

Performance and Accountability Report

Fiscal Year 2003



Message from the Secretary

February 13, 2004



I am pleased to provide the Department of Homeland Security's Performance and Accountability Report for Fiscal Year 2003. The report documents progress toward fulfilling President Bush's commitment to protect our citizens from the threat of terrorist attacks, while safeguarding those freedoms that are at the heart of what it means to be Americans.

In January 2003, the President signed an Executive Order creating the Department of Homeland Security, the Nation's 15th and newest Cabinet department. The most significant transformation of the United States government since President Truman merged the various branches of our armed forces into the Department of Defense, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security consolidated 22 previously separate agencies under one organization with one unified mission: to protect our nation from those who seek to harm our people, and extinguish America's beacon of liberty to the world.

The shock and horror of the attacks of September 11, 2001 soon yielded to an appreciation of the enormity of the task of hardening the nation to future attacks, proactively disrupting terrorist networks and better harnessing federal, state and local resources. In the twelve months since the creation of the Department, we have made substantial progress. Through the hard work of our dedicated and talented employees, America is more secure and better prepared than we were one year ago. Since January 2003 we have:

- Improved the collection, analysis and sharing of critical intelligence with key federal, state and local entities;
- Allocated or awarded over \$8 billion to state and local governments to help them prevent, respond and recover from acts of terrorism and other potential disasters:
- Strengthened border security through the "One face at the border" initiative, which will cross-train officers to perform three
 formerly separate inspections—immigration, customs and agriculture. This will allow us to target our resources toward higher
 risk travelers:
- Instituted innovative new systems like US-VISIT to identify and track foreign visitors and students and to screen for possible terrorist or criminal involvement;
- Safeguarded air travel from the terrorist threat by hardening cockpit doors, instituting 100 percent checked baggage screening; expanding the Air Marshals Service, and training more than 50,000 federal passenger and baggage screeners;
- Increased safeguards on Maritime transportation and port infrastructure;
- Expanded research and development in the defense of our homeland, through the creation of programs such as the
 Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) which has already engaged hundreds of private companies
 and universities in new cutting-edge technologies and Homeland Security Centers Programs that supports university-based
 centers of excellence;
- Successfully transferred about \$45 billion in assets, \$36 billion in liabilities and more than 180,000 employees to the Department;
- Launched an ambitious, collaborative effort involving input from employees at all levels, unions, academia, and outside experts to design a modern human resources system that is mission-centered, fair, effective and flexible;
- Initiated a five-year budget and planning process and commenced the development of an integrated business and financial
 management system to consolidate the over 80 systems the Department inherited; and
- Ensured the continuity of—and in many cases consolidated and streamlined—essential management and mission support functions throughout the department.

We are using the President's Management Agenda to strengthen the management of the Department of Homeland Security. This report discusses our actions to embrace and advance this agenda.

The financial and performance information contained in this report has been assessed and is fundamentally reliable and complete, and in accordance with guidance issued by the Office of Management and Budget. While weaknesses in internal controls and financial management systems do exist, they do not impair the fulfillment of the Department's mission, and except for those weaknesses we are able to provide reasonable assurance that our management controls and financial systems, taken as a whole, meet the objectives of sections 2 and 4 of the *Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act* (FMFIA). We have resolved many of the material weaknesses inherited from the 22 agencies transferring into the Department. We are correcting the remaining FMFIA issues, as well as auditor identified weaknesses in internal control reported this year. The Department is steadily improving in these areas, and they do not affect our ability to perform our missions and functions with efficiency and accuracy.

Along with the Department's 180,000 employees, I am proud of all we have accomplished in the past year toward protecting our citizens, our borders and our way of life from the threat of terrorism.

Sincerely

Tom Begg

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Overview

The Department of Homeland Security's *Performance and Accountability Report for Fiscal Year 2003* provides financial and performance information that enables the President, the Congress, and the public to assess the effectiveness of the Department relative to its mission performance, program management, and stewardship of resources. The Financial Statements and Notes cover a seven-month period commencing with the Department's initial operation through the end of the fiscal year. Performance goals and results are reported upon for a full 12 months, as they were adopted from transferred agencies. This report satisfies the reporting requirements of the following laws:

- Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990;
- Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982;
- Government Management Reform Act of 1994;
- · Government Performance and Results Act of 1993;
- · Reports Consolidation Act of 2000;
- Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002; and
- Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996.

Part I of this report contains the Management's Discussion and Analysis. This section provides a concise overview of the entire report. It describes the Department's mission, organization and progress in implementing the *President's Management Agenda*. It explains the impact of the *Homeland Security Act of 2002* and highlights the most important performance and financial results of fiscal year 2003. This section also describes management controls we put in place and identifies the material weaknesses that we are working to correct.

Part II of this report contains the Department's financial statements and the Independent Auditors' Report, along with the Inspector General's summary of the most important management and performance challenges facing the Department.

Part III of this report contains a discussion and analysis of accomplishing selected full fiscal year 2003 performance goals. It also contains completeness and reliability information, findings and recommendations of program evaluations to improve performance along with budget information.

In addition to our accomplishments reported in Part III, we have taken a number of steps to organize and mobilize the people and resources of the Department:

- Announced plans to make available more than 5,000 additional armed federal law enforcement agents to increase security at the Nation's airports and on commercial flights;
- Consolidate three different border inspection functions into "one face at the border";
- Announced the Strategic Communications Resources Effort to provide security clearances and secure video and telephone communications to all the states and territories; and
- Issued the *Initial National Response Plan*, a significant first step towards the goal of integrating the current family of federal domestic prevention, preparedness, response and recovery plans into a single all-hazards approach.

Next Steps

During the coming year, our challenge will be to continue to build, sustain and institutionalize the right combination of organizational capabilities and capacities needed to accomplish our mission. To this end, we are taking a series of steps to create a results-oriented culture. Our approach includes:

- Leadership commitment to creating a high-performing organization;
- Strategic planning to establish results-oriented goals and performance measures;
- Performance management to promote accountability for results;
- Implementation of the Planning Programming Budgeting System to integrate the Department's strategic planning and budget and performance management;
- · Collaboration and communication to achieve national objectives; and
- Customer service and public reporting to build the confidence of the American people.

The Secretary plans to implement the following additional actions:

- Continue to improve information and intelligence sharing capabilities with our state, territorial, tribal and local governments and with our private sector partners.
- Establish Department of Homeland Security regional offices to:
 - Coordinate Homeland Security functions at the federal, state, local and private sector levels within the region;
 - Integrate the core functions of the Department components; and
 - Ensure the effective and efficient delivery of services with the regions;
- Fund Project Bioshield to bring researchers, medical experts and the biomedical industry together in a new and focused way, allowing our nation to achieve the same kind of treatment breakthroughs for bio-terrorism and other threats as those that have significantly reduced the threat of heart disease, cancer and many other serious illnesses;
- Initiate a program to develop countermeasures to protect commercial aircraft from shoulder-fired missile systems;
- Launch a comprehensive Human Resource Management System that implements the human resources flexibility of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The system will incorporate best practices from the public and private sectors;
- Streamline the process for state and local governments to obtain Department of Homeland Security grants with the goal
 of rapidly deploying funds to our first lines of defense; and
- Continue to enhance Maritime Security and Safety and improve Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) by recapitalizing the
 U.S. Coast Guard's aging assets, infrastructure and support systems into an integrated, interoperable network centric
 system (Deepwater & Rescue 21).

As we continue to integrate the functions and programs of the Department, we expect to optimize mission performance by consolidating and integrating roles and responsibilities; aligning individual authority to accountability; creating better operating processes and procedures; and using the latest technology. Significant actions and decisions will be described in the *Future Years Homeland Security Program* that is required by the *Homeland Security Act of 2002*. This plan will articulate our vision for fiscal years 2006-2010, and serve as the basis for our budget requests.

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Part I

Vision

Preserving our freedoms, protecting America....we secure our homeland.

Mission

We will lead the unified national effort to secure America. We will prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the Nation. We will ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful immigrants and visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce.

Organization

On November 25, 2002, the President signed *House Resolution 5005, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296.* This act established the Department of Homeland Security. The new Department represents both a substantial improvement in the Nation's domestic security and a momentous change in the organization of the Federal Government.

The *Homeland Security Act* required many Federal agencies to transfer personnel, assets, liabilities and unexpended balances into the newly created Department. Most notably, the following agencies transferred resources into the new Department:

- Department of Agriculture
 - Agricultural Quarantine Inspection Program
 - Plum Island Animal Disease Center
- Department of Commerce
 - Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office
- Department of Defense
 - Chemical and Biological Defense programs, including the National Bioweapons Defense Analysis Center (Biowatch)
 - National Communications System
- Department of Energy
 - Defense Nuclear Non-Proliferation
 - Energy Security and Assurance Center
- Department of Health and Human Services
 - Strategic National Stockpile
- Department of Justice
 - National Infrastructure Protection Center
 - Immigration and Customs Enforcement
 - Office of Domestic Preparedness
 - United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
- Department of Transportation
 - Transportation Security Administration
 - United States Coast Guard
- Department of the Treasury
 - Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
 - United States Customs Service
 - United States Secret Service
- Federal Emergency Management Agency
- General Services Administration
 - Federal Computer Incident Response Center
 - Federal Protective Service

Given the incoming entities widely disparate policies, procedures and information systems, the change was complex and required a high degree of cooperation and coordination. An important step in the establishment of the Department was the determination order process. Through the determination order, agencies documented key financial, logistical, and human resources to be transferred to the Department. The President's November 25, 2002, Reorganization Plan for the Department outlined the transfer of most component agencies and programs to the Department by March 1, 2003.

In the short span of two months, the Under Secretary for Management coordinated the transfers of personnel and resources into the Department. These efforts included the transfer of the following:

- Unexpended Budgetary Resources totaling: \$37 billion. In advance of these transfers, the Department worked with the
 OMB and the Treasury to establish an entirely new appropriation account structure and bureau structure. This effort
 involved over 19 accounting offices processing over 330 separate transfers and created the budgetary resources to
 fund the Department operations;
- Personnel: This effort involved 180,000 full time employees. In advance of these transfers, the Department worked with the Office of Personnel Management to design and implement a personnel management structure impacting seven Federal separate payroll providers. As a result, all personnel were transferred as of the effective date of the *Homeland Security Act*;
- Accounting Location Codes: This effort involved the establishment of approximately 100 locations certifying
 disbursements and depositing receipts. This effort alone ensured the Department would have the capability to process
 commercial payments to vendors and reimburse employees for travel and other expenses and deposit billions of dollars
 in collections; and
- Real estate: The Department of Homeland Security owns 8,500 buildings amounting to a total 34,700,000 square feet of space. In addition, the Department leased 3,600 buildings amounting to a total of 33,800,000 square feet of space.

To accomplish our mission, the Department of Homeland Security is organized into five directorates:

- **1. Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate** identifies and assesses a broad range of intelligence information concerning threats to the homeland, issues timely warnings and takes appropriate preventive and protective action. IAIP functions include:
 - **Information Analysis** provides actionable intelligence essential for preventing acts of terrorism and, with timely and thorough analysis and dissemination of information about terrorists and their activities, improves the government's ability to disrupt and prevent terrorist acts and to provide useful warning to state and local government, the private sector and our citizens; and
 - **Infrastructure Protection** coordinates national efforts to secure America's critical infrastructure, including vulnerability assessments, strategic planning efforts and exercises. Protecting America's critical infrastructure is the shared responsibility of federal, state and local governments, in active partnership with the private sector, which owns approximately 85 percent of our nation's critical infrastructure.
- 2. Border and Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate ensures the security of our nation's borders and transportation systems. Its first priority is to prevent the entry of terrorists and the instruments of terrorism while simultaneously ensuring the efficient flow of lawful traffic and commerce. BTS will manage and coordinate port of entry activities and lead efforts to create borders that feature greater security through better intelligence, coordinated national efforts and unprecedented international cooperation against terrorists and the instruments of terrorism and other international threats. BTS includes the following organizations:
 - U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) provides security at America's borders and ports of entry as well as
 extending our zone of security beyond our physical borders so that American borders are the last line of defense, not
 the first. CBP also is responsible for apprehending individuals attempting to enter the United States illegally, stemming
 the flow of illegal drugs and other contraband; protecting our agricultural and economic interests from harmful
 pests and diseases; protecting American businesses from theft of intellectual property; regulating and facilitating
 international trade; collecting import duties; and enforcing United States trade laws;
 - **U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),** the largest investigative arm of the Department, enforces federal immigration, customs and air security laws. ICE's primary mission is to detect vulnerabilities and prevent violations that threaten national security. ICE works to protect the United States and its people by deterring, interdicting and investigating threats arising from the movement of people and goods into and out of the United States; and by policing and securing federal government facilities across the Nation;
 - Transportation Security Administration (TSA) protects the Nation's transportation systems to ensure freedom of
 movement for people and commerce. TSA will continuously set the standard for excellence in transportation security
 through its people processes and technologies;

- Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) is the Federal Government's leader for and provider of worldclass law enforcement training. FLETC prepares new and experienced law enforcement professionals to fulfill their responsibilities safely and at the highest level of proficiency, ensuring that training is provided in the most cost-effective manner; and
- **Office of Domestic Preparedness** ensures the United States is prepared for acts of terrorism by providing training, funds for the purchase of equipment, support for the planning and execution of exercises, technical assistance and other support to assist states and local jurisdictions as they prevent, plan for and respond to acts of terrorism. Note: For fiscal year 2005 the Secretary has proposed to realign ODP within Department Headquarters to be located under the Office of State and Local Affairs.
- **3. Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) Directorate** ensures that our nation is prepared for, and able to recover from terrorist attacks and natural disasters. EP&R provides domestic disaster preparedness training and coordinates government disaster response. The core of emergency preparedness includes the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), responsible for reducing the loss of life and property and protecting our nation's institutions from all types of hazards through a comprehensive, emergency management program of preparedness, prevention, response and recovery.
- **4. Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate** provides federal, state and local operators with the technology and capabilities needed to protect the Nation from catastrophic terrorist attacks, including threats from weapons of mass destruction. The S&T Directorate will develop and deploy state-of-the-art, high performance, low operating cost systems to detect and rapidly mitigate the consequences of terrorist attacks, including those that may use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials.
- **5. Management Directorate** oversees the budget; appropriations; expenditure of funds; accounting and finance; procurement; human resources and personnel; information technology systems; facilities, property, equipment and other material resources; and identification and tracking of performance measures aligned with the mission of the Department. The Chief Financial Officer, Chief Information Officer, Chief Human Capital Officer, Chief Procurement Officer and the Chief of Administrative Services report to the Undersecretary for Management as allowed by the *Homeland Security Act of 2002*.

Besides the five major Directorates, the following are critical agencies within the Department:


The **United States Coast Guard (USCG)** ensures maritime safety, mobility and security and protects our natural marine resources. Its mission is to protect the public, the environment and the United States economic interests - in the Nation's ports and waterways, along the coast, on international waters, or in any maritime region as required to support our national security. The Coast Guard also prevents Maritime terrorist attacks; halts the flow of illegal drugs and contraband; prevents individuals from entering the United States illegally; and prevents illegal incursion of our exclusive economic zone. Upon declaration of war, or when the President so directs, the USCG will operate as an element of the Department of Defense, consistent with existing law

The **United States Secret Service (USSS)** protects the President and Vice President, their families, heads of state and other designated individuals; investigates threats against these protectees; protects designated buildings within Washington, D.C.; and plans and implements security for designated National Special Security Events. The USSS also investigates violations of laws relating to counterfeiting and financial crimes, including computer fraud and computer-based attacks on our nation's financial, banking, and telecommunications infrastructure.

The **U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)** directs the Nation's immigration benefit system and promotes citizenship values by providing immigration services such as immigrant and nonimmigrant sponsorship; adjustment of status; work authorization and other permits; naturalization of qualified applicants for United States citizenship; and asylum or refugee processing. USCIS makes certain that America continues to welcome visitors and those who seek opportunity within our shores while excluding terrorists and their supporters.

The **Office of Inspector General (OIG)** serves as an independent and objective inspection, audit, and investigative body to promote effectiveness, efficiency, and economy in the Department's programs and operations. OIG seeks to prevent and detect fraud, abuse, mismanagement and waste.

The Department's Organization Chart is provided below:



Implementing the President's Management Agenda

The Department of Homeland Security faces the unprecedented challenge of reorganizing 22 agencies, 180,000 employees and numerous financial management systems, compensation structures and information systems. This presents a unique challenge as well as an opportunity for the Department to become the model of management excellence by creating an integrated, results-oriented, citizen-centered and market-based organization.

During fiscal year 2003, the Department launched an aggressive multi-year effort to institute management reforms by implementing the *President's Management Agenda*. We have established ambitious performance goals and developed an implementation plan to ensure we achieve them. Our progress in implementing each initiative in the *President's Management Agenda* is described below.

Strategic Management of Human Capital

The Department's vision is to create a personnel system that is flexible and contemporary while preserving basic civil service principles and merit concepts. We will have a cooperative, positive work environment that benefits from the knowledge, experience and active input of employees. Significant accomplishments during fiscal year 2003 include:

- Launched a comprehensive effort in conjunction with the Office of Personnel Management to design a groundbreaking Human Resource Management System that implements the human resources flexibility in the *Homeland Security Act of 2002*:
- Identified and incorporated best human capital business practices to help the Department accomplish its goal of becoming a model for effectiveness and efficiency in the Federal Government;
- Established a Department of Homeland Security Human Capital Officer Council with representatives from all primary components of the Department. Used the Council to develop Department proposed policies such as an Senior Executive Service appraisal system and the Departmental awards program;
- Formed a Department of Homeland Security Leadership Training and Development Group to serve as a community of
 practice and to provide information and recommendations regarding current and proposed Department managerial,
 supervisory, and executive leadership training and development programs;
- Developed human resources policies and practices that allowed Directorates and headquarters organizations to
 begin building their staffs. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security assembled a design team, composed
 of Department managers and employees; Human Resources experts from the Department and the Office of
 Personnel Management; and representatives from the agency's three largest unions, to study and prepare options for
 transforming the agency's Human Resource system and finalizing the policy for the new Human Resource Management
 System in alignment with the unique mission of the Department; and
- Transferred 22 agencies to the Department of Homeland Security on March 1, 2003, each with its own set of human resource policies and systems. Currently, there are only 7 human resource-servicing offices within the Department.

The Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) final progress score for strategic management of human capital in fiscal year 2003 is green for success. Our Human Resource Management System and the accompanying *Human Capital Plan* will provide a roadmap to institute further human capital reforms envisioned in the *Homeland Security Act of 2002* and will provide additional strategies for reducing costs, redeploying human resources and de-layering management reporting relationships. The Department is committed to ensuring its workforce is diverse and high performing. As part of the Human Resource Management System design and *Human Capital Plan*, the Department will institute an aggressive recruitment campaign to attract a diverse pool of applicants for positions at all levels. The Department recognizes that identification and removal of barriers to free and open workplace competition are essential to meeting this goal.

Competitive Sourcing

The Department is dedicated to delivering the best services for the best value to the American people. This requires managers and employees to be focused and committed to protecting our homeland and using our resources in the most efficient manner. It means bringing to bear the best mix of in-house, contract and reimbursable support available. Whether it is to inspect cargo, agriculture products, or travelers, the *Federal Activities Inventory Reform* (FAIR) *Act* inventories of commercial and inherently governmental activities and the *OMB Circular A-76* will serve to focus our resources on core mission requirements and help ensure that taxpayers receive maximum value for the resources provided. Our accomplishments during fiscal year 2003 include:

- Completed a comprehensive FAIR Act inventory of commercial and inherently governmental functions, and established a FAIR Act data input and competition tracking system;
- Initiated five competitions involving the work of over 1,200 full-time equivalent employees;
- Initiated a comprehensive review of the Department's existing contracts, including its asset acquisition and services
 contracts to identify opportunities for performance improvements, administrative savings and savings resulting from the
 consolidation of requirements; and
- Created Commodity Councils from organizations throughout the Department to identify competitive sourcing opportunities.

OMB's final progress score for competitive sourcing in fiscal year 2003 is green for success. Over the long-term, significant productivity enhancements are expected and will be measured in improved performance, improved customer satisfaction levels, full-time equivalent employee reductions and increased dollar savings.

Improved Financial Performance

The Department is integrating financial systems to produce information that is timely, useful, complete and reliable in order to facilitate and improve decision-making. Integrating financial management at the Department of Homeland Security is particularly challenging. Most of the organizations brought together to form the Department have their own financial management systems, processes, and in some cases, deficiencies. Four of the five major agencies that transferred to the Department reported 18 material weaknesses in internal control for fiscal year 2002, and all Bureaus within the Department had financial management systems that were not in substantial compliance with the *Federal Financial Management Improvement Act*. We are developing a strong financial management infrastructure to address these and other financial management issues. We have identified success factors; best practices and outcomes associated with world-class financial management; and are making financial management a Department-wide priority.

Our accomplishments during fiscal year 2003 include:

- Began implementation of an enterprise financial management solution to support consolidated financial statements;
- Outsourced payroll to a more cost-effective provider common to all organizations in the Department;
- Implemented an electronic time and attendance system;
- Began to use data mining rather than data calls to gather information;
- Established an investment review process to evaluate and monitor major acquisitions to ensure that they are aligned with the Department's strategic goals and that they stay on cost and schedule;
- Transferred \$37 billion and about 180,000 positions from 22 agencies to the Department;
- Submitted consolidated financial statements for the seven months ended September 30, 2003 and has undergone an audit of those statements;
- Submitted the 2003 Performance and Accountability Report to OMB;
- Received a qualified opinion on the September 30, 2003 Balance Sheet and Statement of Custodial Activity.
 Established a system for compiling and tracking material weaknesses and reportable conditions;

- Reduced to eight, the number of 18 inherited material weaknesses that transferred from the legacy agencies. Eight
 weaknesses were corrected. Several of the remaining weaknesses were consolidated or no longer met the criteria as a
 material weakness. Corrective actions were effectively carried out, for example, at the Federal Emergency Management
 Agency, being closed by the auditors. Management has taken action to develop corrective action plans to remedy
 unresolved weaknesses reported in the fiscal year 2003 audit report;
- Consolidated 9 accounting offices, a reduction from 19 and in doing so implemented the new appropriation account structure; and
- Established a program, approved by OMB, which ensures the Department will comply with the provisions of the *Improper Payments Information Act (P.L. 107-300)*.

OMB's final progress score for improved financial performance in fiscal year 2003 is green for success.

Expanded Electronic Government

The vision of the Department is to deploy and manage information assets and services that ease the burden on citizens, businesses and other government organizations at the federal, state, local and tribal levels that conduct business with the Department. One of our most important and difficult challenges is to eliminate redundant information systems and develop an enterprise architecture solution common to all agencies to enable information sharing. We plan to use information technology (IT) in support of creating new and more efficient solutions to our process problems. Our accomplishments during fiscal year 2003 include:

- Established IT capital planning, investment control and portfolio management processes to leverage technology investments in support of the Department's mission and business plan;
- Completed initial assessments and inventory of Departmental IT systems;
- Published an IT modernization blueprint and developed proposals and plans to integrate existing systems;
- Formulated and implemented the Investment Review Board for evaluation and approval of all IT investments over \$500,000 for Department of Homeland Security components;
- Implemented single email domain (dhs.gov) and white pages directory within 90 days of creation of Department;
- Developed and implemented "Day 1" Departmental IT launch connecting all major components;
- Developed and implemented core Capital Planning Investment Control (CPIC) processes;
- Planned and executed uninterrupted transition of IT services and support from the 22 agencies transferred to the new Department;
- Formulated the first Department of Homeland Security Enterprise Architecture which is a comprehensive description of the Department's current and future business strategies and supporting technologies;
- Established the Enterprise Infrastructure Board (EIB) which controls and manages all facets of the Department's IT infrastructure;
- Established a centralized Network Operations Center (NOC) that monitors, manages and administers the Department's core network which provides connectivity to all Department of Homeland Security components;
- Developed framework for integrated, Department-wide Information Security Program. Consolidated funding strategy, to include role-up of information security budgets for all Organizational Elements. The Department's Information Security Program has been designated a level 1 investment by the Investment Review Board (IRB); and
- Established the Department's Information Systems Security Board (ISSB) which has representation from every Organizational Element. This Board is responsible for developing and implementing consistent information security policies and procedures across the Department.
- Established one-stop, single web portal for Homeland Security grant and training programs.

OMB's final progress score for expanded electronic government performance in fiscal year 2003 is yellow for mixed results. The Department is establishing procedures and systems to monitor department-wide IT investments to help ensure that they meet expectations for supporting the Department's mission, and ensure applications are delivered on time, within budget and achieve performance objectives.

Budget and Performance Integration

The Department is establishing a fully integrated budget planning and program performance system. Our first Strategic Plan is the cornerstone of the *Future Years Homeland Security Program*, and will be the roadmap for resource planning and program evaluations. We will link performance goals with resource allocation plans to form the foundation of the budget. Our accomplishments during fiscal year 2003 include:

- Drafted a Strategic Plan based on leadership's direction, Department priorities and participation from all departmental stakeholders:
- Linked the performance goals and measures in the Department's fiscal year 2005 budget request directly to the Department's new Strategic Plan;
- Implemented the Department's investment review process to ensure program cost, schedule and performance accountability measures are in place and enforced; that the Department's programs are not duplicative; and that all programs support the Department's goals and objectives;
- Established the Department's Planning Programming Budgeting System to ensure program requirements are properly planned and identified; align with the Department's mission and goals; and have measurable performance outcomes that are key to the success of the organization;
- Developed a comprehensive Department of Homeland Security budget process based on strategic priorities and performance, and provided individual program and budget guidance for development of the fiscal year 2005 performance budget;
- Strengthened the link between budget and performance with a Performance Budget Overview for inclusion in the Congressional Justification to the Presidents Budget. This overview directly links each program's budget request to long and short-term performance target;
- Launched the Resource Management Transformation Initiative; and
- Developed an understanding among program managers of performance budgeting in a five-year perspective by conducting training at organizational entities. This resulted in better long range thinking in resource requests and thinking ahead in the initial development of the fiscal year 2005 budget.

OMB's final progress score for budget and performance integration in fiscal year 2003 is green for success. We are focused on building a long-term comprehensive program review process that will align resources to programs that meet the Department's priorities, support our objectives, demonstrate accountability, are performance driven and have identified long-term benefits.

In conclusion, the Department embraces the *President's Management Agenda* and is committed to establishing a high level of maturity in our financial, business and performance evaluation processes. We are working to implement next generation concepts that will serve as a model for the Federal Government.

Performance Highlights

Highlights of the Department of Homeland Security's performance during fiscal year 2003 are provided below. These highlights have been taken from the measures of agencies transferred into the Department, and are reported based on 12-month actuals. A detailed description of these measures is contained in Part III – Performance Information. We will evaluate all hold-over performance measures as candidates for the new department measures that are aligned with the goals in the Strategic Plan.

- The Department met its goal of obtaining a 94 percent data sufficiency rate in the Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS), the primary database that Customs uses to target suspect or high-risk passengers, while facilitating the flow of law-abiding travelers through the clearance process. APIS supports the Department's commitment to protecting our homeland from acts of terrorism and reducing its vulnerability to the threat of international terrorists. The Department's fiscal year 2005 goal is to obtain a data sufficiency level of 99.1 percent.
- In fiscal year 2003 the Department created a new goal to move legitimate cargo and people efficiently. The Department met its fiscal year 2003 target level of 99.8 percent of vehicles approaching the land ports-of-entry that comply with laws, rules, regulations, and agreements enforced by the United States Customs Service. A target of 99.9 percent compliance is set for fiscal year 2005.
- In support of the Department's goal to move legitimate cargo and people efficiently, the Department met its target of ensuring that 93 percent of sea-containerized cargo was transported using Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) carriers. The C-TPAT program improves oversight of trade security and provides a cadre of antismuggling experts dedicated to training, outreach and security verification. This program protects the United States by working closely with industry and major importers who transport goods over land and sea borders. A target of 94 percent is set for fiscal year 2005.
- In the seven months since the Department's creation, the Department met its goal of contributing to a safer America by prohibiting the introduction of the illicit drugs cocaine and marijuana into the United States. In fiscal year 2003, 19,298 kilograms of cocaine, and 321,745 kilograms of marijuana were seized at ports of entry or in the maritime domain by, or with the participation of, U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers and/or the United States Coast Guard (USCG).
- The Department met its goal of removing 61 percent of aliens who have received an order of removal from an immigration judge. This target percentage estimates that 220,000 final orders were issued in fiscal year 2003, and is shown as the percentage of aliens removed as a result of final orders issued. A long-term target of 100 percent is set for fiscal year 2009.
- The Department met its goal of obtaining 57.2 percent enforcement consequences based on preliminary data on closed cases in the year. Enforcement consequences are defined as arrests, indictments, conviction, seizure, fine or penalty for cases completed by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office of Investigations. This is a new performance measure that was developed to include the new investigative roles resulting from the merger of the Customs and Immigration and Naturalization Service Offices of Investigations and supports the Department's reasonability of protecting the American people, property and infrastructure from foreign terrorists, criminals, and other people and organizations who threaten the United States. The Department goal is to increase the percentage of cases that have an enforcement consequence to 57.6 percent by fiscal year 2005. Within approximately six to nine months the means to provide final accurate reliability rates will be in place.

- The Department successfully met and exceeded its target number of 500 communities taking or increasing actions to reduce their risk from natural or man made disasters. In fiscal year 2003, the Department documented that 750 communities took actions to reduce their risk through conducting pre-disaster mitigation activities; joining or increasing their rating in the Community Rating System; joining the National Flood Insurance Program; participating in a Cooperative Technical Partnership; or implementing post-disaster mitigation projects. The Department's long-term fiscal year 2009 goal is to maintain a level of action consistent with its fiscal year 2003 target.
- The Department met its goal of achieving a 20 percent overall measurable reduction to the threats faced by federal facilities, accomplishing a 49.57 percent actual reduction for fiscal year 2003. To achieve this, the Department periodically conducted Building Security Assessment surveys on federal buildings within the Department's control. These surveys provided Department decision makers a means of identifying and evaluating threats to the federal workplace and of assessing program efficiency in reducing these threats. The Department will continue to use these surveys to develop threat indices, prioritize buildings based on vulnerability and make the necessary adjustments to mitigate potential threats. The Department's overall long-term goal is to achieve a 40 percent overall measurable reduction to the threats faced by federal facilities by fiscal year 2009.
- The USCG exceeded its goal of saving 85 percent of mariners in imminent danger despite the continuing challenges of untimely distress notification, incorrect reporting of the distress site location, severe weather conditions and distance to the scene. To overcome these obstacles, the Department is modernizing and improving its Maritime 911 emergency distress and response system (Rescue 21); increasing personnel and training for its Search and Rescue program; and identifying and replacing non-standard boats. The Department's long-term fiscal year 2009 goal is to save 88 percent of mariners in imminent danger. In addition, the USCG aggressively supported Homeland Security by maintaining more than 115 security zones; conducted 36,000 air patrols and 8,000 vessel boardings. The Coast Guard interdicted over 6,000 undocumented migrants attempting to enter the country illegally by sea. Recapitalizing the Coast Guard's aging assets and infrastructure via the Coast Guard's performance-based Deepwater acquisition project will be vital to our nation's maritime security, which includes over 95,000 miles of coast.
- The Department met its goal of restricting counterfeit money being circulated to under \$74 per \$1 million of genuine United States currency, limiting the ratio of counterfeit notes passed on the public to only \$58.00 per \$1 million of genuine currency. The Department is committed to reducing loses to the public that are attributable to counterfeit currency which threatens the integrity of our currency and the reliability of financial payment systems worldwide. The Department's long-term fiscal year 2009 goal is to maintain this level of enforcement.
- The Department met its goal of preventing at least \$1.5 billion in loss attributable to financial crimes. This was achieved through conducting criminal investigations that resulted in the intervention or interruption of criminal ventures, which prevented \$2.5 billion in loss attributable to financial crimes. The Department is committed to reducing losses to the public that are attributable to financial crimes and identity theft. The Department's long-term fiscal year 2009 goal is to maintain this level of enforcement.
- The Department met its target of providing incident-free protection for the Nation's leaders, other protectees and visiting world leaders. The Department evaluated protective-related intelligence on groups, subjects and activities that pose threats to protected individuals, facilities, or events. Utilizing this intelligence, the Department was able to maintain the efficiency of its protective operations without compromising the security of protectees, facilities and events. As there is no acceptable error rate for this measure, the Department's long-tem goal is to maintain a level of 100 percent protection.

Entities that were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security had performance measures already developed for some programs when they came to the Department. Those measures and their performance goals were reviewed and some will continue to be used going forward. In other cases, better measures are superseding the legacy measures. Those that are being considered to be carried forward are reported herein.

Other entities were newly created within the Department of Homeland Security. Being new, those entities had not developed measures for fiscal year 2003. During fiscal year 2003, we have created performance measures for fiscal year 2004 that will be reported in the fiscal year 2004 *Performance and Accountability Report*. During 2003, the Department has:

- Embraced the President's Management Agenda;
- Taken steps to create a high-performing organization that serves as a model for the Federal Government;
- Established and implemented an organizational structure to bring together 22 federal agencies into a single integrated chain of command;
- Identified processes critical to achieving the Department of Homeland Security's mission and developed a plan to fill identified gaps;
- Developed an information architecture that allows for rapid flow of critical information and supports electronicgovernment principles; and
- Integrated 180,000 people from 22 separate federal agencies into the newly formed Department of Homeland Security.

Fiscal Year 2003 United States Department of Homeland Security Performance Summary					
Total Measures	Targets Met	Targets Not Met	Other (Not Available)		
47	33	11	3		

Financial Highlights

The financial information provided in this report is derived from the financial systems and processes used by the agencies that were transferred into the Department of Homeland Security. We plan to implement a single financial management information system utilizing commercial off the shelf software and open systems architecture to support common financial processes for the entire Department. Our goal is to be a model for fiscal responsibility and accountability in the Federal Government.

During fiscal year 2003, 22 agencies were transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security as a result of the *Homeland Security Act of 2002*. Note 1 to the financial statements provides details of the effects of the transfers on the agencies financial statements.

The information provided below presents highlights of the more significant financial statement categories.

Assets

The Department of Homeland Security's total assets as of September 30, 2003, totaled approximately \$44.6 billion. In excess of 60 percent of these assets are tied to the Department's fund balance with Treasury. Additional assets are attributable to the Department's investments and their related interest; advances and prepayments; tax trade receivables; operating materials and stockpile; and property, plant and equipment.

Liabilities

As of September 30, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security's liabilities totaled \$36.7 billion. Over 65 percent of this was attributed to the Department's Military Retirement System. Other liabilities incurred by the Department included amounts transferred to the General Fund of the Treasury; accounts payable; claims and claims settlement expenses; deferred revenue and advances from others; accrued payroll and benefits; injured domestic industries; and miscellaneous expenses.

Net Cost of Department of Homeland Security Operations

The net cost of operations for the Department of Homeland Security for the seven months ended September 30, 2003 totaled \$21.5 billion. The net cost of operations is reported by the Department's directorates and other sub-organizations, to include the Border and Transportation Security Directorate; Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate; Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate; Science and Technology Directorate; United States Coast Guard; United States Secret Service; United States Citizenship and Immigration Service; and Departmental Operations and other activities. While the 22 legacy agencies were not officially transferred to the new Department until March 2003, the responsibility segments displayed on the Department's Consolidated Statement of Net Cost represent a fair approximation of the distribution of the Department of Homeland Security's Operational Costs, and include a breakdown of gross costs and earned revenue for each directorate and sub-organization.

Custodial Revenue


The Department of Homeland Security's net collection activity for the seven months ended September 30, 2003 totaled approximately \$13.2 billion. Total net revenue collected by the Department on behalf of the Federal Government included various taxes, primarily duties on imported goods, user fees, fines and penalties, and other revenue.

The estimated total net underpayment for fiscal year 2003 was \$170 million, representing a Revenue Gap of 0.73 percent. These figures represent revenue collected for the entire fiscal year, but only for the segment of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) known as legacy Customs.

The Revenue Gap is the measure of import duties actually collected by CBP versus projected duties had all goods been entered in full compliance with U.S. trade laws, regulations and agreements. The Revenue Gap is used by CBP, along with trade compliance data, to assess areas that can be targeted for improved compliance and to support informed and enforced compliance activities within the trade community.

Management

Improving our nation's security requires the collective management and leadership skills of the federal, state, local and tribal governments and the private sector. As the General Accounting Office noted, the implementation and transformation of the Department of Homeland Security is a high-risk endeavor. The Department's unprecedented size, scope, complexity and importance are unparalleled in our history. Initial success depends not only on superb management, but also on setting the right priorities, selecting the right people and building strong partnerships. The Department's Strategic Plan provides the foundation for our efforts. We have established an overarching framework for implementation as part of our *Future Years Homeland Security Program.* This results-oriented management approach ties together strategy, organizational structure, operations and culture and guides the formulation of our budget.



Homeland Security Results Framework

During 2003 our management emphasis was concentrated in the following areas:

Setting Priorities

- Engaging in a strategic planning process that involves stakeholders in the assessment of internal and external environments and alignment of activities, core processes and resources to support mission-related outcomes;
- Organizing and aligning the structure and processes of the Department to be consistent with the goals and objectives established in the Strategic Plan;
- Consolidating and reorganizing multiple mission areas and field office operations to make them more effective and efficient;
- Setting performance objectives and milestones consistent with our strategic goals and objectives;
- Implementing an effective performance management system to ensure accountability throughout the Department;
- Establishing an integrated enterprise-wide information management and technology infrastructure to transform our capabilities and capacity to share and act upon quality information and knowledge in a timely manner;
- Establishing Department-wide integrated financial management processes, procedures and systems; and
- Establishing strong management systems and controls to ensure integrity in contracting, including competitive and strategic sourcing initiatives, to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of agency operations and delivery of services to the American people.

Selecting People

- Developing a human capital strategy consistent with our unique statutory authority to recruit, retain and reward a talented and motivated workforce that has the core competencies needed to achieve our mission, goals and objectives;
- Developing a strategy to make maximum use of the collective body of knowledge from agencies that have been brought together as a result of this consolidation.

Building Partnerships

- Developing and maintaining relationships with our partners across federal, state, local, tribal and international governments, as well as the private sector and academia; and
- Engaging in proactive communications with our employees as well as our stakeholders, partners and the American people.

Integrity

This section provides a description of the Department of Homeland Security's material weaknesses as they relate to the following:

- Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982
- Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996
- Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002

Many of the material weaknesses identified transferred with the agencies into the Department. Others are newly identified deficiencies that directly result from the consolidation of 22 separate agencies into one unified organization. This section contains our plans to resolve shortfalls, and identifies planned corrective actions and target completion dates.

Integrity - Implementing the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act and Federal Financial Management Improvement Act

In accordance with guidance issued by the Chief Financial Officer, each organizational element was instructed to conduct reviews of management controls pursuant to Section 2 of the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) and to furnish an assurance statement with respect to compliance with management control requirements presented in Section 5 of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-123, Management Accountability and Control. Each organizational element was also instructed to assess conformance of its financial management systems with the principles, standards and related requirements outlined in Section 7 of OMB Circular No. A-127, Financial Management Systems.

Assessments were outlined by using a variety of information sources. These include reviews of financial information classification structure, audits of financial statements conducted pursuant to the *Government Management Reform Act of* 1994, Inspector General and General Accounting Office reports, program evaluations, and other reviews and reports, as described by Chief Financial Officer guidance. Upon evaluation of the Section 2 and 4 submissions, and other supplement sources of information, the Secretary acknowledged weaknesses in internal controls and financial management systems, however they do not impair the Department's ability to fulfill its mission, and except for those weaknesses, provided reasonable assurance that Department systems, taken as a whole, do meet the objectives of the FMFIA. Reporting these weaknesses reflects positively on the Department's commitment to recognize and address problems.

The Department organizational elements inherited 18 material weaknesses from the 22 agencies that transferred into the Department. The Department made significant progress in resolving many of these inherited weaknesses. There are some material weaknesses remaining as well as several new weaknesses identified during the fiscal year 2003 audit, however, these issues considered together do not affect the Department's ability to perform missions and functions with efficiency and accuracy. Notwithstanding, the Department continues to carefully monitor the correction of auditor identified reportable conditions and management identified challenges in all component financial management systems.

Weaknesses in controls that affect full compliance with the Section 2 objectives of the FMFIA were cited by the following organizational elements:

- Tracking of overstay population of illegal aliens in the United States by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE);
- Identification of deportable criminal aliens at ICE;
- Outdated Inspector Field Manuals at the United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP);
- Development of a Secure Electronic Network for Traveler's Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) at CBP;
- Development of an INS Passenger Accelerated Service System (INSPASS) at CBP;
- Enhance Automated Commercial system at CBP;
- Nonconformance in information technology system logical access and software maintenance security controls at CBP;
- Inability to timely restore critical systems in case of disaster or disruption of business operations at CBP;
- Lack of controls over the laws and regulations regarding the entry process at CBP:
- Nonconformance involving information security controls at Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R);
- Administration of the Contract Screener Program at the Transportation Security Administration (TSA); and
- Lack of major contract oversight at TSA.

The 2003 financial statement audit cites weaknesses in accounting and reporting practices involving multiple organizational elements:

- Accounting for actuarial liabilities at the United States Secret Service (USSS);
- Information technology general controls at all Bureaus within the Department of Homeland Security;
- Financial Reporting systems and related policies and procedures at CBP, CIS, ICE, TSA, EP&R, USCG and the Department of Homeland Security;

- Accounting for property, plant and equipment at TSA and USCG;
- Accounting for operating materials and supplies at USCG; and
- Accounting for post-employment liabilities at USCG.

The Department is committed to aggressively resolving all material issues identified by the auditors. While the weaknesses do not rise to the level required for reporting to the President and the Congress, completing needed financial system and control improvements is a Department priority, closely monitored by senior management.

