

# The Threat of International Terrorism and the Image of the United States Abroad

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THERE CAN BE FEW ANALYTICAL tasks more complicated than tracing the origin of one country's attitudes toward another. The task is especially difficult in the case of the United States, a country with high visibility in foreign affairs, no military or economic equals in the world, and an infinite number of international contacts. Any effort to gauge international views of the United States must take into account numerous causal factors. Drawing from the rich literature on anti-Americanism, one type of factor influencing attitudes towards the United States may be described as "external." Several authors have proposed that external factors are attitudes toward the United States determined by the character of U.S. foreign policies and actions, ranging from military campaigns to the export of Hollywood movies. Other authors emphasize "internal" factors as causal agents. They argue that foreign attitudes derive from the particular psychological, cultural, or political aspects of each nation. The relative importance of the classification of these two factors has become a subject of heated debate both inside and outside the United States, leading to the polarization of public discussion on the U.S.'s image abroad.

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## EXTERNAL VERSUS INTERNAL FACTORS

Authors who focus on external factors tend to highlight the deleterious effects of U.S. economic and cultural expansion, foreign policies, and military actions. Their main goal is often to corroborate an empirical basis for negative assessments of the United

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States. In a recent book entitled *Why Do People Hate America?*, the authors begin by assuring the reader that the title of the manuscript is indeed “a question, not a statement,” and one they wish to examine “honestly.” The book’s underlying message is that hatred of the United States is a reflection of real-life experiences. “America is an object of much fear and loathing, and this opinion is based on concrete experience with Ameri-

**Other external factors such as the role of the United States in globalization and the expansion of capitalism have also been cited as a basis for anti-Americanism abroad.**

can power over the last five decades.”<sup>1</sup> Midway through the text, the authors include an extensive list of every American military intervention in the last century, ranging from Wounded Knee to Afghanistan. The list, which spans ten pages, is intended to speak for itself as clear evidence of what lies

“at the heart of America: violence.”<sup>2</sup> The same emphasis on U.S. foreign policies and actions can be found in several other recent books, including the collection of essays by Gore Vidal and Noam Chomsky’s *9-11*.<sup>3</sup> As Chomsky wrote, “We should recognize that in much of the world the U.S. is regarded as a leading terrorist state, and with good reason.”<sup>4</sup> Chomsky’s work contains a list of nations where U.S. military actions led to civilian killings, including Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, East Timor, Sudan, Iraq, Yugoslavia and Afghanistan.

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Other external factors such as the role of the United States in globalization and the expansion of capitalism have also been cited as a basis for anti-Americanism abroad. The United States has been characterized as the global harbinger of “arrogant secularist materialism,” the destroyer of indigenous cultural traditions, a unilateral bully in international economic affairs, a pusher of unsafe modified foods, and an ominous threat to the environment, human rights, and worker protection. For those authors who emphasize external factors, whether it is the abandonment of the Kyoto accord, the new steel tariffs, the insolence of multinationals, or the bombing of Baghdad, the United States’s image is a product of the nation’s own actions.

Moving from to the other side of the debate focuses on the many authors who stress the internal factors underpinning foreign attitudes toward the United States. Their underlying message suggests that the level of anti-Americanism depends less on U.S. actions than on the particular internal features of foreign countries. Three types of internal factors—psychological, political, and cultural—are prominent in this literature. Drawing from the psychological category, some authors insist that certain critiques of the United States are irrational or pathological. Paul Hollander’s *Anti-Americanism*, for instance, highlights the irrationality thesis. To Hollander, anti-American-

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ism is “less than fully rational . . . a free floating hostility or aversion that feeds on many sources besides the discernible shortcomings of the United States.”<sup>6</sup> A somewhat similar stance is found in a collection of articles on anti-Americanism in which attitudes toward the United States were said to have “more to do with the vagaries of the imagination than with actual experience of that country.”<sup>7</sup> In a recent issue of *Policy Review*, an author derided anti-Americanism as “irrational” and “a fantasy ideology dressed up to look like Marxism.”<sup>8</sup> “Envy” has also been linked to unfavorable foreign attitudes toward the United States.<sup>9</sup>

