

## A READER'S GUIDE TO THE KOREAN WAR

A Review Essay by  
ALLAN R. MILLETT

Just which Korean War one reads about depends on what lessons the author intends to communicate, for the history of the war reeks with almost as much didacticism as blood. For an indictment of American and United Nations intentions and the conduct of the war, see Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, *The Unknown War: Korea* (New York: Pantheon, 1988). Their sympathy for the plight of Korea is justified, but their bias toward the communists is much less compelling. British authors have written significant books: David Rees, *Korea: The Limited War* (London: Macmillan, 1964); Callum A. MacDonald, *Korea: The War before Vietnam* (New York: The Free Press, 1986); and Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). These authors give short shrift to politics, but offer historical perspective and emotional distance. After publishing the above work, however, MacDonald drifted into the Halliday-Cumings camp of anti-American criticism in his subsequent articles.

John Toland and Clay Blair, two of America's most popular (in both senses of the term) military historians, have few reservations about the legitimacy of intervention or the Republic of Korea's right of self-defense. They are more interested in assessing U.S. military performance, however, individual as well as collective. Although Toland integrates South Korean and Chinese interviews to great effect, his focus is on the American effort. Blair's strengths are a knowledge of the 8<sup>th</sup> Army and a keen eye for operational



President-elect Eisenhower in Korea, 1952.

U.S. Army Military History Institute

matters and sharp characterization. The two books in question are John Toland, *In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950–1953* (New York: Morrow, 1991), and Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950–1953* (New York: Times Books, 1987).

Works by disgruntled critics of America, the Truman administration, and the Army have a place in a Korean War library. The key political jeremiad is I.F. Stone, *The Hidden History of the Korean War, 1950–1951* (Boston: Little Brown, 1952), which portrays Truman as the dupe of the sinister Asia First partisans at home and abroad, led by John Foster Dulles and Chiang Kai-shek. The military counterpart of Stone is T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: A Study of Unpreparedness* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), a sharp critique of American culture's weakening effect on soldiers and politics which was reprinted by the Army in 1993. A more recent book in the same genre is Bevan Alexander, *Korea: The First War We Lost* (New York: Hippocrene, 1986), and Joseph Goulden, *Korea: The Untold Story* (New York: Times Books, 1982), which is short on original information and insight. Robert Leckie's *Conflict: The History of the Korean War* (New York: Putnam, 1962) reflects an admiration for the American infantryman and support for the war. Burton I. Kaufman, *The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis,*

*Credibility, and Command* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), is a measured study of the Truman administration's conduct of the war.

Anthologies of informed, scholarly essays (sometimes mixed with good oral history) offer easy entrée to the issues. The best of a full field are edited by Francis H. Heller, *The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective* (Lawrence: Regent's Press of Kansas for the Harry S. Truman Library, 1977); Bruce Cumings, *Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943–1953* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983); William J. Williams, *A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World* (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1993); James I. Matray and Kim Chull-Baum, *Korea and the Cold War* (Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books, 1993); Nagai Yonosuke and Akira Iriye, *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Korean War Research Committee, War Memorial Service-Korea, *The Historical Reillumination of the Korean War* (Seoul: War Memorial Service, 1990); and James Cotton and Ian Neary, *The Korean War as History* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1989).

### Causes of the War

A Civil war—as Korea surely was—has internal and international dynamics and its own shifting sets of political actors, all of whom have agendas of their own. The Korean

Allan R. Millett is professor of history and Associate Director of the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University; he is the author of *Semper Fidelis: The History of the U.S. Marine Corps* and is working on a history of the Korean War.

War is no exception. It was one of many such wars in this century in which the "great powers" chose to make a smaller nation a battleground. Of course, small nations (often plagued with politicians with large ambitions and imaginations) are perfectly capable of enticing larger nations to help sway the local political balance against domestic rivals or other great powers. The Yi dynasty in Korea, for example, struggled to maintain its isolation and independence by playing the Chinese off against the Japanese, then appealed to Czarist Russia and the United States to protect it from its patrons. This too-clever but desperate bit of diplomacy resulted in two wars, the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, and thirty-five years of misery.

Just how much background one seeks is a matter of taste and time. There is ample reading: Carter J. Eckert, Lee Ki-Baik, Young Ick Lew, Michael Robinson, and Edward W. Wagner, *Korea: Old and New* (Seoul: Ilchokak, Publishers for the Korea Institute, Harvard University, 1990); George M. McCune and Arthur L. Grey, *Korea Today* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950); Choi Bong-Youn, *Korea—A History* (Rutland, Vt.: C.E. Tuttle Company, 1971); Donald Stone Macdonald, *The Koreans* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988); and Andrew C. Nahm, *Korea, Tradition and Transformation: A History of the Korean People* (Elizabeth, N.J.: Holly International, 1988).

Literature on Korean-American relations before 1950 stands as a monument to the power of after-the-fact wisdom. Nevertheless, the idea of a communist plot, orchestrated by Moscow, that fell on an innocent South Korea basking in peace and prosperity, must be relegated to the dustbin of history. Ravaged by forced participation in World War II, with an elite compromised by two generations which survived under Japanese rule, Korea was divided by more than occupying armies and the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel. It was caught between two modernizing movements,

tainted legitimacy, authoritarian instincts, romantic economic dreams, and a dedication to political victory and control over a unified Korea. Kim Il Sung or Syngman Rhee would have felt comfortable on the throne of the kings of Unified Shilla at Kyong-ju. For perspective on the trials before 1950, see Kwak Tae-Han, John Chay, Cho Soon-Sung, and Shannon McCune, editors, *U.S.-Korean Relations, 1882-1982* (Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1982).

Works notable for their successful effort to link U.S. foreign policy with Korean political history include James I. Matray, *The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985); Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); James Merrill, *Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989); William J. Stueck, Jr., *The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981); Charles M. Dobbs, *The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945-1950* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1981); and Lisle Rose, *Roots of Tragedy: The United States and the Struggle for Asia, 1945-1953* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976).

Whether regarded with awe or dismay (or both), an inquiry that stands alone for its ability to define the causes of the conflict is Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, vol. 1, *Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), and vol. 2, *The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). While Cumings may see wheels within wheels where none exist, and be a master of inference, he knows Korean politics and recoils from the cant of American politicians, generals, and diplomats. He is no admirer of the communists and especially Kim Il Sung, but his political bias prevents him from seeing any legitimacy in the anticommunist leadership in

South Korea, and he ignores the power of organized Christianity in the struggle for the soul of Korea. Also, Cumings has a limited understanding of the Armed Forces, so he often finds a malevolent purpose in simple bungling. While he writes too much, most of it is required reading.

The convoluted course of American diplomacy did not change in 1950. Arguments on the political direction of the war are found in Rosemary Foot, *The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), as well as in *A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990). Stueck's work on this aspect of the war is *The Necessary War: Korea, An International History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming 1995).

