the so-called far enemy. That strategic shift has further helped embody al-Qaeda as a transnational force.

What is the connection between al-Qaeda and suicide attacks? There is a very symbiotic connection between the two exemplified through what I call al-Qaeda's primacy of suicide attack. To al-Qaeda, no other tactic signifies the dedication of the individual Muslim fighter to God as does suicide attacks. Al-Qaeda has institutionalized this tactic to an extent that we have not seen before in other places such as the Palestinian territories or Lebanon. It has

instilled the spirit of self-sacrifice into the collective psyche of each one of its members. The first theoretician of al-Qaeda to do so was Abdullah Azzam, who was Osama bin Laden's mentor. He even came to the United States to preach about the benefits of martyrdom. An example of al-Qaeda's focus on suicide operations can be seen in August 1996, when Osama bin Laden declared war against the United States. If you go back and read that declaration of war today, you will find ample evidence of how al-Qaeda calls for the use of suicide operations and extols the benefits of martyrdom for the members of al-Qaeda.

To give you another example, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has declassified documents from al-Qaeda, and one of these documents which was found in an al-Qaeda safe house in Afghanistan, titled "Goals and Objectives of Jihad," ranked the goal of attaining martyrdom in the cause of God second only to establishing the rule of God on Earth. That's how important suicide attacks are for al-Qaeda.

Now what about the second part of the argument about the Salafi-Jihadist ideology? What's the connection between Salafi-Jihadist ideology and the transnational spread of this tactic? The Salafi Jihad is a transnational ideology because it claims to represent a global transnational community of Islamic believers, the Umma, while rejecting at the same time national territorial borders between nation states. Hence al-Qaeda's ability to also recruit from geographically distant places, highlighting the transnational character of this

movement. An additional reason is that the Salafi Jihad believes to be engaged in a cosmic war—a term coined by sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer, which denotes a struggle of good versus evil, black versus white. One in which "you're either with us or you're against us."

Al-Qaeda believes that it is engaged in a battle for the very future of Islam and in this battle between good and evil there is no in-between; there is no gray area and it is the religious duty of every true Muslim to participate in that jihad, and especially in suicide attacks. "Martyrdom

... Salafi Jihad believes to be engaged in a cosmic war... a struggle of good versus evil, black versus white. One in which "you're either with us or you're against us."

operations,” the term that al-Qaeda uses for this tactic, is the ultimate way in which a Muslim can show his devotion to God and can participate in the jihad. In that jihad, maximizing deaths among the enemy is elevated to a religious duty.

In terms of the database, I have traced the importance of the Salafi Jihad for suicide attacks by coding every single organization according to its ideological

What works in the U.S.’ favor in this regard is that the credibility of the Salafi Jihad suffers from a fundamental contradiction: on the one hand, Salafi-Jihadists claim to act for the benefit of all Muslims, but on the other hand, it’s really Muslims who suffer the consequences of Salafi-Jihadist terrorism more than any other group.

affiliation. What I have found is that since 2000, 46 percent of all suicide attacks have been perpetrated by organizations who are Salafi-Jihadist in character. An additional 22 percent have been carried out by organizations who are partially Salafi-Jihadist in character, although they also contain some elements of nationalist ideology, as does for example the Taliban. The Taliban is not exactly a Salafi-Jihadist organization but it is very close to it, and it has strong ties with al-Qaeda. So in total, 68 percent of all suicide attacks since 2000 have been perpetrated either by

purely Salafi-Jihadist groups or by groups whose ideology closely resembles Salafi-Jihadism. If you compare that to the period before 2000, less than 6 percent of all suicide attacks before 2000 have been carried out by groups that abided by Salafi-Jihadist ideology.

Let me now go to the fourth and final part of the presentation, namely the implications for counterterrorism of these findings. If we accept the premise that ideology helps drive the current proliferation of suicide attacks, then the efforts of the United States to counterterrorism must also do more to stem the appeal of that ideology. The problem of course is that the United States has lost a lot of respect in the Arab and Muslim world. I believe that the ideological struggle is primarily an internal struggle within the Muslim world. That does not mean that the United States has no role to play; however I would suggest that the United States should not engage in theological debates, because it has no place in doing so. I believe that engaging in the debates about the legitimacy of suicide attacks is something that moderate Muslims and even

Salafis who don't adopt violence have to engage in. But I do believe that there is a role for the United States to play, and here I would say that the best thing that in my mind the United States can do is highlight the destructive practical results that Salafi-Jihadist terrorism has produced, especially by victimizing large numbers of Muslims. What works in the U.S.' favor in this regard is that the credibility of the Salafi Jihad suffers from a fundamental contradiction: on the one hand, Salafi-Jihadists claim to act for the benefit of all Muslims, but on the other hand, it's really Muslims who suffer the consequences of Salafi-Jihadist terrorism more than any other group. That's something that the United States has to highlight whenever it can.

There are several negative practical consequences of Salafi-Jihadist actions upon Muslims. One of them of course is that Muslims, as I said, are the primary victims of Salafi-Jihadist terrorism, including suicide attacks. A second is that Salafi-Jihadists openly justify the killing of Muslims under a logic of the ends justifying the means. That is something that is a contradiction of sorts that we have to highlight as often as we can.

A third negative practical consequence of the Salafi Jihad is the practice of takfir. Takfir is the process in which Muslim groups label other Muslim groups as infidels, or kuffars. That is a practice that is very widely used amongst Salafi-Jihadist. In actuality, the use of takfir has created almost a civil war among Muslims, and I think that we have to stress these implications to Muslims as often as we can. I also believe that we have to highlight some of the inconsistencies and the hypocrisies, I would say, of Salafi-Jihadist leaders. For example, we often hear Osama bin Laden and other members of al-Qaeda extol the benefits of martyrdom, but very rarely do we see these same leaders martyr themselves in suicide attacks or sending some of their loved ones on these missions. I think that we have to expose those hypocrisies.

Finally I think that we have to make it clear that Salafi-Jihadists offer no attractive vision of the future. Moderate Muslims, I believe, should ask themselves—as should Salafis who are on the verge of becoming Salafi-Jihadists—what life under the rule of Salafi-Jihadists would look like. I think that they would find that life would look much like Afghanistan under the Taliban rule. I seriously doubt that many Muslims would want to live in such a reality of war, destruction, perennial jihad, and a lack of opportunity and hope.

Thank you very much.

Cristina Lopez-Gottardi Chao. There have been some significant changes in the structure and the approach of the U.S. intelligence community since 9/11 to meet the challenges posed by terrorism, and this is an area that the Miller Center Forum Program has been following through this series on the business of intelligence gathering and analysis. In your book you conclude with a number of policy recommendations aimed at creating a national counterterrorism strategy. How well do you think that the changes made by the U.S. intelligence community answer some of the concerns that you bring up and how well do you see this going forward under the [Barack] Obama administration?

Assaf Moghadam. First let me say something about the intelligence services. I think one of the reasons that those countries that are in close proximity to the perpetrators of suicide attacks, such as Israel, Turkey, or Sri Lanka—countries that are fighting what I call the more traditional patterns of terrorism and who have been engaged in a long-standing historical conflict with the perpetrators of terrorism—have greater opportunities to infiltrate the terrorist groups with its intelligence agents. One of the problems with the contemporary “globalization of martyrdom,” as I call it, is that the groups or individuals conducting suicide attacks come from foreign countries, or they target forward-deployed troops away from the targeted country’s homeland. It is far more difficult for intelligence agencies to infiltrate terrorist organizations under these circumstances.

In terms of the question of how well has the United States adapted, I think that some improvements have been made. In particular, I am happy to see that the U.S. government’s counterterrorism policy has moved in the same direction that I recommend in my book. For example, a growing number of statements by government officials highlight the fundamentally important statistic that Muslims are the primary victims of the Salafi Jihad.