In explaining “why they hate us,” many have pointed to cultural differences between the United States and other countries. In the wake of 9/11, Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” hypothesis identifying differences in culture as “the fundamental source of conflict in this new world”<sup>10</sup> was cited by hundreds of journalists and experts around the globe.<sup>11</sup> While most of these authors contrasted the Islamic World with the United States, the cultural factor has also been said to influence how Europeans, particularly the French and the Russians, regard various aspects of the United States.<sup>12</sup>

In the opinion of many analysts, negative attitudes toward the United States have come to fruition through the political forces within a given country. Anti-Americanism itself can be seen as a negative ideology, a scapegoat mechanism, that is used by ruling elites, both political and religious, to justify their dominance in society in spite of evident failures. The opposition can use this ideology in its struggle for political power. Bolstering anti-American sentiments, or manipulating already existing hostility toward the United States, may play a part in a conservative religious leader’s campaign against modernization or consumerism. It may also work to the advantage of a leftist leader to whom America represents a major obstacle to revolutionary changes. For example, historian Françoise Thom stresses the importance of anti-Americanism in the internal political and ideological struggle in France. She insists that French anti-Americanism has favored the coalescence of various destructive forces in France including virulent Trotskyists, Islamic extremists, and the radicals of the anti-globalization movement. Thom contends that Chirac’s anti-Americanism is a “preventive capitulation” before “the wild youth which France failed to civilize.”<sup>13</sup>

The authors of this article are wary of overemphasizing the role of any single cause of anti-Americanism. Indeed, most of the factors discussed above are viable. The strong ideological character of this debate tends to push authors toward extreme positions. To a certain extent, the emphasis on ideology explains why some important factors, such as the fear of a common enemy, have not played a major role in the literature. This article will discuss how a foreign country’s perception of the danger posed by international terrorism influences its attitudes toward the United States.

COMMON INTERNATIONAL THREATS IN THE 20<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY AND 9/11

Common threats have led to the cooperation of disparate nations throughout history. Twice in the twentieth century, the mutual fear and suspicion of Germany united the Entente. The reality of the threat posed by the Central Powers during World War I, and the Axis Powers during World War II, generated a mutual understanding, group identification, a spirit of cooperation, and positive interaction between France, Britain, Russia (later the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during WWII), and the United States. Though only considered an Associated Power (not an Allied Power) during WWI, after its entry into this conflict on 6 April 1917, the United States enjoyed a more favorable image among the Allies.<sup>14</sup> Gratitude and respect for the nation's contribution to the war, as well as its subsequent aid to Europe and Russia in the aftermath of the war, lingered in Europe for a few years before anti-American attitudes took hold in the 1930s, particularly in France and the Soviet Union.<sup>15</sup>

With the start of WWII, however, not only did the Western powers warm up to the United States, but even the Soviet Union recognized the country as a leading partner in the anti-Hitler coalition. The radically improved image of the United States in the Soviet Union demonstrates how a commonly perceived danger can change attitudes and stereotypes. During WWII, there was an intensive cultural exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union. A series of U.S. movies played in Soviet theaters, Soviet intellectuals traveled to the United States and vice versa, and the Soviet press regularly quoted U.S. radio and other news sources. In his analysis of the Soviet press, Jeffery Brooks explains that during the war "the British and American allies had been a faint but real presence in the press," and that the editors who printed such coverage "allowed foreigners a legitimacy and authority that contrasted with the xenophobia of the 1930s."<sup>16</sup>

For five decades after WWII, while animosity toward the United States in the Soviet Union rose, the sentiments of the Western powers in Europe remained benign, if not favorable toward the United States.<sup>17</sup> According to dozens of multi-country surveys conducted in 1954-1991, the Western European opinion of the United States was generally favorable.<sup>18</sup> Even in the late 1960s, when mass protests against U.S. policies in Vietnam reached a crescendo, the proportion and intensity of European opposition never came close to the level of resistance to the recent war in Iraq. Although there were several factors that bolstered the positive views of the United States in Western countries during the post-war period—not least of which were the formation of the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the contribution of vast amounts of U.S. financial aid to foreign countries under the Bretton Woods system and the Marshall Plan—the most important factors were the dangers posed by the

