

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
SERBIA 2005



THE STRENGTH OF DIVERSITY

BELGRADE, 2005

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Foreword

Diversity is our wealth

I would like to welcome the Report on human development in Serbia dedicated to multiculturalism as a significant contribution and encouragement to Serbia's efforts in being accepted in the international community as a responsible and equal partner in building a global, humane and developed society.

Serbia today is the only country in the Western Balkans region which has, after citizen and inter-ethnic conflicts of 1991-95, remained a multiethnic and multicultural environment. The challenge for Serbia is to maintain this wealth of varieties among its citizens. In that respect, the Government of Serbia has adopted a number of legal measures and accepted all key international agreements, as well as EU documents in topics covered by this Report. Especially, related to the rights of ethnic minorities and the care of their cultural identities.

There are 24 ethnic communities in Serbia, which make up one third of the total population^{}: Hungarians, Albanians, Roma, Romanians, Bosniaks, Bulgarians, Slovaks, Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Croatians, Macedonians, etc. The current Constitution of Serbia defines Serbia not by the criteria of the most numerous, dominant ethnic group, but as «a democratic state of all citizens that live in it,» and which has been «based on freedoms and rights of every person and citizen, on the rule of law and social justice» (Article 1 of the Constitution). The Constitution guarantees, among other things, all national and cultural rights of people and citizens (Article 3).*

On the territory of Serbia where ethnic minorities are present, official languages and alphabets of those communities are officially recognized, as well as the right to an education in their language, from preschool to university. The Constitution guarantees «the freedom of expression of national belonging and culture and the freedom of using their language and alphabet» (Article 49). All of these rights are elaborated in detail in the legislature of the Republic of Serbia (especially in educational, media, territorial autonomy, religious communities, etc. laws).

Human development is the priority of our policies, and we have accepted multiculturalism as one of its main components and our everyday priority. The policy of ethnocentrism has been rejected in Serbia. As an area which in the past has been subjected to numerous civil, religious, and interethnic conflicts, we consider it our duty to, with all our resources, prevent the appearances of xenophobia, racism, hate speech, religious and cultural intolerance.

Cultural diversity is our wealth, and the state preserves it in all manners possible. First of all, by the establishment of institutions of civil society and legal states. In accordance with our possibilities, we assist through material and financial means the cultural, educational, religious and media institutions of ethnic communities, and at the same time their political and religious communities and organizations.

In a global, leveling and anonymous mass-culture, we would like to sustain the right to a cultural identity of every citizen, and the protection and development of diversity and inter-culturalism for us is an important issue in fulfilling full human and productive capacities.

*Boris Tadić,
President of the Republic of Serbia*

^{*} Including Kosovo.

Foreword

It is my pleasure to introduce this Human Development Report, examining “The Strength of Diversity” in Serbia.

Sustainable human development places people at the centre of the development process and defines the central purpose of development as creating an enabling environment in which people can enjoy a long, healthy and creative life. Since 1990, UNDP has been publishing annual Global Human Development Reports to review the status of human development in the world, and advocate for policies and systems of governance which promote, support and sustain improvements in the quality of people’s lives. In providing tangible support to these advocacy activities with statistical evidence, UNDP has developed the Human Development Index, a summary indicator of human development and an instrument for monitoring progress over time.

In 1994, UNDP’s Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS launched National Human Development Reports (NHDRs) in all countries of the region. Since then, the NHDRs have made important contributions to increase awareness among people on the state of well being in a country. They have also played a significant role in drawing attention of policy makers and citizens to key development priorities. They have, in the process, generated much debate and dialogue often resulting in tangible policy changes and the introduction of new programmes.


The National Human Development Report process in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was initiated in 1996. A second report was published in 1997, while in 1998 the process was interrupted, due to the prevailing political situation. Considering the drastic changes and the tide of events, which have affected human development in the new State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, it has proven a challenge for UNDP to produce a meaningful report capturing the complexity of the situation.

Inspired by the global Human Development Report 2004 on Cultural Freedom, we decided to address human development issues in Serbia analysing the strengths of its diversity. Diversity of culture, of language, of religion, but also geographical, gender and generational diversity, which provide an image of the Republic with multiple resources, but also numerous challenges ahead.

The theme is relevant not only in the light of the history and the legacy of conflicts with an ethnical connotation and its unhealed wounds, but also with a view to Serbia’s future European integration, which requires the capacity to build inclusive and culturally diverse societies. The European Union has built its peace and prosperity on the reciprocal recognition of the value of its people’s diverse cultures, religions and languages, after its nations have fought for centuries over the very same issues. Serbia, with its multicultural historical heritage and present normally aspires to further contribute to this process.

Advocating for inclusive and diverse societies is inherent to the very concept of human development, which achievements would be impossible without an environment allowing people to develop their full potential and choose how to lead their lives.

Unambiguously affirming “The Strength of Diversity”, this Report analyses the status of multiculturalism in Serbia not as a doctrine, but rather as a reality with its positive connotations. This report is an independent study, meant to stimulate debate and discussion around vital issues for Serbia. I hope you will enjoy the Report’s contribution, and I invite readers to participate in the ongoing debate.



Rastislav Vrbensky
UNDP Resident Representative a.i.

Acknowledgements

The Serbia Human Development Report has been prepared by a national team of experts from the **Belgrade Centre for Human Rights** and the **Economics Institute** in Belgrade and has been extensively discussed by a wide range of regional, national and international stakeholders, who have been afforded the opportunity to contribute their views on the design and contents of the report. Technical support for the Report has been provided by UNDP and the **United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA)**.

Dr Vojin Dimitrijević was the Team Leader on behalf of the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, while *Dr Jurij Bajec* led the Economic Institute team. Other members of the team, who successfully contributed to the preparation of the report through their expertise and support, were:


Dr Dragan Popadić, Dr Tamas Korhecz, Dr Gorana Krstić, Ružica Žarevac, M.A., Katarina Stanić, M.Sc., Vladimir Vukojević and Vidan Hadži-Vidanović

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Paola Pagliani,
UNDP Policy Analyst

List of Acronyms

AP – Autonomous Province	REP – Rapid Employment Programme
APV – Autonomous Province of Vojvodina	RS – Republic of Serbia
BCHR – Belgrade Center for Human rights	SCD – Serbian Dinar
BiH – Bosnia and Herzegovina	SC – Security Council
CEIR – Centar za empirijska istraživanja religije (Center for Empirical Religious Research)	SDP – Sandžak Democratic Party
CPS – Center for Policy Studies	SEE – South Eastern Europe
CPIJM – Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research	SFRY – Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
DOS – Democratic Opposition of Serbia	SM (or SCG) – Serbia and Montenegro
DZVM – Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians	SME – Small and Medium Enterprise
EBRD – European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	SMMRI – Strategic Marketing and Media Research Institute
EI – Economic Institute	SPS – Socialist Party of Serbia
EU – European Union	SSMIRP – Southern Serbia Municipal Improvement and Recovery Programme
FDI – Foreign Direct Investment	SVM – Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians
FRY – Federal Republic of Yugoslavia	UNCT – United Nations Country Team
GDI – Gender – Related Development Index	UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
GDP – Gross Domestic Product	UNESCO – United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
GEM – Gender Empowerment Measure	UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
HDI – Human Development Index	UNIASO – UN Inter–agency Support Office
HDR – Human Development Report	UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund
HPI – Human Poverty Index	UNOCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
IDPs – Internally Displaced Persons	UNOHCHR – United Nation Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
MDGs – Millennium Development Goals	WDI – World Development Indicators
MIR – Municipal Improvement Programme	
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization	
NBS – National Bank of Serbia	
NGOs – Non–Governmental Organizations	
OSCE – Organization for Security and Co–operation in Europe	
PPP – Purchasing Power Parity	
PRSP – Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper	

Executive Summary

Serbia faces a challenging and in many respects a controversial issue over the next decade, namely how can a harmonious and tolerant multi-ethnic and multicultural society be forged with due respect for the wide differences that are evident in cultural traditions, values, lifestyles?

The core theme of the 2004 Human Development Report for Serbia is “The Strength of Diversity” – a recognition of the fact that harmonious and culturally diverse societies can be dynamic and progressive with a vibrant economic, social and cultural society which enriches and enlightens all its members. However to reach this desirable end requires continuous efforts by the government, by civil society and by the creation of the right “enabling environment” – legal and otherwise.

The concept of multiculturalism. The report is very wide ranging and brings together a broad spectrum of views on the concept of “multiculturalism”. While the Report draws heavily on the experiences and views of the dominant ethnic community in Serbia, it also addresses the position of the significant ethnic minorities (particularly the Roma, Albanian and Hungarian minorities) and those groups in society, which can be considered as adopting alternative lifestyles. At the core of the report are issues concerned with basic human rights – of the individual and minority communities – and the extent to which the political and institutional systems of society are capable of and motivated to protect these rights.

The report is divided into four main sections. An Introduction – which sets the scene for the ensuing discussion, Part 1 – which reviews the facts and evidence on trends in multi-culturalism; Part 2 – which sets out a policy agenda for promoting multiculturalism in Serbia, and Part 3 presents conclusions and recommendations. Various Annexes complete the report – which includes the statistical estimation of the various human development indices.

The Report introduces the basic concepts of the universalist “**human development approach**” that underpins the series of UNDP human

development reports at the global, regional and national levels. The report assesses how these principles can be applied to the attainment of a multicultural society in Serbia.

It is argued that cultural diversity is an essential component of today’s world in which specified standards of behaviour must be observed. These standards have been laid down by numerous international treaties and agreements. They primarily protect the person as an individual by establishing the minimum rights that he must exercise without interference, thus being able to develop freely. The principles, such as: a commitment to the protection of one’s life, freedom and personal integrity, religion and language must not be violated out of respect for another culture.

The Report examines the wide variety and richness of the languages spoken in Serbia and the **religious diversity**, which reflects well the ethnic composition of its population. There are around 50 registered religious communities in Serbia. According to the 2002 census 85.0% of the citizens declared themselves as Orthodox Christian. 5.5% are Catholic, 3.2% Muslim, and 1.1% are Protestant. The NHDR also points out that there is a significant **rural-urban dimension to multiculturalism** reflecting the differences in urban and rural lifestyles, poverty and incomes. The depopulation of rural areas and ageing of rural population are the best evidence of economic slowdown and the deepening of poverty of the rural population. This is a matter of some concern and the trend must be reversed.

Age profiles and youth cultures. According to the 2002 Census, Serbia ranks among the ten countries with the oldest population in the world: there were 1 million young people aged 15 to 24 years, and their share in the total population was just 13.4%. The youth culture in Serbia is vibrant and undergoing constant change in both urban and rural areas. One of the important specificities of life of the young generation today, compared with older generations, is the possibility of **contact with other nationali-**

ties through overseas travel. However foreign countries have become less accessible because of the visa system, and deteriorated economic situation. One of the opportunities for different cultures not only to meet, but to experience each other and integrate into own identity are mixed marriages. However, the percentage of mixed marriages in Serbia is very small; 94% of the citizens of Serbia come from mono-ethnic marriages.

Refugees and internally displaced persons. During the 1990s, the wars in the Balkan region led to a massive influx of refugees. According to the data from September 2004, a total of 277,601 refugees were registered in Serbia, as well as 207,639 internally displaced persons from Kosovo. Being a refugee deeply changes the conditions and way of life of persons and families. An important factor which determines the life style of refugees is the deterioration of economic position, very often complete impoverishment, and an absolutely uncertain future. In other words, what is characteristic for refugees is dislodgment, and social and psychological eradication. More dramatic unfavourable changes occur within families as well. Accommodation of refugees is also a huge problem for societies to which the refugees fled, particularly if these societies are hit by other, even bigger difficulties.

The report places considerable emphasis on the **unfavourable social and economic status of the Roma in Serbia**. The Roma represent a very large group with the highest degree of exclusion relative to the majority population, which is mostly derived from the specificity of their culture. According to all social indicators (employment, education, standard of living, reputation, etc.), their social and economic status is extremely unfavourable. This is actually the case in most countries in which they live. However, the situation in Serbia is specific due to a great number of Roma among refugees and internally displaced persons, especially from Kosovo.

The Serbia HDR uses a very powerful and revealing measurement technique to gauge the different perceptions the various groups have of each other known as **social distance**. Social distance stands for the degrees of understanding

and intimacy between members of some social groups, which is manifested in readiness to establish more or less close social relationships with members of this group, or lack thereof. **Inter-ethnic relations** can be analysed at the normative level (the laws which regulate this area), through social practice, that is, behaviour of individuals and groups, and through the assessment of attitudes and beliefs. A 2004 survey of ethnic distance between five minority peoples in Serbia showed that the biggest social distance was expressed towards Albanians.

Ethnocentrism is another component of ethnic attitudes, particularly important for inter-ethnic relations in a society. The term ethnocentrism stands for the tendency to idealize one's own ethnic group and consider it superior to other groups. A recent (2004) survey has shown however that ethno-centric statements are rejected by the majority of citizens, but there are at least 20% of those who accept ethnocentric statements. Ethnocentrism was significantly connected with religiousness. The lowest ethnocentrism is shown by citizens who state that they are not religious, but that they have nothing against religion. The highest ethnocentrism is recorded among the citizens who declared that they were religious, and accept all teachings of their church.

Legal Protection of Minorities. On 4 February 2003, with the adoption of the Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was transformed into the state union based on the equality of Serbia and Montenegro, the two former federal units and now member states. Among other things, the aims of this state are respect for human rights of all persons under its jurisdiction; preservation and promotion of human dignity, equality and the rule of law; inclusion in European structures, particularly the European Union, and harmonization of regulations and practices with European and international standards. One of the first documents of the State Union was the *Charter on Human and Minority Rights*, which forms part of the Constitutional Charter. The Charter on Human and Minority Rights stipulates that everyone is obliged to respect human and minority rights

of others and prohibits any direct or indirect discrimination on any ground, including on the ground of race, colour, gender, national belonging, social background, birth or similar status, religion, political or other affiliation, material status, culture, language, age or physical disability.

The Serbia HDR refers to the important role of **regional and local self-government** in the affirmation and protection of multiculturalism. The system of regional and local self-government, where local government bodies have appropriate competences and financial sources, enable the authorities to conduct their policies in accordance with various challenges that differ from community to community. Serbia includes **two autonomous provinces** in accordance with the Constitution: the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo. Vojvodina has remained the unique Central-European national mosaic. Due to its specificity relative to other parts of Serbia, Vojvodina was constituted as an autonomous province and, until the 1990s, enjoyed a high degree of legislative and political autonomy. During the rule of Milošević's Socialist Party of Serbia, Vojvodina was autonomous only formally, since it was deprived of all competences, financial resources and functions. Since 1999, Kosovo is a UN protectorate, in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, therefore this report will not analyse the state of arts in that territory.

The Act on Local Self-Government introduces a completely new institution: the *Council for Ethnic Relations*. **Municipalities** in whose total populations the share of national minorities is over 10% or where one minority has a share exceeding 5% are bound by the Law to form a Council for Ethnic Relations, whose role is to involve members of minorities in reviewing various issues and an attempt to influence the making of decisions at local level which regulate matters of importance to minorities.

The second part of the NHDR reviews some of the key **POLICY RESPONSES AND APPROACHES TO MULTICULTURALISM**. A major recommendation is the need to launch urgent and systematic efforts to **draft a long-term strategy** aimed at turning Serbia and the region as

a whole into a zone with high developmental potential rather than a source of lingering conflicts. The prerequisite for embarking on such a strategy is coming to terms with the past and the traumatic experiences produced by the ethnic strife. Therefore, efforts need to be invested in helping both majority and minority peoples to embrace policies based on social and cultural integrationalism rather than territorial and cultural isolationism. **Civic education** should be further developed as a school subject. The subject became part of the curriculum in the starting grades of primary and secondary schools in the autumn of 2001.

Three specific areas are given special prominence, namely **bridging the ethnic divide with the Albanians**. One of the high-priority tasks must be reducing the resentment of ethnic Albanians to a level, which would make possible both dialogue and peaceful co-existence. Secondly, support **for the Roma community** since discrimination against this community appears to be motivated less by racism than by their weaker social and economic status. Urgent steps must be taken to improve the lot of the Roma and their educational status. Thirdly, the **strategy of upgrading ethnic relations** must also contain a constant process of controlling the quality of those relations expressed through individual attitudes and beliefs. Several organisations (the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, the Humanitarian Law Centre and others) monitor the observance of human rights, record their violations and inform the public thereof on a regular basis. Appropriate public opinion polls are undertaken regularly. The Serbia and Montenegro Ministry for Human and Minority Rights is involved in continuous monitoring of opinions expressed in connection with relations between ethnicities. For the moment, almost all the available information comes from studies undertaken on representative samples of adult and younger citizens of Serbia in which the shares of minorities are far too small to make possible a reliable assessment of their attitudes, conduct and expectations. It is therefore necessary to **organise research focused on members of minorities**, which will deal with their social attitudes and relations with other ethnic groups.

Attitudes towards marginalised groups. The term “marginalised groups” describes not the characteristics of their members but the attitude of society towards them and the status they are given. There are numerous such groups in contemporary societies: groups of people with physical handicaps, persons with uncommon sexual orientation, people who are stigmatised according to other criteria. Their members are insufficiently integrated in the life of their community on account of negative attitudes and feelings towards them (in particular fear and hostility) based on stereotypes. The key factor of the distance assumed from the marginalised groups appears to be ignorance and acceptance of the misguided negative stereotypes about their members.

Openness to the world and an emphasis on youth. Particularly threatened by the wars, isolation and falling standards of living are young people, who have had little opportunity to experience a different life. The youth are therefore especially receptive to extremist ideologies, which go in step with crises and conflicts and which they accept as a convincing interpretation of all aspects of real life. Educating the youth in a spirit of tolerance and civic values is therefore of extreme importance. It is particularly important to apply various means to promote, also outside the educational system, knowledge of languages spoken by minorities in local communities. In general terms, policies aimed at reducing prejudice, stereotypes and discrimination between cultures in a multicultural society have multiple components, which need to act in harmony with one another.

GOVERNANCE POLICY RESPONSES. The challenge of multiculturalism in Serbia lies mainly in the construction of a system which will make it possible for ethnic and linguistic minorities to enjoy full freedom of choice of culture and to develop and promote their specificities in the interest of the creation of the necessary prerequisites for the unimpeded economic and social development of Serbia, free of ethnic conflict and discrimination – building up a state everyone, including the minorities in Serbia, will regard as their own.

Principles of state action to promote multiculturalism in Serbia. In order to ensure the unimpeded development of multiculturalism and expansion of the freedom of choice while preserving what has been achieved in the area of institutional protection of differences in Serbia, it is necessary to operationalise several basic principles which would ensure development of multiculturalism in Serbia as a prerequisite for stable and long-term development of Serbia as an ethnically diverse society. *The principle of differential and incremental approach* – which introduces a series of small measures or improvements according to need and ability to absorb changes – would be useful. The appropriate principle would therefore be a differential and incremental exercise of rights, depending on the needs of the local population and the capacities of the authorities; this means linking the exercise of certain rights to the concentration of minority population(s). Such an incremental approach has been taken by many countries (Canada, Switzerland, Italy and others). *The principle of decentralisation and autonomy* – a greater level of decentralisation makes possible a more flexible multiculturalism policy. Many people in Serbia believe that the state should be careful in respect of decentralisation because it weakens the state, and that a centralised Serbia is a guarantee of its stability and territorial integrity, especially so because there are so many national minorities in Serbia. However, the measures introduced after 2001, which ensured more decentralisation, have had a positive influence on the development, promotion and protection of a multicultural Serbia. An essential requirement for the promotion of a multi-cultural society is the participation of ethnic, linguistic, religious and other groups in public life, and, even more importantly, in the civil service. A good example is the Multi-Ethnic Police organised in southern Serbia by the Serbian Government and the OSCE which employed numerous ethnic Albanians in the Serbian police, whose units had hitherto been ethnically pure – composed of Serbs only.

The final section of the NHDR outlines the **policy and approaches to multiculturalism and the linkages to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)**. The Millennium Development Go-

als actually provide building blocks for human development, – they are a set of quantified and time-bound goals for some of the most important human development objectives. As the ultimate purpose of MDGs is in fact poverty eradication and human development, they can actually be seen as the road map toward human development in Serbia. Moreover, promoting multiculturalism as a means of improvement of human rights and human development is complementary to the task of achieving the MDGs. As the Global HDR (2004) argues, if the world is to reach the Millennium Development Goals and ultimately eradicate poverty, it must first successfully confront the challenge of how to build inclusive, culturally diverse societies. This is not just because doing so successfully is a precondition for countries to focus properly on other priorities of economic growth, health and education for all citizens, but because allowing people full cultural expression is an important development end in itself.

The Report presents a detailed matrix on how the activities related to the improvement of human development and multiculturalism at the same time contribute to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.

IN CONCLUSION the Report stresses that the Republic of Serbia is an ethnically and culturally heterogeneous community in which 16.1% of its population belongs to some of 24 minority communities. Members of different ethnic groups, who lived in harmony in a joint state for decades, suffered the disintegration of the country and a series of wars, which were a product of nationalistic political strategies but were represented as (unavoidable) ethnic and religious conflicts.

For that reason, it is important to:

- Come to terms with the past – full understanding of those events and their interpretation must be the subject of open dialogue, which will provide a multiplicity of views and experiences
- Invest in helping both majority and minority peoples to embrace policies based on social and cultural integrationalism rather than territorial and cultural isolationism.
- Work on the development of awareness of a multiplicity of identities among individuals.

- Identities, which are complementary to ethnic identity, such as citizenship, European identity, regional identity and others, need to be strengthened.

- Eliminate the "hate speech" directed against other ethnicities, which have become commonplace in everyday communication and in the media, and prosecute those responsible for it.

- Affirmation of multiculturalism and inter-culturalism in Serbia demands a clearly defined national strategy and measures for its implementation. Besides the state, such a strategy also needs to be drafted on a provincial level in Vojvodina. Efforts should be made in schools and the media to stimulate mutual awareness of cultures and languages and multiculturalism should be promoted as a social value. Learning a language used in one's community should be encouraged in different ways. Awareness and knowledge about differences and variety should be taken out of the realm of scientific research and elevated to that of actual life.

- There has been some improvement in human development in Serbia since the political changes in 2000 – 6% increase in HDI since 1999 till 2002. Although information on human development (measured with HDI) according to ethnicity or various socio/cultural groups cannot be obtained, findings based on other sources of data point to vulnerability of groups, such as Roma in particular, refugees and IDPs, youngsters, elderly, etc. Therefore, these groups need special attention and should be particularly targeted.

- Promoting multiculturalism as a means towards improvement of human rights and human development is also complementary with achieving the MDGs.

The Final Statement

If the world is to reach the Millennium Development Goals and ultimately eradicate poverty, it must first successfully confront the challenge of how to build inclusive, culturally diverse societies. Accordingly, integration of the minority and various cultural groups into economic, social, cultural and political life of Serbia is directly linked to achieving the MDGs.

Introduction to Multiculturalism and Human Development

THE BASIC CONCEPT OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Introduction to human development. The concept of human development won its full recognition when it became clear, that the achievement of the basic economic objective of the highest possible growth rate and the highest possible GDP per capita – does not necessarily lead to an improvement in the living conditions or welfare of individuals in society. If growth of material wealth and GDP is not accompanied by positive changes in basic living conditions – including a reduction in the incidence of poverty, rise in employment prospects and decreased differences in income distribution – then one cannot speak about a higher level of development¹. This is the essential message of the human development approach.

Insofar as developed countries are concerned, high levels of GDP per capita and employment, coupled with appropriate redistribution policies, have enabled the majority of their population to satisfy their basic material needs. However, very frequently members belonging to various (often minority) social groups (according to ethnic, gender or some other criteria) find it more difficult to participate in social, political and cultural life on an equal footing and exercise their creative abilities and cultural traditions. In summary, genuine development is not achieved if the social, cultural and other essential needs of some minority social groups and even each individual have been denied.

People-centered development strategies. The concept of human development places the individual at the centre of overall development, as its principal agent and sole beneficiary. Accordingly, it is necessary to take an active approach towards its achievement, which implies full recognition of all key components of human development. This is the only way in which the basic aim of human development – the universal development of one's individual capacities – will be achieved².

¹ D. Seers, "What are we Trying to Measure", *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. (8) 3, 1972.

² *Human Development Report*, Belgrade, 1997.

BOX 1.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL LIBERTY

Human development requires more than health, education, a decent standard of living and political freedom. People's cultural identities must be recognized and accommodated by the state, and people must be free to express these identities without being discriminated against in other aspects of their lives. In short: cultural liberty is a human right and an important aspect of human development—and thus worthy of state action and attention.

Source: Global HDR, 2004

Consequently, a passive approach, or an attempt to activate only the narrowly defined economic factors, could slow down or even suspend broader development processes and lead to defective development – or "mal-development". In accordance with this understanding, Serbia should base, to the greatest possible extent, its transition path and development strategy on the concept of human development, which links and mutually empowers the various economic, social and cultural components, thus transforming them into a synergistic and complementary set of balanced development factors. These objectives are already, to a large degree, being adopted in the ongoing work on the PRSP, the Serbian approach to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and foundation work for EU accession – since all of these processes are interlinked and largely overlap³.

³ The *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)* is the main strategic development document for Serbia, which serves as an instrument to assist in the delivery of the MDGs and to promote human development. The MDGs are a set of targets that are also included in the PRSP implementation and represent long-term national political commitments to adopt widely accepted international development goals. As their ultimate purpose is poverty eradication and human development, the MDGs are actually seen as the road-map towards human development. Finally, there is close correspondence between the MDGs, especially those tailored to country-specific situation, and some aspects of the EU agenda.

WHAT IS MULTICULTURALISM

Approaches to multiculturalism. Although there are numerous definitions of culture, it is prudent to adopt a broad conceptual framework for its analysis. This allows for a fuller examination of its connotations for the development of society. Culture can be interpreted in terms of the behaviour and impression of the individual, and as such has to be seen in the widest possible perspective. Alternatively, culture can also be understood as the sum total of the knowledge, opinions and living habits shared by all members of a society and transmitted to each other. Culture can also be considered as being primarily linked to the various forms of “community”; it is formed and developed through it, whereby it absorbs an individual and becomes reflected in him/her. To be part of a culture means to accept the patterns of the social and economic environment in which an individual is formed. At the same time, by belonging to a specified cultural environment, an individual exerts pressure on culture and influences its evolution.

To appraise the ramifications and importance of culture and multiculturalism, it is necessary to proceed on the assumption that the following views are correct and universally accepted:

- Mankind is the totality of different peoples with cultural specificities;
- Even within one people there are groups with different characteristics;
- Peoples (and nations) with different cultural specificities often permeate each other territorially, or at least border on each other;
- Modern conditions of life and the technological revolution commit individuals to communicate with others who are different from them.

Given such propositions, a discussion on the interaction of different cultures and their mutual permeation goes far beyond the consideration of political and philosophical issues to include the vital questions concerning an individual's and a community's development path.

The term multiculturalism was first introduced in Canada as a political instrument for overcoming differences and achieving cohesion among the diverse Anglophone, Francophone and “First

Nation” (Native Indian) members of the society⁴. Subsequently the multiculturalism debate has ranged over the nature of the American racial, cultural and ethnic “melting pot” and Australian policies of maintenance of Aboriginal culture to how can European nation-states achieve integration and accommodate to the expansion of migration from former colonies following the end of the Second World War. The issue also came to the fore with the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the dissolving of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and how to define new borders based on ethnic (and other) considerations.

The above simplified and sharply shortened list of the different approaches to multiculturalism around the world shows the fluent nature of this political tool. It is clear that multiculturalism has numerous forms and interpretations, which in many cases do not fall easily into a common theoretical framework. Nevertheless, it is observed that the goals and the achievements of the different approaches to multiculturalism are much the same – economic and social cohesion of the diverse cultural groups within society and building of tolerance among them. The same position stands for the relationship between the multiculturalist and inter-culturalist approaches. The multiculturalistic approach represents acknowledgment of the diversity of society and the inter-cultural presumes that dialogue and cohesion are critical for social harmony. With respect to the differences between these concepts, for the practical reasons they can all be observed as the stages for the achievement of the same goal. In this report therefore multiculturalism should be understood in the broadest possible sense.

Before we answer the question as to whether multiculturalism is necessary and whether it should be promoted, we must consider the alternatives.

IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE TO MULTICULTURALISM?

If we regard multiculturalism as intercultural dialogue and tolerance among different cultures, as well as their interaction, one of the alterna-

⁴ The so-called “mosaic”.

tives to such a concept is absolute *self-sufficiency*, which may take various forms – ethnic nationalism, xenophobia, chauvinism, social autism... But history has shown that if there is no or insufficient dialogue between different cultural and ethnic groupings, there is either *ignorance leading to cultural isolation and possibly ultimately to conflict*.

Another alternative to multiculturalism so understood is the *negation of differences*, which leads to *assimilation* or, in other words, to the extinction of a minority culture in favour of a majority one. Until recently, such an approach was regarded as desirable for solving the problem of various minorities, especially ethnic ones. Even today there is talk of the desirability of voluntary assimilation. However, why should one renounce one's identity, customs and way of life if nothing is obtained in turn? Assimilation excludes a number of ideas that may contain enormous potentialities for the benefit of society as a whole since it can eliminate choices and diversity in lifestyles. Finally, there are groups that cannot simply renounce their characteristics, because they are biological and not voluntary ones, which will always identify them as members of a different ethnic group or race.

On the other hand, the uncritical acceptance of multiculturalism must be avoided. If it is not applied properly, it may easily turn out to be a *politically correct cover for various forms of discrimination*.

BOX 2.

MULTICULTURALISM IN COMMUNIST SOCIETIES

The concept of multiculturalism in the ex-communist countries simplified the situation in society and reduced multiculturalism to the cohabitation of collective entity through the Party as the sole arbiter and mediator. However, it only created favourable conditions for intercultural dialogue which was interrupted when the mediator was not present.

Multiculturalism and Value systems. Different cultures cannot have the same values. Which values should be kept and which values of another culture should prevail in the process of

assimilation is not a unilateral decision, but is conditioned by one's personal perception and the long process of adopting new and the abandoning of old values, which is the inevitable result of interaction among different cultures. This process should not be regarded as voluntary assimilation, but as a natural process of cultural modification. Further, it is not a static notion, since no culture is immune to the influences of other cultures in an interactive world. Cultural "purity" at any cost does not affect other cultures, but impoverishes one's own. Thus, it is as dangerous as cultural chauvinism.

While the value system of one community can be diametrically opposite to the value system of another, there are no criteria for determining which values are correct and which are not. Should we accept such a view in full, a moral reconsideration of specified cultural patterns would be absolutely impermissible, even though that may be absolutely justified in the eyes of the majority. Thus, the phenomenon of blood feuds or the discrimination of women, or even national and cultural exclusionism would be beyond criticism. As a result, the very idea of multiculturalism would annul itself.

THE LEGACY OF MULTICULTURALISM IN SERBIA

Historical roots of the different cultures in Serbia. The evolution of civil thought and the idea of liberalism and multicultural society in Serbia are linked in large measure to regional circumstances. Serbia spent almost the entire 20th century in union with other countries in this region or, to be more exact, spent it in the single South Slav state of Yugoslavia. Therefore, its development also depended on its attitude toward other peoples living in that territory, while its more recent cultural history is closely related to the cultural history of the entire region.

The Balkan wars and World War I brought to Serbia military victories and a considerable enlargement of its territory. At the time of unification with the neighbouring Slavic peoples, among which only Montenegrins had their independent state, the Serb government imposed its form of government and organization to the new state of Yugoslavia. The Serb dynasty of Karadjordjević became the royal house of

the new state, which was organized on unitary principles but only after much resistance.

The concept of Yugoslavism. In different parts of the Yugoslavia space, its peoples were developing under the influence of different cultures, thus their lifestyle and world-views varied not only from region to region, but also within the same ethnic territory⁵. Although the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were regarded as belonging to the same people, the political parties were formed on ethnic principles, while the parties having a religious character were among the strongest. The heightening of ethnic tensions and conflicts led, in 1929, to the abolition of parliamentarianism and the imposition of King Alexander's autocratic rule. His ideological basis was integral Yugoslavism, that is, the idea about the emerging Yugoslav super-nation. Along these lines, a more aggressive unification of legislation was undertaken; all nationally oriented societies were disbanded and the associations endorsing the idea of Yugoslavism were formed. The territorial division of the state into administrative districts, *banovine*, was made with no regard to ethnic specifics.

BOX 3.

THE EVOLUTION OF "YUGOSLAVIA"

The geographic space known as Yugoslavia has often changed its name. Before World War II, it was called the State of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, then the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and, finally, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. After World War II, it was renamed into the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia, Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. From 1992 to 2003, the territory left after the secession of four of its constituent republics was called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, after which the concept of "Yugoslavism" was abandoned and the state was given its present name Serbia and Montenegro.

With the death of King Alexander in 1934, the chief exponent of the Yugoslav idea left the scene. Although all subsequent governments ple-

⁵ For example, not only Central Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina were regarded as Serb ethnic territories, but also Macedonia, Montenegro and parts of Bosnia.

ded their allegiance to Yugoslavism, the pro-Yugoslav forces began to retreat before the nationalists and clericals. Such a situation did not change until the outbreak of World War II, when the process of disintegration was completed and the nations, once considered as constituting a unified nation, entered into a bloody conflict culminating in horrible atrocities. All this was also contributed to by the general climate in Europe.

Post War development of Socialist Yugoslavia. During World War II, the territory of Yugoslavia was occupied by Germany, Italy and its allies under the Tripartite Pact, which installed various quisling governments. The struggle against the occupying forces was waged along with ideological divisions. At the end of the war, the communist partisans turned out to be strongest and they carried out a socialist revolution. The Communist Party with its allies assumed power and established the new state on republican principles. The ambition of the revolutionaries was to annihilate old cultural values and to substitute them with new, socialist ones.

In recognition of the national heterogeneity of its population, Yugoslavia was organized as a federation. However, power was largely centralized and concentrated in the hands of the highest organs of the Communist Party, which held a political monopoly. The idea of integral Yugoslavism was substituted for the new ideology of "brotherhood and unity", anticipating the recognition of the specifics of different ethnicities, as well as the rapprochement of the brotherly peoples through the acceptance of socialist values, thus surpassing national feelings. In time, it became evident that this ambition was unrealisable and the state became increasingly more decentralized with each nationality enabled to develop into a nation within the single Yugoslav state. Nationalism was gradually becoming the political tool of the communists themselves, especially after the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980.

The collapse of Socialism. At the time, when the communist regimes in Eastern Europe began rapidly to crumble, the ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia began to intensify. The post-communist regimes, comprised mostly of ex-communists, took advantage of the exclusivism so

created. The Serb regime, headed by Slobodan Milošević, resorted to a nationalist agenda, on the basis of which it was strengthening its rule and deriving legitimacy for it in the last decade of the 20th century. National exclusivism prevented genuine multiculturalism.

The nationalist forces won elections in other republics as well. What was inevitably to follow was the collapse of a multinational Yugoslavia, the most liberal socialist country and the major candidate for accession to European integration processes.

THE POSITION OF ETHNIC AND NATIONAL MINORITIES

The measures for the protection of minorities in Serbia were introduced under the influence of the powers – victors in World War I. Under the Treaty of St Germain, Serbia obliged itself to

“ ... adopt all regulations, having agreed to embody them in a treaty to be concluded with the allied and associated Great Powers which they shall deem necessary for the protection of the interests of those inhabitants of the State of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes who differ from the majority of its inhabitants by their language and religion⁶”.

In Serbia, apart from the Slavic people, there were also larger German, Hungarian and Albanian communities. The *Treaty on the Protection of Yugoslav Minorities* of 10 September 1919 and the *Declaration on the Protection of Minorities* of 12 December 1919 were the first documents addressing this issue in Serbia and their basic provisions were included in the first Constitution of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of 28 June 1921.

The attitude toward the minorities was determined in large measure by the country's attitude toward their home countries. If their relations were burdened by disputes or territorial claims, Yugoslavia's attitude toward the relevant national community was less favourable.

The position of the Albanian Minority. The Albanian community was not included in the peace treaties like the former citizens of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It suffered because of the unsettled relations between the Kingdom and Albania. Otherwise, this community, with

its traditional and conservative leadership, could not adjust to the idea of Yugoslavism and, thus, did not accept the new state as its own. Yugoslavia's assimilation policy and colonization of Kosovo with Serbs was turning the Albanian population to their home country. Due to the impossibility to receive education in their native language, Albanian students went to Albania, so that the Albanian intellectual elite in Kosovo were formed through education in Albania proper. Yugoslavia tried to keep its influence on the education of pupils in Muslim religious schools, but it finally abandoned such policy by passing the *Law and the Statute of the Islamic Religious Community* in 1936.

Creation of the Autonomous Provinces. After World War II, due to its specific ethnic composition, Serbia formed two autonomous provinces within its territory, Kosovo and Vojvodina. In Kosovo the Albanian population constituted an overwhelming majority (about 64% of the population), while in Vojvodina the Serb population was slightly in a majority (about 56%) and the rest accounted for national minorities, the largest being the Hungarian one (26%)⁷.

BOX 4.

MINORITIES IN THE KINGDOM OF YUGOSLAVIA

According to the 1921 census, the German national community was the largest minority group in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (505,790 inhabitants or 4.22%). The second largest was the Hungarian national community (472,079 inhabitants or 3.99%), which was followed by the Albanian national community (441,749 inhabitants or 3.77%). According to this census, in the Kingdom there were 12 linguistic groups with more than 10,000 inhabitants. Among larger minority groups there were also the Romanian and Turkish ones. The Orthodox religion was practiced by about 5.5 million people (Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians); 4,700,000 inhabitants were Roman Catholic (Croats, Slovenes and Hungarians), and 1,345,000 inhabitants were Muslim. There were also Protestants (Germans) and Jews (Sephardim in Bosnia and Ashkenazim in Serbia).

⁶ Article 51 of the Treaty of St Germain concluded with Austria on 10 September 1919.

⁷ According to the 1948 census.

Recognition of minority rights. The rights of other minorities were mostly respected, but were under a strong influence of the socialist ideology which regarded them merely as collective rights. The regime did not recognize a number of political rights, including specifically the freedom of association, so that political activity was possible only through the Communist Party. The Party had its members and officials from all ethnic groups, thus avoiding the impression that it represented the dominant nation, the Serbs. In the autonomous provinces high-level positions in government bodies and cultural institutions were held by persons belonging to all peoples and all national minorities on equal terms. The basic requirement was that they were reliable Party members and ideologically above reproach. The Yugoslav regime adhered strictly to “ethnic quotas”.

The enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights was ensured according to economic conditions. So, minority members were enabled to receive education in their native language and develop their own culture provided, naturally, that this was done in a spirit of socialism.

Developments in Kosovo. Strong affirmative action vis-à-vis the Albanian population in Kosovo, especially after 1968, included numerous government subsidies to the Kosovo economy, opening of schools and the university in the Albanian language, as well as the creation of conditions that the Albanian community could regard Yugoslavia and Serbia as their homeland. Although these measures could be regarded as genuine progress in the government’s attitude toward the minorities, at least in the areas of economic, social and, in particular, cultural rights, the reductionist Party policy was disregarding the complexity of the problem, while the implementation of proper measures in a proper way began to produce negative results over time.