A major work by a Japanese scholar-journalist, Ryo Hagiwara, who covered North Korean politics for a Japanese communist newspaper, places the onus for initiating the 1950 invasion to Kim Il Sung. In *The Korean War: The Conspiracies by Kim Il Sung and MacArthur* (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju Press, 1993), he concluded that Pyongyang pursued a course of risky opportunism that assumed reluctant support from China and Russia.

Assessments of the literature are found in Rosemary Foot, "Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," *Diplomatic History*, vol. 15, no. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 411-31, and Judith Munro-Leighton, "A Postrevisionist Scrutiny of America's Role in the Cold War in Asia, 1945-1950," *Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, vol. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 73-98. In addition, see Keith D. McFarland, *The Korean War: An Annotated Bibliography* (New York: Garland, 1986). Two other valuable references are James I. Matray, editor, *Historical Dictionary of the Korean War* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991), and Harry G. Summers, *Korean War Almanac* (New York: Facts-on-File, 1990).



## U.S. Political Direction

After presiding over the end of World War II as an accidental President, Harry S. Truman certainly did not need another war but got one. His version of events is found in his two-volume *Memoirs* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955–56), a selective but vital account to understanding problems at home and abroad. Truman biographies abound in uneven quality: David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); Robert Donovan, *Tumultuous Years: the Presidency of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Norton, 1982); Richard F. Haynes, *The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973); Robert H. Ferrell, *Harry S. Truman and the Modern American Presidency* (Boston: Little Brown, 1983); Donald R. McCoy, *The Presidency of Harry S. Truman* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984); Bert Cochran, *Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1973); and William E. Pemberton, *Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer and Cold Warrior* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989).

Secretary of State Dean Acheson provided a personal interpretation of the war in *Present at the Creation*

(New York: Norton, 1969) and in an abridged account, *The Korean War* (New York: Norton, 1971). The standard biography of Acheson is Gaddis Smith, *Dean Acheson* (New York: Cooper Square, 1971), vol. 16 in the American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy series; see also Ronald L. McGlothlen, *Controlling the Waves: Dean Acheson and U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia* (New York: Norton, 1993), and Douglas Brinkley, editor, *Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

Accounts by other participants include U. Alexis Johnson and J. Olivarius McAllister, *The Right Hand of Power* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984), and Harold J. Noble, *Embassy at War* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975). The institutional participation of the Department of State must be gleaned from documents published in *The Foreign Relations of the United States of America*, a standard though controversial publications program; volumes covering the period of 1950 to 1953 total 29 and were published between 1976 and 1984. (National Security Council documents are contained in the National Security Archive.)

The basic study on American intervention is Glenn D. Paige, *The Korean Decision, June 24–30* (New York: The Free Press, 1968). Distressed by postwar Korean politics, Paige later denounced the book as too sympathetic to Truman and Acheson, but it remains a good work.

## Koreans on the War

Treatments of the war written by Koreans and translated into English reflect a wide range of perspectives—except of course in official (there is no other) accounts by North Korea. Among the South Korean sources, however, one can find various degrees of outrage over intervention, remorse over the role of the Koreans themselves in encouraging foreign intervention, deep sadness over the consequences of the war, pride and contempt over the military performance of Koreans, a tendency to see conspiracy everywhere, and a yearning for eventual unification, peace, economic well-being, and social justice. There is no consensus on how to accomplish these goals, only the certainty that war ruined hope of a better Korea for the balance of the century. The literature also reflects a search for innate order and the rule of law, against a pessimistic conclusion that politics knows no moral order. Among the more scholarly and insightful works by Korean scholars are Kim Myung-Ki, *The Korean War and International Law* (Clairmont, Calif.: Paige Press, 1991); Pak Chi-Young, *Political Opposition in Korea, 1945–1960* (Seoul: National University Press, 1980); Cheong Sung-Hwa, “Japanese-South Korean Relations under the American Occupation, 1945–1950” (doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa, 1988); Kim Chum-Kon, *The Korean War, 1950–1953* (Seoul: Kwangmyong, 1980); Kim Joung-Won A., *Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945–1972* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975); Kim Gye-Dong, *Foreign Intervention in Korea* (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth Publishing, 1993); Cho Soon-Sung, *Korea in World Politics, 1940–1950* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); and, in



U.S. Army Military History Institute



U.S. Army Military History Institute

Korean, Kim Yang-Myong, *The History of the Korean War* (Seoul: Ilshinsa, 1976).

Syngman Rhee is mythic in the depth of his failure and the height of his success, including keeping America involved in Korea, more or less on his terms. He succeeded where Chiang Kai-shek, Ferdinand Marcos, and Ngo Dinh Diem failed. Robert T. Oliver, Rhee's American advisor and information agent, wrote two admiring books noted for their conversations and speeches: Robert T. Oliver, *Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1955) and *Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960* (Seoul: Panmun Books, 1978). A less sympathetic view is found in Richard C. Allen, *Korea's Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait* (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1960). Rhee's political contemporaries, who often shifted between being rivals and supporters, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. An exception is Louise Yim, *My Forty Year Fight for Korea* (London: Gollancz, 1952). Collective portraits of Korea's civilian and military leaders are found in Lee Chong-Sik, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1963), and Kim Se-Jin, *The Politics of the Military Revolution in Korea* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971).

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's account is *The U.S. Imperialists Started the Korean War* (Pyongyang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1977). For general background, see Robert A. Scalapino and Lee Chong-Sik, *Communism in Korea*, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), and Suh Dae-Sook, *The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). For a biography of the late Great Supreme Leader, see Suh Dae-Sook, *Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) which is rich in data and insight. Expatriate North Korean officers discuss the war in Kim Chull Baum, editor, *The Truth About the Korean War* (Seoul: Eulyoo Publishing, 1991) along with Russian and Chinese participants.

Military Allies, Political Doubters

The study of political and military relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea is

not exactly a "black hole" in Korean War historiography, but it is certainly a gray crevice. Activities of the Military Advisory Group Korea (KMAG) are described in very measured terms by Robert K. Sawyer, *KMAG in War and Peace* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1962), which is largely silent on atrocities, corruption, nepotism, and incompetence in the ROK officer corps. Little of the work deals with the 1950-53 period and it ignores the impressive fighting ability of some ROK army units and the professionalism of some of its officers. Sawyer is also less than frank in discussing U.S. Army policies that crippled the ability of the ROK army to resist the Korean People's Army invasion from the North. How, for example, could a ROK division manage with no tanks and only one battalion of limited-range 105-mm howitzers? Some of these problems receive attention in Paik Sun-Yup, *From Pusan to Panmunjom* (Washington: Brassey's, 1992), the memoirs of an outstanding corps and division commander. Paik, however, and his brother Colonel Paik In-Yup are quiet on their past in the Japanese army and their dogged pursuit of the communist guerrillas in the South, 1948-1950. The late Chung Il-Kwon, another ROK army founder, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. Frustrations over nation-building are more directly addressed in Gene M. Lyons, *Military Policy and Economic Aid: The Korean Case, 1950-1953* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1961).