Soviet Union, and the perception of the United States as an adequate counterbalance to this threat. As political analyst Fareed Zakaria recently suggested, if 1968 was a bad year for the United States' image abroad in light of the developments in Vietnam, it was also the year of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. During the Cold War, the Europeans' critical views of the United States were always "balanced by the wariness of the

**The radically improved image of the United States in the Soviet Union demonstrates how a commonly perceived danger can change attitudes and stereotypes.**

Soviet threat and communist behavior."<sup>19</sup> As Thomas Friedman wrote about German-U.S. relations: "Since World War II, America and Germany have had many disputes, but always within limits, because both sides saw a dangerous foe on the other side of that wall—the Communist totalitarians—and realized we needed to fight together."<sup>20</sup>

Each of the major conflicts of the twentieth century spawned international alliances and increased the good will between the Allies to varying degrees. WWI led to the League of Nations and the tempering of the Central Powers. WWII gave rise to the United Nations, NATO, and heightened transatlantic interaction. The Cold War led to the East-West balance of power that functioned as the cornerstone of strategic cooperation between the United States, Western Europe, and several other countries.

However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the need for a counterbalancing threat disappeared, and the Allied Powers could discard their Cold War security blanket. Although the decline of the United States' image in Western Europe was not immediate, the demise of the bipolar world created a new international context in which serious political, economic, and cultural differences were felt more readily on both sides of the Atlantic.<sup>21</sup> Dozens of scholars and journalists—from Robert Kagan to Jose Joffe—have cited the new geopolitical circumstances of the post-Cold War period as a major stimulus of friction and animosity between the United States and its former allies.<sup>22</sup> Indeed, the appreciation of United States for its actions during the Cold War—the liberation of East Germany from the Soviet occupation, the protection of Japan under its nuclear umbrella, etc.—did not last long after the Soviet collapse.<sup>23</sup> Nowhere has this point been more obvious than in South Korea. At the cost of thousands of its soldiers, the United States saved South Korea from subjugation in 1950-1953, and then protected this country for decades thereafter. Nonetheless, U.S. image became increasingly negative in South Korea after 1991. In the next decade, youth in South Korea would blame the United States for obstructing reunification with North Korea.<sup>24</sup>

While the Soviet collapse marked the decline of U.S. image in much of the world, it had the opposite effect in the former Soviet states. In the early 1990s, with concern

about the U.S. threat at its peak, and ruling elite interest in democratic ideals, attitudes of those in the former Soviet States toward the United States were comparably favorable.<sup>25</sup>

On 11 September 2001, the world changed dramatically. The character and magnitude of the terrorist attacks on the United States had no precedent in history. No terrorist attack before 9/11 had ever centered the world's attention on the problem of terrorism. As one public opinion analyst wrote, "regardless of the place where people live, the language they speak or their economic situation, 'everybody' has an opinion about September 11."<sup>26</sup> Despite near universal interest in the 9/11 attacks, there was not a universal understanding of what they meant, and how to respond.

Today, the image of the United States is determined, at least in part, by how each country perceives the level of danger posed by international terrorism, and by the extent to which they support U.S. involvement in checking this danger. Some accept the United States as a partner in a coalition against the common threat of terrorism, engendering favorable attitudes. Some countries, such as Colombia, have even appealed to the United States for help—including military assistance—in the fight against terrorism. In other cases, the fear of terrorism is low, and the United States is seen as irrelevant to the problem, or even as its cause. In these circumstances, U.S. activities against terrorism may indeed expedite the decline of its image. This essay examines whether, and to what extent, fear of terrorism affects attitudes toward the United States.

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#### **HYPOTHESES AND EMPIRICAL DATA**

In a research project initiated immediately after 9/11, we measured the reaction of foreign elites—that is, people who shape the foreign and domestic policies in their countries—to the events of 9/11, its possible perpetrators, and the U.S. response to the attacks, as reflected in the international press. Our view on the interaction between elites and the media are close to those authors who insist that the leaders of major political, cultural, and economic institutions have a crucial influence on the media.<sup>27</sup>