So I think that there has been a lot of improvement in that regard, and I personally believe that the Obama administration understands the importance of tackling the ideological challenges of suicide attacks. But I think that there will be a lot more challenges in the way ahead because a counterterrorism strategy that understands that ideology is a critical part of the problem of suicide attacks has to be devised very carefully. It takes a lot of time, so we shouldn’t really expect any results anytime soon.

Question. I understand your argument that the United States should not be involved in theological discussions about suicide attacks, but how do you explain the lack of resistance to suicide attacks on theological bases within the Muslim community?

Assaf Moghadam. First of all it's a great question, because I think that it's absolutely true that we don't see enough theological resistance to suicide attacks on the part of Muslim religious scholars. I believe that ironically, one of the reasons why suicide attacks have become so difficult for Islamic theologians to challenge is that they had previously gone to great lengths providing religious legitimacy for suicide attacks against Israel when Israel was the primary target of suicide attacks. By legitimizing suicide attacks against Israelis, those scholars essentially laid the groundwork for subsequent arguments by other Muslims who argued that suicide attacks against "infidels" in general are permitted. A second reason for the relative silence on the part of religious scholars, I believe, is that people are intimidated and, quite frankly, afraid to speak out because of the negative consequences that could follow.

The SITE [Search for International Terrorist Entities Intelligence Group] Institute, for example, featured some footage of moderate Muslims who spoke out against suicide attacks on radio and TV shows. Some were denounced on live camera and even called infidels. This, of course, is a huge problem because the verdict for an infidel in Islam is death. And so I think that there is intimidation and I think that we have to help moderate Muslims to speak out by empowering them and by standing by them. This is particularly important because I do think that they realize that they are also the enemies Salafi-Jihadist, and they could well use more of our support in that regard.

Question. It appears in Afghanistan and Pakistan that often the only option for education for children is the Taliban madrasas. Greg Mortensen has had quite a bit of success raising money and building secular schools in that part of the world. Would we benefit by supporting those efforts? And what effect do the madrasas have on raising—new, perhaps suicidal terrorists in that part of the world?

Assaf Moghadam. Peter Bergen, who also spoke before this audience, wrote an article in *The Washington Post* called "The Madrasa Myth." He actually argues that the madrasas no longer produce as many terrorists as they have done perhaps some decades ago. I would tend to agree with him, especially as he has done

some extensive field research. Certainly there's still a lot of madrasas that preach hate, and we have to do our best to try to see what we can do to limit their influence. However, in my opinion the most dangerous places in which suicide bombers are recruited these days are not madrasas or even mosques but places like Islamic bookstores, and cultural centers where young Muslims come together. If we look, for example, at the London bombers, they were radicalized by spending time together by going hiking and by working out together in gyms. European intelligence confirms that recruiting in these institutions, rather than in madrasas or mosques, is much more common nowadays.

Another place where many suicide bombers are being recruited are prisons. The prison system, both in the United States and especially in Europe, has become a breeding ground for radicalism and it has become a matter of great concern for government and security officials.

And finally, I have to mention the Internet, because some recruiting today takes place on the Internet. From my understanding, there is not a lot of practical recruiting, but there is a lot of incitement and indoctrination. There are lots of recruitment videos of which most of us are probably aware. The Internet, I think, plays a crucial role in indoctrination, leading a lot of young Muslims to seek an affiliation with other Muslims in a transnational community of Muslim believers, or Umma. One of the important conclusions is that recruitment nowadays is really a bottom-up recruitment; it's individuals who are coming to the understanding that they want to join jihad, and not necessarily organizations that send their recruiters to find potential terrorists. Youth are being influenced by propaganda and are then actively seeking ways in which they can join jihad, as opposed to organizations actively recruiting members to join the groups that are conducting suicide attacks.

Question. Is it true that suicide bombing attacks have increased in Iraq rather dramatically within the last couple of years?

Assaf Moghadam. Yes, there have been more suicide attacks in Iraq since 2003 than in all other countries in the last 27 years combined. This statistic is particularly shocking because suicide attacks have emerged in Iraq only in the last five years. Iraq is therefore the main theater for suicide attacks. In a recent study of mine published in the *CTC Sentinel*, which is the monthly publication of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, I've taken a fresh look at

the statistics, and found that in relative terms, suicide attacks in Iraq are actually now on the decline. The main new theaters of suicide attacks are Afghanistan and Pakistan, with Pakistan showing the single-most relative increase of suicide attacks in the last year. If you were to ask me what the reasons are for this, I would probably say that the surge tactic has worked to some extent. Al-Qaeda in Iraq has suffered tremendously, and I think that a growing number of foreign fighters are now not flocking to Iraq but instead to the new theaters of jihad, to the Afghan-Pakistani tribal region, because that's where they find that they can do most damage these days.

Question. Carrying this back a little bit to the [Josef] Stalin campaign as far as the Germans were concerned in World War II and also the use of the kamikaze by the Japanese, those seem to be more of an example, of where they lacked the ability to keep up with the speed of the events that were taking place; they couldn't put the land mines down and place them fast enough to defeat the German army. The Japanese, on the other hand, couldn't get to the American Army or the American Navy except with kamikaze attacks; they were moving too fast for them. Don't you think speed is a great factor, and also intermediate explosive devices are related in this too, because they can be considered a substitute for land mines, as is terrorism with the idea of killing off people who were invading their country?

Assaf Moghadam. I certainly think that speed has to do with it and I would actually take this to another level. I haven't really talked about the tactical benefits of suicide attacks, but they are numerous. Suicide attacks are the poor man's atomic bomb of sorts. Speed is one benefit of suicide attacks; but there are a lot of others. If you ignore for a second the fact that the organization loses a person, which of course is a cost, suicide attacks are otherwise an extremely cheap tactic. Suicide belts can cost as little as \$100. You can time these belts to detonate at the most opportune moments so that they can create the maximum damage. In the case of Japan, according to Stephen Hopgood, who has done extensive research on the kamikaze, one of the main reasons why the Japanese sent the kamikaze on suicide attacks was because they were afraid of the consequences of defeat. They were afraid of the consequences of a possible U.S. occupation of Japan; they were afraid for their families, and that's what at least in part motivated them.

Question. If possible, can you distinguish between those who help to organize the suicide attacks—the recruiters versus the individuals who actually carry out the

attack? Do they have different backgrounds? Do they have differing motives other than some sort of ideology that unifies around Salafism?

Assaf Moghadam. That's a great question. In the course on suicide terrorism that I teach at West Point, I provide the cadets a framework of analysis for the causes of terrorism. I use a levels of analysis approach that distinguishes between the motivations of the individual; the motivations of the organization; and the role that the society plays in the genesis of suicide attacks. What I and many other scholars who have conducted research on suicide attacks have found is that the motivations that lead individuals to engage in suicide attacks differ fundamentally from those that lead organizations to employ this tactic.

There have been many studies on the individual suicide bombers. The consensus is that there are four main motivations that play a role at the individual level. The first is revenge and is by far the most common motivator when it comes to suicide attacks. A second is commitment, and this can be a commitment to a nation, commitment to a group, commitment to an organization, commitment to the very small cell, but certainly commitment to a cause that leads individuals to become suicide bombers. A third is personal crisis. We see this especially with women suicide bombers, who oftentimes found themselves in a personal crisis. Sometimes they have brought dishonor on their family, and many suicide bombings of course occur in traditional places where bringing dishonor on your family has severe consequences. And finally there are a few cases where people have conducted suicide attacks for financial reasons for their families who benefited from their activities.