The Department of Homeland Security is not currently subject to the requirements of the *Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990* and, consequently, is not required to comply with the *Federal Financial Managers' Improvement Act of 1996* (FFMIA). However, we have included financial management information systems and federal accounting deficiencies related to FFMIA, and our organizational elements are focusing on improvements to their management systems that fall short of compliance.

Integrity - Implementing the Federal Information Security Management Act

The Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) requires that agencies protect information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification or destruction in order to provide integrity, confidentiality and availability. The Department provided a report as required by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Memorandum M-03-19 that included the results of our risk assessments; outlined our security policies and procedures; summarized our system security plans; explained our training programs; summarized the results of annual testing and evaluation; reported security incidents; and explained our plan to ensure continuity of operations.

For purposes of this report, we have defined significant deficiencies as failure to meet the requirements of FISMA and failure to substantially comply with related policies, guidance and standards. Specifically, the criteria we used to identify material weaknesses consists of the following:

- Merits the attention of the Secretary, the President, or Congress;
- Significantly impairs the fulfillment of the Department's mission;
- · Deprives the public of needed services;
- Violates statutory or regulatory requirements;
- Significantly weakens safeguards against waste, loss, unauthorized use or misappropriation of funds, property, or other assets;
- Results in a conflict of interest;
- Prevents the Department's primary accounting systems from achieving central control over agency financial transactions and resource balances;
- Prevents compliance of the primary accounting system, subsidiary system or program system with *OMB Circular A-127* (Financial Management Systems), the Standard General Ledger and the Core Financial Systems Requirements; or
- Results in a significant and recurring misstatement in reports required by OMB or Congress.

We conduct a quarterly review of information technology (IT) security performance measures as part of our program assessment and evaluation process. Beginning in December 2003, the results of this review will be provided to OMB. In addition, plans of action and milestones for IT security-related initiatives will be cross-referenced with budget materials we provide to OMB. In 2003, the newly established Department of Homeland Security focused on the realignment of 22 separate Federal agencies into a single new Department. This is the most comprehensive reorganization of the Federal government in more than a halfcentury, and nowhere has this been more evident than in the area of information security. The many challenges associated with reorganization are directly reflected in the complexity and challenges inherent in creating a single, secure computing environment. Although in existence for only a few short months, the Department of Homeland Security has already completed the development of, and is now implementing, a detailed plan for ensuring an effective and statutory-compliant Information Security Program throughout the Department. The Program has been specifically tailored to migrate the many legacy programs into a single, consolidated Information Security Program for the future. This plan not only incorporates the best ideas and capabilities from the 22 federal agencies that were transferred to the new Department, but also includes best practices from the broader information security community. In fiscal year 2004, these will be identified and assigned to the appropriate directorate for correction, and remediation monitored by a Departmental compliance program. The tables below summarize known information security-related material weaknesses at both the Department and component levels. The Department of Homeland Security Chief Information Officer has begun identifying all existing IT material weaknesses transferred from the agencies to the Department. We will continue to identify outstanding material weaknesses through a Department-level compliance program and quarterly reviews of our IT security performance, and will document the results of our findings in reports to OMB.


Department-Level Material Weaknesses That Remain at the End of Fiscal Year 2003

Material Weakness	Corrective Action Being Taken	Target Correction Date
Program Management and Integration	Minimal capabilities exist in establishing overall security program management and governance function under the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO). The Department is working hard to integrate the legacy security program areas within the CISO. We are developing an acquisition strategy, detailed project plans, performance measures and metrics to facilitate consolidation efforts.	30 September 2004
Compliance and Oversight	The Department has limited tracking, evaluation and reporting tools necessary to provide oversight over the Department's information security efforts to ensure compliance with FISMA requirements and other Federal and Department of Homeland Security information security policies and standards. The Program will assess and evolve the existing manual process for developing metrics and design and implement an automated process to gather the necessary metrics needed to evaluate overall compliance in support of a balanced scorecard and will provide comprehensive FISMA compliance tracking. The Department will standardize the use of self-assessments as contained within the National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-26: Security Self-Assessment Guide for Information Technology Systems. We will create a Department-wide automated risk assessment capability with "Trusted Agent FISMA" tool and an automated Certification and Accreditation Process including Systems Security Plan management.	30 September 2004
Security Architecture	We have insufficient technologies in place to support an enterprise architecture and the security architecture needed to achieve the Department's mission. We are in the process of developing and implementing an architecture "trust model" to identify specific mechanisms that are necessary for the Department to respond to specific threats. It will formalize a threshold for risk, support the risk analysis process and attenuate discovered risks. We are working to integrate security profiles into the Technical Reference Model of Enterprise Architecture and will design a notional systems-level information security architecture.	30 September 2004

Material Weakness	Corrective Action Being Taken	Target Correction Date
Continuity Planning for Critical Department Assets	The Department has insufficient resources, processes, policies and guidelines in place to ensure the identification, protection and continuity of services to reduce the Department's vulnerabilities and risks and to sustain mission-critical functions in the event of a man-made or natural disaster. We have established a Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Program, to ensure the identification, protection, and continuity of services to support the homeland security missions of the United States. A Department CIP policy has been developed and a CIP Working Group has been established. This group will continue to develop CIP guidance and policy for the Department. We will complete development of new and expanded executive agent Continuity of Operations and Continuity of Government plans, policies and procedures to address changing conditions and capabilities. We will establish and conduct integrated Continuity of Operations and Continuity of Government training, testing and exercise programs for all hazards. A Department-wide Project Matrix review will be performed to identify all critical information security assets.	30 September 2004

Component Level Material Weaknesses That Remain at the End of Fiscal Year 2003

Agency	Material Weakness as of Date of Transfer	Corrective Actions Taken	Target Correction Date
Emergency Preparedness & Response (EP&R)	The agency identified eight material weaknesses in policies, procedures and practices. Deficiencies included: (1) system security program; (2) security control implementation; (3) contingency planning; (4) computer security education and awareness; (5) personnel security; (6) risk management; (7) security life cycle management; and (8) certification and accreditation.	These material weaknesses were identified in fiscal year 2000 and due to be remedied in fiscal year 2003. They were not resolved due to budget constraints. In addition, EP&R could not identify if all weaknesses exist for any of the remaining components apart from the Federal Emergency Management Agency. EP&R has developed a Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) to identify critical milestones for corrective actions and is tracking to ensure the timely resolution of deficiencies.	In fiscal year 2004, these will be identified and assigned to the appropriate directorate for correction.





Part II

Message from the Under Secretary for Management

February 2004



The creation of the Department of Homeland Security presents an opportunity to model management excellence by effectively and efficiently managing resources to deliver measurable results. Just as the Department has consolidated border and transportation security functions, merged response activities, integrated terrorist threat intelligence and coordinated homeland security research and development efforts, so too we must work with equal vigor to transform our business practices and integrate our financial systems. Over the past year we have:

- Managed a divestiture of 22 organizations, which were spun off from 10 different federal Departments: Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Justice, Transportation, General Services Administration (GSA), Treasury, Health and Human Services (HHS) and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
- Transferred almost \$45 billion in assets, \$36 billion in liabilities and more than 180,000 employees to the Department in March 2003 with no diminution of mission execution or operation.
- Established a support services plan based upon the most effective, efficient and least cost solution to provide services
 across the enterprise, including a shared services arrangement for three of our largest bureaus whereby one bureau
 is the service provider for all three in various mission support areas. This reduces bureaucracy and capitalizes on best
 practices.
- Established a Department-wide approach to acquiring goods and services ensuring the best value for our dollar. We
 consolidated 22 different human resource servicing offices down to 7 and consolidated 271 processes associated with
 administrative services, such as mail management and printing and graphics, down to 103.
- Consolidated accounting business lines previously provided by the Departments of Commerce, Defense, HHS, Justice,
 Agriculture and the GSA. This streamlining of financial management functions reduced the number of financial
 management centers from 19 to 10. The Department now can more readily access bureau financial data, conduct
 Department-wide financial analyses, and make sound financial decisions.
- Consolidated bankcard programs throughout the Department from 27 to 3, and moved to a daily billing and payment system which will double the amount of rebates received Department-wide.
- Initiated a future years homeland security program planning process that will align resources to programs that meet the Department's priorities, support our objectives, demonstrate accountability, are performance driven, and have identified long term benefits. This will ensure resources are wisely used and spending directly supports and furthers the Department's mission and provides optimal benefits and capabilities to stakeholders and customers.
- Launched an aggressive program to consolidate and integrate business and financial management information systems.

Although the *Homeland Security Act of 2002* waives the requirement for the Department to have a financial statement audit in 2003, the Department subjected its consolidated financial statements to the rigor of an independent audit only three months after its inception. This was done to establish a baseline understanding of the financial management strengths and weaknesses throughout the Department. This also positions the Department to pursue a full-scope audit on its consolidated financial statements in fiscal year 2004—less than two years from inception of the Department.

The Department's component organizations inherited 18 material weaknesses from the 22 organizations that transferred into the Department. In fiscal year 2003, the Department made significant progress in resolving many of these weaknesses. Notwithstanding, the Department continues to carefully monitor the correction of auditor identified reportable conditions and management identified challenges in all component financial management systems.

While weaknesses in internal controls and financial management systems do exist, they do not impair the fulfillment of the Department's mission, and except for those weaknesses we are able to provide reasonable assurance that our management controls and financial systems, taken as a whole, meet the objectives of sections 2 and 4 of the *Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act* (FMFIA). Our organizational elements are actively pursuing major improvements to their financial management systems. I believe that reporting these weaknesses reflects positively on our commitment to recognize and address problems. Also toward this end, I will continue to use the FMFIA as a tool for holding the Department's management team accountable for achieving defined and measurable goals.

Although our successes to date provide a solid foundation for our efforts to set a standard of excellence in federal financial management, much remains to be done. Guided by the *President's Management Agenda*, we will:

- Increase effectiveness and efficiency by delivering to decision makers financial information that is timely, reliable and accurate;
- Strengthen financial accountability by ensuring that internal controls are in place across the Department and that appropriate oversight reviews are conducted; and
- Significantly reduce costs and increase effectiveness by further consolidating functions, integrating information systems and designing business and financial processes using best business practices and benchmarking to guide our efforts.

We have set ambitious goals and high standards of achievement, and are moving aggressively to make the vision of excellence in federal financial management a reality.

Sincerely,

Janet Hale

Introduction

The following financial statements have been prepared to report the consolidated financial position as of September 30, 2003, and results of operations of the Department of Homeland Security for the seven months then ended. These statements have been prepared from the books and records of the agencies that transferred into the Department upon its establishment and were prepared in accordance with the methods and formats prescribed by the Office of Management and Budget in Bulletin 01-09: Form and Content of Agency Financial Statements. These statements consist of the following sections:

- **Consolidated Balance Sheet** provides information on assets, liabilities and net position similarly to balance sheets reported in the private sector;
- **Consolidated Statement of Net Cost** reports the components of the net costs of the Department's operations during the seven months ended September 30, 2003, and consists of the gross cost incurred by the Department less any revenue received from our activities;
- **Consolidated Statement of Change in Net Position** reports the beginning net position, the transactions that affected the net position during the seven months ended September 30, 2003, and the ending net position;
- **Combined Statement of Budgetary Resources** provides information on how budgetary resources were made available and their status during the seven months ended September 30, 2003, and at the end of the fiscal year 2003;
- Consolidated Statement of Financing reports the relationship between budgetary transactions and financial transactions; and
- **Statement of Custodial Activity** reports the net custodial revenue received by the Department, along with sources and disposition of collections.

These statements are not presented on a comparative basis since the Department was initially established during the period being reported. The Department's Inspector General engaged the independent public accounting firm of KMPG LLP to audit these financial statements.

Inspector General's Report



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Office of Inspector General Washington, DC 20528

December 31, 2003

MAJOR MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES FACING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

During its first nine months of existence, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has faced the challenge of effectuating the largest reorganization of the federal government in more than half a century, and creating the third largest Cabinet agency with the critical, core mission of protecting the country against another terrorist attack. While DHS has made progress, it still has much to do to establish a cohesive, efficient, and effective organization.

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) has identified the areas listed below as "major management challenges" facing the department. This list will be used in setting DHS OIG priorities for audits, inspections, and evaluations of DHS programs and operations. This is the second such assessment we have issued since the establishment of the department, and we will continue to issue these assessments on an annual basis.

CONSOLIDATING THE DEPARTMENT'S COMPONENTS

Perhaps the biggest challenge facing DHS is integrating 22 separate components into a single, effective, efficient and economical department with about 180,000 employees. DHS has several integration efforts under way that OIG will monitor and assess on an ongoing basis. For example, according to DHS management, a total of over 350 different management processes, some of which were duplicative, have been reduced to 130. Similarly, the department has reduced from over 2500 in Fiscal Year (FY) 03 to roughly 600 the number of services that are provided under Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with non-DHS providers. The services, formerly supplied under these MOUs and now supplied by DHS, include payroll, mail, personnel security, and other critical services.

Further, one of the top priorities of the department was to integrate specific functions to enhance efficiencies and create greater accountability in one seamless border service. For the first time in the country's history, all agencies in the United States government with significant border responsibilities have been unified into one agency of our government.

DHS also reports that, using a "shared services" model, it has realigned over 6000 support services employee slots (both government and contractor) from the legacy U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to support the 68,000 employees of the Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) bureaus.

The department has deployed information technology (IT) systems to allow DHS employees to communicate internally and for the American public to communicate with the department, including headquarters network and email systems, intranet, and internet sites.

DHS has developed human resources (HR) policies and practices that enabled directorates and headquarters organizations to begin building their staffs. In addition, DHS assembled a design team, composed of DHS managers and employees, HR experts from DHS and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and representatives from the department's three largest unions, to

study and prepare options for transforming the department's HR system and finalizing the policy for the new HR management system in alignment with the unique mission of the department.

The department has also established a Strategic Sourcing Group (SSG) to implement a DHS-wide approach to acquiring goods and services. The SSG has established commodity councils that are working to identify the department's needs for each commodity and to develop more efficient purchasing mechanisms to meet those needs. The total number of commodity councils established thus far is 17, covering such items as office supplies, copiers, weapons and ammunition, uniforms, and electricity. Also, DHS has established a Resources Management Transformation Office to oversee the development of an integrated financial management system for use department-wide.

To a great degree, however, the department is still a collection of separate components operating under a common organizational umbrella. Appropriate plans (including workforce plans), goals, objectives, and meaningful performance measures must be established as soon as possible to guide the integration process, track progress, and support effective planning and budget allocation across the full range of DHS' missions. Efforts to do so are under way. For example, DHS is implementing a ten-step process to create, validate, and institutionalize measures of effectiveness in critical performance areas. OIG will monitor this process as it proceeds.

CONTRACT MANAGEMENT

A major challenge for the department is integrating the procurement functions of its component organizations, some lacking important management controls. For example, during its first year of operation, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) relied extensively on contractors to accomplish its mission, while providing little contract oversight. As a result, the cost of those initial contracts ballooned. TSA is in the process of devising policies and procedures that require adequate procurement planning, contract structure, and contract oversight.

Other components of the department have some large, complex, high-cost procurement programs under way that need to be closely managed. For example, CBP's Automated Commercial Environment project will cost \$5 billion, and the Coast Guard's Deepwater Capability Replacement Project will cost \$17 billion and take two to three decades to complete. Further, in early 2004, the department will award a contract for the development of an automated system to support the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indication Technology (US-VISIT) program for tracking and controlling the entry and exit of all aliens entering and leaving the country through air, land, and sea ports of entry. It is anticipated that this will be a multi-billion dollar program implemented over the next ten years. DHS OIG will be reviewing these major procurements on an ongoing basis. In addition, DHS recently developed a comprehensive list of department contracts as of March 1, 2003, which OIG is reviewing.

GRANTS MANAGEMENT

DHS manages a variety of grant programs that provide money for disaster preparedness and response and prevention. Significant shortcomings have been identified in many of these programs in the past, and the potential for overlap and duplicate funding has grown as the number of grant programs has grown. For example, DHS OIG's report on the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program (OIG-ISP-01-03, September 2003) pointed out that many items authorized for purchase under the program are also authorized for purchase under the State Homeland Security Grant Program. In addition, preparedness grant programs are located in different DHS directorates. Having similar grant programs in separate organizations within DHS creates challenges related to inter-departmental coordination, performance accountability, and fiscal accountability. Furthermore, DHS program managers have yet to develop meaningful performance measures necessary to determine whether the grant programs have actually enhanced state and local capabilities to respond to terrorist attacks and natural disasters.

We are currently reviewing the delivery of Office for Domestic Preparedness first responder grants to states and local jurisdictions to identify problems in getting funds to first responders in a timely manner. In FYO4, we will conduct audits of individual states' management of first responder grants and analyze the effectiveness of DHS' system for collecting data on

state and local governments' risk, vulnerability, and needs assessments. We will also continue our audits of the department's disaster relief programs.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Integration and Reporting

The most immediate financial management challenge for DHS has been the integration of the financial operations of its 22 components and the creation of its own central financial management processes. This process is ongoing. At the same time, the department must seek longer-term solutions to serious financial system problems inherited from legacy agencies. Finding the systems to correct these longstanding problems, but which also optimize DHS' financial operations, is a huge challenge. The Chief Financial Officer has established a working group to address this matter.

Although the department has many financial reporting requirements, one of the most notable will be its *Performance and Accountability Report*, which will include DHS' first set of audited financial statements. The mid-year creation of DHS with a full year transition period thereafter created special one-time circumstances that should, for the most part, not be repeated in FY 2004. DHS will then be able to provide additional focus on its consolidation efforts and on improving its financial reporting processes.

Revenue Collection

Annually, CBP collects more that \$22 billion in duties, excise taxes, fines, penalties and other revenue. With regard to one kind of such revenue, the Treasury OIG conducted a review of CBP's international mail operations and found that information on values from the mail declarations is often inaccurate and reliance on such information has resulted in CBP's losing revenue. The results of a CBP mail revenue survey for fiscal year 2001 showed that CBP loses an estimated \$494 million per year based on examination of the contents of parcels.

Also, both ICE and CIS perform a key revenue generating role in collecting and accounting for the more than \$2 billion in application fees from non-citizens seeking entry into the U.S. In fulfilling its mission, CIS processes millions of actions and requests that are documented in paper files. The systems that track these applications are non-integrated, and many are ad hoc. As a result, CIS has had to halt normal business operations for up to two weeks in past years in order to determine and report deferred revenue. Deferred revenue is a financial measure of pending applications and is material to DHS' accurate financial statements. The challenge for CIS is to move from paper based and non-integrated processes to an integrated case management system, which CIS is in the process of doing.

Further, CBP is responsible for collecting user fees from air passengers arriving in the U.S. The fees are designed to pay for the costs of inspection services provided by CBP, which now includes the INS and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) inspection processes. Between FYs 1998 and 2002, the former U.S. Customs Service collected \$1.1 billion from the airlines. Now that CBP's inspection workforce has expanded to include INS and APHIS inspection services, it is important that CBP ensure that revenues collected are accounted for and are adequate to cover the costs of services provided. In addition, the TSA is required to impose a fee on airline passengers. This fee is designed to pay for the costs of providing civil aviation security services provided by screening personnel, federal air marshals, and equipment. OIG plans to conduct audit activity during FY04 that will address these issues.

HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

The *Homeland Security Act* gave DHS special authorization to design a human capital management system that fits its unique missions. As noted above, on April 1, 2003, the department announced that it would assemble a team of diverse employees from across the department and representatives from OPM and major unions to design a new human capital management

system for the department's approximately 180,000 employees. This team developed a range of options for pay and classification, performance management, labor relations, discipline, and employee appeals that were presented to the Secretary and the Director of OPM. The decisions of the Secretary and the Director will be published as proposed regulations. These new regulations will dramatically affect not only DHS employees, but also, at least potentially, the entire civilian workforce, as the DHS system will likely be considered a model for civilian personnel programs government-wide.

BORDER SECURITY

CBP and ICE share responsibility for ensuring the security of the U.S. borders. CBP's focus is on security at and between the ports of entry along the border, and it is responsible for enforcing customs and immigration laws, with emphasis on the movement of goods and people. Employees from the former Customs Service, INS, APHIS, and the Border Patrol work together to accomplish this mission. ICE's focus is on enforcement of immigration and customs laws. The inspectors and agents place heavy reliance on various information systems and high technology equipment to secure the borders against terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, illicit narcotics, and other illegal activity. Prior to DHS' establishment, OIGs at both the Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Treasury, as well as the General Accounting Office, identified numerous deficiencies in the systems used to track aliens, and in the deployment, use, and operational effectiveness of the equipment used to meet the border security mission. To a great extent, these challenges remain.

Specific challenges include the following:

Entry/Exit Tracking

DHS has no effective system to determine whether non-citizens who legally enter the country subsequently leave it. Many aliens enter under temporary visas and then fail to leave after their visa expiration date ("visa overstays"). Prior efforts to track these visitors have proved to be ineffective. The US-VISIT system is intended to solve the problems that have plagued previous efforts. DHS OIG will monitor the system's establishment and independently assess its effectiveness.

Student Visa Tracking

DOJ developed and fielded the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), an automatic tracking system designed to improve the monitoring of foreign students while in the United States. DOJ OIG identified computer difficulties SEVIS experienced, and serious shortcomings in the school accreditation process. Recent statements from various higher education officials indicate that problems persist.

Interior Enforcement/ Detection

Apprehension, detention, and removal of illegal aliens is a key DHS interior security enforcement responsibility. ICE uses several systems to perform its interior security enforcement role. These systems include SEVIS and the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (to be replaced by US-VISIT). ICE uses the information the systems generate to locate and remove aliens who overstay their visas or otherwise violate the terms of their admission. DOJ OIG concluded in a pre-DHS study that, on average, ICE is deporting only about 13% of all non-detained aliens under final orders of removal. The study also sampled high risk categories and found that ICE had removed only 6% of aliens with final removal orders who came from countries listed as sponsors of terrorism. And, only 35% of aliens with criminal records and final removal orders were being removed.

ICE has other interior enforcement responsibilities that include investigating a range of issues like terrorist financing, export enforcement, money laundering, intellectual property rights violations, preventing the illegal employment of undocumented aliens, and attacking sweatshops and smuggling enterprises that exploit undocumented aliens.

The DHS OIG is currently reviewing ICE's detention of illegal aliens, focusing on whether ICE has sufficient resources and facilities to house detainees. In addition, we have incorporated other projects into our FY04 Performance Plan, which will evaluate the effectiveness of ICE's Institutional Removal Program and the practices and procedures ICE uses to prioritize aliens to be detained.

Intelligence Matters

One of the principal objectives behind the establishment of DHS was to centralize in its Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) directorate intelligence concerning terrorist threats against the homeland, so as to facilitate analysis and appropriate follow up action. However, since the establishment of DHS, two even newer entities, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, run by the CIA, and the Terrorist Screening Center, run by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), have been created that have homeland security related intelligence responsibilities that either overlap with, duplicate, or even trump those of IAIP. Ensuring that DHS has access to the intelligence that it needs to prevent and/or respond to terrorist threats is, under such circumstances, an even harder challenge than it would otherwise be.

Moreover, the federal government's various terrorist watchlists have yet to be integrated into a single one for easy access by border security officials and law enforcement personnel. DHS OIG is monitoring DHS' terrorist watchlist integration efforts.

In addition to the foregoing, insufficient staff, slower than anticipated consolidation of administration functions, office locations, and delayed connectivity with other agency databases and communication systems have further hampered IAIP's and, therefore, DHS' effectiveness with regard to intelligence related matters.

Integrated Fingerprint Systems

CBP uses a two-print fingerprint scanning and automated search system (IDENT) to identify repeat illegal entries by aliens and to conduct a criminal history check against a limited immigration database. The DOJ has worked for several years to integrate IDENT with the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, which is a ten-print full criminal history check. This integration is critical to identifying illegally entering aliens on lookout lists or with criminal histories, but progress has been slow. According to the latest DOJ OIG report, the initial integrated version is scheduled for deployment this month, two years later than originally planned.

High Technology Equipment

Since September 11, 2001, CBP has expanded the use of high-technology equipment to search for radioactive materials, explosives, and chemicals. This equipment, which includes various vehicle x-ray systems, radiation detection systems, and trace detection systems, permits CBP officials to inspect cargo and conveyances for weapons of mass destruction without having to undertake the costly and time-consuming process of unloading cargo, drilling through it, or dismantling conveyances.

Treasury OIG concluded that it was unable to determine whether use of detection equipment was meeting legacy U.S. Customs Service's goals. According to Treasury OIG, the efficient and effective use and deployment of high-technology equipment could be improved through decisive management action. The DHS OIG will continue to examine deployment strategies, equipment utilization, reliability testing, and establishment of performance measures to assess the effectiveness of high technology equipment in detecting weapons of mass destruction.

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

Screeners

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which was enacted as a result of the events of September 11, 2001,

mandated that TSA hire and train thousands of screeners for the nation's 429 commercial airports by November 19, 2002. As a result, TSA hired 62,000 screeners. In the rush to meet the statutory deadline, TSA fell short in a number of areas, including screener recruitment, training, and performance. While some improvements have been made, further improvements are necessary to ensure that the flying public is adequately protected from terrorist activity. For example, a recent DHS OIG undercover audit of screener procedures revealed vulnerabilities and the need for full development of supervisory training programs. The DHS OIG is evaluating TSA's revised training programs and will continue to monitor TSA's progress in improving its weapons detection performance.

Checking Bags for Explosives

TSA has been largely successful in its effort to implement the ATSA requirement that all checked bags be screened by explosives detection systems (EDS). Remaining to be done are: (1) deploying such equipment to the remaining airports where alternative screening methods are in use today; (2) integrating explosives detection systems into baggage handling systems where needed (at a cost of more than \$3 billion); and (3) using research and development funds to develop and deploy more effective and economical equipment to address current and future threats and risks. DHS OIG is conducting reviews of EDS equipment deployment, and contract oversight and performance with regard to training, maintenance, and reliability of such equipment.

Maritime Security

Management challenges concerning the implementation of the *Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002* include the approval and enforcement of about 18,000 vessel, facility, and port security plans to be submitted by all owner/operators by December 31, 2003, under the guidance of the U.S. Coast Guard. Maritime Security final rules issued by the U.S. Coast Guard in mid-October 2003 established compliance dates and documentation requirements for owners and operators, who have until July 1, 2004, to implement vessel and facility security plans fully. The Coast Guard is also responsible for developing Area Maritime Security Plans, which must be consistent with the department's National Maritime Transportation Security Plan. These security plans will contribute to DHS' efforts to assess facility and vessel vulnerability and in the establishment of security incident response plans.

As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, seaport security and the cargo that enters into the U.S. at our seaports have become prominent issues. While CBP has taken positive steps to address the terrorist threat, additional steps are needed. Treasury OIG found that, to mitigate vulnerabilities at U.S. ports of entry, CBP must strengthen its implementation of security controls and procedures. Additionally, improvements in staffing, training, and proper record keeping are needed to enhance targeting effectiveness. Further, the commonality of conditions identified at the ports visited indicated that closer oversight and direction by Customs headquarters management was needed to ensure that vessel containers were effectively secured, inspected, and targeted for inspection.

CBP has implemented initiatives to increase the involvement of industry in the area of port security to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. ports to terrorist activities. These initiatives include the Container Security Initiative (CSI), and the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). Another initiative is to improve the Automated Targeting System by revising rules and rule weights to enhance capabilities for identifying cargo that might conceal weapons of mass destruction and other implements of terrorism. DHS OIG is currently reviewing the CBP's inspection process and conducting an audit of CSI, focusing on the issues associated with the pre-screening element, such as reliance on inspections of cargo containers conducted by foreign officials. We also plan to review C-TPAT to determine whether CBP has implemented adequate management controls over the program to ensure that participants are meeting program requirements and program objectives.

Treasury OIG also found that the significant safety, smuggling, and terrorism risks associated with the importation of hazardous materials (HAZMAT) require CBP to strengthen its management controls. CBP needs to focus on allocation of HAZMAT resources and identification of shipments at highest risk for smuggling drugs or becoming implements of terrorism.

Other Transportation Modes

Appropriately, TSA focused its first year efforts on aviation security. However, ATSA mandates that TSA be responsible for security in all modes of transportation, including non-aviation modes such as rail, highway, mass transit, cruise lines, and ferries. TSA has to date given relatively little attention to other modes. TSA is in the process of working on a national security plan that will address all modes of transportation, and of drafting memorandums of understanding with various Transportation Department agencies to determine how they will coordinate work in the future. DHS OIG will examine whether TSA devotes appropriate resources and efforts to non-aviation modes of transportation.

INTEGRATION OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Information technology remains a major management challenge for DHS. The Chief Information Officer (CIO) is working to establish a department-wide IT infrastructure for effective communications and information exchange among DHS employees. In this context, the CIO is charged with inventorying IT assets, identifying wireless compatibilities, and consolidating hundreds of redundant systems from the legacy agencies into a modernized, interoperable, and integrated infrastructure that supports the mission and business processes of DHS. Additionally, operational IT planning and budgeting must align with mission goals, reflect federal budgetary constraints, and utilize capital asset planning techniques to ensure that the technology portfolio achieves performance goals with the lowest life cycle costs and with the least risk.

SECURITY OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INFRASTRUCTURE

The security of IT infrastructure is also a major management challenge. As required by the *Federal Information Security Management Act* (FISMA), the CIO must develop and implement a department-wide information security management program that addresses the risks and vulnerabilities facing DHS' IT systems. As DHS OIG reported in September 2003, based on its annual FISMA evaluation, DHS has made some progress in establishing a framework for an IT systems security program in the short time since its inception. However, still more needs to be done. For example, DHS does not have a process to ensure that all security weaknesses, for both classified and unclassified systems, are identified and remedied. Further, none of the DHS components has a fully functioning IT security program.

Independent Auditors' Report



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Office of Inspector General Washington, DC 20528

February 13, 2004

MEMORANDUM

TO:

The Honorable Tom Ridge, Secretary

FROM

Clark Kent Ervin, Inspector General

SUBJECT:

Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' Financial Statements

Audit Report No. OIG-04-10

This memorandum transmits and serves as an executive summary of the *Independent Auditors' Report* prepared by the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP (KPMG), which audited DHS' financial statements as of September 30, 2003, and for the seven months then ended, as required by the *Accountability of Tax Dollars Act of 2002*.

DHS is to be congratulated on preparing its first set of financial statements for audit, a noteworthy event accomplished under difficult circumstances. When this audit started in May 2003, DHS was just two months old and represented one of the largest and most complex reorganizations of the federal government ever. DHS was still in the process of organizing itself and transferring agencies and programs, and its ability to produce financial statements was untested. Despite limited staff with many other responsibilities, DHS agreed to accept the challenge of a financial statement audit even though it added strain to its relatively limited resources. DHS management agreed with the Office of Inspector General that an audit would establish a solid baseline from which it could plan for and build good financial management processes. Thanks to this audit, DHS now has that solid baseline for improvement.

Summary of Auditors' Opinion

KPMG gave a qualified opinion on the consolidated balance sheet and statement of custodial activity, meaning that, except for certain items described below, they were presented fairly and free of material misstatements. KPMG was unable to provide an opinion on the remaining statements for the reasons also discussed below.

The qualification on the balance sheet related to: (1) the lack of sufficient documentation provided prior to the completion of KPMG's audit procedures to support \$2.9 billion in property, plant, and equipment at the U.S. Coast Guard; (2) KPMG's inability to observe inventory or otherwise verify \$497 million in operating materials and supplies at the U.S. Coast Guard; and (3) the lack of sufficient documentation provided prior to the completion of KPMG's audit procedures to support retirement benefits recorded at \$3.3 billion at the U.S. Secret Service and postemployment benefits recorded at \$201 million at the U.S. Coast Guard. Unlike some of the other large bureaus that came into DHS, the U.S. Coast Guard's financial statements had never been audited on a stand-alone basis, nor had they been audited at the level of detail required at DHS. It is not uncommon for a large established agency such as the U.S. Coast Guard to require additional time to get its processes and systems in place to facilitate a financial statement audit. The U.S. Secret Service has already started corrective actions related to its retirement benefits.

KPMG was unable to provide an opinion on the consolidated statements of net cost and changes in net position, the combined statement of budgetary resources, and the consolidated statement of financing for several reasons. First, several "legacy" agencies (agencies from which component entities or functions were transferred to DHS) submitted accounting and financial information over which DHS had limited control. Consequently, the auditors were unable to complete procedures relating to revenue, costs, and related budgetary transactions reported by the legacy agencies to DHS. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard was unable to provide sufficient documentation prior to the completion of KPMG's audit procedures to support certain revenues, costs and related budgetary transactions.

Internal Controls

Under standards issued by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, "reportable conditions" are matters coming to the auditors' attention relating to significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls that, in the auditors' judgment, could adversely affect the department's ability to record, process, summarize, and report financial data consistent with the assertions of management in the financial statements. "Material weaknesses" are reportable conditions in which the design or operation of one or more of the internal control components does not reduce to a relatively low level the risk that misstatements in amounts that would be material in relation to the financial statements being audited may occur and not be detected within a timely period by employees in the normal course of performing their assigned functions.

Summary of Material Weaknesses

The following are highlights from the material weaknesses described in the *Independent Auditors' Report*.

Financial Management and Personnel: DHS' Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) needs to establish financial reporting roles and responsibilities, assess critical needs, and establish standard operating procedures (SOPs). These conditions were not unexpected for a newly created organization, especially one as large and complex as DHS. The U.S. Coast Guard and the Strategic National Stockpile had weaknesses in financial oversight that have led to reporting problems, as discussed further below.

Financial Reporting: Key controls to ensure reporting integrity were not in place, and inefficiencies made the process more error prone. At the U.S. Coast Guard, the financial reporting process was complex and labor-intensive. Several DHS bureaus lacked clearly documented procedures, making them vulnerable to the loss of key people.

Financial Systems Functionality and Technology: The auditors found weaknesses across DHS in its entity-wide security program management and in controls over system access, application software development, system software, segregation of duties, and service continuity. Many bureau systems lacked certain functionality to support the financial reporting requirements.

Property, Plant, and Equipment (PP&E): The U.S. Coast Guard was unable to support \$2.9 billion in PP&E due to insufficient documentation provided prior to the completion of KPMG's audit procedures, including documentation to support its estimation methodology. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) lacked a comprehensive property management system and adequate policies and procedures to ensure the accuracy of its PP&E records.

Operating Materials and Supplies (OM&S): Internal controls over physical counts of OM&S were not effective at the U.S. Coast Guard. The U.S. Coast Guard also had not recently reviewed its OM&S capitalization policy, leading to a material adjustment to its records when an analysis was performed.

Actuarial Liabilities: The U.S. Secret Service did not record the pension liability for certain of its employees and retirees, and when corrected, the auditors had insufficient time to audit the amount recorded. The U.S. Coast Guard also was unable to provide sufficient documentation to support \$201 million in post-service benefits.

Transfers of Funds, Assets, and Liabilities to DHS: DHS lacked controls to verify that monthly financial reports and transferred balances from legacy agencies were accurate and complete.

Other Reportable Conditions

The following are highlights from the *Independent Auditors'* Report.

Drawback Claims on Duties, Taxes, and Fees: The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) accounting system lacked automated controls to detect and prevent excessive drawback claims and payments.

Import Entry In-bond: CBP did not have a reliable process of monitoring the movement of "in-bond" shipments, i.e., merchandise traveling through the U.S. that is not subject to duties, taxes, and fees until it reaches a port of destination. CBP lacked an effective compliance measurement program to compute an estimate of underpayment of related duties, taxes, and fees.

Acceptance and Adjudication of Immigration and Naturalization Applications: The Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services' (CIS) process for tracking and reporting the status of applications and related information was inconsistent and inefficient. CIS did not perform cycle counts of its work in process that would facilitate the accurate calculation of deferred revenue and reporting of related operational information.

Fund Balance with Treasury (FBWT): The U.S. Coast Guard did not perform required reconciliations for FBWT accounts and lacked written SOPs to guide the process, primarily as the result of a new financial system that substantially increased the number of reconciling differences.

Intra-governmental Balances: Several large DHS bureaus had not developed and adopted effective SOPs or established systems to track, confirm, and reconcile intra-governmental balances and transactions with their trading partners.

Strategic National Stockpile (SNS): The SNS accounting process was fragmented and disconnected, largely due to operational challenges caused by the laws governing the SNS. A \$485 million upwards adjustment had to be made to value the SNS in DHS' records properly.

Accounts Payable and Undelivered Orders: CIS and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, TSA, and the U.S. Coast Guard had weaknesses in their processes for accruing accounts payable and /or reporting accurate balances for undelivered orders.

Status of Prior Year Material Weaknesses

DHS inherited 18 material weaknesses from the former U.S. Customs Service, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and TSA. KPMG determined that nine of the material weaknesses were corrected or partially corrected. The remaining ones were consolidated into the seven DHS material weaknesses or reclassified to a reportable condition or other matter for management's attention.

Compliance with Laws and Regulations

KPMG identified weaknesses in DHS' reporting process for the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982 and instances of non-compliance with the Federal Information Security Management Act. KPMG also noted instances where DHS was not in full compliance with Office of Management and Budget Circular A-133, subpart D -Federal Agencies and Pass-Through Entities and Appendix B, Compliance Supplement.

OIG Responsibility

We contracted with KPMG to audit the financial statements of DHS as of September 30, 2003, and for the seven months then ended. The contract required that the audit be done in accordance with U.S. generally accepted government auditing standards, OMB's bulletin, *Audit Requirements for Federal Financial Statements*, and the GAO/PCIE Financial Audit Manual.

In connection with the contract, we reviewed KPMG's report and related documentation and inquired of its representatives. Our review, as differentiated from an audit in accordance with U.S. generally accepted government auditing standards, was not intended to enable us to express, and we do not express, opinions on DHS' financial statements or internal controls. Likewise, we cannot and do not express conclusions on DHS' compliance with laws and regulations. KPMG is solely responsible for the attached auditor's report dated January 30, 2003, and the conclusions expressed in the report. However, our review disclosed no instances where KPMG did not comply, in all material respects, with U.S. generally accepted government auditing standards.

Attachment



KPMG LLP 2001 M Street NW Washington, DC 20036

INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' REPORT

Secretary and Inspector General U.S. Department of Homeland Security:

We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheet of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as of September 30, 2003, and the related statement of custodial activity for the seven months then ended. Further, we were engaged to audit the related accompanying consolidated statements of net cost and changes in net position, combined statement of budgetary resources, and consolidated statement of financing for the seven months ended September 30, 2003. In connection with our engagement, we also considered DHS's internal control over financial reporting and tested DHS's compliance with certain provisions of applicable laws and regulations that could have a direct and material effect on these financial statements.

Summary

As stated in our opinion, except for the effects of such adjustments, if any, as might have been determined to be necessary had we been able to examine evidence related to certain financial statement balances, the accompanying consolidated balance sheet and statement of custodial activity present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of DHS as of September 30, 2003, and the related custodial activity for the seven months then ended, in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America. The scope of our work was not sufficient to enable us to express an opinion on the accompanying consolidated statements of net cost and changes in net position, combined statement of budgetary resources, consolidated statement of financing, and certain information disclosed in Note 10 related to prohibited seized property, for the seven months ended September 30, 2003.

As further described in Note 1 of the consolidated financial statements, DHS was established by the *Homeland Security Act of 2002* (the Act) as an Executive Branch Department of the United States government. Transfers of funds, assets, liabilities, and obligations from twenty-two existing Federal agencies and programs began on March 1, 2003, the effective date of DHS's operations.

As discussed in Notes 2, 9, 11, and 17 of the consolidated financial statements, DHS made certain adjustments to the amounts transferred into DHS from legacy agencies to correct accounting errors and to adopt a change in accounting method.



KPMG LLP, a U.S. limited liability partnership, is the U.S. member of KPMG International, a Swiss cooperative.



Our consideration of internal control over financial reporting resulted in the following conditions being identified as reportable conditions:

Reportable Conditions that are Considered to be Material Weaknesses

- A. Financial Management and Personnel
- B. Financial Reporting
- C. Financial Systems Functionality and Technology
- D. Property, Plant, and Equipment
- E. Operating Materials and Supplies
- F. Actuarial Liabilities
- G. Transfers of Funds, Assets, and Liabilities to DHS

Other Reportable Conditions

- H. Drawback Claims on Duties, Taxes, and Fees
- In-bond Movement of Imported Goods
- J. Acceptance and Adjudication of Immigration and Naturalization Applications
- K. Fund Balance with Treasury
- L. Intragovernmental Balances
- M. Strategic National Stockpile
- N. Accounts Payable and Undelivered Orders

The results of our tests of compliance with certain provisions of laws and regulations disclosed instances of noncompliance with the following laws and regulations that are required to be reported under *Government Auditing Standards*, issued by the Comptroller General of the United States, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Bulletin No.01-02, *Audit Requirements for Federal Financial Statements*:

- Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (FMFIA)
- Federal Information Security Management Act (Electronic Government Act of 2002)
- Single Audit Act Amendments of 1996

DHS is not currently subject to the requirements of the *Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990* (CFO Act) and, consequently, is not required to comply with the *Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996* (FFMIA). Therefore, we are not reporting herein on DHS's compliance with FFMIA. However, our testwork disclosed deficiencies in financial management information systems, the application of federal accounting standards, and recording of financial transactions, related to FFMIA that are presented within our report on internal control over financial reporting.

The following sections discuss our opinion on the accompanying consolidated balance sheet and statement of custodial activity; the reasons why we are unable to express an opinion on the accompanying consolidated statements of net cost and changes in net position, combined statement of budgetary resources, and consolidated statement of financing for the seven months ended September 30, 2003, and Note 10 related to prohibited seized property; our consideration of DHS's internal control over financial reporting; our tests of DHS's compliance with certain provisions of applicable laws and regulations; and management's and our responsibilities.



Opinion on the Consolidated Balance Sheet and Statement of Custodial Activity

We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheet of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security as of September 30, 2003, and the related statement of custodial activity for the seven months then ended. Further, we were engaged to audit the related accompanying consolidated statements of net cost and changes in net position, combined statement of budgetary resources, and consolidated statement of financing for the seven months ended September 30, 2003.