We analyzed more than 4,000 articles from the ten largest newspapers in China, Colombia, Egypt, Germany, India, Lithuania, and Russia, published between 12-15 September 2001. While many of these articles were written by pundits paid to be provocative, we separated and measured the opinions of political, business, cultural, and religious leaders. The sample from each country neared a census of the mainstream representation of the opinions of elites (as presented by the ten largest newspapers) in the first four days following the terrorist attacks. All members of our research team are native speakers of the languages they analyzed and are proficient in English. In India, five different researchers were necessary to translate the five different languages used in the ten largest Indian newspapers (Hindi, Gujarati, Malayalam, Urdu, and Bengali,

*The Threat of International Terrorism and the Image of the United States Abroad* respectively). We tested the reliability of our data using Cohen's kappa, the results of which may be interpreted as "moderate to substantial."<sup>28</sup>

Treating nations as groups, we applied the "we-they distinction" (a key concept in intergroup relations literature) as the theoretical basis for describing international attitudes toward the United States.<sup>29</sup> We assumed that the terrorist attacks—like Hitler's invasion of Poland at the start of WWII—could be perceived as a threat to several countries, besides the United States. We hypothesized that the rise of a perceived common enemy (i.e., Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda) would stimulate group identification between the United States and threatened countries, generating favorable attitudes toward the United States.

Several authors have supported the proposition that a common enemy or mutual conflict enhances group identification among countries or subgroups within a country.<sup>30</sup> If this had been the case after 9/11, we would have found a positive association between a country's degree of concern about similar terrorist attacks and its attitude toward the United States. This relationship, as we will demonstrate, was well supported by the results of our project. Countries that strongly condemned the terrorist attacks and identified Osama bin Laden as the prime suspect were more likely to support the United States' response to the attacks, agree with the U.S. explanation of 9/11's cause, offer aid to the U.S. war on terrorism, and generally hold a favorable image of the United States. In other words, countries that shared the United States' perception of the terrorist threat were more willing to evaluate the country favorably and to support its approach to fighting terrorism.

At the same time, it should be pointed out that the empirical relationship described above does not imply an equivalent relationship between the level of negative attitudes toward terrorism and the level of positive attitudes toward the United States. In each country, the percentage of authors who condemned terrorism was greater than the number who identified with the United States. These differences indicate that the fear of like attacks was only one of several factors that shaped views of the United States in other countries.

#### **THE IMAGE OF THE DANGER: THE WORLD REACTS TO 9/11**

To measure the level of perceived danger in each of the examined countries post-9/11, two aspects of press representation of the attacks were surveyed: the qualitative description of the event itself and the portrayal of the perpetrator. The goal of the project was to compare the degree of U.S. concern about terrorism with the concern in other countries. The reactions of the U.S. government were used as the point of reference. By all surveyed accounts, both the American people and the U.S. government viewed the

attacks extremely negatively, and the majority of Americans named Osama bin Laden as a prime suspect.

Judging by the first indicator, much of the world was relatively sympathetic to the U.S. position. Very few elites publicly praised the acts of terrorism in the four days following 9/11. Respondents who defended the perpetrators—describing their actions as courageous or labeling the terrorists as “victims of oppression”—comprised no more than five percent of the sample in all countries surveyed. Although the international press generally described the attacks in negative terms, such as “horrible, terrible, or a killing of innocent people,” there were differences in the frequencies of condemnation among surveyed countries. Eighty-six percent of Lithuanian respondents characterized the attacks in clearly negative terms compared to 54 percent in Egypt. A considerable number of people in the international print media used neutral terms such as “well-organized”, “shrewd”, “thorough”, or “meticulous.” Egyptians (41 percent) used the most neutral terminology, followed by Indians (29 percent), Germans (27 percent), Colombians (23 percent), Russians (21 percent), Chinese (15 percent), and Lithuanians (14 percent).

#### **THE PRIME SUSPECT OF 9/11**

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In the wake of the attacks, the majority of U.S. elites shared the view of the White House and the media that Islamic extremist Osama bin Laden was responsible for 9/11. Among elites of other countries, however, there was less agreement. Germany, Lithuania, and India agreed with the U.S. stance on bin Laden, while China and Egypt were more doubtful. Only 11 percent of Egyptians blamed Osama bin Laden and none held Islamic fundamentalists responsible. In contrast, 84 percent of Germans blamed either bin Laden (57 percent) or Islamic fundamentalists (27 percent).