The American military of 1950-53, absorbed with its own problems of survival, showed little understanding of the greater agony of Korea, including a much-maligned South Korean army. But there is no longer any excuse for such insensitivity. A novel by Richard Kim and Donald K. Chung, *The Three Day Promise* (Tallahassee, Florida: Father and Son Publishing, 1989), relates a heart-rending story of family separation and ravaged dreams. The war is summarized in a work published by the Korean Ministry of National Defense, *The Brief History of ROK Armed Forces* (Seoul: Troop Information and



Education Bureau, 1986). Soldiers of the 8<sup>th</sup> Army could not avoid dealing with Koreans since many served in American units under the Korean Army Training with the U.S. Army (KATUSA) program, still in effect today, but often a haven for well-born conscripts who speak some English. An official history of the KATUSA program prepared by Richard Weinert and later revised by David C. Skaggs was published as "The KATUSA Experiment: The Integration of Korean Nationals into the U.S. Army, 1950–1965," in *Military Affairs*, vol. 38, no. 2 (April 1974), pp. 53–58.

## The Armed Forces

The body of literature on the strategic and operational performance of the Armed Forces in the Korean War is substantial and dependable, at least for operational concerns. Building on its commitment to a critical history in World War II, the military establishment worked with the same stubborn conviction that both the public and future generations deserved to know what happened in Korea and why. The products are generally admirable. For a big picture start with Doris Condit, *The Test of War, 1950–1953* (Washington: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988), the second volume in the History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense series. For the perspective on the Joint Chiefs see James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, vol. 3, *The Korean War* (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1979).

As one might expect, the Department of the Army went to work with a vengeance on the Korean War, but faded in the stretch. It produced an important policy volume: James F. Schnabel, *United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972). It published two theater-level operational titles: Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (1961), which covered the 8<sup>th</sup> Army and X Corps from June until late

November 1950, and Walter Hermes, Jr., *Truce Tent and Fighting Front* (1966), on the "stalemate" period from October 1951 to July 1953. The much-delayed tome by Billy Mossman, *Ebb and Flow* (1990), plugged the chronological gap from November 1950 to July 1951. The candor void is filled by Roy Appleman who dedicated his later years to writing tough-minded critiques, all published by the Texas A&M University Press: *East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea* (1987); *Escaping the Trap: The U.S. Army in Northeast Korea, 1950* (1987); *Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur* (1989); and *Ridgway Duels for Korea* (1990). His work is required reading for anyone interested in tactical expertise on cold weather and night operations. While Appleman does not quite supersede S.L.A. Marshall, *The River and the Gauntlet* (New York: Morrow, 1953) or *Pork Chop Hill* (New York: Morrow, 1956), he shares the battlefield. So does Shelby Stanton with *America's Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1989), which resurrects the reputation of LTG Edward M. Almond, USA, a commander who was endowed with intelligence and skill yet cursed by a wretched personality. Battle books of the coffeetable variety abound. For a detached analysis, see Russell A. Gugeler, *Combat Actions in Korea* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954; reissued in 1970 and 1987).

The official Marine history is Lynn Montross et al., *History of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950–1953*, 5 vols. (Washington: Historical Branch, G–3, Headquarters, Marine Corps, 1954–1972), which covers the experience of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division and 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force Pacific. Of other semi-official Marine Corps books the best is Robert D. Heinl, *Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968).

The Navy published a one-volume official history: James A. Field, Jr., *History of United States Naval Operations Korea* (Washington: Director of Naval History, 1962); but two officers with line experience in World War II produced an earlier

and livelier account: Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, *The Sea War in Korea* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1957). Naval aviation receives special treatment in Richard P. Hallion, *The Naval Air War in Korea* (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing, 1986).

The Air Force published one large monograph on the Korean War, the literary equivalent of a one-megaton blast with endless fallout: Robert F. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953*, revised edition (Washington: Office of the Chief of Air Force History, 1983), which is encyclopedic on the Air Force's effort to win the war alone and too coy about the actual results. Recent anthologies from the Office of Air Force History on the uses of combat aviation include essays on air superiority, strategic bombing, and close air support in Korea, but their modification of Futrell will be slow.

Books by or about senior American leaders are generally well done and show how wedded these officers were to World War II norms. Two Army officers of high repute wrote histories of the war: J. Lawton Collins, *War in Peacetime* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), and Matthew B. Ridgway, *The Korean War* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967). But larger shadows blur the Collins-Ridgway war: Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall, Statesman, 1945–1959* (New York: Viking, 1987); D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur, Triumph and Disaster, 1945–1964* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985); and Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983). D. Clayton James with Anne Sharp Wells, *Refighting the Last War: Command and Crises in Korea, 1950–1953* (New York: The Free Press, 1993), argues that World War II spoiled generals and distorted understanding of such concepts as proportionality and the relationship between ends and means. Limited war did not suit the high commanders of the 1950s, but only MacArthur challenged Truman's policy. This cautionary tale remains best told in John W. Spanier, *The*

*Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1959). For naval leaders, see Robert W. Love, Jr., editor, *The Chiefs of Naval Operations* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980). The view from the top of the Air Force is found in Phillip S. Meilinger, *Hoyt S. Vandenberg* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989).

## Logistics and Coalition Warfare

Korea provided an early test of whether the Armed Forces could support a limited war coalition expeditionary force and extemporize a regional, long-term base system at the same time. The answer, with many qualifications, was yes. The global picture (for one service) is described in James A. Huston, *Outposts and Allies: U.S. Army Logistics in the Cold War, 1945-1953* (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1988). A more detailed account of the combat theater by the same author is *Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War* (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1989). An earlier study is John G. Westover, *Combat Support in Korea* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955). The best place to start the study of Korean War manpower and materiel mobilization is Terrence J. Gough, *U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War* (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1987). There are no comparable separate logistical histories for other services whose historians dealt with such matters as part of operational histories.

## The Allies

The political environment on Korean affairs at the United Nations is found in the works of Stueck (see above); Yoo Tae-Hoo, *The Korean War and the United Nations* (Louvain, Belgium: Librairie Desbarax, 1965); and Leon Gordenker, *The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea: The Politics of Field Operations, 1947-1950* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959).