The U.S. Coast Guard, a component entity of DHS, was unable to provide sufficient documentation, prior to the completion of our audit procedures, to support the acquisition value and existence of property, plant, and equipment (PP&E), amounting to \$2.9 billion that is included within the \$9.1 billion net PP&E balance stated in the accompanying consolidated balance sheet. We were unable to observe a sufficient number of the physical counts of operating materials and supplies (OM&S) conducted by the U.S. Coast Guard, and we were unable to satisfy ourselves by other means as to the fairness of the quantities used in the valuation of OM&S, that amounted to \$497 million included within the \$1.2 billion net OM&S, inventory, and stockpile balance stated in the accompanying consolidated balance sheet. The U.S. Secret Service, another component of DHS, and the U.S. Coast Guard were unable to provide sufficient documentation, prior to the completion of our audit procedures, to support retirement and post-employment benefits amounted to \$3.3 billion and \$201 million, respectively, included within the \$25.3 billion military and other retirement balance stated in the accompanying consolidated balance sheet. The amount of PP&E, OM&S, and retirement and post-employment benefits at September 30, 2003, enters into the determination of net position, net cost, status of budgetary resources, the reconciliation of net cost to budgetary obligations, and custodial activity as of and for the seven months ended September 30, 2003.

Several legacy agencies (federal agencies from which component functions were transferred to DHS) continued to provide accounting and administrative services to DHS during the seven months ended September 30, 2003, pursuant to agreements between the agencies. Legacy agencies regularly submitted accounting and financial information to DHS that is reported in the consolidated financial statements. The scope of our audit did not extend to these legacy agencies in sufficient detail to complete procedures over revenue, costs, and related budgetary transactions, provided by them and reported by DHS during the seven months ended September 30, 2003. In addition, we were unable to complete audit procedures over certain revenues, costs, and related budgetary transactions of the U.S. Coast Guard, prior to the completion of the consolidated audit of DHS.

Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standard No. 3, *Accounting for Inventory and Related Property*, requires financial statement note disclosure of an analysis of prohibited seized property, including weight or item counts onhand at the beginning of the year, seizures and disposals during the period, and on-hand weight or item counts at the end of the year (see Note 10). Because we were not engaged as auditors until after March 1, 2003, we were not present to observe the physical count of the prohibited seized property in DHS' possession on March 1, 2003, and we were unable to satisfy ourselves through other audit procedures as to beginning inventory quantities or seizures and disposals that occurred during the seven month period ended September 30, 2003.

In our opinion, except for the effects of such adjustments, if any, as might have been determined to be necessary had we been able to examine evidence related to certain PP&E, OM&S, and retirement and post-employment



benefits, as discussed in the second paragraph of this section, the accompanying consolidated balance sheet and statement of custodial activity present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of DHS as of September 30, 2003, and the related custodial activity for the seven months then ended, in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America.

Because of the matters discussed in the second and third paragraphs of this section, the scope of our work was not sufficient to enable us to express, and we do not express, an opinion on the accompanying consolidated statements of net cost and changes in net position, combined statement of budgetary resources, and consolidated statement of financing for the seven months ended September 30, 2003. In addition, because of the matters discussed in the fourth paragraph of this section, the scope of our work was not sufficient to enable us to express, and we do not express, an opinion on the accompanying disclosure in Note 10 of the weight and item counts of prohibited seized property transferred to DHS from legacy agencies on March 1, 2003, and seizures and disposals that occurred during the seven months ended September 30, 2003.

As further described in Note 1 of the consolidated financial statements, DHS was established by the Act on as an Executive Branch Department of the United States government. Transfers of funds, assets, liabilities, and obligations from twenty-two existing Federal agencies and programs began on March 1, 2003, the effective date of DHS's operations.

As discussed in Notes 2, 9, 11 and 17 of the consolidated financial statements, DHS made certain adjustments to the amounts transferred into DHS from legacy agencies to correct accounting errors and to adopt a change in accounting method.

The information in the Management's Discussion and Analysis (MD&A), Required Supplementary Stewardship Information (RSSI), and Required Supplementary Information (RSI) sections is not a required part of the consolidated financial statements, but is supplementary information required by accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America or OMB Bulletin No. 01-09, Form and Content of Agency Financial Statements. Pursuant to OMB instructions, DHS has presented annualized information in the MD&A for the twelve months ended September 30, 2003. In addition, DHS has presented twelve months of data in certain RSSI disclosures. We did not apply certain limited procedures as prescribed by professional standards to the MD&A and RSSI because the annualized information presented includes the five months preceding March 1, 2003, the effective date of DHS operations as an entity. We have applied certain limited procedures, which consisted principally of inquiries of management regarding the methods of measurement and presentation of RSI. We noted that certain information presented in the RSSI and RSI is based on net cost and budgetary data from the consolidated statements of net cost and changes in net position, combined statement of budgetary resources, and consolidated statement of financing for the seven months ended September 30, 2003, on which we have not expressed an opinion. We also noted that DHS did not present as RSI a schedule of budgetary resources by major budgetary account, as required. In addition, we determined that DHS did not reconcile nonfiduciary accounts with its trading partners, as specified by OMB requirements, which could affect the intragovernmental information presented as RSI. We did not audit the MD&A, RSSI and RSI and, accordingly, we express no opinion on it.



The information in the Performance Information and Other Accompanying Information Sections are presented for purposes of additional analysis, and is not a required part of the financial statements. The Performance Information and Other Accompanying Information Sections have not been subjected to auditing procedures, and accordingly, we express no opinion on this information.

Internal Control over Financial Reporting

Our consideration of internal control over financial reporting would not necessarily disclose all matters in the internal control over financial reporting that might be reportable conditions. Under standards issued by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, reportable conditions are matters coming to our attention relating to significant deficiencies in the design or operation of the internal control over financial reporting that, in our judgment, could adversely affect DHS's ability to record, process, summarize, and report financial data consistent with the assertions by management in the financial statements.

Material weaknesses are reportable conditions in which the design or operation of one or more of the internal control components does not reduce to a relatively low level the risk that misstatements, in amounts that would be material in relation to the financial statements being audited, may occur and not be detected within a timely period by employees in the normal course of performing their assigned functions.

In our audit for the seven months ended September 30, 2003, we noted certain matters, described in Appendices I and II, involving internal control over financial reporting and its operation that we consider to be reportable conditions. We believe that reportable conditions A through G presented in Appendix I are material weaknesses. Appendix II represents other reportable conditions H through N.

We noted that DHS management's FMFIA report did not contain material weaknesses that have been reported by us in Appendix I. We also noted weaknesses in the DHS' FMFIA reporting process that are reported in Appendix I within Comment B – *Financial Reporting*.

* * * * *

A summary of the status of prior year reportable conditions related to the specific agencies and programs that transferred into DHS, as reported by the legacy agencies in their previous annual report or performance and accountability reports is included as Appendix IV.

We also noted other matters involving internal control over financial reporting and its operation that we will report to the management of DHS and certain component entities.

Internal Controls over Required Supplementary Stewardship Information

We noted certain significant deficiencies in internal control over Required Supplementary Stewardship Information, discussed in Appendix I, that in our judgment, could adversely affect DHS's ability to collect, process, record, and summarize Required Supplementary Stewardship Information.



Compliance with Laws and Regulations

Our tests of compliance with certain provisions of laws and regulations, as described in the Responsibilities section of this report, disclosed instances of noncompliance with laws and regulations that are required to be reported under *Government Auditing Standards* and OMB Bulletin No. 01-02, and are described in Appendix III.

DHS is not subject to the requirements of the CFO Act and, consequently, is not required to comply with the FFMIA. Therefore, we are not reporting herein on DHS's compliance with FFMIA. However, our testwork disclosed deficiencies in financial management information systems and in the application of federal accounting standards related to FFMIA (e.g., OMB Circulars A-127, *Financial Management Systems*, and A-130 *Management of Federal Information Resources*), and recording of financial transactions, that are presented in Appendices I and II of our report on internal control over financial reporting.

Responsibilities

Management's Responsibilities The Accountability of Tax Dollars Act of 2002 requires DHS to obtain annual financial statement audits.

DHS management is responsible for the financial statements, including:

- Preparing the financial statements in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America:
- Establishing and maintaining internal controls over financial reporting, and preparing the MD&A (including the performance measures), RSI, and RSSI; and
- Complying with laws and regulations.

In fulfilling this responsibility, estimates and judgments by management are required to assess the expected benefits and related costs of internal control policies. Because of inherent limitations in internal control, misstatements, due to error or fraud, may nevertheless occur and not be detected.

Auditors' Responsibilities As discussed in the Opinion section of this report, the scope of our work was not sufficient to enable us to express an opinion on the accompanying consolidated statements of net cost and changes in net position, combined statement of budgetary resources, and consolidated statement of financing for the seven months ended September 30, 2003, and certain information disclosed in Note 10 related to prohibited seized property, for the seven months ended September 30, 2003. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the consolidated balance sheet of DHS as of September 30, 2003, and the related statement of custodial activity for the seven months then ended, based on our audit. Except as discussed in the Opinion section of this report, we conducted our audit in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in the United States of America, the standards applicable to financial audits contained in *Government Auditing Standards*, and OMB Bulletin No. 01-02. Those standards and OMB Bulletin No. 01-02 require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the consolidated balance sheet and statement of custodial activity are free of material misstatement.



An audit includes:

- Examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements;
- Assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by management; and
- Evaluating the overall consolidated financial statement presentation.

We believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinion on the consolidated balance sheet of DHS as of September 30, 2003, and on the related statement of custodial activity for the seven months then ended.

In planning and performing our audit of the consolidated balance sheet of DHS as of September 30, 2003, and on the related statement of custodial activity for the seven months then ended, we considered DHS's internal control over financial reporting by obtaining an understanding of DHS's internal control, determining whether internal controls had been placed in operation, assessing control risk, and performing tests of controls in order to determine our auditing procedures for the purpose of expressing our opinion on the consolidated balance sheet and statement of custodial activity. We limited our internal control testing to those controls necessary to achieve the objectives described in *Government Auditing Standards* and OMB Bulletin No. 01-02. We did not test all internal controls relevant to operating objectives as broadly defined by the *Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982*. The objective of our audit was not to provide assurance on internal control over financial reporting. Consequently, we do not provide an opinion thereon.

As required by OMB Bulletin No. 01-02, we considered DHS's internal control over RSSI by obtaining an understanding of the DHS's internal control, determining whether these internal controls had been placed in operation, assessing control risk, and performing tests of controls. Our procedures were not designed to provide assurance on internal control over RSSI and, accordingly, we do not provide an opinion thereon.

OMB Bulletin No. 01-02 requires auditors, with respect to internal control related to performance measures determined by management to be key and reported in the MD&A, to obtain an understanding of the design of significant internal controls relating to the existence and completeness assertions. Our audit was not designed to provide an opinion on performance measures, and we do not express such an opinion. As discussed in the Opinion section of the report, we did not apply procedures to the MD&A and performance measures presented therein, because the data presented was for the twelve months ended September 30, 2003, which includes five months preceding the period covered by our audit.

As part of obtaining reasonable assurance about whether DHS's 2003 consolidated balance sheet and statement of custodial activity are free of material misstatement, we performed tests of DHS's compliance with certain provisions of laws and regulations, noncompliance with which could have a direct and material effect on the determination of consolidated balance sheet and statement of custodial activity amounts, and certain provisions of other laws and regulations specified in OMB Bulletin No. 01-02. We limited our tests of compliance to the provisions described in the preceding sentence, and we did not test compliance with all laws and regulations applicable to the DHS. We also note that while OMB Bulletin No. 01-02 requires certain testing and reporting on the compliance requirements of FFMIA, DHS is not subject to those requirements, and as a result, testing for compliance with FFMIA requirements



was not an objective of our audit. Providing an opinion on compliance with laws and regulations was not an objective of our audit and, accordingly, we do not express such an opinion.

Distribution

This report is intended for the information and use of DHS management, DHS Office of the Inspector General, OMB, GAO, and the U.S. Congress, and is not intended to be and should not be used by anyone other than these specified parties.



January 30, 2004



Appendix I - Material Weaknesses in Internal Control

A. Financial Management and Personnel

Background: The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on March 1, 2003, brought together 22 Federal agencies and programs that previously operated within varied financial management environments from other Executive Branch departments. Management activities, such as the assignment of financial management responsibilities, the degree of autonomy to make decisions, the use of integrated reporting systems, and financial reporting procedures were vastly different in the agencies and programs (referred to as Bureaus) that transferred into DHS. Since March 1, 2003, the DHS financial reporting infrastructure, including systems and reporting processes, and its management oversight of financial reporting have remained mostly decentralized, with Bureau finance departments and responsibilities remaining largely intact. As such, many of the Bureaus that came into DHS continued to rely on their former Executive Branch departments (referred to as legacy agencies) to provide accounting services. The DHS Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) operates with relatively few finance personnel, who principally serve to coordinate financial management policy and consolidate financial information submitted by the Bureaus. For fiscal year (FY) 2004, DHS intends to consolidate most of these accounting operations.

Conditions: We noted the following internal control weaknesses related to financial management and personnel:

1. The DHS OCFO has not:

- Established a hierarchy of financial reporting authority or an entity-wide financial management organization chart that clearly defines roles and responsibilities and assists with the identification of critical human resources needed to ensure that all financial management responsibilities are assigned.
- Assessed the critical needs of the financial management process to ensure that proper internal controls over financial reporting are designed and operating effectively, as defined by the Comptroller General.
- Developed standard operating procedures (SOPs) that will result in consolidated financial reports that are consistent, timely, accurate, and in compliance with Federal accounting standards.
- Hired or contracted qualified personnel to properly perform financial reporting functions of an Executive Branch department CFO's office.
- 2. The U.S. Coast Guard and the Strategic National Stockpile, both component bureaus of DHS, have weaknesses in financial management oversight that hinder their ability to prepare accurate, complete, and timely financial information for consolidation into the DHS financial statements. At the U.S. Coast Guard, we noted weaknesses related to the financial reporting process, maintenance of financial records, and policies and procedures and some aspects of Federal accounting standards related to repairable property, plant and equipment (PP&E) components, certain types of PP&E improvements and post-employment benefits. These weaknesses, as further explained later in this appendix, indicate the need for increased financial management oversight and skilled personnel. At the Strategic National Stockpile, the accounting process is fragmented and lacks unified financial management oversight. This condition is also further explained later in this appendix.



Cause/Effect: Many of the conditions at DHS Headquarters were not unexpected for a newly created organization, especially one as large and complex as DHS. Additionally, the conditions at the U.S. Coast Guard have surfaced because of its greater relative size to DHS compared to its former legacy Executive Branch department. This has brought its financial reporting processes under proportionally greater scrutiny. Nevertheless, the conditions described above have prevented DHS from timely preparation of accurate consolidated financial information and reports during the seven months of operations. DHS will continue to have difficulty complying with Federal accounting standards and requirements, and meeting internal control standards designed to achieve the five essential elements of internal control as defined by the Comptroller General and stated below. In addition, improvements will be necessary to meet the accelerated due dates for FY 2004 financial statement reporting.

Criteria: The Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (FMFIA) requires that agencies establish internal controls according to standards prescribed by the Comptroller General and specified in the General Accounting Office's (GAO) Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. According to these standards, management should ensure that they have an organizational structure that supports the planning, directing, and controlling of operations to meet agency objectives; clearly define key areas of authority and responsibility; and provides for appropriate lines of reporting. Management is to identify the knowledge and skills needed for various jobs and establish good human capital practices. The standards also define internal control as an integral component of an organization's management that provides reasonable assurance that the following objectives are achieved: effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of financial reporting, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations. The five essential control elements referred to above are: control environment, communication, control activities, risk assessment, and monitoring.

Recommendations: We recommend that:

1. The DHS OCFO:

- a) Establish a hierarchy of reporting authority and financial management organization chart, including the designation of key managerial positions within the individual Bureaus and the OCFO.
- b) Assess critical needs related to financial management that should be performed to ensure that financial processes are designed and implemented with proper internal control, including the five essential control elements (i.e., control environment, communication, control activities, risk assessment, and monitoring) as defined by the Comptroller General.
- c) Establish SOPs that will result in consolidated financial reporting that is consistent, timely, accurate, and in compliance with Federal accounting standards and control requirements.
- d) Hire or contract additional accounting personnel that possess complementary technical accounting skills to manage the development and implementation of SOPs and to provide appropriate oversight of the consolidated financial reporting process.
- e) Take a more active oversight role of accounting functions performed outside the DHS entity, particularly at the Strategic National Stockpile.



2. The U.S. Coast Guard:

- Evaluate the existing financial management organizational structure and conduct an assessment to determine the number of personnel needed along with requisite skills and abilities and make improvements as indicated.
- b) Develop procedures for providing oversight and guidance to operating unit and program offices that provide key financial information.
- c) Establish procedures for performing periodic reviews to assess the sufficiency of financial policies and procedures.

B. Financial Reporting

Background: Financial reporting at DHS is dependent upon the quality of financial reporting at its individual Bureaus and the ability of the OCFO to consolidate information timely and consistently. The consolidation process is accomplished, in large part, by using the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) Treasury Information Executive Repository (TIER), a data warehouse through which DHS Bureaus submit their financial information. TIER interfaces with the CFO Vision software, which is used to prepare DHS consolidated and individual Bureau financial statements. Most Bureau financial systems are not electronically interfaced with TIER, necessitating manual monthly submissions to the OCFO, which inputs the data into TIER. The OCFO is using TIER as a temporary system solution until permanent financial reporting system architecture for DHS can be developed and implemented.

Conditions: We noted the following internal control weaknesses related to financial reporting at DHS and its Bureaus:

1. The OCFO, together with DHS Bureaus, has not:

- Prepared accurate and timely periodic consolidated financial statements due, in part, to difficulty related to the use of TIER. The implementation and use of TIER and related software have presented challenges, many of which still remain, to the OCFO and the Bureaus. For example, most Bureaus had to configure their systems, processes, and procedures to properly accumulate, edit, and submit data for TIER, but errors continue to occur routinely. Only Bureaus that transferred to DHS from Treasury had policies and procedures already in place to ensure the accurate and timely submission of TIER data.
- Implemented an electronic interface between TIER and the Bureaus that allows for accurate and efficient
 consolidation of financial data. For example, at the DHS bureau Emergency Preparedness and Response
 (EPR), the lack of an electronic interface has made already complicated manual closing processes even
 more complicated and error prone.
- Completed a comparison of the U.S. Standard General Ledger (USSGL) software coding in TIER and
 its mapping to the CFO Vision software against the Treasury's USSGL roll-ups and financial statement
 crosswalks, to ensure that DHS' financial statements, as produced by CFO Vision, are presented consistent
 with applicable accounting standards. For example, we noted that other liabilities were not properly
 presented in the DHS balance sheet and required revisions to the TIER software to correct the discrepancy.
- Performed an analysis or developed procedures to ensure that all Bureaus are consistently interpreting Treasury's USSGL guidance and consistently applying it to the data submitted for consolidated reporting purposes.



- Prepared policies and procedures related to timely, complete, and accurate submission of monthly TIER
 financial information and subsequently perform a reconciliation of TIER and CFO Vision output to the original
 data submissions to check the accuracy of the TIER processing. The OCFO performs only limited data quality
 checks for TIER and CFO Vision input and output, although there are some high-level system software
 checks.
- Prepared comprehensive financial reporting instructions relating to all elements of the DHS Performance
 and Accountability Report, including the financial statements, related notes, Management Discussion
 and Analysis (MD&A), Required Supplementary Information (RSI), Required Supplementary Stewardship
 Information (RSSI), and other financial reporting matters, such as proper identification and reconciliation of
 intra-department eliminating entries. Some financial statement templates and/or instructions provided to
 the Bureaus by the OCFO were incomplete or unclear, did not allow sufficient time for the Bureaus to properly
 implement the requirements, and did not address unique reporting considerations existing in some Bureaus.
- Prepared RSSI correctly by including outcome measures for each stewardship investment discussed, as required.
- Adopted an effective process to compile year-end consolidated financial statements, including all note
 disclosures, to ensure presentation in accordance with federal accounting standards. DHS does not have
 effective systems or procedures to accumulate and present cost data by responsibility segment and major
 program, as required by Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standard (SFFAS) No. 4, Managerial Cost
 Accounting Concepts and Standards, or by major budgetary account in RSI, as required. In addition, DHS
 OCFO has not implemented adequate procedures and controls to compile balances and other financial data
 reported by the Bureaus into periodic (e.g., quarterly) consolidated financial statements.
- Performed an analysis and informed the Bureaus of laws and regulations that could have a direct and material effect on DHS' consolidated financial statements. In addition, the OCFO has not implemented monitoring controls to determine if the Bureaus are in compliance with laws and regulations.
- Implemented procedures, and related controls, that will ensure accuracy and completeness in the FMFIA
 reporting process. We noted several discrepancies between information provided by various Bureaus and
 information reported in DHS's draft Performance and Accountability Report. In addition, we noted that
 DHS has not reported some material weaknesses that we have reported herein. We also noted a lack of
 timeliness in reporting by some Bureaus and corrective actions and milestones were not presented for some
 findings.

2. At the U.S. Coast Guard:

- The financial reporting process is complex, labor-intensive, and requires a significant number of "on-top" adjustments (adjustments made to financial statements directly rather than first through general ledger entries). This situation is due in large part to the manual integration of data from three separate general ledger systems, to produce year-end financial information.
- The processes that finance center personnel use for making year-end closing entries do not include sufficient documentation of internal controls, such as management review and approval of adjusting entries. In addition, the software application used to process on-top adjustments does not have sufficient controls such as identifying all entries (debits and credits for USSGL accounts affected) for each adjustment.



3. At Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (collectively referred to as CIS/ICE because they share the same accounting operations), EPR, and the U.S. Coast Guard, policies and procedures for exporting data from the general ledger for periodic TIER submissions is not documented, quality control reviews of financial reports are not regularly performed, documentation of on-top adjustments is lacking, and/or TIER input is not routinely reconciled with CFO Vision output provided by DHS Headquarters. In addition, in some cases, the accuracy of financial information is highly dependent on the knowledge and experience of a limited number of key financial personnel, rather than on clearly documented procedures manuals and process flow documentation.

Cause/Effect: The rapid formation of DHS and the very limited staffing at the OCFO have prevented the OCFO from fully addressing the conditions noted above. It will take a reasonable period of time for the OCFO to stabilize DHS' financial reporting, prepare standard reporting and control procedures, and perform the necessary analyses to ensure the reliability of financial information. During the period ending September 30, 2003, most Bureaus manually prepared TIER submissions, which increased the likelihood of error. The conditions at U.S. Coast Guard are due in part to an extensive number of Treasury symbols that increases the number accounts that require monitoring. CIS/ICE has been negatively affected by the recent attrition of financial personnel worsened by the lack of documented procedures. EPR has been negatively affected by a lack of clear instructions during the implementation of the TIER upload and account mapping process. Nevertheless, the financial reporting weaknesses described above directly affect the reliability and usefulness of DHS' periodic financial information, the accuracy of the annual consolidated financial statements, and the efficiency of the reporting process.

Criteria: Although DHS is not presently subject to the Chief Financial Officers Act, as amended, (CFO Act), its requirements are still relevant to DHS. At agencies subject to this law, CFOs are responsible for maintaining an integrated financial management system, including financial reporting and internal control, that complies with accounting and internal control standards and requirements, and provides for reliable and timely financial information. Furthermore, GAO's *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government* requires that internal controls be documented in management directives, administrative policies, or operating manuals, transactions and other significant events also be clearly documented; and information be recorded and communicated timely with those who need it within a timeframe that enables them to carry out their internal control procedures and other responsibilities.

Recommendations: We recommend that:

- 1. The DHS OCFO, in coordination with Bureau financial management:
 - a) Continue to stabilize the consolidation reporting process, and install electronic interfaces between TIER and Bureau systems to ensure timely and accurate financial data consolidation. Written policies and procedures should be developed for exporting data from Bureau general ledger systems to TIER. Development of a DHS integrated financial management system architecture and its implementation should continue.
 - b) Develop and implement internal control policies and procedures to ensure that the TIER and CFO Vision logic is reviewed periodically for accuracy, completeness, and fair presentation. This periodic review will ensure that TIER and CFO Vision are updated for any future modifications made to the Treasury USSGL crosswalks and for future material changes to the nature and presentation of DHS financial statement balances.



- c) Identify and prepare Department-wide guidance, where needed, to ensure the consistent application of Federal accounting principles and use of Treasury's USSGL.
- d) Establish written policies and procedures that provide reasonable assurance that the inputs and outputs to and from TIER and CFO Vision are materially accurate and complete. These procedures should include periodic Bureau reconciliations of TIER inputs to TIER-produced trial balances and CFO Vision Bureau financial statements, and confirmations to the DHS OCFO that such reconciliations have been completed and reconciling items have been resolved.
- e) Develop and provide the Bureaus comprehensive DHS-specific financial reporting instructions for the Performance and Accountability Report, including financial statements and notes, MD&A, RSI, RSSI, and other financial reporting matters. Implement an OCFO process to prepare MD&A, RSSI and RSI that is in full compliance with required reported standards.
- f) Develop and implement procedures to compile data and prepare accurate and complete consolidated financial statements that contain disclosures required by federal accounting standards. Develop procedures to accumulate and present cost data consistent with the requirements of SFFAS No. 4 in the statement of net cost, and present required budgetary data in the RSI. Prepare pro-forma financial statements prior to year-end that contain all anticipated updates and changes to presentation and note disclosures. Complete the GAO CFO Checklist timely, together with explanations on how required disclosures are addressed in the DHS consolidated financial statements. The Checklist should be prepared at the same time as the pro-forma consolidated financial statements prior to year-end.
- g) Develop, implement, and monitor procedures for the Bureaus to reconcile intra-DHS eliminations on at least a quarterly basis, beginning in FY 2004.
- h) Develop and implement a procedure with assistance from DHS General Counsel, if considered necessary, to perform an annual review and update of the laws and regulations that could have a direct and material effect on DHS' consolidated financial statements, and to report such laws and regulations to the Bureaus. In addition, develop and implement monitoring and reporting controls to measure Bureau compliance with the laws and regulations that affect DHS' financial reporting.
- i) Develop procedures to ensure the timely performance and accurate reporting of management's assessment of controls and financial management systems in compliance with OMB Circular A-123.

2. The U.S. Coast Guard:

- a) Conduct an assessment of its current financial reporting process, with the goal of implementing appropriate internal controls and reducing complexity.
- b) Improve documentation for year-end closing entries, including management review and approval and clear identification of all on-top adjustments with all associated account entries.
- c) Reduce the reliance on the limited number of key personnel by cross training personnel and documenting the financial reporting process.

3. The EPR, CIS/ICE and the U.S. Coast Guard:

 a) Employ sufficient financial management and staff and other resources as necessary to ensure that accounting processes from other smaller DHS Bureaus are integrated effectively into BICE, as planned in FY 2004.



- b) Develop policies and procedures for exporting data from the general ledger for periodic TIER submissions, performing quality control reviews, documenting on-top adjustments, and reconciling TIER input with CFO Vision output provided by DHS Headquarters.
- c) Cross-train additional personnel in the financial reporting and TIER submission process, especially in the quality assurance review of the data submitted, to ensure that sufficient resources are available to assist at peak financial reporting periods.
- d) Document key SOPs for significant financial reporting processes.

C. Financial Systems Functionality and Technology

Background: Controls over information technology (IT) and related financial systems are essential elements of financial reporting integrity. Effective general controls in an IT and financial systems environment are typically defined in six key control areas: entity-wide security program planning and management, access control, application software development and change control, system software, segregation of duties, and service continuity. In addition to reliable controls, federal financial management system functionality is important to program monitoring, increasing accountability of financial and program managers, providing better information for decision-making, and increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of services provided by the Federal government.

DHS is currently designing Department-wide IT and financial architectures, to be completed by the end of FY 2005. Until the architectures are complete and the related IT and financial system infrastructure, controls, and processes are implemented, DHS' IT and financial system control environment will continue to consist primarily of the processes and controls in place at the Bureaus.

Conditions: We noted the following IT and financial system control and functionality weaknesses at DHS and its Bureaus:

- 1. Regarding entity-wide security program planning and management:
 - Security certification and accreditation (C&A) programs were not consistently and thoroughly implemented.
 Complete system inventories were not maintained, and reviews of controls had not been conducted for many systems.
 - Security training and awareness programs were inconsistent.
 - Security plans did not consistently document existing system security controls, were incomplete, or otherwise did not meet requirements set forth in Office of Budget and Management (OMB) Circular A-130, Management of Federal Information Resources.
 - Security risk assessments were not regularly performed and were not performed consistently.

2. Regarding access controls:

Instances of missing user passwords on key servers and databases, weak user passwords, and weaknesses
in user account management were noted. Also, we noted several cases where user accounts were not
periodically reviewed for appropriateness, including authorizations to use group user accounts and to identify
excessive access privileges.



- Instances where workstations, servers, or network devices were configured without necessary security
 patches, or were not configured in the most secure manner. We also identified many user accounts that were
 not configured for automatic log-off or account lockout.
- 3. Regarding application software development and change control:
 - Instances where Bureaus did not document changes made to applications and related change approvals.
 Procedures for documenting, approving, and implementing application changes were not consistently in place and applied.
 - Changes to software were not always tested prior to implementation, and movement of changes into the production environment was not always controlled.

4. Regarding system software:

- Instances where policies and procedures for restricting and monitoring access to operating system software were not implemented, or were inadequate. In some cases, the ability to monitor security logs did not exist.
- Changes to sensitive operating system settings were not always documented.

5. Regarding segregation of duties:

- Instances where individuals were able to perform incompatible functions, such as the changing, testing, and implementing software, without sufficient compensating controls in place.
- Instances where key security positions were not defined or assigned, and descriptions of positions were not documented or updated.

6. Regarding service continuity:

- Several Bureaus had incomplete business continuity plans and systems with incomplete disaster recovery
 plans. Some plans did not contain current system information, emergency processing priorities, procedures
 for backup and storage, or other critical information.
- Some Bureau service continuity plans were not consistently tested, and individuals did not receive training on how to respond to emergency situations.

7. Regarding financial system functionality:

- Several instances where Bureau financial management systems were not fully compliant with the USSGL at the transaction level. Specific and significant instances of non-compliance are described in other reportable conditions in this appendix and appendix II.
- Most Bureau financial management systems, are not fully integrated, leading to extensive manual efforts and the need for routine on-top adjustments to generate and report financial information.
- Bureau financial management systems often do not adequately support managerial cost accounting
 requirements. Consequently, most Bureaus have difficulty accumulating data in a manner that enables DHS
 to fully comply with federal accounting standards.



Cause/Effect: Although these weaknesses were inherited from the Bureaus that came into DHS, a current contributing factor is the challenge of merging numerous and varying financial management systems and control environments into a DHS environment. At many of the larger Bureaus, IT and financial system support operations are decentralized, contributing to challenges in integrating DHS IT and financial operations. In addition, financial system functionality weaknesses can be attributed to non-integrated legacy financial systems that do not have the embedded functionality called for by OMB Circular A-127, Financial Management Systems.

DHS has taken some steps to begin addressing current IT and financial system issues on a Department-wide basis. For example, DHS has designated a Chief Information Security Officer, issued the *Information Technology Security Program Publication*, and formed a council focused on developing the requirements for Department-wide financial systems and supporting business processes. Nevertheless, collectively, the identified weaknesses limit DHS' ability to ensure that critical financial and operational data is maintained in a manner to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

Criteria: DHS is required to comply with the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), which was passed as part of the Electronic Government Act of 2002. FISMA requires that Federal agencies and departments: 1) conduct an annual self-assessment review of their IT security program; 2) develop and implement remediation efforts for identified security weaknesses and vulnerabilities; and 3) report to OMB on the level of compliance. In addition FISMA calls for agencies and departments to comply with the requirements contained within OMB Circular A-130. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) publications further describe essential criteria for maintaining effective IT system controls. In addition, OMB Circular A-127 prescribes policies and standards for executive departments and agencies to follow in developing, operating, evaluating, and reporting on financial management systems. In particular, OMB Circular A-127 specifies the need for integrated financial systems and to account for financial data using the USSGL at the transaction level.

SFFAS No. 4, requires the classification of revenue and cost information by responsibility segment and major program in the statement of net cost. In addition, Departments are required to present a schedule of budgetary resources by major budgetary account in RSI.

Recommendations: We recommend that the DHS CIO, in coordination with the OCFO:

- 1. For entity-wide security program planning and management:
 - a) Design and implement a DHS-wide security C&A program that encompasses the design and implementation of a DHS-wide security training and awareness program, consistent with OMB and NIST guidance.
 - b) Complete security risk assessments in a consistent manner per OMB guidance.

2. For access control:

- a) Adopt password controls that meet DHS password requirements and are enforced on all systems.
- b) Implement password account management process within the Bureaus to ensure the periodic review of accounts.



- c) Design and implement a DHS-wide patch and security configuration process.
- d) Implement a vulnerability assessment process, where systems are periodically reviewed for security weaknesses.
- 3. For application software development and change control:
 - a) Adopt an entity-wide application change control policy that requires changes to be authorized and tested prior to implementation.
 - b) Adopt policy to require documentation of specific changes and related approvals.
 - c) Adopt policy to require analysis of change requests to ensure consistency with agency policy, user requirements, and implementation schedules.
- 4. For system software, ensure policies and procedures to monitor and restrict the use of or ability to make changes to operating systems are in place and followed by Bureaus.
- 5. For segregation of duties, perform an analysis of IT position responsibilities and implement policies and procedures at the Bureau level to improve segregation of duties for IT and accounting functions, including documentation of key security positions.
- 6. For service continuity:
 - a) Require Bureaus to develop and implement complete business continuity plans and system disaster recovery plans.
 - b) Periodically test key service continuity capabilities.
 - c) Design and implement a DHS-wide service continuity-training program.
- 7. For financial system functionality:
 - a) Continue with plans to identify requirements needed to design a department-wide financial system and related business processes that are integrated and reduce the need for manual and on-top adjustments.
 - b) Ensure that new financial systems and business processes are designed and implemented to meet Federal reporting requirements with policies and standards such as those contained in OMB Circular A-127.

D. Property, Plant, and Equipment

Background: Property, plant and equipment (PP&E) represents approximately 20 percent of total DHS assets and more than 50 percent of non-monetary assets. DHS uses a wide variety of capital assets to accomplish its mission, some of which are not typically maintained by non-defense agencies, such as aircraft, marine boats and vessels, and explosive detection devices. These assets often have long useful lives, and undergo extensive routine servicing that may increase their value or extend their useful lives. In addition, DHS has several internal use software development projects underway that will result in capitalized software balances in future years. Consequently, application of proper accounting standards to account for PP&E is important to the accuracy of DHS' consolidated financial statements.



Conditions: We noted the following internal control weaknesses related to PP&E at DHS Bureaus:

- 1. The U.S. Coast Guard has not:
 - Retained original acquisition documentation or sufficient documentation of alternative estimation methodologies and assumptions to support and record \$2.7 billion of PP&E.
 - Properly accounted for depreciation related to improvements made to certain types of PP&E consistent with Federal accounting standards.
 - Established internal financial management policies related to useful lives for certain vessels that are consistent with useful life determinations made by the U.S. Coast Guard's Ship Structure and Machinery Evaluation Board (SSMEB).
 - Properly classified repairable items with useful lives over two years as PP&E instead of operating material and supplies (OM&S) and depreciated these items accordingly.
- 2. The DHS Bureau Transportation Security Administration (TSA) lacks a comprehensive automated property management system that interfaces and reconciles with the general ledger and does not have adequate policies and procedures that ensure the accuracy of reported acquisitions and disposals of property.
- 3. The CIS/ICE has not consistently applied procedures to identify and capitalize software development costs or to reclassify software placed into production from software in development. At September 30, 2003, software costs were not considered material to the consolidated financial statements; however, software development costs are expected to increase in future years.

Cause/Effect: The U.S. Coast Guard lacks sufficient policies that define documentation requirements for PP&E; sufficient financial management oversight to ensure the proper application of Federal accounting standards related to improvements for certain types of assets and classification of repairable items; and appropriate policy to ensure useful lives for financial reporting are consistent with program/operational criteria. An analysis of repairable items was performed and the U.S. Coast Guard modified its policy and adjusted balances accordingly. TSA relies on several disconnected databases to assist in the tracking, accounting, and financial reporting of PP&E. The result is a complicated asset reporting process at TSA that increases the likelihood of error in the financial statements. CIS/ICE lacks sufficient SOPs that clearly define accounting policies for software costs. Over the next few years, CIS/ICE anticipates spending significant resources developing new software, such as US VISIT. Therefore, the lack of SOPs will increase the risk of financial statement errors due to misapplication of accounting standards for software.

Criteria: SFFAS No. 6, Accounting for Property, Plant, and Equipment:

- Requires that PP&E be recorded at historical cost with an adjustment recorded for depreciation. In the absence of such information, estimates may be used based on a comparison of similar assets with known values or inflation-adjusted current costs.
- Provides clear requirements for the period over which PP&E and their improvements are to be depreciated, depending upon whether the useful life of the base asset has been extended. The U.S. Coast Guard's Naval Engineering Manual specifies the SSMEB as the prime source of information on material condition and remaining service life of cutter and standard boat classes.



Defines PP&E as tangible assets that have estimated useful lives of two years or more, are not intended to
be sold, and are intended for use by the agency. The U.S. Coast Guard's repairable items have useful lives
of 2 years or more. They are generally components of larger equipment, such as the U.S. Coast Guard's
vessels, aircraft, and electronic systems (but primarily aircraft) that also have useful lives longer than two
years. Classifying repairable items as PP&E means that the cost of this equipment will be systematically and
rationally allocated through depreciation over the lives of these assets.

SFFAS No. 10, Accounting for Internal Use Software, provides requirements for the capitalization and reporting of software development costs. Although DHS is not subject to the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA), DHS should still ensure that its systems meet federal financial systems requirements, which include the requirement for effective and efficient financial systems. GAO's internal control standards require that internal control and all transactions and other significant events are clearly documented and readily available for examination.

Recommendations: We recommend that:

1. The U.S. Coast Guard:

- a) Develop and document methodologies and assumptions to support the value of the \$2.7 billion in PP&E that is not evidenced by original acquisition or otherwise sufficient documentation.
- b) Develop and implement policies to ensure the quality, sufficiency, and maintenance of documentation for future PP&E acquisitions and disposals.
- c) Develop and implement policies and procedures that ensure appropriate depreciation according to Federal accounting standards.
- d) Account for repairable items as PP&E.

2. The TSA:

- a) Implement a comprehensive automated property system that interfaces with its general ledger.
- b) Develop property management policies and procedures for property acquisitions, disposals, retirements, and transfers
- c) Establish an effective property management program at all field facilities, applying a Bureau-wide property management policy with associated controls.

3. The CIS/ICE:

- a) Perform a review of its existing software capitalization policy to determine adequacy, especially given the large anticipated future software development expenditures. The policy should be sufficiently detailed to allow developers and accounting personnel to identify the various phases of the software development lifecycle and the associated accounting treatment, as described in SFFAS No. 10.
- b) Develop and implement procedures for developers to track and notify accounting personnel when software has been placed into production so that accounting personnel can properly classify and amortize the software costs.



E. Operating Materials and Supplies

Background: OM&S are maintained by the U.S Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in significant quantities, and consist of tangible personal property to be consumed in normal operations to service marine equipment, aircraft, and other operating equipment. The majority of the U.S. Coast Guard's OM&S is physically located at either Inventory Control Points (ICPs) or in the field. The U.S. Coast Guard's policy requires regularly scheduled physical counts of OM&S, which are critical to supporting the proper valuation of OM&S and its safekeeping.

Conditions: We noted the following internal control weaknesses related to OM&S at the U.S. Coast Guard:

- Internal controls over physical counts were not operating effectively. Personnel at certain field units lacked an understanding of inventory property procedures. At nearly half of the locations we observed, personnel either did not properly resolve all count variances or did not properly approve all adjustments. In addition, items were not always properly bar-coded and tagged. On-hand quantities frequently did not agree to the perpetual inventory records, and procedures did not sufficiently address whether all inventory on-hand was properly recorded in those perpetual records or require timely resolution, which could take up to 45 days. Also, at several field units, minimum statistical sampling requirements necessary to accurately conclude on the existence and completeness of inventory were not met.
- The U.S. Coast Guard's OM&S policy was not periodically reviewed and evaluated to ensure its materiality assertion remains valid. The policy was based on the belief that the value of the OM&S did not represent a material amount. As a result, a material amount of OM&S at field units was expensed upon purchase, rather than when consumed. However, at our request, the U.S. Coast Guard performed an analysis and, as a result, concluded that the aggregate value of such OM&S exceeded their materiality threshold and should have been capitalized.

Cause/Effect: The U.S. Coast Guard's policies and procedures for conducting physical inventories are outdated, resulting in ad hoc procedures being performed to complete inventories and excessive time periods taken to resolve variances. Unresolved inventory discrepancies could result in financial statement misstatements that may not be corrected in time to meet accelerated reporting requirements.

The U.S. Coast Guard also does not have a process in place to periodically review its OM&S capitalization threshold policy for field units to ensure that material amounts are identified and appropriately capitalized. During our FY 2003 audit, the U.S. Coast Guard performed an analysis of these amounts and concluded that their materiality assertion was no longer valid. Consequently, the U.S. Coast Guard modified its policy, increased the number of reportable units, and adjusted the OM&S balance accordingly.

Criteria: According to GAO's internal control standards, assets at risk of loss or unauthorized use should be periodically counted and compared to control records. Auditing standards require that the auditor observe physical counts of inventories and determine the effectiveness of the counting procedures. SFFAS, No. 3, *Accounting for Inventory and Related Property*, states that OM&S generally should be recorded as an asset and expensed when issued to the end user. An exception is made if the amount of OM&S is immaterial.