With strictly limited political rights of all citizens without exception, any criticism of the Party policy was precluded, thus ruling out any possibility of finding a better model for solving the current problems. Such a climate provided a fertile ground for Serb nationalists, who shaped their policy of raising national consciousness by exploiting the unfavourable status of Kosovo Serbs. The Milošević regime unilaterally abolished the autonomy of the pro-

vinces in Serbia and installed leaders loyal to the regime. Due to its repressive policy vis-à-vis the Albanians, continuing disparagement of them and their treatment as second-rate citizens, the Serb authorities gave legitimacy to the separatist aspirations of the Albanian extremists. The intensification of the conflict in Kosovo resulted in NATO intervention in 1999. Under the Agreement, through which NATO intervention was terminated, Milošević’s Government surrendered the province to the international administration. The withdrawal of the Serb military and police forces was accompanied by the mass exodus of Serbs from Kosovo. The exodus of Serbs has not stopped.

BOX 5.**MULTIPLE CULTURES
AND MULTIPLE IDENTITIES**

There is no person who is a member of one group only. Therefore, there is no group that can be regarded as homogeneous and self-sufficient. An individual may have one nationality, belong to a second ethnic group and speak a third language. Moreover, he may belong to a fourth religion and be highly educated and yet belong to a destitute population group, etc. To satisfy his individual needs, it is not sufficient to grant his national group the status of a protected minority, or permit his religious group to build a shrine. The essence of multiculturalism lies in the recognition that different groups exist and that they have their distinctive features and needs, so that they must be allowed to develop, while each individual must be allowed, due conditions of tolerance, to make his contribution to the overall progress of society. No one must suffer because of his inherent characteristics or his chosen group affiliation.

Consequently, NATO intervention was not an introduction to the settlement of ethnic conflicts in Kosovo. Rather, it was an introduction to a new cycle of violence, with the Albanians as the stronger factor, to the detriment not only of the Serb community, but also to the detriment of other non-Albanian communities in the territory, which formally still belongs to the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, but is not under effective control of its governments.

WHAT ARE THE LIMITS OF MULTICULTURALISM?

In today's world there are, and must be, specified standards which should be observed. Although they insult the views of certain cultural groups, they ensure their existence as well.

Those standards have been laid down by numerous international treaties, so that it can be said with good reason that they have a legitimacy from which they also derive their authority. They primarily protect the individual by establishing the minimum rights that he must exercise without interference, thus being able to develop freely. The principles, such as: a commitment to the protection of one's life, freedom and personal integrity, must not be violated out of respect for another culture. This does not compromise the principles of multiculturalism, but provides scope for its existence – an individual has the right to his cultural identity, as well as the right to ch-

oose other options and he is limited only to the extent to which others have the same options.

In our time, which is characterized by the renaissance of individualism, each instrument for the improvement of social reality must be subordinated to individual needs, in particular. That is how multiculturalism should also be understood. Humans are political beings, so that it is natural to belong to one or more social, cultural or peer groups.

UNDERSTANDING THE BALKAN WARS

It is difficult to comprehend the reasons why ethnic hatred was so easily rekindled among people who lived peacefully together for fifty years, leading to a series of wars and crimes against humanity being committed in the Former Yugoslavia on a massive scale⁸.

BOX 6.

THE "BALKAN WARS"

The "Balkan wars" of the 1990s were dramatic and perverse but an intrinsic element of the transition and democratization process in South East Europe. They cannot be understood if analyzed solely from an ethnic perspective. The ethnic element was in fact a secondary one but in reality ethnicity was used as a camouflage to veil the other causes of conflicts including about resources, power, and territory. In all cases, ethnicity was a means for mobilization – ethnic mobilization – of constituencies and societies but not the genuine engine behind the process.

One fundamental element necessary to understand the Balkan wars is nation building (different from ethnic animosities) and emancipation of national identities in the region as well as their links to the process of democratization. The former multi-national entities on the "socialist camp" were all but voluntary unions. In the process of democratisation, the disciplining political framework in different countries collapsed and national self-determination immediately turned into a major element of various (often ideologically different) political agendas. Violent national

emancipation in the former Yugoslavia triggered mutually reinforcing historic acts of secessions and "counter-secessions." Its first outcome – the growing mutual suspicion – blocked dialogue and even when a normative system for the defense of minority rights existed, as in the case of former Yugoslavia, it was suspended as soon as open conflict erupted. But, again, the conflict was rarely about ethnicity. Important economic factors should be taken into consideration when analyzing the "Balkan wars" of the 1990s. The secession of the better-off republics like Slovenia and Croatia was economically logical. Once the conflict was defined in ethnic and religious terms (and particularly after the imposition of arms embargo), it acquired an additional economic momentum. Being a lucrative business in the region, arms smuggling contributed not just to the consolidation of local warlords' economic mini-empires which thrived on conflict. All this puts the issue of the "Balkan wars" in a more complex and multidimensional perspective. They are part not just of the past but also of the present of the Balkans. Hopefully not of its future.

⁸ Yugoslavia was hailed as a paradigm of rationalist modernisation and humanist communism during the 1980's (G. Bowman 1993, Allock 1993). It was open to the West as well as to the East. With a stable economy, it had the highest standard of living of

the states practicing state socialism ("real socialism") in Eastern Europe. As the leader of the non-alignment movement, it had a strong position in the world diplomacy.

Some authors have been quick to observe that the bloody war was the product of “centuries of settling of scores in the Balkans” and of “hated nurtured throughout history”. However, until World War II there were no large-scale conflicts based on *ethnic* hatred. To be sure, Serbs and Croats fought each other in the armies of the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman empires, but never *qua* Serbs or *qua* Croats. Contrary to all the myths of the remote, glorious past, spread by nationalist leaders and their followers, the disintegration of Yugoslavia was not the consequence of a distant historical or ethnically determined past.

THE REGIONAL CONTEXT

There is no unique pattern for multiculturalism. Such a pattern would be paradoxical, since each environment has its own specificity. Therefore, the “import” of the already tested patterns from countries with rich experience in this area would be wrong.

Regionalism and Europeanism. According to its historical background, population composition and geographic characteristics, South Eastern Europe differs considerably from the countries in which the idea of multiculturalism was born, i.e. the United States and Canada. Whereas multiculturalism in those countries has developed to reconcile different immigrant cultures and solve the problems of the indigenous population, in this part of Europe that has not been so. In South Eastern Europe all peoples are indigenous and all peoples are colonists. Due to the turbulent historical events, an individual living at one place from birth to death had sometimes to change citizenship several times, being a member of the majority in one period, and of the minority in another. Here the question of cultural pluralism imposed itself not as the result of sudden migrations, but as the result of a centuries-long process involving border changes and mingling of different cultures. Thanks to its gradualness, cultural differences are not so dramatic, unlike those encountered in the newer immigrant states. In particular, the situation in the region in the 20th century, contributed to the elimination or, at least, lessening of differences.

Vestiges of a strong patriarchal society are still felt in almost all cultures in this region, but

a strong breakthrough of Europeanisation is exerting influence on their liberalization. Here one cannot speak about the “conflict of civilizations” with completely different value systems, which can allegedly hardly be reconciled due to their insurmountable differences. Even the wars waged at the end of the 20th century were not conflicts of different cultures, although they are often interpreted as such. Rather, they were waged for territory and economic dominance.

Forging multicultural societies. South Eastern Europe is the meeting place of different symbols with which individuals identify themselves and to which they are strongly tied. There are no differences in their essential views of the world. There are only external manifestations of their cultural feelings. Therefore, the *first task in the creation of multicultural societies* in South Eastern Europe should be to point to the similarities of different cultures in the region and then to the specific needs of each cultural group, which can easily be understood, since they do not violate the generally accepted principles of life of the majority of the population. The collectivistic spirit is still present in the region. Belonging to a group determines in large measure the life of an individual. The individualist understanding of freedom has only lately begun to replace the collectivistic understanding of this notion as the freedom from another, alien and hostile to one’s group. Therefore, the homogeneity of a group was also of utmost significance. Belonging to one nation also determined one’s religious affiliation, ideology and language. Therefore, the *second task* in the creation of multicultural societies in South Eastern Europe should be also to strengthen the individual by guaranteeing human rights and recognizing minority rights as a set of individual rights and not as a set of collective rights and privileges, as these rights are often regarded in the region.

The existing concept of the relationship between the group and an individual also determines the attitude of states and citizens in this region towards the problems of cultural pluralism. Persons belonging to other groups are regarded as alien and different, without knowing the basic characteristics of their culture and their views. Stereotypes often dominate the relations between groups. Minorities are viewed with suspicion as a destabilizing factor and necessary evil. Political

parties are formed on national principles due to an inadequate participation of minorities in the major political parties. The minority political parties opt to act locally, which also contributes to the impression of their separatist aspirations. *The third task* in the creation of multicultural societies in South Eastern Europe should involve the acquaintance of each other's culture, elimination of all stigmas and prejudice, as well as the integration of the minority population into the functioning of the community.

As of late, most people have increasingly realized that their differences are not that insurmountable and have been demonstrating their will for intercultural dialogue. This encouraging development has been stimulated by a strong European movement, which established itself at the beginning of the new millennium. With their membership in the Council of Europe and accession to all major international human rights treaties, all States in the region have demonstrated their readiness to abandon the old path of confrontation and start a dialogue, which was avoided for a long time, or was wrongly conducted.

BOX 7.**“WHOSE SONG IS THIS?”**

The similarity of the cultures of Balkan peoples and their lack of mutual understanding are shown in the documentary film “Whose Song Is This” (Чия е тази песен) by the Bulgarian film director Adela Peeva. It is about an identical old melody which is regarded as “theirs” by the author's temperamental interlocutors from Turkey, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Macedonia and Bosnia.

In search of the origin of that song, which all peoples from this region claim to be part of their own tradition and supply it with the text in their native language, the film shows the exclusivism of those regarding something that is theirs as sacred and something that belongs to “someone else” as “stolen” or “unworthy”, failing to understand that “someone else's” often means “common”. After the end of the film there was no excitement about mutual similarities. Instead, a quarrel among the “co-owners” of the song ensued.

PART I

Conceptual Issues Relating To Multiculturalism In The Human Development Context

1. BASIC PREMISES OF MULTICULTURALISM IN SERBIA

1.1. Structure of the Serbian society

ETHNIC STRUCTURE OF SERBIA

The Republic of Serbia is an ethnically heterogeneous community in which 16.1% of its population of 7.581,437 citizens belong to one of 24 minority communities (according to the 2002 census)⁹. Of that total, Albanians, Hungarians and Bosniaks make up 6.5% of the population, and comprise more than one third of the total minority ethnic population. In some regions they account for the majority of the inhabitants and even achieve some degree of ethnic dominance or homogeneity. Besides the above mentioned nationalities, the other important national minorities in Serbia, are the Ashkalis/Egyptians, Bulgarians, Croats from Bačka, Tsintsars, Czechs, Albanians from Gora, Croats, Jews, Macedonians, Germans, Roma, Romanians, Ruthenians, Slovaks, Slovenians, Turks, Ukrainians, Wallachians.


According to the 2002 census, the Republic of Serbia (without Kosovo) had a population of, 6.212,838 Serbs (82.9% of the total population), 293,299 Hungarians (3,9%), 108,193 Bosniaks/Muslims, (1.4%) Roma 0.9% Montenegrins, (0.8% or 59,021) Slovaks, (0.5% or 40,054) Wallachians, (0.8% or 34,578) Romanians, (0.3% or 20,497) Bulgarians, (0.3% or 20,012) Bačka Croats, (0.9%) Croats, (0.8%) Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Turks and other nations. 1.1% declare themselves as Yugoslav, and 1.4% did not reveal their ethnicity (Chart 1). If these data are compared with data from the 1991 census, it is apparent that the share of Serbs in the total population has increased by 2.5%.

The Ethnic Communities of Serbia

Central Serbia is mainly populated by Serbs (89.5% of the region's total population) and is

ethnically relatively homogeneous, except in Sandžak, where there are around 300 000 Bosniaks, and in three municipalities where the Bulgarian and Albanian nationalities are in a majority.

CHART 1. Ethnic structure of Serbia according to the 2002 census



Source: 2002 Census, Republic of Serbia, Republic Statistical Office

Vojvodina, which accounts for more than 20% of the total population of Serbia, is outstandingly multi-ethnic, with a total of 26 nations and national and ethnic groups represented but with the Serbs in an absolute majority. According to the 1991 census, there was a total of 1.143.723 (56.8%) Serbs, and, according to the 2002 census their number increased to 1,321,807 (65.05%). The 2002 census recorded the next largest population groups as Hungarians (14.3% or 290,207), Croats (2.8% or 56,546) and a number of other nationalities including Slovaks, Montenegrins, Romanians, Roma, Ruthenians,

⁹ Census data can be found on:
<http://www.statserb.sr.gov.yuzipesn31.pdf>.

Macedonians and other smaller ethnic groups. A total of 2.45%, or 48,881 of population declared themselves as Yugoslavs in 2002, while 2.7% or 55,016 refused to declare their ethnicity.

According to the 1991 census¹⁰, the total population of Kosovo was 1,956,196, or somewhat less than 20% of the population of Serbia. According to the ethnic composition, the vast majority of population were Albanians – 1,596,072, or 81.6% of the total population of this province, which makes up 17% of the total population of Serbia. The second most numerous population groups were Serbs (194,190), Muslims (66,189), Roma (45,745), Montenegrins (20,356), Turks (10,446), Croats (8,062), and other smaller national and ethnic groups, the total number of which was 24.

BOX 8.

THE ROMA PEOPLE IN SERBIA

A relatively large ethnic group, with a specific culture, are the Roma. Their arrival in the Balkans and Serbia dates from the 14th century, parallel with the invasion of Turks. Roma in Serbia do not have a unique culture. Based on origin, language and religion, four groups can be distinguished: (a) Turkish Roma, who populated the country in mid-14th century: by religion, they are Muslims and Christians (b) White Roma, who came from Bosnia, who are Muslims and speak Serbian, (c) Wallachian Roma who came from Romania; they are Orthodox, and they speak Serbian and Romanian, (d) Hungarian Roma, who came from Austria.

The largest national minority in Serbia are Hungarians. They predominantly live in Vojvodina. However, the main demographic feature of the Hungarian population in Yugoslavia is depopulation. This negative population trend (known as “white plague”) is a characteristic for the entire Hungarian population in Serbia, but most pronounced in Vojvodina.

Albanians are a people of non-Slavic origin, which have been living in the Balkans together with Serbs for more than thousand years¹¹. In Serbia proper, practically all of the Albanian po-

pulation (93.4%) lives in three undeveloped municipalities in the south of Serbia. In two of the municipalities they are the majority population, as well as in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo, which is legally a part of Serbia and Montenegro. Albanians also comprise a substantial minority in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The Bosniak/Muslim population is concentrated in Sandžak, a region located between Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia. There, in three municipalities, they are in an absolute majority.

The Bulgarian national minority constitutes 0.3% of the Serbia population, according to the last census. The majority of them inhabit eastern Serbia, in the border-area towards Bulgaria. The size of the Bulgarian minority constantly decreases, due to out-migration, decline in the birth rate, cultural assimilation, and ethnic mimicry.

“Bunjevci” (Croats from Bačka) populate mainly the northern Bačka area in Vojvodina. The names “Bunjevci” itself, as well as the origin of these people is a matter of some discussion. While some experts think that they are an old-Balkan people who settled in Vojvodina in the 17th century from their ancient homeland in Dalmatia, Herzegovina and Lika, others assert that “Bunjevci” are undoubtedly of Croat ethnic origin; they substantiate this opinion with such elements of Croat national identity as the Catholic religion and the dialect that the “Bunjevci” use.

Until 1991, in the Republic of Serbia, there were 105,406 inhabitants of Croat nationality. However, as a result of disintegration of Yugoslavia and the war in Croatia and Bosnia, a part of the Croat population moved to Croatia, in the 2002 census their number was 70,602.

The ethnic community which populates north-eastern Serbia is the Wallachian, who number 17,672. There are some divisions among anthropologists, ethnologists, and particularly the historians over the origin of the Wallachians, whether they are an autochthonous old Balkan people which have, over time, accepted the values of the majority Slav and Romanian locale, or whether they are of distinct Romanian origin. It is certain, however, that these people have a language, folklore and traditions which indicate their Romanian origin, while part of traditions, personal names and toponyms substantiate their old-Balkan or Slav origins.

¹⁰ <http://www.gov.yucw.ethical.htm>.

¹¹ More detailed in P. Imami: *Serbs and Albanians Over Centuries*, Belgrade, Samizdat Free, B92, 2000.

NATIONAL AND ETHNIC LANGUAGES

Language and culture. Language is considered the most important element of a culture. First of all, it is the principal means of communication: it makes possible understanding between members of the same language community, but it also restricts communication between people who, no matter how friendly and motivated to communicate, do not have a common language. Besides that, language has an important role in the development of human group identity. The language of a group becomes not only its symbol of identification, but also a sign of its authenticity. Language is a medium in which the cultural achievements of one group are preserved, which embodies collective memory and the most valuable group experiences. Language represents “a second homeland”, the endangering of which can be perceived as the endangering of a territory.

BOX 9.

LANGUAGES IN SERBIA

According to the 2002 census, 88.3% of the population speak Serb, 3.8% speak Hungarian, 1.8% speak Bosnian, 1.1% speak Romany, 0.8% speak Albanian, 0.8% speak Slovak, 0.7% speak Wallachian, 0.5% speak Romanian, 0.4% speak Croat, 0.2% speak Bulgarian, and 0.2% speak Macedonian. Other languages are spoken by 0.5% of population, while for 0.8% of population this information is unknown.

Hungarian belongs to the non-Indo-European Hungarian-Finnish language group, Romanian belongs to neo-Latin languages, and Albanian, still belonging to the Indo-European language community, forms part of no known wider subgroup, while Slovak, Macedonian and Bulgarian are Slavic languages.

Roma in Serbia speak either the Romany language or the language of the people with which they amalgamated. There are three main dialects of Romany. Roma use their mother tongue in their homes; 37% do not even start speaking Serbian before school age; 46% are not fully articulate in Serbian¹².

The Serbian Language. The variety of languages, which are spoken in Serbia, reflects well the

ethnic diversity of its population. While the great majority of the population speak Serbian, within the Serbian language there are numerous dialects, which prevail in certain parts of Serbia; they differ by accentuation, and phonetic system, which sometimes serves as means of recognition of someone’s regional affiliation. The Serbian language belongs to the Slavic languages, and it is a part of the sub-regional language system also used by Montenegrins, Croats and Bosniaks. This means that these peoples belong to the same basic language culture within which they completely understand each other, and they can share the same media contents (books, press, TV, radio...).

Serbian and the Cyrillic alphabet are in official use in Serbia. Cyrillic is a Slavic alphabet which goes back to the end of the 9th or beginning of the 10th century. Besides its use by Serbs, Cyrillic is also used by their neighbours in Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria as well as in Russia. The Latin alphabet is used by the neighbouring Croats, Albanians, Hungarians and Romanians. National minorities have a legal right to officially use their language and alphabet in the areas which they populate. In Serbia both the Cyrillic and Latin alphabet are equally used. For example, daily newspapers are printed almost equally in Cyrillic and Latin alphabet, and both alphabets are similarly used on TV programmes.


DIVERSITY OF RELIGION

The importance of religion. Belonging to some religion implies the acceptance of a complex system of beliefs, traditions and norms which contain all elements of a specific culture. The cultural elements which are incorporated into religious beliefs were codified by religious authorities in the past, so that possible confrontation between religion (as the quintessence of tradition) and modernity has been constantly present. In those societies in which there are various parallel religions, a particular problem is the mutual relationship between religious communities, which can range from cooperative attitudes, through isolationism to open opposition and competition. Religion and inter-religious relations gain particular importance and become a source of potential division as opposed to harmony when religious identity coincides with national identity.

¹² Simić, *Study on Social Integration of Romanies*, Association of Romanies of the Republic of Serbia, Niš, January, 1993.

There are around 50 registered religious communities recorded in Serbia. Among the citizens of Serbia the most numerous are the Christians (somewhat above 90%). According to the 2002 census 85.0% of the citizens declared themselves as Orthodox Christians, 5.5% are Catholic, 3.2% Muslim, and 1.1% are Protestant. Just 785 (0.01%) declared themselves as Judaists, 530 or 0.01% belong to some pro-oriental cults, and 0.25% to other religions. 0.5% of citizens declare that they are not believers, 1.3% are undeclared, while, for 1.8% of citizens this is unknown (Chart 2).

CHART 2. Religion of the citizens of Serbia
– 2002



Source: Census of 2002, Republic of Serbia, Republic Statistical Office

BOX 10.

RELIGIOUSNESS OVER THE YEARS

In 1971, 26% of Belgrade residents declared themselves as religious. In surveys carried out in 1972 and 1975, just 9% of religious high-school graduates were registered in Belgrade. Among the students of Niš University, there were just 3% of religious ones in 1985, and in Belgrade, just 10% religious students were recorded in 1987.¹³

Ethnicity and religion. There is a relatively high correlation between ethnicity and religious affiliation. Serbs identify themselves with Orthodoxy and the Serbian Orthodox Church, Croats and Hungarians with the Catholic Church, Bosniaks and Albanians with Islam. The Evange-

list church gathers Slovaks, the Reformist church gathers a part of the Hungarian national minority, and the Vicary of the Romanian Orthodox Church gathers Romanians who live in Banat¹⁴.

Since 2001, the so-called traditional religious communities have been allowed to organize religious teaching within public schools¹⁵. The following churches and religious communities were proclaimed as “traditional”: the Serbian Orthodox church, the Muslim community, the Catholic Church, the Slovak Evangelist church, the Jewish community, the Reformist Christian church and the Evangelist Christian church¹⁶.

In the 2002 census, citizens were asked about their religious affiliation. Many citizens classify themselves into one or more religious traditions as a sign of their own confessional origin (“the religions of their grandfathers and fathers”), or they saw identification with traditional confessions as a sign of national identification, although they are not religious.

Post War Restrictions on Religious Affiliations.

After World War II, Marxist atheist doctrines, had a practical political objective of alleviating national and confessional tensions, which characterized this past period, through restricting the use of religious symbols and practices. This process did not however have the same consequence in all parts of Yugoslavia. It happened to have the strongest effect in homogenous Orthodox areas which led to a constant decrease in the number of Orthodox believers. Besides, it led to the domination of religiosity among the older citizens, those from rural areas, and less educated population. In several surveys carried out in the early 70's, religious people were in a remarkable minority, particularly among the younger and more educated population.

While practicing religion was not forbidden, it was considered as an obstacle to social development, and perceived as a sign of backward-

¹⁴ Z. Kuburić: *Religion and Freedom*. Belgrade: JUNIR, 1999, p. 17.

¹⁵ Religious teaching was a compulsory subject in schools before the Second World War. In 1952 religious teaching was banned from public schools, and the Theological Faculty was excluded from Belgrade University. At the initiative of the Serb Orthodox Church, the Government of Serbia passed a **Decree on Organization and Realization of Religious Teaching**, which was announced in the Official Gazette of RS No. 46 on 27.7. 2001, while the actual religious teaching started in October/November 2001.

¹⁶ **Decree on Organization and Realization of Religious Teaching**, Official Gazette of RS No. 46 on 27.7. 2001.

¹³ From: D. Pantić: Changes in Religiousness of the Citizens of Serbia. *Sociological Review*, page 177–204. Vol. XXVII, No 1–4, 1993.

BOX 11.

RELIGIOUSNESS IN 2004

In a 2004 survey¹⁷, a total of 96% of the population in Serbia declared to belong to some religion (85.8% Orthodox, 7.1% Catholic, 1.9% Islamic, 0.5 other religions, 0.5% were undecided, 1.2% did not belong to any religion, while 3.1% refused to answer this question). Nevertheless, 65% of population declared themselves as religious (of which, 30.4% claim to be religious, but do not accept all teachings of their church, while 34.8% are believers, and abide by all teachings of their religion). 23.8% of citizens declared themselves as non-religious, but tolerant towards religion, 1.2% were stated to be opposed to religion, while 9% were indecisive.

ness. In the eighties, a process of “desecularisation” was initiated, as a part of a wider process of “re-traditionalisation”. As a result, the number of believers, which in mid 1990, in Serbia (without Kosovo), added up to approximately 1/3 of the population, started to increase, and, in November 1993 it reached 42%¹⁸. Churches started to gain importance and social influence, and the process of uniting of national and religious identities started increasing. Various forms of religious practice (christening, Patron-Saint’s day...) became customary, and they were perceived as a sign of maintenance of national identity. Since this was the period of greatest outburst of nationalism and national conflicts, these processes had a reflection on the increase in religious intolerance.

BOX 12.

INTER-RELIGIOUS COOPERATION IN VOJVODINA

On 22–24 November 2004, the Serbian Orthodox Church’s Dioceses of Bačka and the Roman Catholic Bishopric of Subotica, with the support of other Christian Churches in the territory of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, took the initiative to organize a conference to discuss with the participation of stakeholders belonging to local and international communities, various issues of religious, cultural and inter-ethnic cooperation in the context of European integration. Despite the fact that the initiative was limited to Vojvodina, and did not include the Muslim community, it was attended by the most important Serbian dignitaries, and it conveyed positive notes in its final message, such as the following points:

a. The Christian Churches gathered at this Conference call for fruitful dialogue and fraternal cooperation, such as they themselves traditionally nurture, among all persons and institutions that have the need and the possibility of making a contribution to the furthering of religious, cultural and inter-national cooperation among people, individuals and peoples. At the same time, participants of the Conference encourage all servants in the Church, as well as all faithful, to

encourage mutual dialogue and concrete cooperation within their communities in keeping with their Christian mission

b. We wish to emphasize that those who believe that their nationality, faith and culture can develop fully in isolation are not correct nor those who believe that in order to join the family of democratic peoples of Europe it is necessary to renounce one’s own heritage and identity


c. Cognizant that the Churches base their life and their mission on love toward God and their neighbour, we call on all Christians and people of goodwill to examine their own conscience and to [demonstrate] responsible and proactive love toward their neighbour that transcends customary tolerance. Christians do not live merely next to each other or with one another, they live for each other because every person, regardless of faith, skin colour or social status, recognizes the living icon of God and in it loves his or her brother or sister [created] in God’s image. From this standpoint we jointly condemn every form of violence and extremism such as anti-Semitism, Islamophobia and similar.

The full text of the message can be read at <http://www.spc.yu/mir/deklaracija-eng.html>

¹⁷ Ibid. page 190.

¹⁸ BCHR 2004.

The number of religious persons slightly decreased with age: from 69.6% of population aged 18–29 years to 62.1% of population aged 60 + years (Chart 3).



Dimensions of religious beliefs. Consequently, religiousness is not a minority phenomenon any more in Serbia as it used to be in early '90s. In a survey¹⁹ which covered younger categories (from 15 to 25 years of age), the percentage of religiousness was high with 74% of young people declaring themselves as religious. Religious identification, however, did not coincide with the obedience of religious rules (Table 1).

TABLE 1. Attitudes of the young towards religion

	N	%
I am a believer, I regularly comply with all main religious canons	118	7,4
I consider myself a believer, I mainly comply with main religious canons	422	26,5
I consider myself a believer, I comply with religious canons in special occasions	445	28,0
I consider myself a believer, but I do not comply with religious canons	201	12,6
I do not consider myself a believer, I comply with religious canons because of traditions	252	15,8
I do not consider myself a believer, I do not comply with religious canons	131	8,2
No answer	22	1,5
Total	5591	100,0

Source: Standard of Living Survey for 2002 and 2003. Preliminary data for 2003.

¹⁹ PRONI 2002.

In fact, it appears that, just one in ten citizens who consider themselves believers, regularly hold on to their religious practices, while 17% completely fail to do so. On the other hand, within the corpus of citizens, who do not consider themselves believers, as much as two thirds respect religious practices as part of their tradition.

THE RURAL–URBAN DIMENSION IN CULTURAL DIVERSITY

The rural–urban divide. In our discussion of various cultures, understood as different ways of life within the same society, the usual, and one of the most visible divisions is between urban and rural cultures or ways of life. The rural and urban way of life differs not only in terms of social and economic and even political perspectives but also in respect to the modalities of earning a living, the types of residence, and generally, the way in which public and private life is organized. Urban culture exists if there is a distinct urbanized society, which develops with the configuration of bigger cities through the specific conditions of high population and housing density and a broad based cultural and ethnic heterogeneity. In many respects, the so-called rural–urban polarity is equivalent to the traditionalism–modernism dimension, in stereotyped presentation, and also with retrograde–modern, developed–undeveloped dimensions. A particular attribute of most urban societies is that they make possible the interpenetration of cultures, heightened cultural tolerance, and the cultivation of an “elite urban form of culture” which transcends religious and cultural barriers.

In Serbia, somewhat more than one half of the population (56.4%) lives in cities, and, it is one of the least urbanized of the former socialist countries. In 2001 there were 6.156 settlements in Serbia, of which 45 were towns.

Socio–Economic Status of the Urban and Rural Population

The social and economic status of the **urban and rural population** varies widely. Although the *labour force participation rates* of the urban and rural population are almost identical, the unemployment rate of the rural population is lower than that of the urban population (Table 2).

This is the result of a higher participation of the rural population in the informal sector (see Table in Box 17). Measured by *average household consumption*, the standard of living in 2003 of the rural population was 21% lower than in the urban centres. However, more significant differences in the standard of living are observed at the lower level of consumption (at the poverty line). The

rural population was much poorer than the urban population in view of the fact that the *poverty index of the rural population* was almost twice as high as that of the urban population, while their relative poverty risk was higher by about one-third relative to the average for the total population.

TABLE 2. Economic status of the urban and rural population in Serbia, 2002–2003

	Urban		Rural		Total	
	2002.	2003.	2002.	2003.	2002.	2003.
Participation rate, in %	62.2	61.7	62.3	61.0	62.2	61.4
Unemployment rate, in %	9.0	9.4	7.5	7.5	8.4	8.6
Average consumption, in din.	10,617	11,420	8,934	9,047	9,883	10,386
Average income, in din.	8,380	10,027	9,218	9,797	8,745	9,927
Poverty index, in %	7.8	9.0	14.2	17.9	10.6	12.9
Poverty gap, in %	1.5	1.7	3.2	3.8	2.2	2.6

Note: Consumption and income are expressed by consumption unit.

Source: Standard of Living Survey for 2002 and 2003.

Poverty in Serbia has become a rural phenomenon, corresponding to the situation in most countries in transition²⁰, as opposed to the 1990s, when poverty was dominant in urban areas. This can be explained by the fact that over the past few years the growth of real wages and pensions, which constitute the major source of income of the urban population, was relatively high as compared to the growth of other sources of income. The poverty gap in rural areas was also greater than in urban ones.

Over the decades, rural areas have been characterized by economic and cultural stagnation and a deteriorating social and economic position as the result of inadequate agricultural policy and the perennial neglect of rural development. The possibilities for finding employment outside agriculture are limited²¹. All of this has contributed to increasing rural–urban migration especially of the young and most capable. Depopulation of rural areas and the ageing of the rural population are the best evidence of an economic slowdown and the deepening of poverty of the rural population.

About 60% of the economically active population engaged in agriculture is older than 60 years, while slightly more than 15% of the rural population has no economically active member in the household. Therefore, the consequence (and also a cause) of the more difficult economic status of the rural population relative to the urban one is the unfavourable age distribution of the rural population, its reduced working ability and income-earning capacity, unfavourable educational structure and unfavourable land holding structure (the average holding has an area of 3 ha).

GENDER-RELATED ASPECTS OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY

Within a total of 7,498,001 inhabitants in Serbia (2002 census) the female population slightly prevails over the male population (51.4%: 48.6%). This is considered a consequence of the increased loss of male population in the I and II World Wars. Approximately the same percentage of females and males live in the cities (56.6% of female citizens and 56.2% of male citizens). Average age of female population (38.4 years) slightly exceeds the average age of male population (36.4 years), as well as the life span (75.1 years for women and 70.1 years for men). The suicide rate among females is 10.8, and among males 28.1.

²⁰ In most countries in transition, urban poverty reduction was much more evident than poverty in rural areas. See: *EBRD Transition Report (2002)*.

²¹ In urban areas, employment in the service sector accounted for 71% of total employment, as contrasted to 30% in rural areas.

The Socio-Economic Status of Men and Women

Men and women are almost equally affected by poverty in view of the fact that the percentages of poor men and women are almost identical. The same applies to the poverty gap (Table 3). This leads to the conclusion that in the poorest population groups, economic discrimination between men and women was not observed. The average consumption of women below the poverty line is almost the same as that of men.

TABLE 3. Economic status of men and women in Serbia, 2002–2003

	Men		Women	
	2002	2003	2002	2003.
Participation rate, in %	61.2	61.1	63.6	61.8
Unemployment rate, in %	7.5	7.5	9.6	10.2
Average consumption, in din.	9,927	10,448	9,842	10,328
Average income, in din.	8,863	10,078	8,634	9,786
Poverty index, in %	10.57	12.8	10.60	13.0
Poverty gap, in %	2.3	2.6	2.2	2.7

Source: Standard of Living Survey for 2002 and 2003. Preliminary data for 2003.


Gender discrimination. However, a number of other indicators points to the less favourable social and economic status of women, such as: a less favourable educational and occupational structure (48% of women have less than secondary school education, as compared to 35% of men) and higher unemployment rate. The education level of unemployed women was generally higher than that of men, with a longer period of waiting for employment, more stringent employment requirements and career advancement, lower wages and the like. The difference in wages between men and women with the same qualifications (i.e. educational level, working experience, skill level, etc.) was 13% in favour of men in 1995 and 17% in 2002, although according to the law the level of remuneration should be the same for the same job. A part of this difference is explained by the greater number of hours worked by men relative to women.

The vulnerability of women is reflected also when the picture is broken up by different groups (majority, Roma and IDPs/refugees). As seen from Chart 4, women unemployment rates are higher than for men. In some cases, the unemployment rates for IDPs and refugees are

even higher than those for Roma – probably because of the more limited access to informal networks (and hence the informal economy) which is usually associated with contacts and affiliation to certain regions.

CHART 4. Unemployment rates of men and women in Serbia, 2004

Source: UNDP Vulnerability Survey 2004.



The less favourable status of women is also supported by the results on the *Gender Development Index* (GDI) and the *Gender Empowerment Measure* (GEM) indices. For example, although according to the GDI there has been an improvement in gender equality over the observed period 1999–2002, Serbia – with a GDI value of 0.759 – still lags significantly behind many developed and neighbouring countries. Comparing GEM values – measuring women participation in a country's political and economic life – for the group of selected developed and transition countries, the result is similar²².

Although the gender pay gap increased considerably (by one-third) during the observed period, it is still one of the lowest among the countries in transition (*Newell and Reilly, 2001*).

Considered by sector, the share of women employed in the service sector was slightly higher than that of men (55% vs. 50%) and lower in industry (15% of women vs. 21% of men), while the employment of women and men in agriculture was almost identical (about 30%).

AGE-RELATED ASPECTS OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY

An ageing population. According to the 2002 Census, Serbia is among the ten countries in the world with the highest proportion of elderly

²² See the Part IV – Annex – for methodology and results.

BOX 13.

MUSICAL AND FOLKLORE SUBCULTURES

One of the main elements of the youth culture is music. The young differ from elders not only in the time spent on music, but in the type of music preferred. While the young are fans of rock and pop music, elders listen to folk music; however, this traditional division has tended to change in recent times.

The fact that Serbia is located in the area where various civilisations and cultures meet and intermingle, is best reflected in its music. Numerous folklore and musical traditions exist one beside the other, often blending together.

Serb folk music has been preserved for centuries as a part of traditional culture, and it has two components. One of them has been kept away from Turkish influence, and the other one was developed under the influence of Turkish music. On the territory of Serbia other folklore traditions are also strong. In Vojvodina there is a strong influence of Hungarian folklore, as well as the folklore of Slovaks and Ruthenians. In the east of Serbia we can meet a rich Wallachian tradition and in southwest of Serbia the Muslim folklore. The music of the Roma is a very important part of Roma' identity, and it shows great diversity.

In the period after the II World War the most popular form of music was the so-called "popular" music which developed under west European influence. Rock-and-roll was a dominant musical style of young generation. Initially met with ideological condemnation, Rock was later promoted as a part of ideologically dominant cultural model of cosmopolitanism. Rock inde-

ed had a cosmopolitan dimension on one side, and, on the other side, a part of rockers found a stronghold in the Serb traditional right-wing²³.

One of the phenomena of popular music in Serbia was the so-called neo-folk (rural pop music). Although it was socially marginalized, and among young and educated people even despised, neo-folk practically realized the biggest circulation, because, with its rural and traditional motives, it reflected the feelings of semi-urbanised population, which moved from villages to towns in search of jobs, not being able to adapt to completely new conditions.

Since the beginning of the nineties, drastic social changes have been reflected in popular music events. One form which appeared then by combination of folk music and techno matrix, which soon became the most popular, is turbo-folk (or techno-folk). Some believe that turbo-folk has been systematically promoted with the aim to destroy rock, as a dominant urban, cosmopolitan, subversive matrix and replace it with nationalist, anti-west and rural turbo folk²⁴. But, according to other authors, turbo-folk does not contain rural, nationalist elements, it is an urban phenomenon, at the same time permeated with oriental melodic expression, and it represents a local stem of global consumerism²⁵; In any case, turbo-folk appeared as a specific amalgam of neo-folk, the then existing urban subcultures, and massive consumerism of western type, and it contains the seal of the period in which the amalgam appeared: period of wars, anomaly, isolation, relenting to market.

persons and lowest share of younger persons in its population. The share of the 1 million younger working age population (aged 15 to 24 years) in the total population was just 13.4%. The young, aged from 15 to 19 years numbered 495,651 (6.6%), and the young aged from 20 to 24 years numbered 512,429 (6.8%). The population younger than 20 years numbered 22.3%, while, just ten years earlier (1991 census) their share was 30.2%.

²³ e.g. Idoli, later Riblja čorba, then the album "Pesme istoka i zapada" (Songs from East and West) with compositions based on texts of Nikolaj Velimirović.

Growing generation gaps. Although generations sometimes marks the interval between parents and their descendants, in a sociological sense generations are not born, but are created and constitute a social group whose formative life experiences are very similar and formed in

²⁴ e.g. E. Gordy: *The Culture of Power in Serbia*. Pennsylvania University Press, 1999.

²⁵ e.g. I. Kronja: *Deadly Embrace – Mass Psychology and Esthetics of Turbo-folk 1990–2000*. Tehnokratia, Belgrade, 2001, e.g. M. Djurković: *Dictatorship, Nation, Globalization*. Institute for European Studies, Belgrade, 2002, page 221.

the same historical and social context²⁶. Social experiences, lived and processed in the same phase of life cycle, form within one generation a characteristic attitude towards the world, values and political orientation, which can sometimes be expressed in a clear discontinuity with previous generations. The age span of some generations obviously depends on the dynamism and dramatic events of social changes. Generations of fathers and sons once could belong to the same generation in a sociological sense, because both generations grew up in identical social conditions and created identical values and way of thinking. However in dynamic periods successive generations become denser and the generation gap becomes larger.

In recent history there have been numerous events which dramatically marked the lives of contemporaries and made them into a “special generation”. The most prominent of all was the II World War, and the state created after it. The generation born before the II World War which is now 65 years and older (born in 1937 or before, and who can remember the war) makes up 16.6% of the current population²⁷.

The Tito socialist generation. Life in Yugoslavia after the II World War, until 1980 was characterised not only by socialism, but also a specific political culture built around the regime of the President Josip Broz Tito. Life in the post-Tito period seem hard to imagine to many people. The share of the current, post-Tito generation – which includes population born in 1978 and later, that is, the current student population – is 29.1% of total population.

The post socialist generation. The most recent generation can be described as the one born after the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Their everyday life was characterised by war and conflicts, constant impoverishment and lack of a stable state entity.