At the height of the war the U.N. Command included ground



U.S. Army Military History Institute

forces from fourteen countries excluding the United States. Nineteen nations offered to send ground combat units as part of the U.S. 8<sup>th</sup> Army, but four proposed contributions were too little, too late. Three infantry divisions offered by the Chinese Nationalist government fell in another category: too large, too controversial. The largest non-U.S. contribution was the Commonwealth Division, organized in 1951 from British army battalions and similar units from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The smallest were companies from Luxembourg and Cuba. The ground forces included a Canadian brigade, Turkish brigade, New Zealand artillery regiment, and reinforced battalions from France, Thailand, Ethiopia, Belgium, Australia, Colombia, and the Netherlands. The force reveals a careful political and geographic balance: contingents from Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Air and naval forces were similarly reinforced. Eight navies and four air arms deployed combat elements while eight nations sent air and sea transport. Six nations sent medical units, five of which (Denmark, India, Italy, Norway, and Sweden) provided only medical assistance.

Since the limited size of non-U.S. and non-ROK contingents precluded them from having a great impact on the operational course of the war, their participation has been largely ignored in the United States. The exception is the dramatic participation of one or other units in a specific battle, for example, 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, which fought to the last bullet and trumpet call on the Imjin River in April 1951. This approach overlooks the potential lessons about coalition warfare represented in U.N. Command. It also ignores the useful exercise of seeing one's military practices through the eyes of allies, in this case nations that sent their best and toughest soldiers to Korea for experience. To honor them Korea published short accounts in English of these national military contingents: Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, *The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War*, 6 vols. (Seoul: War History Compilation Commission, 1975). The battlefields of Korea also have excellent monuments (many erected by Korea) to U.N. forces. The United States has made no comparable effort to recognize these forces, many of which were more effective given their size than comparable American



units. (For example, the most vulnerable corridor into the Han River valley was defended in 1952 and 1953 by the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division and Commonwealth Division.) Most American treatments of foreign contributions, such as they are, are incorporated in U.S. organizational histories.

The Commonwealth Division experience provides the most accessible account of service with the 8<sup>th</sup> Army and only muted criticism of the high command. The British history was written by a member of 1<sup>st</sup> Glousters, an esteemed general and able historian, Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley. His books are *The British Part in the Korean War*, vol. I, *A Distant Obligation* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1990) and vol. II, *An Honourable Discharge* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1994). They supersede C.N. Barclay's *The First Commonwealth Division: The Story of British Commonwealth Land Forces in Korea, 1950–1953* (Aldershot, U.K.: Gale and Polden, 1954). Other accounts include Norman Bartlett, *With the Australians in Korea* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1954); Robert O'Neill, *Australia in the Korean War*, 2 vols. (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1981 and 1985); Herbert Fairlie Wood, *Strange Battleground: The Official History of the Canadian Army in Korea* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery,

1966); Historical Section, General Staff, Canadian Army, *Canada's Army in Korea* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1956); and Tim Carew, *Korea: the Commonwealth at War* (London: Cassell, 1967). For an insightful review, see Jeffrey Grey, *The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988). An ambitious effort to integrate national history and the war is Ian McGibbon's *New Zealand and the Korean War*, vol. I, *Politics and Diplomacy* (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992) with a volume on operations to follow. Dennis Stairs, *The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) is a comparable work. On naval cooperation, see Thor Thorgrimsson and E.C. Russell, *Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters, 1950–1953* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965).

## Russia and the War

From the beginning there were the Soviets—until they were written out of the history of the Korean War by their own hand and by those Western historians who could not identify a bear even if he was eating out of one's garbage can. The Soviet Union may not have started the war, but it certainly gave it a big bear hug and embraced it past Stalin's death and a period of détente in the mid-1950s. The collapse of the Soviet

Union has reopened the issue of Russian connivance and collaboration, bolstered by tantalizing glimpses of communist internally-oriented histories and supporting documents. Retired Russian generals and diplomats have become regular participants in Korean War conferences, but Russian histories are not translated or widely available to Western scholars with the requisite language skills. Nevertheless, the Russian role as sponsor continues to receive clarification and is not diminished. Early plans emerge in Eric Van Ree, *Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945–1947* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). Most recent admissions and revelations come from Soviet veterans who have talked to the media or participated in international conferences, including pilots and air defense specialists. Documentary evidence has come primarily from Communist Party and foreign ministry archives. Material from the armed forces and KGB has been limited. Few documents have been translated and published, although Kathryn Weathersby, a Russian historian at Florida State University, has taken up the grail of translation and interpretation through the *Bulletin* of the Cold War International History Project and working papers which have been issued by Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars in Washington. The British scholar Jon Halliday has also been active in interviewing Russian veterans.

Much of Moscow's involvement is found in works on Sino-Soviet relations primarily interpreted from a Chinese perspective. Two titles in this genre are Robert R. Simmons, *The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow, and the Politics of the Korean War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), and Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993).

## China and the War

The recent release or leakage of Chinese sources, especially the war-time correspondence of Mao Zedong, has resulted in a new wave of scholarship by Hao Zrifan, Zhai Zhihai,



LTG Matthew B. Ridgway, USA.

U.S. Army Military History Institute



F-86 Sabre fighters saw their first action in December 1950.

U.S. Air Force

Chen Jian, and Michael Hunt in both article and essay form. These scholars add texture to such earlier works as Joseph Camilleri, *Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and Its Aftermath* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980); Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China: 1941-1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); and Melvin Gurtov and Byoong-Mao Hwang, *China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).

One result of international collaboration on exploring the conflict between the United States and China is Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, editors, *Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1989). A critical view of the People's Liberation Army is found in Zhang Shu-gang, *Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, forthcoming 1995), based largely on a self-assessment. Three Western works of lasting value are Alexander L. George, *The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and Its Aftermath* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (New York: Macmillan, 1960); and Walter A. Zelman, *Chinese Intervention in the Korean War* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967). For a face of battle account of

PLA struggles in the winter of 1950-51, see Russell Spurr, *Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea, 1950-1951* (New York: Henry Holt, 1988), which is based on interviews with veterans.

## Aftermath

Finally, the impact of the war is discussed with care in the anthologies by Heller and Williams cited earlier. Also see the work edited by Lee Chae-Jin, *The Korean War: A 40-Year Perspective* (Claremont, Calif.: Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, 1991). One beneficiary of the war was Japan—or at least those Japanese political groups allied to America, capitalism, and the social status quo. War-fueled prosperity and the diminished ardor for social reform is captured in Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989), and Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, vol. 2 (Spring 1993), is dedicated to "The Impact of the Korean War" with essays on Korea, China, Japan, and the United States. **JFQ**

## GETTING TO KNOW JOMINI

A Book Review by  
MICHAEL D. KRAUSE

The Art of War  
by Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini,  
with a new introduction  
by Charles Messenger  
Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1992.  
410 pp. \$35.00  
[ISBN 1-85367-119-3]

If one sampled a group of officers today about the influence of Jomini, few would respond with any real insight. This is peculiar since many concepts and terms (such as logistics, lines of communication, and structure of military organization) are based on his work. By contrast, the name of Clausewitz is instantly recognized, and his trinity—government, military, and people—as well as the center of gravity, friction, and fog of war are widely held tenets of military theory. Moreover, his views on the objectives and conduct of war are well known. One can readily discern the Clausewitzian hand in the concept of defense over offense as well as in the culminating point of offensive operations. The aphorism "war is the continuation of policy by other means" is a widely held article of faith. All of this makes Clausewitz the leading theorist of war in American military circles.