Organizations, on the other hand conduct suicide attacks for their own sets of reasons. They have tactical—and I already spoke about the tactical benefits of suicide operations—but also strategic motives to employ this modus operandi. These strategic motives oftentimes revolve around the desire to end the occupation of their country or to achieve self-determination for their nation, sometimes by means of creating ethnic strife. Increasingly, I would argue, suicide attacks are used as part of the overall strategy of jihad. As far as occupation is concerned, if we look really closely at the statements of many Salafi-Jihadists, such as the statements of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the now-killed leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, it is plainly visible that even if the United States would withdraw from Iraq, Salafi-Jihadists would continue to wage jihad because they believe to be engaged in a religious war. Similarly, Osama bin Laden in the last year made several appeals to the American public, saying that the only thing that can save


them is to convert to Islam. So these are some of the differences between the individual and the organizational levels of analysis.

Question. I have two questions. The first one is to what extent is post-mortem survival, which I regard as unintelligible, but to what extent is that a factor in a typical Muslim suicide bomber? And the second question is more general. Skepticism, I'm beginning to think may be a western world way of thinking. Is there a place for skepticism in Muslim religious thinking?

Assaf Moghadam. Regarding your first question about post-mortem survival, I think that a lot of western scholars don't think it is politically correct to suggest that martyrs see certain benefits of martyrdom. We have seen time and again that organizations that conduct suicide attacks are promising the pleasures of paradise to suicide bombers. All you have to do is read the 1996 declaration of war by Osama bin Laden. Pay attention to the many, many references he makes to martyrs and to the benefits the martyr enjoys in paradise.

Now, some may argue that suicide bombers don't do it for these personal benefits, and that may be true, in my opinion that's certainly not what the sponsoring organizations believe. If the terrorist organization wouldn't believe that promises of heavenly rewards would entice individuals to become suicide bombers, then they wouldn't keep making these promises in trying to recruit Muslims mostly. There are many promises that they make to the suicide bombers. They promise them 72 virgins; they promise them reserved slots for 70 of their relatives in the afterlife; they promise them to meet the face of God; and they also promise them that martyrdom is painless, which is really ironic because al-Qaeda frequently charges the west with the "love of life," while highlighting that the martyr "loves death." If that were true, why does al-Qaeda feel the need to make promises that dying in the name of God is painless? If they love death so much then why don't you suffer a little bit for that?

I personally believe that the perceived benefits of martyrdom are one of the important motivations, but there is not one reason and one reason only for an individual to become a suicide bomber. My first scholarly enterprise in this field was my Master's thesis on Palestinian suicide bombers. In that thesis, I found that Palestinian suicide bombers cited many different reasons why they wanted to blow themselves up. A former State Department official, David Long, once said that there are as many reasons for terrorism as there are terrorists in the world and I certainly believe that to be the case. And



Assaf Moghadam speaking at the Miller Center of Public Affairs February 9, 2009.

martyrdom and the benefits of self-sacrifice are one of these many reasons why people conduct suicide attacks. And of course every different suicide attacker has different sets of motivations.

In terms of skepticism, certainly Westerners are taught critical thinking. What is particularly dangerous in the Arab and Muslim world is that no story in the Arab and Muslim world seems to be believed unless it's a conspiracy theory. It's only a tiny minority in the Arab and Muslim world that really believes that Osama bin Laden is responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Much more rampant theories are that it was either the CIA or the Israeli Mossad, mostly the Mossad, who conducted these attacks. These conspiracy theories are rampant and dangerous, and I'm not exactly sure why they are so widespread. I haven't really tried to get deeper into this question, but I do know that they are very rampant.

Question. A book that had a huge influence on me is *The Age of Sacred Terror* by [Steven] Simon and [Daniel] Benjamin, who are both in security, I think, during the [William J.] Clinton administration and they look to the beginning

of terrorism in Egypt, the Brotherhood, and who their patron was; it's Ibn Taymiyya. We don't hear about him—we have St. Francis on the Christian side, and Ibn Taymiyya is kind of their intellectual prophet. His view was that if the imams and clerics don't move to make every country Muslim—and they started with Egypt—[Gamal Abd al] Nasir and [Anwar El] Sadat were their targets; the near enemy you mentioned. Do we still believe what he believed, that it was the responsibility of every Muslim to take the law into their own hands and kill and do whatever it took to bring each country to a Muslim situation? Does Taymiyya still have an influence?

Assaf Moghadam. The answer is, absolutely yes. If you read the statements of Salafi-Jihadists on the Internet, you will think that Ibn Taymiyya, who lived in the Middle Ages at the time of the Mongol invasion of the Middle East, was living right here among us; that's how important an influence he still maintains. He is probably—and I would agree here with Simon and Benjamin—he's probably the single most important influence for Salafi-Jihadist doctrine. The other almost equally important figure is Sayyed Qutb, who was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood active in the 1960s. He was arrested and tortured by the Egyptian regime under Nasir. Together Ibn Taymiyya and Sayyed Qutb have helped develop the notion of the offensive jihad. It is worth, of course, to remember that jihad in Islam is a very, very broad concept that has both aggressive and peaceful connotations for Muslims.

There is the internal jihad against one's evil inclinations, to overcome one's temptations, but then there's also the military struggle, and Ibn Taymiyya was adamant about highlighting the importance of the military jihad. He was heavily influenced by the arrival of the Mongols, which he called infidels. Even though they eventually converted to Islam, Taymiyya said that they were not true Muslims, and so it was justified to fight them. Salafi-Jihadists adopted this view that not everybody who calls himself a Muslim is a Muslim. This is the process of takfir, the process of labeling other Muslims as infidels.

Besides Qutb and Ibn Taymiyya, two other important influences are Abu Ala al-Mawdudi, who was living in Pakistan, but also—even though he was a Shiite, which Salafi-Jihadists hate even more than the Jews and the Christians—the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. Khomeini was a very important figure because he really politicized Islam. He turned Islam from a theology to an ideology, and the Salafi Jihad—I really would want to stress this—the Salafi Jihad is not a religion; we're not talking here about Muslims in general.

We're talking here about a minority of individuals almost akin to a sect. The Salafi Jihad is an ideology for several reasons, its adherents believe to have recognized a certain problem. They argue that Islam is currently in a state of decline and they say that the reason why Islam is in this state of decline is because Muslims are not pious enough and they believe that the only way in which Muslims can redeem themselves is when they go back to the glory of the past. In order to do that, they have to become as pious as the Prophet Mohammed and his traditional companions.

Another reason why the Salafi Jihad is more an ideology than a theology is that Salafi-Jihadists believe to have found the cause for their misery in a conspiracy by a "crusader Zionist alliance," as they call it. And like other ideologies, the Salafi Jihad also offers a remedy, namely the waging of jihad.

Question. I have a practical question about theology. I've heard westerners refer to moderate Muslims using that adjective and have seen quite a bit of pushback from Muslims who do not take kindly to that adjective "moderate." I was wondering if you could comment on the controversy regarding this word "moderate" and your thoughts about it.

Assaf Moghadam. I certainly acknowledge this controversy, and I really use this term with hesitation and for lack of a better term. We should think about the problem of the Salafi Jihad in concentric circles. In the innermost concentric circle are the Salafi-Jihadists, the groups that abide by that ideology and whose adherents believe that they have to spread their particular version of Islam through violent means. Then there is a more exterior circle surrounding the Salafi-Jihadists, and those are Salafis. The Salafis also abide by a very traditional version of Islam; they dress just like the Salafi-Jihadists dress in those traditional Muslim robes. However they believe that the best way to spread Islam is through the peaceful call of Islam, or da'wa; by going out and by talking to people.