#### **THE JOINT INDICATOR**

To indicate a country's respective levels of concern about terrorist attacks, we took the average percentage in each country of those respondents who clearly condemned 9/11 and agreed with U.S. blame of Osama bin Laden and/or Islamic Fundamentalists. Using this anti-terrorism indicator, we separated our targeted countries into three categories: those with a high level of concern regarding terrorist threat (Germany and Lithuania, 79 and 83 percent respectively); those with moderate concern (Russia, Colombia, and India, 69, 71, and 73 percent respectively); and those with low concern (Egypt and China, 33 and 54 percent respectively). If our hypothesis is correct, we should find the highest degree of identification with the United States in Germany and



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Lithuania, and much less identification in Egypt and China. Again, the assumption here is that the more a country perceives itself as a potential victim of terrorism, the greater its solidarity with the United States and the war on terror.

**THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER**

Following the attacks, President Bush, Congress, and a majority of U.S. citizens believed that a military response was the proper course of action. Although support for using force was, by comparison, minimal in most foreign countries, our hypothesized relationship accurately predicted agreement with the U.S. stance: Germany and Lithuania, the two heavyweights on the anti-terrorism scale, posted the two highest percentages in favor of U.S. military actions. Representing the opposite pole, Egyptian respondents were wholly unsupportive of military action in the first days after the attacks. The level of endorsement was also low in Colombia (3 percent) and China (5 percent). Russia (11 percent), and India (15 percent). The two countries who were experiencing terrorism themselves, were slightly more responsive to the U.S. position.

**HOW THE WORLD CHARACTERIZED AMERICA AFTER THE ATTACKS**

According to a study on national stereotypes conducted in the late 1940s, the four adjectives most frequently used by the French, British, Australians, West Germans, Italians, Dutch, and Norwegians to describe U.S. citizens were: progressive, generous, practical, and hardworking.<sup>31</sup> In contrast, the four adjectives the group used most frequently to describe Russians were: domineering, backward, cruel, and hardworking. Undeniably, much has changed since the early post-WWII period. On 12 September 2001—as the United States faced the world as a victim—elites in most countries described the United States in unfavorable terms. Once again, however, we found that countries that shared the U.S. view of the terrorist threat gave the most favorable descriptions of the United States.

In order to compare print media from various countries, we comprised a list of forty different descriptions of the United States—half of them positive and half negative. In the days directly following the attacks, some of the most popular words and phrases used to describe the United States in the Egyptian press were “racially or religiously prejudiced,” “unfair or unjust,” and “arrogant.” Russian respondents used terms such as “vulnerable,” “arrogant,” and “warlike,” while those in India emphasized U.S. indifference to terrorism prior to 11 September. The Colombian and Chinese press were somewhat less critical of the United States. Positive comments about the U.S. economy as well as the term “compassionate” ranked among the most salient images of

the United States in the Chinese press. “Compassionate” also made the top five list in Germany, along with “healthy democracy.” The most favorable adjective list was found in Lithuania, where Americans were deemed “brave,” “freedom loving,” and “determined.”

Overall, the hypothesized relationship emerged as anticipated. Taking into account the hundreds of statements in the Lithuanian and German press, 78 percent of descriptions of the United States in both countries were favorable. This indicator dropped to 20 percent and 25 percent in Russia and Egypt respectively. In India 37 percent and Colombia 53 percent represented a middle ground, and in China 42 percent showed slightly more support for the United States than expected.

### THE IMAGE OF THE ENEMY AND IDEOLOGICAL WARFARE AFTER 9/11

If the level of concern about terrorist attacks was the sole determinant of the U.S. image abroad, we would have found equivalent levels of condemnation of 9/11 and praise for the United States and its response. As our study showed, however, this was clearly not the case. While the perceived threat of international terrorism aligned countries to some extent, the internal and external factors discussed earlier undermine this international unity.