²⁶ Mannheim defined a generation as a “special kind of identity of location, which encompasses similar ‘age groups’ placed in historical and social process”, and he accentuated that biological generations become sociological generations when mutual experience results in similar perception and understanding of reality, for which a “concrete link” is necessary, and this concrete link is “participation in common destiny”. Mannheim, K. *The Problem of Generations. In Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952, page 290.

²⁷ In the 2002 census the population is grouped by age into 5-year categories, so determination of span of one generation is synchronized with these categories.


For this generation the events constitute not just one episode in life, but the only life they know. This generation would cover all population born in 1988 and later, who were 14 years old or less at the time of the 2002 census. Their share of the total population of Serbia is 15.7%.

The socio-economic status of the elderly and youth

The economic status of the **elderly** (aged 65 and over) is less favourable than that of the **youth** (19–25 years). Whereas the youth is faced with a below-average poverty risk, the poverty risk of the elderly is higher by some 40–50% than the population average in the period 2000–2003 (Table 4).

The elderly constitute 17.7% of the total population and almost one-fourth of the total number of the poor. Among pensioners, who constitute the largest group among the elderly, farmer pensioners in rural areas were especially endangered by poverty due to their low pensions, which were paid out with great delay. Although in the period 2002–2003, the difference in poverty between youth and the elderly increased at the expense of the elderly, one should not disregard the problems faced by the urban and rural youth, primarily in the labour market due to the difficulties in obtaining a job.

CHART 5. Unemployment by age groups in Serbia, 2004



Source: UNDP Vulnerability Survey 2004.

BOX 14.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS
OF THE ELDERLY

Serbia's retirement system had a positive impact on the maintenance of at least the minimum standard of living of the elderly during the past decade.

Housing conditions of the elderly are less favourable as compared to those of youth: they live in old houses/flats, with more humidity and leaking roofs, and less sewerage, drinking water, central heating and household appliances. However, it is extremely difficult for young people to live on their own.

Among the government social programmes the most important are homes for the aged (where there are about 9,000 elderly people, of whom 60% are considered immobile) and the allowance for home health care (which is received by 60,000 inhabitants, mostly the elderly).

TABLE 4. Economic status of youth and the elderly in Serbia, 2000–2003

	Youth		Elderly	
	2002	2003	2002	2003
Average consumption, in din.	10,396	10,942	8,524	8,937
Average income, in din.	8,256	9,622	9,039	9,859
Poverty index, in %	9.6	11.3	14.8	19.2
Poverty gap, in %	1.8	2.4	3.1	3.8

Note: Youth belongs to the group aged 19–25, while the elderly are persons aged 65 and over.

Source: Standard of Living Survey for 2002 and 2003. Preliminary data for 2003.

The unemployment rate among youth aged 15–24 years was three times higher than the average unemployment rate (38% vs. 11% in 2002 according to the Labour Survey)²⁸. This extremely high rate of unemployment shows that the youth in Serbia is in a considerably more difficult position than in other countries in transition. It also implies the dissipation of human resources of those age groups which should make the greatest contribution to the economic and social development of society. A special problem is posed by a large outflow of educa-

ted young people abroad in search of jobs and a better standard of living. During the 1990s, about 250,000 young people, mostly university graduates, left the country; an additional 18% of young people are planning to leave the country in the coming period (UNESCO, 2002).

BOX 15.

YOUTH IN TRANSITION

The current generation of 15–24 year-olds is on the leading edge of the transition process in FRY. The oldest of them were 12 years when the Berlin Wall fell, the youngest were toddlers. Their whole world has changed while they have been growing up. The reliable, if repressive, regimes of the past have given way to shattering change and even war. Ironically, young people in FRY may still find their lives constrained by the stultifying rigidity of central planning and political conformity without security and stability of full employment and reliable compensation. The young are exposed to the risks of the new open market and political democracy without reaping the rewards. As they were exposed to the armed conflict accompanying the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, young people are on the front lines of a transition that got underway with the "gentle revolution" of October 2000 but was expressed in the violent events in the Balkans in the early 1990s.

REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

The traumatic events and lifestyle of refugees and IDPs. During the '90s, the most important form of migration to Serbia was refugees. Being a refugee deeply changes the conditions and way of life of persons and families. If we talk about the culture of refugees, we do not mean that all refugees have the same, homogeneous way of life, although it happens in reality that the reasons for becoming refugees, even in case of different conflicts, (which did not coincide territorially or temporally), also homogenize them in terms of socio-demographic characteristics. The life of refugees (from whatever religion or ethnic background) is strongly determined by the sharp and traumatic differences with respect to the past, by what they have lost and left behind, experiences which the domicile

²⁸ See: Krstić (2004).

population does not share with them, and cannot always recognize. People who had seemingly unchangeable and life-long modes of existence and sustenance suddenly lost them overnight. People who had permanent places in the local social structure came into a confusing situation when numerous features of their previous social position, such as education and working-professional status became mere symbols. An important factor, which determines the life style of refugees, is the deterioration of their economic position, very often complete impoverishment, and an absolutely uncertain future. In other words, what is characteristic for refugees is their dislodgment, and social and psychological trauma and eradication. More dramatic unfavourable changes occur within families as well. The accommodation of refugees is also a huge problem for societies to which the refugees fled, particularly if these societies are hit by other, even bigger economic, social and political difficulties.

The refugee crisis in Serbia. The wave of refugees has splashed Serbia since 1991, with the beginning of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. The number of refugees reached 705,667 in 1997. The conflict in Kosovo and armed interventions in 1999 resulted in a wave of over 200,000 internally displaced persons, which fled to Serbia from Kosovo. According to the data from September 2004²⁹, a total of 277,601 refugees were registered in Serbia, as well as 207,639 internally displaced persons from Kosovo. Among the refugees in Serbia, the majority came from Croatia (67.0%) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (32.9%).

The ethnic composition of internally displaced persons in Serbia and Montenegro is the following: 75% are Serbs, 11% are Roma, 4% are Montenegrins, 4% are persons who did not declare their nationality, and the rest are members of other national minorities: Bosniaks, Albanians from Gora, Egyptians and Albanians.

The Socio-Economic Status of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

The total number of internally displaced persons has not changed significantly relative to the end of 1999, since the security and other condi-

tions for their return to Kosovo have not yet been created. This is evidenced by the events in March 2004, when the number of expelled from Kosovo increased by about 4,000.

TABLE 5. Economic status of refugees and internally displaced persons in Serbia, 2002³⁰

	Serbian citizens	Refugees	Internally displaced persons	Total
Participation rate, in %	62.3	60.6	60.0	62.2
Unemployment rate, in %	8.1	18.5	10.6	8.4
Average consumption, in din.	9,932	8,151	9,377	9,883
Average income, in din.	8,834	6,015	7,141	8,745
Poverty index, in %	10.2	20.8	16.6	10.6
Poverty gap, in %	2.2	4.2	4.1	2.2

Note: Consumption and income are expressed per consumption unit. Source: *Standard of Living Survey*, 2002.

The largest number of refugees and internally displaced persons are Serbs. They constitute about 90% of refugees and 76% of internally displaced persons³¹. This means that there are relatively limited linguistic and cultural barriers to their economic and social integration into the new environment. Therefore, the obstacles to an accelerated establishment of social safety nets, which enables greater access to employment and social services, are not cultural but economic. Poor refugees face difficulty in the provision of information and services that might influence their standard of living, mostly due to their restricted social contacts (a small circle of friends, severed family ties, etc.). The attitude of the

³⁰ The indicators of the economic status of refugees and internally displaced persons in Table 5 are based on the data from the Standard of Living Survey of the Population in Serbia which was conducted in 2002. However, the Survey did not cover all refugees and internally displaced persons (including 18,500 persons living in collective centres). Therefore, the data presented in Table 12 can be used only as a provisional indicator as to how much the economic status of refugees and internally displaced persons covered by the Survey is inferior to that of the citizens of Serbia/Montenegro.

The data on refugees and internally displaced persons, provided by the Standard of Living Survey, have not been analyzed due to a considerably smaller sample of the majority population.

³¹ The second largest ethnic group within internally displaced persons is that of Roma (11%).


²⁹ Commissariat for Refugees of the Republic of Serbia, in cooperation with UNHCR.

resident population toward refugees is generally positive, with the exception of Vojvodina, where ethnic minorities have been disturbed by the change in the ethnic composition (PRSP, 2003).

Geographic distribution of refugees. Most refugees live in more developed regions in Serbia: 49% in Vojvodina, 30% in Belgrade, while the rest lives in other regions in Serbia. The greatest number of internally displaced persons lives in Central Serbia (64%), then in Belgrade (28%), while in Vojvodina there is only about 6%. As for housing, most refugees and internally displaced persons live in rented flats (40%) and with their relatives and friends (33–40%), while 18% of refugees have their own flat or house. 18,500 refugees and internally displaced persons still live in structures such as former hotels converted into collective centres for humanitarian emergency reasons.

Economic status of refugees. The participation rate of refugees and internally displaced persons in the labour market is lower than the participation rate of the resident population due to a great number of unemployed among refugees and internally displaced persons. As the results of the “Vulnerability Survey” recently conducted by UNDP in SEE show (Chart 6), for some age groups the unemployment rates for IDPs and refugees are similar to those for Roma communities (usually seen as the most vulnerable). Such an unfavourable position on the labour market cannot be explained by a lower educational level of refugees and internally displaced persons relative to the resident population, since the educational level of refugees (covered by the Survey) was higher than that of the resident population.

CHART 6. Unemployment rates by age




Source: UNDP Vulnerability Survey 2004.

The group of refugees and internally displaced persons (covered by the Survey) is significantly poorer relative to the resident population³². Refugees are faced with a poverty risk³³ which is twice as high as that of the resident population, while the poverty risk of internally displaced persons is more than 50% higher³⁴. The poverty gap of refugees and internally displaced persons is almost twice as high as that of the resident population³⁵. Data from the recent UNDP survey conducted in November 2004 shows similar results. As chart 7 shows, in terms of poverty rates and poverty depth refugees and IDPs “fit” between the majority population and the Roma. The poverty gap for this group (measured by “income gap”, the average distance of individuals or households in poverty from the poverty line as a percentage of the poverty line) is 24% compared to 5% for the majority population and 33% for Roma.

Given that the Survey did not cover the most vulnerable refugees and internally displaced persons living in collective centres, it is estimated that the number of poor refugees and internally displaced persons amounts to 120,000 – 140,000³⁶.

CHART 7. Poverty rates at internationally comparable poverty lines (US\$ PPP 4.30)



Source: UNDP Vulnerability Survey 2004.

³² Household consumption was used as the basic aggregate for poverty measurement.

³³ The poverty risk is the ratio between the poverty indices of the two population groups being compared.

³⁴ In 2003, the poverty line was 5,052 dinars per consumption unit per month.

³⁵ The poverty gap, which is expressed as the percentage of the poverty line, shows the amount of funds per capita which should be allocated to the poor so as to eradicate poverty.

³⁶ Poverty Reduction Strategy of Serbia, Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2003.

THE ROMA POPULATION

Among various social groups having an unfavourable social and economic status in Serbia, Roma represent a very large group with the highest degree of exclusion relative to the majority population, which is mostly derived from the specificity of their culture. According to all social indicators (employment, education, standard of living, reputation, etc.), their social and economic status is extremely unfavourable.

This is actually the case in most countries in which they live³⁷. However, the situation in Serbia is specific due to a great number of Roma among refugees and internally displaced persons, especially from Kosovo.

There are no precise data on the total number of Roma people in Serbia. According to some estimates, their number exceeds the 108,193 registered in the last census³⁸. According to data of the Centre for Study of Ethnicities (March 2004), in 593 settlements in Serbia there is a total of 201,353 Roma, plus another 46,238 of Roma internally displaced from Kosovo. The estimate of the same Centre is that, in settlements with less than 100 inhabitants live another 100,000 Roma, which altogether adds up to around 350,000 persons³⁹.

The Roma settlements. The highest concentration of Roma is in the underdeveloped regions and municipalities in Serbia. The biggest concentration of Roma was in Kosovo (2.2% of total population), however, at the end of the 1990s, a big number of them fled from Kosovo. The biggest concentration of Roma is now recorded in the South of Serbia where in some municipalities Roma make up one third of the total population, as well as in the well developed region of Vojvodina (this is probably due to a greater number of Roma refugees from Kosovo as compared to other regions in Serbia).

³⁷ For international comparisons see the UNDP Regional HDR "Avoiding the Dependency Trap", 2004

³⁸ Official evidence on the Roma population are generally considered unreliable – it is assumed that their number in censuses is somewhat underestimated as a result of the fact that, in fear of discrimination, a number of Roma declare themselves differently. However, this is not the case only in Serbia. According to a UNDP regional report about 5 countries from Eastern and Central Europe, less than one half of Roma declared themselves as Roma on last national census.

³⁹ According to HR in Serbia and Montenegro, 2004:293.

Although territorially scattered, in places in which they live Roma usually live in isolated settlements, the so-called "mahalas" (Turkish quarters), without an appropriate infrastructure, in low-quality houses, and in scantily equipped households. There are, in various parts of Serbia 593 Roma settlements with more than 15 families⁴⁰. Out of the mentioned number of settlements 43.5% are predominantly non-hygienic settlements. 27.3% of these settlements do not have water supply, and, as many as 65.1% of these settlements do not have a sewerage network.

TABLE 6. Roma and majority population by age groups

Age groups	Roma population	Majority population
0 – 6	17.3%	5.2%
7 – 14	16.3%	8.5%
15 – 18	7.9%	4.8%
19 – 25	13.3%	9.0%
26 – 45	28.4%	25.6%
46 – 64	13.7%	27.2%
65+	3.1%	19.7%

Source: SLSP 2003; Main Survey and Roma Survey.

On the average, Roma are an extremely young group – 55% are younger than 25 years, while due to bad conditions of living, the number of old people is very small: just 3.1% are older than 65 years.

TABLE 6a. Roma and majority population by age groups

Age groups	Majority	Roma
0 – 14 years	15%	30%
15 – 29 years	26%	26%
30 – 49 years	30%	28%
50+ years	29%	16%


Source: UNDP Vulnerability Survey 2004.

Data from the recent UNDP "vulnerability" survey reveals a similar demographic profile. From a policy perspective this suggests the crucial role of education both for the group's development opportunities in the future and for society at large. In a nutshell, the uneducated

⁴⁰ According to the study "Roma Settlements, Living Conditions and Possibility of Integration of Roma in Serbia" which was carried out for the Serbian Ministry of Human and Minority Rights.

and not-enrolled youth today is the unemployed core tomorrow with all the marginalization consequences.


CHART 8. Roma and majority population enrolment in primary education



Source: UNDP Vulnerability Survey 2004.

Unfortunately, exactly in terms of education Roma population continuously lags behind. Literacy rates among Roma are not just persistently lower than the rates for the majority population but the trend is disturbing: the share of illiterate in the age group 15–24 is five percent higher than the share for those aged 25–34. This is perhaps an indication of one of the negative externalities of the first years of transition when the old structures were collapsing but were not replaced yet by the new ones.

CHART 9. Roma and majority population employment rates (as share of the labour force for the respective groups)



Source: UNDP Vulnerability Survey 2004.

Unfortunately, the situation today as regards enrolment is not much better. A stable core of 15–20% of Roma children does not attend school and they are progressively dropping out after the age of 11–12 years. To a certain

extent, this is also related to cultural specificity (early marriages for example effectively depriving Roma girls from educational opportunities and dramatically reducing their employment opportunities).

BOX 16.

SOURCE OF DATA ON ROMA STANDARDS OF LIVING

The Standard of Living Survey of the Roma Population was conducted parallel to the Standard of Living Survey of the Majority Population, i.e. from 15 May to 15 June 2003. The Survey was conducted in the territory of Serbia (without Kosovo) and the sample included 525 Roma households, or 2,366 persons. The territory was divided into three strata (Vojvodina, Belgrade with its suburbs and Central Serbia) on the basis of the number of Roma in those strata and the 2002 census. Within each stratum, the settlements with over 100 Roma households were selected and, within them, the number of households in proportion to the number of the Roma population. This Survey covered the potentially most vulnerable Roma, while the Roma integrated into the majority population, were not included in the Survey.

Another source of comparative data was the UNDP “Vulnerability Survey”. The Survey was conducted in the territory of Serbia (excluding Kosovo) and the sample included 399 majority households that live close to Roma populations and face similar socio-economic challenges. In total, 3,029 individuals were covered by the sample. The sample design took place in three stages. First, the universe was defined using an “average and above” share of Roma in each administrative unit/settlement. Second, sampling clusters were determined taking into consideration estimations of Roma organizations (suggesting, for example, than in a municipality “X” Roma dominate, but for various reasons tend to be reported or declare themselves as “Y” or “Z”), the distribution of the settlements and population size. Third, respondents were identified using “random route selection”. The survey covers roughly 85 percent of Roma in Serbia, and it is representative not only for segregated Roma, but also for the majority of Roma.

One of the basic outcomes of low education is low employability reflected both in low participation in the labour market and difficult access to formal employment. This is one of the important explanations of the low employment rates for Roma compared to other groups.

Roma and unemployment. The economic status of the Roma population is determined primarily by its extremely low labour participation rate of only 40.1%, which is lower than that of the majority population by one-third⁴¹. The very low labour participation of Roma people is aggravating the process of their integration into society and is compounding the problem of Roma social and economic backwardness. The unemployment rate of Roma people is more than twice that of the rest of the population (18.3% vs. 8.4%)⁴² and is comparable with the unemployment rate of Roma in Central and Eastern European countries where at least one in every four Roma was unemployed at the end of 2001⁴³.

TABLE 7. Economic status of Roma and the majority population in Serbia, 2003

	Roma	Majority population
Participation rate, in %	70.07	60.94
Unemployment rate, in %	46.10	15.50
Average consumption, in €	177.43	304.5
Average income, in Euros	157.05	372.49
Poverty index*, in %	61.23	10.31
Poverty gap, in %	33	5

Note: Consumption and income are expressed by consumption unit. Consumption aggregate and poverty line exclude the imputational value.

Source: UNDP Vulnerability Survey 2004

The Roma and Poverty. In 2004, poverty among the surveyed Roma was extremely high – two of the three interviewed Roma (61.23%) were poor and 10.3% were classed as extremely poor, (their total consumption was below the extreme poverty line)⁴⁴.

⁴¹ The participation rate of the majority population was 62.2%.

⁴² However, this unemployment rate of Roma people would be even higher without their inclusion in the grey economy to a significant extent.


⁴³ See *Regional HDR "Avoiding the Dependency Trap"*, 2004.

⁴⁴ However, one should bear in mind that the Standard of Living Survey of Roma covered the potentially most vulnerable Roma groups, while the Roma who have been integrated into the majority population and are assumed to have a better material status, were not covered by this Survey.

Compared to the majority population, the total and extreme poverty of the interviewed Roma is severe, just like in other countries in which they live. The incidence of poverty of Roma is 6 times higher than the poverty of the majority population surveyed. The situation is similar in Bulgaria, where the incidence of the poverty of Roma is 4 times higher relative to the majority population surveyed (Chart 10).

This ratio is 3 in Romania, while in Hungary it is 2. It is important to bear in mind that these comparisons reflect the economic distance between Roma and “neighbouring majority populations” living in close proximity to Roma, and thus also to some extent vulnerable. The distance between Roma and the national averages could be even higher.


CHART 10. The ratio of poor Roma to the non-Roma population



Source: UNDP Vulnerability Survey 2004.

The integration of Roma is also severely hindered by their extremely low educational structure. Only 19% of Roma has completed elementary education, compared to 80% of the majority population that lives in close proximity to the Roma population. Chart 11 shows the low share of Roma (older than 12) with completed primary education in other Balkan countries as well.

CHART 11. People aged 12 and above with complete primary education



Source: UNDP Vulnerability Survey 2004.

Almost 90% of employed Roma are unskilled and semiskilled, which corresponds to their very low educational level⁴⁵. Finally, it should be reiterated that the true picture about the economic status of Roma as a whole is somewhat more favourable than it can be concluded from

this analysis. This is due to the fact that the data does not include Roma who have already been integrated into society, so that they have a better social and economic status. Thus, it can be assumed that their standard of living is higher than that of non-integrated Roma.

BOX 17.

EMPLOYMENT IN THE GREY ECONOMY

During the ten-year period of a severe economic crisis in Serbia, the grey economy was the major coping strategy of a considerable part of the population. It was the phenomenon which was tolerated by the government and which developed into a deep-rooted philosophy of behaviour of a considerable number of the population.

It was estimated that in 2002 about one million people in Serbia were involved in the grey economy, constituting nearly one-third (30.6%) of active participants in the labour market. In 2003, employment in the grey economy accounted for 35% of total employment.

**Inclusion of various social groups
in the grey economy in Serbia, 2002–2003
(in % of the reference group)**

	2002	2003
Serbian citizens	30.2	34.4
Refugees	50.3	61.0
Internally displaced person	30.2	...
Roma	...	71.4
Basic population	30.6	34.8
Urban population	21.7	24.0
Rural population	40.8	47.3
Youth	39.9	45.3
Elderly	62.4	82.3
Men	31.8	35.4
Women	29.0	34.0

Source: Standard of Living Survey, 2002 and 2003

Among the observed groups in Serbia, the highest share of those engaging in the grey economy in 2003 accounted for Roma (71%), refugees (61%), rural population (47.3%), elderly (82.3%) and men (34%).

Legalization of the grey economy

Economic policy, which creates the favourable macroeconomic environment for the development of a new private sector in formal economy, at the same time, contributes to the reintegration of the informal, grey economy into the formal economy. Empirical research (Lacko, 2000) indicates that the spreading of the grey economy was slower in transition counties where the private sector had a faster growth and vice versa. Economic growth, especially growth of the new private sector in the formal economy, and with the effective functioning of a legal state and an efficient tax system, will reduce the grey economy. A firm Government commitment to conduct reforms and privatisation, as well as concrete activities regarding lowering the burden of tax and social contributions on wages, changes in labour regulation, as well as the fight against crime and corruption are the first steps towards the creation of a more stable and attractive macroeconomic environment for the private sector and for a reduction of the grey economy.

1.2. Inter-group relations

INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS

Interethnic relations can be analysed at the normative level (the laws which regulate this area), through social practice, that is, behaviour of individuals and groups, and through the assessment of attitudes and beliefs.

The concept of social distance.⁴⁶ One of the usual ways to study attitudes towards other nations is by measuring “social distance”. Social distance stands for the degrees of understanding and intimacy between members of social groups, which is manifested in readiness to establish

⁴⁵ “Quality Education for Everyone – Challenges of Educational Reform in Serbia”. Ministry for Education and Sport of the Republic of Serbia, 2004., page 211.

⁴⁶ E. Bogardus constructed the scale of social distance by choosing concrete social relationships, graduated by degree of distance, and the respondents have to mark which of these relations they would accept with member of certain group, and which they wouldn't.

Bogardus, E.: Social Distance and its Origins. *Journal of Applied Sociology*, 9, 1925.

more or less close social relationships with members of this group, or lack thereof.⁴⁷

In the 2004 survey of social distance⁴⁸ the subject of study was *ethnic distance* between five minority peoples in Serbia, through four potential social relationships. The results are presented in the Table 8⁴⁹.

The biggest social distance is expressed towards Albanians. Two thirds of citizens would oppose marriage of their close relative to an Albanian, 25% of citizens would not grant them citizenship of Serbia, and one in five citizens would not like to have an Albanian as a neighbour. The distance expressed towards Muslims/Bosniaks and Roma is fairly similar, although the Roma are considered less desirable as marriage partners, the readiness to exclude them from the country is no bigger than in the case of other ethnic groups. Although the Croats were one of the sides opposed to Serbia in the recent wars, as

were the Albanians and Bosniaks, the distance from them is somewhat lesser. The distance towards Hungarians is the smallest.

Of all proposed social relationships, the relationship which requires the smallest social closeness is accepting the other person as a citizen. Although this does not imply any social relationship between the respondents and other nationals, a number of citizens (of the majority Serb population) are still unwilling even to share the same political space with members of another group. At the same time, although neighbourhood implies the possibility of personal interaction, which is why this relationship is more difficult to accept, the refusal of another national as a neighbour are not much higher. This means that, if someone accepts members of another nation as citizens, that is, if he/she has a minimum of tolerance, he/she probably will not refuse them as neighbours.

TABLE 8. Social distance towards minorities in Serbia

% of relationship refusal	To be citizen of Serbia	To be your neighbour	Your boss	Marriage with close relative	Average % of relationship refusal
Hungarians	8.5%	10.1%	25.7%	40.6%	21.2%
Croats	11.1%	13.5%	29.5%	43.0%	24.3%
Roma	8.3%	16.7%	33.4%	60.9%	29.8%
Muslims/Bosniaks	15.5%	19.5%	33.8%	56.3%	31.3%
Albanians	25.5%	30.4%	44.3%	65.5%	41.4%
Average % of relationship refusal	13,8%	18,4%	33,3%	53,5%	

Accepting others through marriage with a close relative proves to be the most intimate relationship, and the hardest to accept. This is partly because one is asked to accept a close, relatively permanent relationship, which cannot be severed at will. On the other hand, the reason for this may be in the fact that the nation is perceived as an extended family, where mixed marriages spoil the inborn ethnic purity of a group.

⁴⁷ BCHR2004.

⁴⁸ Data in table are the answers of the citizens of Serbia to question: "Would you mind if (member of certain ethnic group) were..."

⁴⁹ Distance was obtained on the sample in which 85% of the respondents were of Serb nationality (member of Serb nationality (N=1087) with members of other ethnic groups (N=189). The analysis of ethnic distance of individual minority groups would not be reliable because of the small number of each of them in the sample. In the calculation of ethnic distance towards individual groups, members of these groups were excluded from the sample (e.g. for instance towards Romanies, the answers of Romanies were excluded).

Comparative data on social distance. For a better estimate of the level of social distance, it would be very helpful to compare results with data in other countries. Unfortunately, cross-national studies turned out to be very scarce in this area. One of the items from the above Table can, however, serve for comparison, namely the acceptance of Muslims as neighbours, because this was one of the questions asked in the World Values Surveys 1981–1990–1995. Respondents from Serbia were for the first time included in the survey in October 1996, and then 27.5% said that they would not like to have Muslims as neighbours. As we can see, this percentage is after nine years 8% lower. In other countries included in the 1995 survey the percentages of refusal of Muslims as neighbours were, for example, in Germany 9.2%, in Spain 11.5%, in Bulgaria 16.7%, in Great Britain 16.8%, in Slovenia

23.1%, in Latvia 24.8%, in Macedonia 29.1%. For some countries included in the survey in 1990 the respective percentages were: in Austria 14.2%, Italy 14.3%, France 17.5%, Hungary 18.3%, Romania 34.5%, and Slovakia 51.5%. As it can be seen, the level of distance in some other countries which had not been through armed conflicts are not much lower and somewhere are even higher than in Serbia immediately after a series of bloody wars and the peak of ethnically oriented war propaganda.

There are high correlations between distances towards ethnic groups (ranging from +0.68 to +0.81), which indicates the existence of a *tendency towards general distancing*. The fact that

someone is distanced towards Roma, does not in principle have to tell us anything about the degree of his/her distance towards, say, Croats, because the reasons of distancing towards one or the other groups can be found in quite independent social and historical circumstances. It shows, however, that there exists a general willingness or unwillingness to have social contacts with members of other groups. This general inclination towards distancing does not depend on gender. Somewhat increased inclination towards distancing was found among younger respondents ($r = -0.10$) and less educated ones ($r = -0.10$). However, as the linear correlations show, these connections were very weak.

BOX 18.

CHANGES IN ETHNIC DISTANCE OVER TIME

Ethnic distance has been the subject of frequent measurements in Yugoslav society since the 1980s. The initial surveys “consistently indicated low distancing towards other nations, relatively even smaller than in populations of numerous developed countries”⁵⁰. All until mid 1980s ethnic distances were steadily low, and it even showed a decreasing trend. However, at the end of 1980s, short before the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and as a result of conflicts between the republics, ethnic distance increased on the territory of the entire ex Yugoslavia. War produced further abrupt increase of social distance, and not only towards enemy sides, but generally, towards all groups different than the own group. Regular public opinion polls carried out by SMMRI show that, at the end of armed conflicts in BiH and Croatia, social distance among Serbs further increased, because of continued nationalist policies, objective isolation imposed by sanctions of the international community, and opening of the new crisis in Kosovo, as well as the NATO military intervention. Increase of distance reached its culmination in 2000 (survey from May 2000).

Immediately after the democratic changes in October 2000, which resulted in opening towards the world, an abrupt decrease of ethnic distance was recorded (survey from June 2001). After the increase of social distance recorded in February 2002, measurements from August 2003, and July 2004 show trend of gradual decrease of social distance.

Comparison of distances recorded in different periods of time shows that, after the democratic changes in October 2000, with little oscillations, a gradual decrease of distance has been taking place, and distance towards the majority of peoples has reached the level recorded 7 years ago. Although ethnic distance recorded in August 2003 was somewhat lesser than in the preceding year, the general finding is that the attitudes of the Serbs towards national minorities in Serbia are more negative compared to the findings of the survey from February 2002. These trends were particularly pronounced in central Serbia. Besides that, the data substantiate the conclusion about radicalisation of attitudes in the category of younger population.

Comparison of the *ethnic distance of majority and minority population*⁵¹ has shown that members of ethnic minorities have significantly lesser ethnic distance towards other groups than the majority people. In general, the increased rese-

arche of the majority population towards other groups is accentuated when the distance towards Albanians is concerned. While the distance of members of national minorities towards Albanians, Bosniaks and Roma is approximately the same, the distance of Serbs towards Albanians is significantly bigger compared to the other two

⁵⁰ BHCR, 2004.

⁵¹ CPIJM 2002 – data available on: www.cpijm.org.yucpijmd.htm.

groups. It is obvious that the longstanding and unresolved conflict in Kosovo increases distrust towards Albanians, and decreases readiness for any contacts whatsoever.

Although there are differences in the degree of distance shown by Serbs and non-Serbs, the structure of the distance is identical: both Serbs and non-Serbs show equal distance towards Croats and Hungarians, and the biggest distance towards Albanians and Roma.

Ethnic distance in terms of willingness to associate. Mutual social distances between members of different ethnic groups in Serbia are

the subject of another survey⁵² which is based on a declaration about one social relationship – willingness for mutual associating and visiting. All ethnic groups show exceptionally small distance towards members of their own group. Serbs show the biggest distance towards members of other groups (average distance 39%), while, in case of other ethnic groups, on the average one third is not ready to accept others as friends. The least distance was recorded with Montenegrins – 17%⁵³, while the biggest distance is expressed towards Albanians (50% on the average) and Croats (44%), and the least one towards Serbs (6%).

TABLE 9. Is the existence of national minorities an advantage or a source of tensions?

	REGION			TOTAL
	Belgrade	Central Serbia	Vojvodina	
Presence of various languages, cultures and religions within one country makes the culture of this country richer, so this is rather an advantage than a disadvantage for this country	55.0%	40.9%	65.3%	49.5%
Presence of various languages, cultures and religions within one country unavoidably creates tensions, so the countries which do not have national minorities are in better position	45.0%	59.1%	34.7%	50.5%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

Source: SMMRI, August 2003

Serbs are the least distanced towards Montenegrins, an orthodox nation with whom they are attached by similar traditions. Serbs show the biggest distance towards the peoples with whom they had armed conflict in the 1990s on the territory of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, that is, towards Albanians, Muslims/Bosniaks and Croats. Religious differences in this case can also be significant, but, still in interaction with experience of armed conflict. In contrast to results obtained in the previous survey, in this one Serbs did not show bigger distance towards the Roma than other national groups.

It should be pointed that Roma almost always accept the members of the majority people – the Serbs, as possible friends, even a bit more than members of their own group; and the second fact is that the order of their acceptance of other national groups is similar to one shown by Serbs and Montenegrins, which means that they represent a reference group for the Roma.

Attitudes towards ethnic minorities. The very existence of ethnic minorities in one society can be perceived either as a source of tensions, or something, which enriches the society. According to their attitude towards national minorities in Serbia, the citizens of Serbia are divided (Table 9). One half of the citizens think that the presence of ethnic minorities creates a public climate full of tension. Important information is that, in the area which is ethnically the most heterogeneous – in Vojvodina – the highest percentage of people see this heterogeneity as an advantage, while in the region which is the most homogeneous – in Central Serbia, citizens are the most frightened by cultural heterogeneity.


⁵² Z. Golubović, B. Kuzmanović and M. Vasović: *Social Character and Social Changes in the Light of National Conflicts*. Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 1995, page 192.

⁵³ Since the sample was representative of the total population, and taking into consideration the small percentage of Croats, Montenegrins, Albanians and Romanians, the data about distance of these groups towards other groups should not be considered as fully reliable, because of their small share in sample.

Not all ethnic minorities are perceived as equal sources of threat or advantage. The biggest distrust is felt towards Albanians, then Muslims, Croats, and the least towards Hungarians and Roma.

While one half of the citizens agree in principle that the existence of national minorities in society is rather a disadvantage than an advantage, when the question is asked about concrete ethnic groups (Chart 12) only a small percentage see in these groups a potential source of danger. The only exception is Albanians, whom more than half of the Serb population perceive as a disrupting factor in Serbia. Roma and Hungarians are least frequently assessed as undesirable in Serbia.

CHART 12. Percentage of population who agree with the statement that problems in Serbia would not exist if members of certain national minorities did not live in it



In comparison with February 2002, the percentage of citizens who agree with the statement that problems in Serbia would not exist if certain national minorities did not live in it has increased, which points to the fact that the attitude towards national minorities has generally become more negative. Further on, the survey shows that distrust towards ethnic minorities comes from the belief that they are disloyal. The highest average grade for loyalty is given to Roma, then the Hungarians in Serbia, while the lowest grade was given to Albanians.

The level of distrust of national minorities can be seen from the citizens' attitudes towards

the question whether certain national minorities should or should not be limited in use of their own language, cultivation of own culture, traditions and customs, and practising of own religion. A great majority, (almost $\frac{3}{4}$ of the citizens of Serb nationality) think that language, culture and religion of minorities should not be limited, while $\frac{1}{4}$ of the citizens see a danger in this, and advocate limitations. Certain differences exist, depending on which national minority is in question. The higher the level of distrust in some national minority, the lower is the percentage of citizens who would not restrict use of language, culture and religion. Citizens are less tolerant towards the use of language (which refers to communication within a broader community) than towards religion and culture.

BOX 19.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS MINORITY LANGUAGES

Widespread reservations towards the free use of language were expressed in the 2003 survey. The question on "What is your personal attitude towards right of minorities to publish books and attend schools in their native language?", was answered by 53% that they should be allowed to do it without any limitations, another 16% answered that disloyal minorities should be deprived of this right, and loyal minorities should be allowed to do so without any limitations, while 25% were in favour of limiting these rights to all minorities.

ETHNOCENTRISM

Ethnocentrism is another component of ethnic attitudes, particularly important for inter-ethnic relations in a society. The term ethnocentrism stands for the tendency to idealize one's own ethnic group and consider it superior to other groups.

Measurement of ethnocentrism. In a 2004 survey⁵⁴ a scale of ethnocentrism was used which consisted of 8 statements relating to attitudes towards ethnic openness and acceptance. (see Table 10).

⁵⁴ S. Joksimović and Z. Kuburić: Religious page str. 137–154. Novi Sad: CEIR, 2002 (survey carried out in spring of 2002 on 503 secondary school pupils from several cities in Serbia).


TABLE 10. Answers to statements from the scale of ethnocentrism

	Completely disagree	Somewhat disagree	Both yes and no	Somewhat agree	Completely agree	Total
1. Members of my nation should not mix with other nations through mixed marriages	49,9%	9,4%	18,9%	7,2%	14,6%	100,0%
2. One should always be cautious and reserved towards members of other nations, even if they behave as our friends	39,2%	13,2%	24,6%	10,5%	12,4%	100,0%
3. In comparison with other nations, the nation I belong to is much more intelligent	49,2%	10,9%	21,7%	8,0%	10,3%	100,0%
4. Openness and sincerity towards other nations brings more damage than benefit	43,4%	13,6%	23,1%	9,8%	10,1%	100,0%
5. I trust more the members of my nation than other nations	32,8%	10,2%	22,4%	14,7%	19,9%	100,0%
6. Due to mixing of various cultures, my nation is threatened of losing its cultural identity	35,4%	15,2%	26,1%	11,1%	12,3%	100,0%
7. For each nation it is necessary to be open towards the world and influence of other cultures	2,9%	2,6%	18,6%	21,7%	54,2%	100,0%
8. I think it is wonderful to have people of various nations and cultures in my country	4,7%	6,7%	27,5%	20,8%	40,3%	100,0%

In all statements (except statements No. 7 and No. 8) agreement with the statement expresses ethnocentrism. When the respondents express their agreement or disagreement with these two statements which affirmatively describe openness towards other nations, just a minor number of respondents explicitly express disagreement with such ideas, and a majority agree with them. However, when the respondents express their opinion about the statements which contain et-

hnocentric attitudes, acceptance of ethnocentric attitudes is somewhat bigger, but always in minority. Consequently 53% of the respondents disagree and 23% agree with the statement that “One should always be cautious and reserved towards members of other nations, even if they behave as our friends”, 51% of the respondents disagree and 23% agree with the statement that “Due to mixing of various cultures, my nation is threatened of losing its cultural identity”, etc.

CHART 13. Agreement with statement from the scale of ethnocentrism—members of Serb and non-Serb nationality



It can generally be concluded that ethnocentric statements are rejected by a majority of citizens, but there are at least 20% of those who accept each of these statements. Chart 13 shows the degree of agreement with statements from the scale of ethnocentrism (joined categories “completely agree” and “somewhat agree”) of Serb and other nationalities and suggest increased closing towards others, and feeling of distrust. Consequently, significantly bigger number of members of the majority nation (26%) is frightened from the loss of cultural identity as a result of mixing with other peoples compared to members of national minorities (8.8%).

There were no gender related differences in the level of ethnocentrism, however, significant differences were observed depending on the level of education. There was no difference between the citizens with elementary and secondary education, however, citizens with university education had significantly lower scores. Ethnocentrism was significantly connected with religiousness. The lowest ethnocentrism is shown by citizens who state that they are not religious, but that they have nothing against religion. The highest ethnocentrism is recorded among the citizens who declared that they were religious, and accept all teachings of their church.

members of the Orthodox religion. The biggest distance is expressed towards members of small religious communities. This is understandable in the light of the fact that they are usually publicly referred to as “religious sects”, which, further on, are brought into connection with Satanists. Somewhat lesser distance is expressed towards Muslims. For these two groups, half of the respondents would not allow the marriage of a close relative with their members, and somewhat less than one half (around 40%) would not like them to educate their children or be their superiors at work. The distance towards Catholics is lesser – 9% of the citizens would not like to have them as neighbours, while 36% would not consent to marriage with them.

While belonging to the Catholic and Muslim religions is connected with nationality, particularly in groups which were involved in past wars, belonging to small religious communities and atheists do not have signs of national affiliation. Distance towards atheists is not negligible either: 30% of the citizens would not like their relative to marry a non-believer, one in four citizens would not like an atheist to educate their children, and one in seven citizens would not like to be friends with them. In a recent

TABLE 11. “Would you mind if some of the members of groups listed below were...”

% of YES answers	Neighbour	Friend	Managerial position	Child's teacher	Marriage with close relative	Average % of NON Acceptance of relationship
Orthodox	..1%	1.2%	0.5%	0.5%	2.4%	0.94%
Catholics	8.9%	12.7%	28.2%	26.6%	36.2%	22.5%
Muslims	17.7%	23.8%	38.3%	40.2%	52.5%	34.5%
Small religious communities	20.5%	29.5%	38.2%	41.8%	52.0%	36.4%
Atheists	10.0%	14.7%	21.9%	25.5%	29.5%	20.3%
Average %	11,4	16,4	25,4	26,9	34,5	

INTER-RELIGIOUS RELATIONSHIPS

The measurement of religious distance. The BCHR2004 survey examined religious distance, that is, (non) acceptance to establish various social relationships with members of various religions (Table 11).