Recommendations: We recommend that the U.S. Coast Guard perform the following for:

1. Physical Inventories:

- a) Update OM&S physical count policies, procedures, and controls and provide training to personnel responsible for conducting physical inventories, including procedures addressing bar-coding and tagging, and require personnel to complete their research into the cause of variances and submit the results of the physical inventories within 15 or fewer calendar days after completion of the physical count.
- b) Conduct a comprehensive review of field-held OM&S to fully assess current procedures relating to the proper identification and classification of OM&S items including items that do not represent OM&S, excess and/or obsolete items, and system-based issues with OM&S applications.
- c) Implement effective oversight and monitoring procedures to ensure that physical inventory counts are performed and evaluated in accordance with policies and procedures.
- d) Consider developing risk-based cycle counting procedures for OM&S.

Capitalization of OM&S:

- a) Capitalize field unit OM&S, consistent with Federal accounting standards and, as appropriate, based on the results of the U.S. Coast Guard's Study of Field OM&S Reporting Thresholds and Units.
- b) Implement financial management controls to periodically monitor OM&S, to ensure that appropriate changes and revisions to existing policies can be made in a timely, and in a comprehensive and consistent manner.

F. Actuarial Liabilities

Background: We were unable to audit the liability associated with the U.S. Secret Service's (USSS) retiree benefit plan and the U.S. Coast Guard's liability for post-employment military travel benefit at DHS because of insufficient time and/or lack of supporting documentation.

The District of Columbia administers the District of Columbia Police and Fireman's Retirement System for Secret Service Employees (D.C. Pension Plan). The USSS' Uniformed Division and White House Police can elect to join this D.C. Pension Plan up to the day the person retires. The D.C. Pension Plan makes the benefit payments to the retired person and/or their beneficiaries on a pay-as-you-go basis. Active USSS employees who have elected to participate in the D.C. Pension Plan contribute to the plan through salary deductions. The D.C. government is reimbursed each month for benefit payments in excess of salary deductions. The USSS receives a permanent, indefinite appropriation each year to pay the excess of benefit payments over salary deductions.

The U.S. Coast Guard provides an entitlement to its service members to pay the costs associated with travel and transportation of service members, their family members and household goods, at the time of separation from their last duty station to their home or other location. Entitlement is earned upon entry into the military service.

Conditions: At the USSS, we noted that the actuarial pension liability for the employees who have elected to participate in the D.C. Pension Plan was not recorded by the USSS or by any other Federal entity, prior to our audit.



The U.S. Coast Guard did not determine or record the amounts and timing of the future payments consistent with Federal accounting standards.

Cause/Effect: USSS management interpreted SFFAS No. 5 to indicate that only the administrative entity, rather than the USSS, should record the actuarial liability for pension plans. However, based on the criteria discussed below, the USSS would materially understate liabilities on the DHS financial statements, as well as the government-wide consolidated financial statements if an amount was not recorded. Consequently, the USSS engaged an actuary to evaluate the plan and compute the liability for future funding cost of the D.C. Pension Plan at September 30, 2003 resulting in an adjustment for \$3.3 billion to record the future liability.

The U.S. Coast Guard had not recognized the travel entitlement as an Other Post-Employment Benefit (OPEB) and as such did not apply the criteria for calculating the liability in accordance with SFFAS No. 5, Accounting for Liabilities of the Federal Government.

Criteria: SFFAS No. 5 states that pension liabilities should be reported in the financial report of the administrative entity. The liability is the actuarial present value of all future benefits, based on projected salaries and total projected service, less the actuarial present value of future normal cost contributions that would be made for and by the employees under the plan. In the case of the USSS, the District of Columbia, an entity outside of the Federal government, administers the D.C. Pension Plan. However, SFFAS No. 5 also concludes that all elements of pension expense should be recognized in the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. Government, after eliminating intragovernmental transactions. Therefore, in cases where the administrative entity is not a Federal entity, consideration must then be given to the definition of a liability in the Federal government, who is receiving the benefits, who is paying the expense, and where the liability is currently recorded. In this case, the USSS is paying retiree benefit expenses in excess of employee contributions, and it has an obligation to pay these expenses because they represent benefits that employees earn during their employment. Further, under SFFAS No. 5, no other Federal entity can report this liability on DHS' behalf; therefore, this liability must be reported by DHS if material to its financial statements and to ensure its inclusion in the government-wide consolidated financial statements.

The United States Code, Title 37, section 404(a)(4), states that a member of a uniformed service is entitled to travel and transportation allowances upon retirement for travel from his last duty station to his home or the place from which he was called or ordered to active duty. This U.S. Coast Guard entitlement represents an OPEB as defined by SFFAS No. 5. SFFAS No. 5 says the employer should recognize an expense and a liability for OPEB when a future outflow or other sacrifice of resources is probable and measurable and the long-term OPEB liability should be based on the amount and timing of future payments discounted to the present value.

Recommendations: We recommend that:

1. The USSS:

- a) Obtain a timely annual actuarial evaluation to calculate its share of the D.C. pension plan expense and liability using an acceptable cost method.
- b) Record the portion of the D.C. Pension Plan liabilities and expenses that relate to USSS employees in a timely manner.



2. The U.S. Coast Guard should establish procedures for determining the OPEB liability in accordance with SFFAS No. 5, and adjust the resulting liability and related expenses.

G. Transfers of Funds, Assets, and Liabilities to DHS

Background: The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (the Act) and subsequent guidance provided by the OMB and Treasury required legacy agencies to identify and transfer all assets, liabilities, personnel, budgetary funds, and other essential operating and mission-related functions to DHS beginning March 1, 2003. The Act allowed DHS and the legacy agencies up to one year to complete the transfers. To facilitate a smooth transition, DHS entered into several administrative Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) with legacy agencies for continuation of accounting services for certain programs.

Conditions: We noted the following matters that affected the funds, assets and liabilities transferred to DHS by legacy agencies. These matters had a direct bearing on DHS's ability to produce accurate and complete consolidated financial statements for the seven months ended September 30, 2003:

- DHS lacked procedures to verify accuracy and completeness of the March 1, 2003 transferred balances. Reliance was placed on legacy agencies to ensure compliance with the Determination Order process provided by OMB, including identification and transfer of appropriate funds. Only limited procedures have been subsequently performed by DHS that would identify discrepancies or instances of non-compliance with the Act or guidance issued by OMB or the Treasury.
- DHS lacked controls to verify that monthly financial reports received from legacy agencies (pursuant to MOUs) accurately and completely represented the financial position, use of budgetary resources, and net costs for the period.
- Some MOUs did not clearly specify the reimbursement terms for services provided to DHS, resulting in at least two instances where DHS was not billed, and therefore did not initially obligate or record an expense for services provided by legacy agencies, until identified during the consolidated financial statement audit.
- After the transfer date, some agencies operating under an MOU with DHS had difficulty providing required financial statement information needed for DHS to produce its operating statements for the seven months ended September 30, 2003.

Cause/Effect: The OCFO lacked financial management and staff resources needed to develop, implement, and execute internal controls that would have mitigated or prevented the deficiencies noted above. As a result, DHS placed substantial reliance on the legacy agencies to interpret and comply with the Act and has minimal assurance of compliance with the Act and related regulations as it may affect the DHS consolidated financial statements. Accounting systems' limitations did not allow some legacy agencies to perform proper reporting cut-off at March 1, 2003, and thus ensure that the statement of net cost for the seven months ended September 30, 2003 is accurately stated by DHS. In addition, the rapid start-up of DHS necessitated the use of MOUs to ensure a continuation of financial record keeping and systems support in order to prepare monthly and year-end financial statements. In some cases, DHS was not billed for these services or estimated funds were withheld by the legacy agency, which had the effect of understating transferred assets and net cost for the seven-month period.



Transition of accounting operations and related systems were to be accomplished over a period of time. Consequently, during the seven months ended September 30 2003, DHS routinely accepted financial data directly from legacy agencies without processes to verify its accuracy and completeness. Therefore, erroneous financial data could have been accepted and reported in the financial statements without being detected and corrected in a reasonable time period or through normal operating procedures.

Criteria: GAO's internal control standards require that agencies have internal controls in place to ensure the reliability of their financial reporting. This responsibility extends to services provided by other agencies or other outside organizations. Effective controls also include detection of inaccuracies in financial data prior to acceptance into the accounting system. In addition, SFFAS No. 7, *Accounting for Revenue and Other Financing Sources*, states that when government entities receive goods and services from other government entities without reimbursement, an imputed financing source should be recognized. That financing source should be equal to the imputed cost to the receiving entity and recorded to the extent required by other accounting standards (e.g., recognition of a liability and expense).

Recommendations: We recommend that the OCFO:

- a) Continue the transfer of responsibility for accounting operations, currently being performed by legacy agencies, typically through MOUs, to DHS Bureaus. Financial data for all material balances should be received only from accounting centers that are within the DHS control environment, or where DHS can be assured (e.g., through independent audit reports on the service center) that the outside service center has established policies and procedures to accomplish the control objectives defined by the Comptroller General in the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.
- b) Alternatively, if DHS is unable to transfer accounting operations for FY 2004, then SOPs, including sufficient controls, should be established to verify the accuracy and completeness of financial data received from legacy agencies, where accounting functions have been outsourced through an MOU.
- c) Initiate and complete a procedure to ensure substantial compliance with the Act. Recognizing that the Act was written to provide flexibility of implementation and accommodate practical interpretation, DHS could obtain this assurance from review and agreement by constituent governmental authorities, such as OMB, Treasury, the U.S. Congress, and legacy agencies.
- d) Perform a calculation of imputed costs that are absorbed by legacy agencies that are not billed to DHS, and record those costs in the DHS financial statements in a timely manner, as necessary, to fairly state financial statement balances.



Appendix II - Other Reportable Conditions in Internal Control

(Findings A - G are presented in Appendix I)

H. Drawback Claims on Duties, Taxes, and Fees

Background: Drawback is a remittance in whole or in part, of duties, taxes, or fees previously paid by an importer. Drawback typically occurs when the imported goods on which duties, taxes, or fees have been previously paid are subsequently exported from the United States or destroyed prior to entering the commerce of the United States. Depending on the type of claim, the claimant has up to eight years from the date of importation to file for drawback.

Conditions: We noted the following internal control weaknesses related to the drawback of duties, taxes, and fees paid by importers at CBP:

- The revenue accounting system, Automated Commercial System (ACS), lacks controls to detect and prevent
 excessive drawback claims and payments, necessitating inefficient manual processes to compensate. ACS
 does not have the capability to compare, verify, and track essential information on drawback claims to the
 related underlying consumption entries or export documentation upon which the drawback claim is based.
 For example, ACS does not contain electronic edit checks that would flag duplicate claims for export of the
 same merchandise.
- A single integrated system does not exist to support efficient drawback reviews; therefore, use of multiple systems or data sources is necessary to fully complete a review of a single drawback claim.
- Drawback review policies do not require drawback specialists to review all related drawback claims against
 the underlying consumption entries to determine whether, in the aggregate, an excessive amount was
 claimed.
- Policies and procedures addressing the extent and documentation of supervisory reviews performed over drawback claims and payments are not consistently applied in various ports.
- Users with change authorization may override the edit checks that exist in ACS. ACS lacks the capabilities to effectively manage override authority.
- At final liquidation of a drawback claim, ACS does not have a control to prevent a claim from being processed for an erroneous amount.

Cause/Effect: Systems are being developed to replace ACS over a number of years. Until new systems are in place, comparisons of entry and export information cannot be performed electronically, and CBP must rely on manual control processes to mitigate these system weaknesses. CBP uses a sampling approach to compare, verify, and match consumption entry and export documentation to drawback claims submitted by importers. However, procedural limitations decrease the effectiveness of this approach. Policies describing the extent and documentation of required supervisory reviews are not always clear, and are therefore subject to broad interpretation, allowing for discretionary override of the established controls. The inherent risk of fraudulent claims or claims made in error is high for the drawback program, and therefore, good internal controls are essential to manage and reduce the risk of erroneous payments.



Criteria: The Joint Financial Management Improvement Program (JFMIP) publications and OMB Circular No. A-127, *Federal Financial Systems*, outline the requirements for Federal systems. JFMIP's *Core Financial System Requirements* states that the core financial system must maintain detailed information by account sufficient to provide audit trails and to support billing and research activities. Circular No. A-127 requires that the design of financial systems should eliminate unnecessary duplication of a transaction entry. Wherever appropriate, data needed by the systems to support financial functions should be entered only once and other parts of the system should be updated through electronic means consistent with the timing requirements of normal business/transaction cycles.

The *Improper Payments Information Act of 2002*, effective in FY 2004, requires agencies to assess the risk of erroneous payments, report an estimate of improper payments annually and develop a plan to correct control weaknesses. GAO's internal control standards require management to identify and analyze relevant risks associated with achieving reliable financial reporting, effectiveness and efficiency of operations, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and then manage the risk. Under FMFIA, management must implement cost-effective controls to safeguard assets and ensure reliable financial reporting. While DHS is not required to comply with FFMIA, the *Revised Implementation Guidance* dated January 4, 2001, states that financial systems should "routinely provide reliable financial information consistently, accurately, and reported uniformly" to support management of current operations. In addition to the regulatory requirements stated above, CBP's *Draft Drawback Handbook*, dated June 2003, states that management reviews are necessary to maintain a uniform national policy of supervisory review.

Recommendations: We recommend that CBP:

- a) Implement effective internal controls over drawback claims as part of any new systems initiatives, including the ability to compare, verify, and track essential information on drawback claims to the related underlying consumption entries and export documentation for which the drawback claim is based, and identify duplicate or excessive drawback claims.
- b) Adopt a review methodology to allow a statistical projection from drawback testing.
- c) Revise current policies and procedures to require drawback specialists to review all prior related drawback claims against a designated consumption entry to determine whether, in the aggregate, an excessive amount was claimed against the consumption entries.
- d) Create a query that periodically (e.g., weekly or monthly) generates from ACS a report of all overrides, their amount, and the user who performed the override. In addition, the Headquarters Drawback Program Manager should review the report each period and investigate any override that appears unusual or excessive in amount.
- e) Improve the overall design of the supervisory review of drawback claims by ensuring that all CBP drawback offices adhere to a uniform national policy and consistent procedures for supervisory review.

I. In-bond Movements of Imported Goods

Background: Generally, when merchandise arrives in the United States from a foreign country, the importer is required to pay CBP the appropriate duties, taxes, and fees at the port of arrival (port of origin). An exception is made, however, for goods transported "in-bond" from the port of origin to another port (port of destination) within



the United States. Merchandise traveling in-bond is not subject to duties, taxes, and fees until it reaches the port of destination where it is ultimately released into the commerce or destroyed. The bonded carrier is ultimately obligated by their official bond to ensure the integrity of the merchandise until disposition and the payment of appropriate duty, if any is due. It is CBP's responsibility to control the movement and disposition of in-bond shipments with effective policies and regulations that result in either collection of applicable duties, taxes, and fees at the port of destination or the export of the merchandise. CBP has developed a compliance measurement program, called TINMAN, to select, review and determine overall compliance of in-bond movements.

Conditions: We noted the following internal control weaknesses related to in-bond movements of imported goods. CBP:

- Does not have a reliable process of monitoring the movement of in-bond shipments.
- Lacks adequate written SOPs for in-bond processing and use of TINMAN.
- Lacks consistent performance of a compliance measurement program to periodically assess the risk and compute an estimate of underpayment of duties, taxes and fees.

Cause/Effect: In most cases, we noted that in-bond imports were opened correctly in the system at the arrival ports; however, the ports do not have the resources to close out all in-bond movements that are received at the destination port. Policies and procedures have not been developed and/or implemented to reliably and accurately track and close in-bond movements in a timely manner. System limitations reduce the effectiveness of physical inspections and the accuracy of in-bond reports. For example, the open in-bond reports may list an open in-bond shipment that has previously been closed, does not exist, or does not reconcile to the original in-bond submission. Much of the in-bond process is manual, placing an added burden on limited resources. Without an adequate process to track and close in-bond movements and an effective compliance measurement program, CBP lacks assurance that: (i) declared quantity and type of cargo moving in-bond is accurate and complete, (ii) cargo actually reaches its scheduled destination, and (iii) calculated and collected revenue for cargo moving in-bond is accurate and complete in relation to the entry summary filing.

Criteria: Under FMFIA, management must implement cost-effective controls to safeguard assets and ensure reliable financial reporting. While DHS is not subject to FFMIA, the *Revised Implementation Guidance* states that financial systems should "routinely provide reliable financial information consistently, accurately, and reported uniformly" to support management of current operations. In addition, CBP regulations require that all in-bond transactions should be closed out timely to ensure that goods are not diverted into commerce without filing and paying the proper amount of duties, taxes, and fees.

Recommendations: We recommend that CBP:

- a) Design in-bond monitoring and reconciliation controls into new systems that will replace ACS in the future.
- b) Develop and implement SOPs that define procedures and responsibilities for the tracking and closing of inbond movements.
- c) Reinstate the compliance measurement audits over the in-bond program, including a methodology for measurement of results from inspections performed based on TINMAN selection.



J. Acceptance and Adjudication of Immigration and Naturalization Applications

Background: CIS accepts millions of applications annually and typically collects more than \$1 billion in fees from applicants seeking immigration and naturalization services. Applications are received and processed at four service centers, the National Benefits Center, over thirty district offices, and numerous satellite offices. Upon receipt of an application, CIS personnel input the data into a variety of information systems. Numerous ad hoc systems are used to perform monitoring and file tracking functions during the acceptance and adjudication process. To compile and report monthly operating statistics for Congress and other interested parties, CIS makes monthly data calls to its various offices, who then enter the information into the Performance Analysis System (PAS). PAS data also is used as the basis for recording application revenue and deferred revenue. Federal accounting standards require that application revenue must be deferred until adjudication is complete, and consequently the status (e.g., completion) of applications has a direct effect on DHS' consolidated financial statements. The accuracy of pending application inventory records is important to CIS' calculation of deferred revenue and to CIS' operational control over its work-in-process. There are a number of information systems initiatives underway to improve the efficiency of and the quality of management information from the application and adjudication process.

Conditions: We noted the following internal control weaknesses related to the acceptance and adjudication of immigration and naturalization applications at CIS:

- CIS lacks SOPs for tracking and reporting the status of applications and related information. As a result,
 this process is inconsistent across all districts and service centers. For the monthly data call, there is no
 common protocol for gathering, organizing, and entering data into PAS. Some offices manually compile the
 data for PAS and others generate the data from their own local systems. The lack of SOPs increases the risk
 of inconsistency and errors in the data.
- PAS is a data collection system that does not interface with other systems of original data entry, creating significant reporting inefficiencies. It is dependent upon monthly data calls and cannot provide real time information on individual applications or at an aggregate level.
- CIS does not have a policy that requires periodic cycle counts of its pending applications. The lack of such cycle counts in previous years has led to bureau-wide end of the year inventories that have been disruptive to CIS operations and have delayed the completion of year-end financial reporting.

Cause/Effect: Due to the concerns over data quality in both the local and national feeder systems, and the monthly PAS reporting process, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, as CIS was known prior to its transfer to DHS, had to perform an extensive service-wide inventory of pending (SWIP) applications. The SWIP had to be performed at nearly all locations in previous years to accurately state deferred revenue in its financial statements. A SWIP is labor-intensive and time-consuming, but necessary in the absence of cycle counts to verify perpetual application inventory systems and determine adjustments to deferred revenue. The lack of integrated systems and use of ad hoc systems create significant inefficiencies and increase the risk of errors and reporting inconsistencies.

Criteria: OMB Circular A-127 requires that financial management systems provide effective and efficient interrelationships between software, hardware, personnel, procedures, controls, and data contained within the systems. Since CIS' various application and adjudication systems support preparation of the financial statements,



they are considered financial systems. Such systems should have standard data classifications, common processes for similar kinds of transactions, consistent internal control, and a design that eliminates the need for duplicate transaction entry.

Recommendations: We recommend that CIS:

- a) Develop Bureau-wide SOPs related to tracking the status of acceptance and adjudication of immigration and naturalization applications. These policies should address specifically how CIS personnel should track the status of all applications from initial acceptance through the ultimate adjudication, to ensure that actual application status and file location are always current. All application types and all locations should be reviewed at least once annually, to ensure that the SOPs for tracking and reporting application status have been consistently applied.
- b) Interface the PAS, a data collection system, with other systems of original data entry, to provide real time information on individual applications or at an aggregate level.
- c) Require all locations to perform cycle counts of pending applications with a frequency (e.g., rotating quarters) that is sufficient to replace the SWIP process used in the past and provides reasonable assurance of the completeness and accuracy of data used to compute deferred revenue. The results of the cycle counts (e.g., the error rate) should be recorded and used to develop a quality assurance function.

K. Fund Balance with Treasury

Background: Fund balance with Treasury (FBWT) is a significant account at the U.S. Coast Guard and the largest asset account in DHS' financial statements. FBWT represents funds held by Treasury to fund agency operations and missions.

Conditions: The U.S. Coast Guard:

- Did not perform the required reconciliation procedures for its FBWT accounts on a timely basis or the required procedures related to Treasury's FMS 6652, Statement of Differences.
- Lacked written SOPs to direct and document the correct reconciliation processes and internal controls to
 ensure that monthly collection and disbursement activity was reported accurately and timely to the Treasury.

Cause/Effect: The U.S. Coast Guard did not complete timely reconciliations because of difficulties in implementing a new financial system that substantially increased reconciling differences and a learning curve involved in using the new system to research and solve discrepancies. The U.S. Coast Guard completed its reconciliations and analysis of significant items and recorded the necessary on top adjustments as of September 30, 2003. However, failure to implement timely and effective reconciliation processes could increase the risks of fraud, waste, and mismanagement of funds; affect the Government's ability to effectively monitor budget execution; and affect the ability to accurately measure the full cost of the Government's programs.



Criteria: Treasury requires agencies to reconcile their FBWT accounts regularly to ensure the integrity and accuracy of agency and government-wide financial reporting.

Recommendations: We recommend that the U.S. Coast Guard:

- a) Prepare monthly reconciliations of FBWT, including timely resolution of reconciling differences, that are complete, accurate, and reviewed and approved by management.
- b) Develop written SOPs to direct and document its FBWT reconciliation process. The SOPs should be based on Treasury guidance and tailored to the U.S. Coast Guard's own operations and new financial system.

L. Intragovernmental Balances

Background: DHS conducts business with other Federal agencies resulting in intragovernmental receivables, payables, and the reporting of revenues and expenses from intragovernmental transactions. Federal accounting and reporting regulations require Federal agencies to routinely identify and reconcile intragovernmental balances and transactions with trading partners. These procedures help ensure that intragovernmental balances properly eliminate in the government-wide consolidated financial statements.

Conditions: We noted that the U.S. Coast Guard, EPR, CBP, USSS, CIS/ICE, and certain programs that are accounted for by legacy agencies, have not developed and adopted effective SOPs or established systems to track, confirm, and reconcile intragovernmental balances and transactions with trading partners. This condition also impacts DHS's ability to accurately report transactions with government trading partners in RSI as required.

Cause/Effect: The U.S. Coast Guard's financial system is limited in its ability to completely track activity with government trading partners. Instead the U.S. Coast Guard uses a negative confirmation process, which assumes that if no response is received from trading partners, its records are correct. However, positive confirmations are preferable and provide the best evidence of the accuracy of intragovernmental balances. EPR did complete intragrovernmental reconciliations for fiduciary accounts, but did not complete a confirmation and reconciliation process with all trading partners identified in Treasury's Intragovernmental Fiduciary Transactions Accounting Guide due to a lack of time and resources. CBP and the USSS have difficulty confirming their activity with trading partners because of limitations in other agency systems that only identify transactions with DHS, not DHS' individual Bureaus. TSA is a new Federal entity and therefore has not had sufficient time or technical resources to formalize some financial SOPs, including intragovernmental reconciliations. The CIS/ICE's financial system is limited in its ability to completely track activity with government trading partners; thus, manual processes have been established. A lack of resources, clear definition of staff responsibilities and an understanding of Treasury guidance are contributing factors to this condition at CIS/ICE.

Reconciling trading partner activity and balances at least quarterly is necessary to identify material out-of-balance conditions between federal entities and to support an accurate consolidation of DHS with the government-wide financial statements.

Criteria: The Treasury Federal Intragovernmental Transactions Accounting Policies Guide, dated October 23, 2002, requires quarterly reconciliation of intragovernmental asset, liability and revenue amounts with trading



partners. Further, the *Treasury Financial Manual*, Section 4060, *Intragovernmental Activity/Balances*, requires reporting agencies to reconcile/confirm intragovernmental activity and balances quarterly for specific reciprocal groupings. OMB Bulletin No. 01-09, *Form and Content of Agency Financial Statements*, requires the presentation of transactions with trading partners to be presented in RSI.

Recommendation: We recommend that all DHS Bureaus and programs, in conjunction with the DHS OCFO, develop and implement procedures to positively confirm and reconcile, at least on a quarterly basis, all intragovernmental activity and balances with their intragovernmental trading partners, as prescribed by Treasury guidance. In addition, transactions with trading partners should be completely and accurately presented in the Department's Performance and Accountability Report's RSI section.

M. Strategic National Stockpile

Background: The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) is a reserve of medical supplies available for response to a bioterrorist attack or other public health emergency. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred the assets, liabilities, functions, and personnel of the SNS to DHS. It also amended Section 121 of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, which continued to make the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) responsible for ensuring adequate procedures are followed for SNS accounting, inventory management, and physical security. DHS and HHS have signed an MOU to coordinate their activities with respect to the SNS. The Inventory Management System (IMS) is used to physically track the stockpile inventory.

Conditions: We noted the following internal control weaknesses related to the SNS:

- Fragmented accounting processes and responsibilities The accounting process for SNS is currently fragmented and disconnected. Five separate parties (i.e., HHS, Centers for Disease Control [CDC], Department of Veterans Affairs [VA], SNS, and DHS) are involved in some aspect of the SNS accounting process. No agency has full control or complete accounting information needed by DHS to prepare accurate financial statements, and DHS does not have adequate information to properly manage disbursements of SNS funds transferred from HHS. For example, DHS had difficulty obtaining an accounting of SNS proprietary and budgetary accounts as of March 1, 2003 or beyond, and DHS did not receive sufficient information in a timely manner to properly state accounts payable and undelivered orders. DHS has also had difficulty accounting for some funds withheld by HHS to pay for future obligations.
- Valuation of SNS inventory When SNS transferred to DHS, the inventory balance was not valued at
 historical cost, contained unvalued inventory, and contained fixed asset items that should have been
 reported as PP&E. As a result, an adjustment of approximately \$485 million to increase the book value of
 inventory was required.
- System limitations IMS is a stand-alone system and not integrated with the general ledger; therefore, all
 purchases, deployments, and rotations are updated through emails with supporting documentation sent at
 a later date, causing an inventory cut-off issue at year-end that required additional procedures to ensure
 accuracy of year end balances.
- Policies and procedures SNS has only draft SOPs related to system usage and essential accounting
 processes. We also noted some confusion among accounting personnel regarding their chain of command
 that resulted, at least in part, from the dual roles of DHS and HHS in SNS activities.



Cause/Effect: The conditions above exist principally because of operational challenges created by the laws related to the creation of DHS, which transferred SNS funds, assets, and liabilities to DHS but also placed responsibility for the adequacy of accounting processes with HHS. DHS, HHS, CDC, VA, and SNS all have pieces of information that determine status of budgetary authority and accounting transactions affecting the SNS. However, clear, singular authority over the accounting functions has not yet been established, leading to a lack of sound financial management. Without a timely reconciliation between DHS, HHS, CDC, VA, and SNS, DHS will be unable to maintain accurate balances for obligations, undelivered orders, and operating expenses, and will have difficultly in maintaining accurate balances for inventory and accounts payable.

Since FY 2001, the value of SNS inventory has increased significantly. The SNS does not have adequate systems or processes to properly track changes in valuation and adjust financial records timely. For example, IMS does not contain an historical cost or have a standard cost module to properly value the inventory. Further, IMS is not an on-line system; therefore, all purchases, deployments, and rotations are updated through emails with supporting documentation sent at a later date, creating significant inefficiencies and increasing the risk of errors and reporting inconsistencies. Although draft SOPs exist related to entry of inventory transactions into IMS, it does not appear all employees are following the standards and not all of the SOPs are formal documents.

Criteria: FMFIA and GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government require that internal controls be documented in management directives, administrative policies, or operating manuals; appropriate lines of reporting be established; transactions and other significant events be clearly documented; and information be recorded and communicated timely with those who need it within a time frame that enables them to carry out their internal control and other responsibilities. According to SFFAS No. 3, Accounting for Inventory and Related Property, stockpile inventory should be recorded at historical cost or any other valuation method, which approximate historical cost. OMB Circular A-127 requires agencies to have integrated systems that provide complete, reliable, consistent, timely and useful financial management information or processes that accomplish the same.

Recommendations: We recommend that:

The DHS OCFO, in coordination with EPR and the other relevant agencies:

- a) Perform a legal analysis of the pertinent laws and recommend any appropriate changes that would help ensure sound accounting and financial reporting for the SNS.
- b) Develop policy and procedures that require DHS, HHS, CDC, VA, and SNS to periodically reconcile their accounting information and to obtain timely balances for SNS obligations, expenditures, operating expenses, unobligated amounts, accounts payable and any other relevant USSGL accounts. This reconciliation should include the determination of which entity is paying for which goods and services and any amounts that have been withheld by HHS to cover such expenses.
- c) Consider amending the MOU and updating service agreements to re-define responsibilities for accounting functions between DHS, HHS, CDC, VA, and SNS with the objective of minimizing fragmentation of the accounting process, improving timeliness and reliability of financial data, and improving processing efficiencies.
- d) Continue with the development and implementation of a new accounting and inventory system and related SOPs, and establish an appropriate historical baseline for the inventory cost.



- e) Identify all fixed asset items currently included in the SNS inventory, remove them from the inventory balance, and report them as PP&E.
- f) Consider integrating IMS with the general ledger software to improve the accuracy of financial reporting for inventory balances.

N. Accounts Payable and Undelivered Orders

Background: Accounts payable and undelivered orders (UDOs) at reporting cut-off dates are significant to the accurate presentation of DHS consolidated financial statements and require good cut-off procedures. With accelerated reporting requirements effective in FY 2004, many Bureaus already have or will need to develop procedures to accurately estimate accounts payable accrual adjustments at yearend. Accurate and complete UDO balances are often an essential component of accounts payable estimates.

Conditions: We noted the following internal control weaknesses related to accounts payable and UDOs:

At CIS/ICE:

- We noted an error rate of approximately 50 percent in the source data used to calculate the accounts payable accrual estimate at an interim date, selected for our testwork.
- Field personnel are not always reviewing UDOs as required by internal policies and procedures.

At TSA:

- Procedures are not in place to accurately compute and accrue accounts payable transactions based on actual amounts in a timely manner.
- A reliable method to estimate accrued accounts payable has not been developed.

At U.S Coast Guard:

- The September 30, 2003 UDO balance of \$1.9 billion, as recorded in the U.S. Coast Guard's core accounting system and exclusive of military medical expenses, was overstated. We noted a total of 29 exceptions in our sample of 133 items. Also, the Department of Transportation's Office of Inspector General informed us that the Finance Center's UDO balance that transferred to DHS effective March 1, 2003 was overstated by approximately \$22 million. Finance Center personnel indicated that this was corrected after the balance was transferred.
- Some UDOs related to medical expenses for active duty and reserve personnel were either not valid or should have been reclassified as accounts payable. Also, the amount recorded for accounts payable related to medical expenses associated with retired personnel was overstated. Invalid UDOs and overstated accounts payable represent funds that can be put to better use or returned to the Treasury.
- The initial estimate for the September 30, 2003 accounts payable accrual was misstated due to errors in statistical sampling techniques and the accuracy of the sample items selected.
- At the Aircraft Repair and Supply Center (AR&SC), we noted 6 exceptions out of a sample of 145 items, for which goods or services were received, but the associated UDO balances had not been appropriately reduced.



Cause/Effect: Conditions at CIS/ICE resulted from the cyclical nature of validation and verification procedures typically performed, which potentially causes misstated financial statement balances periodically during the year. TSA, as a recently formed entity, has not yet fully developed its SOPs for financial reporting. At the U.S. Coast Guard, program element managers were not performing reviews of open obligations. Also, process and system limitations at the U.S. Coast Guard's AR&SC affect the accuracy of accounting for receipt of goods and services, and could result in an overstatement of UDOs and understatement of payables, expenses and/or assets at the end of an accounting period. Incorrect UDO balances affect (1) the note disclosures related to both the obligated and unobligated fund balances reported for Fund Balance with Treasury and Unexpended Appropriations section of the statement of net position, and (2) the respective balances reported on Standard Form 133, Report on Budget Execution, and the statement of budgetary resources.

Criteria: SFFAS No. 1, *Accounting for Selected Assets and Liabilities*, requires liabilities to be recognized when goods and services are received or to be recognized based on an estimate of work completed under a contract or agreement. GAO's *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government* requires the prompt recording of transactions to maintain their relevance for management in controlling operations and making decisions.

OMB has mandated, through guidance interpreting the *Accountability of Tax Dollars Act* that DHS provide audited financial statements within 45 days after year-end in FY 2004. To comply with this requirement, DHS will need to estimate certain financial statement balances at year-end to meet the accelerated deadline.

Recommendations: We recommend that:

1. The CIS/ICE:

- a) Develop and implement SOPs requiring administrative centers to review the status of all UDOs to ensure they are properly stated, including any adjustments to recognize necessary deobligations.
- b) Monitor the effectiveness of the control procedures using a risk-based approach to ensure accuracy, completeness and timeliness of accounting for UDOs, including strengthening field management review.

2. The TSA:

- a) Develop and implement SOPs to streamline the process for recording and accruing accounts payable and UDOs.
- b) Ensure that accruals for certain items, such as those on a recurring payment schedule, are automatically recorded.
- c) Develop and implement SOPs for timely recording of estimated accounts payable. Such policies may require contracting officers to review major contracts on a monthly basis to estimate goods received or services incurred.



3. The U.S. Coast Guard:

- a) Emphasize to all program element managers the need to perform effective monthly reviews of open obligations.
- b) Develop procedures and controls to ensure that estimates of medical expenses incurred but not yet billed are accurate and supported.
- c) Process transactions for the receipt of goods/services based on the date that AR&SC accepts the goods and services and timely reduce UDO balances.
- d) Improve its estimating procedures by using a statistically valid method, including a random starting point, and establish SOPs to ensure that UDO transactions are properly reviewed.



Appendix III - Compliance with Laws and Regulations

(Findings A - G and H - N are presented in Appendices I and II, respectively)

Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982

OMB Circular A-123 requires agencies and federal managers to (i) develop and implement management controls; (ii) assess the adequacy of management controls; (iii) identify needed improvements; (iv) take corresponding corrective action; and (v) report annually on management controls (commonly known as management's FMFIA report). We noted that DHS management's FMFIA report did not contain material weaknesses that are reported by us in Appendix I and did not include corrective action plans for all material weaknesses identified in its Performance and Accountability Report. We also noted weaknesses in the DHS' FMFIA reporting process that are reported in Appendix I within Comment B – *Financial Reporting*.

Recommendations: We recommend that DHS implement the recommendations provided in Appendix I, in FY 2004.

Federal Information Security Management Act

DHS is required to comply with the *Federal Information Security Management Act* (FISMA), which was enacted as part of the *Electronic Government Act of 2002*. Generally, FISMA requires that Federal agencies and departments: 1) conduct an annual self-assessment review of their IT security program; 2) develop and implement remediation efforts for identified security weaknesses and vulnerabilities; and 3) report to OMB on the level of compliance. FISMA also requires agencies and departments to: 1) provide information security for the systems that support the operations under their control; 2) develop, document and implement an organization-wide information security program; 3) develop and maintain information security policies, procedures and control techniques; 4) provide security training and oversee personnel with significant responsibilities for information security; 5) assist senior officials concerning their security responsibilities; and 6) ensure the organization has sufficient trained personnel to comply with FISMA requirements. We noted instances of non-compliance with FISMA that have been reported by us in Appendix I within Comment C – *Financial Systems Functionality and Technology*.

Recommendations: We recommend that DHS follow the recommendations provided in Appendix I, Comment C, in FY 2004.

Single Audit Act Amendments of 1996

As a grant-making agency, EPR is required to comply with certain provisions of OMB Circular A-133, subpart D – Federal Agencies and Pass-Through Entities and Appendix B, Compliance Supplement. The Circular requires cost-share analysis of applicable grants and communication of program identification information to the recipient. We noted that EPR is not in full compliance with OMB Circular A-133 because certain cost-share analysis and follow-up was not timely performed or provided to State grantees when the percentage of cost share funds paid/unpaid was greater than 20 percent, as required by law. In addition, EPR had not always provided notification of the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) number to grant recipients.



Recommendations: We recommend that EPR, perform the following in fiscal year FY 2004:

- a) Ensure that grants management specialists review the results of their cost-share analysis for reasonableness and accuracy, and perform timely follow-up if their analysis indicates potential issues with the cost-share amounts.
- b) Ensure that all grant identifying information and modifications, including CFDA numbers, are communicated to the grant recipient and that such communication be maintained in the applicable grant file.



<u>Appendix IV - Status of Prior Year Findings</u>

Bureau and Condition Reported in Prior Year CBP (formerly U.S. Customs Service)	Recommendation Reported in Prior Year	2003 Status and Disposition	Rationale, If Recommendation Considered Open
Material Weaknesses: 1. Entry Duties and Taxes Due to suspension of the Compliance Measurement (CM) program for most of 2002, Customs lacks a statistically valid measurement of the effectiveness of its internal controls over the accuracy of entry duties and taxes reported in 2002.	Reinstate the CM program to enable statistical measurement of revenue gap results and overall trade compliance.	Closed The CM program was reinstated in FY 2003.	N/A
2. Drawback Claims on Duties and Taxes Customs lacks an automated system to track and compare drawback claims to detect and prevent excessive drawback claims and Customs does not statistically measure a drawback compliance rate.	Implement procedures to prevent excessive drawback claims and to statistically measure drawback compliance.	Open Finding repeated in DHS Reportable Condition "H."	System controls to prevent excessive drawbacks will be considered with new systems installations (e.g., ACE). Updated sampling and testing procedures have been drafted and are awaiting approval.
3. Financial Systems Security Customs IT system logical access and security controls need improvement in the areas of network and system configuration, sensitive system administrator authorities granted, software upgrades, and password management.	Improve network and system configurations, review and minimize system administrator authorities granted, install the latest software patches (upgrades) and enforce their stated password management policy.	Open Finding repeated in DHS Material Weakness "C."	CBP still needs to resolve vulnerabilities in network and host-based system configurations and improve password management processes, and minimize sensitive system administrator authorities granted.



Bureau and Condition Reported in Prior Year

4. Financial Systems Integration

Core financial systems need to be improved and integrated. These systems include:

- a) The Automated Commercial System (ACS) cannot provide necessary information on unpaid amounts.
- b) The Cost Management implement procedures to record Information System (CMIS) cannot produce cost information on a regular basis or without significant manual processes. implement procedures to record transactions as they occur; and interface property management systems with the general ledger.
- c) The Asset Information Management System (AIMS) cannot properly record transactions for financial reporting purposes.
- d) Various property management systems do not accurately reflect inventory balances and activity and are not integrated with AIMS.

Recommendation Reported in Prior Year

Adopt a customer-based accounts receivable subsidiary ledger that is Joint Financial Management Improvement Program (JFMIP) compliant based on a cost / benefit analysis; integrate financial systems and report cost information; implement procedures to record transactions as they occur; and interface property management systems with the general ledger.

2003 Status and Disposition

Open Finding repeated in DHS **Material Weakness "C."**

Rationale, If Recommendation Considered Open

CMIS processing has been automated and data is produced on a monthly basis. Remaining conditions cited continue to exist and are being considered in the design and implementation of new IT systems.

Reportable Conditions:

5. Bonded Warehouse and Foreign Trade Zones

Reviews of bonded warehouse and foreign trade zones operations were not performed in 2002 or were substantially curtailed from the scheduled plan because resources were diverted to other mission related objectives.

Customs should perform periodic spot-check inspections, using standard national criteria, of bonded warehouses and foreign trade zone operators and perform periodic follow-up reviews to ensure that findings, if any, are corrected.

Open Finding repeated in CBP Observations and Recommendations Comments provided to CBP management. Condition cited continues to exist. CBP is developing standardized guidelines for both bonded warehouses and foreign trade zones using national criteria. Implementation of corrective actions is expected in FY 2004



Bureau and Condition Reported in Prior Year

6. In-Bond Movements

Customs did not adequately monitor in-bond movement and also did not utilize its existing in-bond movement compliance measurement process in 2002.

Recommendation Reported in Prior Year

Develop procedures to properly track and close in-bond movements and reinstate the in-bond movement compliance process.

2003 Status and Disposition

Open Finding repeated in DHS **Reportable Condition "I."**

Rationale, If Recommendation Considered Open

Conditions cited continue to exist.
CBP issued a Directive establishing tighter controls over opening and closing of in-bond.
CBP is continuing the TINMAN compliance measurement program and quarterly compliance audits will be reinstated as regularly recurring automated selections.

7. Drawback in New York and Newark

Due to the events of September 11, 2001, Customs lost important entry and drawback records. Consequently, compensating controls were implemented to ensure the accuracy of financial reports. Customs lacked procedures regarding liquidation and verification of certain drawback claims, and the self-inspection program was suspended for 2002.

Implement procedures to properly verify and liquidate drawback claims where the documentation is no longer available and implement a self-inspection program in New York/Newark.

Partially Closed Remaining conditions repeated in CBP *Observations and Recommendations Comments* provided to CBP management.

CBP reinstated the self-inspection program in New York/Newark during FY2003, and the New York/Newark drawback office has implemented procedures to liquidate drawback claims of \$250,000 or more. However, no alternative procedures have been developed related to verifying claims where the support is no longer available.