Jomini, however, is relatively unknown despite the fact that his ideas are implicit in military structure and doctrine. *Précis de l'Art de Guerre (The Art of War)* appeared in Paris in 1838 and was reprinted *augmentée d'un appendice* in 1855. The English translation under review here, which has an introduction by Charles Messenger, is a facsimile edition. When it was first published in 1862 tactics as taught at West Point

Colonel Michael D. Krause, USA (Ret.), is a defense analyst and has taught military history at both the National War College and the U.S. Military Academy.



were largely derived from this book and it was said that every Union and Confederate commander rode into battle with a sword in one hand and a copy of Jomini in the other.


Antoine de Jomini (1779–1869), a Swiss of French extraction, joined Napoleon's army as a volunteer aide-de-camp to Marshal Ney during the Austerlitz campaign. He had earlier served on the Swiss general staff and commanded a brigade. His four-volume *Traité des Grandes Opérations Militaires* brought him to Ney's attention. Appointed a colonel by Napoleon, Jomini earned many honors including a barony. He was Ney's chief of staff in Spain and gained the rank of general in the French and Russian armies, a conflict of interest that excused him from the disastrous Russian campaign. Later he was made an aide-de-camp to the Czar and devoted himself to establishing a staff college in Moscow before retiring to write. He was recalled to St. Petersburg as an advisor to the Czar during the Crimean War and subsequently returned to France where he lived out his days.

When rumors of renewed war with Prussia spread in 1806, Jomini had predicted that the enemy would advance through the Erzgebirge pass at Hof. He advised Napoleon to concentrate his forces at Bamberg, a short distance away, and prepare for a counteroffensive. When Napoleon asked how he could be certain of the enemy's intentions, Jomini reputedly said that he had studied the map of Europe and read history. This advice aroused Bonaparte to amass his troops, take the offensive, catch the Prussians before they could assemble, and crush them at Jena and Auerstadt. Jomini was at Jena as was Karl von Clausewitz; the former epitomized the practical and scientific approach to war and the latter represented the theoretical.

Jomini gained wide acceptance because of his distillation of the history of war into practical principles.

Moreover, his ideas on the military instrument were adopted in the United States. Like Sun Tzu's five conditions for victory, Jomini identified twelve for an effective military instrument. He wrote at a time of intense upheaval as the French Revolution and Napoleonic era spawned the start of modern war. Europe remained continuously in conflict between 1789 and 1815. Empires and kingdoms rose and fell; millions fought and tens of thousands died. New means of harnessing military power were forged and states that failed to grasp them were destroyed. Jomini and Clausewitz witnessed these events and contrasted Napoleonic warfare with the limitations of the Frederician style of war.

In his treatise on practical application, *The Art of War*, Jomini stipulates that an effective military must have a good recruiting system, organization, and national reserves. Reserves should be able to double as standing forces. Increases in potential necessitate quick and dramatic means of organization vis-à-vis order of battle—from company level to corps—and a structure to govern and support forces. There also must be a recruitment system, either voluntary or compulsory, based on a national consensus and a commitment to defend the state. The military must be provisioned and then sustained in battle. Jomini's term for this, logistic support, is familiar. By contrast, Clausewitz divorced logistics from the conduct of war.



Antoine de Jomini

One basic aspect of an effective military is superiority in weaponry: "... armament is still susceptible of great improvement; the state which takes the lead in making them will secure great advantage. The means of destruction are approaching perfection with frightful rapidity." Jomini warned that the quantity-quality equation might offer advantages but cannot assure victory: "The superiority of armament may increase the chances of success in war: it does

not, of itself, gain battles, but it is a great element of success."

Another condition for an effective military is doctrine, which Jomini characterized as "good combat, staff, and administrative instructions." He grounded his ideas about doctrine in history. In addition, he indicated that engineers and artillerymen needed to interact on doctrinal matters and recognized the technological complexity of engineering and gunnery.

Jomini viewed a general staff—though not the German model—as applying principles on the battlefield. Inherent in his approach was a staff officer well versed in both theory and practice, a concept that runs throughout his work and that influenced many military institutions. On the functions of a general staff he stated: "In times of peace [it] should be employed in labor preparatory for all possible contingencies of war. Its archives should be furnished with all statistical, geographical, topographical, and strategic treatises and papers for the present and future." Operational plans must be drawn up to prepare for all possible contingencies. In short, nothing should be omitted by the general staff in readying for conflict. Jomini refers to a chain of "command . . . directing the principle operations of war." He also outlined a system for selecting theater commanders.

In sum, his conditions for an effective military instrument call for:

- ▼ thorough recruitment
- ▼ sound organization
- ▼ national reserves
- ▼ combat, staff, and administrative instructions (doctrine)
- ▼ discipline, punctuality, and subordination based on conviction
- ▼ well developed rewards
- ▼ thoroughly trained engineers and artillery
- ▼ superior armaments
- ▼ general staff officers with a theoretical and practical education
- ▼ commissaries, hospitals, and general administration
- ▼ a system of assigning command and directing principle operations of war
- ▼ means "to excite and keep alive the military spirit of the people."

Such conditions are measures of institutional, technological, doctrinal, educational, theoretical, and leadership development in our view of military history. There is also a strong case to be made for the primacy of Jomini's ideas in all areas of our military in theory and practice.

Jomini originated the idea of principles of war that were adapted by the American military. He said that if force is applied at the right time, in the right place, and in the right way, success follows. One principle underpins operations: "... [throwing] by strategic movement the mass of one's army at the decisive point of a theater of war; and also upon the communications of the enemy and as much as possible without compromising one's own ... to engage a fraction of the enemy army with the mass of one's own ... to engage the enemy line at the most critical juncture [and] critical time and with ample energy." This work makes a practical appeal to military history.

Jomini and Clausewitz witnessed a revolution in military affairs (RMA), change in military structure that harnessed the people in defense of the nation. Furthermore, Napoleon's contribution in terms of organization was the corps. This was revolutionary because a corps included infantry, cavalry, artillery, and support elements in a coherent organization that could fight unaided against superior forces and march 15–20 miles a day. A corps moved from one location to another with alacrity and assurance. This enabled Napoleon to plan operations and then campaign with mutually supporting forces for simultaneous action at points of concentration which yielded decisive results. Recruiting, training, and equipping were based on *levee en masse*. These organizational changes revolutionized the conduct of operations. The dominance of maneuver was restored to accomplish decisive results in battle. And battles won campaigns which, in turn, gained the objective of war: an opponent's will. Both Jomini and Clausewitz wrote guides to this RMA.