Then there is another concentric circle surrounding the Salafis that consists of Islamists. Examples of these individuals are found perhaps in most members of the Muslim Brotherhood. They would like to live in a country that is ruled according to the sharia, according to Islamic laws, but they dress according to western styles of clothing; they also participate in the political process; they establish political parties. Finally, the outermost concentric circle consists of ordinary Muslims. The reason why I presented this is that when I say

moderate Muslims, I mean those Muslims that are outside of that innermost circle, i.e., the non-Salafi-Jihadists. Not that they are all moderate, but I think that when we're talking about suicide attacks and the terrorism that really hits us hard, we have to attempt to bring everybody to our side, including, I believe, the Salafis, who are very, very religious; they preach hate absolutely. But I think that they are among our best hope to fight the people who believe that they have to use violence in order to achieve their aims.

Question. Considering the fact that al-Qaeda is the major proponent of suicide today, did our government make a major mistake by not following and killing Osama bin Laden when we had the chance, and would it have made any difference?

Assaf Moghadam. Of course, in retrospect we wish that President Clinton would have killed Osama bin Laden as opposed to just going and firing a few rockets in the Sudan. But I think that the question is really how much of a difference would it make if bin Laden were to die today, and my answer is that it would be a symbolic setback. It would be a significant setback, but only on the symbolic level, and the reason is that the global jihad movement today is so diffused. There are three parts to the global jihad movement that I distinguish: one is the al-Qaeda core, of which bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are the leaders. The second is the network of terrorist groups that are affiliated or associated with al-Qaeda. So we have al-Qaeda as the main hub of this network, but then we have all these other terrorist groups who are within that network. Finally, there is this larger movement, which consists of a lot of self-radicalized or "home-grown" cells.

Would the death of bin-Laden make a difference? Yes, absolutely, and especially so for the al-Qaeda hard core in the Afghan-Pakistani border region. I certainly think that it would be possible that we could see a power struggle if Osama bin Laden were to die, because [Ayman al-] Zawahiri, bin Laden's number two, is not uncontested. There are other individuals looming in the background, such as Abu Yahya al-Libi for example, who is a rising star in the movement. I wouldn't be surprised if there would be some power struggle and that might be the most significant problem for al-Qaeda. The larger movement influenced by al-Qaeda's message would continue to pose a threat to the United States, and indeed may pose the main threat to the United States. The al-Qaeda hard core most certainly continues to pose a grave threat to the United States, but I think that the al-Qaeda core has utterly failed in recent years to attack the

United States, most recently in the botched August 2006 plot to hijack about a dozen airliners and detonate them above American cities has failed. As a result of those failures, the main attacks of al-Qaeda in the future are likely going to be targeted more against U.S. installations in the Middle East or southwest Asia as opposed to attacks in the U.S. proper, which are so difficult to carry out, at least by the core.

DEALING *with the* NEW IRANIAN SUPERPOWER

Robert Baer

George H. Gilliam. Our guest today is Robert Baer who has enjoyed a legendary career as a case officer and as the Director of Operations in the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]. Baer is a graduate of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He's a fluent Arabic speaker and he has publicly acknowledged assignments in India, Beirut, Tajikistan, and in Kurdish Northern Iraq. In the mid-1980s, he was investigated by the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] for allegedly conspiring to assassinate Saddam Hussein. Later, he tried to persuade the [William J.] Clinton administration to support a Sunni coup against Hussein.

He quit the Agency in 1997 and received the CIA's career intelligence medal. Journalist Seymour Hersh said that Bob Baer was considered, "perhaps the best on-the-ground field officer in the Middle East." His book, *See No Evil*, details some of his experiences in the Agency, and that book, along with *Sleeping with the Devil*, were the basis for the 2005 academy award-winning *Syriana*. The George Clooney character in that movie is said to be based on Baer. Baer has recently been working on documentaries and has produced four, focusing on suicide bombings. His new book, *The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower*, deals with issues that are very much on the front page. Please welcome Bob Baer.

Robert Baer. Thank you. It's delightful to be here. I did spend 21 years in the CIA as a case officer. I served in stations overseas. For those who have worked in the CIA overseas or have just followed it, you know that one comes away with a very peculiar view of the world that is shared by few.

I wrote a book on Iran based on an absolute fascination with this country, and I can tell you where that fascination started. It also points at a bias, in my mind, and that is that all deep knowledge is won by suffering, and in this case, blood. It was April 1983, Beirut, an absolutely stunningly beautiful day.



MILLER CENTER
of PUBLIC AFFAIRS
UNIVERSITY of VIRGINIA

People were walking up and down the Corniche. Lebanon was going to be resurrected, the civil war was over, you had American troops driving around, flags on their backs. The Lebanese love Americans, they loved that our troops were there, they loved that the Palestinians had left. Lebanon was going to be [Ronald] Reagan's beachhead for democracy in the Middle East—it sounds a bit like Iraq, doesn't it—and the question was what could go wrong. The Lebanese were on the verge of recognizing Israel, the first state since Jordan and Egypt, and it was a great defeat for Syria in particular, who was our enemy at the time.

Anyhow, it was about 11:30 in the morning and this GMC [General Motors Corporation] pickup truck comes down the Corniche, heads up toward the Palm Beach Hotel, parks facing down the Corniche and just sits there. The people that remember the truck remember it was heavy on its springs, there was a young man in the truck who sat there, kept the engine running. It was a little before noon, just as the schools were letting out, that a Mercedes came barreling down the Corniche. According to eyewitnesses, the driver waved at the young man in the truck, who started up and headed down the Corniche and continued through the traffic very calmly. No one remembers much. When the pickup truck got next to the U.S. Embassy it made an abrupt left, drove through, under the portico, up the stairs, and exploded in the lobby. As we all know, the embassy came down, 19 Americans were killed, dozens of Lebanese. Bob [Robert C.] Ames, National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East, was killed. The Marine at Post 1, they never found him. He disappeared. They just found the buttons from his tunic that somehow survived the heat of the explosion.

Now from a CIA perspective, we don't consider the morality of the attack or the political implications. We cared about the techniques. Inside, they had put actual explosives in the truck so that there was no signature left for us to figure out who did the bomb. The FBI agents, I've kept in touch with them all these years, are just astounded by the technique, the secrecy, and the fact that we don't know who the suicide bomber was until this day. I mean, think of a culture that can take what they would call a martyr like this, and keep his identity secret from his family, from the press, from everybody.

We realized in April 1983 that we were dealing with something entirely different from Palestinian terrorism. We were dealing with a force that frankly would drive us out of Lebanon. In October, some Marines were blown up in a similar operation. There were attacks on the Marines, and the United States, really for the first time in the Middle East, was forced to withdraw. We called it "redeploying to ships." It was a political decision. Our forces were not defeated

in Lebanon. We could have moved into citadels, into castles, as we are in Afghanistan. We could have just said, “We’re not giving up, we’re staying.”

Reagan very rightly pulled out, but what was curious was what happened next, and that was this force, whatever it was, this conspiracy, turned its guns not on the West, but on Israel. What became very quickly apparent was this organization went from terrorism to kidnapping Americans to blowing up our embassy to killing journalists and getting the Chief of Station, Bill [William F.] Buckley, and torturing him to death. It later evolved into a classical guerilla war. We watched this day-by-day, where it starts out with suicide bombings; cars filled with ammonium nitrate and Semtex, driving up near an Israeli patrol, blowing it up. What struck people who followed this war—and it was a war little known to Americans—was just the sheer ability. It was the sheer ability that we saw in the attack on the embassy, of defeating a modern army.

For those of you who have spent time with the Israeli Army, they are very, very good. They are not an army easily defeated. Between 1982 and 2000, the Israelis were defeated. They will tell you, if you go to Tel Aviv, the people that fought in this war, that it was a political decision, they weren’t defeated, they could have stayed, it wasn’t worth it. This organization, which became Hezbollah, was not worth losing 1,000 Israeli lives.