Acquisition Regulations.

Bureau and Condition Reported in Prior Year	Recommendation Reported in Prior Year	2003 Status and Disposition	Rationale, If Recommendation Considered Open
8. Financial Systems Entity-wide Security			
The supporting documentation in the NDC Mainframe Systems Accreditation Package contains inaccuracies and incomplete and/or unclear process descriptions.	Identify and correct all inaccuracies and deficiencies with regard to completeness and/or clarity in its supporting documentation related to the security package.	Closed Elements of PY findings closed, however other conditions remain open and have been combined with CBP item No. 3 above and repeated with other entity-wide security conditions noted at other Bureaus in DHS Material Weakness "C."	Condition cited continues to exist – see rationale in CBP item No. 3 above.
9. Internal Control over Laws and Regulations			
Customs has not corrected a finding identified in a FY 2000 Inspector General report related to reporting on user fees and all fees it imposes for services and things of value.	Report to Congress regarding COBRA fees for FY 2002 and review user fees for FY 2002 to ensure they reflect actual costs.	Closed Recommendation implemented during FY 2003.	N/A
Certain contracts over \$100,000 in value did not contain an Individual Transaction Plan (ITP), as required by the Department of Treasury	Prepare an ITP for all contracts over \$100,000.	Closed Recommendation implemented during FY 2003.	N/A



Bureau and Condition Reported in Prior Year

CIS/ICE (formerly Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS]) as of February 28, 2003

Recommendation Reported in Prior Year 2003 Status and Disposition

Rationale, If Recommendation Considered Open

Material Weaknesses:

1. Financial Systems Functionality

INS does not have a reliable system that can provide regular, timely and detailed data on the number and value of immigration applications received, pending and completed.

Develop or enforce policies to ensure that all application information is correctly entered into the new file tracking and case management and tracking systems; is consistently retained at all locations; and is reliably tracked within or outside of CIS. Also, new systems should support applicable financial and accounting requirements.

Open Finding repeated in DHS **Reportable Condition** "J."

Corrective actions are on-going.

2. Accounts Payable

INS has not developed a methodology for recording accounts payable and computing related accrual estimates.

Develop and implement policies and procedures for determining, documenting, testing, and approving accounts payable postings and accrual calculations. **Open** Finding repeated in DHS **Reportable Condition "N."**

Condition cited continues to exist; however, some improved policies and procedures have been implemented. Condition expected to be fully addressed by FY 2005

3. Financial Reporting

INS did not have adequate processes and supporting policies and procedures in place to facilitate the effective reconciliation of certain key account balances.

Strengthen the reporting capabilities of its new Federal Financial Management System and develop and implement policies and procedures to ensure all key account balances are effectively reconciled.

Open Findings repeated in CIS Observations and Recommendations Comments provided to CIS management.

Corrective actions are on-going.

Reportable Conditions: 4. Information Systems

INS had weaknesses in controls over their financial management system and general network that

could adversely affect INS' ability to report financial information accurately and reliably. Implement corrective procedures to address the various weaknesses identified.

Open Finding in DHS
Material Weakness "C."

Corrective actions are on-going.



4. Real and Personal Property FEMA does not have a real and

personal property management

system that adequately meets FEMA's accounting needs or JFMIP

requirements.

Bureau and Condition 2003 Status Rationale, If Recommendation Recommendation **Reported in Prior Year** Reported in Prior Year and Disposition **Considered Open** Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] (a component of DHS EPR Directorate) **Material Weaknesses:** 1. Information Security FEMA had weaknesses in controls Continue with its corrective **Partially Closed Remaining** Corrective actions are on-going. over their financial management procedures to address the various conditions repeated in DHS Material Weakness "C." system and general network that weaknesses identified. could adversely affect their ability to report financial information accurately and reliably. 2. Financial Systems **Functionality** FEMA information management Review and modify its key financial Partially Closed Remaining Corrective actions are on-going. systems are not JFMIP compliant processes to obtain required system conditions repeated in DHS and lack the ability to efficiently Material Weakness "C." functionality. perform certain required accounting and reporting functions. 3. Financial Reporting FEMA's financial reporting process Assess, document, and improve **Partially Closed** Corrective actions are on-going. does not allow for the timely, Recommendations related its financial reporting process routine or accurate preparation to ensure that the financial to the preparation of a FEMA of financial statements as a bystatements are prepared in a stand-alone Performance and product of existing policies and consistent, timely and accurate Accountability Report are no procedures and internal controls. manner. longer applicable. Remaining conditions are repeated in DHS Material Weakness "B."

Open Findings repeated

in EPR Observations and

Comments provided to EPR

Recommendations

management.

Continue to implement a JFMIP

compliant property management

system and to develop policies and

procedures to ensure that property

related transactions are timely and

correctly recorded.

Corrective actions are on-going.



Bureau and Condition Reported in Prior Year	Recommendation Reported in Prior Year	2003 Status and Disposition	Rationale, If Recommendation Considered Open
5. Account Reconciliation			
FEMA does not have processes to ensure that key account and transaction amounts are consistently and effectively reconciled on a timely basis.	Prepare timely and effective reconciliations of all key accounts and transactions, including those with federal trading partners.	Partially Closed Remaining condition related to trading partner reconciliations remains open. Repeated in DHS Reportable Condition "L."	Corrective actions are on-going.
6. Accounts Receivable			
FEMA did not have processes to timely identify and record certain accounts receivable.	Strengthen the accounts receivable process, in particular those related to audits and interagency agreements.	Closed Recommendation implemented during FY 2003.	N/A
Reportable Conditions:			
7. Cerro Grande FEMA lacked a process to evaluate	Perform an analysis to determine	Closed No new claims were	N/A
the accuracy of the new claims estimation methodology and lacked sufficient documentation related to certain claims information.	the dollar impact on the liability estimate as a result of the new methodology and ensure proper retention of all claims supporting documentation.	processed in FY03, and the remaining liability amount is not significant to DHS.	7.



Bureau and Condition Reported in Prior Year	Recommendation Reported in Prior Year	2003 Status and Disposition	Rationale, If Recommendation Considered Open
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)			
not in place to require that the procurement department verify budget authority prior to obligating	Establish policies and procedures that require budget approval prior to making procurements and that require class costs to be determined consistently.	Closed Recommendations implemented during FY 2003.	N/A
	Perform risk assessments of major systems.	Closed Finding not significant to DHS.	N/A
consistently recording construction	Implement procedures to verify that all fixed assets, including CIP, are properly recorded.	Closed Recommendation implemented during FY 2003.	N/A
non-cancelable lease for the construction and operation of dormitories. FLETC did not perform adequate capital planning as	Ensure that future capital projects are planned and evaluated so that proper funding can be secured and risks can be managed and reported in accordance with the provisions of OMB Circular A-11.	Open. Findings repeated in DHS Observations and Recommendations Comments provided to DHS management.	Condition cited continues to exist.



Bureau and Condition Reported in Prior Year	Recommendation Reported in Prior Year	2003 Status and Disposition	Rationale, If Recommendation Considered Open
Transportation Security Administration (TSA)			
Material Weaknesses: 1. Human Resources TSA has not hired a sufficient number of qualified accounting personnel.	Hire an adequate number of qualified accounting personnel.	Closed Recommendation implemented during FY 2003.	N/A
2. Financial Reporting and Systems (related to Third-Party Systems and Applications)			
a) TSA did not delete separated employees from its personnel information management system.	Establish procedures to ensure biweekly reviews of payroll files for separated employees.	Open Finding repeated in DHS Material Weakness "C."	Condition cited continues to exist; however, TSA expects closure in FY 2004.
b) Certain information technology (IT) staff had excessive access to production data and programs and to the operating system.	Modify the access levels of the related IT staff as appropriate.	Open Finding repeated in DHS Material Weakness "C."	Condition cited continues to exist; however, TSA is taking action to address the conditions in FY 2004
c) Risk assessments are either not performed or do not provide sufficient information to effectively manage risks associated with particular vulnerabilities	Develop and perform risk assessments and test the operating effectiveness of the IT security controls.	Open Finding repeated in DHS Material Weakness "C."	Condition cited continues to exist. TSA uses DOT financial information systems and most financial business processes. TSA is working with DOT to correct the condition.
d) TSA does not have the monitoring and evaluation processes in place to meet the requirements of the Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act.	Establish a self-assessment and evaluation process to continually monitor internal control and accounting systems.	Open Finding repeated in DHS Material Weaknesses " B ".	Condition cited continues to exist. TSA will establish internal evaluation processes in FY 2004.
3. Property, Plant, and Equipment (PP&E)			
TSA does not maintain complete and accurate records of its passenger and baggage screening equipment.	Develop policies and procedures to ensure all PP&E is correctly recorded and perform a complete physical inventory of PP&E.	Open Finding repeated in DHS Material Weaknesses "D."	Condition cited continues to exist. TSA is working with DHS to implement an automated property management system, which will track accountable property and resolve the condition. The system is expected to be implemented in FY 2004.



Bureau and Condition Reported in Prior Year	Recommendation Reported in Prior Year	2003 Status and Disposition	Rationale, If Recommendation Considered Open
4. Financial Management Policies a) TSA did not record purchase orders/obligating documents, mostly due to incomplete and erroneous information included on the obligating documents.	Develop and implement procedures to ensure that all required information is correctly included on obligating documents.	Closed Recommendation implemented during FY 2003.	N/A
b) TSA incorrectly expensed some purchases of PP&E that should have been capitalized.	Reemphasize its policies and procedures to ensure that PP&E purchases are appropriately capitalized.	Closed Recommendation implemented during FY 2003.	N/A
c) TSA did not accrue accounts receivable related to its air carrier and passenger security fees.	Establish proper procedures to ensure an accrual for these fees.	Closed Recommendation implemented during FY 2003.	N/A
d) TSA did not have a process to properly disclose the required information related to its leasing arrangements.	Establish a process to monitor its leasing arrangements and obligations to ensure full financial disclosure.	Open Findings repeated in TSA <i>Observations and Recommendations</i> Comments provided to TSA management.	Condition cited continues to exist. TSA intends to establish a database in FY 2004 to track all leases and capture required information for disclosure.
e) TSA did not record certain grant payments appropriately.	Establish policies and procedures to accurately monitor and report grant activity.	Open Findings repeated in TSA Observations and Recommendations Comments provided to TSA management.	Condition cited continues to exist. In FY 2003 and prior years, the DOT managed TSA grants. In FY 2003, TSA began transitioning grants administration functions away from DOT. The transition is expected to be complete in FY 2004 and the condition should be closed at that time.
5. Administration of Screener Contracts			
Policies and procedures have not been established to effectively control and monitor contractor costs and performance.	Develop and implement oversight activities that enforce the verification of contractor cost and pricing data.	Closed Recommendation implemented during FY 2003.	N/A
Reportable Conditions: 6. Personnel Files Personnel files that were requested from the human resources third-party contractor did not contain adequate information.	Implement a time and attendance (T&A) system to ensure that all T&A information is properly recorded in its personnel and payroll system.	Open Findings repeated in TSA Observations and Recommendations Comments provided to TSA management.	Condition cited continues to exist.



Bureau and Condition Reported in Prior Year

Recommendation Reported in Prior Year 2003 Status and Disposition Rationale, If Recommendation Considered Open

N/A

All Bureau's Compliance with
Federal Financial Management
Information Act of 1996 (FFMIA)

Several DHS Bureau's reported noncompliance with FFMIA in the prior year. However, DHS is not subject to FFMIA. Findings related to IT systems, use of the U.S. Standard General Ledger, and application of federal accounting standards, if applicable have been reported with other Bureau findings in Appendices I through IV.

Recommendations are noted above. **Open** But not applicable as an FFMIA finding.

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Management Response

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

MEMORANDUM FOR CLARK KENT ERVIN INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: Andrew Maner

Chief Financial Officer

SUBJECT: Management Response - Report of the Auditors on the

Department of Homeland Security Fiscal Year (FY) 2003

Financial Statements

On behalf of Secretary Ridge, I am responding to the auditor's report on the Department's FY 2003 financial statements included in the Department's FY 2003 Performance and Accountability Report.

We appreciate your efforts to audit the Department's FY 2003 financial statements and provide relevant and objective recommendations on how our office can improve the Department's financial reporting practices. Issuing the Department's Performance and Accountability Report, while achieving a qualified opinion, is an extraordinary achievement given this is our first year of operation. All Department offices, bureaus and directorates are to be commended for their participation in this effort. Moreover, the accompanying report of your auditors would not have been possible without your office's professional assistance, optimism, technical expertise and commitment.

We concur with the seven reportable conditions that are considered to be material weaknesses as well as seven other reportable conditions and the instances of noncompliance with law and regulation contained in the auditor's report. Corrective actions are underway to address those conditions inherited from the 22 agencies that transferred into the Department, effective March 1, 2003. In addition, corrective actions will be prepared to address other inherited weaknesses that were identified for the first time in the auditor's report. We will provide your office with new or updated action plans, as appropriate, to correct these conditions. The affected Department organizational elements will continue to focus on and strive to improve their efforts to address the conditions and noncompliance issues contained in the auditor's report.

The ability of my office to produce auditable financial statements and the ability of your staff to carryout the audit provide clear evidence of the professional, cooperative working relationship between our staffs. I am confident that these effective relationships and partnerships will result in recognizable and measurable improvements and efficiencies in our respective reporting and auditing practices.

Financial Statements

Department of Homeland Security

Consolidated Balance Sheet As of September 30, 2003 (In Millions)

ASSETS	
Intra-governmental Assets	
Fund Balance with Treasury (note 4)	\$27,343
Investments, Net (note 5)	1,546
Advances and Prepayments (note 6)	3,054
Other (note 12)	415
Total Intra-governmental Assets	32,358
Tax, Duties, and Trade Receivables, Net (note 7)	1,140
Operating Materials and Supplies, Inventory and Stockpile, Net (note 9)	1,162
Property, Plant, and Equipment, Net (note 11)	9,138
Other (note 12)	750
Total Assets (note 3)	\$44,548
LIABILITIES	
Intra-governmental Liabilities	
Due to the Treasury General Fund (note 3)	\$1,209
Accounts Payable	398
Other (note 18)	349
Total Intra-governmental Liabilities	1,956
Accounts Payable	1,979
Claims and Claims Settlement Liabilities (note 14)	754
Deferred Revenue (note 15)	1,969
Accrued Payroll and Benefits (note 16)	2,275
Military Service and Other Retirement Benefits (note 17)	25,285
Other (note 18)	2,450
Total Liabilities (note 13)	36,668
Commitments and Contingencies (notes 19 and 20)	
Net Position (notes 24 and 25)	
Unexpended Appropriations	23,560
Cumulative Results of Operations	(15,680)
Total Net Position	7,880
Total Liabilities and Net Position	\$44,548

The accompanying notes are an integral part of these statements.

Department of Homeland Security

Consolidated Statement of Net Cost (Unaudited) For the Seven Months Ended September 30, 2003 (In Millions)

	Intragovernmental	With the Public	Total
Border and Transportation Security:			
Gross Cost	\$2,476	\$9,545	\$12,021
Less Earned Revenue	(336)	(909)	(1,245)
Net Cost	2,140	8,636	10,776
Emergency Preparedness and Response:			
Gross Cost	390	5,953	6,343
Less Earned Revenue	(28)	(1,161)	(1,189)
Net Cost	362	4,792	5,154
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection:			
Gross Cost	9	139	148
Less Earned Revenue		-	
Net Cost	9_	139	148
Science and Technology:			
Gross Cost	2	84	86
Less Earned Revenue			
Net Cost	2	84	86
United States Coast Guard:			
Gross Cost	481	3,570	4,051
Less Earned Revenue	(110)	(6)	(116)
Net Cost	371	3,564	3,935
United States Secret Service:			
Gross Cost	187	508	695
Less Earned Revenue	(4)	-	(4)
Net Cost	183_	508	691
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services:			
Gross Cost	451	829	1,280
Less Earned Revenue	<u>-</u>	(638)	(638)
Net Cost	451	191	642
Departmental Operations and Other:			
Gross Cost	9	80	89
Less Earned Revenue		-	
Net Cost	9_	80	89
NET COST OF OPERATIONS (notes 21 and 22)	\$3,527	\$17,994	\$21,521

The accompanying notes are an integral part of these statements.

Department of Homeland Security

Consolidated Statement of Changes in Net Position (Unaudited) For the Seven Months Ended September 30, 2003 (In Millions)

	Cumulative Results of Operations	Unexpended Appropriations
Net Position, March 1, 2003	\$0	\$0
Legacy Agency Transfers (note 1)		
Appropriations Transferred In	-	37,380
Budgetary Financing Sources: Transfers In without Reimbursement	2,465	-
Other Financing Sources: Net Liabilities Transfer In without Reimbursement	(13,792)	-
Total Legacy Transfers	(11,327)	37,380
Cumulative effect of correction of errors and change in accounting (notes 9, 11 and 17)	(3,401)	-
Adjusted Legacy Transfers	(14,728)	37,380
Budgetary Financing Sources:		
Appropriations Received (note 23)	-	7,501
Other Transfers In	-	762
Appropriations Returned to Treasury (notes 4 and 23)	-	(1,565)
Appropriations Used	20,518	(20,518)
Non-exchange Revenue	946	-
Donations and Forfeitures of Cash and Cash Equivalents	8	-
Transfers Out without Reimbursement	(2,005)	-
Other Budgetary Financing Sources	36	-
Other Financing Sources:		
Transfers In Without Reimbursement	643	-
Imputed Financing Sources	423	-
Total Financing Sources	\$5,841	\$23,560
Net Cost of Operations	(21,521)	-
NET POSITION, September 30, 2003	(\$15,680)	\$23,560

The accompanying notes are an integral part of these statements.

Department of Homeland Security

Combined Statement of Budgetary Resources (Unaudited) For the Seven Months Ended September 30, 2003 (In Millions)

BUDGETARY RESOURCES	
Budget Authority:	
Appropriations Received (note 23)	\$9,459
Borrowing Authority (note 23)	1,635
Net Transfers	23,883
Unobligated Balance:	
Beginning of Period	-
Net Transfers (note 1)	2,930
Spending Authority from Offsetting Collections:	
Earned:	
Collected	2,554
Receivable from Federal Sources	224
Change in Unfilled Customer Orders:	
Advances Received	-
Without Advances From Federal Sources	429
Transfers from Trust Funds	3
Total Spending Authority from Offsetting Collections	3,210
Recoveries of Prior Year Obligations	661
Permanently Not Available (note 23)	(1,558)
TOTAL BUDGETARY RESOURCES	\$40,220
STATUS OF BUDGETARY RESOURCES	
Obligations Incurred (note 23):	
Direct	\$29,413
Reimbursable	1,550
Total Obligations Incurred	30,963
Unobligated Balances Available:	
Apportioned	5,411
Exempt from Apportionment	958
Unobligated Balances Not Available (note 23)	2,888
TOTAL STATUS OF BUDGETARY RESOURCES	\$40,220
RELATIONSHIP OF OBLIGATIONS TO OUTLAYS	
Obligated Balance, Net, Beginning of Period	-
Obligated Balance Transferred, Net (note 1)	\$12,847
Obligated Balance, Net, End of Period:	
Accounts Receivable	(458)
Unfilled Customer Orders from Federal Sources	(722)
Undelivered Orders	16,965
Accounts Payable	3,847
Total Obligated Balance, Net, End of Period	19,632
Outlays:	
Disbursements	22,912
Collections	(2,606)
Total Outlays	20,306
Less: Offsetting Receipts	(1,072) \$19,234
NET OUTLAYS The accompanying notes are an integral part of these statements	\$±3,234

Department of Homeland Security

Consolidated Statement of Financing (Unaudited)
For the Seven Months Ended September 30, 2003
(In Millions)

(iii iviiiioiis)	
Resources Used to Finance Activities:	
Budgetary Resources Obligated	
Obligations Incurred	\$30,963
Spending Authority from Offsetting Collections and Recoveries	(3,871)
Obligations Net of Offsetting Collections and Recoveries	27,092
Offsetting Receipts	(1,072)
Net Obligations	26,020
Other Resources	
Transfers in without reimbursement	643
Imputed Financing from Costs Absorbed by Others	423
Total Resources Used to Finance Activities	27,086
Resources Used to Finance Items Not Part of the Net Cost of Operations:	
Change in Budgetary Resources Obligated for Goods, Services and Benefits Ordered but not yet	
Provided	(5,859)
Budgetary Offsetting Collections and Receipts that do not Affect Net Cost of Operations	81
Resources that Finance the Acquisition of Assets or Liquidation of Liabilities	(1,064)
Other resources or adjustments to net obligated resources that do not affect net cost of operations	(531)
Total Resources Used to Finance Items Not Part of the Net Cost of Operations	(7,373)
Total Resources Used to Finance the Net Cost of Operations	19,713
Components of the Net Cost of Operations that will not Require or Generate Resources in the Current Period:	
Resources in the Current Period:	
Increase in Exchange Revenue Receivable from the Public	212
Other	670
Total Components of Net Cost of Operations that will Require or Generate Resources in Future Periods	882
Components not Requiring or Generating Resources:	
Depreciation and Amortization	446
Revaluation of Assets or Liabilities	189
Other	291
Total Components of Net Cost of Operations that will not Require or Generate Resources	926
Total Components of Net Cost of Operations that will not Require or Generate Resources in the	
Current Period	1,808
Net Cost of Operations	\$21,521

The accompanying notes are an integral part of these statements.

Department of Homeland Security

Statement of Custodial Activity For the Seven Months Ended September 30, 2003 (In Millions)

Sources of Custodial Revenue

Revenue Received	
Duties	\$11,930
User Fees	454
Excise Taxes	1,264
Fines and Penalties	43
Interest	8
Total Revenue Received	13,699
Less: Refunds and Drawback Disbursements (notes 18 and 24)	(558)
Total Sources of Custodial Revenue	13,141
Accrual Adjustment	(3)
Total Custodial Revenue	<u>\$13,138</u>
Disposition of Custodial Revenue	
Amounts provided to Non Federal Entities	\$59
Amounts provided to the Treasury General Fund	13,082
Accrual adjustment	(3)
Total Disposition of Custodial Revenue	<u>\$13,138</u>
Net Custodial Activity	\$0

The accompanying notes are an integral part of these statements.

Notes to the Financial Statements

1. Creation of the Department of Homeland Security

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department) was established by the *Homeland Security Act of 2002* (the Act), Public Law 107-296 (the Law), dated March 25, 2002, as an executive department of the United States government. The primary mission of DHS is to:

- Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;
- Reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism:
- Minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks and natural disasters that occur within the United States;
- Carry out all functions of entities transferred to the Department, including acting as a focal point regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning;
- Ensure that the functions of the agencies and subdivisions within the Department that are not related directly to securing the homeland are not diminished or neglected except by a specific, explicit Act of Congress;
- Ensure that the overall economic security of the United States is not diminished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland; and
- Monitor connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, coordinate efforts to sever such connections, and otherwise contribute to efforts to interdict illegal drug trafficking.

The Law was implemented according to the President's *Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan (Reorganization Plan)*, dated November 25, 2002.

On January 24, 2003, the effective date of the Law, and in accordance with the *Reorganization Plan*, the Office of the Secretary of DHS (the Secretary) was established, as well as other key managerial positions. In addition, pursuant to the Law and *Reorganization Plan*, the Secretary established the following four DHS Directorates: Science and Technology; Border and Transportation Security; Emergency Preparedness and Response; and Information Analysis and Infrastructure; and the following Bureaus or suborganizations: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; U.S. Secret Service; U.S. Coast Guard; and Management, including the Office of Inspector General.

Transfers of personnel, facilities, records, assets (including technology systems), obligations, and functions (e.g., authorities, powers, rights, privileges, immunities, programs, projects, activities, duties and responsibilities) from 22 existing Federal agencies and programs, began on March 1, 2003 – the inception date of DHS operations – pursuant to guidance provided to the legacy agencies from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the U.S. Department of Treasury (Treasury). Legacy agencies were instructed to record non-expenditure transfers as of March 1, 2003, using full-accrual basis of accounting, for transferred asset and liability balances and unobligated and unexpended appropriation budgetary balances. In addition, legacy agencies were required by OMB M-03-04, *Memorandum for the Heads of Selected Departments and Agencies*, to complete determination orders, for Secretarial and OMB approval, documenting all assets, liabilities, personnel, and other operational transfer information.

Revenues and expenditures of transferred agencies and programs, related to the five month period October 1, 2002 through February 28, 2003, did not transfer to DHS and are to be reported by the legacy agencies in accordance with Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board's (FASAB) Technical Bulletin 2003-1, *Questions and Answers Related to Creation of the Department of Homeland Security Act of 2002* (TB 2003-1), and guidance issued by Treasury's Financial Management Service (FMS), *DHS Transfers – 2003 Interim Scenarios*. This Technical Bulletin required legacy agencies to present a sub-total for "net cost of continuing operations" immediately before the presentation of amounts related to transferred operations, that represents revenue and expenditure activity for the five months ended February 28, 2003. TB 2003-1 and FMS guidance requires DHS to recognize the net effect of the assets and liabilities, equal to the book value of the legacy agency, as a "transfers-in" on the consolidated statement of changes in net position.

Reporting Entity

The Directorates, Bureaus, offices and programs of DHS (hereafter referred to as Bureaus and suborganizations) and the transferring legacy agency are shown below.

DHS Directorate and Bureau/Office/Program	Legacy Agency
Border and Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate:	
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP)	Departments of Treasury, Justice, Agriculture (APHIS
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)	Departments of Justice, Treasury, and GSA (FPS)
Transportation Security Administration (TSA)	Department of Transportation
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)	Department of the Treasury
Agricultural Quarantine Inspection Program	Department of Agriculture (USDA)
Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP)	Department of Justice
Federal Protection Service (FPS)	General Services Administration (GSA)
Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) Directorate:	
Federal Emergency Management Agency (EPR)	Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Strategic National Stockpile	Department of Health and Human Services
Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate:	
National Bioweapons Defense Analysis Center (Biowatch)	Department of Defense
Defense Nuclear Non-Proliferation (DNNP)	Department of Energy
Plum Island Animal Disease Center	Department of Agriculture
Information Analysis and Infrastructure (IAIP) Directorate:	
Federal Computer Incident Response Center (FEDCIRC)	General Services Administration
National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC)	Department of Justice
Energy Security & Assurance Program	Department of Energy
National Communications System (NCS)	Department of Defense
Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO)	Department of Commerce
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)	Department of Justice
U.S. Secret Service (USSS)	Department of the Treasury
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)	Department of Transportation
Office of the Inspector General (OIG)	Various
Headquarters Management (MGT)	Various

The accompanying consolidated financial statements and notes thereto reflect the assets, liabilities, revenues, expenses, transfers-in with and without reimbursement and resulting net position and budgetary activity of the Department subsequent to the date of inception (March 1, 2003), which occurred throughout the seven months ended September 30, 2003. Since DHS, as a financial reporting entity of the Federal government, did not exist prior to March 1, 2003, comparative financial information is not available and has not been presented in the financial statements and notes thereto. Details of the proprietary and budgetary transfers-in to DHS from legacy agencies are presented in the Other Accompanying Information section.

2. Summary of Significant Accounting Policies

A. Basis of Accounting and Presentation

The financial statements have been prepared from the accounting records of DHS and its Directorates and Bureaus in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States, and the OMB Bulletin No. 01-09, *Form and Content of Agency Financial Statements*. Accounting principles generally accepted for federal entities are the standards prescribed by the FASAB, the official accounting standards-setting body of the Federal Government.

These financial statements are provided to meet the requirements of the *Accountability of Tax Dollars Act of 2002*. They consist of the consolidated balance sheet, the consolidated statement of net cost, the consolidated statement of changes in net position, the combined statement of budgetary resources, the consolidated statement of financing, and the consolidated statement of custodial activity. The consolidated statements of net cost, changes in net position, financing, and combined statement of budgetary resources, and all information contained in the notes to the financial statements that relate to these statements, are unaudited.

While these financial statements have been prepared from the books and records of the Department in accordance with the formats prescribed by OMB, these financial statements are in addition to the financial reports used to monitor and control budgetary resources, which are prepared from the same books and records.

The Department's consolidated financial statements reflect the reporting of entity activities which include appropriations received to conduct its operations and revenue generated from those operations. They also reflect the reporting of certain non-entity (custodial) functions it performs on behalf of the Federal Government and others.

Transactions are recorded on an accrual and a budgetary basis of accounting. The consolidated balance sheet, the consolidated statement of net cost, and the consolidated statement of changes in net position are reported using the accrual basis of accounting. Under the accrual basis, revenues are recorded when earned and expenses are recognized when a liability is incurred, regardless of when cash is exchanged. The combined statement of budgetary resources is reported using the budgetary basis of accounting. Budgetary accounting facilitates compliance with legal constraints and controls over the use of Federal funds. It generally differs from the accrual basis of accounting in that obligations are recognized when new orders are placed, contracts awarded, and services received, that will require payments during the same or future periods. The statement of financing reconciles differences between the budgetary and accrual basis of accounting. Non-entity revenue and refunds are reported on the statement of custodial activity using a modified cash basis. With this method, revenue from cash collections are reported separately from receivable accruals, and cash disbursements are reported separately from payable accruals.

Intragovernmental assets and liabilities result from activity with other Federal agencies. All other assets and liabilities result from activity with parties outside the Federal government, such as domestic and foreign persons, organizations, or governments. Intra-governmental earned revenues are collections or accruals of revenue from other Federal agencies, and intra-governmental costs are payments or accruals to other Federal agencies. Transactions and balances among the Department's entities have been eliminated from the consolidated balance sheet, the consolidated statement of net cost, and the consolidated statement of changes in net position. As provided by OMB Bulletin No. 01-09, the statement of budgetary resources is presented on a combined basis; therefore, intra-departmental transactions and balances have not been eliminated from this statement. In accordance with OMB Bulletin No. 01-09, intra-departmental transactions and balances have been eliminated from all the amounts on the consolidated statement of financing, except for obligations incurred and spending authority from offsetting collections and adjustments, which are presented on a combined basis.

These financial statements should be read with the realization that they are for a component of a sovereign entity, that liabilities not covered by budgetary resources cannot be liquidated without the enactment of an appropriation, and that the payment of all liabilities other than for contracts can be abrogated by the sovereign entity.

B. Entity Revenue and Financing Sources

The Department receives the majority of funding needed to support its programs through Congressional appropriations. The Department receives annual, multi-year, and no-year appropriations that may be used, within statutory limits, for operating and capital expenditures. Additional funding is obtained through exchange revenues, non-exchange revenues and transfers-in.

Appropriations are recognized as financing sources when related expenses are incurred or assets are purchased. Revenue from reimbursable agreements are recognized when the goods or services are provided by DHS. Prices for goods and services sold to the public are based on recovery of full cost or are set at a market price. Reimbursable work between Federal appropriations is subject to the *Economy Act* (31 U.S.C. 1535) or other statutes authorizing reimbursement. Prices for goods and services sold to other Federal government agencies are generally limited to the recovery of direct cost. DHS recognizes as imputed financing the amount of accrued pension and post-retirement benefit expense for current civilian employees paid on behalf of DHS by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), as well as amounts paid from the Treasury Judgment Fund in settlement of claims, legal settlements, or court assessments. When costs that are identifiable to DHS and directly attributable to DHS operations are paid for by other agencies, the Department recognizes these amounts as imputed costs.

Exchange revenues are recognized when earned, i.e., goods have been delivered or services have been rendered. Non-exchange revenues are accounted for when DHS is entitled to receipt and primarily consists of user fees collected by CBP to off-set certain costs of operations. Other financing sources, such as donations and transfers of assets without reimbursements also are recognized on the consolidated statement of changes in net position during the period in which they occurred.

Fees for flood mitigation products and services, such as insurance provided through EPR's National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) are established at rates necessary to sustain a self-supporting program. NFIP premium revenues are recognized ratably over the life of the policies. Deferred revenue relates to unearned premiums that are reserved to provide for the remaining period of insurance coverage.

CIS requires advance payments of the fees for applications or petitions for immigration, nationality, and citizenship benefits. Revenue associated with the application fees received is not considered earned until the processing of the application is completed.

C. Non-Entity Assets, Revenue, and Disbursements

Non-entity assets are those that are held by the Department but are not available for use by the Department. Non-entity fund balance with Treasury represents funds available to pay refunds and drawback claims of duties, taxes and fees; and other non-entity amounts to be distributed to the Treasury General Fund and other Federal agencies in the future.

Non-entity revenue reported on the Department's statement of custodial activity includes duties, excise taxes, and various fees collected by the CBP and the CIS that are subsquently remitted to Treasury's General Fund or to other Federal agencies. CBP assesses duties, taxes, and fees on goods and merchandise brought into the United States from foreign countries. At the time importers bring merchandise into the United States, they are required to file entry documents. Generally, within ten working days after release of the merchandise into the United States commerce, the importer is to submit an entry document with payment of estimated duties, taxes, and fees. Non-entity tax and trade accounts receivables and custodial revenue is recognized when CBP is entitled to collect duties, user fees, fines and penalties, refunds and drawback overpayments, and interest associated with import/export activity on behalf of the Federal government that have been established as a legally enforceable claim and remain uncollected as of year-end. Generally, CBP records an equal and off-setting liability due to the Treasury General Fund for amounts recognized as non-entity tax and trade receivable and custodial revenue. CBP accrues an estimate of duties, taxes and fees related to commerce released prior to year end where receipt of payment is anticipated subsequent to year end.

Non-entity revenue is recognized when the cash CBP is entitled to collect on behalf of the Federal government is received.

These revenue collections primarily result from current fiscal year activities. Application fees collected by CIS for nonimmigrant petitions (H1b fees) are recognized at the time of collection.

The significant types of non-entity accounts receivable, custodial revenues as presented in the statement of custodial activity, are described below.

- Duties: amounts collected on imported goods and other miscellaneous taxes collected on behalf of the Federal government.
- Excise taxes: amounts collected on imported distilled spirits, wines and tobacco products.
- User fees: amounts designed to maintain United States harbors, and to defray the cost of other miscellaneous service programs; also includes application fees collected from employers sponsoring nonimmigrant petitions.
- Fines and penalties: amounts collected for violations of laws and regulations.
- Refunds: of duties, taxes and fees previously paid by an importer/exporter; also includes drawback remittance paid when imported merchandise, for which duty was previously paid, is exported from the United States.

Non-entity receivables are presented net of amounts deemed uncollectible. It is CBP's policy to track and demand payment of estimated duties, taxes, and fees receivable by establishing a liquidated damage case that generally results in fines and penalty receivable. A fine or penalty, including interest on past due balances, is also established when a violation of import/export law is discovered. An allowance for doubtful collections is established for substantially all accrued fines and penalties and related interest, based on the historical experience with resolution of disputed assessments. CBP regulations allow importers to dispute the assessment of duties, taxes, and fees. Receivables related to disputed assessments are not recorded until the protest period expires or when a protest decision has been rendered in CBP's favor.

Refunds and drawback of duties, taxes, and fees are recognized when payment is made. A permanent, indefinite appropriation is used to fund the disbursement of refunds and drawbacks and is recorded as a decrease in the amount transferred to Treasury General Fund reported on the consolidated statement of custodial activity. An accrual adjustment is recorded on the statement of custodial activity to adjust cash collections and refund disbursements with the net increase or decrease of accrued non-entity accounts receivables, net of uncollectible amounts, and refunds payable at year-end.

D. Fund Balance with Treasury, Cash, and Other Monetary Assets

Entity fund balances with Treasury are primarily appropriated, revolving, trust, deposit, receipt, special, and working capital fund amounts remaining as of fiscal year-end from which the Department is authorized to make expenditures and pay liabilities resulting from operational activity, except as restricted by law. The Department does not, for the most part, maintain cash in commercial bank accounts. Certain receipts, however, are processed by commercial banks for deposit into individual accounts maintained at the Treasury. The Department's cash and other monetary assets primarily consist of undeposited collections, imprest funds, cash used in undercover operations, cash held as evidence, seized cash, and drafts in transit, and are presented as a component of other assets in the accompanying consolidated balance sheet.

E. Investments, Net

Investments consist of United States government non-marketable Treasury securities and are reported at cost or amortized cost net of premiums or discounts. The Bureau of Public Debt manages certain trust fund investments, such as the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, for DHS. Premiums or discounts are amortized into interest income over the terms of the investment using the effective interest method. No provision is made for unrealized gains or losses on these securities because it is the Department's intent to hold investments to maturity.

F. Advances and Prepayments

Intra-governmental advances consist primarily of EPR's disaster recovery and assistance grants to other federal agencies tasked

with mission assignments. Advances are expensed when drawn by the grant recipients. At year end, the amount of grant funding unexpended by grant recipients is estimated based on cash transactions reported by the grant administrator used by EPR. It is the Department's policy to advance funds to grant recipients so that recipients may incur expenses related to the approved grant. Advances are made within the amount of the total grant obligation and are intended to cover immediate cash needs.

Advances and prepayments to the public, presented as a component of other assets in the accompanying consolidated balance sheet, consist primarily of EPR's disaster recovery and assistance grants to states and other grants to states of which the largest category is Emergency Management Performance Grants, a consolidation of grant programs that supports state and local emergency management staffs and operations, insurance policy acquisition costs, consisting of commissions incurred at policy issuance, and are amortized over the period in which the related premiums are earned, generally one to three years.

G. Tax, Duties, and Trade Receivables, Net

Tax, duties, and trade receivables consists of import duties, user fees, fines and penalties, refunds and drawback overpayments, which have been established as a legally enforceable claim and remain uncollected as of year-end. These receivables are net of amounts deemed uncollectible which were determined by considering the debtor's payment record and willingness to pay, the probable recovery of amounts from secondary sources, such as sureties, and an analysis of aged receivable activity.

H. Accounts Receivable, Net

Accounts receivable, which are presented as a component of other assets on the consolidated balance sheet, represent amounts owed to the Department by other Federal agencies and the public as the result of the provision of goods and services to them. Intra-governmental accounts receivable results from reimbursable work such as investigative services performed by CIS; passenger processing, trade compliance and enforcement activities performed by CBP; activities to safeguard communities around chemical weapon storage sites performed by EPR; information technology and communication services provided by TSA; and reimbursable services provided to the Department of Defense by USCG, such as repairing of boats or aircraft. Intragovernmental accounts receivable are considered to be fully collectible.

Public accounts receivable consist of amounts due to ICE and CIS from commercial air and sea vessel carriers for immigration user fees, 1931 Act overtime services, surety companies breached surety bonds; reimbursable services and user fees collected and interest assessed by CBP; premiums and restitution due to EPR from Write Your Own (WYO) insurance companies participating in EPR's Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration flood insurance program and amounts due from insurance policy holders; amounts due to the USCG's Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund to recover costs incurred to respond to oil pollution incidents and to collect civil fines and penalties from parties responsible for oil spills recognized when the claim arises; and security fees assessed by TSA on the public and air carriers. Public accounts receivable are presented net of an allowance for doubtful accounts, which is based on analyses of debtors' ability to pay, specific identification of probable losses, aging analysis of past due receivables, and historical collection experience. Interest due on past due receivables is fully reserved until collected.

I. Credit Program Receivables, Net

Credit program receivables consist of loans outstanding and are recorded in other assets in the accompanying consolidated balance sheet. Loans are accounted for as receivables as funds are disbursed. For loans obligated prior to October 1, 1991, loan principal and interest receivable are reduced by an allowance for estimated uncollectible amounts. The allowance is estimated based on past experience and an analysis of outstanding balances.

Post 1991 obligated direct loans and the resulting receivables are governed by the *Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990* (FCRA). Under FCRA, for direct loans disbursed during a fiscal year, the corresponding receivable is adjusted for subsidy costs. Subsidy costs are an estimated long-term cost to the United States government of its loan programs. The subsidy cost is equal to the

present value of the estimated cash outflows over the life of the loans minus the present value of the estimated cash inflows, discounted at the applicable Treasury interest rate. Administrative costs such as salaries and contractual fees are not included in the subsidy costs. Subsidy costs can arise from interest rate differentials, interest subsidies, delinquencies and defaults, and other cash flows. EPR calculates the subsidy costs based on a Subsidy Calculator model created by OMB.

Loans receivable are recorded at the present value of the estimated cash inflows less cash outflows. The difference between the outstanding principal of the loans and the present value of their net cash inflows is recorded in the allowance for subsidy, which is estimated and adjusted annually, as of year end.

J. Operating Materials, Supplies, Inventory, and Stockpile, Net

Operating materials and supplies (OM&S) are primarily consumed during normal operations to service USCG and CBP vessels and aircraft. They are valued based on the weighted moving average method or on the basis of actual prices paid. OM&S are expensed when consumed or issued for use. Excess, obsolete and unserviceable OM&S are stated at net realizable value net of an allowance based on the condition of various asset categories, as well as USCG and CBP's historical experience with using or disposing of such assets.

Inventories consist primarily of USCG Supply Fund's uniform clothing, subsistence provisions, retail stores, general stores, technical material and fuel, and USCG Yard Fund's supplies. Inventories on hand at year-end are stated at cost using standard price/specific identification, last acquisition price, or weighted average cost methods, which approximates historical cost. Revenue on inventory sales and associated cost of goods sold are recorded when merchandise is sold to the end user. USCG's inventory is restricted to sales within the USCG, and is not available for sale to other government agencies.

The Department maintains stockpiles of strategic and critical materials, including vaccines, biological materials, and other medical treatments to be used by the government in response to local and national emergencies and aid in the recovery from major disasters. Stockpile materials are not held for sale and are valued at historical cost using a weighted average cost flow assumption. DHS's agreements with vendors who produce stockpiled material include routine refreshment for expired goods; therefore, an allowance for obsolecence is not recognized in the accompanying consolidated financial statements.