Amphibious operations are categorized by Jomini as descents, which rank "among the most difficult in war when in presence of a well prepared enemy." He also points out the joint nature of this effort: "Since the invention of gunpowder and the changes effected by it in navies ... an army can make descent only with the assistance of a numerous fleet of ships of war which command the sea, at least until the debarkation of the army takes place." Such advice must have influenced the selection of beachheads in World War II. "Deceive the enemy as to the point of landing, choose a spot where the vessels may anchor in safety and the troops land together; infuse as much activity as possible into the operation, and take possession of some strong point to cover the development of the troops as they land; put on shore at once a part of the artillery." For the German defenders of Normandy he seems to have added: "I can only advise the party on the defensive not to divide his forces too much by attempting to cover every point. ... Signals should be arranged for giving prompt notice of the point where the enemy is landing, and all the disposable force should be rapidly concentrated there, to prevent his gaining a firm foothold ... an army landing upon a coast should always keep its principal mass in communication with the shore ... first care should be to make sure of the possession of one fortified harbor, or at least of a tongue of land which is convenient to a good anchorage. ..."

Clausewitz, who was chief of staff to General Scharnhorst at Jena when Jomini faced him, foresaw disaster in the Prussian campaign plan with its lack of unity of effort and command. He was resolved to discover why Prussia was so severely defeated by France and, in so doing, he wrote *On War*, which was published as an incomplete work by his widow in 1831. But Jomini wrote for another thirty years and became the more practical thinker, which appealed to American military minds.

Why is Jomini almost eclipsed by Clausewitz? To claim that he was right and Clausewitz was wrong on key issues is to suggest that one man's theory bested the other's. Clausewitz was indeed wrong to divorce the conduct of war from logistics. Jomini saw logistics—getting forces to a theater or battle—as vital to commanders and the outcome. In coining the term logistics he asked if it was simply a science of detail. In discussing what logistics meant previously (march orders, laying out camps), he provided an all-encompassing way to set an army in motion, and to get it to a new location, while maintaining maneuver momentum. He cited what must be done "in harmony and concert" to support a commander's concept of operations. Jomini brought together logistics and operations in a revolutionary way so that today deploying and sustaining forces are central to a successful campaign. Jomini conceived of national military organizations in practical terms while Clausewitz advanced his trinity. Both men used history and recognized the RMA of their day as fundamental to the conduct of war. Jomini was not a philosopher but his views are imbedded in American military culture whereas Clausewitz has only recently gained ascendancy in this country. It is therefore an irony that Clausewitz is well known and Jomini remains virtually obscure.

In sum Jomini is practical in the way he advocates art in war. His basic principle is to mass force at the right point, at the right time, and in the right way so that the outcome will be decisive. Logistics is an integral part of the military equation. If you read Clausewitz, do not neglect Jomini. He is a must for every student of joint warfighting. Invest in *The Art of War*.

JFQ



## JOINT IN SPITE OF THEMSELVES

A Book Review by


BRIAN R. SULLIVAN

Most Americans would agree that the Nation needs a powerful Navy. But even advocates disagree sharply over its size, shape, and functions. For a century, such disputes involved more than academic arguments or bureaucratic squabbles. They ultimately determined the way the Navy prepared for war and the outcome of battles waged by its sailors and their ships. In *One Hundred Years of Sea Power*, George Baer tells the story of the modern Navy by explaining the theories on which it was built and the consequences of those theories in the six major wars since 1898.

The author is an eminent historian and a fine writer; but *One Hundred Years of Sea Power* benefits in particular from what he has learned as chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College, where so much of our naval theory has been developed and tested. The book not only demonstrates a deep understanding of the thinking that has propelled the Navy over the last century but does so in a vivid, clear, and exciting way. Despite his evident sympathy for the men who charted the Navy's course, however, Baer does not hesitate to point out the failures in their theory. In fact, the core of the book is a critique of the patron saint of the Naval War College as well as the intellectual father of the modern Navy, Alfred Thayer Mahan.

Mahan was not an intellectual cast among sea dogs, but an articulate advocate of commonly-held ideas on seapower shared by senior officers and Navy Department officials in the late 1880s. To sway both

SH-3 Sea King landing on USS Barry in the Arabian Gulf.



U.S. Navy (Craig McClure)

### One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990

by George W. Baer

Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.

553 pp. \$42.50

[ISBN 0-8047-2273-0]

the public and Congress, he wrote *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*, which was published in 1890. It became the most powerful work written on the purpose of naval forces. While the book appeared to be a history of Britain's rise to world primacy through seapower, Mahan used the story of the Royal Navy in the age of sail to argue for an American naval policy in the age of steam. To be a global power, he strongly suggested, the Nation needed a large force of battleships to defend its shores. In time of war, this concentrated battle fleet would take offensive action against an enemy fleet, defeat it or drive it into harbor, and control the sea. Obviously, that required the building and maintenance of a battle fleet in peacetime.

*The Influence of Sea Power* appealed to a readership ready to be persuaded. Congress had already approved the first two modern American battleships in 1886 and it authorized construction of another three even more powerful ships in 1890. These and the cruisers ordered with them gave the Navy the force it needed to smash the Spanish fleets in Manila Bay and outside Santiago harbor in 1898. As a result, the United States acquired an empire and status as a world power. Mahan's

theories seemed vindicated by success in war.

After former Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt entered the White House in September 1901, Mahan's thought became government policy. While disagreeing with Mahan over details, the new President agreed on the prime importance of battleships, the need to keep the battle fleet concentrated in war, and its use as an offensive weapon. Indeed, as Baer points out, Roosevelt's major motivation to build the Panama Canal was to allow the unification of the battle fleet for war, since in peace it was divided as a precaution between the Atlantic and Pacific.

The American emphasis on battleships increased as a result of the Royal Navy's creation of the all-big-gun *Dreadnought* in 1905-06. In fact, the Navy had already considered such a ship but delayed construction until plans were perfected. When Roosevelt left office, the United States had laid down six dreadnoughts and set a pattern of authorizing two battleships per year indefinitely. By the outbreak of World War I, America had the world's third largest battleship fleet.

President Woodrow Wilson's insistence on strict neutrality conflicted with the desire of the naval leadership for readiness. But the

Brian R. Sullivan is a member of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. He has taught military history at the Naval War College and Yale University.

President, naval leaders, and Congress agreed to the Naval Act of 1916 as the best way to protect freedom of the seas, regardless of the outcome of the war. The 1916 act projected a gigantic five-year building program of 156 ships, including sixteen huge battleships and battle cruisers, to make the Navy the most powerful in the world by 1922–23.