Then we fast-forward to 2006, the 34-Day War, when the Israelis were decisively beaten. They went into Lebanon with a very definite mission, to destroy Hezbollah bases, eviscerate Hezbollah so it was no longer a political force, and then get out. The fact is they left without achieving any goals. It was a defeat. It was a clear-cut defeat, the first defeat that Israel has suffered in the Middle East. How did they do this? One factor that surprised the Israelis is that Hezbollah had surface-to-sea missiles. They took out an Israeli frigate, killed four Israeli sailors, came out of complete nowhere. The Israelis had no idea that these C-802s were in-country, or the fact that Hezbollah could actually fire one of these. They also moved into fiber optic cables, which as you know cannot be intercepted. You need to actually get in the ground and bend the cable, send the light out to intercept these things. In other words, the Israelis were blind in Lebanon and it terrified them. They also found out that Hezbollah had acquired dual-charge weapons. They hit the outer armor of a tank and penetrated, a second charge goes right through. It defeated their armor.

What the Israelis knew and what we knew inside the CIA, and the Pentagon knows as well, is none of this happened by accident. There was a small

group of Iranians. It goes back to 1980. It was at one time called Force 9000. It eventually became the Quds Force. The Quds Force, inside the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which reports to the Supreme Leader, [Sayyid Ali] Khamenei, is the most effective guerilla force that we've seen in the 20th or 21st century. Guerilla forces in Malaysia—it puts them to shame, even the Vietnamese. Never had this sort of sophistication been seen.

Hezbollah is the invention of Iran. Hassan Nasrallah is an Iranian agent. This is a group that we are absolutely totally mistaken if we think it's a religious conspiracy or any sort of extremism. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps voted for a moderate [Mohammad] Khatami during the elections. Every Iranian that deals any time with these, they talk about these people as secular. What we are seeing in Iran is an attempt to create an empire by proxy. What we are seeing in Iran is this Quds Force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, has figured out a new formula for deterring the United States. Not beating the United States, not carrying on a missionary civilizing movement. It is a movement simply to supplant the United States as the primary power in the Middle East. Again, it's an empire by proxy. You will not see Iranian forces in Basra, in the south, and you will not see Iranian forces in Lebanon. If you call up the Iranian Embassy and ask them if they have a Persian language school in Beirut and they'll tell you no. You call up Hezbollah and you say, "Are there any missionary activities to convert the Lebanese to Shiite Islam?" They'll tell you there's nothing like it. Is there such thing as a benign empire? I don't know, but if there is, this is what the Iranians are trying to project.

Hezbollah is the invention of Iran. This is a group that we are absolutely totally mistaken if we think it's a religious conspiracy or any sort of extremism.

I spent the last three years in Israeli prisons talking to Hamas and Islamic jihad organizations about suicide bombings. I walked away with a clear view that Israel has not stopped the suicide bombings by the border. It has not stopped it by police activity. What we've seen is a transformation of Hamas from a purely terrorist organization that blows up restaurants to one that has switched to rockets. This is the same arc we saw in Lebanon that went from blowing up embassies, kidnapping Americans, into a classical military struggle.

Iran is not done. Iran is looking at Egypt, it is in its sites now. Iran has spent the last ten years at the Muslim Brotherhood, saying, “We are not here to convert you to Shiite Islam, we are not here to control Mecca, the holiest site. We are here to defeat colonialism in the Middle East, and we’re going to do

The common idea is that the surge worked. The surge did work, but it’s because the Iraqis made it work, and the way they made it work was in 2006 and 2007, there was a bloodletting. Baghdad became a Shiite city.

that not by killing other Muslims, we’re not going to do that by blowing up restaurants in Israel. We are going to do it by sheer military force and we are going to do it by rockets.” The 22-Day War, Hamas against Israel, is precisely that. Look at the parallel between Hezbollah firing rockets in the 34-Day War, putting Israeli cities under siege, and Hamas. This is not an accident. There have been no suicide bombings in Israel of significance for three or four years now. This is a huge change.

The same is true in Iraq. The common idea is that the surge worked. The surge did work, but it’s because the Iraqis made it work, and the way they made it work was in 2006 and 2007, there was a bloodletting. Baghdad became a Shiite city. There was ethnic cleansing, the Sunni were forced out of Baghdad, they were forced out of neighborhoods, back into Anbar province, hundreds of thousands of Shiite living in Sunni, Anbar province, were forced into the south. What we had was a Bosnian solution in Iraq.

This is not to detract from the U.S. military. The fact is I spent enough time in Iraq—the U.S. military cannot knock down doors and figure out who are terrorists and who are not. It’s impossible, even if you had a five-level Arabic proficiency like the Israelis do. They can’t do it in the West Bank, so we didn’t do it there. What we see is a spreading Iran, where Iran went along with the surge, and this isn’t just Bob Baer saying it, this is David Satterfield, an old colleague of mine in charge at the State Department. He said thanks to Iran, violence subsided. Ryan Crocker, the former Ambassador, said it’s thanks to Iran that it subsided. One of the fascinating things, and I go back to this weird view that foreign service officers and CIA officers have, is that he called what’s happening in Iraq, the “Lebanonization” of that country. What he’s saying, basically, is Iran intends to do the same thing. It intends to create a unified Arab-Shiite party which will control two-thirds of Iraq. It’s already happened, it’s there.

This comes to my question of do we care as Americans. I'm not a Muslim. I don't care if there's a rising Shiite Islam, if there's a rising Iran. What we care about is Iran and the nuclear bomb. We are emotionally, historically attached to Israel. This has nothing to do with the Israeli lobby. It has to do with an American view of the world. We look at history through the Holocaust, we look at it through Hollywood. We share an intellectual tradition with Israel. We are going to give up Israel about the same time we give up Britain. I mean it's a long time that we've been attached at the hip. So we have to figure out and decide whether Iran is a rational country, and this is where you come back to getting those very ground roots of this attack on the embassy and Iran's use of terrorism. What we can say with absolute certitude is that the Iranians have focused suicide bombings on military targets, what they define as military targets. That would be embassies, Khobar barracks, the Marines.

What is astounding about the Iranians is that in the 2006 war, they had absolutely moved beyond terrorism. There are thousands of Americans living in Lebanon; there is no unified police force there. Hezbollah rules the city, as we've seen; they can go anywhere they want. No American was touched. The orders came down saying we've moved beyond that, protect the Americans. We are in a classical military confrontation. And you look at the Sunni, who I consider the anarchists of Islam, or the Protestants if you like, and you look at the Iranians as the Catholics of Islam. It's so weird talking to these people.

I was in a prison, the Hasharon Prison in Israel, talking to a suicide bomber, who talked about justifying what they did. One of the heads of the network sent this young woman to Haifa, and she was supposed to blow up a hospital and ended up going to an Arab-Israeli restaurant on the sea, an absolutely beautiful place. She and the driver go in, she's in the Mohajaba; there's no door check. They sit down and they have a kebab lunch together, and she's not let on at all what's about to happen. On one side of them are Arab employees, Arab Muslims, on the other side there's two Israeli families, three generations. About 20 minutes into the meal they're about done, had their tea, and she tells the driver to leave, and she gets up and walks in between the two tables and blows herself up, kills 21 people, three generations.

So I asked the guy who sent her, it was her cousin, why. Why the children? How can you justify this? This man was very pleasant, he had these very penetrating green eyes, he was a schoolteacher. He's the type of man, if you walked into Hebron, where he was from, he would meet you on the street, "Are you lost? Can I help you? Are you American? I love the United States.