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Taking Russia as an example, we might expect that the operations conducted by Chechen terrorists in Moscow and other regions of the country would generate group identification between Russia and the United States due to the perceived common enemy of Islamic fundamentalism. To some extent, such was the case following 9/11. Several analysts noted that for a brief period following the attacks, the problem of terrorism bolstered Russian-U.S. relations.<sup>32</sup> President Vladimir Putin’s initial reaction to 9/11 was, by all accounts, sympathetic, and his solidarity with the United States was strong. Russia quickly became a member of the international anti-terrorist coalition, and took several measures to allow U.S. troops into Central Asia, and official relations between the United States and Russia were warmer than at any time since WWII. Yet there are many other factors that have countered this growing relationship. Actions such as the expansion of U.S. influence within countries formerly controlled by Moscow, the inclusion of Baltic countries in NATO, envy of the U.S. economic success, and the necessity of the Kremlin to find a scapegoat for its failed economic reforms have all caused conflict or controversy.

As our study showed, although the threat of international terrorism does influence how foreign countries perceive the United States, this influence is relatively weak. One reason for its impotence may be the ideology underlying U.S. policy. In the past, there have been both positive and negative ideologies used to justify war. The former stresses the importance of defending values such as liberty or democracy, while the

latter accentuates the negative character of the enemy. Throughout history, war propaganda has generally assumed a negative character. For example, the goal of defeating Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia was more prominent in ideological campaigns of the West during WWII than was praise of Western democracy.


Negative ideology usually centers on two elements of the enemy's image: the agent (leader of country) and the structure (political and social system, specific culture, or religion). During WWII and at the peak of the Cold War, the Allies focused on both elements: the Nazi regime and Adolf Hitler, and the Soviet system and Josef Stalin. Likewise, Soviet propaganda attacked the capitalist system and its leaders, particularly U.S. President Harry Truman. Conversely, the structure, institutions, and ideologies of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia were the main focus of Western propaganda.

With the start of the war on terrorism, the United States chose, for various reasons (not least of which was its concern about alienating the Muslim population in the United States and the rest of the world), a propagandist strategy that employed a "positive ideology." The emphasis was placed more on what the United States should defend, then on what it should attack. Moreover, the elements of negative ideology that were employed by U.S. President George W. Bush and his administration focused on a single negative agent (Osama bin Laden), but almost ignored the structural component of the enemy (Islamic fundamentalism). According to our content analysis of forty-six of the president's statements after 9/11, he named Osama bin Laden as the prime suspect 57 times and characterized the perpetrators in terms of "Islamic extremism" once. This refusal to describe the structure and ideology of the enemy represents a striking contrast to the U.S. government's presentation of opposing forces during WWI, WWII, and the Cold War.

The only evident structural component of Bush's rhetoric was a reliance on "good versus evil" terminology. Our content analysis shows that out of 25 references to the perpetrators of the attacks, 59 percent contained the word "evil." In addition to being vague, the descriptor is also unpopular. According to a Pew study conducted in April 2002, 75 percent of Western Europeans disapprove of Bush's "axis of evil" rhetoric while one third U.S. respondents disapprove.<sup>33</sup> Although many factors determine how a country perceives the threat of terrorism, one of its most direct components is the image of the enemy promulgated by the United States.

**Although many factors determine how a country perceives the threat of terrorism, one of its most direct components is the image of the enemy promulgated by the United States.**

## CONCLUSION

By all accounts the war against international terrorism will last many years. To a great extent, the outcome of this war will depend on how foreign countries perceive the United States. In recent years, the attention given to U.S. image abroad has been devoted to investigating the causes of “anti-Americanism.” The literature on this subject encompasses a polarized debate that focuses either on the shortcomings of U.S. actions in the international arena or on the political, psychological, and cultural circumstances in foreign countries. Much less of an emphasis has been placed on foreign attitudes toward international terrorism and the effect of a common enemy on attitudes toward the United States. In this article, we attempted to show that even in the case of terrorism on the scale of 9/11 (a danger that is much less defined and salient than most global threats of the past) countries who identified with the U.S. image of the enemy are more willing to support the U.S. strategy for preventing terrorism. Our findings suggest that a U.S. strategy for building support among other nations should include a clear explanation of the U.S. intentions and a carefully articulated description of the threat facing the United States and its allies. A failure to convince other countries about the imminence of a global threat will ultimately lead to a negative view of the United States abroad. 