Mahan's stress on the primacy of the battleship had been criticized by other naval thinkers for years. Critics said that the Navy needed light craft, especially for operations in the Caribbean, but that Congress had been mistakenly convinced by Mahan to fund a navy top heavy with capital ships. Experience during World War I seemed to support such criticism. The struggle the Navy actually had to wage bore no resemblance to that envisioned by Mahan. The German High Seas Fleet had already been driven into port by the Royal Navy. As a result, no American battleship fired a single broadside in anger in 1917–18.

Germany contested control of the Atlantic with U-boats. Instead of offensive fleet actions, the Navy fought to gain sea control in partnership with the Royal Navy by defensive troop convoy protection, patrolling by light anti-submarine craft, and mine laying. It had not occurred to Mahan that, despite defeating its surface fleet, an enemy might contest control of the seas by other means. Yet advances in technology made ideas about seapower based on 18<sup>th</sup> century models obsolete.

Just before the November 1918 armistice, Wilson and his naval advisors agreed to augment the battle fleet by an additional 16 capital ships. They considered the naval events of 1917–18 an aberration. The goal of the new building program was to ensure American strategic independence in the postwar world through battleship superiority over Britain and Japan. Such plans did not long survive. In 1921, President Warren Harding and Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes decided to avoid a post-war arms race by proposing world disarmament. They could hardly offer to reduce American land armaments in return

for similar reductions by foreign powers. The Army was far too small for such a pledge to have meaning; but the Navy was large and growing.

Hughes opened the Washington disarmament conference in 1921 by advocating that most battleships should be scrapped, plans for new battleship construction canceled, parity in British and U.S. battleships established, and smaller ratios for other powers set. The conference agreed and the Washington Treaty followed. But the accord did not restrict submarines and America held the right to build 135,000 tons of aircraft carriers. Over the next sixteen years, the Navy received little funding for construction because of treaty limits, isolationism, lack of a perceived threat, and the Great Depression. But it built two large aircraft carriers in the 1920s, *USS Lexington* and *USS Saratoga*, based on the hulls of uncompleted battle cruisers. The fleet problems of 1929 and 1930 proved carriers to be more versatile than battleships. Taking advantage of the balance of the 135,000 tons allowed for carrier construction, Congress authorized four more by 1935.

The Navy probably had its greatest friend ever in Franklin Roosevelt, who like his cousin Theodore also had been an Assistant Secretary of the Navy. But it was not until 1938 that Japan's aggression in China combined with rejection of the Washington Treaty persuaded the President and Congress to authorize a larger navy. In response to a growing sense of danger, three construction bills passed in 1938–40. As planners designed a balanced fleet, the emphasis was on battleships and carriers. But the Navy also ordered over a hundred fleet submarines, designed to attack large warships. With these appropriations, the Navy was able to get about any type of ship it wanted.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor crippled much of the battle fleet that had survived the Washington Treaty. Out of necessity the Navy turned to carriers and submarines for offensive operations.

Both types of ships won notable victories, carriers earlier and spectacularly, starting at Midway; submarines later but just as importantly by strangling Japan's home islands in 1944–45. In the Atlantic, the Navy helped win a second, longer struggle against German U-boats. But in the Atlantic as well as the Pacific, the war showed that American naval experiences in 1917–18 were not an aberration. Contrary to Mahan's ideas, the Navy conducted joint campaigns in both oceans, particularly in support of gigantic amphibious operations. It was the Japanese navy that fought an independent naval war based on Mahan's principles and suffered crushing defeats.

Among other reasons, it was the extraordinary flexibility of aircraft carriers that persuaded the naval leadership to make them the centerpiece of the post-war Navy. Carrier air could attack enemy fleets, as at the Coral or Philippine Seas, and they could sink submarines, protect convoys, support amphibious landings, strike land targets, shoot down planes, and provide reconnaissance, all at ranges and speeds beyond anything possible for battleships. These capabilities also assumed political importance since no enemy navies survived the war. At the time, the Soviet navy could offer only feeble coastal defense and other navies of significance were allied to the United States. Under such circumstances, control of the seas by America and its allies seemed a given even after the start of the Cold War. But carriers could perform many tasks besides sea control.

The Navy struggled through a difficult period between World War II and Korea, however, thanks to the advent of the atomic bomb and long range jet bombers. With no serious naval rival to prepare against, and pushed aside in perceived importance by the Air Force, the Navy attempted to define a role around atomic weapons. Naval leaders proposed supercarriers large enough to launch bombers on nuclear strikes against Soviet targets. But President Harry Truman denied the Navy supercarrier. To add insult to injury,



Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson proclaimed amphibious operations obsolete. In the first years of Truman's administration, the Navy shrank to one-fifth of its size on V-J Day. In 1950, what did the United States need a Navy for?

The Korean War provided the answer by indicating the effectiveness of naval operations in limited conflicts against allies of continental powers like the Soviet Union and China. In particular, the Korean peninsula, surrounded on three sides by water, allowed carrier air to strike anywhere that land-based air could. The landings at Inchon and Wonsan and the evacuation from Hungnam proved that amphibious operations were not only feasible but effectual. The success of carriers created increased support for supercarriers. *USS Forrestal*, authorized in 1952, was the first in a line of huge carriers that the Navy will receive into the next century.

Developments in submarine technology provided the Navy with another purpose. In 1955, the first nuclear submarine, *USS Nautilus*, became operational. Able to remain under water for months rather than hours, nuclear submarines provided enormous potential for undersea warfare. For example, as *USS Nautilus* went into service, the Navy began work on larger submarines capable of launching intermediate range ballistic missiles. The first Polaris entered service in 1960 and the Navy gained a central role in strategic nuclear deterrence. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, the Navy had undergone a great revival, with two types of warships contending for the central role of capital ship.

For reasons of sea control, supercarriers—not ballistic missile submarines—provided the Navy's capital ships. By the 1960s aviators had come to dominate the service. Naval participation in Vietnam accentuated this trend by giving prominence to carrier strike operations over the North. Using tactical naval aviation to carry out a strategic bombing campaign created enormous strains on the Navy's air wing. Furthermore, the commitment of naval resources to that aspect of the

Vietnam War deprived riverine and coastal interdiction operations of the requisite support. Naval activities in Vietnam bore little resemblance to Mahan's notions about the proper use of American seapower; but his influence lived on in the Navy's emphasis on capital ship operations.