I'd love to go live there or visit." I said, "How can you justify killing these children, two and three years old?" He said, "Well, they grow up to be soldiers." You know what that means, it means that if you're Palestinian, you're going to grow up to be a terrorist so the Israelis can kill you, doesn't it? And his argument was reduced to, "They have tanks and machine guns and rockets and we don't."

If you go to Tehran and ask the people from the Basiege, who clearly were in suicide operations—and I talked to a family where a young boy, he was 13 and the legend went he was the first suicide bomber, Iranian, and he rolled under a tank and blew himself up. He was a school kid during the Iran-Iraq War. But the Basiege were very interesting and they said in a time of war, if you have somebody who charges a machine gun nest, what do you call him? Is he a martyr or is he not? What's the difference? I would go on and say, "Well, what about the keys to heaven?" He said, "Don't insult my country and my religion by talking about these famous plastic keys to heaven and the 72 virgins. It is a military tactic. Yes, we will lose people." So what I walked away with, in my ground understanding of Islam and the Middle East, is that the Shiite are disciplined, the Sunni aren't.

So now as we approach a solution in the Middle East—and by the way, the Sunni have moved on. We have not been attacked since 9/11 in this country, not because of the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], and it's not because the FBI is good or incompetent. Any of us can leave this room right now and go to the hardware store and buy the chemicals to make a suicide bomb. We can find all the directions we need on the Internet. We don't need any central control. It's just that the Sunni Muslims have moved on, in the West at least, from this wasted effort to slaughter people. We'll see if I'm right in a couple of years.

What I do walk away with is the sense that Iran, from 1979, the conflict in Lebanon, has moved into a much more mature power. It's a hegemon in the Gulf, intends to become a hegemon in the Gulf, but can we deal with it? In the newspapers we tend to reduce Iran to the fact that it's getting nuclear weapons or has said it will, it's implied that it will. But what I don't see is a country here bent on suicide. I see a country that's grown up, a leadership that's grown up.

We are distracted by [Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad, who some Iranians say is bipolar. He's certainly entertaining. If you read the *Washington Post* and *The New York Times* very carefully, and the people that know Iran, he does not have his finger on the trigger. He is the man that followed the same arc of terrorism to classical military power, to empire by proxy, who was directly involved in taking American hostages in Lebanon. He was probably cognizant of preparations to

attack the Marines, but what we've seen is this man has become a military dictator. He's not an Ayatollah. What drives him is classical military considerations. He is the man who has avoided conflict in the Gulf, he is the man who has helped us in the surge in Iraq. He is the man who pulled back Hezbollah when it took over Beirut two years ago. He is the man who has stood away from a confrontation during the 22-Day War with Hamas, when he's trying to turn Hezbollah into

a political force in Lebanon. Hezbollah, history aside, is here to stay, Iran is here to stay, and we are a country that needs allies in the Middle East.

Hezbollah, history aside, is here to stay, Iran is here to stay, and we are a country that needs allies in the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia is our classical ally that has pumped cheap oil for a long time. On the other hand, there were 15 Saudis on those airplanes, and if you look at the 9/11 Commission Report, you will not

see a word about who recruited those 15 Saudis. We are very close to the Saudi royal family, they're very helpful, there's a long history there, but when it comes to picking allies in the Middle East, as we've seen with the [Barack] Obama administration, we have gone to Iran and we're saying help us in Afghanistan, and that is absolutely the right way to do it.

I do not think we're going to see a [Richard] Nixon moment, where Obama flies to Tehran and there's hugs around. There's too much bad blood. There's too much history. We have an Israel that's saying to us, "You know that's fine, these theories that Iran is irrational, they're going to help you, but we need proof." I think what we're going to see as we withdraw from Iraq, we're going to see a much more open cooperation with Iran, who's going to help us, to make sure the ethnic cleansing doesn't start again, and hold back the Shiite. We are going to see the same thing in Afghanistan. We cannot win in Afghanistan; we cannot create a democracy of our dreams there. We're not even quite sure who we're fighting there, but with Iran on our side we stand a better chance. It's going to take about four or five years. This President doesn't have the political capital to open up completely to Iran, but I think with every move we make toward Iran, you'll see something reciprocal coming back the other way.

Khamenei, in the press, just rejected the Obama offer. What he's rejecting is the idea of yes, we've had bad relations and yes, Persian culture is great, yes you're a great country. Iran wants to see more, they're more pragmatic. They want to see what we have planned and I think what we really need to do in

order to protect Israel and protect Saudi Arabia is come to an accommodation with Iran. Iran's power is too great now to fight without putting a million soldiers in the Gulf or a 30-years war of containment. Containment hasn't worked. The Chinese are moving very steadily into Iran, so are the Russians. The Russians are playing a malicious role by sending advanced weapons, almost as if they'd like to see a conflict between Iran and the United States.

I think we can very intelligently counter both China and Russia, and I think that Iran could actually go back to being an ally, not a supine ally to the United States, but almost as a partner in the Gulf. I think that this arc they've traveled, they will continue on it, from terrorist state to one who wants a proxy empire. Ultimately I think we can very subtly cut the relationship between the Arabs and the Persians, which we want to do in a very Machiavellian way, simply to take the wind out of their sails, go ahead with Resolution 242, go back to the five June borders, take the settlements out of the West Bank, open up Gaza to Egyptian trade, and ultimately we'll be doing Israel a favor. We won't be doing Israel a favor if we push toward war. There's still a large number of people in this country who believe the only solution is a military one with Iran and I just don't see it.

That is my ground truth of having lost two bosses to the Iranians, having an embassy blown up. I was in Beirut shortly before and shortly after the

*We cannot win in Afghanistan;
we cannot create a democracy of our
dreams there. We're not even quite
sure who we're fighting there,
but with Iran on our side we stand
a better chance.*

bombing. I've seen just how vicious this country can be if you decide to take it on. Just because it's vicious, I mean Yasser Arafat was a terrorist, killed our ambassador in Khartoum. He was blowing up planes through the 1980s and yet overnight this changed. I think we can do the same with Iran. That's my prognosis for the Middle East, my happy story that things are going to be OK.

George H. Gilliam. Bob, I don't want to steer the conversation away from Iran, but I do want to pick up on a thread that you touched on towards the end of your opening comments, and that is the whole business of recruiting people to do dangerous things. As a case officer and the Directorate of Operations, you and I have discussed the efforts that you made, sometimes successful, sometimes unsuccessful, to recruit agents who would be helpful to the United States. I'd like to ask if you would reflect a little bit on that experience, the

successes and the failures and what the challenges are, and then segue over into the recruitment of the 9/11 hijackers, and what your thoughts are on that process and who these people were and who actually did the recruiting.

Robert Baer. It was so much easier during the Cold War. With the CIA, the Directorate of Operations spent 90 percent of its time and its money recruiting Soviet military officers. The only thing we cared about was, were the Russians going to come through the fold, the gap. Were they going to launch their ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles]? It was so easy to do, because the Soviet Union was rotten, people knew inside it was rotten, and we had that commonality that the thing was going to fail, and so Russians came out of the woodwork to join the CIA. Some were recruited. More often than not, we just made our officers available, people volunteered. The best recruits are often volunteers, because they're already ideologically recruited in their minds.