K. Seized and Forfeited Property

Prohibited seized and forfeited property results primarily from CBP criminal investigations and passenger/cargo processing. Seized property is not considered an asset of the Department and is not reported as such in the Department's financial statements; however, the Department has a stewardship responsibility until the disposition of the seized items are determined, i.e., judicially or administratively forfeited or returned to the entity from which it was seized. Non-prohibited seized property, including monetary instruments, real property, and tangible personal property of others in the actual or constructive possession of DHS will be transferred to the Treasury Forfeiture Fund and is not presented in the accompanying consolidated financial statements of DHS.

Forfeited property is property for which the title has passed to the United States government. As noted above, non-prohibited forfeited property or currency become assets of the Treasury Forfeiture Fund. However, prohibited forfeited items, such as counterfeit goods, narcotics, or firearms, are held by CBP until disposed or destroyed. In accordance with Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standard (SFFAS) No. 3, Accounting for Inventory and Related Property, analyses of changes in seized and forfeited property of prohibited items is disclosed in Note 10.

CBP will also take into custody, without risk or expense, merchandise termed "general order property," which for various reasons cannot be legally entered into the United States commerce. CBP's sole responsibility for the general order property is to ensure it does not enter the commerce of the United States. If general order property remains in CBP custody for a prescribed period of time, without payment of all estimated duties, storage and other charges, it is considered unclaimed and abandoned and can be sold

by CBP at public auction. Auction sales revenue in excess of charges associated with the sale or storage of the item is remitted to the Treasury General Fund. In some cases, CBP incurs charges prior to the sale and funds these costs from entity appropriations. Regulations permit CBP to offset these costs of sale before returning excess amounts to Treasury.

L. Property, Plant, and Equipment, Net

DHS's property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) consists of aircraft, vessels, vehicles, land, structures, facilities, leasehold improvements, software, and information technology and other equipment. PP&E is recorded at cost and is depreciated using the straight line method over the estimated useful lives of the assets. In cases where historical cost information was not maintained, PP&E is capitalized using an estimated cost based on the cost of similar assets at the time of acquisition or the current cost of similar assets discounted for inflation since the time of acquisition. The Department owns some of the buildings in which it operates. Other buildings are provided by the GSA, which charges rent equivalent to the commercial rental rates for similar properties.

The Department capitalizes acquisitions of PP&E when the cost equals or exceeds an established threshold and has a useful life of two years or more. Costs for construction projects are recorded as construction-in-progress until completed, and are valued at actual (direct) costs, plus applied overhead and other indirect costs. Capitalized software includes the full cost, including an allocation of indirect costs incurred during the software development stage. DHS is developing capitalization thresholds for consistent use across all Bureaus. For the seven months ended September 30, 2003, the capitalization thresholds of the legacy agencies transferred to DHS were maintained. The ranges of capitalization thresholds used by DHS Bureaus, by primary asset category, are as follows.

Asset Description	Capitalization Threshold
Land	Regardless of cost to \$100,000
Buildings and improvement	\$25,000 to \$200,000
Equipment and capital leases	\$5,000 to \$50,000
Software	\$200,000 to \$750,000

The Department begins to recognize depreciation expense once the asset has been placed in service. Depreciation on buildings and equipment provided by the GSA is not recognized by the Department. Leasehold improvements are depreciated over the shorter of the term of the remaining portion of the lease, or the useful life of the improvement. Buildings and equipment acquired under capital leases are amortized over the lease term. Amortization of capitalized software begins on the date of acquisition if purchased, or when the module or component has been placed in use (i.e., successfully installed and tested) if contractor or internally developed. Land is not depreciated.

In accordance with the FASAB TB 2003-1 and related FMS guidance, PP&E transferred to DHS from legacy agencies during the seven months ended September 30, 2003, pursuant to the *Homeland Security Act of 2002*, were recorded at the net book value of the transferring agency.

M. Liabilities

Liabilities represent the probable and measurable future outflow or other sacrifice of resources as a result of past transactions or events. Since the Department is a component of the United States government, a sovereign entity, its liabilities cannot be liquidated without legislation that provides resources or an appropriation. Liabilities covered by budgetary resources are those liabilities for which Congress has appropriated funds or funding is otherwise available to pay amounts due. Liabilities not covered by budgetary or other resources represent amounts owed in excess of available, congressionally appropriated funds or other amounts, and there is no certainty that the appropriations will be enacted. The United States government, acting in its sovereign capacity, can abrogate liabilities of the Department arising from other than contracts.

N. Environmental Cleanup Costs and Contingent Liabilities

The Department has responsibility to clean up its sites with environmental contamination, and it is party to various administrative proceedings, legal actions, and tort claims which may result in settlements or decisions adverse to the Federal government. The Department has accrued a liability for future cleanup of environmental hazards when losses are determined to be "probable", which is generally when the government is legally responsible for creating the hazard or is otherwise related to it in such a way that it is legally liable to clean up the contamination, and the cost can be estimated. These liabilities are a component of other liabilities on the accompanying consolidated balance sheet.

Contingent liabilities are liabilities where the existence or amount of the liability cannot be determined with certainty pending the outcome of future events. The Department recognizes contingent liabilities when loss is probable and reasonably estimable. The Department discloses contingent liabilities in the notes to the consolidated financial statements when the conditions for liability recognition are not met and when loss from future events is more than remote. Payments made from the Treasury Judgment Fund for settlement of DHS legal claims and judgments are recognized as an imputed financing source in the accompanying consolidated statement of net position.

O. Grants Liability

EPR and ODP provide grants to federal, state, and local governments, universities and non-profit organizations for the purpose of building capacity to respond to disasters and emergencies, conduct research into preparedness, and conduct other DHS-related activities. EPR estimates a year-end grant accrual representing the amounts payable to grantees, using historical disbursement patterns over a period of 20 quarters to predict unreported grantee expenditures. The ODP grant liability accrual is estimated using known reported expenditures reported by grantees and the estimated daily expenditure rate for the period subsequent to the latest grantee submission in relation to the cumulative grant amount. Grants liabilities are combined with accounts payable to the public in the accompanying consolidated balance sheet.

P. Claims and Claims Settlement Liabilities

EPR administers NFIP through sale or continuation-in-force of insurance in communities that enact and enforce appropriate flood plain management measures. Claims and claims settlement liability represents an estimate of NFIP losses that are unpaid at the balance sheet date and is based on the loss and loss adjustment expense factors inherent in the NFIP insurance underwriting operations experience and expectations. Estimation factors used by the insurance underwriting operations reflect current case basis estimates and give effect to estimates of trends in claim severity and frequency. These estimates are continually reviewed, and adjustments, reflected in current operations, are made as deemed necessary. Although the insurance underwriting operations believes the liability for unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses is reasonable and adequate in the circumstances, it is possible that the insurance underwriting operations' actual incurred losses and loss adjustment expenses will not conform to the assumptions inherent in the estimation of the liability. Accordingly, the ultimate settlement of losses and the related loss adjustment expenses may vary from the amount included in the financial statements.

Q. Debt and Borrowing Authority

Debt is reported within other intra-governmental liabilities and results from the Treasury loans and related interest payable to fund NFIP and Disaster Assistance Direct Loan Program (DADLP) operations. NFIP loan and interest payments are financed by flood premiums and map collection fees. Additional funding for NFIP may be obtained through Treasury borrowing authority of \$1.5 billion. DADLP annually requests borrowing authority to cover the principal amount of direct loans not to exceed \$25 million less the subsidy due from the program account. This borrowing authority is for EPR State Share Loans. Borrowing authority for Community Disaster Loans is requested on an "as needed basis." At the end of the fiscal year, borrowing authority is reduced by the amount of any unused portion. USCG also has borrowing authority with Treasury for amounts up to \$100 million for the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.

R. Annual, Sick, and Other Accrued Leave

Annual and other vested compensatory leave is accrued as earned and the liability is reduced as leave is taken. At year end, the balances in the accrued leave accounts are adjusted to reflect the liability at current pay rates and leave balances, and are reported within accrued payroll and benefits. Sick leave and other types of non-vested leave are not accrued and are expensed when taken.

S. Workers' Compensation

A liability is recorded for actual and estimated future payments to be made for workers' compensation pursuant to the *Federal Employees' Compensation Act* (FECA). The actual liability is presented as a component of intra-governmental other liabilities, and the actuarial liability is presented within accrued payroll and benefits in the accompanying consolidated balance sheet. The FECA program is administered by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), which initially pays valid claims and subsequently seeks reimbursement from Federal agencies employing the claimants. Reimbursement to DOL on payments made occurs approximately two years subsequent to the actual disbursement. Budgetary resources for this intra-governmental liability are made available to the Department as part of its annual appropriation from Congress in the year in which the reimbursement takes place.

Additionally, a liability due to the public is recorded that includes the expected liability for death, disability, medical and miscellaneous costs for approved compensation cases. The liability is determined using an actuarial method that utilizes historical benefit payment patterns related to a specific incurred period to predict the ultimate payments related to that period. The Department allocates the actuarial liability to its bureaus based on payment history provided by DOL. The accrued liability is not covered by budgetary resources and will require future funding.

T. Military and Other Retirement Benefits

DHS and Bureau Civilian Workforce Pension and Other Benefits:

The Department recognizes the full annual cost of its civilian employees' pension benefits; however, the assets of the plan and liability associated with pension costs are recognized by the OPM rather than the Department.

Most employees of the Department hired prior to January 1, 1984, participate in the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS), to which the Department contributed 8.5 percent of base pay for regular CSRS employees, and 9 percent of base pay for law enforcement agents.

Employees hired after December 31, 1983, are automatically covered by FERS and Social Security. FERS also offers a savings plan to which the Department automatically contributes 1 percent of base pay and matches any employee contributions up to an additional 4 percent of base pay. The Department also contributes the employer's matching share for Social Security. For the FERS basic benefit the Department contributed 10.7 percent of base pay for regular FERS employees and 22.7 percent for law enforcement agents.

Similar to CSRS and FERS, OPM rather than the Department reports the liability for future payments to retired employees who participate in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program and Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. The Department is required to report the full annual cost of providing these other retirement benefits (ORB) for its retired employees as well as reporting contributions made for active employees. In addition, the Department recognizes an expense and liability for other post employment benefits (OPEB), which includes all types of benefits provided to former or inactive (but not retired) employees, their beneficiaries, and covered dependents.

The difference between the full annual cost of CSRS or FERS retirement, ORB and OPEB benefits and the amount paid by the Department is recorded as an imputed cost and off-setting imputed financing source in the accompanying consolidated financial statements.

USCG - Military Retirement System Liability

The USCG Military Retirement System (MRS) is a defined benefit plan that covers both retirement pay and health care benefits for all active duty and reserve military members of the USCG. The plan is funded through annual appropriations and, as such, is a pay-as-you-go system. The unfunded accrued liability reported on the accompanying consolidated balance sheet is actuarially determined by subtracting the present value of future employer/employee contributions, as well as any plan assets, from the present value of the future cost of benefits. Current period expense is computed using the aggregate entry age normal actuarial cost method.

A portion of the accrued MRS liability is for the health care of non-Medicare eligible retirees/survivors. Effective October 1, 2002, USCG transferred its liability for the health care of Medicare eligible retirees/survivors to the Department of Defense (DoD) Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund (the Fund), which was established in order to finance the health care benefits for the Medicare-eligible beneficiaries of all DoD and non-DoD uniformed services. DoD is considered to be the administrative entity and in accordance with SFFAS No. 5, is required to recognize the liability on the Fund's financial statements. The USCG makes monthly payments to the Fund for current active duty members. Benefits for USCG members who were retired, prior to the establishment of the Fund, are provided by payments from the Treasury to the Fund. The future cost and liability of the Fund is determined using claim factors and claims cost data developed by the DoD, adjusted for USCG retiree and actual claims experience. The USCG uses the current year factors to project costs for all future years, without any assumption about future changes in the factors. The portion of care provided by Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs) varies from year to year. To the extent that costs vary between purchased care and MTFs, total future cost will vary.

USCG - Post-employment Military Travel Benefit

USCG uniformed service members are entitled to travel and transportation allowances for travel performed or to be performed under orders, without regard to the comparative costs of the various modes of transportation upon separation from the service, placement on the temporary disability retired list, release from active duty, or retirement, from his last duty station to his home or the place from which he was called or ordered to active duty, whether or not he is or will be a member of a uniformed service at the time the travel is or will be performed.

USCG recognizes an expense and a liability for this OPEB when a future outflow or other sacrifice of resources is probable and measurable on the basis of events occurring on or before the reporting date. The OPEB liability is measured at the present value of future payments, which requires the USCG to estimate the amount and timing of future payments, and to discount the future outflow using the Treasury borrowing rate for securities of similar maturity to the period over which the payments are to be.

U.S. Secret Service - Uniformed Division and Special Agent Pension Liability

The District of Columbia Police and Fireman's Retirement System (the DC Pension Plan) is a defined benefit plan that covers USSS Uniformed Division and Special Agents. The DC Pension Plan makes the benefit payments to retirees and/or their beneficiaries. The USSS receives permanent, indefinite appropriations each year to pay the excess of benefit payments over salary deductions. The DC Pension Plan is funded through annual appropriations and, as such, is a pay-as-you-go system. The unfunded accrued liability reported on the accompanying consolidated balance sheet is actuarially determined by subtracting the present value of future employer/employee contributions, as well as any plan assets, from the present value of future cost of benefits. Current period expense is computed using the aggregate cost method.

U. Use of Estimates

Management has made certain estimates and assumptions in the reporting of assets, liabilities, revenues, expenses, obligations incurred, spending authority from offsetting collections, and note disclosures in the consolidated financial statements. Actual results could differ from these estimates. Significant estimates include: the allocation of trust fund receipts, year-end accruals of accounts and grants payable, contingent legal and environmental liabilities, accrued workers' compensation, allowance for doubtful accounts receivable, allowances for obsolete inventory and OM&S balances, allocations of indirect common costs to construction-in-progress, subsidy re-estimates, deferred revenues, NFIP claims and settlements, MRS and other pension, retirement, and post-retirement benefit assumptions, and certain non-entity receivables and payables related to custodial activities.

V. Taxes

The Department, as a Federal agency, is not subject to Federal, state or local income taxes and accordingly, no provision for income taxes has been recorded in the accompanying consolidated financial statements.

W. Corrections of Errors and Change in Accounting Method

The USCG corrected an error in its method of accounting for repairable spare parts after the transfer of assets to DHS on March 1, 2003. A change in accounting was made to associate \$869 million (unaudited) in repairable spare parts with the major PP&E asset class they support, to remove an allowance for OM&S obsolescence of \$125 million (unaudited), and to recognize \$672 million (unaudited) of accumulated depreciation expense on those spare parts, computed on a straight-line basis, using the same useful life as the major asset (see notes 9 and 11).

The Strategic National Stockpile recorded an adjustment to increase inventory by \$485 million to correct an error in method used to value stockpile inventory (see note 9).

The USSS recorded an adjustment to recognize an unfunded liability equal to \$3.3 billion (unaudited) for the future funding requirements of the DC Pension Plan liability (see note 17).

3. Non-Entity Assets

Non-entity assets at September 30, 2003, consisted of the following (in millions):

Intra-governmental:

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Fund Balance with Treasury	\$1,720
Other Receivables Due From Treasury (note 12)	109
Total Intra-governmental	1,829
Public:	
Duties and Taxes Receivable, Net (note 7)	1,140
Other	64
Total Public	1,204
Total Non-Entity Assets	3,033
Total Entity Assets	41,515
Total Assets	\$44,548

Non-entity fund balance with Treasury consists of permanent appropriations, miscellaneous receipts, and portions of special and deposit funds that are available to pay non-entity liabilities presented as a component of other liabilities on the consolidated balance sheet at September 30, 2003, including \$1.4 billion (in deposit fund) of duties collected by CBP on imports of Canadian softwood lumber, for which there is an anti-dumping dispute currently being litigated by interested parties; CBP Injured Domestic Industries (IDI) accrued liability of \$247 million (in special fund), and estimated duty refunds or drawbacks payable of \$98 million. Non-entity fund balance with Treasury also consists of trust-related assets primarily from cash held on behalf of obligors and fees, fines and penalties collected that are managed by CIS.

Non-entity receivables due from Treasury represent an estimate of duty, tax and/or fee refunds and drawbacks that will be reimbursed by a permanent and indefinite appropriation account when payment is made to importers/exporters. Duties and taxes receivable from public represents amounts due from importers for goods and merchandise imported to the United States, and upon collection, will be available to pay the accrued intragovernmental liability due to Treasury General Fund at September 30, 2003 equal to \$1.2 billion.

4. Fund Balance with Treasury

A. Fund Balance with Treasury

Fund balance with Treasury at September 30, 2003, consisted of the following (in millions):

Total Fund Balance with Treasury	\$27,343
Deposit Funds	1,677
Special Funds	1,709
Revolving and Working Capital Funds	237
Trust Funds	74
Appropriated Funds	\$23,646

Appropriated funds consist of amounts appropriated annually by Congress to fund the operations of DHS and its component Bureaus.

Trust funds are both receipt accounts and one or more expenditure accounts that are designated by law as a trust fund. Trust fund receipts are used for specific purposes, generally to offset to cost of expanding border and port enforcement activities, oil spill related claims and activities, or to hold CIS bond receipts.

Revolving funds are used for continuing cycles of business-like activity, in which the fund charges for the sale of products or services and uses the proceeds to finance its spending, usually without requirement for annual appropriations. The working capital fund is a fee-for-service organization established to support operations of a specific Bureau and costs incurred are fully reimbursable. Also included are the liquidating and financing funds for credit reform and the National Flood Insurance Fund.

Special funds are receipts and/or off-setting receipt funds earmarked for specific purposes including the disbursement of nonentity monies received in connection with anitdumping and countervailing duty orders and findings to qualifying IDI. DHS also has special funds for user fees, inspection fees, flood map modernization, subsidy, off-set, and refund transfers.

Deposit funds represent amounts received as an advance that are not accompanied by an order and include non-entity collections that do not belong to the Federal government and for which final disposition has not been determined at year end, including \$1.4 billion of duties collected on imports of Canadian softwood lumber (see note 3).

B. Status of Fund Balance with Treasury

As of September 30, 2003, the status of fund balance with Treasury consisted of the following (in millions):

Unobligated Balances:

Total Status of Fund Balance with Treasury	\$27,343
Non-budgetary Receipt and Deposit Funds	1,365
Obligated Balance Not Yet Disbursed	19,642
Unavailable	2,888
Available	\$3,448

Unobligated balances available, as presented in the combined statement of budgetary resources, includes borrowing authority of \$1.6 billion, and investments of \$1.5 billion. Included in fund balance with Treasury are unavailable restricted balances of \$1.7 billion of non-entity funds, as described in note 3, and user fees account balance of \$640 million, which is restricted by law in its use to offset costs incurred by CBP until authority is granted through appropriations acts.

The unavailable balance also includes amounts appropriated in prior fiscal years that are not available to fund new obligations. The obligated not yet disbursed balance represents amounts designated for payment of goods and services ordered but not received or goods and services received but for which payment has not yet been made. Unliquidated obligations for estimated future disaster costs of \$8.1 billion are also included in obligated balances not yet disbursed. During FY 2003, DHS returned to Treasury \$64.6 million of indefinite no-year authority, and \$1.5 billion in authority permanently unavailable for obligation pursuant to public law (unaudited).

5. Investments, Net

DHS' investments at September 30, 2003, consisted of the following (in millions):

Type of Investment	(Net Investments	Market Value
U.S. Treasury Securities:				
USCG - Non-Marketable, Par Value	\$956	\$9	\$965	N/A
EPR - Non-Marketable, Market-Based	581	-	581	\$581
Total Intra-governmental Investments	\$1,537	\$9	\$1,546	- =

Unexpended funds in the USCG Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (Oil Spill Fund) and the Gift Fund are invested by the Bureau of Public Debt in U.S. Government Securities. Interest and principal on invested balances in the USCG's Oil Spill Fund are available for use by the USCG to offset the cost of oil spill clean-up, payment of environmental claims against the fund, and for specific funding of clean-up related operations. EPR maintains investments for the Gifts and Bequests Fund and the NFIP. EPR investments are restricted to Treasury bonds, bills, notes, and overnight securities. The current EPR investments portfolio consists principally of overnight securities, which have neither market value variances nor unamortized premium or discount.

6. Advances and Prepayments - Intra-governmental

Intra-governmental advances and prepayments at September 30, 2003, consisted of the following (in millions):

Total Intra-governmental Advances and Prepayments	\$3,054
Other	238
Disaster Recovery Fund	\$2,816

Advances and prepayments made to the public are presented as a component of other assets on the accompanying balance sheet (see note 12).

7. Tax, Duties, and Trade Receivables, Net

Tax, duties, and trade receivables at September 30, 2003, consisted of the following (in millions):

Receivables Category	Gross		Total Net
	Receivables	Allowance	Receivables
Duties	\$1,020	(\$102)	\$918
Excise Taxes	73	(1)	72
User Fees	71	(1)	70
Fines/Penalties	694	(621)	73
Refunds and Drawback	36	(29)	7
Total Tax, Duties, and Trade Receivables, Net	\$1,894	(\$754)	\$1,140

When a violation of import/export law is discovered, a fine or penalty is established, typically for the full value of the merchandise. After receiving the notice of assessment, the importer or surety has a period of time to either file a petition requesting a review of the assessment or pay the assessed amount. Once a petition is received, CBP investigates the circumstances as required by its mitigation guidelines and directives. Until this process has been completed, CBP records an allowance on fines and penalties of approximately 90 percent of the total assessment based on historical experience of fines and penalties mitigation and collection. Duties and taxes receivable are non-entity assets for which there is an offsetting liability due to the Treasury General Fund at September 30, 2003.

8. Direct Loans and Loan Guarantees, Non-Federal Borrowers

A. Summary of Direct Loans to Non-Federal Borrowers (in millions):

	Loans Receivable, Net
Community Disaster Loans	\$14.5

An analysis of loans receivable and the nature and amounts of the subsidy and administrative costs associated with the direct loans is provided in the following sections.

B. Direct Loans Obligated Prior to FY 1992 (Present Value Method, in millions):

	Lagua Dagaiyahla	Interest	Allawanaa far	Value of Assets
	Loans Receivable, Gross	Interest Receivable	Allowance for Loan Losses	Related to Direct Loans
Community Disaster Loans	\$.167	\$.004	(\$.017)	\$.154

C. Direct Loans Obligated After FY 1991 (in millions):

	Loans Receivable, Gross	Interest Receivable	Allowance for Subsidy Cost (Present Value)	Value of Assets Related to Direct Loans
Community Disaster Loans	\$130.9	\$54.5	(\$171.0)	\$14.4

- D. Total Amount of Direct Loans Disbursed, Post-1991: None.
- E. Subsidy Expense for Direct Loans by Program and Component (in millions):

Subsidy Expense for New Direct Loans Disbursed: None

Modifications and Reestimates (Prior reporting year):

	Interest Rate	Technical	Total
	Reestimates	Reestimates	Reestimates
Community Disaster Loans	\$-	(\$19)	(\$19)

Total Direct Loan Subsidy Expense:

	Current Year	Prior Year
Community Disaster Loans	\$-	(\$19)

F. Direct Loan Subsidy Rates

The direct loan subsidy rates, by component, are as follows:

	Community	
	Disaster Loans	State Share Loans
Interest Subsidy Cost	(0.84) %	(4.48) %
Default Costs	- %	- %
Other	93.01 %	0.38 %

G. Schedule for Reconciling Subsidy Cost Allowance Balances (in millions)

Beginning Balance of the Subsidy cost allowance	\$163
Add: subsidy expense for direct loans disbursed during the reporting years by component:	
(a) Interest rate differential costs	-
(b) Other subsidy costs	-
Adjustments:	
(a) Loans written off	-
(b) Subsidy allowance amortization	8
Ending balance of the subsidy cost allowance before reestimates	171
Add subsidy reestimate by component	
(a) Technical/default reestimate	-
Ending balance of the subsidy cost allowance	\$171
H. Administrative Expenses (in millions):	
Community Disaster and State Share Loans	\$ -

9. Operating Materials, Supplies, Inventory, and Stockpile, Net

Operating materials and supplies (OM&S), inventory, and stockpile, net at September 30, 2003, consisted of the following (in millions):

OIVI&S (unaudited)
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Items Held for Use	\$417
Items Held for Future Use	80
Excess, Obsolete and Unserviceable Items	10
Less: Allowance for Losses	(10)
Total OM&S, Net	497
Inventory	
Inventory Purchased for Resale	58
Less: Allowance for Losses	(1)
Total Inventory, Net	57
Strategic National Stockpile	608
Total OM&S, Inventory, and Stockpile, Net	\$1,162

The USCG corrected an error and changed its method of accounting for exchange and repairable spare parts that were classified as OM&S prior to the transfer of assets to DHS on March 1, 2003 (see Note 11). Part of the correction included the reduction of an allowance for obsolescence of \$125 million associated with these spare parts, that was recorded as a cumulative effect adjustment to the transfer-in from legacy balance in the consolidated statement of changes in net position.

The USCG has reclassified slow-moving OM&S items from "held for use" to "excess, obsolete and unserviceable" and "held for future use", and also recognized an allowance to reflect the net realizable value of excess, obsolete and unserviceable items.

The strategic national stockpile inventory balance was adjusted to correct an error in method used to value stockpile inventory prior to the transfer to DHS. The correction increased the value of stockpile inventory transferred-in on March 1, 2003 by \$485 million and was recorded as a cumulative effect adjustment to the balance transferred-in from the legacy agency in the consolidated statement of changes in net position.

10. Prohibited Seized Property

Prohibited seized property activity and item counts as of and for the seven months ended September 30, 2003, are as follows:

		<u>Seizure</u>	Activity (unau	dited)		
Seized Property:	Seven Months Ended September 30, 2003				Seized	
Category	Balance March 1, 2003	New Seizures	Remissions	New Forfeitures	Adjustments	Property September 30 Weight/Items
Illegal Drugs:						
Cannabis (marijuana)	1,191	321,745	0	(322,573)	(32)	331
Cocaine	164	19,298	0	(19,280)	(29)	153
Heroin	18	382	0	(381)	3	22
Firearms and Explosives	6,992	2,554	(396)	(1,390)	(3)	7,757
Counterfeit Currency (US/ Foreign)	2,892,538	224,215	(165,877)	0	(97,481)	2,853,395
Pornography	235	153	(3)	(187)	(20)	178
			Activity (una			
Forfeited Property:	Sev	ven Months E	inded Septem	ber 30, 2003		
Category	Balance March 1, 2003	New Forfeitures	Transfers	Destroyed	Adjustments	Forfeited Property September 30 Weight/Items
Illegal Drugs:						
Cannabis (marijuana)	160,105	322,573	0	(359,768)	(9,379)	113,531
Cocaine	14,309	19,280	(23)	(16,221)	(375)	16,970
Heroin	4,033	381	(31)	(1,373)	(33)	2,977
Firearms and Explosives	292	1,390	(2)	(5)	(335)	1,340
Pornography	89	187	(1)	(202)	7	80

This schedule is presented for material prohibited (non-valued) seized and forfeited property only. These items are retained and ultimately destroyed by CBP and USSS and are not transferred to the Departments of Treasury or Justice Forfeiture Funds or any other Federal agency. Adjustments include reclassification of property categories and minor adjustments to the balances transferred-in on March 1, 2003. The ending balance for firearms includes only those seized items that can actually be used as firearms. Illegal drugs are presented in kilograms; firearms, explosives, and pornography are presented in number of items; counterfeit currency is presented in number of bills.

USCG also seizes and takes temporary possession of small boats, equipment, contraband, and other illegal drugs. USCG usually disposes of these properties within three days by transfer to CBP (who transfers non-prohibited seized property to the Treasury Forfeiture Fund), the Drug Enforcement Administration, or foreign governments, or by destroying it. Because USCG never takes ownership of the property and keeps it for a short duration, seized property in USCG possession at year end is considered insignificant and therefore is not valued and is not reported in the consolidated financial statements of DHS.

11. Property, Plant, and Equipment, Net

Property, plant, and equipment (PP&E), at September 30, 2003, consisted of the following (in millions):

	Service Life	Acquisition Cost	Accumulated Depreciation/ Amortization (unaudited)	Total Net Book Value	Unaudited Net Book Value
Land and Land Rights	N/A	\$54	\$ -	\$54	\$40
Improvements to Land	3-50 yrs	7	-	7	-
Construction in Progress	N/A	1,377	-	1,377	665
Buildings, Other Structures, and Facilities Equipment:	2-50 yrs	1,894	31	1,863	1,084
ADP Equipment	3-5 yrs	34	6	28	-
Aircraft	10-20 yrs	1,152	102	1,050	617
Vessels	5-10 yrs	2,264	77	2,187	134
Vehicles	3-6 yrs	368	168	200	1
Other Equipment	2-20 yrs	1,803	31	1,772	299
Leasehold Improvements	3-50 yrs	160	7	153	-
Internal Use Software	3-10 yrs	236	34	202	38
Internal Use Software- in Development	N/A	245	-	245	-
Total Property, Plant, and Equipment		\$9,594	\$456	\$9,138	\$2,878

FASAB TB 2003-1 states that "receiving entities will recognize assets and liabilities based on the legacy entities' book values at the time of transfer." Accordingly, transfers of PP&E from legacy agencies to DHS have been recorded at the net book value at the date of transfer. Acquisition cost represents the net book value of the assets transferred-in from other Federal agencies together with the net change in assets from additions and disposals that occurred from March 1, 2003 through September 30, 2003. Accumulated depreciation represents depreciation expense for the seven months ended September 30, 2003.

The USCG corrected an error and changed its method of accounting for exchange and repair spare parts after the transfer of its assets to DHS. Exchange and repair spare parts valued at \$869 million (unaudited) classified as OM&S at the time of transfer from the legacy agency have been reclassified to PP&E as of March 1, 2003. Repairable spare parts are associated with the major PP&E asset class they support and depreciated on a straight-line basis, using the same useful life as the major asset. In connection with this change the USCG also recognized accumulated depreciation equal to \$672 million (unaudited) and removed an allowance for obsolescence of \$125 million (unaudited) on these spare parts as of March 1, 2003, as a cumulative effect adjustment to the transfer-in from legacy agency balance in the consolidated statement of changes in net position, and included the net effect of \$197 million (unaudited) increase of PP&E as a component of acquisition cost of transfers-in presented in the table above.

12. Other Assets

Other assets at September 30, 2003, consisted of the following (in millions):

Intra-governmental:	
Accounts Receivable	\$306
Receivables Due From Treasury	109
Total Intra-governmental	415
Public:	
Accounts Receivable and Related Interest	591
Allowance for Doubtful Accounts	(291)
Advances and Prepayments	365
Cash and Other Monetary Assets	59
Credit Program Receivables, Net (note 8)	15
Other	11
Total Public	750
Total Other Assets	\$1,165

Intra-governmental accounts receivable results from reimbursable work performed by CBP, TSA, ICE, and EPR. Accounts receivable with the public consists of amounts due to CBP, ICE, and EPR for reimbursable services and user fees. Advances and prepayments consist primarily of National Flood Insurance payments made by EPR.

13. Liabilities Not Covered by Budgetary Resources

Liabilities not covered by budgetary resources, as of September 30, 2003, consisted of the following (in millions):

Intra-governmental:	
Accrued Workers' Compensation (note 16)	\$178
Debt owed to Treasury	8
Other	4
Total Intra-governmental	190
Public:	
Military Service and Other Retirement Benefits (note 17)	25,285
Actuarial Workers' Compensation (note 16)	1,125
Accrued Annual Leave	845
Claims and Claims Settlement Expenses - Cerro Grande	44
Other:	
Environmental and Disposal Liabilities (note 20)	98
Contingent Legal Liabilities (note 20)	58
Capital Lease Liability (note 19)	167
Other	3
Total Public	27,625
Total Liabilities Not Covered by Budgetary Resources	\$27,815
Liabilities Covered by Budgetary Resources or Non-Entity Assets	8,853
Total Liabilities	\$36,668

DHS anticipates that the liabilities listed above will be funded from future budgetary resources when required. Budgetary resources are generally provided for annual leave when it is taken.

14. Claims and Claims Settlement Liabilities

National Flood Insurance Program

The liability for unpaid losses and related loss adjustment expenses for the NFIP was \$672 million at September 30, 2003. Activity for the seven months ended September 30, 2003 (unaudited), was as follows (in millions):

Total NFIP Liability at September 30, 2003	\$672
Less: Amounts paid during current period	(190)
Incurred losses and increase estimated losses	803
Transferred-in NFIP liability (March 1, 2003)	\$59

Cerro Grande Fire Assistance Act

The U.S. Department of Interior, National Park Service initiated a prescribed burn that resulted in the loss of federal, state, local, Indian tribal and private property. In July 2000, Congress passed the *Cerro Grande Fire Assistance Act* (CGFAA) to compensate as fully as possible those parties who suffered damages from the Cerro Grande Fire.

At September 30, 2003, the estimated claims liability for the CGFAA was \$82 million. The liability for unpaid claims and claim adjustment expenses represents an estimate of the known probable and estimable losses that are unpaid as of September 30, 2003 based on the Final Rules dated March 21, 2001, entitled, the Disaster Assistance: Cerro Grande Fire Assistance, Final Rule, published in the Federal Register Part II at 44 CFR Chapter I, Part 295. This estimated claims liability for September 30, 2003, includes \$44 million, which is unfunded.

15. Deferred Revenue

Deferred revenue at September 30, 2003, and CIS application fee activity for the seven months then ended (unaudited), consisted of the following (in millions):

CIS Application Fees:

Total Deferred Revenue	\$1,969
Advances from Others	12
EPR Unexpired NFIP premium	1,008
Total CIS Application Fees	949
Adjustments for undeposited collections and others	(21)
Less: earned revenue (completed applications)	(439)
Collection deposited, March 1 - September 30, 2003	580
March 1, 2003 transferred-in balance	\$829

CIS requires advance payments of the fees for applications or petitions for immigration, nationality, and citizenship benefits. EPR's deferred revenue relates to unearned NFIP premiums that are reserved to provide for the unexpired period of insurance coverage.

16. Workers' Compensation

Claims incurred for the benefit of DHS employees under FECA are administered by DOL and are ultimately paid by DHS. The accrued liability representing money owed for current claims incurred during the seven month period ending September 30, 2003, was equal to \$178 million. Future workers' compensation estimates, generated from an application of actuarial procedures developed by the DOL, for the future cost of approved compensation cases was \$1.1 billion at September 30, 2003. Workers' compensation expense was \$170 million (unaudited) for the seven months ended September 30, 2003.

The DOL calculated the estimated future benefit payments based on several assumptions. The interest rate assumptions utilized to discount the estimated future benefit payments to present value are 3.84 percent in year one and 4.35 percent in year two and thereafter. The wage inflation factors and medical inflation factors used in the calculation are approximately 2.0 percent and 3.5 percent, respectively.

17. Military Service and Other Retirement Benefits

Accrued liability for military service and other retirement benefits at September 30, 2003, consisted of the following (in millions):

USCG Military Retirement and Healthcare Benefits	\$21,745
USCG Post-Employment Military Travel Benefits (unaudited)	201
USSS DC Pension Plan Benefits (unaudited)	3,339
Total Military Service and Other Retirement Benefits Liability	\$25,285

Military Retirement System Liability

The components of the Military Retirement System (MRS) expense for the seven months ended September 30, 2003, consisted of the following (in millions):

Defined Benefit Plan (unaudited):	
Normal cost	\$224
Interest on the liability	637
Actuarial gains/(losses)	(122)
Benefits paid (estimated)	(425)
Total Defined Benefit Plan Expense	314
Post-retirement Healthcare (unaudited):	
Normal cost	\$78
Interest on the liability	123
Gains/(losses) due to change in medical inflation rate assumptions	(54)
Total Post-retirement Healthcare Expense	147
Total MRS Expense for the seven months ended September 30, 2003 (unaudited)	\$461

USCG's military service members (both active duty and reservists) participate in the MRS. USCG receives an annual "Retired Pay" appropriation to fund MRS benefits, thus the MRS is treated as a pay-as-you-go plan. Consequently the plan has no assets. The unfunded accrued liability, presented as a component of the liability for military service and other retirement in the accompanying consolidated balance sheet, represents both retired pay and health care benefits for non-Medicare eligible retirees/survivors. On October 1, 2002, USCG transferred the actuarial liability for payments for the health care benefits of Medicare eligible retirees/survivors to the Department of Defense Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund (the Fund). USCG makes monthly payments to the Fund for current service members. An actuarial present value of accumulated plan benefits is derived from the future payments that are attributable, under the retirement plan's provisions, to a participant's credited service as of the valuation date. Credited service is the years of service from active duty base date (or constructive date in the case of active duty reservists) to date of retirement measured in years and completed months. The present value of future benefits is then converted to an unfunded accrued liability by subtracting the present value of future employer/employee normal contributions.

USCG plan participants may retire after 20 years of active service at any age with annual benefits equal to 2.5 percent of retired base pay for each year of credited service up to 75 percent of basic pay. Personnel who became members after August 1, 1986 may elect to receive a \$30,000 lump sum bonus after 15 years of service and reduced benefits prior to age 62.

Annual disability is equal to the retired pay base multiplied by the larger of (1) 2.5 percent times years of service, or (2) percent disability. The benefit cannot be more than 75 percent of retired pay base.

If a USCG member is disabled, he/she is entitled to disability benefits, assuming the disability is at least 30 percent (under a standard schedule of rating disabilities by Veterans Affairs) and either: (1) the member has 8 years of service, (2) the disability results from active duty, or (3) the disability occurred in the line of duty during a time of war or national emergency or certain other time periods.

The significant actuarial assumptions used to compute the MRS accrued liability are:

- (1) life expectancy is based upon the DoD death mortality table;
- (2) cost of living increases are 3.0 percent annually; and
- (3) annual rate of investment return is 6.25 percent

District of Columbia Police and Fireman's Retirement System for Secret Service Employees (unaudited)

Special agents and personnel in certain job series hired by USSS before January 1, 1984, are eligible to transfer to the District of Columbia Police and Fireman's Retirement System (DC Pension Plan) after completion of ten years of protection related experience. All uniformed USSS officers who were hired before January 1, 1984, are automatically covered under this retirement system. Participants in the DC Pension Plan make contributions of seven percent of base pay with no matching contribution made by USSS. Annuitants of this plan receive benefit payments directly from the DC Pension Plan. The USSS reimburses the District of Columbia for the difference between benefits provided to the annuitants, and payroll contributions received from current employees.

The USSS recorded an adjustment to increase liabilities with an offsetting decrease in cumulative results of operations transferred-in from the legacy agency by \$3.3 billion (unaudited) to recognize an unfunded pension benefits liability equal to the present value of future payments at the DC Pension Plan as of March 1, 2003. This liability is presented as a component of the liability for military service and other retirement benefits in the accompanying consolidated balance sheet. The legacy agency had not previously recognized this liability and accordingly a zero balance was transferred-in on March 1, 2003. SFFAS No. 5 Accounting for Liabilities of the Federal Government requires the administrative entity (administrator) to report the actuarial liability. However, the USSS adopted the provisions of SFFAS No. 5 because the administrator, the DC Pension Plan, is not a federal entity and as such the liability for future funding would not otherwise be recorded in the United States government-wide consolidated financial statements.

The adjustment recorded as of March 1, 2003 has been determined using the aggregate cost method. The primary actuarial assumptions used to determine the liability at September 30, 2003 are:

- (1) life expectancy is based upon the 1994 Uninsured Pension (UP94) tables;
- (2) cost of living increases are 3.5 percent annually;
- (3) rates of salary increases are 3.5 percent annually; and
- (4) annual rate of investment return is 7.25 percent

Total expenses related to the DC Pension Plan for the seven months ended September 30, 2003 were \$91.6 million of which \$12.2 million was funded but not paid.

18. Other Liabilities

Other liabilities at September 30, 2003, consisted of the following (in millions):

Intra-governmental:	
Accrued Workers' Compensation	\$178
Advances from Others	77
Employer Benefits Contributions and Payroll Taxes	57
Custodial Liability other than Due to General Fund	19
Debt Owed to Treasury	8
Other Intra-governmental Liabilities	10
Total Intra-governmental Other Liabilities	349
Public:	
Duties for Imports of Canadian Softwood Lumber (note 3)	1,439
Injured Domestic Industries (note 3)	247
Contingent Legal Liabilities (note 20)	75
Capital Lease Liability (note 19)	167
Environmental and Disposal Liabilities (note 20)	98
Refunds and Drawbacks (note 3)	98
Other Public Liabilities	326
Total Public Other Liabilities	2,450

Intra-governmental accrued workers' compensation primarily represents the unfunded FECA liability for current claims. Intra-governmental other liabilities consist principally of current liabilities, while the majority of public other liabilities are considered non-current.

\$2,799

The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, calls for CBP to collect and disburse monies received in connection with antidumping and countervailing duty orders and findings to qualifying Injured Domestic Industries (IDI). Antidumping duties are collected when it is determined that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being released into the U.S. commerce at less than its fair value to the detriment of a U.S. industry. Countervailing duties are collected when it is determined that a foreign government is providing a subsidy to its local industries to manufacture, produce, or export a class or kind of merchandise for import into the U.S. commerce to the detriment of a U.S. industry. Antidumping and countervailing duties collected and due to IDIs at September 30, 2003, totaled \$247 million. Canadian softwood lumber duties of \$1.4 billion are also collected by CBP, and will eventually be distributed, pursuant to rulings by the Department of Commerce. Duties for imports of Canadian softwood lumber is included in non-entity fund balance with Treasury, and represents a non-entity liability for which there is an anti-dumping dispute currently being litigated.

Refunds and Other Payments

Total Other liabilities

Disbursements from the refunds and drawback account for the seven months ended September 30, 2003, consisted of the following (in millions):

Total	\$558
Drawback	159
Refunds	\$399

The disbursements include interest payments of \$36 million. In certain instances, a refund may be identified prior to liquidation for amounts remitted by the importer. These refunds are funded from the collections rather than the refunds and drawback account. For the seven months ended September 30, 2003, these refunds totaled \$235 million.