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## NOTES

1. Ziauddin Sardar, and Merryl Wyn Davies, *Why Do People Hate America* (New York: The Disinformation Company, 2003).

2. Ibid.

3. Gore Vidal, *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: How We Got To Be So Hated*, (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press/Nation Books, 2002); see also his *Dreaming war: blood for oil and the Cheney-Bush junta*, (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press/Nation Books, 2002).

4. Noam Chomsky, *9-11* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2001).

5. See Pierre Bourdieu, *Acts of resistance: against the tyranny of the market*, translated from the French by Richard Nice, (New York: New Press, 1998); see also Benjamin R. Barber, “Beyond Jihad Vs. McWorld” (*The Nation*, 21 January, 2002); Greg Palast, *The Best Democracy Money Can Buy: An Investigative Reporter Exposes The Truth About Globalization, Corporate Cons, and High Finance Fraudsters* (Sterling, Va.: Pluto Press, 2002).

6. Paul Hollander, *Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad 1965-1990* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). The application of the irrationality model to the debate over anti-Americanism is apparent in several of Hollander's more recent commentaries. See, for instance, “It's a Crime That Some Don't See This as Hate” *Washington Post*, 28 October, 2001 and “Loving Peace & Detesting America—what makes the anti-war movement thrive,” (*National Review Online*, March 2003). See also Victor Davis Hanson, “I love Iraq, bomb Texas,” *Commentary*, Volume 114, Issue 5, December 2002.

7. Theodore Zeldin, “Foreword,” in Denis Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik, and Marie-France Toinet (eds.), *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).

8. Lee Harris, “The Intellectual Origins of America-Bashing,” *Policy Review* (January 2003, Issue 116).

9. See Josef Joffe, “The axis of envy: why Israel and the United States both strike the same European

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nerve," *Foreign Policy*, September-October 2002; Mark Hertsgaard, *The Eagle's Shadow: Why America Fascinates and Infuriates The World* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002); Vladimir Shlapentokh, "Is the Greatness Syndrome Eroding," *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2002. See also a special issue of *New Criterion* that contains the work of several authors who cite envy as a determinant of "anti-Americanism," including: "The Politics of Envy" by Paul Hollander, "Retreats into Fantasy" by David Pryce-Jones, "Failures of Nerve" by Roger Kimball, and "Yearning to be Liked" by John Derbyshire *New Criterion*, vol. 21, no. 3, November 2002.

10. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3, Summer 1993.

11. See, for instance, an editorial in the *Hindustan Times* (13 September, 2001), a German news article by Leo Weiland (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 September, 2001), a Colombian opinion piece by Gabriel Iriarte Nunez (*El Tiempo*, 12 December, 2001), and an interview with the prominent Russian political analyst Vyacheslar Nikonov (*Trud*, 13 September, 2001).

12. See Jean-Francois Revel, *L'Obsession Anti-Americaine*, (Plon, 2002): pp. 141-184; Vladimir Shlapentokh, "The Changeable Soviet Image of America," *The Annals*, vol. 497, May 1988.

13. Francoise Thom, "Deux points de vue critiques sur la diplomatie francaise. La capitulation preventive," *Le Figaro*, 6 May, 2003. For more about the role of anti-Americanism in the political processes in France, see Philippe Roger, *L'Ennemi Americain: Genealogie de L'antiamericanisme Francais*, (Paris: Seuil, 2003). For more about the role of anti-Americanism in the leftist movement in Greece, see Takis Michas, "America the Despised," *The National Interest*, no. 67, Spring 2002.

14. For example, as explained by two experts on French attitudes toward the United States, public opinion in France experienced a sudden swing by the end of WWI. "The Americans' involvement in the war, albeit belated, naturally fostered pro-American sentiments, particularly after the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty" (Denis Lacorne and Jacques Rupnik, "France Bewitched by America," In Denis Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik, and Marie-France Toinet (eds.), *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).

15. See, among others, Tony Judt, who claims that by the 1930s, "European commentary shifted perceptibly from the dismissive to the resentful," "Anti-Americans Abroad," *New York Review of Books*, 1 May, 2003.

16. Jeffery Books, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!* Princeton, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000).