Since 80% of the respondents belonged to the Orthodox confession, it is understandable that the smallest distance is articulated towards

survey⁵⁵, even bigger distance of the young towards atheists was recorded. A bigger distance than that towards atheists was recorded only towards Muslims: atheists were rejected by 43% and accepted by 57% of pupils. “It is interesting that the paradigm of animosity has changed”, comment the researchers. “Once dominant, ath-

⁵⁵ Ibid. page 148.

eists are now greatly rejected by the current generation of the young, the same as the believers were previously rejected by the atheists”⁵⁶.

One indicator of religious tolerance is the relationship towards sacral objects which belong to other religions. In Serbia, as a dominantly Orthodox locale, it is important what kind of attitude the citizens have towards building of mosques. Somewhat less than one third of Serb nationals would unreservedly accept the building of a mosque in the place or area where they live. For around 50% of the respondents the building of mosque would not be acceptable (even in case of sufficient number of Muslim believers). Compared to 2002, there are no considerable differences in the opinions of citizens.

TABLE 12. Opinions about building of mosques in the place where respondent lives⁵⁷

% in population	Percent 2003	Percent 2002
Would accept it	29.2	29.4
Both would and would not accept	18.1	23.2
Would not accept	51.5	45.9
Refuse to answer	1.2	1.5

GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS

Important social events, which mark and form one generation leave a permanent seal on its values and attitudes, including the commitments which are important for a multicultural society. Some of these key events have a positive, and some have a negative effect.

Impact of armed conflict on attitudes. A big obstacle for multiculturalism is the fact that many citizens witnessed extremely severe inter-ethnic conflicts, and a number of these citizens participated in these conflicts themselves. This experience has a particularly strong impact on people of younger age, because they have less strong points of support in such situations, and because, in their experience, such events are not anomalies but almost the only social reality they have encountered.

Within the survey CPS 2003, the young were directly asked about their participation in wars which took place in the 1990s. Among young male respondents, aged from 28–36 years (those who, at the beginning of war, were of age 18), almost one third were in the combat zone (Table 13). In addition to that, the number of respondents who were forcibly mobilised exceeded by three times the number of those who went to war voluntarily. 5% managed to avoid mobilization by leaving the country.

TABLE 13. “Have you been in the combat zone during the nineties (in Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo)?”

Was in the combat zone as a volunteer	5.2%
Was in the combat zone as member of Army or Police	15.2%
Was in the combat zone after forcible mobilization	14.1%
They tried to mobilize him, but he avoided it (leaving the country)	4.9%
Was not in situation to go to combat zone	50.0%
Does not want to answer	10.6%

Ethnocentrism of the young. One of the findings⁵⁸ in the survey was also that the youngest age group, which previously, in February 2002, was somewhat more tolerant towards ethnic minorities than older parts of population, stopped being different from other age groups, which was interpreted as a radicalisation of attitudes in the category of younger citizens. Another thing, which was confirmed⁵⁹, was that the young are not the leaders in openness towards others. On the contrary, there is a tendency that, within the age range from 18 to 60 years, younger respondents have a bigger distance than older respondents – an increase of distance is recorded with the citizens aged 60+ years.

The highest level of ethnocentrism⁶⁰, was found with young people aged 20–23 years, that is, those who were born in the period 1980–1983. This is a generation which was 8 and 11 years old in 1991, and the generation which witnessed the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Balkan wars

⁵⁶ SMMRI 2003.

⁵⁷ SMMRI 2003.


⁵⁸ Survey BCHR 2004.

⁵⁹ Survey CPS 2003.

⁶⁰ Survey PRONI 2002.

while in elementary school. For the age group of 28 years and above, which has the lowest scores on ethno-centrism, the period when the wars began was, at the same time, the period when they became adults (older than 18).

CHART 14. Ethnic distance by age – SMMRI 2004



POSSIBILITY OF CONTACTS WITH OTHERS


Travel abroad to broaden ethnic and national tolerance. One of the important features of the life of the young generation today, compared with older generations, is the diminished possibility of contact with other nationalities, the possibility to travel, and meet each other. The new State Union itself is smaller by one half than the one, which existed before 1991. Unfortunately, foreign countries have become less accessible because of the visa system, and the deteriorated economic situation. On the other hand, the young have at their disposal the new means of communication, which were not available to older generations: Internet, e-mail, and satellite TV. Yet how many citizens of Serbia are able at all to **travel abroad**? The question shows that far fewer have travelled abroad than in earlier times.

Just 44% of the citizens of Serbia have a passport, 40% have never had a passport, and 16% used to have a passport, but they do not currently have it. In all age groups up to 60 years approximately one half of respondents have a passport, while, in generation above 60 years this estimation considerably decreases.

The possession of a passport merely makes possible the act of travelling abroad, but it depends on other circumstance whether this

possibility will be realized. Overall 66% of the citizens have travelled abroad; the proportion of citizens who have travelled abroad increases with age until the age of 60, when it abruptly decreases. The youngest respondents have the least experience with staying abroad (which, of course, does not mean that older generations travelled more when they were in the same age).

CHART 15. Travelling abroad and age



Among young people aged 15–25 years, 51.5% have never been abroad (this includes the ex-Yugoslavia countries)⁶¹. Another 17.5% have been across the border only once (of which 14.2% stayed for a short time, up to one week), while just 31.1% went abroad more than once. In a recent survey realised by the Students' Union of Serbia in April 2004, on the sample of 1027 students, it was established that just 32% of students have travelled abroad after secondary school, including destinations in ex-Yugoslavia countries.


Opportunities to meet different cultures and people from other countries are not only the journeys abroad, but also the visits of foreign tourists. Serbia is gradually becoming more and more attractive for foreign tourists. In just three years the number of foreign tourists who visited Serbia has doubled.

New means of communicating. One of the possibilities for communication is by the use of the **Internet** and **e-mail**. Just 25.2% of citizens of Serbia have a computer in the household, and an even smaller number have access to the Internet (16.5%) and an e-mail address (13.8%). However, if groups with various levels of educati-

⁶¹ According to survey BCHR 2004.

on are compared, it becomes obvious that these means of communication are available only to students and citizens with a college and university education. Among citizens with only elementary school education the number of Internet users is negligible.

CHART 16. Availability of computer, Internet and e-mail depending on age




Language skills. For communication with others, particularly for discovering other cultures, **knowledge of foreign languages**, besides native language, is of utmost importance. According to the survey results, around one half of the Serbian population speak some foreign language⁶². Among foreign languages, the majority speak English, half this number speak Russian, and French and German are spoken by 6% of citizens. The percent of citizens who know the language of some minority living in Serbia is practically identical to the percentage of representatives of these minorities in the sample. This means that no one speaks their language except the members of minority groups – neither the members of majority nation nor the members of other minority groups. The connection between the knowledge of foreign languages and age is shown in Chart 17⁶³.

English is spoken by 60% of the young, aged from 18 – 29 years. In other age groups English is the principal foreign language, but it becomes

less and less dominant, while Russian becomes as frequently spoken (the same as German is spoken in the oldest age group). While 46.1% of the citizens do not speak any foreign language, another 39% speak one foreign language, and 14.9% speak two or more languages. The number of foreign languages spoken is correlated to the level of education. Among citizens with lower education 3/4 do not speak any foreign language, while those with a university education there are less than 20% of citizens who do not speak any foreign language, while 1/3 speak two or more languages.

CHART 17. Knowledge of foreign languages and age



One of the opportunities for different cultures not only to meet, but to experience each other and integrate into own identity are **mixed marriages**. However, the percentage of mixed marriages in Serbia is very small. 94% of the citizens of Serbia come from monoethnic marriages. This percentage does not seem to have varied much in time. Namely, almost identical is the percentage of mono-ethnic marriages of the parents of respondents aged 18–29 years (93%), and those aged 60+ years (94%). The present respondents' marriages are also monoethnic (92%).


IMPORTANCE OF GROUP IDENTITY

Group dynamics and personal identities. Group identity of each individual is based on his/ her belonging to a large number of groups and social categories. Individual group identities vary by intensity, in the sense of more or less developed

⁶² The sum of percentages can exceed 100 because the respondents can speak more than one foreign language; percentage of knowledge of four foreign languages is presented.

⁶³ In survey PRONI 2002.

CHART 18. “How much are you attached to ...”



left column: Serbs right column: non-Serbs

awareness of belonging to a certain group, and smaller or bigger importance which they attach to this belonging. Multicultural societies requires that individuals become aware of its complexity and their own and other people’s identities, and the significance of these differences.

Group identity of the young. In a recent Survey the young were asked to mark on the four point scale (“strong”, “moderate”, “a little” and “not at all”) their attachment to six groups they belong to: nation, religion, place of residence, Serbia, Yugoslavia and Europe⁶⁴. In 30% of the cases the young recoded a strong attachment to the nation, and a similar intensity of attachment refers to Serbia (28%), as well as to religion and place of residence (26% each). Attachment to Yugoslavia is much less (14%) as well as Europe (11%).

There were differences in the strength of group attachment between the young people of Serbian nationality and the others (Chart 18). For both groups the most important is belonging to the nation (somewhat more important to Serbs than to others), the second most important is attachment to Serbia. However for just 21% this is of little importance or not at all important. Attachment of the members of non-Serbian nationalities to Serbia is considerable, but significantly less than for the Serbian majority (a little, or not at all important 39%).

TABLE 14. Importance of group identification of the young

The most important group	%
Generation group	34.9%
Ethnic group	24.1%
Profession	11,1%
Group of people with similar interests	10,9%
Group of people with same religion	2.5%
Political group	0,3%

The intensity of group identification of the young was tested for the degree of affiliation to six proposed groups, according to their subjective feeling⁶⁵. According to the results presented in the table below, generational identification is most important and, after that, belonging to one’s own ethnic group. Religious affiliation is more important than anything else to just 2.5% of the young.

The significance of two of the most important group identifications change with age. For the youngest, secondary school age group, generational identification is decisively the most important, while the priority of national affiliation exists with just 20% of the young. In the case of older ages, generational belonging gradually abates and national identification strengthens.

The respondents were also asked to mark the importance of several proposed characteristics for friendship/choice of marriage partner⁶⁶. The


⁶⁴ In survey CPS 2003.

⁶⁵ In survey BCHR 2004.

⁶⁶ Survey BCHR 2003.

importance of religion and nationality of a potential marriage partner or friend was the most pronounced in the youngest age group, and, in all other age groups, it had approximately the same intensity.

CHART 19. Importance of religion and nationality with age



GENDER RELATIONS

Gender discrimination and inequality. Gender inequality is a problem that even the most developed societies struggle to cope with. Gender-related discrimination is a heritage of previous cultures, which, without exception, were patriarchal. When they live in the same community, a man and a woman have different positions, different typical characteristics are attributed to them, and dissimilar characteristics are considered desirable for men and women. The distribution of roles is such that it regularly puts women in a more difficult, unequal position. There exists an entire system of traditions, beliefs and norms which perpetuate these differences. It appears that modern societies differ only by the intensity of gender inequality, and the degree to which this problem is registered and how they try to solve it.

Measures of gender inequality. There are numerous indicators of gender-related inequality in Serbian society, a possibility is to calculate the Gender Empowerment Measure and the Gender Development Index, which have been presented in the Statistical Annex of this report. Except for an almost equal share in the population, men and women do not have the same share of social power or control of economic resources. For example, in the Serbian Parliament out of 250 members just 27 (10.8%)

are women. At the local level (in almost 25% of Serbian municipalities) there are no female representatives, and, in another 25% there is just one female representative.

Employment discrimination. In the area of employment, the awareness of gender-related discrimination does not exist⁶⁷. The question “What chances for employment and advancement in work do women have?”, was answered by somewhat less than one half of the respondents (46%) with “women have the same chances as men”. Among the remaining answers, those who think that women are in a worse position exceed by three times (39%) the respondents who think that men are in a worse position (13%).

An identical picture is obtained in the 2004 survey which shows that increased awareness about discrimination of women exists mainly among women, although just one half of them think that women are in worse position. Among men, majority belief is that genders are equal, and just a trifle above one quarter of them think that women are in an inferior position.

TABLE 15. “What chances for employment and advancement in work do women have?”

	Gender		Total
	Male	Female	
Better than men	106	56	162
	19,0%	8,4%	13,2%
The same as men	299	281	580
	53,5%	42,0%	47,2%
Worse than men	154	332	486
	27,5%	49,6%	39,6%
Total	559	669	1228
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

One indicator of male supremacy can also be the fact that, in ethnically mixed marriages, children take over the father’s ethnicity rather than that of their mother’s much more frequently. 68% of children from ethnically mixed marriages stated their father’s nationality as theirs, and in 22% of cases the nationality of their mother (in 10% of cases they made some other choice)⁶⁸. One survey has substantiated that, regarding religious

⁶⁷ Survey BCHR 2004.


⁶⁸ S. Joksimović and Z. Kuburić: *Religious Tolerance and Distance*. Collection of papers of Z. Kuburić (edited by) *Religion, Religious Teaching, Tolerance*, page 137–154. Novi Sad: CEIR, 2002.

affiliation, children from mixed marriages had chosen their father's religion much more often (47%) than their mother's (30%)⁶⁹.

SEXUAL ORIENTATION

Attitudes towards homosexuals. Regarding sexual dissimilarity, social distance has been examined through questions about four potential relationships with a homosexual person⁷⁰.

CHART 20. Social distance towards homosexual persons
Acceptance of homosexuals in four capacities



BOX 20.

ETHNIC DISTANCE AND HOMOSEXUALITY

Speaking about intolerance one should bear in mind the high positive correlation, which exists between the score on ethnic distance and score on distance towards homosexuals. Although these two attitudes seem to be logically unrelated, it appears that, the more pronounced distance one has towards other ethnic groups, the higher is probability that one will reject homosexuals (the $r = +0.40$).

The majority of the respondents – somewhat above one half – would accept a homosexual person as a neighbour. One in three respondents would agree to have a homosexual person as a friend, or superior at work. Respondents have the biggest reserve towards situation where a


⁶⁹ In survey BCHR 2004.

⁷⁰ Z. Golubović, B. Kuzmanović and M. Vasović: *Social Character and Social Changes in Light of National Conflicts*. Beograd: Filip Višnjić, 1995.

homosexual would educate their children – just one in four would agree to that. Nevertheless, this degree of social distance is considerably lower than one recorded in a survey which was carried out ten years ago, also on the sample of adult citizens of Serbia⁷¹. In that survey, as much as 65.4% of the respondents stated that they would not like to have a homosexual as a fellow-citizen.

Distance towards homosexuals slightly increases with age.

CHART 21. Social distance towards homosexuals by age



ATTITUDES TOWARDS HIV POSITIVE PERSONS

HIV positive persons are important for the study of multiculturalism, not only because the attitude towards them is a test of tolerance of one society towards differences, but also because, with the increase of the number of HIV positive persons, they go beyond the category of rare diseases, and they increasingly become a socially visible group. Since the first two cases of AIDS in Yugoslavia were registered in 1985, the epidemic has had a moderate, but constant rising trend. According to data released by the Institute for Health Protection from Belgrade, in the period from 1984 till December 2004, a total of 1882 HIV cases were recorded in Serbia without Kosovo. Among those infected with HIV there were 1226 (65%) AIDS patients, and 70% of them have died. Serbia is a country with low incidence of HIV/AIDS. The great majority of infected (more than 70%) are from Belgrade, and the majority belongs to the age category 30–39 years (38%).

The attitude of pupils towards HIV positive persons, on the scale of social distance, shows the following results. The smallest number, but certainly not a negligible one (16%) would not

⁷¹ Survey IP 2002.

like to go to same school with a HIV positive person; a similar number of respondents (17%) do not accept to live in the neighbourhood with such a person. One quarter of respondents (25%) do not accept to be in the same class with such person, and more than one third (36%) would not exchange books, notebooks, CD–s and cassettes with a person infected with HIV⁷². Almost one half of pupils would not like to sit in the same bench (48%), or socialize (exchange visits) with such individuals (49%). A considerable number (60%) would not accept to share the room on excursion with such persons, while a great majority (92%) rejects even the idea of having sexual relations with a person who is diagnosed as HIV positive.

Boys have a higher social distance towards HIV positive persons than girls, this applies to elementary school children (compared to secondary school children), pupils from suburban municipalities whose permanent residence is rural, or suburban centre (rather than pupils from Belgrade), children whose parents are craftsmen, farmers, unqualified or semi qualified workers, (more than children whose parents are professionals with post secondary and university education).

The most important factor upon which depends social distance towards HIV positive persons is knowledge about this topic: the bigger the knowledge, the smaller the distance.

One third of the young think that HIV positive persons should not be allowed to work in any occupation which involves contact with other people. Here too, like on the scale of social distance, boys have a more restrictive attitude, as well as those with lesser knowledge, pupils who attend elementary schools and three–year vocational schools, as well as pupils residing in rural or suburban municipalities.

1.3. Political and Legal Framework of Multiculturalism in Serbia

1.3.1. Legal Protection of Minorities

The Constitutional Charter. On 4 February 2003, with the adoption of the Constitutional Charter

of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (hereinafter: the Constitutional Charter)⁷³, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was transformed into the state union based on the equality of Serbia and Montenegro, the two former federal units and now member states. Among other things, the aims of this state are respect for human rights of all persons under its jurisdiction; preservation and promotion of human dignity, equality and the rule of law; inclusion in European structures, particularly the European Union, and harmonization of regulations and practices with European and international standards.

The Constitutional Charter stipulates that the member states should regulate, ensure and protect human and minority rights and civil freedoms in their respective territory, while the State Union should monitor the exercise of these rights and freedoms and ensure their protection in the case when such protection has not been provided in the member states (Article 9, Sections 1 and 3). Serbia and Montenegro should be a single personality in international law (Article 14) and should have the same obligations under the international treaties and agreements as those formerly assumed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Thus, from the aspect of human rights, Serbia and Montenegro can be viewed as a single legal entity. The international treaties that are binding upon Serbia and Montenegro are also binding upon its member states.

Human and Minority Rights Charter. One of the first documents of the State Union was the *Charter on Human and Minority Rights* (in further text: the Charter)⁷⁴, which forms part of the Constitutional Charter. The Charter is a great step toward the regulation of human rights. It anticipates the *direct exercise* of all human and minority rights, which are guaranteed by this document (Article 2). In addition, it guarantees the direct exercise of all human and minority rights, which are guaranteed by generally accepted rules of international law and international treaties being in force in Serbia and Montenegro (Article 7), while the Constitutional Charter stipulates the precedence of the international treaties and

⁷² Official Gazette of SM, No. 1/03.

⁷³ Official Gazette of SM, No. 1/03.

⁷⁴ Official Gazette of SM, No. 6/03.

practices over domestic regulations (Article 16). The decision on the direct applicability of the Charter is very important, because the problem of non-harmonization of other regulations with the Charter and international standards is thus surmounted on a regulatory plane⁷⁵.

Serbia and Montenegro is bound by a great number of the most important universal and regional international treaties concerning human rights, especially those which deal either directly or indirectly with the protection of the basic minority rights and freedoms, whereby the most important ones are: the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*⁷⁶ (as well as the First and Second Optional Protocols to the Covenant)⁷⁷, the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*⁷⁸, *Convention on the Protection and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*⁷⁹, *International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination*⁸⁰, *United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women*⁸¹, *Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities*⁸², etc. Accession to the *European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages* is underway, just like the negotiations with the neighbouring countries for the conclusion of bilateral agreements on the protection of national minorities⁸³. The commitment to the promotion of international relations, in conformity with the principles of good neighbourliness, friendly relations and cooperation between states, become apparent during the participation of representatives

of Serbia and Montenegro in all regional initiatives.

BOX 21.

ASSOCIATION OF MULTI-ETHNIC TOWNS

The steering committee for preparing the founding conference of an Association of Multi-Ethnic Towns of South-Eastern Europe was formed in Belgrade in July 2004, while the Association itself is expected to be formed in the spring of 2005. At a conference organised for this purpose by the Novi Sad-based Centre for Multi-Culturalism, an Agreement on Multi-Ethnic Tolerance and Co-operation of about 50 south-east European town was signed. The Agreement, which presents the aims, principles and programmes of activity of the future association, was signed by representatives of towns and NGOs from Belgrade (Serbia and Montenegro), Zagreb (Croatia), Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Sofia (Bulgaria), Skopje (FYR of Macedonia), Novi Sad (Serbia and Montenegro), Tuzla (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Osijek (Croatia), Niš (Serbia and Montenegro), Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina) Bar (Serbia and Montenegro), Bajina Bašta (Serbia and Montenegro), Split (Croatia), Mostar (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Kotor (Serbia and Montenegro), Pula (Croatia), Timisoara (Romania), Szeged (Hungary), Kecskemet (Hungary), Arad (Romania), Kumanovo (FYR of Macedonia), Preševo (Serbia and Montenegro) and Shkoder (Albania). The starting point will be organising local and regional self-government according to European standards, ethnic tolerance in the region, promotion of school programmes and plans on tolerance, small and medium-sized business operations in cross-border and regional co-operation and long-term development plans of the multi-ethnic towns in the region.

Source: Beta, 8 July 2004

Guarantees of minority rights. *The Constitutional Charter, Charter on Human and Minority Rights, as well as the Serbian Constitution (1990)*⁸⁴ collectively guarantee specified minority rights,

⁷⁵ See more in *Human Rights in Serbia and Montenegro in 2003*, BCHR, Belgrade, 2004.

⁷⁶ *Official Gazette of SFRY*, No. 7/71.

⁷⁷ *Official Gazette of the FRY (International Treaties)*, No. 4/01.

⁷⁸ *Supra*, n. 4.

⁷⁹ *Official Gazette of the Presidium of the National Assembly of the FPRY*, No. 2/50.

⁸⁰ *Official Gazette of the FPRY (International Treaties)*, No. 6/67.

⁸¹ *Official Gazette of the FPRY (International Treaties)*, No. 6/67.

⁸² *Official Gazette of the FRY (International Treaties)*, No. 6/98, but ratification instruments received by Council of Europe only on 11 May 2001.

⁸³ International agreements covering minority rights have so far been concluded with Hungary, Romania and Croatia, and one is also expected to be signed with Albania. The Agreement on Friendship, Goodneighbourliness and Co-operation concluded with Romania also contains principled provisions on national minorities; each side undertook to protect and respect the rights of national minorities on its territory in accordance with UN and OSCE standards.

⁸⁴ *Official Herald of the Republic of Serbia*, No. 1/90. A new constitution is being drafted in Serbia. A number of NGOs, political parties, law experts and the Government have drafted and presented to the public their models for a future Constitution of Serbia.

although there are differences in their definition. Whereas the Constitutional Charter uses the term national minorities, which is most frequently used in comparative law, the Serbian Constitution mentions nationalities, the term, which was also used in the former Yugoslavia. The Serbian Constitution is based on the civil and not ethnic understanding of the state, so that the Republic of Serbia is a “democratic state of all citizens who live in it, founded on the freedoms and rights of citizen, on the rule of law and on social justice” (Article 1). Since both the Charters and the Serbian Constitution stipulate that the way of exercising the guaranteed rights and freedoms should be prescribed by law, the Federal Assembly, in February 2002, passed *The Act on the Protection of Freedoms and Rights of National Minorities*⁸⁵ (in further text: the Act on the Protection of National Minorities). In contrast to international documents, this Act defines a national minority as “any group of citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro, the author’s note), which is sufficiently representative in its numbers, albeit in a minority in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which belongs to an autochthonous group of the population with a lasting and firm connection with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and possesses some distinctive features, such as language, culture, national or ethnic belonging, origin or religion, due to which it differs from the majority of the population, and whose members shall show their concern over the preservation of their common identity, including culture, tradition, language or religion”.

In order to adjust the non-standardized terminology from the earlier regulations to some degree, the Act also regards national minorities as “all groups of citizens who consider or define themselves as peoples, national or ethnic communities, national or ethnic groups, nations or nationalities” and fulfil the defined conditions⁸⁶. Although such a broad definition of a national minority ensures that many interested communities, despite their small numbers, enjoy

the rights and benefits of belonging to national minorities under the Act, the main shortcoming of the definition is that it is limited to citizens of Serbia and Montenegro. According to the Committee for Human Rights, the rights of members of national minorities should not be limited only to citizens of Serbia and Montenegro⁸⁷.

Limiting the definition to cover only citizens has also been criticised by the Advisory Committee of the Council of Europe, which has said that such a definition could have negative consequences for Roma and other persons who moved in after the break-up of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or are displaced from Kosovo, whose citizenships have not been regulated or who have difficulties obtaining citizenship certificates because of missing personal documents⁸⁸. The authorities in Serbia and Montenegro should consider expanding implementation of the Framework Convention to cover these persons and non-citizens article by article, in consultation with those groups.

The content of the Law points to the intention to apply the standards, which are laid down in the Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities, so that its adoption was positively received by the representatives of national minorities⁸⁹. At the level of Serbia it was decided not to pass a special law on the protection of minority rights, but to use the federal one as a framework and regulate specified areas in greater detail by a number of special laws.

PROHIBITION OF ETHNICALLY-BASED DISCRIMINATION

Compared to the earlier constitutional solutions at the federal level, innovations include the explicit prohibition of discrimination on the basis of one’s belonging to a national minority, and the obligations of the State Union and its member states to protect minorities from any action directed towards their forced assimilation, which is naturally forbidden.

⁸⁷ *General Comment No. 2350 of the Human Rights Committee, HRIGEN1Rev.5, 1994.*

⁸⁸ *Opinion on Serbia and Montenegro, Position of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 27 November 2003, ACFCOPI(2003)008, § 23.*

⁸⁹ *Supra*, n. 3, p. 185.

⁸⁵ *Official Gazette of the FRY, No. 11/02.*

⁸⁶ The Act recognizes a national minority status for the Roma (Article 2 § 2) and defines affirmative action measures aimed at upgrading their social and economic status.

The Charter on Human and Minority Rights stipulates that everyone is obliged to respect human and minority rights of others and prohibits any direct or indirect discrimination on any ground, including on the ground of race, colour, gender, national belonging, social background, birth or similar status, religion, political or other affiliation, material status, culture, language, age or physical disability. The only permissible form of discrimination is affirmative action. Therefore, it is allowed to temporally implement special measures, whose aim is to ensure equality, necessary protection and progress for persons or groups of persons who are in an unequal position, thus enabling them to enjoy in full their human and minority rights under equal terms. Such measures are necessary in order to ensure *de facto* equality, so that they can only be implemented until the achievement of the aims due to which they have been adopted.

Where necessary, the member states will be obliged to adopt the appropriate measures for the promotion of full and effective equality among persons belonging to a national minority and persons belonging to the majority population in all areas of economic, social, political and cultural life. Bearing in mind the especially difficult economic and social status of persons belonging to the Roma minority, the *Act on the Protection of National Minorities* emphasizes the government's obligation to adopt such measures so as to improve their status. In an attempt to improve the status of Roma, the greatest number of measures were undertaken in the educational field (for more detail see section 1.3.2). In the sphere of economic life, the measures were undertaken in less developed regions which are inhabited by national minorities, especially in three municipalities in southern Serbia with the Albanian minority. The Coordination Body for Southern Serbia provided funds for assistance to economic activities in the municipalities of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medvedja, so that these financial incentives also improved the standard of living of over one thousand employees, including a large number of Albanians.

What Serbia still lacks is a comprehensive anti-discrimination law, which has still not been ad-

opted, although a model has been presented by the Centre for the Promotion of Law Studies⁹⁰.

PRESERVATION OF NATIONAL AND CULTURAL IDENTITY

The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro guarantees members of national minorities rights in the sphere of exercising, preserving and developing their national, cultural and religious specificities, from which emanate several other rights which serve to preserve the identity of minorities. The Act on the Protection of National Minorities guarantees as an inalienable individual and collective right the right to exercise, preserve, cultivate, develop, transfer and publicly express national and ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic specificities as part of the tradition of citizens, national minorities and their members. In order to preserve and develop national and ethnic specificities, national minorities are entitled to the formation of specific cultural, artistic and scientific institutions, societies and associations in all areas of cultural and artistic life.

In the sphere of cultural life, apart from a great number of educational measures, the Act on the Protection of National Minorities envisages that the government should provide cultural contents in the language of national minorities in the radio and TV programmes as public service. The Act also stipulates that museums, archives and institutions for the protection of cultural monuments founded by the state should secure the presentation and protection of cultural and historical heritage of national minorities in their territory, while representatives of national councils will participate in decision-making concerning the method of their representation. Also, under the Act on the Activities in the Common Interest in the Cultural Field of the Republic of Serbia, the programmes devoted to the culture of national minorities as well as concern about the protection of their cultural heritage are in the common interest. The greatest efforts to improve cultural identity and cultural heritage are taken in Vojvodina, where a great

⁹⁰ The Centre for the Promotion of Law Studies, an NGO, drafted an Anti-Discrimination Law Model and a Model Law on the Prohibition of Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities in 2002.

number of widely varied festivals, meetings of amateur societies and the like are organized with a view to preserving and promoting literature, arts, folklore and customs of the national minorities living in that region.

BOX 22.**MINORITIES' CULTURAL EVENTS**

Persons belonging to national minorities themselves organize the events at which they present their cultural heritage. Some of the most interesting ones are, for example, traditional days of culture, organized each year by members of the Hungarian, Slovak and Roma minorities in Novi Sad, and the ethno-festival of the Croats, Bunjevci, Šokci and Hungarians in northern Banat, in Vojvodina, which marks the end of the harvest, Durindo, Gyongyobokreta and Tini Festival (organised by ethnic Hungarians), Tancuj Tancuj (organised by ethnic Slovaks), Červena ruža (organised by ethnic Ruthenian), Dužijanca (organised by Croats). The Ministry of Human and Minority Rights initiated the event called the Days of Culture of National Minorities with a view to presenting the culture and creative work of national minorities living in Serbia and Montenegro.

Individual and collective rights of national minorities are protected in conformity with the protection of human rights under international law. Collective rights anticipate that persons belonging to national minorities, either directly or through their chosen representatives, participate in the decision-making process, or decide on specified issues relating to their culture, education, dissemination of information and the use of their language and alphabet. In order to realize their right to self-government in these areas, members of a national minority may elect their national councils, in conformity with law. So far, the national councils of Hungarian, Ruthenian, Romanian, Croatian, Slovak, Bunjevci, Greek, Bulgarian, Ukrainian, Roma and Bosniac national minorities have been elected, while the formation of a Macedonian council is under way. For example, representatives of national councils participate in the preparation of the

curriculum for instruction in the native language with the elements of national minority culture.

BOX 23.**MINORITIES AND COLLECTIVE RIGHTS**

Although national minorities have in the past advocated broader collective rights, some of those who took part in the round-table forum in Novi Pazar believe that collective rights and the establishment of national minority councils do not represent the ideal solution. They say that emphasising collective rights will lead to a loss of individual rights, which means that minorities would not be gaining very much. They add that securing the enjoyment of collective rights has been passed on from the state to the level of no one, because councils cannot have powers without adequate budgets, but also because it is doubtful whether those who sit on national councils always possess the professional and also moral qualities that are required for the job.

The State Union, as well as the bodies of the member states, obliged themselves to promote a spirit of tolerance and intercultural dialogue in the fields of education, culture and information, and undertake efficient measures with the aim to promote mutual respect, understanding and cooperation among all peoples living in its territory, irrespective of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity. National minorities are guaranteed the right to participate on equal terms with other citizens in the management of public affairs, including the right to vote and be put up as candidates for a public position.

*The Act on Local Self-Government*⁹¹ introduces a completely new institution: the Council for Ethnic Relations. Municipalities in whose total populations the share of national minorities is over 10% or where one minority has a share exceeding 5% are bound by the Law to form a Council for Ethnic Relations, whose role is to involve members of minorities in reviewing various issues and an attempt to influence the making of decisions at local level which regulate matters of importance to minorities.

⁹¹ *Official Herald of the RS*, No. 9/2002.

BOX 24.

COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL MINORITIES

Implementing Article 18 of the Act on the Protection of National Minorities, the Serbian Government on 16 September 2004 for the purpose of preserving, promoting and protecting the national, ethnic, religious and cultural specificities of members of the national minorities issued The Decree on the Formation of Council of the Republic of Serbia for National Minorities. The Council is made up of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Public Administration and Local Self-Government, the Minister of Culture, the Minister of Education and Sport, the Minister of Religions, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Internal Affairs and the presidents of all the national councils formed under the said Law. The Council's scope of activities includes verification of the symbols and holidays of the national minorities at their own proposal; review of draft

laws and other regulations of importance for the exercise of the rights of minorities and issue of relevant opinions to the Government; monitoring the exercise of minority rights and proposing full equality measures; monitoring of co-operation between the national councils and the state authorities; review of the conditions in which national councils are working and others.

The Council may be praised for its first decision – recommending that the Ministry of Education import as soon as possible secondary engineering school textbooks from Hungary, as well as religious studies books needed by the Slovak minority. In this way, the Council showed readiness to respond rapidly to the demands of national minority councils, as the said Decision was adopted at the very first session.

The rights of minorities. National minorities are recognized to have various rights with a view to facilitating the preservation of their specificities: the right to express, preserve, cultivate, develop and manifest their national, ethnic, cultural and religious specificities; to use their national symbols at public places; to freely use their native language and alphabet; to have government bodies – in the communities where a minority population lives in substantial numbers – to conduct administrative and court procedure in the language of the respective national minority; to receive instruction in their native language in public institutions; to establish private educational institutions at all levels; to freely use their personal names in their native language; to have traditional local names, names of streets and settlements, as well as other toponyms to be also displayed in the language of the respective national minority; to have a specified number of seats in the Assembly of the member state and the Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro, based on the principle of direct representation, in conformity with the laws of the member states; to be adequately represented in public services, as well as in the bodies

of government and local self-government; to be fully and impartially informed in their own language, including the right to express, receive, send and exchange information and ideas, and to establish their own media.

The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro guarantees to all persons belonging to national minorities the rights to express, preserve, cultivate and promote their national, cultural and religious specificities, from which a number of other laws are derived, thus ensuring the identity of minorities in practice. The Charter guarantees to persons belonging to national minorities the right to freely express their national belonging and the right not to do so. The Act on the Protection of National Minorities stipulates that no one will suffer any damage as a result of his/her affiliation or expression of national belonging, or of his/her not doing so.

THE LANGUAGES OF MINORITIES

The State Union is obliged to recognize to every person belonging to a national minority the right “to use freely and without interference his/her language, in private and in public, orally and

in writing⁹².” Under the Serbian Constitution, the Serbo–Croatian language and the Cyrillic alphabet are in official use, while the Latin alphabet is used in the manner specified by law (Article 8). At the same time, the Constitution guarantees the right to official use of the languages of the national minorities in the regions of the Republic of Serbia where they live, stipulating that the languages and alphabets of national minorities are in official use, parallel to the “Serbo–Croatian language and Cyrillic alphabet”, as specified by law. In order to observe Article 7 of the European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages to which Serbia and Montenegro should also accede, the Law on the Protection of National Minorities specifies that this is the question of the right to free, private and public (official) use of one’s native language and alphabet. Apart from the Constitution and the Act on the Protection of National Minorities, certain aspects of the right to public and official use of the minority language are regulated by the Act on the Official Use of the Language and Scripts, the Act on the Establishment of Specified Competences of the Autonomous Province (the so–called Omnibus Law), the Act on Local Self–Government, Statute of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, Decision on more detailed regulation of specified issues relating to the official use of the language and scripts of national minorities in the territory of the autonomous province of Vojvodina, laws regulating the issuance of personal documents, laws on education and process laws.

The Act on the Protection of Rights and Freedoms of the National Minorities of Serbia and Montenegro stipulates that the unit of self–government is obliged to enter the language and alphabet of a national minority in official use wherever the percentage of that national minority in the total population in its territory reaches 15% according to the latest census. The Act also allows for the official use of minority languages in the units of self–government where the percentage of national minorities in the total population does not exceed 15% if these units of self–government so decide. In accordance with the principle of acquired rights, it is

stipulated that in those units of self–government where the language of a national minority was in official use at the moment of the enactment of the Act, the language and alphabet of the respective national minority will remain in use. Although the threshold of 15% sounds very reasonable, it is not fully equitable, especially with respect to the Roma population. Namely, although Roma constitute one of the large minorities in Serbia and Montenegro, there is a small number of municipalities where this minority exceeds 15% of the population due to their dispersion.

The Act on Local Self–Government stipulates, as one of the basic responsibilities of the municipality, to “determine the language and alphabet of national minorities which are in official use in its territory” (Article 18). Under the Law on the Official Use of the Language and Alphabet, the decision as to whether minority languages will be in official use is taken by the municipalities in whose territory the respective minorities live. However, this Act did not establish the criteria which the municipalities should observe when determining which language will be in official use, so that they apply different solutions. However, in May and June 2002, all units of self–government in Vojvodina, i.e. 43 municipalities and the city of Novi Sad, adopted the new statutes, harmonized with the Act on Local Self–Government. Of the 45 units of self–government and the City of Novi Sad, 36 anticipated to have one or more national minority languages in official use in the territory of the municipality or a part thereof.

The Act on the Establishment of Specified Competences of the Autonomous Province (Omnibus Law) stipulates the transfer of some of the Republic’s competences relating to the right to official use of the language at the provincial level, so that the autonomous province, through its bodies and in conformity with the Act on the Official Use of the Language and Scripts, regulates in greater detail the official use of national minority languages and alphabets in the territory of the autonomous province and supervises the enforcement of the regulations governing those issues and the relevant laws. The Statute of the AP of Vojvodina regulates the official use of minority languages in the bodies of the AP of

⁹² Article 10 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.

Vojvodina. Parallel to the Serbian language and Cyrillic alphabet, in official use are also the Hungarian, Croatian, Slovak, Romanian and Ruthenian languages and their alphabets (Article 6). Pursuant to this Decision, persons belonging to national minorities may address, orally or in writing, the relevant government bodies and public institutions in their native language and alphabet which are in official use in the territory of that respective body. Further, a person belonging to a national minority has the right to receive an answer, orally or in writing, in the language in which he addressed that respective body. In the enactment relating to their internal organization and job classification, the mentioned bodies must prescribe, as the requirement for employment, fluency in the language of the national minority in official use for a specified number of jobs, such as: the provision including customer services or conduct an administrative procedure (2.8).

The Charter on Human Rights guarantees to persons belonging to national minorities the right “to use their personal names in their native language”, while the Act on the Protection of Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities regulates in even greater detail the right of persons belonging to national minorities to the free choice and use of their personal names and names of their children, and to enter these personal names in all public documents, official registers and registers of personal data *in accordance with the rules of the language and orthography of the national minority* (our italic). However, there were cases that the registration of the names of newly born infants according to the tradition of national minorities was rejected.

A person belonging to a national minority has the right to enter his/her personal name and names of their children in the registers of personal data in their original form, in the alphabet and according to the orthography of their native language.

If the personal name of a person belonging to a national minority has been entered in the registers in their original form, that personal name will be entered in the same way in all public documents (identity papers, extracts from the register of personal data, etc.) which are issued to him or her, irrespective of the language and alphabet used in that public document. This does

not exclude the parallel entry of one’s personal name in the Serbian language and alphabet.