Amounts refunded during the seven months ended September 30, 2003, identified by entry year, consisted of the following (in millions):

Total	\$558
Prior Years	80
2000	28
2001	52
2002	84
2003	\$314
Entry Year:	

The disbursement totals for refunds include antidumping and countervailing duties collected that are refunded pursuant to rulings by the Department of Commerce. These duties are refunded when Commerce issues a decision in favor of the foreign industry.

The total amounts of antidumping and countervailing duties vary from year to year depending on decisions from Commerce. Antidumping and countervailing duty refunds and associated interest refunded for the seven months ended September 30, 2003, consisted of the following (in millions):

Total Antidumping and countervailing duty refunds	\$70
Interest	13
Antidumping and countervailing duty refunds	\$57

19. Leases

Operating Leases (unaudited)

The Department leases various facilities and equipment under leases accounted for as operating leases. Leased items consist of offices, warehouses, vehicles, and other equipment. Much of the office space occupied by the Department is either owned by the Federal government or is leased by GSA from commercial sources. The Department is not committed to continue to pay rent to GSA beyond the period occupied providing proper advance notice to GSA is made and unless the space occupied is designated as unique space only for DHS operations. However, it is expected that DHS will continue to occupy and lease office space from GSA in future years and that the lease charges will be adjusted annually to reflect operating costs incurred by GSA.

As of September 30, 2003, estimated future minimum lease commitments under operating leases for equipment and GSA controlled leases are as follows (in millions):

GSA	Non-GSA	Total
\$487	\$47	\$534
485	46	531
489	46	535
493	46	539
490	47	537
-	52	52
\$2,444	\$284	\$2,728
	\$487 485 489 493 490	\$487 \$47 485 46 489 46 493 46 490 47 - 52

The estimated future lease payments for GSA controlled leases are based on period payment made during 2003. Lease payments to GSA are expected beyond 2008, however, costs cannot be reasonably estimated.

Capital Leases

DHS maintains nominal capital leases for equipment, buildings, and commercial software license agreements. The liabilities associated with these capital leases and software license agreements are presented as other liabilities in the accompanying consolidated financial statements based upon the present value of the future minimum lease payments. As of September 30, 2003, the aggregate capitalized net cost of buildings subject to capital leases agreements was \$65 million, net of \$2 million accumulated depreciation. As of September 30, 2003, the aggregate capitalized net cost of commercial software license agreements subject to capital leases agreements was \$102 million, net of \$10 million accumulated depreciation.

Certain license agreements are cancelable depending on future funding. Substantially all of the net present value of capital lease obligations and software license agreements are expected to be funded from future sources.

20. Contingent Liabilities and Other Commitments

Legal Contingent Liabilities

The Department is a party to various administrative proceedings, legal actions, and claims brought against it that arise during the normal course of business. Judgements, if any, resulting from such litigation generally will be paid from the Treasury Judgement Fund. Until such claims are resolved, the estimated amount of the probable loss is recognized as a liability. The estimated contingent liability recorded in the accompanying financial statements included with other liabilities for all probable and estimable litigation related claims at September 30, 2003, was \$75 million, of which \$17 million is funded. Asserted and pending legal claims for which loss is reasonably possible was estimated to range from \$3.8 billion to \$3.9 billion, at September 30, 2003. Approximately \$3.4 billion of this estimated range involves cases related to the 1995 bombing of Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, that were transferred to DHS with the Federal Protective Service from the legacy agency.

The Department is subject to various other legal proceedings and claims. In management's opinion, the ultimate resolution of these other actions will not materially affect the Department's financial position or net costs.

Environmental Cleanup Liabilities

The source of cleanup requirements in determining the environmental liability is based on compliance with Federal and state or local environmental laws and regulations. Environmental cleanup liability of \$98 million, presented with other liabilities in the accompanying consolidated balance sheet consists primarily of fuel storage tank program, fuels, solvents, industrial, and chemicals, and other environmental cleanup associated with normal operations of the USCG. For Plum Island Animal Disease Center, potential environmental liabilities that are not presently estimable could exist due to the facility's age, old building materials used, and other materials associated with the facility's past use as a United States Army installation for coastline defense. Cost estimates for environmental and disposal liabilities are subject to revision as a result of changes in technology and environmental laws and regulations.

NFIP Premiums

NFIP premium rates are generally established for actuarially rated policies with the intent of generating sufficient premiums to cover losses and loss adjustment expenses of a historical average loss year and to provide a surplus to compensate the Insurance Underwriting Operations for the loss potential of an unusually severe loss year due to catastrophic flooding. Notwithstanding the foregoing, subsidized rates are charged on a countrywide basis for certain classifications of insured. These subsidized rates produce a premium somewhat less than the loss and loss adjustment expenses expected to be incurred in a historical average loss year, and do not include a provision for losses that may result from catastrophic flooding. Subsidized rates are used to provide affordable insurance on construction or substantial improvements started on or before December 31, 1974, or before the effective date of the initial Flood Insurance Rate Map (i.e., an official map of a community on which NFIP has delineated both the special hazard areas and the non-subsidized premium zones applicable to the community). Any future loss potential of catastrophic flooding cannot be meaningfully quantified as it relates to insurance policies in effect. Accordingly, the financial statements do not include any provision for this contingent liability.

Duty and Trade Refunds

There are various trade related matters that fall under the jurisdiction of other Federal agencies, such as the Department of Commerce, which may result in refunds of duties, taxes, and fees collected by CBP. Until such time as a decision is reached by the other Federal agencies, CBP does not have sufficient information to estimate a contingent liability amount for trade related refunds under jurisdiction of other Federal agencies. All known refunds as of September 30, 2003, have been recorded.

Loaned Aircraft and Equipment

DHS is generally liable to the DoD for damage or loss to aircraft on loan to CBP. As of September 30, 2003, CBP had 16 aircraft loaned from DoD with an acquisition value of \$94.4 million. No damage or aircraft losses were accrued as of September 30, 2003.

21. Consolidated Statement of Net Cost & Net Costs of DHS Sub-organizations (unaudited)

The Department's consolidated statement of net cost displays information by the Department's program directorates and other sub-organizations. The Department's Strategic Plan was developed during the current fiscal year, and therefore it was not fully applicable to the reporting period. Generally however, the responsibility segments displayed on the Department's consolidated statement of net cost are representative of the strategic missions identified in the Department's Strategic Plan.

The classification of responsibility segments has been determined based on DHS' organization structure and existing responsibility components, such as bureaus, administrations, offices, and divisions within a department. During the period of organizational development (i.e., transfer of programs and operations), the Department accumulated and reported program costs through each responsibility segment. The cost of Department-wide initiatives that would require an allocation of cost from responsibility segments was determined to be insignificant by DHS management.

In addition, intra-Departmental costs and revenues resulting from the provision of goods and services on a reimbursable basis between Departmental responsibility segments are reported as costs by the providing responsibility segment. Such costs and revenues are eliminated in the consolidation process.

22. Gross Cost and Earned Revenue by Budget Subfunction (BSF) Classification (unaudited)

government, based on the guidance and direction from the Treasury, is presented below. The BSF codes are established by the OMB and the Data provided to the Treasury by budget subfunction (BSF) classification for inclusion in the consolidated financial statements of the Federal Treasury for government-wide reporting purposes and differ from the classifications used for the Department's segment reporting. The Department's gross cost and earned revenue by BSF for the seven months ended September 30, 2003, are presented below (in millions):

	National Defense	Pollution Control & Abatement	Agricultural Research & Services	Transportation	Community & Regional Development	Health	Income Security	Administration of Justice	General Government	2003 Total
Agency Gross Cost:										
Gross Cost - Federal	\$11	\$10	\$19	\$1,321	\$319	\$72	\$	\$2,346	\$32	\$4,130
Less: Intra-Departmental Eliminations	•	•	1	(3)	(3)	•		(110)	(6)	(125)
Inter-Departmental Gross Cost - Federal	11	10	19	1,318	316	72	'	2,236	23	4,005
Gross Cost - Public	186	23	86	8,498	5,804	12	124	5,863	100	20,708
Agency Gross Cost	\$197	\$33	\$117	\$9,816	\$6,120	\$84	\$124	\$8,099	\$123	\$24,713
Agency Exchange Revenue:										
Exchange Revenue - Federal	\$	₩	∳	\$231	\$21	∳	₩	\$345	\$8	\$605
Less: Intra-Departmental Eliminations			•	(96)	(2)	1	1	(29)	•	(127)
Inter-Dept. Exchange Revenue - Federal	1	'	1	135	19	1	1	316	∞	478
Exchange Revenue - Public	1	1	1	535	1,161	1	•	991	27	2,714
Agency Exchange Revenue	₩	₩	₩	\$670	\$1,180	↔	₩	\$1,307	\$35	\$3,192
Agency Net Cost	\$197	\$33	\$117	\$9,146	\$4,940	\$84	\$124	\$6,792	88\$	\$21,521

23. Combined Statement of Budgetary Resources (unaudited)

Appropriations Received

Appropriations received on the combined statement of budgetary resources (SBR) of \$9,459 million will not match the unexpended appropriations on the consolidated statement of changes in net position (SCNP) of \$7,501 million due to \$1,958 million of trust fund receipts that are not reflected in the unexpended appropriations section of the SCNP.

Permanently Not Available/Adjustments

Budgetary resources permanently not available on the SBR of \$1,558 million does not agree to the unavailable appropriations returned to Treasury of \$1,565 million on the SCNP due to: (1) reclassification of trust funds from unexpended appropriation to cumulative net results of operations which has no effect on the SBR; (2) authority permanently unavailable that was processed through cumulative results of operations and not unexpended appropriations; (3) repayments of debt that was processed through payables and not unexpended appropriations; and (4) reductions of borrowing authority that have no effect on the proprietary accounts.

Apportionment Categories of Obligations Incurred

Apportionment categories are determined in accordance with the guidance provided in OMB Circular A-11, *Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget*. Category A represents resources apportioned for calendar quarters. Category B represents resources apportioned for other time periods; for activities, projects, or objectives; or for any combination thereof (in millions).

	Apportionment Category A	Apportionment Category B	Exempt from Apportionment	Total
Obligations Incurred - Direct	\$11,811	\$17,591	\$11	\$29,413
Obligations Incurred - Reimbursable	222	1,328	-	1,550
Total Obligations Incurred	\$12,033	\$18,919	\$11	\$30,963

Borrowing Authority for EPR

The NFIP has borrowing authority of \$1.5 billion available as of September, 30, 2003. NFIP loans are for a three year term. Interest rates are obtained from the Bureau of Public Debt. Simple interest is calculated monthly, and is offset by any interest rebate, if applicable. Interest is paid semi-annually on October 1 and April 1. Partial loan repayments are permitted. Principal repayments are required only at maturity, but are permitted at any time during the term of the loan. At the end of the Fiscal Year, borrowing authority is reduced by the amount of any unused portion. EPR's liability for borrowed amounts was \$8 million at September 30, 2003.

Under Credit Reform, the unsubsidized portion of direct loans is borrowed from the Treasury. The repayment terms of EPR's borrowing from Treasury are based on the life of each cohort of direct loans. Proceeds from collections of principal and interest from the borrowers are used to repay the Treasury. In addition, an annual re-estimate is performed to determine any change from the original subsidy rate. If an upward re-estimate is determined to be necessary, these funds are available through permanent indefinite authority. Once these funds are appropriated, the original borrowings are repaid to the Treasury.

EPR maintains three funds under the Credit Reform Act:

- 70-4234: Disaster Assistance Direct Loan Financing
- 70-0703: Disaster Assistance Direct Loan Program (no year)
- 70-0703: Disaster Assistance Direct Loan Program (annual)

Borrowing Authority for USCG

Budgetary Resources

Total Status of Budgetary Resources

Relationship of Obligations to Outlays

Obligated Balance, Net End of Period:

Obligated Balance Transferred

Accounts Receivable

Undelivered Orders

Disbursements

Collections

Total Outlays

Outlays:

Budget Authority: Borrowing Authority

The USCG has borrowing authority of \$100 million in the form of an advance from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (the Fund). Amounts advanced are repaid to the Fund when, and to the extent, removal costs are recovered by the USCG from the parties responsible for the spill.

Non-Budgetary, Credit Program, and Financing Account

DHS did not separately present the non-budgetary, credit program, and financing account out on the face of the SBR. DHS has only one financing account in EPR for Disaster Assistance Direct Loan. Information for the seven months ended September 30, 2003, is presented below (in millions):

\$35

(3)

\$10

\$3

(3)

3

10

(1)\$9

Net Transfers, Current Year Authority	2
Spending Authority from Offsetting Collections:	
Collected	1
Change in Unfilled Customer Orders	3
Permanently Not Available:	
Capital Transfers and Debt Redemption	(4)
Other Assets	(27)
Total Budgetary Resources	\$10
Status of Budgetary Resources	
Obligations Incurred:	
Direct Obligations	\$10
Unobligated Balance:	
Balance Currently Available	3
Unobligated Balance Not Available:	
Other	(3)

Explanation of Differences between the Combined Statement of Budgetary Resources and the Budget of the United States Government

The combined statement of budgetary resources (SBR) will not match the *Budget of the United States Government (the Budget)* for fiscal year 2003. The major reason is that the SBR reflects only seven months covering the period from March 1, 2003, to September 30, 2003, whereas *the Budget* has been annualized and covers the period from October 1, 2002, to September 30, 2003. This explanation applies to both the budgetary resources and outlays. A copy of *the Budget* can be obtained from the OMB web site at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb.

24. Permanent Indefinite Appropriations

Permanent indefinite appropriations refer to the appropriations that come from permanent public laws, which authorize the Department to retain certain receipts, rather than the annual appropriation process. The amount appropriated depends upon the amount of the receipts rather than on a specific amount. The Department has two permanent indefinite appropriations as follows:

- CBP has a permanent and indefinite appropriation which is used to disburse tax and duty refunds, and duty drawbacks. Although funded through appropriations, refund and drawback activity is, in most instances, reported as a custodial activity of the Department. This presentation is appropriate because refunds are, in substance, a custodial revenue related activity in that they are a direct result of taxpayer overpayments of their tax liabilities. Federal tax revenue received from taxpayers is not available for use in the operation of the Department and is not reported on the consolidated statement of net cost. Likewise, the resultant refunds of overpayments are not available for use by the Department in its operations. Refunds and drawback disbursements totalled \$558 million for the seven months ended September 30, 2003, and are presented as a reduction of revenue received and netted against amounts provided to the Treasury General Fund on the statement of custodial activity.
- USSS has a permanent and indefinite appropriation which is used to reimburse the District of Columbia Police and
 Fireman's Retirement System (DC Pension Plan) for the difference between benefits provided to the annuitants
 (employees) eligible to participate in the DC Pension Plan (see note 17), and payroll contributions received from current
 employees (unaudited).

These appropriations are not subject to budgetary ceilings established by Congress. CBP's refunds payable at year end are not subject to funding restrictions. Refund payment funding is recognized as appropriations are used.

25. Legal Arrangements Affecting the Use of Unobligated Balances of Budget Authority (unaudited)

Included in the cumulative results of operations for special funds is \$749 million that represents the Department's authority to assess and collect user fees relating to merchandise and passenger processing, to assess and collect fees associated with services performed at certain small airports or other facilities, and to retain amounts needed to offset costs associated with collecting duties, taxes and fees for the Government of Puerto Rico. These special fund balances are restricted by law in their use to offset specific costs incurred by the Department. In addition, the Department is required to maintain \$30 million in its User Fees Account. Part of the passenger fees in the User Fees Account, totaling approximately \$640 million as of September 30, 2003, is restricted by law in its use to offset specific costs incurred by the Department and are available to the extent provided in Appropriation Acts.

The entity trust fund balances result from the Department's authority to use the proceeds from general order items sold at auction to offset specific costs incurred by the Department relating to their sale, to use available funds in the Salaries and Expense Trust Fund to offset specific costs for expanding border and port enforcement activities, and to use available funds from the Harbor Maintenance Fee Trust Fund to offset administrative expenses related to the collection of the Harbor Maintenance Fee.

26. Explanation of the Relationship Between Liabilities Not Covered by Budgetary Resources and the Changes in Components Requiring or Generating Resources in Future Periods (unaudited)

For the seven months ended September, 30, 2003, the *changes in components requiring or generating resources in future periods* was generated from the expense accounts, and is reflected in the other liabilities in the consolidated balance sheet. The option of computing the changes by subtracting the beginning balances from the ending balances of the unfunded liabilities was not used. The liabilities not covered by budgetary resources were transferred to DHS, and are reflected as part of the *Transfers-In/Out Without Reimbursement* section of the consolidated statement of financing.

27. Dedicated Collections

Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund

The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) account includes the parent OSLTF fund that is managed by BPD, the USCG Oil Spill Recovery transfer account (70X8349), the USCG Trust Fund Share of Expenses transfer account (7038314), and the USCG Oil Pollution Act (OPA) Claims transfer account (70X8312). These three transfer accounts fund outlays through SF-1151 non-expenditure transfers from the BPD OSLTF parent fund.

Boat Safety Account

The USCG's Boat Safety Account (70X8149) receives funding from the Department of Interior's Sport Fish Restoration Account, which is funded in part from the Aquatic Resource Trust Fund (ARTF) managed by Bureau of Public Debt (BPD). Funds are available until expended (no-year). Outlays in this account are funded through SF-1151 non-expenditure transfers from the Sport Fish account.

Condensed financial information for the seven months ended September 30, 2003, is presented below (in millions):

	Oil Spill	
	Liability	Boat Safety
	Trust Fund	Account
Assets:		
Investments	\$965	\$ -
Other Assets	48	58
Total Assets	\$1,013	\$58
Liabilities:		
Accounts Payable	\$ -	\$23
Other Liabilities	3	-
Total Liabilities	3	23
Net Position (unaudited):		
Transfers In without Reimbursement	1,000	100
Non-Exchange Revenue	52	-
Less: Program Expenses	(42)	(65)
Net Position	1,010	35
Total Liabilities and Net Position	\$1,013	\$58

28. Subsequent Event

FY 2005 President's Budget request for DHS proposes transferring funding for the Strategic National Stockpile to the Department of Health and Human Services.

Required Supplementary Information (unaudited)

Deferred Maintenance

In FY 2003, the Department reported \$504 million in deferred maintenance on general property, plant, and equipment, and heritage assets. This amount represents maintenance on vehicles, vessels, and buildings and structures owned by the Department that was not performed when it should have been or was scheduled to be and which is delayed for a future period.

The Department bureaus use a specific methodology in determining deferred maintenance. This procedure includes reviewing equipment, building, and other structure logistic reports. Upon completion of this step, logistic personnel use a condition assessment survey to determine the status of referenced assets. A five level rating scale (excellent, good, fair, poor and very poor) is used for assessment purposes. Bureau logistic personnel subsequently identify maintenance not performed as scheduled and establish future performance dates. A summary of deferred maintenance at September 30, 2003, is presented below (in millions):

	Deferred	
	Maintenance	Asset Condition
Building & Structures	\$464	Poor to Fair
Equipment (vehicles and vessels)	40	Poor to Fair
Total	\$504	

Intra-governmental Assets as of September 30, 2003 (in Millions)

	Fund Balance	Investments and	Advances and	
Partner Agency	with Treasury	Related Interest	Prepayments	Other
Treasury General Fund	\$ -	\$-	\$ -	\$109
Department of Agriculture	-	-	-	3
Department of Commerce	-	-	10	-
Department of Interior	-	-	8	62
Department of Justice	-	-	11	54
Department of the Navy	-	-	87	(113)
Department of State	-	-	-	23
Department of Treasury	27,343	1,546	32	184
General Services Administration	-	-	-	7
National Science Foundation	-	-	-	8
Department of the Air Force	-	-	-	1
Environmental Protection Agency	-	-	-	5
Department of Transportation	-	-	2,772	40
Dept of Health & Human Services	-	-	37	-
Dept of Housing & Urban Development	-	-	-	1
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers	-	-	-	7
Office of the Secretary of Defense Agencies	-	-	-	40
Other	-	-	97	(16)
Totals	\$27,343	\$1,546	\$3,054	\$415

Intra-governmental Liabilities as of September 30, 2003 (in Millions)

Partner Agency	Due to Treasury	Accounts Payable	Other
Treasury General Fund	\$1,209	\$-	\$3
Government Printing Office	-	1	-
The Judiciary	-	1	-
Department of Agriculture	-	-	-
Department of Justice	-	17	6
Department of Labor	-	-	184
Department of the Navy	-	78	(10)
Department of State	-	4	5
Department of Treasury	-	5	10
Department of the Army	-	6	-
Office of Personnel Management	-	1	27
Social Security Administration	-	-	2
General Services Administration	-	57	10
Department of the Air Force	-	-	2
Department of Transportation	-	-	34
Department of Health & Human Services	-	24	-
Department of Energy	-	1	(1)
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers	-	20	59
Office of the Secretary of Defense Agencies	-	124	9
Other	-	59	9
Totals	\$1,209	\$398	\$349

See accompanying Independent Auditors' Report.

Required Supplementary Information

Schedule of Budgetary Resources by Responsibility Segments (in Millions)

Budget Authority:	Transportation Security	Preparedness & Response	Infrastructure Protection	Science & Technology	U.S. Coast Guard	U.S. Secret Service	Citizenship & Immigration Services	Offices & Other	Total
Appropriations Received	\$6,428	\$1,521	₩	\$	\$628	\$30	\$702	\$150	\$9,459
Borrowing Authority	•	1,535	'	1	100	'	•	1	1,635
Net Transfers	10,675	6,661	155	534	4,064	822	734	238	23,883
Unobilgated Balance:									
Beginning of Period	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	
Net Transfers	1,439	50	104	o	1,265	20	7	36	2,930
Spending Authority from Offsetting Collections:									
Earned:									
Collected	1,222	1,193	2	1	140	26	(29)	•	2,554
Receivable from Federal Sources	148	16	1	1	33	(17)	44	1	224
Change in Unfilled Customer Orders:									
Advances Received	10	(45)	•	1	31	2	7	1	
Without Advances From Federal Sources	387	11	н	1	16	9	н	7	429
Transfers from Trust Funds	m	•	•	1	•	•	•	1	ဗ
Total Spending Authority from Offsetting Collections	1,770	1,175	3	1	220	17	18	7	3,210
Recoveries of Prior Year Obligations	274	269	4	1	15	35	63	н	199
Permanently Not Available	(1,462)	(33)	(1)	1	(12)	(47)	•	1	(1,558)
TOTAL BUDGETARY RESOURCES	\$19,124	\$11,178	\$265	\$543	\$6,277	\$877	\$1,524	\$432	\$40,220

See accompanying Independent Auditors' Report.

Schedule of Budgetary Resources by Responsibility Segments (in Millions)

STATUS OF BUDGETARY RESOURCES	Border and Transportation Security	Emergency Preparedness & Response	Information Analysis & Infrastructure Protection	Science & Technology	U.S. Coast Guard	U.S. Secret Service	Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services	Departmental Offices & Other	Total
Obligations Incurred:									
Direct	\$14,722	\$7,694	\$243	\$190	\$4,209	\$765	\$1,283	\$307	\$29,413
Reimbursable	1,229	89	С	•	162	11	49	7	1,550
Total Obligations Incurred	15,951	7,783	246	190	4,371	776	1,332	314	30,963
Unobligated Balances Available:									
Apportioned	1,990	1,922	13	353	807	73	145	108	5,411
Exempt from Apportionment	•	6	•	'	949	•	•	•	958
Unobligated Balances Not Available	1,183	1,464	9	•	150	28	47	10	2,888
TOTAL STATUS OF BUDGETARY RESOURCES	\$19,124	\$11,178	\$265	\$543	\$6,277	\$877	\$1,524	\$432	\$40,220
Ohlidated Ralance Net Reginning of Period	er.	(V	U	u	U	U	U	ů.
	+		•				•	+	. !
Obligated Balance Transferred, Net	3,826	6,221	46	14	1,949	210	526	52	12,847
Obligated Balance, Net, End of Period:									
Accounts Receivable	(\$229)	(\$24)	\$	\$	(\$132)	\$	(\$13)	₩	(\$458)
Unfilled Customer Orders from Federal Sources	(204)	(123)	(2)	1	(77)	(11)	വ	(7)	(722)
Undelivered Orders	6,667	7,135	140	118	2,042	197	495	171	16,965
Accounts Payable	1,668	1,059	S	Т	929	82	252	124	3,847
Total Obligated Balance, Net, End of Period	\$7,599	\$8,047	\$143	\$119	\$2,489	\$268	\$679	\$288	\$19,632
Outlays:									
Disbursements	\$11,371	\$5,661	\$143	\$85	\$3,816	\$693	\$1,070	\$73	\$22,912
Collections	(1,235)	(1,149)	(2)	•	(219)	(28)	27	'	(2,606)
Total Outlays	10,136	4,512	141	85	3,597	999	1,097	73	20,306
Less: Offsetting Receipts	(6)	(15)	•	•	•		(1,048)	•	(1,072)
NET OUTLAYS	\$10,127	\$4,497	\$141	\$85	\$3,597	\$665	\$49	\$73	\$19,234

See accompanying Independent Auditors' Report.

Custodial Activity

Substantially all of the duty, tax, and fee revenues collected by CBP are remitted to various General Fund accounts maintained by Treasury. Treasury further distibutes these revenues to other Federal agencies in accordance with various laws and regulations. CBP transfers the remaining revenue (generally less than two percent of revenues collected) directly to other Federal agencies, the Governments of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, or retains funds as authorized by law or regulations. Refunds of revenues collected from import/export activity are recorded in separate accounts established for this purpose and are funded through permanent indefinite appropriations. These activities reflect the non-entity, or custodial, responsibilities that CBP, as an agency of the Federal government, has been authorized by law to enforce.

CBP reviews selected documents to ensure all duties, taxes, and fees owed to the Federal government are paid and to ensure regulations are followed. If CBP believes duties, taxes, fees, fines, or penalties are due in addition to estimated amounts previously paid by the importer/violator, the importer/violator is notified of the additional amount due. CBP regulations allow the importer/violator to file a protest on the additional amount due for review by the Port Director. A protest allows the importer/violator the opportunity to submit additional documentation supporting their claim of a lower amount due or to cancel the additional amount due in its entirety. Work in progress will continue until all avenues to file a protest have expired or an agreement is reached. During this protest period, CBP does not have a legal right to the importer/violator's assets, and consequently CBP recognizes accounts receivable only when the protest period has expired or an agreement is reached. For FY 2003, CBP had legal right to collect \$1.1 billion of receivables. In addition, there is an additional \$1.65 billion representing records still in the protest phase. CBP recognized as write-offs \$42 million of assessments that DHS has statutory authority to collect at year end, but has no future collection potential. Most of this amount represents fines, penalties, and interest. CBP also estimated that trust funds are neither overstated nor understated as of September 30, 2003.

USCG collects various fines, penalties, and miscellaneous user fees from the public that are deposited to the general fund miscellaneous receipts of the U.S. Treasury. USCG does not collect taxes or duties. As of September 30, 2003, USCG had outstanding general fund receipt receivables due to the Treasury General Fund of \$16 million.

Segment Information (in millions):

	Working Capital Fund	Revolving Fund: Supply	Revolving Fund: Yard
Fund Balance with Treasury	\$90	\$12	\$51
Accounts Receivable	1	14	1
Property, Plant and equipment	28	-	55
Other Assets	10	41	(45)
Total Assets	\$129	\$67	\$62
Accounts Payable Other Liabilities	\$1 7	\$13 -	(\$3) 9
Total Liabilities	8	13	6
Cumulative Results of Operations	121	54	56
Total Liabilities and Net Position	\$129	\$67	\$62
Total Costs	\$16	\$3	\$8
Exchange Revenue	26	7	7
Excess of Revenues and Financing Sources over Costs	\$10	\$4	(\$1)

See accompanying Independent Auditors' Report.

Required Supplementary Information

The Department's Working Capital Fund (WCF) is a fee-for-service entity that is fully reimbursable. The WCF provides a variety of support services primarily to the Department's bureaus, and to other Federal entities. The WCF operates on a revolving fund basis, whereby current-operating expenses charged to the customer finance the cost of goods and services. The overall financial goal of the fund is to fully cover the operating expenses while building a minimal capital improvement reserve.

The USCG Yard revolving fund (Yard Fund) finances the industrial operations at the USCG Yard in Curtis Bay, Maryland and other USCG industrial sites. The Yard Fund is financed by payments from CG and other domestic and foreign military customers. The USCG Supply Fund revolving fund (Supply Fund) finances the procurement of uniform clothing, commissary provisions at USCG dining facilities, general stores, technical material, and fuel for vessels over 180 feet in length. The fund is financed by payments from the USCG and other domestic customers.

Risk Assumed Information

We have performed an analysis of the contingencies associated with the unearned premium reserve for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). That analysis shows that the unearned premium reserve is greater than the combined values of (i) the estimated present value of unpaid expected losses and (ii) other operating expenses associated with existing policy contracts. Therefore, we can state that the likelihood is probable that the unearned premium reserve will be adequate to pay future losses and other operating expenses associated with existing policy contracts. However, there is always a chance that, given the volatile nature of flooding, the volume of flood losses in the next year could exceed the unearned premium reserve.

Our estimate of the present value of unpaid expected losses is based on a loss ratio (losses to premium) which is then multiplied by the current unearned premium reserve. This loss ratio is derived from the NFIP actual historical premium, historical losses, and historical mix of business, each adjusted to today's level. More specifically, historical premiums have been adjusted to reflect the premium levels of the present by making adjustments for historical rate changes and historical changes in coverage amounts. Historical losses have been adjusted for inflation, using inflation indexes such as the Consumer Price Index as well as chain price indexes, to reflect the values that historical losses would settle at if they were settled today. In addition, the historical mix of business is adjusted to reflect today's mix of business. Examples of how the historical mix of business has changed are the fact that today there are proportionately fewer pre-firm policies versus post-firm policies in force compared to in the past, and today there are proportionately more preferred risk policies in force than there have been historically.

See accompanying Independent Auditors' Report.

Required Supplementary Information

Required Supplementary Stewardship Information (unaudited)

Heritage Assets

USCG and CBP maintain heritage assets, located in the United States and Puerto Rico. Heritage assets are property, plant and equipment that have historical or national significance; cultural, educational, or artistic importance; or significant architectural characteristics. Heritage assets are generally expected to be preserved indefinitely. Multi-use heritage assets have more than one purpose such as an operational purpose and historical purpose. The physical quantity information for the multi-use heritage assets is included in supplemental stewardship reporting for heritage assets.

The following table summarizes activity related to Heritage Assets from October 1, 2002, to September 30, 2003 (in number of units).

USCG	СВР	Total
20.293	4	20,297
55	-	55
(729)	-	(729)
19,619	4	19,623
	20,293 55 (729)	20,293 4 55 - (729) -

USCG possesses artifacts that can be divided into four general areas: ship's equipment, lighthouse and other aids-to-navigation items, military uniforms, and display models. The addition of artifacts is the result of gifts to USCG.

- Ship's equipment is generally acquired when the ship is decommissioned and includes small items such as sextants, ship's
 clocks, wall plaques, steering wheels, bells, binnacles, engine order telegraphs, and ship's name boards. Conditions vary, but
 much is worn out from decades of use.
- Aids-to-navigation items include fog and buoy bells, lanterns, lamp changing apparatus, and lighthouse lenses. Buoy
 equipment tends to be worn out and is usually acquired only when new technology makes it obsolete. Classical lighthouse
 lenses vary greatly in condition. The condition is normally dependent on how long the item has been out of service and not
 maintained. Most of the good lenses go to local museums or USCG bases as display items.
- Military uniforms are generally donated by retired USCG members, and include clothing as well as insignia and accoutrements. Most clothing is in fair to good condition, particularly full dress items which saw little daily wear.
- Display models are mostly of USCG vessels and aircraft. These are often builders' models. In addition to being accurate and
 valuable, they are generally in very good condition. Builders' models are acquired by USCG as part of the contracts with the
 ship or aircraft builders. The withdrawal of display models was due to wear and tear.

The USCG also has non-collection type heritage assets, such as sunken vessels and aircraft under the property clause of the U.S. Constitution, Articles 95 and 96 of the International Law of the Sea Convention, and the sovereign immunity provisions of Admiralty law. Despite the passage of time or the physical condition of these assets, they remain Government-owned until the Congress of the United States formally declares them abandoned. The USCG desires to retain custody of these assets to safeguard the remains of crew members who were lost at sea, to prevent the unauthorized handling of explosives or ordnance which may be aboard, and to preserve culturally valuable relics of the USCG's long and rich tradition of service to our nation in harm's way.

See accompanying Independent Auditors' Report.

Required Supplementary Stewardship Information

Buildings and Structures - As a matter of public law and policy, USCG does not acquire or retain heritage buildings and structures without an operational use. Most real property, even if designated as historical, is acquired for operational use and is transferred to other government agencies or public entities when no longer required for operations. Of the USCG buildings and structures designated as heritage, including memorials, recreational areas and other historical areas, over two-thirds are multi-use heritage. The remaining are historical lighthouses, which are no longer in use and awaiting disposal; their related assets; and a gravesite. CBP also has four multi-use heritage assets located in Puerto Rico. All multi-use heritage assets are reflected on the consolidated balance sheet.

Financial information for multi-use heritage assets is presented in the principal statements and notes. Deferred maintenance information for heritage assets and general PP&E is presented in the required supplementary information.

Stewardship Investments (in Millions)

	Non-Federal Property	Human Capital	Research and Development	
March 1 - September 30, 2003	\$242	\$25 *	\$45 *	

^{*} These amounts also include costs incurred from October 1, 2002 to February 28, 2003.

Non-federal property investment represents funds provided by TSA for facility modifications, in cooperation with airport authorities, state and local governments, to improve the security infrastructure of the Nation's airports.

Human Capital investment represents costs of training and professional development provided by EPR's National Fire Academy and Emergency Management Institute. Training is provided to emergency management "first responders" at the state and local fire and emergency response community and its allied professionals.

Research and Development (R&D) investment primarily consists of USCG's R&D program costs to develop and evaluate technologies, materials, and human factors directly related to improving the performance of USCG's operations. It also includes R&D costs of EPR's United States Fire Administration (USFA), the mission of which is to promote and improve fire prevention and life safety.

Other Accompanying Information (unaudited)

Estimated Disaster Costs

One of EPR's primary missions under the *Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act* (P.L. 93-288, as amended) (Stafford Act) is to respond to major disasters and emergencies, including terrorist acts committed on the United States. By law, all requests for disaster assistance are made by the governor of the affected state. If the impact of the disaster warrants federal assistance, the Director of EPR submits a recommendation to the President of the United States (the President) for a formal declaration of a major disaster or an emergency.

The Federal government does not have legal or financial responsibility until a declaration is made. Costs from many natural disasters do not meet the definition of a liability for financial reporting purposes until the government formally acknowledges financial responsibility for costs from the event and an exchange or non-exchange transaction has occurred. In the case of government-acknowledged events such formal acceptance of financial responsibility by the federal government occurs when the President declares a disaster.

The EPR Disaster Finance Center tracks all of the disasters that have been declared since FY 1989 under the guidance of the Stafford Act. Cost projections are built based on historical data disasters including direct and allocated indirect cost.

Cost projections are compared against current obligations and expenditures incurred to provide EPR with budgeting information, and to prepare appropriation requests to Congress. EPR has projected the total costs of the declared disasters to be approximately \$45 billion as of September 30, 2003, of which approximately \$43.6 billion has been obligated and \$35.5 billion paid or accrued. Should all projected remaining costs be paid or accrued by EPR, an additional \$9.5 billion in expenses would be recorded. Information regarding the disaster cost projections as of September 30, 2003 is summarized below (in millions):

Estimated Future Disaster Cost (unaudited)

Hnfu	hahnı	Cost:
UIIIU	mueu	COSti

Remaining Projected Expense	\$9,547
Net Unliquidated Obligations	8,131
Expenditures Incurred	(35,487)
Obligations	43,618
Unliquidated Obligations:	
Net Unfunded Costs – future disasters	1,416
Obligations	(43,618)
Cost Projections	\$45,034

See accompanying Independent Auditors' Report.

Other Accompanying Information

Transfers In for the Creation of DHS

Transfers of assets, liabilities, obligations, and unobligated balances from 22 existing Federal agencies and programs began on March 1, 2003, the inception date of DHS operations. Legacy agencies were instructed to record non-expenditure transfers as of March 1, 2003, using full-accrual basis accounting, for transferred asset and liability balances and unobligated and unexpended appropriation budgetary balances. Below are the DHS' balance sheet, statement of changes in net position, and statement of budgetary resources as of March 1, 2003.

Balance Sheet	March 1, 2003 Balances Transferred-in	Effect of Correction of Errors	Adjusted Transferred-in Balances
Assets			
Fund Balance with Treasury	\$39,846	\$ -	\$39,846
Other Assets:			
Intra-governmental	6,450	-	6,450
Public	11,941	(62)	11,879
Total Other Assets	18,391	(62)	18,329
Total Assets	\$58,237	(\$62)	\$58,175
Liabilities			
Intra-governmental	\$3,722	\$ -	\$3,722
Public	28,462	3,339	31,801
Total Liabilities	\$32,184	\$3,339	\$35,523
Net Position			
Unexpended Appropriations	37,380	-	37,380
Cumulative Results from Operations	(11,327)	(3,401)	(14,728)
Total Net Position	\$26,053	(\$3,401)	\$22,652
Statement of Changes in Net Position	March 1, 2003 Balances Transferred-in	Effect of Correction of Errors	Adjusted Transferred-in Balances
Budgetary Financing Sources			
Appropriations Transferred-in, net Other Financing Sources	\$37,381	\$ -	\$37,381
Transfers-in Without Reimbursement	2,465	-	2,465
Reconciliation to Fund Balance with Treasury	\$39,846	\$-	\$39,846
Transfers-in Without Reimbursement			
Total Other Assets	\$18,391	(\$62)	\$18,329
Total Liabilities	32,184	3,339	35,523
Transfers-in Without Reimbursement, Net	(\$13,793)	(\$3,401)	(\$17,194)

See accompanying Independent Auditors' Report.

Other Accompanying Information

Statement of Budgetary Resources	March 1, 2003 Balances Transferred-in	Effect of Correction of Errors	Adjusted Transferred-in Balances
Budgetary Resources			
Budget Authority			
Borrowing Authority	\$1,500	\$ -	\$1,500
Transfers, Net	23,833	-	23,833
Unobligated Balance Transferred, Net	2,649	-	2,649
Spending Authority from Offsetting Collections	21	-	21
Total Budgetary Resources	\$28,003	\$-	\$28,003
Status of Budgetary Resources			
Unobligated Balance			
Apportioned	\$4,736	\$ -	\$4,736
Exempt from Apportionment	727		727
Unobligated Balance Not Available	22,540	-	22,540
Total Status of Budgetary Resources	\$28,003	\$-	\$28,003
Components of Obligated Balances Transferred			
Undelivered Orders	\$11,105	\$ -	\$11,105
Accounts Receivable	(255)	-	(255)
Unfilled Customer Orders from Federal Sources	(463)	-	(463)
Accounts Payable	2,460	-	2,460
Total Net Obligated Balances Transferred	\$12,847	\$ -	\$12,847

On the statement of budgetary resources, total budgetary resources of \$28,003 along with obligated balance, undelivered orders of \$11,105 total \$39,108. On the balance sheet, the fund balance with Treasury is \$39,846. The difference is attributed to the transfer of fund balance with Treasury with liabilities that were not processed as a non-expenditure transfer, but were processed as such by Statement of Transactions (SF-224). There was no budgetary impact.

On the statement of changes in net position, budgetary financing sources, appropriations transferred in, net of \$37,380 and other financing sources, transfers in without reimbursement of \$2,465 total \$39,845. On the balance sheet, fund balance with Treasury is \$39,846, which agrees except for a rounding difference.

Borrowing authority transferred-in reflects only the borrowing authority carried forward from FEMA. Current year borrowing authority was not transferred. It was removed from the legacy agency and reestablished in DHS.

See accompanying Independent Auditors' Report.

Other Accompanying Information



Part III

Introduction

This section describes the results achieved by the Department during fiscal year 2003 relative to the performance goals that were established by agencies prior to transfer into the Department. In addition, this section contains an assessment of the completeness and reliability of performance data, highlights evaluations conducted during the year to improve performance. Following guidance from the Office of Management and Budget, the information presented here is a subset that consists of those candidate performance goals and selected measures that are under consideration for carrying forward into the future. While this information provides insight into certain areas of our performance, it does not present a complete view of the results achieved by the Department. Nonetheless, these performance goals and associated performance measures are mapped to the goals articulated in the Department's Strategic Plan where they best fit.

During fiscal year 2003, we met or exceeded 33 or 70 percent of the performance targets that were established for the performance goals for agencies that transferred into the Department. For 2, or 4 percent of the performance goals, although the target was not met, the difference between the target and actual level of performance is statistically irrelevant and did not affect overall program results. We did not meet 9, or 19 percent of the performance targets that were significant to program accomplishment. For 3, or 6 percent of the performance measures, actual performance results were not available at the time of the publication of this report, and results will be reported in the next *Performance and Accountability Report*.

During fiscal year 2003, we established a Department-wide initiative to improve program performance goals and measures and develop new ones aligned with our Strategic Plan. In fiscal year 2004, the Department will continue to evaluate these hold-over performance measures and make necessary adjustments to align performance goals, measures, and targets with the goals in our Strategic Plan. We published a revised set of performance goals and measures in the fiscal year 2005 *Performance Budget Overview* in the justification that supports the *President's Budget Request* to Congress.

We are implementing a Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) that will serve as the basis for developing the Department's *Future Years Homeland Security Program* (FYHSP) that will be submitted to Congress in accordance with the provisions of the *Homeland Security Act of 2002*. The PPBS is a cyclic process that ensures requirements are properly identified, programs are aligned with the Department's mission and goals, and outcome-based performance measures are established to include factors that are key to the success of the Department. The Department's Strategic Plan, FYHSP and PPBS together create a recurring cycle of program planning, budgeting, execution, measurement and reporting. This continuous cycle, along with our program assessment and evaluation process, ensures the Department performs at the optimal level necessary to defend the homeland and protect the American people.