17. According to a major study in international public opinion conducted in 1948, the USA received a notably favorable "friendliness score," and a positive "stereotype score" from the Dutch, Norwegians, Italians, Australians, French, Germans (from the British Zone of Occupation), British, and Mexicans (William Buchanan, and Hadley Cantril, *How Nations See Each Other*, (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1953). The authors cite military and ideological alliances as two major factors that influence how one nation perceives another.

18. Steven K. Smith and Douglas A. Wertman, "Redefining U.S.-West European Relations in the 1990s: West European Public Opinion in the Post-Cold War Era," *Political Science and Politics*, vol. 25, issue 2, June 1992.

19. Fareed Zakaria, "The Arrogant Empire," *Newsweek*, 24 March, 2003.

20. Thomas Friedman, "Let them Come to Berlin," *New York Times*, 7 November, 2002.

21. For more about how international views of the USA changed significantly for the worse after the fall of the USSR, see Jean Francois Revel, *L'Obsession Anti -Americaine*, (Paris: Plon, 2002), 14; John M. Owen, "Transnational Liberalism and U.S. Primacy," *International Security*, vol. 26, 2002; see also, Paul Hollander's new introduction to his *Anti-Americanism* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995); Richard Bernstein has also placed the emphasis on the demise of the Soviet threat as the springboard for negative attitudes toward the USA in Western Europe; see his "Iraq Crisis Bares Deep Rift for Old Allies," *New York Times*, 14 February, 2003, and his "The Germans Who Toppled Communism Resent the U.S.," *New York Times*, 22 February, 2003.

22. See Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," *Policy Review*, no. 113, June-July 2002; Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003); James Caesar, "A Genealogy of Anti-Americanism," *The Public Interest*, 23 July, 2003; Josef Joffe, "Round 1 Goes to Mr. Big," *New York Times*, 10 February, 2003; Thomas Friedman, "Peking Duct Tape," 16

February, 2003.

23. For more about the attitudes of East Germans to America, see Nina Bernstein, "Young Germans ask: thanks for what?", *The New York Times*, 9 March, 2003.

24. See Mun Yol Yi, "The country America can not see," *The New York Times*, 27 August, 2003.

25. See Vladimir Shlapentokh, "The changing Russian view of the West: From admiration in the early 1990s to hostility in the late 1990s," in Tom Casier and Katlijn Malfliet (eds.), *Is Russia a European Power. The position of Russia in a new Europe* (Louvain: Leuven University, 1998).

26. Marta Lagos, "Terrorism and the Image of the United States in Latin America," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, vol.15, no. 1, 2003.

27. Justin Lewis, *Constructing Public Opinion* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); John Downing, *Internationalizing Media Theory* (London: Sage Publications, 1996).

28. See J.R. Landis, and G.G. Koch, "The measurement of observer agreement for categorical data," *Biometrics*, vol. 33, 1977.

29. See, for instance, H. Tajfel, H. "Experiments in intergroup discrimination," *Scientific American*, vol. 223, 1970; H. Tajfel, M.G. Billig, R.R. Bundy, C. Flament, "Social categorization and intergroup behavior," *European Journal of Social Psychology*, vol.1, 1971.

30. For a recent study on the impact of terrorism on attitudes toward the United States in Latin America, see Marta Lagos, "Terrorism and the Image of the United States in Latin America," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, vol.15, no. 1, 2003. For a discussion of this issue in the social psychology literature, see Marilynn B. Brewer, and Rupert J. Brown, "Intergroup Relations," in Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey (eds.), *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, vol. 2 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998); R.R. Blake, and J.S. Mouton, "From theory to practice interface problem solving," In S. Worchel and W. Austin (eds.), *Psychology of intergroup relations* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1986); D.T. Campbell, "Enhancement of contrast as a composite habit," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 53, 1956; M. Sherif, B.J. White, and O. Harvey, "Status in experimentally produced groups," *American Journal of Sociology*, 60, 1955.

31. William Buchanan, and Hadley Cantril, *How Nations See Each Other* (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1953).

32. See, for instance, an interview with Nikolai Zlobin, Director of Russian and Asian Programs at the Center for Defense Information in the United States, in *Izvestia*, 28 August, 2003.

33. Pew Research Center, Survey Report, 20 April, 2002.