THE FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION

The Charter on Human Rights guarantees the freedom of thought and conscience and the freedom of religion. Each person has the right to belief, practice of religion, as well as the performance of religious rites. A novelty is that the freedom to change one’s religion is explicitly guaranteed, in accordance with international standards. Religious communities are equal and separated from the state; they are autonomous in decision-making relating to their internal organization, management of religious affairs and performance of religious rights, and they have the right to establish religious schools and charity organizations, in conformity with the law.

Education and ethnic communities. With the adoption of the new Act on the *Elements of the System of Education and Upbringing* in 2003, private persons are allowed to establish private schools, which also provides an opportunity for the establishment of religious schools.

In 2001, the Serbian Government adopted the Decree on the Organization and Provision of Religious Instruction and an Alternative Subject in Elementary and Secondary Schools, thus introducing religious education and instruction in the alternative subject into schools. Instruction is conducted in all eight grades of elementary school and in all four grades of secondary school. Amendments to the Acts on Elementary and Secondary Schools stipulate that religious education should be organized for members of traditional churches and religious communities. Those are: the Serbian Orthodox Church, Islamic Community, Roman Catholic Church, Slovak Evangelical Church, Jewish Community, Reformed Christian Church and Evangelical Christian Church.

The alternative subject is Civic Education, that is, education for democracy and civil society. The introduction of this subject was the government’s response to numerous initiatives of international organizations to promote stability and peace in the world through education for and in democracy, human rights and tolerance, as well as to ensure that the development of democratic societies is based on the rule of law, protection of human rights, active citizen

participation, tolerance and mutual understanding. Therefore, Civic Education is directed to full development of child's personality so as to be able to play a useful role in such society.

BOX 25.**THE LAW ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION**

Rapid rises in the influence of the church and religious nationalism are common in the transition societies of Eastern Europe. The situation in Serbia is similar. In mid-2004, the Serbian Government opened a public debate on the preliminary draft of a law on freedom of religion, churches, religious communities and religious associations. The text was extremely retrogressive; if adopted, the law would effectively have returned church-state relations to those, which existed before the Second World War. Under the bill, the seven churches and religious communities which had enjoyed a status of public organisations with public legal entity status at the time of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia were given that status again, not just formally. "Traditional" churches and religious communities and those, which appeared post-war were given clearly unequal positions. Under the bill, the former would even have been entitled to demand bans on the activity of some of those religious organisations which "offended the feelings and interests" of some of the traditional churches and religious communities. Numerous shortcomings in the text provoked strong criticism from civil society and protestant churches in Serbia, and the preliminary draft was replaced with a new and more neutral one. But the new text retains some provisions, which could result in the unequal treatment of existing churches and religious communities in Serbia.

Under the present legal provisions, religious or civic education is compulsory for a pupil who had opted for one or the other in the current school year. The pupil cannot change from one to the other until the next school year.

Believers can be absent from work for their greatest religious holidays, so that multi-religious society in Serbia is respected. Under the Law on the State Holidays of the Republic of Serbia, Christians can be absent from work for Christmas and Easter (different calendars of the Orthodox

and Roman Catholics are respected), whereby Orthodox Christians can also be absent on their patron saint's day. Muslims can be absent from work on the first day of Ramadan Bairam and on the first day of Kurban Bairam and members of the Jewish Community on the first day of Yom Kippur.

PROCEDURAL PROTECTION OF MINORITIES

Under the *Charter on Human Rights*, any instigation and incitement of national, racial, religious or other discrimination are forbidden and punishable. The same applies to the instigation and incitement of national, religious and other hatred and intolerance. Both the Charter and the Constitution of Serbia anticipate restrictions on the freedom of the press and the freedom of association should their exercise be directed towards the instigation of national, racial or religious hatred and intolerance. The Laws on Elementary and Secondary Schools of the Republic of Serbia forbid all activities in school that might endanger or disparage groups or individuals on a racial, national, linguistic, religious, gender or political basis, as well as the incitement of such actions. They also stipulate fines for such impermissible practices.

Unfortunately, there exist no statistics on the numbers of relevant criminal prosecutions and verdicts issued. The shortcomings of judiciary – its poor efficiency and independence – as well as the problematic functioning of the prosecutorial services, reflect on the protection of minorities⁹³, i.e., the poor confidence of the population in both of those institutions leads to a situation in which they do not seek such protection at all.

Protection of minorities. There are also other problems in the protection of minorities, which could be rectified more rapidly. In some situations, it is not completely clear which state authority is responsible for fulfilling a specified obligation of the state. In the procedure of redefining the constitutional and legal organisation of the state and abolition of a number of former federal institutions, it remains unclear how full protection can be implemented. Under

⁹³ Opinion on Serbia and Montenegro, *supra*, n. 16, §§ 36–37.

the Act on the protection of National Minorities, the competent authority is the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights of Serbia and Montenegro (at the time Federal Ministry of National and Ethnic Communities). This ministry, as well as the national councils of the national minorities, were empowered to file constitutional complaints to the Federal Constitutional Court where they believed that there were violations of the constitutional rights and freedoms of members of national minorities, or in cases where they were approached by a member of a national minority who held that his constitutional rights and liberties had been violated. But the Federal Constitutional Court no longer exists, and the Constitutional Charter provided for the establishment of a Court of Serbia and Montenegro. Given that under the Charter this Court handles complaints filed by citizens of Serbia and Montenegro whose rights or liberties guaranteed by the Charter are threatened by an institution of the State Union, in cases where no other legal remedy exists, it remains unclear whether the Ministry is empowered to approach the said Court. Furthermore, for some time no one could submit complaints to the Court because it was only formed in June 2004, and it still not fully functional.

The role of the Ombudsman. In the territory of Serbia, at the republican level, there is still no institution of ombudsman⁹⁴. However, ombudsmen have been established at the level of the Autonomous Province (AP) of Vojvodina and at the level of local self-government. Under the Act on the Establishment of Specific Competences of the Autonomous Province (Article 56)⁹⁵, the AP of Vojvodina has acquired the right to autonomously establish and regulate the status and organization of the provincial ombudsman. Thus, at its session of 23 December 2002, the Assembly of the AP of Vojvodina brought the Decision on the Provincial Ombudsman⁹⁶, which ensures the independence, efficiency and effectiveness of this institution in a very good

way. According to Article 1 of the Decision, the provincial ombudsman is obliged to ensure the protection and promotion of human rights and freedoms of each person and protect the rights and freedoms against violations committed by provincial and local organs, as well as institutions, organs and organizations having administrative and public competences, which have been founded by the Province or a municipality (e.g. schools, hospitals, etc.). The provincial ombudsman controls the legality of work of the mentioned organs, as well as the justifiability and efficiency of their activities (Article 1, Section 3).

1.3.2. Regulations on the Right of Education of Minority Communities in SCG

Serbia and Montenegro is a signatory of the *Framework Convention for the Protection of Minorities* and, as such, it has obligations in the educational field. The right to education, which is formulated under the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia as the right to schooling, is accessible to everyone under equal terms. Under the Constitution, citizens do not pay a tuition fee in all public educational institutions, so that education in elementary and secondary schools, as well as in institutions of higher learning is free.

In Serbia, the rights of persons belonging to national minorities not only to learn their native language, but also to receive education in their native language, have a constitutional character, since they are guaranteed both by the Charter on Human Rights and the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. The Statute of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina stipulates that the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina should create conditions for the education of persons belonging to other peoples and national minorities in their native language in conformity with the law.

The right to upbringing and education in the native language is realized in institutions for pre-school, elementary and secondary education. The state obliged itself to create conditions for instruction in the language of a national minority and, until then, to guarantee bilingual instruction or instruction in the minority language with the elements of national history and culture for persons belonging to the respective national minority.

⁹⁴ A draft law existed as far back as 2002, but the parliament never discussed it. The new Government has meanwhile presented a new text, but its features are both good and bad, some of which could cast doubt on the independence and proper and efficient functioning of the institution.

⁹⁵ *Official Gazette of the RS*, No. 6/02

⁹⁶ *Official Gazette of the AP of Vojvodina*, No. 23/02.

BOX 26.

THE OMBUDSMAN OF THE AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE OF VOJVODINA

The provincial Ombudsman in the Autonomous province of Vojvodina began work in mid-January 2004; his first annual report on the institution's performance and the human rights situation was published in March 2005⁹⁷. Protection of the rights of national minorities is within the scope of the Ombudsman's jurisdiction. The Decision on the Provincial Ombudsman prescribes explicitly that one of his five deputies is in charge of the protection of the rights of national minorities, and that one of the five must be a member of a national minority. This formal demand represents one form of positive discrimination and its objective is to ensure that at least one of the key posts in the institution is held by a representative of the national minorities, which make up almost one-third of Vojvodina's overall population.

Tensions rose considerably in 2004 on account of alleged threats to the Hungarian national minority in Vojvodina; the media reported on a series of incidents, including some claimed to have had an ethnic background. The situation peaked in the autumn, when the question was placed before the European Parliament. The Provincial Ombudsman launched an investigation ex officio, which is still in progress; its results will be presented either in a special report or the regular annual report. The Provincial Ombudsman has spoken out on a number of occasions in connection with ethnically motivated violence and incidents. Expressing regret over violent and uncivilised conduct by individuals and groups, the Provincial Ombudsman demanded that the competent authorities carry out detailed

investigations and implement all necessary measures to duly prosecute those responsible. Expressing belief that preservation of the specific diversity surrounding the lives of all people in Vojvodina all disputes must be resolved without threatening or harming elementary human rights and liberties, the Provincial Ombudsman said that it was necessary:

- to use all available democratic means to undertake every possible action and measure in all areas of communal life in Vojvodina to strengthen awareness about the necessity to live together with others and to respect their differences;

- to affirm tolerance, especially through the media, as well as efforts to establish the truth about incidents and conflicts;

- to implement in the cultural sphere policies conducive to cultural pluralism, for the cultures of national minorities to be presented as an integral part of the culture of Serbia, which requires financial support for the cultural institutions of the national minorities;

- to upgrade mechanisms for protecting minorities by full and proper enforcement of the standards of criminal law, but also through decentralisation of the administration, by granting broader powers to local authorities to control police, and by raising the proportion of members of national minorities employed in the police;

- to support the efforts local authorities are investing in preventing the creation of ethnic divisions by major social sub-systems, such as education, culture and political life.

Annual Report of the Ombudsman of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina

Under the *Act on Social Child Care*, pre-school education is received in the Serbian language, while the method and conditions for pre-school education in minority languages are prescribed by the Minister of Education. To a degree, this abridges the constitutional right of persons belonging to national minorities to receive pre-school education in their native language.

Under the *Act on Elementary Schools in Serbia* and the *Act on Secondary Schools*, the curriculum

in the language of a national minority or bilingual instruction have so far been organized if at least 15 pupils enrol in the first grade (of the elementary or secondary school)⁹⁸. If instruction is conducted only in the language of a national minority, it is then obligatory to learn the Serbian language as well.

⁹⁷ Available at <http://www.vojvodina.sr.gov.yu>

⁹⁸ As for secondary schools, it is anticipated that 15 pupils in the already formed class should express their wish to have instruction in their native language. Since this is difficult to achieve in classes of a mixed ethnic composition, this is done at enrolment like in elementary school.

On the other hand, in the communities where instruction is provided only in the Serbian language and not in the language of a national minority or is bi-lingual, the school must create conditions for instruction in the minority language with the elements of national culture twice a week, throughout elementary school education. The curricula of educational institutions in the Serbian language must include a subject containing the knowledge of the history, culture and position of national minorities. The state should also provide for the curricula containing the option for members of the majority population to learn the language of a national minority.

Persons belonging to other national minorities can also receive education in their native language (e.g. there are 18 elementary schools

for the Romanian minority, 18 for the Slovak minority, etc.). However, it is more difficult to organize systematic education in the Romany language. There is still an insufficient number of teachers. A great number of Roma have not registered and have no documents, so that the enrolment of their children in school is aggravated. The other problem is non-enrolment or absenteeism. The survey conducted in 2002 shows that only 21.9% of the total Roma population completed elementary school, 7.8% secondary school and 0.3% two-year post-secondary school or university.

The Serbian authorities are undertaking measures to solve the problem relating to the education of Roma. Over the past two years, the competent ministries have provided free textbooks for 5,886 Roma children.

TABLE 16. Textbooks published by the Textbook Publishing House in the languages of national minorities (source: FC Report)

LANGUAGE OF THE NATIONAL MINORITY	Elementary school		Secondary school		University textbooks	Most important works – special editions	Total
	Textbooks	Readings	Textbooks	Readings			
Hungarian	104	52	55	4	–	13	228
Slovakian	91	46	46	–	–	13	196
Romanian	85	58	24	–	–	12	179
Ruthenian	83	36	35	1	–	13	168
Roma	1	–	–	–	–	–	1
Albanian	81	13	107	–	168	4	373
Turkish	60	12	12	–	–	5	89
Bulgarian	21	8	4	–	–	2	35
Ukrainian	–	–	–	–	–	1	1
Total	526	225	283	5	168	63	1270

Apart from textbooks, the Textbook Publishing House publishes additional readings and the most important books in the languages of national minorities living in Serbia and Montenegro (see Table 16).

As for two-year post-secondary and university education, instruction can be organized in the languages of national minorities upon decision of the Serbian Government as the founder, or upon its consent if it is not the founder.

At the request of pupils and their parents, in the regions where the Latin script or the language of a nationality (national minority) is in official use, educational institutions must

issue certificates and other public documents in the Latin script, and if the pupils have received education in the language of a national minority, their certificates and public documents must also be issued in that language.

The rights of persons belonging to national minorities to establish private educational institutions has a constitutional character, while the Act on the Protection of Minorities (15) also stipulates that persons belonging to national minorities have the right to establish and support private educational institutions, schools or universities with instructions in the languages or national minorities or bilingual instruction. According to

international standards, the government is not obliged to finance such institutions, but Serbia and Montenegro anticipated concessions and discharge from duties in the case of financial

BOX 27.**MINORITIES' EDUCATION**

In the AP of Vojvodina, persons belonging to the Hungarian minority can receive education in their native language in 78 elementary and 30 secondary schools. In some of them instruction is bilingual and in some only in the Hungarian language. As for two-year post-secondary and university education, instruction in the Hungarian language is given in the two-year post-secondary vocational school in Subotica, two-year post-secondary schools for the education of kindergarten nurses in Subotica and Novi Sad, at the Departments for the Hungarian Language and Literature in Novi Sad and Belgrade, Faculties of Economics and Civil Engineering in Subotica, Department of Sombor's Teachers Faculty in Subotica and partly at the Art Academy in Novi Sad (at the department for acting in the Hungarian language). Pupils belonging to the Bulgarian minority can receive instruction in their language in three elementary schools in Serbia and in Bosilegrad there is also a secondary school. In Dimitrovgrad instruction is provided in the Serbian language, but there are also additional classes for learning the native language with the elements of national culture for pupils belonging to the Bulgarian nationality. At the Philological Faculty in Belgrade there is the Department for the Bulgarian Language and Literature. In Southern Serbia, in the territory inhabited by the Albanian minority, education is provided in their native language in more than ten schools. There are also 3 secondary schools in which instruction is bilingual or in the Albanian language. At the Philological Faculty of Belgrade, there is the Department for the Albanian language and Literature.

donations by domestic and foreign organizations, foundations and private persons. However, the Act on Elementary Schools of the Republic of Serbia limits the enjoyment of the right guaranteed by the Charter, stipulating that elementary schools

can be established only by the Government of the Republic of Serbia. In contrast to elementary schools, legal and physical persons in Serbia and Montenegro may establish secondary, two-year post-secondary schools and faculties in accordance with law, so that this right is also granted to the minority communities themselves.

There is a need for the education of kindergarten nurses and teachers who will provide instruction in a minority language. Therefore, the government is instructed to provide for departments and faculties – within two-year post-secondary and university education – where kindergarten nurses, as well as teachers and language teachers will receive education in the language of national minorities or bilingual education (14.1).

BOX 28.**MINORITY HUMAN RESOURCES IN VOJVODINA EDUCATION SYSTEM**

According to their ethnic composition, in two-year post-secondary schools in the AP of Vojvodina, the part of the state with the largest number of minorities, teachers and associates belonging to the Hungarian national minority constitute 7.86% of total teaching staff. Among teachers and associates in two-year post-secondary schools in the AP of Vojvodina there are also persons belonging to other national minorities – 5% of the total number of teachers and associates accounts for those belonging to the Romanian national minority, 2.14% accounts for Slovaks, 1.43% for Croats and 0.71% for Bulgarians. Of the total number of professors and associates at the faculties of Novi Sad University, Hungarians account for 8.27%, Croats for 2.57%, Slovaks for 1.29%, Ruthenians for 1.01% and Romanians for 0.34%, while other nationalities (except Serbs and Montenegrins who, together, constitute 82%), uncommitted and those who did not express their national belonging account for 4.42%. This will be compared with the population structure.

There is also the possibility to study the languages and literature of the national minorities living in Serbia and Montenegro at the philological faculties and faculties of philosophy within different universities in Serbia. So, for

example, the Albanian, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Romanian, Slovak, Turkish and Ukrainian languages and their literature and Near Eastern languages can be studied in Belgrade. At the Faculty of Philosophy in Novi Sad it is also possible to study Ruthenian.

The government also obliged itself to support vocational training and terminological specialization of teachers, as well as to promote international cooperation, thus enabling persons belonging to national minorities to study abroad in the language of the respective minority and the validation of diplomas acquired in this way in accordance with the law. Under the Programme of Cooperation, Serbia and Montenegro agreed with three states, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania, on the exchange of experience and specialization of kindergarten nurses, teachers and professors who, in Serbia and Montenegro, teach in the Bulgarian, Slovak and Romanian languages or subjects in those language, while the teachers of the Serbian language or teachers giving instruction in the Serbian language from these countries would come to Serbia and Montenegro.

1.3.3. Regional and Local Self-Government

Importance of regional governance. Various forms of regional and local self-government can play a significant role in the affirmation and protection of multiculturalism. In democratic countries, local government bodies are elected by the local population to whom they are responsible, so that they usually have a “better ear” for solving specific local problems and meeting local challenges. This general rule also applies to the meeting of challenges arising from the exercise of full freedom of culture in multinational, multi-religious and multi-linguistic communities. The system of regional and local self-government, where local government bodies have appropriate competences and financial sources, enables the authorities to conduct their policies in accordance with various challenges that differ from community to community. The central authority is often unable to efficiently perceive and adequately respond to the specific needs and requirements of various religious, national and linguistic groups, which take diffe-

rent forms, depending on the local circumstances. In addition, the central authority – which is, above all, the expression of the will of the majority in all states as well as in Serbia – frequently does not show interest in solving specific problems in multicultural communities. Local authorities are formed by the will of the local majority. In part, the system of local self-government may cushion the fact that, at the national level, decisions are taken by the will of the majority in the whole country. In this way, a specific form of the vertical division of power is achieved, which can facilitate the meeting of challenges to which the government is exposed.

TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY

The Autonomous Provinces. Serbia includes two autonomous provinces in accordance with the Constitution: the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo. Under the Serbian Constitution, the autonomous provinces represent the level of “regional” government between the republican level of government and the level of local self-government. These autonomous provinces, with a different degree of autonomy, were established 60 years ago in recognition of historical, national and cultural characteristics of these parts of Serbia.

Since the Autonomous Province of Kosovo has been placed under international administration by Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council and is excluded from the state’s legal and political system, only the status of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina will be considered (in further text: Vojvodina).

Vojvodina is situated in the northern part of the Republic and covers a little more than one-fourth of the territory and the population of Serbia. According to its ethnic, linguistic and religious affiliation, the population in Vojvodina is very heterogeneous. Despite a dynamic and forceful migration of its population during and after World War II (i.e. the Jewish Holocaust, expulsion of Germans, settlement of the Serbs from Bosnia and Croatia in several waves), Vojvodina has remained the unique Central-European national mosaic. Due to its specificity relative to other parts of Serbia, Vojvodina was constituted as an autonomous province and, until

the 1990s, enjoyed a high degree of legislative and political autonomy. During the rule of Milošević's Socialist Party of Serbia, Vojvodina was autonomous only formally, since it was deprived of all competences, financial resources and functions. The extent of its degradation is best illustrated by the fact that the Vojvodina budget for 2000 amounted to only 5,000,000 Euros and was spent mostly on the salaries of the completely inactive provincial administration. This situation changed after the victory of the democratic opposition at all levels of government. The Law on the Establishment of Specified Competences of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina – the so-called Omnibus Law⁹⁹ – was enacted. In accordance with this Law, Vojvodina was given back more than 200 administrative competences in more than 20 areas of social life, which were, until then, exercised by the relevant ministries of the Republican Government.

In addition, changes in the republican budget and tax laws provided the Province with appropriate budgetary revenues, so that its budget for 2003 and 2004 amounted to more than 200 million Euros. A good part of these recovered competences includes the areas of utmost significance for the preservation of Vojvodina's cultural and national identity and the affirmation of its multiculturalism.

LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

Local self-government in Serbia is exercised in 169 municipalities, in four largest municipalities, which acquired the status of a city by law (Niš, Novi Sad, Kragujevac and Priština) and in the Capital Belgrade. Insofar as competences are concerned, except in the case of the Capital, cities and municipalities are equal. The largest four municipalities, Niš, Novi Sad, Kragujevac and Priština, acquired the status of a city and larger financial revenues, in conformity with law. The municipal territory is comprised of one central settlement (this is most frequently the city after which the municipality got its name) and a number of settlements surrounding the central settlement which do not enjoy autonomy.

⁹⁹ The Law on the Establishment of Certain Competences of the Autonomous Province, *Official Herald of the RS*, No. 6/2002.

The organs of regional governance. The bodies of local self-government are the Assembly, the Municipal Council and the President. The Municipal Assembly adopts the Statute, as the highest legal document of the municipality, urban development plan and budget of the municipality and other secondary legislation. The Municipal Council is elected by the Assembly at the proposal of the President of the Municipality. It supervises the work of the municipal administration, decides on the decisions of the municipal administration at second instance, assists the President of the Municipality and proposes the budget. The president of the unit of local self-government is elected directly by citizens and represents the executive power, enforces the decisions taken by the Assembly, as well as other regulations, coordinates the work of the municipal administration and has executive authority over the disposal of budgetary funds. In addition to its traditional functions in the area of urban planning and utilities, local self-government also includes many other areas of significance for the cultural development of national minorities. A special novelty is the introduction of the *Council for Ethnic Relations* and the Civil Defence Attorney, i.e. the municipal ombudsman. The task of the former body is to gather the representatives of the national communities living in the municipality and discuss with them the issues concerning the cohabitation of national communities and, thus, exert influence on the work of the Assembly while taking decisions that affect the status of the minorities in the municipalities.

1.3.4. Political Participation

One of the basic conditions for the smooth functioning of multinational, multi-religious and multilingual states is to ensure the full and efficient participation of all communities in the political process, formation of the popular will, as well as in the pursuance of the principle of national sovereignty. Participation in political life implies that there are no legal and political obstacles to the participation of various minority groups in the formation of government bodies, as well as in the formation of the political will, regardless of the extent to which minority communities effectively participate in the formation of the

political will. Political participation of minority groups is ensured only if the political system enables minorities to efficiently participate in the political process, to exert a real influence on decision-making, especially if the decisions concern their equality, as well as to have their views be taken into account when such decisions are made. To this end, it is important that the regulations do not place the citizens into an unequal position and that the system of government does not favour the majority population not only *de jure* but also *de facto*. In that sense, the provisions of the Serbian election laws setting the requirement of 10,000 certified voters' signatures for the submission of a list of candidates for deputies to the Serbian Assembly are disputable. In real fact, this makes it more difficult for the political parties of national minorities to participate in elections, although they have a small chance to receive a sufficient number of votes even for a few seats in parliament. A highly centralized system of government, where all more important decisions are taken by the central bodies of government by a simple democratic majority, leads inevitably to domination by the majority, that is, the outvoting of the minority in those bodies even if they do participate in the political process. The examples can be found in Serbia's political history of the 1990s when, due to a high degree of centralization, the interests, proposals and views of the political representatives of the Bosniaks and Hungarians in the Assembly and the Government of Serbia were persistently rejected. For a genuine political participation of minorities, it is also necessary to adjust the electoral system and the system of government as to take into account Serbia's multicultural reality.

ELECTORAL PROCESS AND POLITICAL PARTIES

In Serbia, the multiparty system, freedom of political organization and action, as well as democratic elections were formally introduced as early as 1990. At that time, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the sole authority of the Communist Alliance were abandoned. However, until the end of 2000, pluralist political democracy in Serbia was functioning in a specific situation, so that one could hardly speak of an equitable political game between the ruling parties and the opposition. Except at the level of local self-

government, political power was exercised solely by Milošević's Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and its political satellites.

Abridged freedom of the media, war propaganda, ruthless manipulation with the polling districts and frequent rigging of the electoral process enabled Milošević and various formal and informal centres of power to retain strict control over the state and its economy.

Despite these restrictions, multiparty elections for representative bodies at all levels of government were regularly held since 1990. A great number of political parties – whose formation and registration were relatively free and mostly without manipulation – participated in these elections. As for political rights (the right to elect and to be elected and the right of political organization and assembly) during that period and after 2000, there was no direct discrimination on an ethnic, religious or linguistic basis. The formation of a political organization was not restricted, so that it was also possible to form national political organizations, with the programme directed to the pursuance of collective aims. The number of citizens required to form a political party (one hundred citizens) was not unfavourable or discriminatory.

NATIONAL MINORITY POLITICAL PARTIES

Since the introduction of a multiparty system into Serbia, larger national minorities have been organized into special, so-called national political parties. This process was instigated in large measure by nationalism and chauvinism prevailing in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Ethnic mobilization was dominant in the territory of Serbia. The Albanians in Kosovo and southern Serbia, the Hungarians and Croats in Vojvodina and the Bosniacs in Sandžak formed their own political organizations immediately after the introduction of a multiparty system into Serbia, whereby the Kosovo Albanians boycotted all elections in that province since 1990, while other national minorities in Serbia actively participated in the elections at all levels of government with more or less success. In the meantime, the Roma, Vlachs, Romanians, Bunjevci and Slovaks also formed their political organizations but rarely participated in elections on their own and mostly without success.

BOX 29.

MINORITY POLITICAL PARTIES

The political parties representing the largest national minority in Serbia (without Kosovo), the Hungarians, have been the most active and most successful in the political process. The political parties of Vojvodina Hungarians participated autonomously in the elections for the Republican Assembly and scored significant successes up to 2000. The Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians (in further text: DZVM), which was the unique political organization of this national minority up to 1994, scored very good results at various regular and early parliamentary elections: in 1990 it won 8 seats, in 1992 – 9 and in 1993 – 5. In 1994, the new political party of Vojvodina Hungarians was formed – the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (in further text: SVM), which has been the strongest political party of

the Hungarians in Serbia since then. It can be stated that in almost all elections the Hungarian national minority in Vojvodina voted mostly for its national parties and that it defined itself not only as a special ethnic community, but also as a special political community. Insofar as the political organizations of the Bosniacs in the Sandžak/Raška region and the Albanians in southern Serbia are concerned, the situation is similar. The most influential political organizations of the Bosniacs in Sandžak are the Party of Democratic Action and Sandžak Democratic Party and those of the Albanian population in southern Serbia are the Party for Democratic Action, Party for Democratic Unification of Albanians and Movement for Democratic Prosperity.

THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES OF NATIONAL MINORITIES AFTER THE FALL OF THE MILOŠEVIĆ REGIME

The largest political party of Vojvodina Hungarians, the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians, as well as the Sandžak Democratic Party (SDP) and political parties of Vojvodina Croats played a significant role within the DOS in the victory of the democratic opposition in Serbia and the fall of the 12-year autocratic regime of Slobodan Milošević. Opposition candidate Vojislav Koštunica at the presidential election and the DOS at the parliamentary elections won the most convincing victory just in the municipalities with the Hungarian and Bosniac majority (Kanjiža, Senta and Tutin). These circumstances resulted in a qualitatively new situation in Serbia. Namely, it was for the first time in the history of the multiparty system in Serbia that legitimate political representatives of major national minorities in Serbia participated in the executive authorities at state and provincial levels. Apart from seats in federal parliament, the leader of the SDP became the Minister of National and Ethnic Communities; the SVM was allotted one position of vice-president of the republican government and one position of a deputy minister. Apart from 17 seats in the Vojvodina Assembly, the SVM was allotted three

secretariats in the Executive Council of Vojvodina, one position of a vice-president, as well as four functions of a deputy provincial secretary. The experience of the new coalition government has shown, especially in Vojvodina, that the participation of minority parties in government should not be regarded as disturbing and the source of conflict but, on the contrary, as a stabilization factor and proof that the interests of the Serbian majority and national minorities are not exclusive.

EARLY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN DECEMBER 2003 AND THE DISCRIMINATION OF MINORITIES

Early parliamentary elections were scheduled for December 2003, following the assassination of the Prime Minister and the leader of the Democratic Party, Zoran Đinđić, as well as a crisis within the ruling DOS. The elections were staged under the election law of 2000, prescribing the system of proportional representation, with Serbia as a single electoral unit and the electoral threshold of 5%. Although the Coalition Together for Tolerance, comprised mostly of the parties of national minorities, won 160,000 votes, it was not enough to pass the threshold of 5%. As a result, for the first time after the introduction of a multiparty system into Serbia, the largest party of Vojvodina Hungarians remained without any

seat in the Republican Assembly. Realizing that the provision of the election law was untenable, because it discriminates national minorities, the new Assembly modified the election rules right away, abolishing the electoral threshold for the parties of national minorities¹⁰⁰. Although this affirmative action will produce effects only after the next parliamentary elections, it is an important step towards facilitating and encouraging the participation of minorities in political life.

NATIONAL COUNCILS OF THE NATIONAL MINORITIES

National councils of national minorities are new institutions of cultural autonomy, which were introduced into Serbia's legal system in 2002. These national councils should be the representative bodies of national minorities, which would be thus represented in the fields of education, informing in the language of the national minority, use of their native language and culture. The members of the council were elected for the first time under the so-called electoral system by members of the respective minority, while the long-term rules governing the election of the council should be regulated by a special law. The Law on the Protection of Minorities establishes only a regulatory framework for the functions of national councils, which will be supplemented by special laws. It will be necessary to effect radical changes before these national councils take their right place, that is, until the right measure of functions which each national council will be able to perform in a quality manner in the interest of the respective national minority, as well as in the interest of society as a whole. Namely, neither the national minorities are effectively in the same position in Serbia, nor are their abilities and interests identical. At best, national councils will autonomously perform those functions and decide on those issues, which they handle better than the government or the territorial unit. As for the functions that can be performed by the government or the territorial unit more adequately, say, in consultation with national councils, such functions will be retained by the government or the territorial unit. From

September 2002, when the National Council of Hungarians was formed first, by the end of 2004, national councils were formed by the Croats, Ruthenians, Romanians, Slovaks, Roma, Bunjevci, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Bosniaks, Greeks and Macedonians.

1.4. Cultural Challenges

1.4.1. Cooperation with Regional Organizations as the Driving Force of Multicultural Society in Serbia

After the democratic changes in 2000, Serbia joined European integration processes and set membership in the European Union as the basic aim of its long-term policy. Considering the long duration of the authoritarian regime, weak institutions and low standards in the implementation of human and minority rights, it is necessary – prior to accession to the European Union – to effect a number of changes in the relevant legislation and practice. By acceding to the Council of Europe and furthering its cooperation with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Serbia could embark on the formation of a liberal society, based on human rights, democratic values and cultural pluralism. Although there are still many obstacles and resistance in legislation, practice, as well as in the consciousness of its citizens, it seems that for the first time there is good will to persist on that path.

As a member state of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, Serbia acceded to the Council of Europe, thus assuming a number of obligations. So, *the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*, *Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities* and *the European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages* have been ratified. These treaties lay down the standards providing for the guarantee of the proclaimed rights not only because of their reputation in the international community, but also because of the mechanisms being available for their realization.

By acceding to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, the citizens of Serbia gained access to the European Court of Human Rights. Although that is not its primary function, the Court plays a significant role in the creation of a multicultural society. By protecting

¹⁰⁰ The Act on Alterations of and Amendments to the Law on the Election of National Deputies, *Official Herald of the RS*, No. 18/2004.

the rights of an individual, it also protects his or her cultural specificity against unjustified government interference. Although it stated that it was not its task to decide on the status-related issues of communities aspiring to achieve the status of a national minority (*Gorzelik v. Poland*, 20 December 2001), the Court nevertheless promoted the right of those communities to fight for such a status by using all permissible political means (2 October 2001). In the famous *Belgian Linguistics Case*, the Court laid down the criteria for the provision of instruction in minority languages (the decision of 23 July 1968). On a number of occasions the Court also expressed its view on the freedom of religion, whereby it set the limits of government interference with the internal affairs of the Church (*Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova*, 13 November 2001, *Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria*, 26 October 2001), the extent of a state's obligation as regards the freedom of religion (*Kokkinakis v. Greece*, 25 May 1993), etc.

The Court also recognized the difficult position of Roma in this part of Europe and, early in 2004, stated that this large community was discriminated against (*Nachova and Others vs. Bulgaria*, 26 February 2004). It is clear that its decisions have exerted, and are still exerting, a great influence on the legislation and practice of the European countries, thus contributing to the creation of multicultural societies in Europe.

So far, the Court has not brought any decision against Serbia and Montenegro. However, more than 700 petitions have already arrived in the Court and some of them will certainly involve respect for cultural and minority rights.

In 2002, Serbia and Montenegro submitted its report on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities to the Council of Europe Committee for the Protection of National Minorities. The Committee's general comments have been taken into account and its recommendations have already been implemented in part, especially those concerning the institutionalisation of minority problems. However, there are still many changes that should be effected, especially those with respect to the status of the Roma community and internally displaced persons.

Serbia is also given advice by other bodies within the Council of Europe, especially by the *Council of Europe Venice Commission – Democracy through Law*. One of its major tasks is to help the countries in transition to harmonize their legislation with the principles of a modern democratic society. *The South-East Europe Strategic Review*, a special contribution of the Council of Europe to the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, also plays an important role, especially in the context of social development of the region. The major tasks of this project are to strengthen institutions with a view to improving the social status of the population, promoting regional cooperation and converging the relevant domestic legislation to European standards. So far, cooperation has been established in the areas of employment, right to housing and social security. The Human Dignity and Social Exclusion Project plays a great role in the improvement of the social status of the groups that have so far been excluded from social life. It is an attempt on the part of the Council of Europe to create favourable conditions for the development of a multicultural society through development initiatives.

Since 1993, the *Council of Europe* has also intensified its efforts towards improving the status of the Roma in the entire territory of Europe, through the protection of minorities, fight against racism and intolerance, as well as the fight against their social exclusion. To that end, the Specialist Group on Roma has been established. It monitors the position of this large community in the territory of Europe and, through various projects, exerts influence on its improvement. Serbia also has at its disposal numerous other bodies within the Council of Europe, which provide guidelines for the creation of a genuinely multicultural society. One of them is the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, whose basic task is to protect and improve human rights in the context of the fight against racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and intolerance. In cooperation with the OSCE, Council of Europe, UNHCR and UNOCHA, the state union Ministry of Human and Minority Rights has prepared a National Strategy for Integration of the Roma Community in Serbia and Montenegro, whose adoption is underway.

The OSCE launched a number of initiatives towards the development of democratic society. Its mission cooperates actively with the state union Ministry of Human and Minority Rights in the implementation of the Law on the Protection of Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities. The project of multiethnic police, which is carried out in southern Europe, in addition to the announcement of a similar project in Vojvodina, represents probably the most successful project realized in cooperation with the OSCE. The project has been implemented in the municipalities of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa, where there was a great need for the integration of the Albanian population into government structures. The OSCE also provided great support to the training and implementation of the electoral rights of minorities.

The OSCE also provides assistance in solving the problem of refugees and internally displaced persons. The result of this effort is the Joint Action Plan for Repatriation, which, apart from Serbia and Montenegro, includes Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under its gender equality project, which includes 33 municipalities in the country, the OSCE is taking an active part in assisting Serbia to address this problem as well.

An important role in the promotion of international cooperation in the region is also played by the *Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe*, which is the first serious effort of the international community to influence the prevention of conflicts in this region by long-term policy. The Stability Pact is a political agreement whose basic aim is to ensure the stability and development of South Eastern Europe.

BOX 30.

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

The OHCHR work in Serbia and Montenegro focuses on a broad range of human rights activities. After significant political changes occurred in 2000, much of the OHCHR's work within Serbia and Montenegro shifted from the monitoring of individual human rights abuses to supporting the efforts of the newly elected democratic government to carry out substantial reform of its institutions. Respect for human rights of all citizens is a key goal of the agency and it seeks to promote respect for all ethnicities, religions and languages in the quest for a multicultural democratic society. OHCHR works to promote and educate society about basic human rights as well as assist in developing a national human rights capacity to prevent future conflict. OHCHR plays a crucial role in ensuring that all groups in Serbia such as IDPs, refugees, and Roma are ensured their fundamental human rights.

The OHCHR also monitors, analyses and reports if impunity of human rights violations occurs. Such efforts in this regard include: trial monitoring, interviewing witnesses and victims of serious human rights violations and assessing the effectiveness of prosecutors, and investigating judges and trials. This allows the agencies

to determine where improvements and reform can be implemented.

In southern Serbia, OHCHR has been a part of the process of peace building by ensuring that all terms of a peace treaty negotiated in the region between Albanian leaders and authorities were in accordance with human rights standards. The OHCHR created a position for a full time human rights officer in southern Serbia to oversee and monitor progress on implementing the peace plan, working with UNCT, the OSCE, and local Albanian leaders on a variety of human rights issues.

The OHCHR has also created a Belgrade Human Rights Contact Group comprised of NGOs international actors such as the OSCE, Council of Europe and members of the UN Country Team. This group chairs various working groups on human rights issues such as Roma and IDPs. The office is also currently working on developing a human rights centre in Belgrade to serve as a resource for many local agencies active in Serbia. The idea is that it becomes a central point and repository for human right information and it should serve to disseminate and raise awareness of human rights issues for civil society in Serbia.

1.4.2. Southern Serbia, Vojvodina and Sandžak – A Comparison with Central Serbia

Present-day Serbia is a state with marked cultural differences among its regions. Only Central Serbia represents a relatively homogeneous entity in respect of the language, religion and culture of its population.

Vojvodina. The northern part of Serbia, Vojvodina, which is separated from Central Serbia by the rivers Danube and Sava, is historically linked to Serbia solely through the centuries-long presence of Serbs in the territory of present-day Vojvodina. Vojvodina was never a part of the mediaeval Serbian state or of the modern Kingdom of Serbia. It became part of Serbia only after World War I and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. With its distinctly multinational composition, Vojvodina has remained a genuine ethnic mosaic of Central Europe in a relatively small area. Apart from the increasing Serbian majority, which is homogeneously Orthodox, the northern part is dominated by Hungarians, who are mostly Roman Catholics, and, to a lesser degree, by members of the Christian Reformed Church and Evangelical Church. In certain villages and towns Slovaks, who are mostly Evangelists, constitute a majority, while some villages are inhabited mostly by Orthodox Romanians and Greek Catholic Ruthenians. Multiculturalism in Vojvodina can be seen at every step, even in those communities, which are, due to historical circumstances, inhabited almost exclusively by the Serbian population. There is hardly any larger settlement in Vojvodina without at least three types of shrines and where architectural monuments, graveyards and churches do not bear witness of the presence of various cultures from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, or where multilingualism is not present.