The Soviet navy expanded significantly in the 1970s and 1980s. After Vietnam, the Navy focused on that threat. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, the Chief of Naval Operations in 1970–74, tried to reorient the service from carriers and submarines to a mixture of frigates, light helicopter carriers, patrol boats, and air-cushion skimmers to deal with the growing Soviet submarine fleet. Zumwalt believed the eighty year-old doctrinal stress on offensive strikes into enemy waters by capital ships had been rendered obsolete by missiles, tactical nuclear weapons, and high-performance aircraft. He proposed cruise missiles for strike operations but failed to get support from inside or outside the Navy. Instead, during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations, the Navy scrapped its last World War II construction but laid down few replacements. Successive Presidents expected a war with the Soviets to be either a strategic nuclear exchange or a short, intense land war in Europe. Aside from ballistic missile submarines, the Navy could play little role in either case. For the first time since Mahan, the Navy had lost the support of both the public and politicians.

In the late 1970s, naval leadership developed a concept for employment in a war against the Soviet Union known as maritime strategy. As Baer notes, its purpose was to create a coherent war plan, build a consensus in the Navy, and regain public support. In 1985 maritime strategy was presented to Congress and made public the next year. This strategy proposed an immediate naval offensive against the Soviets if war broke out to shape the conflict into a protracted, non-nuclear struggle on a global scale. With the support of President Ronald Reagan and

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman asked Congress for a 600-ship navy with heavy emphasis on carriers, attack submarines, and amphibious ships to back maritime strategy. Congress gave Lehman most of the ships he requested.

In effect, the Navy reintroduced the ideas of Mahan with the capabilities of the late 1980s. It presented the Nation a strategic plan that, if accepted, would have made the Navy the foremost service, free to wage independent war as advanced in the era of Theodore Roosevelt. But though the service got the majority of ships it wanted and regained public support, it ultimately failed to persuade national leaders of the wisdom of maritime strategy. To replace nuclear deterrence with a doctrine based on a war of attrition that could escalate into nuclear war seemed much too risky. In any event, as the Soviet threat collapsed in 1989–91, so did the rationale for maritime strategy.

The Persian Gulf War allowed the Navy to play an important if secondary role. The crisis presented it with a mission to justify its existence after the virtual disappearance of its Soviet rival from the high seas. The following year the Navy issued a white paper entitled . . . *From the Sea*, a basic shift from open-ocean warfighting *on* the sea toward joint operations conducted *from* the sea. As Baer observes: "In 1992 the U.S. Navy, after one hundred years, closed its book on seapower doctrine in the image of Mahan. For how long remained to be seen."

*One Hundred Years of Sea Power* tells a complex story in an exciting way. By examining the history of the modern Navy in detail, it explains how and why the service struggled so hard to preserve its independence. Baer's book makes equally clear why the Navy has finally embraced jointness. Naval officers should read this book for a better appreciation of their service; officers of other services should read it to understand why the United States needs a navy.

JFQ

## A NOTE TO READERS AND CONTRIBUTORS

**DISTRIBUTION:** *JFQ* is published four times each year for officers of the Armed Forces. One copy is distributed for every two officers on active duty assigned to joint billets and one copy for every four majors/lieutenant commanders and lieutenant colonels/commanders across all the services.

Copies are distributed to the field and fleet through respective service channels. Corrections in shipping instructions, quantities received, and addresses for service distribution should be directed to the appropriate activity listed below.

▼ **ARMY**—Contact the installation Publications Control Officer or write to the U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, Maryland 21220-2896 (reference Misc. Publication 71-1).

▼ **NAVY**—Contact the Aviation Supply Office, Navy Publications and Forms Directorate (Code 10363), 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19120-5000; FAX: (215) 697-2601/DSN 442-2601.

▼ **MARINE CORPS**—Contact the Marine Corps Logistics Base Atlantic, Warehouse 1221, Section 5, Albany, Georgia 31704.

▼ **AIR FORCE**—Contact the base Publishing Distribution Office to establish requirements. Service-wide functional distribution is then made by the Air Force Distribution Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, Maryland 21220-2896.

▼ **COAST GUARD**—Contact the Commander, Coast Guard Atlantic Coast Area (AO), Governor's Island, New York, New York 10004-5098, or Commander, Coast Guard Pacific Area (PO), Coast Guard Island, Alameda, California 94501-5100; or write to U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, ATTN: Defense Operations Division, 2100 2<sup>d</sup> Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20593-0001.

In addition, distribution is made to the Office of the Secretary of

Defense, defense agencies, Joint Staff, unified commands, service colleges, and other selected activities. Changes of address for these copies must be communicated to the Editor.

**SUBSCRIPTIONS:** *JFQ* is available by subscription from the Government Printing Office (see the order blank in this issue). To order for one year, cite: *Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ)* on the order and mail with a check for \$19.00 (\$23.75 foreign) or provide a VISA or MasterCard account number with expiration date to the Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15220-7954, or FAX the order to: (202) 512-2233.

**CONTRIBUTIONS:** *JFQ* welcomes submissions on all aspects of joint and combined warfare from members of the Armed Forces as well as from defense analysts and academic specialists from both this country and abroad, including foreign military personnel. There is no standard length for articles, but contributions

of 3,000 to 5,000 words are appropriate. Other submissions, however, to include letters to the editor, items of commentary, and brief essays are invited. Reproductions of supporting material (such as maps and photos) should be submitted with manuscripts citing the source and indicating their availability; do *not* send originals.

## CHARIVARI

Clark Murdock—the author of “Mission-Pull and Long-Range Planning” which appeared in *JFQ*, number 6 (Autumn/Winter 1994-95)—wishes to acknowledge the efforts of a number of his former colleagues on the Policy Planning Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense who developed the mission-pull planning concept and contributed to the article: Col Donald Selvage, USMC, Wade Hinkle, Mark Sawoski, Seth Carus, and LTC Robert Johnson, USA.

One of the citations in the *JFQ* Quarterly Review of Joint Literature on page 120 of number 6 (Autumn/Winter 1994-95) contained typographical errors in both the author's name and the title. The correct cite is: Jon T. Hoffman, *Once A Legend: “Red Mike” Edson of the Marine Raiders*.

—The Editor





To facilitate review, provide three copies of the manuscript together with a 150-word summary. Place personal or biographical data on a separate sheet of paper and do not identify the author (or authors) in the body of the text. Follow an accepted style guide in preparing the manuscript, but endnotes rather than footnotes should be used. Both

the manuscript and the endnotes should be typed in double-space with one-inch margins.

If possible submit the manuscript on a disk together with the typescript version. While 3.5- and 5.25-inch disks in various formats can be processed, WordPerfect is preferred (disks will be returned if requested). Further information on

the submission of contributions is available by calling (202) 475-1013 / DSN 335-1013, FAX (202) 475-1012 / DSN 335-1012, or writing:

Editor

*Joint Force Quarterly*  
ATTN: NDU-NSS-JFQ

Washington, D.C. 20319-6000

JFQ

*In every battle it is not numbers and untaught  
bravery so much as skill and training that generally  
produce victory.*

—Flavius Vegetius Renatus  
*Epitoma Rei Militaris*