Now you fast-forward to Islam, and the problem is—any of these people that are coming in—what motivation do you have if they believe in the afterlife and if they're willing to take their lives? There's nothing the CIA can offer them. What? Two weeks at Disneyland? They don't care about money. Hezbollah doesn't care about money, these people don't care about money. It is virtually impossible to get inside an organization like this of believers. It's like getting inside the Khmer Rouge. I used to meet with the Khmer Rouge in the late '80s and the early '90s, and there's just no talking to these people, let alone recruiting them. Back then they just looked at me like I had no conception of history, no conception of the future. They were complete, total believers, so it's very, very hard to get in and get future plans. The administration used torture in the hope of obtaining intelligence. That doesn't work either, I mean the ticking bomb theory has never been—there's been a case, and Alan Dershowitz talks about it. There's no case, I mean the Israelis will tell you, Shin Bet, you sit with them. One guy with a bomb doesn't know about the other guy, so in a lot of ways we're just stymied and it's a lot of guesswork.

Pakistan is of course on everybody's mind, and that's impossible to get into. I just adopted a child from Pakistan, a little girl, and while we were waiting, we got up to Peshawar and it's just a mess. When you hear artillery on the edge of Peshawar and shooting, you can't go out. I spent as much time as I could with the Red Mosque people, who took over the mosque in Islamabad, and there was just no talking to them. In my very small effort, I know what the CIA's up against. We live in a fortress there. The attack today on the police academy in Lahore, you know al-Qaeda is in the cities, in Lahore, they're in Karachi. If the Pakistanis can't get

inside of them, how can we? So we are very much thrown back on the National Security Agency, telephone intercepts, looking at satellites. It's much of a hit or miss.

So much of the military's problems in Afghanistan is that they've got Tajik translators. Tajiks hate the Pashtun, the Taliban are mainly Pashtun, and we are living in fortresses in Afghanistan. I think we should see what we can do in a couple of years in Afghanistan and get out for good. I mean this is what we have the B-2 bombers for. If [Osama] bin Laden shows up at the Serena Hotel in Islamabad, you know you flatten it. I know that sounds Paleolithic, but I would rather do this from the air than from on the ground, because it's not doable, from the intelligence side.

George H. Gilliam. So who recruited the 9/11 hijackers?

Robert Baer. That's what I would like to know. Is anybody curious about that?

I mean, you look at the 9/11 Commission Report, it's not there. I used to do operations, and 90 percent of my operations failed because my agents had other ideas or they were incompetent or they were working for the wrong side. That's the nature of operations. So how did these guys get 15 people on those airplanes and yet to this day we don't know who recruited them or vetted them. Saudi Arabia is not telling us. I hope they know who did it.

Why did Khalid Sheikh Mohammed spend a year in Doha? There's nothing in the 9/11 Commission Report of an explanation from the government of Qatar. This is the problem with the Iraq War. I spent a lot of time in Iraq and yes, I did have the idea of killing Saddam. It seemed like a good idea rather than invading, but whether I could or not, that's something else, but we would have saved a lot of American lives.

The Taliban didn't attack us, so I'm not sure why we're at war with the Taliban. The Taliban rented a room out to a lunatic, bin Laden, a mistake obviously, but now we're at war with the Pashtun. It was clearly some sort of Jihadist, Takfiri group in Saudi Arabia which put together the 9/11 attacks. We don't know who they are, which disturbs me. People in the CIA I talk to that were in Riyadh all those years, they don't know who they are either, so that's equally disturbing. I like to think that the CIA and the FBI have secrets they don't trust me with, but they know them, but I've got the impression they don't know, which is pretty scary.

Question. I have a question with regard to preconditions. It would appear that in the past, when we've approached Iran to talk with them, to engage in negotiations, that we have established preconditions, particularly with regard to nuclear

weapons. Is it important to have preconditions before you engage in negotiations with Iran? That may be a stumbling block.

Robert Baer. I think we should drop the preconditions entirely. The Iranians are too powerful to insist on preconditions. They know we cannot attack. Look, all those rockets in the 34-Day War that they hid in caves, you know they had false rockets they brought out, they learned this from the Polish, you know that the Israelis had something to shoot at, but they were just cardboard rockets. That whole technology they learned in Lebanon, they put on the Persian Gulf. What they're saying is if you attack us preemptively, you insist on your preconditions, we're going to take 17 million barrels of traded oil off the markets. So for us to insist on preconditions or hang over threat, keep the military option on the table, they know that that's not going to happen. And if the Israelis were to attack a couple nuclear facilities, they don't care. They would like it.

So I think we should go in, and it's not so much that we should accept their nuclear program, but going into a country that is this powerful is unwise. The Iranians are too proud, they've got us in a stranglehold in Iraq and Afghanistan, so why—this is American politics and they're not going to give up. The price of oil is going back up, it's at what, a dollar? In any case, in 2000, when they finally forced the Israelis out, the price of oil was hovering around \$10 a barrel. It never stopped it. This war by proxy is very cheap.

Question. Can you comment on the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, where we have a large Sunni majority from Rabat, all the way into Indonesia, dealing with the upstart Shiites to date. To what extent will the dynamics of friction between Sunni and Shiite play to the West's favor as you see it going forward and trying to manage developments in the Middle East today?

Robert Baer. From a Machiavellian point of view, it's good for us. We are not facing a unified Islam. We're facing a resurgent Shiite Islam. There's been a couple of great books on this. Vali Nasr is an absolute must read about what the Shiites are doing. We are looking at the Shiite, a resurgent Shiite. They've been oppressed since 680, it's a division in the Middle East, that's the only thing people talk about. They talk about Iran's ascendancy, they talk about this division, they talk about Iraq. For them Iraq, for Saudi Arabia in particular, was the worst disaster that's happened to that country ever, including Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, because what they see is the United States returning to an isolationist foreign policy. We leave Iraq, we leave a preeminent Iran and they're next.

What we can do is take advantage of that division and keep a peace remotely between the Sunni and Shi'ite, or at least throw our weight in a very [Henry] Kissinger-like balance of power. What's so hard for us to understand is this deep, deep division, especially in Lebanon, because if Hezbollah walks away in June as the power in Lebanon, it's another country that's fallen, and Syria is a country that's under the Iranian shadow. So you look at the Sunni as they're being encircled. If some sort of pro-Iranian government came to power after [Hosni] Mubarak dies in Egypt, it could be a catastrophe for old allies and they would be looking at us to set this balance right. So if we play our cards right it may work.

Question. In your previous book about Saudi Arabia, you say that Saudi Arabia isn't really a working partner because of how corrupt and incompetent the royal family is. And the one hope you offer, I think it was written in 2003, when King Fahd was still technically king, was that Crown Prince Abdullah looks like the best hope for Saudi Arabia. He's been King now for three years, and in today's comments it sounds like that optimism that you had didn't pan out and Saudi Arabia is still as bad as it was. Am I correct in understanding that?

Robert Baer. Abdullah has gone a long way in cleaning up Saudi Arabia, I mean he is still the bright light in that whole country. He's given women more rights, he's cut back on the corruption. He's cut back on the power of the Sudairi Seven. He can only move so fast, I mean he cannot turn against the clerics in Mecca and Medina. There's just no way that he can, but the man is old and he's appointed Nayef his Crown Prince, which I can tell you that the Arabs, the other Arab countries are just—they hate Nayef. The Yemenis hate him. They're apoplectic about this. So the real proof is going to be when Abdullah dies. If he dies and Nayef turns the country back the way it was going under Fahd—Fahd and Nayef are full brothers—we could see some unsettling things.

But you have to look at Saudi Arabia; it's in a sense an artificial country, as Iraq is. It's a new country, the Hejaz and the Nejd are very two different kinds of people, and it's hard in the Middle East. You know, the rotting Ottoman Empire was never divided up nicely and neither was Iraq. Iraq was an invention of [Winston] Churchill, with the three Ottoman provinces cobbled together and it was a country held together with extreme violence, under the Ba'athies, under Saddam. It was re-jiggered under extreme violence and in a sense it's being held together by extreme violence. There were American helicopters over Sunni neighborhoods yesterday, putting down the Awakening Council because you need a lot of force to hold this country together, because of the divisions. So in the Middle East, all the mess of the Ottoman Empire is played out and it's played

out every day. We cannot hold the Middle East together alone because we don't do empires well. We don't want to do empires. We can no longer afford it.