Sandžak. In the south-western part of Serbia, in the border area between Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina is the Sandžak region, or the Raška region, as it is called by Serbs. Serbia's part of Sandžak is comprised of six municipalities¹⁰¹ of which Novi Pazar, with its 100,000 inhabitants, is the major econo-

mic, cultural and administrative centre. In this region, Bosniaks, who were more frequently called Muslims in the past, constitute the majority population. This national community, which lives mostly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is of Slavic origin and Muslim by religious affiliation. Their language does not differ significantly from the language of Serbs, Montenegrins or Croats. In contrast to Vojvodina, where the challenge of multiculturalism is manifested by differences among various Christian religions and languages, as well as the integration of a great number of Serbian refugees from Bosnia and Croatia, in Sandžak we encounter Christianity and Islam as the legacy of 500 years of Ottoman rule over mediaeval Serbia.

Southern Serbia or, more exactly, its three municipalities (Bujanovac, Medveđa and Preševo) in the region bordering on Kosovo, poses a special challenge. In contrast to Vojvodina where (except some rare cases and the organized expulsion of Croats from some municipalities in the Srem region) there were no wars or ethnic conflicts during the 1990s and in contrast to Sandžak where there was massive discrimination and some form of persecution of Bosniaks, but there was no armed ethnic conflict, the relations between Serbs and Albanians in Southern Serbia are directly burdened by the horrors of the war and ethnic conflicts in the neighbouring Kosovo and the armed rebellion of Albanians in that region. In Southern Serbia, all challenges of multiculturalism are present: different languages, enormous ethnic distance, different religions (the Albanians in Southern Serbia are Muslims), etc. The relations between Serbs and Albanians are especially burdened by the fact that, although direct armed conflicts have been avoided, the Albanians almost do not participate in Serbia's political life. So, the overwhelming majority of them boycotted the last two elections (i.e. parliamentary elections in December 2003 and presidential elections in June 2004).

CENTRAL SERBIA

In the Capital Belgrade and Central Serbia, with its large industrial and administrative centres of Niš and Kragujevac, there are almost no challenges of multiculturalism linked to religion – all

¹⁰¹ Prijepolje, Priboj, Sjenica, Tutin, Novi Pazar, Nova Varoš.

present minorities, including Roma, Vlachs and Bulgarians, are Orthodox Christians and their linguistic diversity is much less pronounced than in Vojvodina.

The Roma in Central Serbia. The major challenge is posed by Roma, whose number in Central Serbia is only estimated but, according to the official statistics, it is about 70,000. Roma do not live in specified areas traditionally or in substantial numbers. Instead, they are scattered in almost all parts of Central Serbia, but most of them live in Belgrade, Niš and Leskovac. The problem of Roma in Serbia is similar to that in all Central European countries with a considerable Roma population. That is pronounced economic and educational backwardness of this community relative to the majority population, in addition to a great ethnic distance and discrimination of Roma. Their severe poverty and low educational level, as well as the suspicion and distance of society vis-à-vis them form a vicious circle, which this community cannot break. The problem faced by Roma is not whether the government will allow them to live in their traditional way (often associated with extremely low standard of housing, low educational level and unemployment). Their problem is that the government does almost nothing to improve their living conditions and prospects.

Whereas Vojvodina Hungarians request from the government to enable them to receive education in their native language in special classes and special schools, thus preserving their specificities, native language and identity, Roma fight against sending their children in special schools where they would be separated from Serbian children. After the changes in 2000, the government established a legal framework for affirmative action vis-à-vis Roma, but so far the government has not succeed in preparing the Strategy for the Settlement of the Roma Problem, implementing necessary measures and providing sufficient funds, thus changing their reality in general¹⁰².

The Vlachs community. Apart from challenges relating to the integration and affirmation of

Roma in Central Serbia, we also encounter the process of reaffirming the identity of Vlachs. This community, which lives primarily in the eastern part of Central Serbia, in so-called Timočka Krajina, is exposed to assimilation to a large extent. The Vlach population, which is regarded by many as an ethnic group within the Romanian people, was largely assimilated in the 20th century. The Vlachs largely remained without their native language as well, or use it only at home. They also lost their first names and surnames. Religious similarity and cohabitation with Serbs brought this community close to complete assimilation. However, the 1990s were marked by its national revival: they began to establish their cultural and national societies and an increasing number of them began to declare their national belonging as Vlach¹⁰³. Apart from Timočka Krajina, South Eastern Serbia, that is, the bordering region with Bulgaria comprising two municipalities – Bosilegrad and Dimitrovgrad (Caribrod), is also inhabited by national minorities in substantial numbers.

Similarly to the Vlach community, the **Bulgarian community** has also been assimilated to a large extent. In the second half of the 20th century, the similarity with their native language and alphabet, religion and customs made the Bulgarian community in Serbia to gradually lose their cultural and linguistic specificities. Although most of them still declare themselves as Bulgarians, institutional protection of their specificity in these municipalities has been reduced to a minimum. Education in the Bulgarian language is provided only in Bosilegrad, but not in any elementary school in Dimitrovgrad¹⁰⁴.

VOJVODINA

As already mentioned, Vojvodina represents a specific example of multiculturalism in Serbia. The centuries-long cohabitation of various eth-

¹⁰² Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minority – Opinion on Serbia and Montenegro, ACFCOPI (2003)008, p. 3.

¹⁰³ According to the 1991 census, there were 18,000 Vlachs in Serbia, as contrasted to 2002 when 40,000 Serbian citizens declared their national belonging as Vlach. Ethnic Mosaic of Serbia According to the 2002 Census, Ministry of Human and Minority Rights of Serbia and Montenegro, Belgrade, 2004.

¹⁰⁴ *The First Report of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities*, submitted in accordance with Article 25, Section 1, of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Belgrade, p. 89.

nic communities, which differed in their language, alphabet, religion and tradition, in this area: the Serbs, Hungarians, Germans, Croats, Slovaks, Romanians, Jews and others and the preservation of that diversity despite high pressure from the central authority (Budapest, Vienna and Belgrade) against it, resulted in the fact that present-day Vojvodina is synonymous with multiculturalism. Today, it would be hardly possible to conceive the existence of Vojvodina, that is, its autonomy without various ethnicities, languages, religions and cultural patterns. As a political notion, Vojvodina emerged in the 19th century as the result of the struggle of Serbs, in particular, against centralization and growing Hungarian nationalism in Hungary. However, over time, the autonomy of Vojvodina became the symbol of the protection of diversity and the fight for the recognition of Vojvodina's specificity relative to other parts of the state. Among other things, its specificity is reflected in multiculturalism. It is no wonder that after 1920, that is, after joining the Kingdom of Serbia, that is, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Vojvodina's struggle for the recognition of its specificity and autonomy never stopped. Namely, the citizens of Vojvodina, including the Serbs, did not understand Vojvodina only as a means of their emancipation from Budapest, but also as a means of their protection against any centralization, economic exploitation and non-recognition of Vojvodina's specificity.

Due to tragic events during and after World War II, two important and large ethnic communities in Vojvodina disappeared. Those were the Germans and Jews, whose presence in this region has been evident since the early 18th century. Although these two communities almost completely vanished, they are still present in Vojvodina's culture thanks to their contribution to the development of industry, handicrafts and architecture in the region. Suffice it to mention two impressive synagogues in Subotica and Novi Sad, the monumental Catholic church in Vršac, but also the still successful breweries in Vojvodina. Multiculturalism in Vojvodina can be proven by using a number of impressive data. So, for example, in state-run elementary schools in Vojvodina, instruction is provided in 6 languages

(Serbian, Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian, Croatian and Ruthenian) and in secondary schools in 5 languages (Serbian, Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian and Ruthenian). Information in electronic media, financed partly from the budget, is provided in 8 languages (Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian, Croatian, Romany, Ukrainian, Ruthenian and German). The minority languages are in official use in 36 Vojvodina municipalities and cities (out of 45). There are also professional theatres in the Serbian, Hungarian, Slovak and Romanian languages, which are subsidized from the budgetary funds. The non-government sector is also developed. Members of national and ethnic minorities in Vojvodina have formed several hundred active societies and organizations with a view to cultivating and promoting their customs, folklore, culture, language, education, etc.

BOX 31.**PROMOTION OF MULTICULTURALISM
IN VOJVODINA**

Multicultural education and raising children in a tolerant environment lead to true inter-culturalism. An example of this is one village near Zrenjanin, the town in Vojvodina, called Belo Blato (Hungarian name – Erzsébetlak). In the elementary school "Bratstvo i jedinstvo" (Brotherhood and Unity) 150 pupils are learning in three languages – Hungarian, Slovak and Serbian. The majority speak all three languages. Within the school, there is a dancing section where those children are learning Hungarian, Slovak, Bulgarian and Serbian traditional songs and dances. There is a dancing association called "Jedinstvo" (Unity) with similar activities. Three religious communities, Christian Orthodox, Slovak Evangelistic and Roman-Catholic are in close co-operation and even serve together on some religious ceremonies! The biggest company in the Belo Blato with approximately 50 employees is called, again, "Jedinstvo" (Unity)!

Even from this short survey of some aspects of multiculturalism in Vojvodina it is evident that the region has a developed institutional framework of multiculturalism and that different cultures and languages really live in it. In addition,

So, for example, if they have a chance, a high percentage of minority-group members opts to receive education in their native language. As could be seen in the previous chapters, one's cultural and linguistic identity is often crucial for his/her political choice (most Hungarians, for example, always vote for their national parties). Thus, it can be concluded that multiculturalism in Vojvodina is reality and that there are also institutional guarantees for the preservation of this unique cultural diversity. However, Vojvodina also faces significant challenges and problems arising from its cultural and linguistic plurality. Although multiculturalism or, more exactly, the promotion of diversity is widely respected in Vojvodina and forms part of its everyday life, it is still not accepted by all important factors in society. There is also strong resistance by some Serbs in Vojvodina, in particular. Although there was some latent resistance in the past, the real difficulties started parallel to the escalation of the crisis in Kosovo, rise of Greater Serb nationalism and chauvinism in the late 1980s, as well as the outbreak of ethnic conflicts and wars first in Croatia, then in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, finally, in Kosovo. That period was also marked by large-scale ethnic mobilization of the Serbs in Vojvodina, whereby diversity and specificity were often treated as an obstacle to the pursuance of nationalist aims and plans. Thus, during the 1990s, the minorities were forced to close their ranks, which resulted in their homogenisation to some degree, but it never ended in radicalisation (namely, despite severe destruction near the border of Vojvodina, its national minorities did not organize themselves militarily, nor there

was any violence or act of terrorism). What we can state on the basis of reliable data is that many Serbs in Vojvodina have come to resist multiculturalism to a significant extent as the result of a chauvinist government policy, which was conducted especially through the government-controlled media, and this is evident from various surveys¹⁰⁵. There is no doubt that this was also contributed by the settlement of hundreds of thousands of Serbs, refugees from Bosnia and Croatia during the 1990s. Integration of this people coming from the areas of disastrous ethnic conflict into a multilingual environment such as Vojvodina (they came from an absolutely monolingual region) was not always easy and posed a special challenge.

The government did not work enough to provide care to this people, let alone to have them accepting values such as multiculturalism or multilingualism. Today, they speak openly about a secret agreement between Serbian President Milošević and Croatian President Tuđman concerning the so-called humane resettlement of the Croats from Vojvodina in Croatia and of the Serbs from Croatia in Serbia with a view to achieving the homogenisation of the state. Consequently, it is necessary to create conditions for the Serbian majority in Vojvodina to accept cultural and religious diversity as a value and not as an obstacle that must be removed as soon as possible. A great role in such a process could be played by learning the language of one's community, that is the native language of the minority living in that community in substantial numbers, which has absolutely been neglected.

TABLE 17. Ethnic Affiliations of District Court Judges and District Prosecutors or Deputy Prosecutors in Vojvodina¹⁰⁶

	Serbs	Hungarians	Montenegrins	Yugoslavs	Croats
District court judges	76%	5%	5%	3.75%	1.25%
District prosecutors or deputy prosecutors	71%	5.71%	3%	8.5%	—

one can observe in Vojvodina deep devotion to one's national culture and identity.

A special challenge is posed by the appropriate minority representation in various sectors of public life. Statistical data show that insofar as their education is concerned, persons belonging

¹⁰⁵ These surveys show that most Serbs in Vojvodina are against granting national minorities the right to officially use their language or receive education in their native language. This must arouse concern in view of the fact that such a right is already exercised in Vojvodina.

¹⁰⁶ Source: Provincial Secretariat for Regulations, the Administration and National Minorities.

to national minorities in Vojvodina, except the Roma, do not lag behind the Serbian majority to a significant extent¹⁰⁷. However, in government bodies and public services, especially at a high level, the minorities in Vojvodina, even those with a similar educational background, are represented significantly less than the Serbs¹⁰⁸. Full equality of all citizens and their confidence in the law enforcement authorities are not possible without an appropriate presence of various population groups (including the ethnic and linguistic minorities in these authorities). During the 1990s, there was silent ethnic cleansing in the police, judiciary, prosecutor's offices, customs service and inspectorates, so that they often became almost monolingual, even in distinctly multiethnic communities in Vojvodina.

A particular challenge in connection with Vojvodina's multiculturalism is the question of inter-culturalism and the interpenetration of various cultures. Efforts to preserve one's own culture often block the influence of cultures and their enrichment by others. The policy and practice of multiculturalism in Vojvodina should stimulate inter-culturalism and mutual enrichment of the various cultures, with attendant institutional protection of cultural specificities. Schools and the media in Vojvodina spread little awareness and information about other ethnicities; few in the Serb majority ever learn a minority language and almost nothing is known about the culture, customs and histories of the people alongside whom they live in Vojvodina. The converse is often also the case: national minorities in Vojvodina often seal themselves off in their cultural and linguistic communities, although a majority do speak Serbian. Therefore, Vojvodina needs, besides institutional preserva-

tion of differences, also influence, affirmation and enhancement of dialogue among the different cultures, a situation seldom seen today. Viewed historically, however, the national cultures in the region of Vojvodina considerably influenced each others' traditions and customs.

SANDŽAK

The region around south-western Serbia and northern Montenegro is sometimes referred to as Sandzak, and it is not an administrative region, but the heritage of the Ottoman Sandžak and the long "Muslim" oriented tradition, which strongly enforced the ethnic dimension of this area. Historically the region could be identified either with the Ottoman administrative unit of Sandzak (which would in current days include 3 municipalities in Bosnia, 6 in Serbia and 4 in Montenegro), or with the first Serbian state, organized during the Middle Ages around the town of Raška. It is one of least developed in Serbia. The population consists of a variety of peoples and its inhabitants identify with different religions and ethnicities. The ethnic composition of the region includes Muslims, Serbs, Montenegrins, Yugoslavs, Roma and Albanians. The deteriorating economic situation has the potential to aggravate already existing tensions between such groups and the fragile political accommodation reached in this region in the wake of the Kosovo crisis. Unemployment in the region remains high. Today, much of the current economic activity is in the informal and illegal economy and therefore not sustainable in the long term.

In contrast to Vojvodina, which has a complex institutional system for the protection of multiculturalism and where linguistic diversity is in the essence of multiculturalism, the challenges and problems faced in Sandžak are mostly different. The Bosniaks, the people of South Slavic origin and Muslim by their religious affiliation, do not differ essentially from the Serbian majority insofar as their native language is concerned. However, they use the Latin alphabet and not the Cyrillic one, which is the principal alphabet of the Serbs. Their folklore also displays significant similarities, but has certain specificities. Due to this similarity, it is necessary, in large measure, to take a different approach to the issue of education, information and use of native

¹⁰⁷ The Ethnic Mosaic of Serbia According to the 2002 Census, Ministry of Human and Minority Rights of Serbia and Montenegro, Belgrade, 2004, pp. 102–131.

¹⁰⁸ According to the statistical data, the Serbs who hold a senior position, or are employed as office workers constitute 5% and 7.5% of the working population respectively; these percentages for Hungarians are 2.5% and 5%, for Ruthenians 3% and 6.5% and for Croats are 3.5% and 6%. These great differences among specified groups of economically active population cannot be explained by the fact that the percentage of Serbs with secondary, two-year post-secondary and university education is higher by 20–30% relative to the mentioned minorities, especially if one bears in mind that the employment level of the Serbs is higher in any case as compared to the mentioned minorities. *Ibid.*, pp. 192, 193, 198 and 200.

language. So far, for example, the radio programme, which provides the inhabitants of Novi Pazar with impartial and detailed information about local events, satisfies the need of Novi Pazar Bosniaks to have accessible information (in their native language) almost in full. Naturally, this does not mean that the cultural needs of Bosniaks, for example, can be satisfied through Belgrade's daily newspapers, regular programmes of Republic TV and Radio Public services, or the curricula prepared for education in the Serbian language. Sandžak is faced with two major challenges: the first is to ensure full freedom of religion, equal job opportunities for the Bosniaks and Serbs, as well as equal access to jobs in the government bodies and public services, while the second is to ensure additional contents in education, information and culture concerning the specificity of the Bosniaks, their tradition, literature, folklore and culture.

BOX 32.
UNDP IN SANDŽAK

The fragile situation in Sandžak has been addressed by UNDP since 2002, when it began efforts to assist in establishing and efficient public sector economic development institutions as well as to support non-governmental organizations aimed at promoting local economic development. UNDP recognizes that the main obstacles to development in the region are institutional weakness and therefore is working to strengthen critical institutions in the public and private domain. It is encouraging and aiding local authorities to take a proactive role in implementing projects relating to local economic development and restructuring the agriculture and environmental sectors.

As one of the most under-developed regions within the former Yugoslavia, the "Sandžak area" was always under the special attention of the central government authorities, which offered significant financial and technical support. Its development was essentially based around the location of new large-scale industries in the region regardless of local traditions, available labour, supplier businesses, raw materials and resources and other important geographically specific fa-

ctors. Notwithstanding, this aspect of regional policy made some progress in the 1970s and 1980s in fostering development and raising the level of GDP per capita in the region. However, this progress was only relative, given that the rise in GDP per capita was much less than in the other richer northern regions of Serbia. However, one part of the "Sandžak area" appears to be performing better than the surrounding municipalities. In the regional hub city – Novi Pazar – there is an appearance of progress, with significant entrepreneurial activity, housing and other construction, traffic congestion and a comparatively low rate of unemployment. Much of this activity is remittance-driven, reflecting the large population of residents since 1990 now making their home in EU countries. However, underlying this apparent progress is a significant element of informal entrepreneurial activity (e.g. textiles, leather) and illegal business (e.g. guns, drugs, stolen cars, human trafficking).

Contacts between the region and the centre (Belgrade) remain tense. There is significant tension around the goals of the Muslim majority and its main political representatives. There is general feeling in the Muslim community in the Sandžak region that the authorities in Belgrade are unfair towards this region on account of its Muslim majority. Especially in Novi Pazar, very little faith is routinely expressed in the goals and actions of the central government's departments or programmes with regard to them improving upon the conditions in the Sandžak region. At the same time, most of the local-level proposals for economic development – the construction of an airport, a University, more local taxation power, better road connections to the south-east (Kosovo) and south-west (Bosnia) – are received with suspicion in the capital city.

SOUTHERN SERBIA

Southern Serbia, the region comprising three municipalities, Bujanovac, Medveđa and Preševo, where Albanians constitute the majority population, poses an extremely sensitive issue. The recent insurgency in southern Serbia, which was brought to a peaceful end in early 2001, was a consequence of the discriminatory policies of the Milošević regime towards ethnic Albanians,

and the ensuing ethnic conflict in Kosovo. The legacy of human rights abuses and ethnically exclusionary policies caused ethnic strife in this part of Serbia, as well as some population short-lived displacement, and fuelled this insurgency movement among ethnic Albanians. The disadvantaged environment in southern Serbia also offers a favourable ground for organized cross-border crime, illegal trafficking of persons, drugs, small arms and light weapons.

BOX 33.

MULTIETHNIC POLICE IN SOUTHERN SERBIA

Accelerated courses were completed between 21 May and 14 July 2001 by a total of 70 policemen, who began work at once. Based on this experience, a Plan for Realising the Multi-Ethnic Police Course Training was drafted and the course organised from 6 August 2001 until 28 June 2002 at the Training Centre in Mitrovo polje on Mt. Goč. A total of 375 trainees (28 women and 347 men) completed the course; 245 of them ethnic Albanians, 125 Serbs, four Roma and one Yugoslav. After the course, which was conducted by local and foreign staff, field training continued in police stations according to a programme agreed by the police and the OSCE. The aim of the project is avoiding inter-ethnic tensions and possible conflicts, because the population would have more confidence in an ethnically diverse police force.

It would be a good thing if the multi-ethnic police concept were to be followed in other ethnically-mixed regions, for example Vojvodina and Sandžak (the Raška Region) – this idea is being examined but has still not been implemented.

Source: Report on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Civic and Political Rights in the FRY for the 1992–2002 period, June 2003, CCPR/C/SEMO/2003/1

It is a particularly convenient transit route for trafficking between the Middle East, Asia and Western Europe, using the main highway E 75 and being geographically adjacent to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and to Kosovo. Illicit activities provided financing not only for criminals, but also for extremist and separatist elements. Criminal elements are alleged to utilize intimidation within and across ethnic groups to promote instability and fear, in

order to maintain the conditions in southern Serbia in which their illicit business can operate. Continued discoveries of weapons caches in the former Ground Safety Zone (a buffer strip between Serbia proper and Kosovo) indicate that large numbers of illegal arms continue to circulate, in addition to high levels of individual possession within both ethnic Albanian and ethnic Serb communities of the area. The psychological impact of the war and the continued circulation of large number of military weapons have strengthened the widespread culture of violence. The main cause is to be found in the recent history of the country. Tensions are exacerbated by the widespread poverty, lack of opportunities and limited perspectives of improvements. In addition, southern Serbia is characterized by the legacy of a particularly weak civil society, with a limited culture of interaction with local authorities and a history of mistrust among the various ethnic and religious communities. The language problem often constitutes a further source of friction. A certain degree of social exclusion of minorities has led some groups to militate for armed conflict and secession.

Furthermore, the economy in southern Serbia has recently been characterized by the lack of private investment, low capacity to undertake entrepreneurial activities, absence of credit facilities, high unemployment, emigration of skilled talent and lost marketing outlets and, above all, the widespread grey economy. Statistical data indicate that municipalities in the south have the lowest national ranking in terms of income per capita. Outputs in the agriculture and livestock sectors has declined with the political crisis and economic stagnation, and are further affected by the loss of legal access to markets in Kosovo. There is a particular concern regarding opportunities for your adults, since a large number of them (including several thousand ex-combatants) have never entered the regular workforce. Years of low public and private investment has resulted in the highest unemployment rates in Europe – only 6,000 people, out of the 55,000 population of Bujanovac are currently employed, while 60 percent of the working age population in Preševo is without a job. Under current economic reforms it is estimated that 30,000 jobs have already been lost in southern Serbia as a result of the privatisation process.

Bearing in mind the failure of attempts to solve the Kosovo problem by military and police repression, the new Serbian government tried to stop the Albanian revolt in Southern Serbia, which was strongly supported from Kosovo, by using political and other non-violent means. One of such efforts is the formation of multiethnic police within which nearly three hundred policemen of Albanian nationality were trained and included in the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in this region¹⁰⁹.

In order to face the emergency determined by the 2001 conflicts between the Albanian population and the Serbian institutions, the Serbian Government established the Coordination Body for Southern Serbia, responsible for political mediation and for managing and overseeing

international and governmental funds to address the issue. The funds were also earmarked for livestock breeding, which is an extremely important industry in southern Serbia. Assistance was also provided for infrastructure, i.e. for the construction, reconstruction and winter maintenance of local roads and streets, repair of local hydro-systems and irrigation systems. Of great significance is also the programme of "fast employment", which was carried out with UNDP support. A significant measure was also the organization of a mini donors' conference in 2002 for the Dimitrovgrad municipality, at which international organizations considered the projects of support to the development of local infrastructure and to small and medium-sized enterprises.

BOX 34.

UNDP IN SOUTHERN SERBIA

The southern part of Serbia is a very underdeveloped region made up of diverse ethnic communities. After the Kosovo crisis in 1999, relations between its ethnic Albanian and Serbian communities deteriorated. In 2001 after the newly elected Serbian government embarked on a policy of reconciliation in the region, the UN play a key role in helping to ease ethnic tensions and foster peace. A UN inter-agency support office, UNIASO, was established in Vranje to assist in these efforts.

One project, **The Rapid Employment Programme**, or REP, which was supported by UNDP, in cooperation with the European Agency for Reconstruction, contributed to the efforts of reconciliation and social and economic stabilization. The project sought to stimulate the economy and create immediate job opportunities for those unemployed, particularly younger people through infrastructure and public works. By reducing unemployment, social and political tensions were minimized.

Civil society has also played a critical role in creating a more sustainable, multicultural society in southern Serbia. By giving an active role to ci-

vil society in promoting economic development the UNDP sponsored project known as **The Southern Serbia Municipal Improvement and Recovery Programme** or SSMIRP has been helping to improve the political and security situation in the region. Some of the results include enhanced community participation through the establishment of inter-ethnic municipal development committees in 6 municipalities. To date, 80 development projects have been implemented to address the needs of the entire population in areas such as vocational training, education, infrastructure and health. 2,300 community leaders, of which 500 are women, from three ethnic groups, have been trained in identifying priorities and selecting and formulating projects.

The Municipal Improvement Programme or MIR (Peace in Serbian, Good in Albanian) has been another successful UNDP undertaking in southern Serbia, continuing the partnership with the European Agency for Reconstruction. Its overall goal is to reduce poverty and strengthen the environment for political, community and municipal capacity primarily through labor intensive and infrastructure projects.

¹⁰⁹ *The First Report of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities*, submitted in accordance with Article 25,

Section 1, of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Belgrade, 2002.

The measures, which were implemented in the area of social (and, indirectly, economic) life, as part of a broader plan for reintegration of the Albanian national minority into social life, that is, the programme relating to the settlement of the crisis caused by actions of Albanian extremists in the municipalities of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa¹¹⁰, included the employment of the Albanian minority in the police fo-

rces. After numerous talks with representatives of the Albanian minority and the OSCE, the then Minister of Interior issued a Decision on the Admission of Trainees for Multi-Ethnic Police Force Policemen in Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa. Under the Decision, training courses, based on a special system, were organized so as to form a multiethnic police and build the confidence of different groups in that region.

BOX 35.**THE ROMA IN SOUTHERN SERBIA**

Serbian–Albanian relations are not the only issue in southern Serbia. As is the case in many other parts of Europe, the Roma in this region can be classified as a vulnerable group. Living conditions for the Roma are generally poor and they are often not integrated in their communities. One of the most pressing issues for the Roma of this area is their lack of access to quality education and to public institutions and services. In April of 2004, to promote the need for their inclusion into a multicultural society in Bujanovac, UNDP and a local NGO, Youth Forum for Roma Education, organized a round table dealing with the status of the Roma following the adoption

in Serbia of a new law on ethnic minorities. The event was aimed at raising awareness on a larger level regarding the most common problems of the local Roma community and exploring new approaches to addressing them. UNDP plans to continue to support such efforts to improve the conditions of the Roma by raising awareness amongst their communities and informing them of their rights. It will also be important to continue to educate the local community of their situation. In the future, UNDP will organize workshops in which Roma NGOs will play a critical role and will further work towards Roma rights and integration.

As a result of the actions taken since 2001, there have been gradual improvements in municipal representation, local infrastructures, human security and interethnic relations. However, widespread poverty and weak governance (especially with respect to the rule of law) continue to prevail, together with great inter-ethnic distrust and ethnic distance, yielding potential for further instability. A number of factors could trigger greater conflict, especially the unresolved

situation in Kosovo, and the continued activities of separatist movements in the Balkans. Apart from developing an institutional framework of multiculturalism, it will be also necessary to intensify the efforts towards the rapprochement of the two communities and permeation of their culture. The possible directions of government policy include the two-way learning of the community language, intensive inclusion of the Albanians in the political process and investments.

BOX 36.**THE FUTURE IS NOW – THE BEST ESSAYS WRITTEN BY THE SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS FROM SIX MUNICIPALITIES IN SOUTHERN SERBIA**

This book includes 26 young authors, 26 essays, 26 ideas and one, unique message. Essays were written as a part of the competition in high schools in six southern Serbia municipalities of Le-

skovac, Vranje, Bujanovac, Preševo, Medveđa and Lebane. High school students were writing about democracy, cultural diversity, prejudices, (in)tolerance in their neighbourhoods. The contest was organised by the Civil Society supporting team of UNDP's Southern Serbia Municipal Improvement and Recovery Programme at the end of 2002–spring semester. More than 2,000 young adults

¹¹⁰ The Programme was harmonised by the Co-ordination Body for Southern Serbia of the FRY, the Serbian Government and the OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro.

participated in the contest and approximately 7,000 pupils more in the similar challenge arranged for elementary schools. UNDP donated just about US\$ 15,000 in total for the best theses, but got priceless ideas that are shared with large public by printing this book.

ZLATICA ĐORĐEVIĆ. We, people from the South of Serbia, still live in a nervous and tense atmosphere. For a moment, we start to think that the mutual tolerance of ethnical communities has prevailed but the war cries are heard again. But that has to stop. I don't want any more tears; let alone blood to be shed. And I am not alone in my wish. Most of my generation: Nada, Spresa, Ljuana, Cvetanka... want the same. We really mean it. Almost yesterday, on Friday, many of us, both boys and girls were together in a ethnically mixed company. We had breakfast, travelled in the same car, sat at the same table... We laughed, sang, told jokes... Now, while I'm writing, I'm thinking. We're all human. When brought into this world, we were not asked to choose gender, religion or nation. I was not asked; but now, I'm shouting to the whole South of Serbia and I need to step out from this backwardness and languor. And move on to modern European ways of living and thinking. To achieve that, all the communities have to let go of the ethnical rivalry and national ideals mixed with old myths and legends.

It is high time for the dark forest of the prejudices to be lit and the walls of our illusions pulled down.

Many religions and philosophers are teaching us that we are all brothers. So let us be sensible and tolerant. Let us cut the Gordian knot of intolerance. It must be the ultimate decision of the young generation.

I am strongly convinced that tolerance, as the means of overcoming conflicts in the South of Serbia, will win, and that we will start living together like various flowers in a well arranged garden. Tolerance will make it possible for us to resolve all the problems, release our positive energy and step through the door of modern revival and restoration. We will start living in a big family of the European peoples. And Europe will be a great companion on our road to a beautiful careless and happy future.

BLERINA PAJAZITI. The globe is spinning and along with it my life. In some countries joy and happiness, and in some suffering, blood and hunger. Who causes all these wounds? It is the pitiful hand of man, without any doubt. I have but one prayer. Oh, God, I am praying to you who gave us our souls, stop the ones carrying the rifles from taking our children's lives.

All the living creatures are born free and equal in respect of dignity and human rights. All the people have the right to live free and be equal regardless of their race, colour or religion. We have nothing against any nation in the world, but the criminals and their acts are condemned by the whole civilized world. The world today has many, many bad habits. How can we stop that? Should we take up guns and bombs? Should we rebel and demonstrate? Should we swear and hate? No!

We should fight for love and mercy. I think we have suffered long enough and now an ending to all our sufferings and misery has come. I think we're still waiting for better days to come, and that we should reconcile with one word.

We know what that word is. It greets you with softness and cuddles you with love. We know which word is beautiful, which can make you happy; which word makes a day a day, and winter a winter. We know which word reconciles the South and the North.

It's peace, freedom. Peace begins with a smile. The smile belongs to all the people be they black or white. Peace enables life; it's a way of life. Peace stands against the destruction of the human soul and the nature around us. Life gives both good and bad, along with humane strains for a better tomorrow. In order to achieve the good and destroy the evil we should put together our capabilities and work hard to put our country on the right path of progress and the only true future, the one that leads us towards democracy.

You can overcome each problem by working on it. But we should reconcile and become like-minded people giving an example to the future generations for uniting and cooperation.

We will try to break the ice, to break the old layers of wrong attitudes although it may take a long period to see the signs of progress because long time was needed for the ice to be deposited.

PART II

Policy Responses and Approaches to Multiculturalism

1. SOCIAL POLICY CHALLENGES

1.1. How to develop relations between social groups in Serbia in a spirit of multiculturalism – Assessments and recommendations

ETHNIC RELATIONS

The population of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), members of different ethnic belonging who lived in harmony in a joint state for decades, suffered the disintegration of the country and a series of wars which were a product of nationalistic political strategies but were represented as (unavoidable) ethnic and religious conflicts, allegedly the result of an inherent impossibility of a harmonious communal existence of members of different cultures. The traumas caused by the wars and the ballast of the un-eradicated nationalist ideology, which interprets the wars by blaming others and warning about the dangers of co-existence with other ethnic groups, are the main problems standing in the way of improvement of ethnic relations. For that reason, it is necessary to launch urgent and systematic efforts to draft a long-term strategy aimed at turning the multi-ethnic coexistence in Serbia and the region as a whole into a developmental potential rather than a source of conflicts.

A strategy for multi-ethnic coexistence. The prerequisite for embarking on such a strategy is coming to terms with the past and the traumatic experiences produced by the ethnic strife. Full understanding of those events and their interpretation must be the subject of open dialogue, which will provide a multiplicity of views and experiences. People must be given a chance to learn about the experiences of those belonging to other, adversarial, groups, and in such a way to avoid the creation of a black-and-

white image in which their own side is the only victim and all the others are the guilty parties.

The process of reconciliation and restoration of inter-ethnicity communication has little chance of success if those responsible for the crimes and mass violations of human rights committed by the parties to the conflict have not been brought to justice and if there is attribution of collective responsibility. It is therefore important to individualise moral and criminal responsibility for the crimes committed by all sides in the conflicts. The rhetoric, which conceals the crimes and presents the criminals as guardians of the nation and heroes, only serves to perpetuate conflicts and the mutual dislike and mistrust. It is almost never a result of concern for national interests, but rather of efforts by those directly or indirectly responsible for the crimes to win the protection of their group and to avoid prosecution. Therefore, before dialogue can begin between the (until recently) warring ethnic groups, the crimes must be solved and those responsible brought to justice.

Views, which are particularly prevalent among the majority people and according to which the interests of different ethnic groups have always and will always be irreconcilable and will inevitably lead to strife, need to be challenged. Such views automatically lead to the perception of others as a threat and a negative interpretation of their actions. Such perceptions and interpretations very easily turn into self-fulfilling prophecies, as the individual and group reactions, which emanate from them vector inter-ethnic relations in an undesirable direction. Although even at the worst moment of the wars such thinking did not hold a complete monopoly, the war propaganda made it dominant and self-intelligible. It shields a fact that needs to be emphasised – that periods of peace and co-operation were always far longer (and certainly more bearable) than periods of conflict, and that they came even after the most brutal wars.

Although empirical results indicate that distrust of other peoples is more widespread among the majority people than the others, they are not the only ones to blame for that state of affairs. Minority peoples must also take an active part in the development of mutual confidence and co-operation. Therefore, efforts need to be invested in helping both majority and minority peoples to embrace policies based on social and cultural integration rather than territorial and cultural isolationism.

Overemphasising individual ethnic identity has proved particularly harmful; once it attains absolute priority over other identities, it begins to “swallow them up”, and the individual sees himself and others solely as members of a nation serving the national interests. National identity then becomes the most important element of the creation of self-respect, and inevitably leads to glorification of one’s own nation and denigration of others. It is therefore important to work on the development of awareness of a multiplicity of identities among individuals, where ethnic identity is just one of many and is one which is largely a product of social manufacture and completely unrelated to the “kinship of blood and soil”, as it is often portrayed. Identities, which are complementary to ethnic identity, such as citizenship, European identity, regional identity and others need to be strengthened. Stimulating the crosscutting of identities places an obstacle in the way of those seeking to create deep divisions in society and makes possible a more balanced and objective perception of oneself and others.

The task of the state is to eliminate the “hate speech” directed against other ethnicities and prosecute those responsible for it. Numerous elements of this hate speech are simply a dark legacy of the past that has become common place in everyday communication and in the media in the form of insulting descriptions and abusive name-calling, and their negative influence remains largely unnoticed. Even more dangerous are statements made by members of the political and cultural elites, in which the hate speech attains glamour and an ideological processing and which, precisely because they not only go unpunished but are broadcast far and wide, have a powerful effect and are remembered for a long time by members of both the threatening and the threatened group.

Belief that those who are different are a source of enrichment rather than a threat is best embraced when based on one’s own experience. However, many people have little chance of seeing this for themselves, as they exist in ethnically homogeneous environments. Efforts need to be invested to enable people, especially the youth, to experience friendly and co-operative contacts with members of different cultures. This includes direct contacts like day-trips and longer tours, cultural exchanges, professional visits, participation by civic associations in joint actions, etc. Symbolic contacts are also important: learning about others from films, TV, literature, insight into their cultural output. A culture, which appears not to produce any motion pictures, music, books or other works of art not only remains unknown but is also perceived as being inferior.

All the tasks set out so far can and must find a place for themselves in schools, as part of the civic and democratic education programme. This element of education, which helps to prepare its beneficiaries for life in a democratic multicultural society, should be one of the priorities in education, and should also be a part of other school subjects (history, geography, the native language...), as well as cross-cultural and extra-cultural activities.

Civic education should be further developed as a school subject. The subject became part of the curriculum in the starting grades of primary and secondary schools in the autumn of 2001, and has so far been extended to the following two grades in both. Initially it was an elective subject, and later schoolchildren were given a choice between civic education and religious classes. Assessment of the first three years indicates both a number of positive effects and elements, which need to be modified. Civic education must not be treated as an alternative to religious education, as this prevents those who go to religious classes from attending civic education, and also creates a situation in which civic and religious identities are seen as being mutually exclusive. Attendance of civic education classes should be made possible for all children, especially those in rural areas and those who belong to minority language groups.

The broadest ethnic gap, distrust and negative attitudes exist between the majority and ethnic

Albanians. These divisions, a result of linguistic, cultural and even social and economic barriers, have always existed, but were intensified after the escalation of the Kosovo conflict and the continuing failure to resolve it; in extreme cases they even have racist overtones. The low incidence of ethnic strife within Serbia proper¹¹¹ is probably the result of the territorial separation of ethnic Albanians from the majority population (they live in a number of virtually ethnically-pure communities), and the fact that the Albanians are not socially recognisable (like for example the Roma) and by their behaviour do not validate the existing extremely negative stereotypical views of them; this means that their neighbours see them as exceptions they do not need to resent. One of the high-priority tasks must be reducing this resentment of ethnic Albanians to a level, which would make possible both dialogue and peaceful co-existence.

According to numerous statistical and other indicators, the Roma are Serbia's most vulnerable population. The **United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights office in Serbia and Montenegro (SCG)** said in a report covering the period up to April 2003 that there were constant violations of the rights of Roma in SCG. Discrimination against this community appears to be motivated less by racism than by their extremely inferior social and economic status and the "vicious circle of poverty". Urgent steps must be taken to improve the lot of the Roma and their educational status. The Ministry of Education of Serbia has developed a number of recommendations in connection with education:

- Adoption of a strategy of enrolling Roma children in primary school
- Development of educational programmes intended for upgrading Roma education
- Training teaching staff to work with Roma children.

The strategy for improving the education of the Roma conceived in this way is aimed at bringing this group into the regular educational system and ensuring for them continuity in

their education and good-quality education, development of tolerance and respect of differences within the broader community, as well as cultivation of the cultural identity of the Roma.

The Ministry has already undertaken the following activities¹¹²:

- Affirmative action was implemented to enrol Roma schoolchildren and students in schools and universities
- Textbooks were provided free of charge to indigent Roma children
- Financial support was provided for 74 school projects creating conditions for higher-quality work with Roma (encompassing a total of 6,500 Roma schoolchildren).