Completeness and Reliability

During 2003, we carefully reviewed the hold-over performance measures that were established by agencies that transferred into the Department. Those included in this report are candidates under consideration for carrying forward into the future. While these measures provide insight, they do not present a complete view of the performance of the Department. During development of our *Fiscal Year 2005 Annual Performance Budget Overview*, we created additional performance measures that will be used to track and assess progress toward achieving the goals of the Department as articulated in our new Strategic Plan. When the results are reported in subsequent *Performance and Accountability Reports*, these newly established performance measures will permit a more meaningful assessment of the Department as a new entity.

Department Program Managers are responsible for the reliability and completeness of performance measurement information for programs under their cognizance. Program Managers classify performance information as either: Reliable, Inadequate, or To Be Determined. This section provides a summary of those performance measures classified by the Department as Inadequate, or in the case of a new measure, To Be Determined. With the exception of the performance measures identified in the table below, information contained within this report is reliable in accordance with the standards contained in *Office of Management and Budget Circular A-11 Section 230.2(f)*.

Directorates/ Sub- Organizations	Data Not Reasonably Accurate or Materially Inadequate	Reason for Inadequacy and Actions to Correct
Border and Transportation Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement	The percentage of closed investigations which result in an enforcement consequence. Accuracy rating to be determined as under development.	This new measure was developed to include the new investigative roles from the merger of Customs and Immigration and Naturalization Service Offices of Investigations within the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. It will take approximately six to nine months of review to provide an accurate reliability rate. The Executive Information Unit, Mission Support Division, Office of Investigations, will validate and verify data compiled by Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) and Enforcement Case Tracking System (ENFORCE) by using established internal reviews and statistical sampling methodology to determine accuracy, completeness and related quality control practices. Specifically, the data will be validated by defining data quality characteristics and quality thresholds; developing statistical sampling methods to extract population samples; analyzing samples using pre-defined validation rules; determining the prevalence of known data quality deficiencies; creating tabulations for the presentation of results; and documenting findings.

Directorates/ Sub- Organizations	Data Not Reasonably Accurate or Materially Inadequate	Reason for Inadequacy and Actions to Correct
Emergency Preparedness and Response	Percentage of Federal Departments and Agencies with fully operational Continuity of Operations (COOP) capabilities. Accuracy rating to be determined as under development.	COOP data and assessments of data are currently collected through interviews and after action reviews following real world deployments. After action reviews following Federal agency-wide exercises provide the ability to evaluate strengths and weaknesses of overall COOP programs. The fielding and successful testing and validation of the Readiness Reporting System (RRS) in fiscal year 2004 will allow data collection on a regular basis, through secure means, and as events and activities occur which impact capabilities. Data will be verified through periodic assessments and exercises that will analyze the validity and accuracy of self-reported data collected by RRS. Reliable data for COOP will be available beginning in fiscal year 2005 with the fielding of the RRS and its related assessments.
United States Coast Guard	Seizure rate for cocaine that is shipped via non-commercial maritime means. Accuracy rating to be determined as under development.	Total non-commercial maritime flow data will not be available until April 2004 when the Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement (IACM) is published. At that time, an actual cocaine seizure rate will be published for fiscal year 2003.
United States Customs and Border Protection	Outbound Enforcement Targeting Effectiveness Accuracy rating to be determined as under development.	U.S. Customs and Border Protection had two parallel outbound exam findings systems. The Outbound Targeting and Tracking System (OTTS) collected exams not in the Automated Export System (AES). Evolving enhancements are constantly being made to the AES. One of the enhancements was to provide one system to input and review all exam findings. Accordingly, the AES was the chosen system and OTTS was terminated on June 29, 2003. Since June 29, 2003, all exam findings, both AES and non-AES, have been entered into the AES exam findings module thus streamlining the exam findings system. Unfortunately, the OTTS (non-AES) exam findings information prior to June 29, 2003, is not retrievable. Thus the data in the AES exam findings module does not include the non-AES findings in OTTS from October 2002 until June 29, 2003. If the OTTS information were available, the target would probably have been met. In the future (after Census completes the Commodity Redesign), all exams will be in AES as all information must be sent electronically. At that time (later this year), AES will be the only source to capture this information and the statistics should be very reliable.

Strategic Goal 1 - AWARENESS

Identify and understand threats, assess vulnerabilities, determine potential impacts and disseminate timely information to our homeland security partners and the American public.

The Department of Homeland Security's new entities of the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, and the Science and Technology Directorate have developed performance goals and measures to reflect accomplishments in supporting this goal. As these goals and measures were developed in mid-fiscal year 2003, there are no targets or actuals to report this year, but will be reported in future reports. Measures of the Transportation Security Administration, and other units, are similarly newly developed under revised program structures and do not meet Office of Management and Budget's guidance for inclusion in this year's *Performance and Accountability Report*.

Strategic Goal 2 - PREVENTION

Detect, deter and mitigate threats to our homeland.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

Strengthen national security at and between ports of entry to prevent the illegal entry of persons and contraband into the United States.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
High priority border corridors demonstrating optimum deterrence.	YES	9	9
Description: The number of operational corridors of illegal entry identified, for the southern border that achieve the optimal level of deterrence. Optimum deterrence is defined as the level at which applying more Border Patrol agents and resources would not yield a significant gain in arrests/deterrence.			

United States Coast Guard (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

Remove illegal drugs in transit to our country by denying maritime smuggling routes.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Seizure rate for Cocaine that is shipped via non-commercial maritime means. Description: The 20.7 percent target for fiscal year 2003 was aligned with the 1998 National Drug Control Strategy promulgated by the Office of National Drug Control Policy. The Coast Guard's actual cocaine seizure rate has hovered at approximately 12 percent over the past 5 years. The Coast Guard seized 136,865 lbs of cocaine in fiscal year 2003. This amount is second only to the record setting total of 138,393 lbs seized in fiscal year 2001. Total non-commercial maritime flow data will not be available until April 2004 when the Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement	TBD	20.7 percent or greater	Actual Actual available April 2004
(IACM) is published. At that time, an actual cocaine seizure rate will be published for fiscal year 2003. NOTE: Starting in fiscal year 2004 the target will be a cocaine "removal" rate as smugglers increasingly jettison or otherwise destroy the drugs they are carrying to prevent physical seizure by the Coast Guard. This measure will account for the cocaine that is not recovered, since those drugs still speak to the performance effectiveness of the program.			

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

Contribute to a safer America by prohibiting the introduction of illicit contraband into the United States.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Inspection narcotics seizures (Legacy United States Customs Service data only).	YES	37.6	76.2
Cocaine seized - thousands of pounds			
Description: The amount of cocaine seized at the ports of entry by, or with the participation of, U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers from passengers, vehicles, commercial and private aircraft, vessels, trucks, cargo, and railcars entering the United States.			

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Inspection narcotics seizures (Legacy United States Customs Service data only). • Cocaine – number of seizures	YES	1,632	1,806
Description: The number of incidents of cocaine seized at the ports of entry by, or with the participation of, U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers from passengers, vehicles, commercial and private aircraft, vessels, trucks, cargo vessels, and railcars entering the United States.			

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Inspection narcotics seizures (Legacy United States Customs Service data only).	YES	863.5	864.8
Marijuana seized - thousands of pounds			
Description: The amount of marijuana seized at the ports of entry by, or with the participation of, U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers from passengers, vehicles, commercial and private aircraft, vessels, trucks, cargo, and railcars entering the United States.			

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Inspection narcotics seizures (Legacy United States Customs Service data only). • Marijuana - number of seizures	YES	10,274	10,516
Description: The number of incidents of marijuana seized at the ports of entry by, or with the participation of, U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers from passengers, vehicles, commercial and private aircraft, vessels, trucks, cargo vessels, and railcars entering the United States.			

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Inspection narcotics seizures (Legacy United States Customs Service data only).	NO	4.0	3.8
Heroin seized - thousands of pounds			
Description: The amount of heroin seized at the ports of entry by, or with the participation of, U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers from passengers, vehicles, commercial and private aircraft, vessels, trucks, cargo, and railcars entering the United States.			

Explanation: The rate of pounds seizure per month during the last five months of the year were less than the first seven months of the fiscal year. Probable cause was several large heroin seizures during the first seven months of the fiscal year.

Recommended Action: Pounds seized can be easily skewed by a few large weight seizures. Efforts to find the best measures will continue in fiscal year 2004.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Inspection narcotics seizures (Legacy United States Customs Service data only). • Heroin- number of seizures Description: The number of incidents of heroin seized at the ports of entry by, or with the participation of, U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers from passengers, vehicles, commercial and private aircraft, vessels, trucks, cargo vessels, and railcars entering the United States.	YES	742	771

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
International Air Passengers in Compliance with Agricultural Quarantine Regulations (percent compliant). Description: The percent of passengers in the air environment that are in compliance with the Agricultural Quarantine Regulations.	YES	97 percent	97 percent

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
International Vehicle Passengers in Compliance with Agricultural Quarantine Regulations (percent compliant). Description: The percent of passengers in the vehicle environment that are in	YES	96 percent	96 percent
compliance with the Agricultural Quarantine Regulations.			

United States Coast Guard (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

Reduce the flow of undocumented migrants entering the United States.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Interdict or deter a certain percentage of undocumented migrants who attempt to enter the United States via maritime routes.	NO	87 percent or greater	85.3 percent
Description: The number of migrants entering the United States by maritime routes compared with the number of migrants that would attempt to enter with no interdiction presence.			
NOTE: The measure only tracks four migrant groups at this time. A small number of migrants (approximately 10 percent) from various source countries are not included because formal flow estimates of migrants leaving these countries are not available.			

Explanation: In fiscal year 2003, there were 3,793 successful arrivals and an estimated threat of 25,750 migrants, yielding an 85.3 percent performance result. This value is just shy of the 87 percent goal. However, there were 5,331 Coast Guard migrant interdictions this year compared to 2,409 in fiscal year 2002 (estimated threat was 21,750), an increase of over 120 percent for interdictions against an 18.4 percent increase in estimated threat. Socioeconomic and political conditions continue to drive migrant flow. Haitian, Cuban, Dominican and Chinese migrants are using new migrant routes via the Mona Pass, Turks & Caicos, United States Virgin Islands and the Bahamas. Late in 2002, Castro imprisoned 75 Cubans due to their affiliation with human rights groups, motivating many Cubans with similar beliefs to illegally depart the country. A lack of severe tropical weather during the hurricane season was one additional contribution to increased migrant flow.

Recommended Action: As explained above, migrant interdiction is a complex mission that is contingent upon a combination of socioeconomic, political and weather factors. This performance goal was set at an approximate target level, and the deviation from that level is slight. There was no effect on overall program or activity performance.

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

Deny the use of airspace for implementing acts of terrorism against critical infrastructure, personnel and institutions within the United States and its territories.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Reduce the number of air space intrusions within the Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ) such as the National Capital Region (NCR). Description: Airspace intrusions within the FRZ of the NCR were reduced by 96 percent in six months from 182 to 7 due to the airspace security provided from the establishment of Air & Marine Operations.	YES	7	7

United States Coast Guard (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

The Coast Guard will provide core competencies such as Maritime Interception Operations; Port Operations Security and Defense; Military Environmental Response Operations; Peacetime Engagement; and Coastal Sea Control Operations when requested by the Department of Defense or the Department of State.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Provide core military competencies when requested 100 percent of the time.	NO	100 percent	78 percent
Description: The percentage of time that requests for Coast Guard core military competencies are filled by providing that competency.			

Explanation: The measure assesses the state of readiness of an asset in relation to its capabilities including: equipment, logistics, personnel, training, preparedness, etc. This is a standardized system that is applied throughout the Department of Defense. The Department of the Navy Status of Readiness and Training System (SORTS) is a self-evaluation performed periodically by the Commanding Officer and personnel on the Coast Guard asset. Many readiness degradations were linked to equipment casualties associated with operating an aging cutter fleet and unit training deficiencies.

Recommended Action: The Coast Guard has specific plans to recapitalize Deepwater assets to eliminate equipment casualties and thereby eliminating the cause of deteriorated performance.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

Protect our homeland from acts of terrorism and reduce its vulnerability to the threat of international terrorists.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) Data Sufficiency Rate (percent of flights with passenger data provided data sufficiency rate in fiscal year 2002 and beyond).	YES	94 percent	98 percent
Description: This measure is an estimate of the level of effectiveness of the primary processing method in identifying high-risk passengers that are in violation of any major category violation.			

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Outbound Currency Seizures (in millions of dollars).	YES	\$49	\$51.7
Description: The value of outbound currency seized by, or with the participation of, Customs officers for violations of the currency reporting regulations (31 USC 5316/5317) and the bulk currency smuggling regulations (31 USC 5332).			

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Targeting Efficiency Rate (TER) in the Land Passenger Environment.	NO	24	13
Description: This measure is a statistically valid estimate of the effectiveness of primary processing in identifying high-risk passengers or vehicles that are in violation of any major category violation. Data is obtained from information reported in Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS), Operations Management Report (OMR), Automated Targeting System (ATS) and Category I violations.			

Explanation: The TER did not meet the target of 24 because there were 2,415 less Enforcement Category One Referrals in fiscal year 2003 compared to fiscal year 2002. This reduced the Target Efficiency Results below the fiscal year 2003 target.

Recommended Action: Increase the number the number of Enforcement Category One Referrals.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Outbound Enforcement Targeting Effectiveness (percent effective).	NO	9 percent	5.74 percent
Description: Outbound Enforcement Targeting Effectiveness is the total number of positive examinations divided by the total number of targeted examinations conducted. This measure captures the targeting effectiveness for all manually targeted exams recorded in the Outbound Targeting and Tracking System (OTTS) and all other exams targeted by the Automated Export System (AES). Both sets of data are combined and a percentage expressed. Data supporting this measure is extracted into the OMR.			

Explanation: U.S. Customs and Border Protection had two parallel outbound exam findings systems. The OTTS collected exams not in the AES. Evolving enhancements are constantly being made to the AES. One of the enhancements was to provide one system to input and review all exam findings. Accordingly, the AES was the chosen system and OTTS was terminated on June 29, 2003. Since June 29, 2003, all exam findings, both AES and non-AES, have been entered into the AES exam findings module, thus streamlining the exam findings system. Unfortunately, the OTTS (non-AES) exam findings information prior to June 29, 2003, is not retrievable. Thus, the 5.74 percent in the AES exam findings module does not include the non-AES findings in OTTS from October 2002 until June 29, 2003. If the OTTS information were available the target would probably have been met.

Recommended Action: In the future (after Census completes the Commodity Redesign), all exams will be in AES as all information must be sent electronically. At that time (later this year), AES will be the only source to capture this information and the statistics should be very reliable.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

Move legitimate cargo and people efficiently while safeguarding the border and the security of the United States.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Compliance Rate In the Vehicle Passenger Environment (percent of travelers compliant). Description: The percentage of vehicles approaching the port-of-entry that are not in violation of any laws, rules, regulations, or agreements enforced by the United States Customs Service.	YES	99.8 percent	99.9 percent

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Percent of sea containerized cargo transported by Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) carriers. Description: The amount of cargo shipped through certified C-TPAT carriers. This method of shipment maintains effective security processes throughout the international transportation chain.	YES	93 percent	93 percent

United States Coast Guard (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

Passenger and Maritime Worker fatalities have been separately reported as a lagging Marine Safety performance indicator. Reporting the combined number of death and injuries for both passengers and marine workers is a preferable future metric. The Coast Guard is conducting an analysis of its Marine Safety programs that will study both lagging and leading indicators including upper and lower control limits that may lead to better performance measures. The Coast Guard's goal is that by fiscal year 2009 the 5-year average number of passenger and maritime worker deaths & injuries will decline to 685 per year down 32 percent from the 5-year average of 930 in fiscal year 2001.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Five-year average of number of passenger and maritime worker deaths and injuries.	YES	801 or fewer	673
Description: This measure combines a five-year average of deaths and injuries on United States commercial vessels with an annual measure of recreational boating fatalities. The two sub-measures are separate and their effect on this larger index should also be examined separately as the approaches to reducing each will require different preventative actions.			

Explanation: It should be noted that starting in fiscal year 2003 this measure combines a five-year average of deaths and injuries on U.S. commercial vessels with an annual measure of recreational boating fatalities. Therefore, in the event of a sudden spike in the annual "recreational boating" fatalities due to a unique happening may unduly influence the reliability of the larger index even though commercial vessel injuries and deaths are slowly declining. Prior to fiscal year 2003, the measure recorded Passenger and Maritime Worker Injuries and Fatalities (801 was the fiscal year 2003 target with 673 being the actual number) and Recreational Boating Fatalities (742 was the fiscal year target - actual not available since states collect and report recreational boating fatalities by calendar year) separately.

United States Coast Guard (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

By realizing the Average-Aid-Availability target of 99.7 percent and maintaining signal availability for Radio Navigation target of 99.7 percent the Aids to Navigation (ATON) program will contribute to the independent system of interventions to reduce the number of collisions, allisions and groundings by 20 percent over-five-years (4 percent annually) of the five-year average used to establish target.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Five-year average of number of collisions, allisions and groundings.	YES	2010 or fewer	1523
Description: The performance measure for the ATON program is a five-year average of collisions, allisions (e.g. vessel striking a fixed object), and groundings (CAG). This measure represents the effectiveness of the ATON system in preventing CAG incidents.			

United States Coast Guard (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

Domestic Ice Breaking: Maintain the navigation season in ice bound areas of the Great Lakes. Prevent canal closures to 2 days in an average winter and 8 days in a severe winter.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Domestic Ice: Limit number of days critical waterways are closed due to ice to 2 days in an average winter and 8 days in a severe winter.	YES	2 (Avg.) 8 (Severe)	7
Description: The number of days critical Great Lakes Icebreaker Replacement project waterways are closed due to ice conditions. This is based on the severity of the winter. Seven waterways have been identified as critical to Great Lakes icebreaking based on historical ice conditions, volume of ship traffic and potential for flooding.			

United States Coast Guard (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

Polar Ice Breaking: Provide icebreaking support as requested by the National Science Foundation, Department of Defense, or the Department of State 100 percent of the time.

Performance Measure: Me	et	Target	Actual
Polar Ice Breaking: Percentage of requests that are met to provide ice breaking support to the National Science Foundation, Department of Defense, or the Department of State. Description: The percentage of requests for ice breaking support met by the Coast Guard. Coast Guard activity in this mission ensures the mobility needed to achieve the scientific research and logistics replenishment desired by other agencies	S	100 percent	100 percent

Strategic Goal 3 - PROTECTION

Safeguard our people and their freedoms, critical infrastructure, property and the economy of our nation from acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or other emergencies.

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

Remove 100 percent of removable aliens.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Number of final order removals divided by the number of final orders issued.	YES	61 percent	77.7 percent
Description: The number of final order removals is the number of aliens removed from the United States after receiving an order of removal from an immigration judge. It is shown as a percentage of the number of final orders that immigration judges issued during the same time period.			
The Target percentage assumes 220,000 final orders issued. The fiscal year 2003 Target value is 61 percent. A Target value of 100 percent is set for fiscal year 2009.			
Note: Preliminary data based only on data from the Deportable Alien Control System (DACS), and does not include data from the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR). Normally, data from DACS is compared against EOIR data. EOIR data is provided quarterly and is not available at this time.			

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

Protect the American people, property and infrastructure from foreign terrorists, criminals and other people and organizations who threaten the United States, by increasing the percentage of cases which have an enforcement consequence.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
The percentage of closed investigations which result in an enforcement consequence.	YES	57.2 percent	57.2 percent
Description: The number of completed cases with enforcement consequences (e.g., arrest, indictment, conviction, seizure, fine and/or penalty) in relation to the number of cases completed by the Office of Investigations.			
NOTE: The Department met its goal of obtaining 57.2 percent enforcement consequences based on preliminary data on closed cases in the year. This is a new performance measure that was developed to include the new investigative roles resulting from the merger of the Customs and Immigration and Naturalization Service Offices of Investigations and supports the Department's reasonability of protecting the American people, property and infrastructure from foreign terrorists, criminals and other people and organizations who threaten the United States. The Department goal is to increase the percentage of cases that have an enforcement consequence to 57.6 percent by fiscal year 2005. Within approximately six to nine months, the means to provide final accurate reliability rates will be in place.			

United States Secret Service (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

Reduce threats posed by global terrorists and other adversaries.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Intelligence cases completed.	NO	4,000	3,927
Description: This measure represents the total number of intelligence cases completed by agents assigned to field operations that identify and investigate groups, individuals and emerging technologies that may pose a threat to Secret Service protectees.			

Explanation: This performance goal was set at an approximate target level, and the deviation from that level is slight. There was no effect on overall program or activity performance.

Recommended Action: None

Federal Emergency Management Agency (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

Attain all annual targets in the areas of potential property losses, disaster and other costs avoided; improved safety of the United States population through availability of accurate flood risk data in Geographic Information System (GIS) format; and number of communities taking or increasing action to reduce their risk of natural or man made disaster.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Potential property losses, disaster and other costs avoided (Billions of dollars).	YES	\$1.1	\$1.1
Description: The measurement is drawn from the floodplain management activities of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and mitigation grant program activities. The NFIP floodplain management element of this goal was based on three factors: (1) the number of Post-flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM) structures in the Special Flood Hazard Areas by year; (2) the estimated percentage of those structures built in compliance with minimum NFIP requirements; and (3) the estimated reduction in average annual damages based on historical NFIP loss experience.			

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Percentage of the population whose safety is improved through availability of accurate flood risk data in GIS format.	NO	10 percent	5 percent
Description: The performance measure is calculated based on the revision to flood maps that is then compared to census data of the jurisdiction's demographics to determine the percent of the population whose safety is improved.			

Explanation: Through the National Flood Insurance Program, FEMA produced Digital Flood Insurance Rate Maps for 111 communities in a GIS format. This covers roughly 5 percent of the Nation's population. Other digital data in GIS format that is not specifically included in the above percentage includes floodplain boundaries from the Q3 product and other hazard information available through http://www.Hazardmaps.gov. Other digital flood hazard data contributing to improving the Nation's safety is available to the public online at FEMA's flood map store. Each of these other products was specifically not included in the above percentage because they do not necessarily address flood hazards specifically, may not be in GIS format, and/or are generally less accurate than the Digital Flood Insurance Rate Maps noted above.

Recommended Action: FEMA is working to continue updating flood maps in fiscal year 2004.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Number of communities taking or increasing action to reduce their risk of natural or man-made disaster.	YES	500	750
Description: The number of communities where actions are taken in a given fiscal year to reduce their risk of natural and man-made disaster is compiled by documented evidence of communities that: (1) conduct pre-disaster mitigation activities; (2) join or increase their rating in the Community Rating System (CRS); (3) join the NFIP; (4) participate in a Cooperative Technical Partnership (CTP); or (5) implement post-disaster mitigation projects.			

Federal Emergency Management Agency (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

By fiscal year 2009, 100 percent of jurisdictions (State, Tribal and County) complete self-assessments (validated through random independent verification) using mutually agreed upon baseline performance standards for responding to and recovering from all hazards, including terrorist incidents and WMD.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Non-cumulative percentage of State jurisdictions assessed under the National Emergency Management Baseline Capability Assessment Program.	NO	50 percent	25 percent
Description: The non-cumulative percentage of State jurisdictions assessed is a reflection of objective and subjective compliance with Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) standards or other additional succeeding nationally recognized standards. This self-assessment data is collected at the state, tribal or local jurisdictional level.			

Explanation: The assessments of State jurisdictions did not begin until three months into the fiscal year (January 2003) due to the fact that FEMA was operating under a continuing resolution and was awaiting funding. It is noted that state participation in this program is strictly voluntary.

Recommended Action: Based on our current schedule, FEMA anticipates reaching the 50 percent goal of conducting 28 state assessments by March 2004.

United States Coast Guard (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

The volume of oil spilled per million gallons shipped, the number of debris items collected per mile of shoreline surveyed and the total number of pollution incidents are lagging indicators that may not reflect current USCG Marine Environmental Protection performance. The Coast Guard is conducting a mission analysis project that will study both leading and lagging indicators including upper and lower control limits that may lead to better performance measures. By fiscal year 2009, the 5-year average number of Chemical discharge incidents and Oils Spills >100 gallons will decline to 350 per year.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
The 5-year average number of total of all chemical discharge incidents and oil spills less than 100 gallons per 100 million tons shipped.	YES	42.6 or less	29.4
Description: The five-year average number of U.S. Coast Guard investigated chemical spills and oil spills greater than 100 gallons discharged into navigable waters of the United States per 100 million short tons of chemicals and oil products shipped in U.S. waters. Data for the denominator is obtained from the annual report of the Waterborne Commerce of the United States compiled by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.			
NOTE: Only discharge incidents from maritime sources into U.S. waters are counted. Discharges onto land, into the air, or into enclosed spaces are excluded. Discharges from non-maritime sources – such as aircraft, trucks & other vehicles, rail cars & rail equipment; naval and other public vessels; fixed platforms and pipelines – are excluded. Discharges from unspecified, unclassified, and unknown sources are also excluded.			

United States Secret Service (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

Protect our nation's leaders and other protectees.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Percentage of instances protectees arrive and depart safely.	YES	100 percent	100 percent
Description: The security of protectees is the ultimate priority of the Secret Service. This measure represents the percentage of travel stops where the protectee safely arrives and departs. The performance target is always 100 percent. Anything under 100 percent is unacceptable.			

United States Secret Service (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

Protect visiting world leaders.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Percentage of instances protectees arrive and depart safely.	YES	100 percent	100 percent
Description: The security of protectees is the ultimate priority of the Secret Service. This measure represents the percentage of travel stops where the protectee safely arrives and departs. The performance target is always 100 percent. Anything under 100 percent is unacceptable.			

United States Secret Service (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

Protect our Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidates and Nominees.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Percentage of instances protectees arrive and depart safely.	N/A	N/A	N/A
Description: The security of protectees is the ultimate priority of the Secret Service. This measure represents the percentage of travel stops where the protectee safely arrives and departs. The performance target is always 100 percent. Anything under 100 percent is unacceptable.			
Explanation: During fiscal year 2003, there were no Presidential or Vice President	ial Candidates	or Nominees.	
Pagammandad Action: N/A			

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

Federal Protective Service (FPS) overall goal is to reduce the vulnerability to Federal facilities and tenants by providing a safe secure environment to federal tenants and the visiting public, but to maintain our ultimate responsibility to the taxpayer. FPS long-term goal is to achieve a 40 percent overall measurable reduction to the threat of Federal facilities.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Reduction of Risk Factor for Federal facilities.	YES	Greater than 20 percent	49.57 percent
Description: The FPS long-term goal is to achieve a 40 percent overall measurable reduction to the threat of federal facilities. This measure provides FPS decision makers a means of identifying and evaluating threats to the federal workplace and of assessing program efficiency in reducing these threats.			

Federal Emergency Management Agency (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

By fiscal year 2009, all Federal Executive Branch Departments and Agencies will attain and maintain a fully operational Continuity of Operations (COOP) capability to guarantee the survival of an enduring constitutional government and 75 percent of states will have established COOP Plans.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Federal Departments and Agencies with fully operational COOP capabilities.	Data not Available	75 percent	See Explanation
Description: FEMA determines the percentage of federal departments and agencies with fully operational COOP capabilities based on criteria that define "fully operational capabilities." The criteria are derived from documents such as Presidential Decision Directive – 67: Enduring Constitutional Government and Continuity of Operations, numerous classified Operational Plans, and other guidance documents.			

Explanation: The Actual cannot be obtained. The Department's ability to collect reliable data on this measure will be piloted in fiscal year 2004 and will be in place beginning fiscal year 2005.

United States Coast Guard (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

By fiscal year 2009, at least 97 percent of commercial fishermen in the United States will be fishing in compliance with federal regulations.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Percent of fisherman complying with federal regulations.	YES	97 percent	97 percent
Description: This program is aimed at reducing the number of significant fishing violations that occur within the United States Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) through at-sea enforcement of management plan regulations. The target is to ensure at least 97 percent of commercial fishermen in the United States will be fishing in compliance with federal regulations.			

United States Coast Guard (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

By fiscal year 2009, limit foreign fishing vessel incursions into the United States Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to less than 202 incursions per year.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Number of incursions into the United States Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Description: The limit on foreign fishing vessel incursions into the United States Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).	YES	202 or fewer	153

United States Secret Service (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

Reduce loses to the public attributable to counterfeit currency, other financial crimes, and identity theft crimes that are under the jurisdiction of the Secret Service, which threaten the integrity of our currency and the reliability of financial payment systems worldwide.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Counterfeit passed per million dollars of genuine United States currency.	YES	\$74	\$58
Description: The measure reports the dollar value of counterfeit notes passed on the public per million dollars of genuine currency. This measure is an indicator of the proportion of counterfeit currency relative to the amount of genuine United States currency in circulation. Past audits indicate that overall error rates are less than one percent.			

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Financial crime loss prevented (Billions of dollars).	YES	\$1.5	\$2.5
Description: This measure reports an estimate of the direct dollar loss prevented due to Secret Service intervention or interruption of a criminal venture through a criminal investigation. This estimate is based on the likely amount of financial crime that would have occurred had the offender not been identified or the criminal enterprise disrupted.			

Strategic Goal 4 - RESPONSE

Lead, manage and coordinate the national response to acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or other emergencies.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

By fiscal year 2009, maximum response time for emergency response teams to arrive on scene is reduced to no more than 12 hours.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Maximum response time in hours for emergency response teams to arrive on the scene.	NO	72hr	See Explanation
Description: FEMA deploys rapid reaction response teams that demonstrate interagency coordination in responding to all-hazard events, including Domestic Emergency Support Teams, Urban Search and Rescue Teams and National Disaster Medical System Teams.			

Explanation: In responding to most disasters, FEMA, in conjunction with its State and local partners, has successfully met the needs of disaster victims within 72 hours. FEMA's disaster response is intended to provide disaster supplies and commodities that supplement supplies available in impacted State and local jurisdictions. While actions are currently underway that are designed to reduce the time it takes to deliver relief supplies and commodities to disaster victims following a Presidential disaster declaration, for Hurricane Isabel, FEMA's most significant disaster response event in fiscal year 2003, there were several instances where relief supplies and commodities were not delivered "into the hands of the disaster victims" within 72-hours of the President's disaster declaration. It is important to note that in responding to Hurricane Isabel, FEMA took an aggressive pre-event posture of closely coordinating with potentially affected State partners to ensure that all were informed of the predicted path of the storm and the potential for severe damage, down to the local level. FEMA's disaster response teams were dispatched before the hurricane's arrival and disaster supplies and equipment were pre-positioned to the north, south and west of the predicted path of destruction where they would be located out of harm's way, yet be positioned close to those areas predicted to need support. After the hurricane passed, FEMA was ready with teams, supplies and equipment to respond to support State and local jurisdictions in meeting the needs of the disaster victims, pending the Presidential disaster declaration and identification of support requirements by the States. The quantity and types of teams, supplies, and commodities that FEMA pre-positioned was an estimate of what would be required to supplement existing State and local capabilities. Enhanced State and local preparation, however, was far less than expected. Thus, poorly defined increased requirements added to the response times which exceeded 72-hours in some cases and were as high as 120-hours, while some supplies were delivered well within the 72-hours.

Corrective Action: States and localities need to be better prepared and FEMA must enhance its logistics support capabilities to ensure efficient, timely distribution of large quantities of disaster supplies. FEMA's proactive and forward-leaning approach used for Hurricane Isabel gave the Agency the capability to place relief supplies and commodities in the hands of the disaster victims well within the 72-hour threshold, but because of the underestimation of the needs at the State and local level and problems delivering the supplies, some delays in deliveries occurred. Important lessons have been learned from this response and FEMA will work closely with the States to ensure disaster logistics systems are in place that can provide rapid local distribution of needed supplies when disaster strikes.

United States Coast Guard (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

By 2009, performance will improve to saving 88 percent of mariners in imminent danger.

Performance Measure:		Target	Actual
Save mariners in imminent danger.		85 percent	87.7 percent
Description: The percent of successful incidents of mariners rescued from imminent danger. Several factors compound the difficulty of successful responses including: 1.) untimely notification to the Coast Guard of distress; 2.) incorrect reporting of the distress site location; 3.) severe weather conditions at the distress site; and 4.) distance to the scene.			

Strategic Goal 5 - RECOVERY

Lead national, state, local and private sector efforts to restore services and rebuild communities after acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or other emergencies.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

By fiscal year 2009, provide recovery assistance at 100 percent of the fiscal year 2009 target level for performance in non-catastrophic disasters.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Progress toward providing assistance at the 2009 target level for performance in non-catastrophic disasters. Percentage of customer satisfaction with Individual Assistance disaster aid.	YES	90 percent	90 percent
Description: Percentage of customers of the Individual Assistance program that indicate they are satisfied with the program.			

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Progress toward providing assistance at the 2009 target level for performance in non-catastrophic disasters. Percentage of customer satisfaction with Public Assistance Program disaster aid.	YES	88 percent	91 percent
Description: Percentage of customers of the Public Assistance program that indicate they are satisfied with the program.			

Strategic Goal 6 - SERVICE

Serve the public effectively by facilitating lawful trade, travel and immigration.

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

To provide legal permanent residency information and benefits in a timely, accurate, consistent, courteous and professional manner; and preventing ineligible individuals from receiving immigration benefits.

Performance Measure:		Target	Actual
Average case processing time: Adjustment of status.	NO	21 months	33 months
Description: Aliens (including certain undocumented immigrants, temporary workers, foreign students and refugees) who wish to apply for lawful permanent residency and are already living in the United States may file an application for "adjustment of status" with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. The fiscal year 2003 target for average case processing time is no more than 21 months. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services long-term goal is to achieve a six-month average case processing time by fiscal year 2006.			

Explanation: The Department did not meet its target average of 21 months processing time for Adjustment of Status applications. The Department missed this target due to new responsibilities for protecting national security, assumed following September 11, 2001, which have continued to impact processing times. These responsibilities, while necessary to support the new balance of USCIS priorities, redirected already limited resources away from application processing and backlog reduction efforts. Additional responsibilities include registering and fingerprinting approximately 120,000 nationals from countries identified as potential threats already living in the United States for the National Student Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS); Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) checks, which were expanded to include all applications and are only valid for 35 days (if not adjudicated within timeframe they have to be repeated); and implementation of the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), which involved re-certification of schools and oversight of the program development, plus implementation of a more robust tracking system and associated training for adjudicators.

Several of these responsibilities had a one-time impact on production in that USCIS can now expect to regain the production capacity lost to those efforts (e.g., NSEERS). Others responsibilities, however, have become permanent, necessary additions to USCIS processes and thus will continue to impact USCIS' production capacity going forward (e.g., IBIS checks). Both the one-time and permanent additions to processing responsibilities resulted in significant losses of production capacity that will be carried as part of the application backlog for years to come.

Recommended Action: USCIS is working to modernize and increase its capacity through reengineering of processes, and development of new IT systems and mechanisms to more proactively interact with customers.

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

To provide citizenship and naturalization information and benefits in a timely, accurate, consistent, courteous, and professional manner; and preventing ineligible individuals from receiving naturalization benefits.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Average case processing time: Naturalization.		11 months	14 months
Description: Every applicant for naturalization (age 18 and over) must file an Application for Naturalization. The fiscal year 2003 average case processing time was targeted to be no more than 11 months. The Actual average case processing time is calculated by dividing the average of the past 12 months of cases completed into the number of pending applications at the end of September. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services long-term goal is to achieve a sixmonth average case processing time by fiscal year 2006.			

Explanation: The Department did not meet its target average of 11 months processing time for Naturalization applications. The Department missed this target due to new responsibilities for protecting national security, assumed following September 11, 2001, which have continued to impact processing times. These responsibilities, while necessary to support the new balance of USCIS priorities, redirected already limited resources away from application processing and backlog reduction efforts. Additional responsibilities include registering and fingerprinting approximately 120,000 nationals from countries identified as potential threats already living in the U.S. for the National Student Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS); Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) checks, which were expanded to include all applications and are only valid for 35 days (if not adjudicated within timeframe they have to be repeated); and implementation of the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), which involved re-certification of schools and oversight of the program development, plus implementation of a more robust tracking system and associated training for adjudicators.

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Recommended Action: USCIS is working to modernize and increase its capacity through reengineering of processes, and development of new IT systems and mechanisms to more proactively interact with customers.

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (Transferred Agency)

Performance Goal:

Adjudicate asylum and refugee applications in a timely, accurate, consistent and professional manner, and prevent ineligible individuals from receiving program benefits.

Performance Measure:	Met	Target	Actual
Complete 75 percent of reform referrals (at local offices) within 60 days of receipt. Description: Under the Asylum Reform, an asylum applicant is not eligible for Employment Authorization unless granted asylum, or if no negative decision is	YES	75 percent	83 percent
made within 180 days from the date of filing. In order to meet the 180-day time limit, the Service has to complete and transfer cases referred from the home office within 60 days, giving the court 120 days to complete the adjudication.			

Strategic Goal 7 - ORGANIZATIONAL EXCELLENCE

Value our most important resource, our people. Create a culture that promotes a common identity, innovation, mutual respect, accountability and teamwork to achieve efficiencies, effectiveness and operational synergies.

Performance goals and measures have been developed for use in the future to report for this Strategic Goal. As these goals and measures were not in existence until mid-fiscal year 2003, they did not meet the Office of Management and Budget's requirement for reporting in this year's *Performance and Accountability Report*. Performance goals and measures that align with Strategic Goal 7 are now in place and will be accounted for in the Department's fiscal year 2004 *Performance and Accountability Report*.

While performance goals and measures were not developed until after the Department of Homeland Security was created in March 2003, the Department has since launched an aggressive effort to institute management reforms through the establishment of ambitious performance goals and measures aimed at implementing the *President's Management Agenda*. For a better understanding of what the Department has accomplished in support of achieving Strategic Goal 7, please refer to the Implementing the *President's Management Agenda* section of this report.

Program Evaluations

The Department of Homeland Security is committed to making its programs effective and efficient. As part of our program assessment and evaluation process, we identify strengths and weaknesses of Department programs and take subsequent action to ensure continued effectiveness. During fiscal year 2003 numerous evaluations of the Department's programs were performed by the Office of the Inspector General and the General Accounting Office. Representative significant findings, by program, are summarized below.

Program:	Public Assistance Program
Evaluation:	February 2003
Conducted by:	Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Office of Inspector General (OIG)
Findings:	Moderately Effective FEMA's OIG audit report entitled "Measuring the Effectiveness of FEMA's Redesigned Public Assistance Process" assessed the redesign effort and its implementation status. The OIG reported that the redesign improved some areas of program delivery, including the development of standardized policies and procedures, and increased opportunities for State and local participation. The OIG also made 11 recommendations, with primary focus on two areas: the development of monitoring tools needed to evaluate the impact of the redesign, and the need to institute tracking and reporting systems to measure the impact of the changes on program effectiveness.

Program:	Aviation Passenger Screening Program
Evaluation:	Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and Implementation Issues (GAO-03-253)
Conducted by:	General Accounting Office (GAO)
Findings:	Effective The Registered Traveler Program is supported by stakeholders, but there are concerns that this will lead to new aviation security vulnerabilities. Decisions concerning key issues are needed prior to development and implementation of program.

Program:	U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Border Security Inspections and Trade Facilitation at Ports of Entry
Evaluation:	Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Homeland Security (GAO-03-102)
Conducted by:	General Accounting Office (GAO)
Findings:	Effective The new Border and Transportation Security Directorate faces considerable challenges and its success will require sustained attention from the new department's leadership. Challenges include improving different international mail and package inspections processes, ensuring that various illegal items, including weapons of mass destruction, do not enter the country in cargo containers at seaports, and acquiring a new import processing system. According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the inspection of incoming foreign mail remains largely a manual process that relies primarily on physical examination. One courier is working with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to pilot test an advance manifest system, a computerized database that receives cargo manifest information. The database will allow U.S. Customs and Border Protection to analyze incoming package information and make more informed decisions about what packages to inspect.

Program:	U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Passenger Screening Initiative
Evaluations:	 Impact of Personal Search Changes; Racial Profiling; Counterfeit ID; and United States Customs Service/Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Random Sample Inspectional Programs
Conducted by:	 Department of Treasury, Office of Inspector General; Department of Treasury, Office of Inspector General; General Accounting Office; and General Accounting Office
Findings:	1. Effective Customs personal search policies procedures and training appear reasonable. 2. Moderately Effective A comparative review of Treasury enforcement bureaus to guard against racial profiling. 3. Moderately Effective No recommendations on screening weaknesses in gaining entry into the United States. 4. Moderately Effective Customs and INS random inspection programs can be strengthened.

Program:	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Detention and Removal Program
Evaluation:	Removal of Aliens Issued Final Orders
Conducted by:	Department of Justice Office of Inspector General (OIG)
Findings:	Adequate The OIG reported that the INS remains effective at removing detained aliens but remains ineffective at removing non-detained aliens. The report identified that INS failed to implement corrective actions and continues to face the same problems reported in 1996.

Program:	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Investigations
Evaluations:	 Peer to Peer Networks Provide Ready Access to Child Pornography (GAO-03-351); Combating Child Pornography: Federal Agencies Coordinate Law Enforcement Efforts, but an Opportunity Exists for Further Enhancement (GAO-03-272); Export Enforcement: Numerous Factors Impaired Treasury's Ability to Effectively Enforce Export Controls (OIG-03-069); Florida Pilot Project, Delegation of Law Enforcement Authority
Conducted by:	 General Accounting Office (GAO); General Accounting Office (GAO); Department of Treasury Office of Inspector General (OIG); U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Investigations Headquarters staff
Findings:	1. Effective No recommendations 2. Effective No recommendations 3. Effective Recommendation to develop a license determination tracking system that provides Exodus Command Center (ECC) Management with meaningful, accurate information on ECC program results - rating 4 (corrective action in progress - testing phase) 4. Effective No recommendations



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