I never advocated that Saudi Arabia collapse violently in any way because we are addicted to cheap oil. We just simply cannot afford to have Saudi oil off world markets for any length of time and not suffer economically. So I hope Nayef is a different king than Fahd was, I mean Fahd was disabled, but I'm not very optimistic.

Question. Can you comment a bit further on Obama's approach?

Robert Baer. I think he's doing absolutely the right thing. He has no choice but to open to Iran. You'll notice at the same time he's offered the message to Persian culture, which is nice. The Clinton administration did the same thing. Madeleine Albright said we're sorry for the Mosaddeq coup. I'd like to just say something about the Mosaddeq coup. I've read the files on the Mosaddeq coup and the United States—let's just get the facts right—had a very minor role in this. The key man in the Mosaddeq coup was General [Norman] Schwarzkopf's father, who had been head of the New Jersey police. Now why he became the interlocutor to the Shah of Iran, I don't know. I mean I do know, but it seems very odd to me. He sat the Shah down and said, "Be a man, get rid of this prime minister, he's pro-Soviet, he's going to ally Iran with the Soviet Union." This was all done in this context and the Shah went to his generals and said Mosaddeq has got to go. It was in the Shah's authority. So the CIA had a very limited role in this coup, very limited.

Anyhow, Madeleine Albright apologized to the Iranians and the Iranians landed with not even a slight echo in Tehran. That's because, according to my theory, the Iranians are too powerful to be appeased by nice words. Obama's got to go through the nice words, but what they really want to see is concrete measures on the part of the United States, reflecting Iran's newfound power, which again goes back to Iraq. Having tried to kill Saddam or at least thought it was a good idea, invading Iraq was the biggest folly this country has committed in foreign policy in its history, because we've completely unbalanced the Middle East. We have lived off this balance of power in the Persian Gulf, Iran and the Arabs, for so long and we essentially handed this country to them. You won't see—I mean Iran is too big for [Nouri Al-] Maliki, the Prime Minister, to oppose, and it's too easy to go along with. Maliki is closing down the Iranian opposition camps, you've got Iranian oil companies moving in. Marubeni [Corporation] has started building a pipeline. It's going to go from Basra down to the Iranian

export lines. I think it's a bad sign when the Iranians are talking about exporting the bulk of Iraqi oil. I mean it gives a certain control over the country, but I'm a minority voice. So anyhow, we've made the mistake, now let's move on.

The other day a couple of journalists were over that spent eight years pounding on [George W.] Bush, and now the wind is out of their sails and they don't know what to do. So let's get over the anger, let's get over the Bush years, let's get over that and see what we can get out of this Afghan proposal. Trust me, the Iranians don't want to see a hostile Taliban in Kabul. They don't want to see the Taliban stirring up their Sunni minority, who are going to be setting car bombs. They don't want to see it either. You know, you could almost go to the Iranians now and tell them, "Look, the worst thing that could happen to you is if we just pulled out of Iraq with a mess and pulled out of Afghanistan, because you're going to have total chaos on your borders and you're going to be all alone, and if you really get out of hand and you go ahead and make your bomb and talk about nuking Israel, we can play the game, we'll support the Sunni fundamentalists. We did in Afghanistan, you know we obviously paid for it, but we can do it again." That's the kind of Machiavellian confrontation you can have with the Iranians off the front pages of the newspapers.

Dennis Ross is the administration's interlocutor. He's trusted in Israel and that's why he was appointed. Now he is mistrusted in Tehran because he is so close to Israel, but I think we can get through that. The Iranians know how the cards fall with this, and as long as we can go concrete, step-by-step, we're going to get through the next four years at least.

Question. You had mentioned earlier about possibly pulling out of Afghanistan.

Would you agree that the lack of attention that the United States government gave to Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal led to a vacuum with terrorism, with the Taliban, with bin Laden, that ultimately led to 9/11?

The other question I had was about [Ahmad] Khatami. Do you foresee him winning in the next election? And if so, is that going to be favorable to the United States?

Robert Baer. I think Khatami is ultimately not going to run. He's supported another candidate at this point. But it really becomes quite irrelevant because the man we have to look at is Khomeini. Khomeini, the spiritual leader, is called an ayatollah, but in fact he does not have the credentials to be an ayatollah. He controls the military. I think undoubtedly, he poisoned Khomeini's son in order to hold onto power. He's a very brutal guy, he's not a nice guy, he's a

dictator. He's the guy that we ultimately have to be looking at for a solution. It's what he wants and the generals around him that are important. But again, I don't think they're suicidal. I get a lot of disagreement with that but you know, you look at every single event that comes along.

Question. What role do you think the United Nations might be able to take in the Middle East, or do you think there is a role?

Robert Baer. I think we should give Iraq to the United Nations. Look, I'm going to be proved wrong, but what scares me now is we're going to start pulling a few troops out. Here's the scenario. I used to get paid for negative scenarios. The military has red team, green team, blue teams—and the red team guys are always envisioning the worst possible scenarios, and that's what I used to get paid to do. It fits my personality. In any event, as the Kurds and the Arabs start to fight around Kirkuk, just as the Obama administration is starting to pull troops out significantly, and you know the Turks will get involved. There will be some sort of new civil war in Iraq. If that happens, what does the administration do?

The problem with the Democrats has always been that they are assumed to be weak on national security. So if we were to pull out of Afghanistan and Iraq about the same time, which we should, and there's an attack on the United States, one kid gets acetone peroxide, puts on a vest and goes into a mall and kills 20 people. What's the message for the next four years? It will be that Obama was weak on national security, and there's no connection. I mean we invaded Iraq, there was no connection between Saddam and bin Laden, but we invaded on this myth that there was one. This is what terrifies John Kerry and the White House. I think at the end of the day they knew we could probably leave and not suffer much in either country, but it's going to be that random attack which is going to turn over the apple cart. You have to sympathize with the Democrats, because you really—I understand that we are not in a red state any more, in Virginia, or certainly Charlottesville is not. I spend a lot of time in the red states and that is what politics are reduced to. They hit us on 9/11, we've got to keep on hitting them back until they give up, whatever that means, but when people go into the voting booths that's what they think in these red states.

I don't want to leave it on a negative message. I think we're sort of doomed to fight in these two countries for a very, very long time and ultimately, don't get angry at the CIA or the military when we can't win this. It's not a question of incompetence. It's a question of the nature of the conflict. We are trying to hold together the Ottoman Empire with super glue, which can't be done.

The University of Virginia's Miller Center of Public Affairs, following Jefferson's vision of the University's public service mission, is a leading public policy institution that serves as a national meeting place where engaged citizens, scholars, students, media representatives, and government officials gather in a spirit of nonpartisan consensus to research, reflect, and report on issues of national importance to the governance of the United States, with special attention to the central role and history of the presidency.



MILLER CENTER
of **PUBLIC AFFAIRS**
UNIVERSITY *of* VIRGINIA

George H. Gilliam
Cristina Lopez-Gottardi Chao
General Editors

Anne Chesnut
Designer

Ansel Olson
Stephanie Gross
Sean Gallagher
Photographers

Worth Higgins &
Associates, Inc.
Printer



Mixed Sources



Product group from well-managed
forests, controlled sources and
recycled wood or fiber
www.fsc.org Cert no. SCS-COC-00635
© 1996 Forest Stewardship Council





MILLER CENTER
of PUBLIC AFFAIRS
UNIVERSITY *of* VIRGINIA

CENTRAL IN



UNITED STATES