Finally, the strategy of upgrading ethnic relations must also contain a constant process of controlling the quality of those relations expressed through individual attitudes and beliefs. Several organisations (the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, the Humanitarian Law Centre and others) monitor the observance of human rights, record their violations and inform the public thereof on a regular basis. Appropriate public opinion polls are undertaken regularly. The SCG Ministry for Human and Minority Rights is involved in continuous monitoring of opinions expressed in connection with relations between ethnicities. For the moment, almost all the available information comes from studies undertaken on representative samples of adult and younger citizens of Serbia in which the shares of minorities are far too small to make possible a reliable assessment of their attitudes, conduct and expectations. It is therefore necessary to organise research focused on members of minorities, which will deal with their social attitudes and relations with other ethnic groups.

RELIGIOUS RELATIONS

The dynamics of the changes in religious consciousness and inter-faith relations has many points of similarity with the dynamics characterising most of the post-communist societies of central and eastern Europe in the period of transition. Some of those characteristics are: revitalisation of religion and religious

¹¹¹ According to an **International Crisis Group** report dated December 2003, only a tiny number of the incidents recorded in southern Serbia are the result of genuine ethnic intolerance.

¹¹² *Kvalitetno obrazovanje za sve – izazovi reforme obrazovanja u Srbiji*. Ministry of Education and Sport of the Republic of Serbia, 2004., p. 211.

belief, aspirations by the churches to assume the positions they had in the pre-communist periods, a growing number of new religious movements, linkage between faith and nation and between faith and politics¹¹³. As in the other cases, the situation in the lands of the former Yugoslavia and even Serbia has been made more complicated by the recent wars, which in some cases had some characteristics of religious conflicts, in which people suffered because of their religious affiliations, in which numerous religious objects were destroyed and in which the role of the churches in their incitement and in ending them still remains unclear.

*The Council of Europe*¹¹⁴ has issued recommendations in connection with the improvement of inter-faith relations. They are relevant and do not need to be further developed for our local context:

- ensure religious pluralism and equal conditions for development to all religious groups;
- create better conditions for the observance of various religious rites;
- upgrade education about religions as collections of values;
- upgrade comparative religious education in schools;
- upgrade better inter-faith understanding;
- upgrade cultural and social expression of religions.

Some more recommendations should be added to the above:

- There needs to be an insistence on the separation of church and state and resistance to the tendencies of the church to meddle in the affairs of the state, processes which increase tensions in secular religiously diverse society.

An important aspect of separating the church from the state is abstention of the state from favouring any religion. The hate speech used to talk about non-Christian religious groups must be suppressed, especially the language heard in connection with small religious communities, which are often described as “Satanists” or “se-

cts”. Not only does the inequality in the treatment of different religious communities give rise to their dissatisfaction and inter-faith tensions, but it also offers to the citizenry a model for a general attitude towards all minority groups.

As we have said for ethnic identity, religious identity is just one of many different group identities embraced by individuals. Equating religious with national affiliation creates not only a distorted picture both of religions and of nations, but also a strong identity amalgam which only enhances divisions. Emphasising pluralism of identity (i.e., individuals who believe in the same God may differ from one another in many essential characteristics, just as members of different faiths may be quite identical in many such fundamentals) enhances religious tolerance.

Better knowledge of the many religions, which exist in a multicultural society, is essential, and the education system should play an important role in developing it. In the context, introducing religious education could have positive effects. However, religious classes in schools should be conceived as a general-education subject which will contribute to raising awareness about various religions, their similarities and their peculiarities and their historical development, while religious instruction as such should be left to individual churches.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS MARGINALISED GROUPS

The term “marginalised groups” describes not the characteristics of their members but the attitude of society towards them and the status they are given. There are numerous such groups in contemporary societies: groups of people with physical handicaps, persons with uncommon sexual orientation, people who are stigmatised according to other criteria. Their members are insufficiently integrated in the life of their community on account of negative attitudes and feelings towards them (in particular fear and hostility) based on stereotypes. But this lack of integration is also a result of objective limitations, which are a consequence of society’s blindness to the needs of those groups, which sometimes turns to open institutionalised discrimination. Their reduced social visibility

¹¹³ Borowik, I.: *Institutional and private religion in Poland 1990–1994*, in: I. Borowik, & Gz. Babinski (Eds.), *New Religious Phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe*. Krakow: Nomos, 1997.

¹¹⁴ Recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe *Religion and Democracy* No. 139619911, 1999.

is a reflection of a major social distance and it undermines efforts to reduce prejudice.

The key factor of the distance assumed from the marginalised groups appears to be ignorance and acceptance of the misguided negative stereotypes about their members. For that reason, raising the level of information about various marginalised groups is a high-priority task which can be accomplished using various means. One of them is certainly the education system, but as it covers only a small part of the overall population, information should also be disseminated in other ways, particularly through the media.

Precisely owing to the numerous social and physical obstacles which stand in their way, the presence of members of marginalised groups in public life is negligible; this can create the wrong impression about their size and hence the need to improve their position, as well as a misguided conviction that for one or another reason they deserve the treatment they get. Therefore, the presence of members of marginalised groups in public (political, cultural) life is an indicator of the level of observance of their rights, and also a way to decrease prejudices against them and stereotypical treatment.

The struggle against the discrimination of marginalised groups requires constant activity by a large number of individuals and institutions. Especially important are associations organised by the marginalised groups or those which fight for their rights; their unimpeded activity should be encouraged and assisted.

OPENNESS TOWARDS THE WORLD

Two important points need to be mentioned here. **Firstly**, the vast majority of those who keep a distance from one social group can be expected to do the same towards other, related or completely unrelated, groups. Trust (or distrust) of others appears to be generalised categories. Just as the conflicts of the 1990s enhanced distrust of some groups which were not party to them, we can expect positive experiences with one group to reduce the levels of generalised mistrust which exists towards other groups. Of much importance in this context are not just openness towards local cultures but also openness to the influences coming from outside, working to reduce xenophobia,

readiness to treat one's own group as just one of many in an enriching diversity of equal cultural communities. The period of the armed conflicts and the international isolation attended by nationalistic propaganda have led to a situation in which many people see the international community as being malicious and even openly hostile, and best avoided altogether.

The **second point** is the realisation that contacts with others can play a very important role in reducing stereotypes and prejudice against others. However, not all contacts are equally efficient: some can also provoke effects which are quite the opposite of the desired ones. Intensive research that has been going on in this field for decades has established some of the preconditions for mutual contacts to achieve positive effects; the list of them is also a list of recommendations for organising contacts between religious, ethnic, generational and other groups, which may have diverse form – from organising workshops lasting several days all the way to long-term joint local community activities.

Here are some of the factors that need to be taken into account in organising contacts between groups:

- Co-operation within groups should be maximised and competition between groups should be minimised.
- Members of the in-group and the out-group should be of equal status both within and outside the contact situation.
- Similarity of group members on non-status dimensions (beliefs, values, etc.) appears to be desirable.
- Differences in competence should be avoided.
- The outcomes should be positive.
- Strong normative and institutional support for the contact should be provided.
- The inter-group contact should have the potential to extend beyond the immediate situation.
- Individuation of group members should be promoted.
- Non-superficial contact (e.g., mutual disclosure of information) should be encouraged.
- The contact should be voluntary.

- Positive effects are likely to correlate with the duration of the contact.
- The contact should occur in a variety of contexts with a variety of in-group and out-group members.
- Equal numbers of in-group and out-group members should be used¹¹⁵.

Together with these important recommendations, it is also important to ensure the necessary conditions for the contacts to take place, and to increase the communicational abilities of people. The years of international isolation and economic hardship have left their toll.

Especially threatened by the wars, isolation and falling standards of living are young people, who have had little opportunity to experience a different life. The youth are therefore especially receptive to extremist ideologies, which go in step with crises and conflicts and which they accept as a convincing interpretation of all aspects of real life. Educating the youth in a spirit of tolerance and civic values is therefore of extreme importance.

Openness to the world may be expressed in a literal sense through the number of contacts with members of other groups. The more people travel abroad, the more chance there is for experiencing new cultures.

Ensuring computer literacy must become an integral part of educational curricula. Use of computers, the Internet and electronic mail should be promoted, especially among people of lower or average levels of education, among whom these are now practically non-existent.

Learning foreign languages in school must also be encouraged. It is particularly important to apply various means to promote, also outside the educational system, knowledge of languages spoken by minorities in local communities.

Speaking in general terms, policies aimed at reducing prejudice, stereotypes and discrimination between cultures in a multicultural society have multiple components, which need to act in harmony with one another.

The first set of policies concerns legislation. Statutory measures need to be introduced placing

members of various groups in positions of the highest possible level of equality and preventing open discrimination, but also providing for the prosecution of those who express prejudice. Making possible and encouraging mutual contacts is of vital importance for establishing a society in which people will not spend their lives in sealed enclaves, but get to know one another better and create a clearer image of themselves and others. Systematic education should develop the attitudes, values and abilities needed for living in a democratic society. It is not just school that is responsible for such education, but also other agents of socialisation – the media, family, church ...

The cultures we are speaking about do not exist only within Serbia's borders. Members of the Serb and minority ethnicities in Serbia, Serbian Orthodox believers, Catholics, believers in Islam and other religions live in or interact with neighbouring countries. Their relations in societies outside Serbia reflect on relations in Serbia, and vice versa. If there are problems in their relations, they are not just local problems; therefore, defining and implementing correct policies requires the establishment of links at regional level.

1.2. Improving the socio-economic status of different socio/cultural groups

There has been some improvement in human development in Serbia since the political changes in 2000. The value of HDI reached 0.772 in 2002. This is an increase in HDI of about 6% since 1999. The major source of increase in HDI was caused by growth in GDP per capita. Still, when compared to international data, it is indicative that Serbia attains relatively high human development standards in terms of life expectancy and education, while it lags significantly behind when it comes to economic performance. Consequently, for the improvements of HDI, acceleration of the economic growth is essential for Serbia¹¹⁶.

Information on human development of particular ethnic or cultural groups in Serbia is not available due to the lack of data needed to di-

¹¹⁵ Stephan, W.G.: *Intergroup relations*. In: G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, pp. 599–658, New York: Random House, 1985.

¹¹⁶ See Part IV for more on methodology and results of HDI.

saggregate HDI according to ethnicity or various cultural groups¹¹⁷. However, findings based on other sources of data – which are reported in previous chapter – point to the vulnerability of certain socio/cultural groups. Accordingly, these groups need special attention and should therefore be particularly targeted.

1.2.1. Increasing the living standard of the rural population

Lowering differences of living standards between the urban and rural population, through rural population poverty reduction, following the PRSP recommendations, will be accomplished through increase of income and employment in rural areas. To this end, it is necessary to develop a rural development strategy. A more adequate agricultural and rural regional development policy, an improved SME support, establishment of producers' associations, improvement of primary and industrial processing of agricultural products as well as marketing of these products would contribute to the development of agriculture, and as a consequence to an increase of income of the rural population. Furthermore, it is important to increase emphasis on non-agricultural employment and income generating activities in rural regions, for example development of forestry (including forestation and wood processing), rural tourism.

Solving the problem of farmers' pensions is an urgent matter, having in mind that the farmers' retirement fund has huge deficits causing irregular payment of pensions, up to one and a half year behind schedule.

¹¹⁷ None of the data needed for HDI calculations such as life expectancy, gross enrollment ratio, adjusted GDP PPP per capita, etc. – except for literacy rate (see Supplement in Part IV) – are registered according to ethnicity or some particular sociocultural groups. Therefore it is not possible to directly calculate HDI according to ethnic composition. One can think of the following way to overcome this problem: use majority population of municipality as a proxy for ethnicity, such that the level of human development of municipality, i.e. HDI index, is matched with its majority population. Consequently, the link between human development and multiculturalism and multi-nationalism is to be observed and analyzed at the municipality level. However, this attempt was criticized based on the argument that statistical disaggregation at a too low level (such as municipalities) are risky and can provide distorted results. Accordingly, this method was not reported, neither the results on the municipality level in general so the lowest level of disaggregation reported in Annex is HDI at the district level.

Results on HDI for the overall Serbia are not reliable (see Part IV for explanation), let alone disaggregated data.

Along with income increase as the pre-condition for improvement of living standard, it is necessary to implement another set of measures: improvement of health protection services, education and social security in small towns for inhabitants of surrounding areas, infrastructure development (including public transport, water supply of households in rural regions, waste water management, etc.) increased access to improved communication and information technology in rural areas, as well as protection and preservation of the environment.

1.2.2. Improving gender equality

Measures directed towards the gender aspects of poverty include elimination of special barriers in achieving economic equality of women, economic and political empowerment of women at all levels, as well as encouraging women's associations and entrepreneurship. A faster economic development, especially of the tertiary sector would contribute to lowering women discrimination by absorbing free woman power. Development of household services would increase employment of women in accordance with their level of education.

All this demands the elaboration of a national programme and a plan of activities that would promote gender equality, particularly in the political life of Serbia. Therefore, the main task of the Council for Gender Equality, just formed by the Serbian government, will be to develop a national plan of action concerning gender equality. The council is also preparing a Gender Equality Law.

Special attention should be given to women in traditional, rural areas, Roma women, women among refugees and IDPs population, as these women are subject to "double discrimination" – meaning discrimination on at least two levels: firstly it is gender based since they belong to female sex and secondly, it is based on their belonging to a vulnerable and marginalized group.

Regarding Roma women, priority attention should be given to combating multiple discriminations against Roma women and girls, as well as trafficking. The State should adopt national laws on domestic violence and establish adequ-

ate legal protection against all acts of violence against women, including trafficking.

Programs relating to basic education, in particular to literacy level of all ages of Roma women, should be supported. Roma women's organizations and local healthcare centres should organize the education of young Roma women, young mothers, middle age and elderly Roma women regarding healthcare issues.

1.2.3. Improvement of socio-economic conditions of the elderly¹¹⁸

Policies and measures for improving the socio-economic conditions of the elderly should be aimed at two major directions – ensuring the economic conditions and security for the elderly, and improving the health, psychological and social aspects of old age.

The only way to ensure economic security for the old-aged is the pension system reform. This encompasses further reform of the existing public and mandatory fund (financed in line with the traditional “pay as you go” method) as well as the introduction of private and fully funded system.

The first (public and mandatory) pillar is to continue to be financed on pay-as-you go principle, while some of the major steps should be considered in order to restore a balanced budget – tightening eligibility for early retirement, equal treatment of men and women when it comes to eligibility criteria, eliminate preferential status of certain beneficiaries, reform the Farmers' Pension Fund. Additionally, a private system should be introduced.

Another avenue of policies should be aimed at improving the health status and providing socio-psychological support of elderly. In that regard, public education on health, psychological and social aspects of aging and elderly is an important element of creation of such a social and cultural climate (environment) with a “new” status and role of elderly in modern aging society. This requires changing attitudes and reducing stereotyping and prejudice about the elderly, as

well as promotion of healthy aging and changing the individual behaviour of elderly.

BOX 37.

ELDERLY REFUGEES AND IDPS

Today perhaps one of the biggest challenges facing Serbia is the task of integrating and resettling its refugees and IDP (internally displaced persons) populations into local communities. Approximately 600,000 refugees and IDP's fled to Serbia from the ex-Yugoslav republics and Kosovo during the wars in Balkans that occurred in the 1990s. Older refugees and IDPs are particularly at risk and in urgent need of assistance. A large majority of them lack adequate food and medical treatments, lack privacy in collective centres, lack long term solutions for accommodation issues and are highly dependent on programmes and projects funded by international organizations which are often inadequate for their needs. Sustainable solutions must be found to improve the well being of such refugees and IDPs.

UNDP worked towards this end in cooperation with the Government of Italy, The Ministry of Social Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, and Italian NGOs INTERSOS and Progetto Sviluppo. They assisted in providing alternative forms of accommodation to elderly refugees and IDPs in foster families, multigenerational families and “protected elderly apartments”. The main aim of the project was provide social care and support outreach services to elderly refugees and IDPs in the area of health, environment, personal hygiene, psychosocial care and legal counselling. Despite the project was addressed only to elderly refugees and IDPs, another outcome of the project was the piloting of alternative solutions for elderly people, which have been documented in a comparative study, and can be applied to the elderly vulnerable population at large.

Living in home and family environment is important for the improvement of socio-economic status of elderly. Consequently, there is a need to supplement the traditional family support system through an alternative community based social support system, which would provide services to enable elderly people to stay in the

¹¹⁸ “Improvement of socio-economic conditions of the elderly in Serbia”, Economics Institute, 2004.

familiar surroundings. This includes the promotion of joint (intergenerational) families, support to the families with old members, development of foster care, day care centres, home health care, clubs, counselling for elderly, etc. Furthermore, private sector should be encouraged to engage in providing services for the elderly.

1.2.4. Opportunities for the socio-economic affirmation of youth

According to estimates, more than 300.000 young people have left the country in the last 13 years. Only economic prosperity and political stability can keep young people in the country and prevent further emigration. At the same time, bearing in mind quite worrying survey results (from the previous section) indicating the high level of intolerance among young people, it seems that improving living conditions and providing opportunities for full affirmation of youngsters in Serbia is of the highest priority.

Towards a national Strategy for youth. First of all, it is necessary to define a uniform approach to young people at the state level, i.e. adopt a *National Strategy for Youth*. In relation to that, it is important to provide systematic data collection on youngsters in Serbia, serving as a reliable base for policies and programmes regarding affirmation of youth. Elaboration of programmes and activities for the youth at the local level should be in line with the National Strategy while at the same time taking into account local community specificities and priority needs of youth (PRSP, 2003). In order to ensure the applicability of such strategies, they must be based on the participatory research on the needs of youth. Furthermore, it is important to open the space for participation of youth at all decision-making levels: local, regional and national, and develop mechanisms for the inclusion of youth in all the relevant institutions (schools, health care and cultural institutions, etc.)

The Unemployment rate is particularly high among youth, and many of them are engaged in the grey economy lacking adequate social security and protection. Consequently, a comprehensive employment strategy is needed, which will, through favourable fiscal measures

and credit conditions, speed up new private sector development and provide strong partnership between employment and education, enable faster employment of young and educated people, and provide the conditions for young people to stay in the country.

BOX 38.

THE YOUTH IN SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO

Many of today's youth in Serbia and Montenegro have witnessed several changes growing up during times of crisis and war. Young people today often feel unsure about their future with dramatic changes still taking place in their country in terms of political and economic reform. The youth of Serbia and Montenegro hold the key to the country's future and their healthy development is critical to the country's success. UNICEF is currently working to contribute to the development of young people into active, productive, responsible citizens through its **Young People's Health, Development and Participation Programme**. The programme incorporates social mobilization and communication component that fosters the development of civil society organizations focused on youth participation. Particular emphasis is placed on the promotion of peace and tolerance, the development of youth-friendly social and health services, the promotion of healthy life styles and the advocacy of an appropriate national policy framework in regard to the needs of young people. Some of the successes of the programme include the establishment of multi-ethnic youth clubs in southern and southwest Serbia, increased testing and information for youth about AIDS, and the training of young people and educational professionals in reproductive health services.

On the more specific question of young people, it is important to make room for the inclusion of youth in the decision-making regarding the *education system* and build partnership relations between pupils, teachers and parents. As the current educational system focuses on providing great amounts of information and little attention is directed to the development of critical thinking, generally using out-dated methodology while technical conditions are often inadequate, comprehensive reform of the education

nal system is essential. The Concept of learning should be extended to include informal forms of education, so it could be accepted and understood as a life-long learning and continuous process.

Regarding *Health services*, it is important to initiate and support the establishment of youth counselling centres that would foster a holistic approach and be open for all relevant issues that can improve the quality of living of youth. Furthermore, the implementation of education about drug effects, HIV and AIDS and involving doctors and medical institutions into educational programmes in schools is also needed. Also, financing and promotion of harm-reduction programmes and education of volunteers should be introduced and implemented in schools.

Finally, at the local level, it is necessary to create a social and cultural environment in accord with the needs of youth, as well as support and initiate the establishment of youth centres that would cherish different kind of activities for and with young people.

1.2.5. Resolving the problems of refugees and IDPs

The Government of Serbia adopted in 2002 the National Strategy for Resolving the Problems of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons. This Strategy suggests two main, parallel directions in resolving the problems of refugees and IDPs – ensuring conditions for repatriation and provision of conditions for local integration of refugees and IDPs.

Activities regarding repatriation primarily relates to creation of efficient mechanisms of return of property and their rights such as security and legal safety of potential returnees. This refers especially to the voluntary and safe return of IDPs to Kosovo.

For the adequate *integration* of refugees and IDPs in social and economic life in Serbia, it is essential to provide appropriate economic conditions for their integration, meaning the durable resolution of the essential existential problems. This mainly relates to housing, especially for the residents of those collective centres, which yet have not been closed down. Low quality of collective accommodation intensifies social isolation, makes more difficult access to information, to

the labour market, and to various social institutions, and thus significantly contributes to the maintenance of a culture of poverty and inertness.

Despite these efforts and achievements, much more has to be done for efficient and smooth integration of refugees and IDPs in economic, social and cultural life of Serbia¹¹⁹.

BOX 39.

UNHCR AND REFUGEES

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has been extremely influential in assisting refugees and IDPs in Serbia and Montenegro in their search for durable solutions. UNHCR has actively promoted the rights of IDPs and refugees and strived to ensure respect and dignity for this vulnerable population. In its pursuit for sustainable solutions, UNCHR has worked towards voluntary repatriation of refugees to Croatia and Bosnia–Herzegovina (BiH) as well as the return of IDPs to Kosovo, when possible. Since 1996, UNHCR has directly assisted repatriation to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the Republic of Croatia. Over 1800 tractors were transported back to returnee's homes in Croatia and hundreds of families have had their household belongings transported through UNHCR. Approximately 70,000 Serbs have returned to Croatia, many of whom benefited from UNHCR advice in the process. Additionally, over the past ten years, UNHCR has been successful in resettling 21,000 refugees from the region and elsewhere.

The government and international agencies, be it development or humanitarian, should:

- Identify mechanisms for local integration of the most vulnerable among the refugee and IDP populations.
- Employment and vocational training are essential for all vulnerable groups and especially refugees and IDPs who possess “social capital”, that are skills and resources.
- Development programmes should include durable solutions that will meet the immediate needs of the most vulnerable mem-

¹¹⁹ National Conference on Resolving Issues of the Displaced Return and Integration, Belgrade, October 2004.

bers of the society, refugees and IDPs included.

- The category of refugees in private accommodation should be given due attention in the future programmes.
- The National Housing Policy should include housing solutions for refugees and IDPs as part of a wider system of social and affordable housing. Housing projects should be complemented with employment programmes.
- Donors and development agencies are encouraged to look into the possibilities for the continuation of programmes for the most vulnerable groups of refugees and local population following the phasing out of the humanitarian agencies.
- Refugee and IDPs associations should be given the opportunity to participate on a regular basis in the coordination of integration projects.
- Refugee children should be offered opportunities to learn and maintain the traditions of their places of origin.
- Having in mind the number of IDPs living in poverty, resolving their economic and social problems must be included in the implementation of the PRSP, particularly through projects which will reduce the dependency on humanitarian aid, and will help IDPs to develop their self-sufficiency through self-reliance.

Provision of the SC Resolution 1244, with regard to the safe return of IDPs to Kosovo is a must. This means: guaranteeing their right to live, freedom of movement, as well as all other civil, religious and national rights and freedoms and ensuring normal living conditions.

Having in mind the prevailing security environment and lack of conditions for sustainable reintegration, including violent events in March 2004, and the fact that, so far, out of 29,000 requests made, only 5,000 persons had their rightful property returned to them, “the right to return” of IDPs is unfortunately, up to now, still a pure proclamation.

BOX 40.

HOMES FOR REFUGEES

During 1997–2004, more than 2,500 housing units have been constructed and 3,000 refugee families assisted with building materials; another 1,000 housing units are expected to be built next year; 8 collective centres have been converted into homes for elderly creating capacity for more than 600 elderly refugees. In the same period, as part of self-reliance programmes, thousands of in-kind grants and almost 15,000 micro credits have been disbursed, while 1,200 beneficiaries attended vocational training. The social, health and educational institutions with support from international agencies provided regular services to refugees in Serbia. A number of local NGOs, associations and individuals provided significant assistance to refugees in Serbia through different humanitarian programs and initiatives, thus facilitating integration process.

Source: National Conference on Resolving Issues of the Displaced Return and Integration, Belgrade, October 2004

1.2.6. Improvement of the socio-economic conditions of the Roma

Improvement of socio-economic status of the Roma is essential for their integration into the social and economic life of the country. Policies aimed at improvement of socio-economic conditions of Roma people should take into account the difference between the Roma culture and traditions. A few studies warn that integration can precipitate assimilation, i.e. that in this process Roma run the risk of losing their recognizable ethnic/cultural features¹²⁰. Accordingly, the concept of integration should be based on a two parallel processes¹²¹:

- The improvement of socio-economic conditions of living to the level that would mean stepping out of poverty and into the average living conditions of the wider community.
- The improvement of conditions for the development of Roma national identity, i.e. the preclusion of assimilation as a consequence of the measures undertaken by the state.

¹²⁰ Andrzej Mirga and Nicolae Gheorghe, *The Roma in the Twenty-First Century: A Policy Paper*, Princeton, 1997.

¹²¹ Bašić G. Jakšić B., 2002.

Education is critical for the development of opportunities for the Roma, and therefore should be assigned the highest priority. According to the Regional Human Development Report “*The Roma in Central and Eastern Europe, Avoiding the Dependency Trap*” (2003), low Roma education levels are not solely due to “exclusionist patterns of educational systems.” They also reflect limited proficiency in the majority language, inadequate incomes for purchasing children’s clothes and books, and the important role of Roma children in family income generation. Consequently, policy initiatives in education often failed since it is essential to reflect the multidimensionality of the problem in this area.

Pre-school education is the key to improving educational opportunity for Roma children (Roma HDR, 2003). Strengthening support for pre-school education should be treated as a priority by central and municipal governments. NGOs should have an important (albeit supplementary) role. According to the draft version of the *National Strategy for the integration and empowerment of the Roma in Serbia* (henceforth the draft Strategy), since the Roma speak their mother tongue in the settlements, emphasis should be laid on (bi-lingual) pre-school and primary school education in order to facilitate the early participation of Roma children in the mainstream education system. Furthermore, since inadequate education is linked to poverty, policies regarding state budget expenditures on education should be changed. According to the draft Strategy, such support could include: provision of transport free of charge for pupils living in settlements far from their assigned pre-school or primary school institution, free meals in pre-school or primary school institutions, provision of decent clothing, provision of textbooks free of charge.

The Ministry of Education of Serbia also has developed a number of recommendations in connection with Roma education:¹²²

- Adoption of a strategy of enrolling Roma children in primary school
- Development of educational programmes intended for upgrading Roma education
- Training teaching staff to work with Roma children.

¹²² *Kvalitetno obrazovanje za sve – izazovi reforme obrazovanja u Srbiji*. Ministry of Education and Sport of the Republic of Serbia, 2004., p. 211.

The strategy for improving the education of the Roma conceived in this way is aimed at bringing this group into the regular educational system and ensuring for them continuity in their education and good-quality education, development of tolerance and respect of differences within the broader community, as well as cultivation of the cultural identity of the Roma.

The Ministry has already undertaken the following activities in this regard:

- Affirmative action to enrol Roma schoolchildren and students in schools and universities;
- Textbooks were provided free of charge to indigent Roma children ;
- Financial support was provided for 74 school projects creating conditions for higher-quality work with Roma (encompassing a total of 6,500 Roma schoolchildren).

Activities regarding *employment*, according to the draft Strategy, should focus on support structures for Roma entrepreneurs and on the establishment and development of Roma-owned small and medium-sized enterprises. Considering the lower level of education and professional training among the Roma, employment policies should, in addition, focus on qualifications and training programmes in order to enable Roma to fully participate in the economy. Since employment is closely related to education, actions whose aim is to increase the level of employment of the Roma should be planned and undertaken in a synchronized way. But since the educational process is long, certain measures should be undertaken immediately. This includes, first of all, acquiring relevant data on the market for the products the Roma traditionally produce, and then establishing small workshops in those areas where the Roma can engage in such handicrafts (PRSP, 2003).

In the light of the extremely bad *housing* conditions of large segments of the Roma population, addressing this problem should be considered as a matter of priority. The main objective of integration of Roma settlements is to provide basic facilities such as access to basic public services and infrastructure. Since most of the Roma settlements are deemed to be illegal, the Ministry for Urban Planning and Construction and local authorities should strive

to find solutions towards the legalization of these settlements. In cases where relatively simple and fast legalization is possible (according to existing laws and regulations), programmes of integration and improvements should be initiated in parallel. In settlements where ownership has already been legalized projects for the improvement of living conditions (improving/building of basic infrastructure: water, sewage, electricity, roads, garbage removal) should be initiated (Draft Strategy).

The universal inclusion of all Roma in the *healthcare* system should be the end goal of health care reform (Avoiding the Dependency Trap HDR, 2003). Certain sections of the Roma population should be educated with a view to being more responsible regarding health protection. Roma assistants should be included in order to avoid a discriminatory approach by medical staff involved in such programs. Because of the lack of systematic medical examinations due to high unemployment and the number of children not attending school, preventive and regular medical examinations should be organised. In this regard, again, priority also should be given to the improvement of Roma housing, including infrastructure and waste collection. In large settlements without health institutions (e.g., clinics), such structures should be established, at least temporarily (Draft Strategy).

2. GOVERNANCE POLICY RESPONSES

UPGRADING CULTURAL AND ETHNIC PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION ON NATIONAL AND LOCAL LEVELS, IN LEGISLATION, THE MEDIA AND THE EDUCATION SYSTEM

The most important minorities in Serbia are ethnic and linguistic ones – communities whose members are established in the territories they inhabit and have Serbian citizenship from birth, so that they cannot be classified in the category of minorities, which are strictly defined as indigenous people. Serbia is not an end destination of economic and other migration, so this category of minorities also does not exist, unless we treat the refugees from Bosnia and Croatia (who are almost exclusively of Serbian nationality) as immigrants. This group, numbering over half a million, cannot really be placed

in the traditional category of minorities in the context of multiculturalism because by language, national identity and customs they are identical or very similar to the local population in Serbia, although there do exist difficulties in the process of their integration into the local community, especially in ethnically- and linguistically diverse regions.

The challenge of multiculturalism in Serbia lies mainly in the construction of a system which will make it possible for ethnic and linguistic minorities to enjoy full freedom of choice of culture and to develop and promote their specificities in the interest of the creation of the necessary prerequisites for the unimpeded economic and social development of Serbia, free of ethnic conflict and discrimination – building up a state, which everyone, including the minorities in Serbia, will regard as their own.

Protection, preservation and the development of cultural and linguistic and ethnic specificity has definitely been a feature of post-World War Two life in Serbia. The constitutions of Serbia and its autonomous provinces, criminal law and legislation in the spheres of culture, education and use of language have always protected this diverseness. Thus multiculturalism in Serbia is protected not just statutorily, but also through the existence of a well-developed institutional system, partly budget-funded, in the service of the promotion of multiculturalism. During the period when the provinces had more independence in organising governance, a wide-ranging and diverse system of institutions was built up there to promote multiculturalism, so that the institutional and legal frameworks are much more developed in Vojvodina (in the past also in Kosovo) than in Central Serbia. In spite of the existence of a similar constitutional and legal framework in Central Serbia, the minorities living there had considerably less room for fostering and developing their specific cultures; this had a particularly negative effect on the ethnic Bulgarian and Vlach communities.

During the Slobodan Milošević era, the autonomy of the provinces was considerably reduced; in Kosovo it was suspended outright. The abolition of autonomy enjoyed by the provinces was paralleled by a process of gradual statutory

and material erosion of the rights of minorities in the spheres of education, the use of language and the right to information in their own languages¹²³.

After the fall of the Milošević regime, the state implemented a series of measures aimed at consolidating the legal and real-life equality of the minority with the majority. The normative framework was upgraded by the Act on the Protection of the Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities, which regulates the individual and collective rights of minorities and their right to be different from the majority, all in a modern manner and in line with the highest international standards. The state also acceded to the conventions of the Council of Europe dealing with minorities and their rights and concluded a number of bilateral agreements on the protection of national minorities with neighbouring countries.

The Act on the Establishment of the Competencies of the Autonomous Province and the new law on local self-governance grants broader powers to local government and the autonomous province in the protection and enhancement of the rights of minorities.

There exists in Serbia by tradition a relatively well developed and by many elements in compa-

native law exemplary system of the recognition and protection of minorities. Apart from the insufficient harmonisation of some regulations, little fault can generally be found with the constitutional and legal provisions, which regulate the status of ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities. The difficulties lie in their uneven and flawed implementation, which has also been noted by the international community. Critics say that there exists in Serbia a poor tradition and that regulations are often adopted with little actual determination and serious intent to implement them in practice. Of course, questions linked with the implementation of enforcement of laws relate not just to those dealing with development and promotion of multiculturalism. Like most countries in transition, Serbia has encountered the problem of establishing a state ruled by law and the observance of that principle.

EDUCATION

In the area of pre-school and primary education, laws are being observed relatively well, especially in Vojvodina, where a pre-school and primary education system in six languages has been built up: parents decide on the language in which their children will attend classes, their native tongue or Serbian.

TABLE 18. Primary Education by Language in Vojvodina in the 2003/2004 School Year¹²⁴

LANGUAGE	Serbian	Hungarian	Slovak	Romanian	Russian	Croatian
Number of municipalities with classes in that language	45	27	13	9	3 Kula, Vrbas, Žabalj	1 Subotica
Number of schools	326	78	18	18	3	4
Number of classrooms	6946	978	170	94	37	5
Number of pupils	155,817	18,525	3,382	1,523	693	72

There are also numerous secondary schools in Vojvodina which offer education in minority languages, although there are rather fewer children here than in primary schools, and no Croatian language classes have yet been organised. As a result of the participation of ethnic Hungarians

in the provincial government, secondary school education in Hungarian was considerably expanded in the past two years, two new specialised secondary modules and a vocational secondary school in Hungarian have been opened, and new Hungarian-language classes were begun in the Banat region.

Outside Vojvodina, primary and secondary education in non-Serbian languages exist only in Bosilegrad (Bulgarian), and in Bujanovac and Preševo (Albanian). However, where so requested and where there are a minimum of 15 children per generation who want to attend classes in

¹²³ The Act on the Official Use of Languages and Scripts has introduced the primacy of the Serbian language instead of the former equality of official languages, education legislation has eliminated the right to education in minority languages at university level, and considerable cuts have been made in media and culture subsidies destined for the minorities.

¹²⁴ Information about Primary Education with Special Reference to the Education of Members of National Minorities in the AP of Vojvodina in the 2003/2004 School Year, Provincial Secretariat for Education and Culture, May 2004.

their own national minority language, the educational authorities abide by the law and organise such classes. Even if the number of children is less than the statutory minimum, where the Ministry of Education (in Central Serbia) or the Provincial Secretary for Education (in Vojvodina) issue permission, classes are organised in minority languages, in spite of the extra budgetary expenditure so incurred.

Most higher education in Serbia is in the Serbian language. Minority language teachers get their education at the minority language de-

partments of the Philosophical Faculty of Novi Sad University and the Philosophical Faculty of Belgrade University (Hungarian Language and Literature, Romanian, Ruthenian, Slovak, Bulgarian, etc.). Higher education wholly or partly in Hungarian takes place at some two-year colleges and universities in Vojvodina: the Architectural and Economic Faculties in Subotica, the Pedagogical Faculty in Sombor, the Higher School of Engineering in Subotica and the Higher Schools for Educators in Subotica and Novi Sad.

TABLE 19. Secondary Education by Language in Vojvodina in the 2003/2004 School Year¹²⁵

LANGUAGE	Serbian	Hungarian	Slovak	Romanian	Russian
Number of municipalities with classes in that language	39	12	2 B.Petrovac, Kovačica	2 Alibunar, Vršac	1 Kula
Number of schools	115	35	2	2	1
Number of classrooms	2,634	297	13	8	4
No. of pupils	72,000	6,783	341	187	67

BOX 41.

PRIMARY EDUCATION FOR MINORITIES

Classes in one of the national minority languages are organised in a total of over 120 primary schools in Vojvodina. In 18 of 344 primary schools, a minority language is in exclusive use. A total of 18,525 children attend school in Hungarian; this is about 80% of all ethnic Hungarian children. A total of 3,272 (73 %) ethnic Slovak children attend classes in that language. The comparative number for Romanian is 1,338, or 58% of all schoolchildren of that minority. Classes in Ruthenian have a total of 627 primary school pupils (50%). Just 72 children in four classes attend school in Croatian; the reason for the low number is that the community was officially recognised as a national minority after the fall of the Milošević regime, and classes in Croatian were begun in 2002. National minority schoolchildren in Vojvodina who do not attend classes in their native tongue have optional language and culture classes, and in 10 municipalities in the province there are also classes for Roma children, with 425 pupils.

One shortcoming seen in practice, in respect of the enforcement of regulations pertaining to education, is that in spite of the clearly-stated legal obligation the educational authorities have done little to inject new content promoting multiculturalism into the regular curriculum – to set aside more time for learning about the cultures and traditions of the minorities in Serbia. Such content exists neither in the Serbian-language classes nor those held in minority languages. Unfortunately, research has shown among children of school age the existence of a relatively low level of tolerance for others, so that such programmes could help cut down on prejudice, the reason for many ethnically-motivated excesses. In the former Yugoslavia, classes in the “local language” (the language of a large minority living in a given municipality) were obligatory in Serbian-language schools, as was learning Serbian for children who went to minority-language schools. In the 1990s, this practice was abolished and Serbian became obligatory, putting an end to a tradition going back decades and reducing the opportunities children of the majority group had of learning about the cultures of minority peoples. Learning languages helps children to communicate more easily, enhancing contacts and indirectly also camaraderie, as inter-culturalism and multiculturalism may be values in the true sense of the

¹²⁵ Information about Secondary Education with Special Reference to the Education of Members of National Minorities in the AP of Vojvodina in the 2003/2004 School Year, Provincial Secretariat for Education and Culture, May 2004.

word only where cultural influences are two-way and the flow of ideas and cultures takes place on an equitable basis.

The approach of the nationalistic regime in Serbia in the 1990s was different: state policies, schools and the media advanced a notion that the Serb people was more honest, courageous and industrious than others, and that all others jeopardised the Serb people and its interests. Consequently, the need for Serbs in Serbia to learn or speak any language except their own was rejected, particularly so in the case of the minority languages. Generations of schoolchildren were educated in such a social atmosphere and according to programmes formulated in this way; even programmes intended for the minorities glorified the Serb people and ignored altogether the history and traditions of the minorities in Serbia. It was no wonder that minorities rallied and began to feel hostility for the Serbian language, culture and art, which led to the onset of ghettoisation of national minorities.

BOX 42.**EDUCATION TODAY IN SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO**

Despite the high level of enrolment of children in Serbia and Montenegro in primary school, certain groups still do not have access to an education or what might be considered a “quality” education. Such groups include the children of IDPs and refugees, Roma and Vlachs, children with special needs, and children from villages and in underdeveloped regions. Additionally the educational system in Serbia and Montenegro has been in a state of deterioration and neglect since 1990 due to the considerable attrition of professionals from the field and an increase in the number of individuals in the field who are under-qualified. A lack of motivation exists amongst those in the educational sector due to poor salaries, deteriorating social status of educational professionals and an outdated knowledge of teaching methodologies.

UNICEF in cooperation with several partners began the **Access to Quality Education Programme** in 2002 to address these problems and to contribute to universal access to education. UNICEF

wants to guarantee that all children regardless of ethnic background, disability, poverty, or the violence, abuse and exploitation they were exposed to, receive a quality education. The programme focuses on capacity building in the area of teaching life skills in schools which has aided in fostering peace, and promoting new values for the process of transition to democracy and healthy lifestyles. It also places particular emphasis on participation, creativity and self-esteem and it encourages a child centered curricula and participatory teaching-learning methods. Efforts have also been made to ensure that the appropriate educational conditions for children are implemented as well as appropriate conditions for teachers. Life skills and active learning methods have also been incorporated into the education system as a part of the reform process.

UNDP’s Capacity Building Fund has also worked in assisting the Serbian Ministry of Education and Sports in improving the education system. The educational system involves 20 percent of the Serbian population as pupils, students, or employees. For this reason, it plays a critical role in providing a multicultural framework for future generations and enhancing human resources needed for economic recovery and social change. The Capacity Building Fund aided the Serbian Ministry of Education and Sports in restructuring the system to improve the quality, governance, financial management, stakeholder participation, appreciation of ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversities and the level of professionalism in education delivery.

OFFICIAL USE OF LANGUAGE AND ALPHABET

There is a long tradition of the use of the languages of national minorities in official business in Serbia, especially its provinces. The biggest advance in this area took place in the 1970s, in parallel with the enhancement of the provinces’ autonomy and powers. Thousands of legal cases were conducted solely in Hungarian (mainly in northern Vojvodina). The tendency of promoting the use of more than one language in Serbia came to an abrupt halt in the 1990s, when provincial laws were revoked and a new Law on the Official Use of Language and Script was

introduced (1991)¹²⁶. Although most provisions of the new law featured no restrictions to the use of minority languages in transacting official business, it was nevertheless used to almost completely abolish the official use of minority languages in courts and the state administration. A provision stipulating mandatory translation into Serbian of all documentation in first-instance proceedings in minority languages led to fewer and fewer instances of the exercise of the right to the official use of national minority languages; in Vojvodina, litigation and administrative proceedings in minority languages all but vanished. The state also actively discouraged the exercise of minority rights still guaranteed by the Constitution and laws. This negative policy had many forms: no appropriate additional funding was provided for the local and central authorities in territories where the use of minority languages was possible; translating services were disbanded; knowledge of local languages in official use was no longer a requirement for employment; there was no supervision of the enforcement of the Law on the Official Use of Language etc. The right to the use of national minority languages in official business was never formally abolished, but most state organs of authority where this right could be exercised simply could not function in any minority language. In 35 of the 44 municipalities in Vojvodina, and in the City of Novi Sad, one or more national minority languages are in official use (besides Serbian, the official language in use on the entire territory of Serbia). Albanian and Bulgarian, respectively, are recognised as official languages in two municipalities in southern Serbia and two in eastern Serbia. In actual practice, the Law on the Official Use of (minority) Languages was exercised only partially – mainly in municipalities where a national minority controlled the local government.

Under the law, in all areas where a national minority language is in official use, all public inscriptions (town and street names, traffic signs, names of administrative organs) should be bilingual – Serbian and the relevant minority language. Those violating its provisions were subject to

heavy fines for misdemeanours. Although some organs of authority ignored these provisions, no one was ever prosecuted for breaches.

Since 2002, Vojvodina's local authorities have been charged with supervision of the official use of language and script and full regulation of the official use of language and alphabet of national minorities on its territory. Supervision duly began, and a regulation defining the matter more closely was issued¹²⁷. Regular supervision improved the situation in practice, hundreds of bilingual signs were put up, bilingual forms were printed, civil servants were sent to language classes etc. But in spite of the considerable progress made, some shortcomings remain. Funds for translations are still in short supply, as is the number of fully-trained staff; there is also visible individual or institutional resistance among civil servants.

INFORMATION

The right of national minorities to public information in their own languages is largely being observed. There are radio and TV programmes in most minority languages, *Novi Sad Television* (the Provincial Public Service) has programmes in a total of eight languages on two radio and two TV channels. A Hungarian-language daily is also published, as are weeklies in Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian and Ruthenian, and from this year also in Croatian and in Romany. All are financed mainly from the Vojvodina budget. Besides province-wide electronic and printed media, there is also a very large number of local newspapers, radio and TV stations throughout Vojvodina – many are funded from local government budgets and have programmes in one or more minority languages. According to the provincial government, 27 municipalities in Vojvodina have media founded by local governments¹²⁸. Outside Vojvodina, there are considerably fewer media in minority languages, but a number of

¹²⁶ *The Act on the Official Use of Language and Script, Official Herald of the RS, No. 45/1991.*

¹²⁷ The Decision of the Assembly of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina on the regulation of certain questions linked with the official use of the languages and scripts of the national minorities on the territory of the APV, *Official Gazette of the APV, No. 8/2003.*

¹²⁸ Report on the Regional, Municipal and Private Media in the APV, APV Executive Council, June 2004, p. 37.

private initiatives exist, especially in regard to information in the Roma language.

PROSECUTION OF VIOLATIONS OF MINORITY RIGHTS

Although certain forms of violating the rights of minorities are punishable by law in Serbia, practice has shown that the protection afforded by criminal law is not always adequate, and that the law-enforcement authorities – the police, and in particular prosecutors – generally avoid prosecuting those who perpetrated criminal offences with elements of violations of the rights of minorities. Some such cases do reach the public eye, including reports about graffiti expressing ethnic hatred, ethnically-motivated brawls and bans imposed on Roma from accessing certain public facilities, but the police and prosecutors often either ignore them altogether or define the offences so as to avoid giving them an “ethnic character”. Chauvinistic graffiti are mainly qualified as threatening property, ethnically motivated fights as disorder conduct and causing injuries etc. Although no proper statistics are kept and it is not possible to gauge the precise extent to which the authorities are enforcing criminal law in cases of this nature, official reports and estimates of non-governmental organisations indicate that such offences are prosecuted only very rarely.

PRINCIPLES OF STATE ACTION TO PROMOTE MULTICULTURALISM IN SERBIA

In order to ensure the unimpeded development of multiculturalism and expansion of the freedom of choice while preserving what has been achieved in the area of institutional protection of differences in Serbia, it is necessary to operationalise several basic principles which would ensure development of multiculturalism in Serbia as a prerequisite for stable and long-term development of Serbia as an ethnically diverse society.

THE PRINCIPLE OF A DIFFERENTIAL AND INCREMENTAL APPROACH – MEASURES ACCORDING TO NEED AND ABILITY

Human rights and liberties are universal and do not depend on race, gender, social or ethnic position, or the location where an individual was born or lives. Local and national specificities are

of major importance for the observance, exercise and protection of human rights and liberties, especially in the area of the protection and guaranteeing of linguistic and cultural rights and freedoms. The principle of “realistic needs and capacities” in the promotion of multiculturalism in Serbia should be deemed important by the state and the legislative framework needs to accommodate to this. There must be full equality of language, particularly in areas where there is a real need for it and where it is possible to accomplish. The law provides wide-ranging guarantees for official use of minority languages. In two-thirds of all municipalities in Vojvodina, ethnic Hungarians are guaranteed the right to communicate verbally and in writing in their own language with all levels of government. But in actual practice, this right cannot be exercised in most towns, as municipal authorities have neither the appropriate personnel nor material capacities; well aware of this state of affairs, people do not even try to exercise the said rights. This means that when it regulated this matter by law, the state had not taken into account realistic needs and capacities for the exercise of the right to the use of native language – this right is guaranteed formally, but there is very little actual opportunity to use minority language or script in transacting official business.

BOX 43.

OFFICIAL USE OF MINORITY LANGUAGES

The Ruthenian and Slovak languages are in official use in the municipality of Bačka Topola, whose population of 40,000 includes 292 Ruthenians and about 200 Slovaks. Ensuring the exercise of this right for them would require two to three hundred civil servants speaking Slovak and a like number who speak Ruthenian – as many as there are members of those nationalities.

The appropriate principle would therefore be a differential and incremental exercise of rights, depending on the needs of the local population and the capacities of the authorities; this means linking the exercise of certain rights to the concentration of minority population(s). The exercise of some rights can be guaranteed easily (multilingual street signs), while some require more

resources. This means that some regulations need to be changed and that the selective application of the protection or rights needs to be ensured. But what can be done without changing laws, is to define in the statutes of local governments, those communities where the right to the official use of minority languages is exercised, gradually closing the gap that exists between normative and actual reality, rights and practice. In this way minorities would be able to enjoy their language rights in areas where there exists an actual need and appropriate material support, changing the situation, which is nowadays being described as “the broadest possible rights on paper, but in practice practically nothing”. Such an incremental approach has been taken by many countries (Canada, Switzerland, Italy and others). The principle of “needs and capacities” should also be applied in other areas of importance for the promotion of multiculturalism. In education, where there exist large and concentrated minorities, it is natural to ensure full education in their language, while where groups are smaller, a principle of a gradual transfer to Serbian-language schooling is preferable: the native language is in use in pre-school institutions, primary schools would be bi-lingual, and secondary school education would be in Serbian. This principle would be appropriate for the widely dispersed minorities, for areas where the use of the native language is mainly in private communication. This would perhaps be the best option for the Roma population, as it would help to ensure their integration into society as whole. The application of a selective and incremental principle would of course be voluntary and based on freedom of choice, and must respect the principle of acquired rights. The application of this principle may therefore not endanger the existing systems of education in the Slovak, Romanian and Ruthenian languages in Vojvodina, because that would represent abolition of the acquired rights of those communities.

THE PRINCIPLE OF DECENTRALISATION AND AUTONOMY

A greater level of decentralisation makes possible a more flexible multiculturalism policy. Much prejudice exists in Serbia around the concept of

a decentralised state; it is generally believed that a decentralised state is a weak state, and that decentralisation and regionalization enhance nationalisms and secessionist tendencies of the national minorities, while a centralised system blocks the spread of nationalism and separatism among them. Many people in Serbia believe that the state should be careful in respect of decentralisation because it weakens the state, and that a centralised Serbia is a guarantee of its stability and territorial integrity, especially so because there are so many national minorities in Serbia. It is easy to see from an analysis of the state and legal histories of some countries that there is no link whatsoever between a centralised state and that state’s stability and might; this is the case in both multinational and ethnically pure countries. In Europe, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Great Britain and Italy are highly decentralised countries, and at the same time stable and powerful; in those countries decentralisation is much more a means of stabilisation than a sign of weakness, because without the autonomy of Scotland, the Basque country, Catalonia, Trentino Alto Adige/Sud Tirol and Flanders, the said countries would either not exist at all or be a source of conflict and tensions in their regions. On the other hand, until recently France, Greece, Albania, Belarus, the Ukraine, Romania and Hungary, and even Serbia, could be classified as countries with a higher level of centralisation, which did not at all mean that they were stable and strong. The intensive centralisation in Serbia, complete rejection of all demands made by the ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo and massive police and military engagement there did nothing to stop the Albanians’ drive for independence or to preserve Serbia’s territorial integrity. The rejection of federalisation and the rigid approach of the Serbian authorities in negotiation with the Albanians further radicalised their demands, and a compromise solution seems further away now than it ever was.

However, the measures introduced after 2001, which ensured more decentralisation have had a positive influence on the development, promotion and protection of a multicultural Serbia. The sober and political settlement of the Albanian problem in southern Serbia in

2001 is proof that it is possible to resolve the crisis by political and economic means and that decentralisation does not strengthen centrifugal forces. The optimal solution demands an appropriate balance between the functions of the central, regional and local authorities. The best test for the requisite level of decentralisation is its functionality. Things that can be done better in the best interest of the local population should be done at local level, by local government, what is at regional level should be effected there, and everything that can be performed best by the central authorities should be left to them. This is similar to the principle of subsidiarity as practiced by the EU. There are very few state functions (defence, foreign policy, monetary policy and the security of the state) that must remain within the purview of the central authorities; all others can be partially or wholly performed by regional and local governments.

DECENTRALISATION AND REGIONALISM AS MEANS OF ENHANCING OR WEAKENING NATIONALISM

The longstanding prejudice in Serbia that upgrading the powers of regional and local authorities in multi-ethnic regions strengthens nationalism and separatism among minorities has also been proven wrong. The dissolution of the Kosovo parliament in 1989 and exclusion of ethnic Albanians from the local authorities in Kosovo did not reduce the nationalism and separatism of the Albanians, who simply turned to working outside the framework of formal institutions. Elsewhere, in Vojvodina, eight municipalities with ethnic Hungarian political majorities have controlled local governments much of the time since 1992, yet there has been no radicalisation of Hungarian nationalism or extremism or any similar manifestations. Quite the contrary – these areas are stable and exemplary in respect of upholding the Constitution and the law, and their actions have come in for criticism only exceptionally. Not only does recognition of autonomy and multiculturalism and upgrading them not advance nationalism and separatism, but also practice has shown that autonomy can play a role in reducing nationalism. This is easier to see in the example of Vojvodina, whose identity is fundamentally tied to the concept of an

ethnically diverse, multi-lingual and multicultural society. It is therefore inclusive rather than exclusive culture – and language-wise. Being recognised as a “Vojvodinian” is part of the identity of both Serbs and ethnic Hungarians in the province. Where in a multicultural and multi-ethnic environment there exist diverse lines of division, which do not coincide, the possibility of grouping along ethnic and linguistic lines is less probable. The powerful regional identity that exists in Vojvodina irrespective of language, religion and ethnicity can be a means both of mitigating negative and promoting positive differences, and it exists as a common denominator for groups which have different religions, languages, ethnic identity and culture. In the period when Vojvodina enjoyed a high level of autonomy, when a policy of “national and linguistic equality” ruled, the loyalty of the minorities to the state was at a high level, which in some areas actually strengthened integration, and even voluntary assimilation of national minorities. The “Vojvodina regional identity” must of course contain certain predefined values and content. It is possible to define and implement an affirmative policy of “Vojvodina multiculturalism”, it is necessary by implementing various measures in education, cultural policy and the media to give content to the “Vojvodina identity” by developing inter-culturalism. For example: the Vojvodina multicultural identity could encompass the following: “respecting and understanding differences”, “acquiring knowledge about the languages and customs of others in Vojvodina”, “consensual democracy in questions relating to diversity”, “respect for and a cult of agriculture and rural life” etc.

BOX 44.

CREATING REGIONAL IDENTITIES

In the very ethnically-diverse municipality of Subotica in northern Vojvodina (with about equal proportions of Serbs, Hungarians and Croats), strengthening a “Subotician” identity implying cultural and language diversity but also mutual respect and fusion, can help ease differences and channel those that keep Croats, Serbs and Hungarians apart in Subotica. A similar example is Belgrade, which has by law for several decades been a special territorial unit.

An essential requirement for the promotion of a multi-cultural society is the participation of ethnic, linguistic, religious and other groups in public life, and, even more importantly, in the civil service. A good example is the Multi-Ethnic Police organised in southern Serbia by the Serbian Government and the OSCE which employed numerous ethnic Albanians in the Serbian police, whose units had hitherto been ethnically pure – composed of Serbs only.

3. POLICY AND APPROACHES TO MULTICULTURALISM—LINKAGES TO THE MDGs

At the United Nations Millennium Summit in September 2000, world leaders expressed determination to end world poverty. The 189 countries at the summit adopted the Millennium Declaration committing to do their utmost to achieve key objectives of humanity in the 21st century. Stemming from the Declaration were the Millennium Development Goals—a set of 8 goals, 18 targets and 48 indicators—that establish concrete, time-bound targets for advancing development and reducing poverty by 2015 or earlier. The MDGs are:

1. Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger;
2. Achieving universal primary education;
3. Promoting gender equality;
4. Reducing child and maternal mortality;
5. Reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS and malaria;
6. Reducing by half the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water;
7. Ensuring environmental sustainability;
8. Developing a global partnership for development; with targets for aid, trade and debt relief.

The MDG actually provide basic building blocks for human development – they are a set of quantified and time-bound goals for some of the most important human development objectives. As the ultimate purpose of MDGs is in fact *poverty eradication and human development*, they can actually be seen as the road map toward human development. Therefore, as the global

HDR (2003) argued, human development and the Millennium Development Goals share a common motivation and vital commitment to promoting human well being that entails dignity, freedom and equality for all people. The Millennium Development Goals are benchmarks of progress towards the vision of the Millennium Declaration—guided by basic values of freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and shared responsibilities. These values have much in common with the conception of human well being in the concept of human development. Accordingly, they also mirror the fundamental motivation for human rights. Thus, the MDGs, human development and human rights share the same motivation (HDR, 2003).

Moreover, it can be added that promoting multiculturalism as a means of promoting human rights and human development is complementary with achieving the MDGs. As the Global HDR (2004) argues, if the world is to reach the Millennium Development Goals and ultimately eradicate poverty, it must first successfully confront the challenge of how to build inclusive, culturally diverse societies. This is not just because doing so successfully is a precondition for countries to focus properly on other priorities of economic growth, health and education for all citizens, but because allowing people full cultural expression is an important development end in itself.

The matrix on the next page presents how the activities related to the improvement of human development and multiculturalism at the same time contribute to the achievement of Millennium Development Goals.

And the other way round also holds – in order to achieve Millennium Development Goal 1 (eradicate extreme poverty and hunger), the *MDG Baseline Report*, prepared in 2002, with the title "How much Serbia is on Track?" (hereinafter the Baseline Report) recommended better targeting of the most vulnerable groups by active and passive social measures (refugees, IDPs, Roma minority and others)¹²⁹. Additionally, the report recognized the problem of prevalence of children malnutrition in rural, compared to urban areas.

¹²⁹ The Millennium Development Goals "How much Serbia is on the track", UNDP (2002).

Regarding MDG 2: Achieve universal primary education – the Baseline Report for Serbia points to the problem of Roma pupils exclusion from primary education and high drop out rates, and in that context asks for special attention that have to be paid to Roma children – and other vulnerable categories – including education in mother tongue, pre school preparation and securing special schools¹³⁰. The Report also recognizes the huge urban – rural differences in the utilization of school space as well as the problem of inflow of refugee and IDPs children in schools especially in urban areas.

Regarding the achievement of Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women, the Baseline Report argues that the data clearly show that there is no gender disparity in primary and secondary education, while the inequality of women can be mostly seen from the fact that men dominate managerial and better paid positions, and position in public and political life. The report also recognizes the need for special attention toward women in traditional rural areas, Roma women, women among refugee and IDPs population.

Concerning Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability, and in particular Target 10: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water, and recognizing that Serbia is generally on track, the Baseline Report points out that water quality is unsatisfactory, particularly in some rural areas (where wells are used) and areas occupied by refugees and IDPs, due to increase demand of water. It can be added that water accessibility is of particular concern in Roma settlements. Finally, although regarding Target 11 (by 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers) the Baseline Report estimates that there is no serious slum problem in Serbia, it should be emphasises that majority of this problem is related to the Roma settlements, and therefore key policy recommendation related to this Target should be aimed at resolving housing problems of Roma population (and Refugee and IDP population to certain extent).

However, the Millennium Development Goals do not capture entirely all the crucial dimensions of human development. In particular, they do not mention expanding people's participation in the decisions that affect their lives or increasing their civil and political freedoms, which are essential for promoting multiculturalism and cultural diversity. Participation, democracy and human rights are, however, important elements of the Millennium Declaration which includes – in addition to the eight MDGs – six commitments for promoting human rights, democracy and good governance. Finally, the full realization of economic, social and cultural rights for all people requires far more than achieving the MDGs. However, achieving the Goals is an important step and indication towards that end. Therefore, although human development, human rights and multiculturalism are broader concepts, MDGs should be taken as a good indicator towards their achievements.

Additionally, for the MDGs to be meaningful at the national level, targets need to be tailored to reflect national circumstances and development priorities. Global targets are valid but not all nations can meet them because country-specific circumstances differ significantly from global trends. On the other side, understanding MDGs literally for some countries may seem that the country is on track, while at the same time plagued with serious problems related to the aims that MDGs refer to.

The spirit of the Millennium Declaration, however, is not to impose a uniform set of targets on each and every country. Therefore, the quantitative MDG targets should be translated into nationally agreed targets that balance ambition with realism. Over-ambitious targets are not likely to trigger action or mobilise social actors; non-challenging targets are unlikely to mobilise extra resources or to foster pro-poor policy reforms. Tailoring and customising the MDG targets is essential for enhancing the sense of national ownership of the MDGs.

In the light of the aforementioned, for Serbia some of the Millennium Development Goals and Targets may seem not to be challenging enough. For example, the way goals and targets connected to education are set up gives the impression that

¹³⁰ The Millennium Development Goals "How much Serbia is on the track", UNDP (2002).

*How do human development goals and promoting multiculturalism relate to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals?**

Key capabilities for human development	Multiculturalism Policy and approaches	Corresponding Direct Millennium Development Goals and Targets		Corresponding indirect Millennium Development Goals
LIVING A LONG AND HEALTHY LIFE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Solving the problems of primary health care for Roma people Improvement of the health care system in the rural areas Improvement of health care of youth 	<p>Goal 4: Reducing child mortality</p> <p>Goal 5: Improving maternal health</p> <p>Goal 6: Combating major diseases</p>	<p>Target 5: Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate</p> <p>Target 6: Reduce by two quarters, between 1990 and 2013, the maternal mortality ratio</p> <p>Target 7: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS</p>	Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
BEING EDUCATED	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Policies regarding Roma inclusion in the education system Improvement of primary education in rural areas 	<p>Goal 2: Achieving universal primary education</p> <p>Goal 3: Promoting gender equality (especially in education) and empowering women</p>	Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling	Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
HAVING A DECENT STANDARD OF LIVING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Integration and repatriation of refugees and IDPs Improvement of economic conditions of elderly Improvement of economic conditions of Roma people Adequate agricultural and rural development policies 	Goal 1: Reducing poverty and hunger	Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day	<p>Goal 4: Reducing child mortality</p> <p>Goal 5: Improving maternal health</p> <p>Goal 6: Combating major diseases</p> <p>Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development</p>
ENJOYING POLITICAL AND CIVIL FREEDOMS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE LIFE OF ONE'S COMMUNITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Full right to the official use of minority languages Strengthen religious pluralism Integration of marginal groups into the society Improvement of psychological, sociological and cultural aspects of the elderly 	Not a Goal but an important global objective included in the Millennium Declaration		
Essential conditions for human development	Multiculturalism Policy and approaches Activities	Corresponding Direct Millennium Development Goals and Targets		Corresponding indirect Millennium Development Goals
ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Solving the housing problems of Roma people Improvement of infrastructures in rural areas Protection and preservation of environment in rural areas 	Goal 7: Ensuring environmental sustainability	<p>Target 10: Halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water</p> <p>Target 11: By 2020 to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers</p>	<p>Goal 4: Reducing child mortality</p> <p>Goal 5: Improving maternal health</p> <p>Goal 6: Combating major diseases</p>
EQUITY – ESPECIALLY GENDER EQUITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Promote gender equality amongst cultural groups (especially within vulnerable – Roma, refugees) 	Goal 3: Promoting gender equality (especially in education) and empowering women		Goal 5: Improving maternal health
ENABLING GLOBAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Creation of favourable environment for accelerated private sector development in order to employ young, highly qualified and educated workforce 	Goal 8: Strengthening partnership between rich and poor countries	Target 16: In co-operation with developing countries, develop and implement Strategies for decent and productive work for youth	

* This matrix is an adjusted version of "Millennium Development Goals: A compact among nations to end human poverty" (HDR, 2003) by including policies and approaches to multiculturalism and accompanying activities

Serbia is not only on track, but has accomplished the goal already. Indeed, primary (eight years) education in Serbia is compulsory and tuition free, and net enrolment ratio in primary education is very high (almost 98%). Ethnic minorities have the right to be educated in their native languages. One can say that all indicators measuring universal primary education show that this goal has already been achieved in Serbia. Yet, the Baseline Report recognized the fact that the quality of education especially since it has been affected severely in the last decade, is quite poor, and definitely does not reflect the needs of society, which is in a transition to modern market economy, a democratic state and European integration. Furthermore, indicators such as the primary net enrolment ratio in primary education, proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5, and literacy ra-

te of 15–24 year olds are inadequate for a country like Serbia.

Tailoring Millennium Development Goal 2 to the country-specific situation in Serbia should give rise to the need of, amongst other things, promoting multiculturalism through the education system. In order to obtain certain quality of education level in Serbia, targets and indicators regarding secondary and higher education should be introduced, which is directly linked to some of the measures regarding multiculturalism and cultural liberty in Serbia. Furthermore, modules, which would familiarize majority population pupils with history, tradition and culture of minorities, and minorities with the culture of majority population, should be introduced into regular curriculum.

PART III

Concluding Remarks and Recommendations

The Republic of Serbia is an ethnically and culturally heterogeneous community in which 16.1% of its population (without Kosovo) belongs to some 24 minority communities. The members of different ethnic belonging, who have lived in harmony in a joint state for decades, suffered the disintegration of the country and a series of wars, which were a product of nationalistic political strategies but were represented as (unavoidable) ethnic and religious conflicts. For that reason, it is important to:

- Come to terms with the past – full understanding of those events and their interpretation must be the subject of open dialogue, which will provide a multiplicity of views and experiences;
 - Invest efforts in helping both the majority and minority peoples to embrace policies based on social and cultural integrationalism rather than territorial and cultural isolationism;
 - Develop awareness of a multiplicity of identities among individuals. Identities, which are complementary to ethnic identity, such as citizenship, European identity, regional identity and others need to be strengthened;
 - Eliminate the “hate speech” directed against other ethnicities, which have become common place in everyday communication and in the media, and prosecute those responsible for it;
 - Civic education should be further developed as a school subject. Learning about democracy and civics should be one of the priorities in education, and should also be a part of other school subjects;
 - The broadest ethnic gap, distrust and negative attitudes exist between the majority and ethnic Albanians, which intensified after the escalation of the Kosovo conflict and the continuing failure to resolve it, and which in extreme cases even have racist features. One of the high-priority tasks must be reducing the resentment directed at ethnic Albanians to a level, which it would make possible both dialogue and peaceful co-existence.
- When it comes to recommendations on religious relations, the Council of Europe recommendations should be accepted, namely that to ensure religious pluralism and equal conditions for development to all religious groups, there is a need to:
 - Create better conditions for the observance of various religious rites;
 - Upgrade education about religions as collections of values;
 - Upgrade comparative religious education in schools;
 - Upgrade cultural and social expression of religions.
 - Some more recommendations should be added to the above:
 - There need to be an insistence on the separation of church and state and resistance to the tendencies of the church to meddle in the affairs of the state, processes which increase tensions in the secular domain which is religiously diverse;
 - Emphasising pluralism of identity enhances religious tolerance;
 - Trying not to equate religious with national affiliation;
 - Promote better knowledge of the many religions – religious classes in schools should be conceived as a general-education subject which will contribute to raising awareness about various religions, while religious instruction as such should be left to individual churches.
 - The years of international isolation and economic hardship have taken their toll. Therefore, it is also important to ensure the

necessary conditions for the contacts to take place:

- Especially threatened by the wars, isolation and falling standards of living are young people, who have had little opportunity to experience a different life. The youth are therefore especially receptive to extremist ideologies. Educating the youth in a spirit of tolerance and civic values is therefore of extreme importance;
 - Travelling abroad as well as more foreigners visiting Serbia – the more chance there is for experiencing new cultures;
 - Ensuring computer literacy must become an integral part of educational curricula. Use of computers, the Internet and electronic mail should be promoted, especially among people of lower or average levels of education, among whom these are now practically non-existent;
 - Learning foreign languages in school must also be encouraged. It is particularly important to apply various means to promote, also outside the educational system, knowledge of languages spoken by minorities in local communities.
- Affirmation of multiculturalism and interculturalism in Serbia demands a clearly defined national strategy and measures for its implementation. Besides the state, such a strategy also needs to be drafted on a provincial level in Vojvodina. Efforts should be made in schools and the media to stimulate mutual awareness of cultures and languages and multiculturalism should be promoted as a social value. Learning a language used in one's community should be encouraged in different ways. Awareness and knowledge about differences and variety should be taken out of the realm of scientific research and elevated to that of actual life.
- Unimpeded and full exercise of the rights of national minorities guaranteed by the Constitution and law requires institutions and instruments which would efficiently implement relevant legislation such as: establishment of a ministry for the rights of national minorities (or an administrative organ attached to one or more existing ministries), adoption of secondary legislation needed for the execution of various obligations of the state in connection with exercise of the guaranteed rights of minorities, drafting government plans and strategies needed to improve the situation in respect of equal employment opportunities for members of national minorities, implementation of relevant laws, reduction of ethnic intolerance, collection of relevant statistical data which would make possible efficient action by the state in suppressing negative developments.
- In the existing education system, it is necessary to determine appropriate and adapted norms of funding for institutions where teaching is conducted in a national minority language or in more than one language. This type of education always costs more, as it often involves smaller classes, more expensive textbooks, forms and other documents and school implements due to smaller circulations, higher costs of training teachers etc. The existing education system does not take these additional costs into account, leading to funding difficulties for the education in minority languages. Additional and supplementary norms for this education also need to be determined. Affirmation of multiculturalism requires more teaching about the cultures of "others", their languages etc.
- As for the official use of languages and scripts of national minorities, it is necessary besides increasing supervision also to alter the manner of funding the costs of the official use of languages. Determination of the sources of funding for local government and the work of decentralized state organs of authority requires that an additional parameter be taken into consideration – the extra costs created by the use of more than one official language: costs of new translating services, language training for personnel, extra pay for personnel who use more than one language, purchase of appropriate computer software, forms etc.
- There has been some improvement in human development in Serbia since the political changes in 2000 – 6% increase in HDI since 1999 until 2002. Although information on human development (measured with HDI) according to ethnicity or various socio/cultural groups cannot be obtained, findings based on other sources of data point to vulnerability of groups,

such as Roma in particular, refugees and IDPs, youngsters, elderly, etc. Therefore, these groups need special attention and should be particularly targeted.

Improving living conditions and providing opportunities for full economic, social, political and cultural affirmation of *youngsters* in Serbia seems to be of the highest priority since, according to estimates, more than 300.000 young people have left the country in the last 13 years and new generations are still planning to do so. In addition, recent survey results are indicative of high intolerance among young people. In relation to that, it is necessary to define – with the close participation of young people – a National Strategy for youth. Of particular importance is the comprehensive reform of the educational system, as well as creating favourable conditions, which would enable faster employment of young and educated people, and therefore provide the conditions for young people to stay in Serbia.

Women are equally affected by poverty in view of the fact that the percentages of poor men and women are almost identical which leads to the conclusion that in the poorest population group, economic discrimination between men and women is not observed. However, a number of other indicators points to the less favourable social and economic status of women, such as: a less favourable educational and occupational structure, higher unemployment rate, longer period of waiting for employment, aggravated employment requirements and career advancement, lower wages and the like. Less favourable status of women is also supported by results on GDI and GEM indices, although there has been an improvement in GDI over the period 1999–2002. Therefore, measures directed towards improving gender equality should primarily focus on economic and political empowerment of women at all levels, as well as encouraging women's associations and entrepreneurship.

Among various social groups having an unfavourable social and economic status in Serbia, *Roma* represent a very large group with the highest degree of exclusion relative to the majority population. According to all social indicators, their social and economic status is

extremely unfavourable. Although this has been the case in most countries in which they live, the situation in Serbia is somewhat specific due to a great number of Roma among refugees and IDPs. Improvement of socio-economic status of Roma people is essential for their integration into the social and economic life of the country, while policies aimed at the improvement of socio-economic conditions of Roma people should take into account specificity of their culture. The most urgent problems that have to be tackled are, above all, education, extremely bad housing conditions and accordingly health conditions, as well as unemployment.

Wars since 1991 in Croatia and Bosnia, the conflict in Kosovo and the related NATO intervention in 1999, resulted in enormous number of *refugees* (in 1997 the number of refugees reached 705.667) and *IDPs* (over 200.000). This group is particularly vulnerable due to the unfavourable economic situation reflected mainly in the problems of housing (only around 18% own flat or house) and labour market (10 percentage points higher unemployment rate compared to domicile population). Therefore, although significant progress have been achieved on integration of this vulnerable group, much more has to be done for efficient integration of refugees and IDPs in economic, social and cultural life of Serbia, primarily on resolving their housing problems as well as providing employment opportunities.

- Promoting multiculturalism as a means towards improvement of human rights and human development is also complementary with achieving the MDGs. If the world is to reach the Millennium Development Goals and ultimately eradicate poverty, it must first successfully confront the challenge of how to build inclusive, culturally diverse societies. This is not just because doing so successfully is a precondition for countries to focus properly on other priorities of economic growth, health and education for all citizens, but because allowing people full cultural expression is an important development end in itself. Accordingly, integration of the minority and various cultural groups into economic, social, cultural and political life of Serbia is directly linked to achieving MDGs.

PART IV

Annex

ANNEX 1. MAIN SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

1. CURRENT TRENDS IN THE SERBIAN ECONOMY

BACKGROUND

During the nineties, Serbia experienced an economic and social breakdown. The nature of the authoritative regime and numerous mistakes in economic policy, international isolation, the collapse of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia market, wars in the surrounding countries and NATO intervention in Serbia in 1999 caused a sharp decline of national and per capita GDP by 50% with respect to the previous decade, which ranked Serbia as one of the lowest in the Europe.

Industry utilized only 20–30% of its rated capacity and the banking sector was on the brink of bankruptcy. The official unemployment rate exceeded 30% and even among the employed every third person was surplus to actual needs. During this period, economic isolation favoured the development of a grey economy (which in volume reached half of the domestic product), corruption and organized crime. The difficult economic and social situation was additionally aggravated by a huge inflow of refugees from BiH and Croatia and internally displaced persons from Kosovo (who in

some years reached almost 10% of Serbia's population).

All that contributed to a dramatic fall of living standards, an increase of poverty, a decay of social values, exclusion from world affairs, a marked decline in development trends, growing apathy of the majority of the population and a lack of reasonable and tolerant perspectives – particularly among the young generation. In short, together with the deep economic crisis almost all dimensions of the human development in Serbia deteriorated.

SUCCESS OF THE FIRST AND FAILURE OF THE SECOND GENERATION OF REFORMS

More favourable conditions for economic recovery and a new development strategy in Serbia emerged after the radical political changes in the October 2000. At that time, the new democratic Government faced two equally serious problems. On the one hand, after what they have been through in the nineties, citizens expected a rapid economic recovery and immediate increase of living standards. On the other hand, in order to catch up after a ten-year delay in transition processes with other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, it was necessary

TABLE A1. The main macroeconomic indicators (2000–2004)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Nominal GDP, current US\$ mil.	8019	10,661	14,282	18984	21771*
GDP pc	1069	1421	1904	2531	2903*
Real GDP growth	5.0	5.5	4	3	7*
Inflation, end of period	111.9	40.7	14.8	7.8	13.7
Government expenditure, total (% of GDP)	37.6	40.2	46.7	46.1	..
Fiscal deficit, in % of GDP	0.2	1	4.2	3.8	2.5
Trade deficit (in mil. US\$)	1,788	2,834	3,908	4,847	7,047
Current account deficit (% of GDP)	4	3.2	10	9.1	13.2
FDI, net (mil. US\$)	25	165	475	1,360	966
Foreign exchange reserves of NBS (mil. US \$), end of period	524	1,169	2,280	3,550	4,244
External debt (in mil. US\$)	11,403	11,948	11,839	14,241	13,555 ¹⁾
Unemployment rate (official)	25,6	26,8	29,0	31,7	31,6

* Estimate for 2004 ; 1) Preliminary data as of November 31, 2004

Source: National Bank of Serbia, Republic Statistical Office, estimates of Economics institute

to accelerate socio-economic reforms, some of them being painful.

The first generation of reforms, especially in 2001–2002, was carried out “by the book” and produced favourable results:

- An economic growth rate of 4–5% per annum was achieved together with macroeconomic stability (the inflation rate was reduced to a one-digit number; the internal convertibility of the domestic currency was introduced; the budget deficit of 3–5% of GDP was financed exclusively from real domestic sources).
- The liberalization of international economic relations was conducted (foreign trade restrictions were lifted; average tariff rates were

lowered below 10%; a number of foreign trade agreements was signed – with Russia, former Yugoslav republics and other countries in the region).

- The new privatisation model brought in (2002 – 2003) €1.2 billion to the state budget, provided an additional €720 million through contracted investments and another €270 million for social programs. In that period, over 1,000 enterprises were privatised.
- A number of important reform laws were adopted in the fiscal, monetary and banking sectors, as well as in the areas of foreign economic relations, labour and capital market, the judiciary system and social security.

TABLE A2. Structural and Institutional indicators

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Index of price liberalization	2.3	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
Index of forex and trade liberalization	1.0	3.0	3.3	3.3	3.3
EBRD index of small-scale privatization	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.3
EBRD index of large-scale privatisation	1.0	1.0	2.0	2.3	2.3
EBRD index of enterprise reform	1.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
EBRD index of competition policy	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
EBRD index of infrastructure reforms	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
EBRD index of banking sector reform	1.0	1.0	2.3	2.3	2.3
EBRD index of reform of non-bank financial institutions	1.0	1.0	1.7	2.0	2.0

* Score 1–4, the higher the better; Source: EBRD

TABLE A3. Labour market indicators

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004*	Data source	Data description
Total employment (in 000)	2,097	2,102	2,067	2,041	2,042	Statistical Yearbook of Serbia 2004 and NBS	Serbia (*since 1999 without Kosovo) All sectors included
Number of unemployed (in 000)	722	769	843	947	941		Serbia (*since 1999 without Kosovo) Annual average
Unemployment rate (official)	25.6	26.8	29.0	31.7	31.5		% of labour force
Average net salary (current Dinars)	2,389	5,375	9,224	11,518	13,706	NBS	
Average net salary real growth	5.5	16.4	47.2	13.6	..		

* Average January–October

However, these initial results blurred and concealed numerous problems, which, especially in 2003, became more evident and finally, caused a slowdown of economic growth and a suspension of the reform process.

It turned out that the leading political and social groups failed to reach a consensus on the second generation of reforms (as was done by successful countries in transition) which,

above all, refer to an efficient functioning of the institutions of market economy and the rule of law. As a result, basic market institutions – the protection of property and contract, performance of labour and capital market – failed to function proficiently. Banking and financial reforms were stopped halfway. The judiciary is still operating according to the standards of the previous system. The grey economy has not been significantly

TABLE A4. Social Sector

	2000	2001	2002	2003	Data source	Data Description/Construction
Public expenditures on pensions (% GDP)	..	9.4	11.7	11.7	PRSP	Serbia
Health expenditure, private (% of GDP)	1.70	1.70	WDI 2004	Serbia and Montenegro
Health expenditure, public (% of GDP)	5.90	6.50		
Health expenditure, total (% of GDP)	7.60	8.20		
Poverty index, in %	36.5	..	14.5	..	PRSP	Serbia without Kosovo
Gini coefficient (per capita)	28.3	..	34.4	..	HDR / PRSP	Serbia

TABLE A5. Education

	1990	1995	2000	Data Description/Construction
Pupil–teacher ratio (primary, %)	22	..	19.9	Primary school pupil–teacher ratio is the number of pupils enrolled in primary school divided by the number of primary school teachers
School enrolment, primary (% gross)	72,0	70,0	98,8	Gross enrolment ratio is the ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown.
School enrolment, primary, female (% gross)	72,7	70,5	98,7	
School enrolment, primary, male (% gross)	71,4	69,4	98,9	
School enrolment, secondary (% gross)	63,4	63,5	88,7	
School enrolment, secondary, female (% gross)	64,5	64,7	89,2	
School enrolment, secondary, male (% gross)	62,4	62,4	88,2	
School enrolment, tertiary (% gross)	18,2	20,5	36,0	
School enrolment, tertiary, female (% gross)	19,5	22,6	39,4	
School enrolment, tertiary, male (% gross)	17,0	18,5	32,8	
Scientific and technical journal articles	1569	460	546**	

*Data for Serbia and Montenegro; ** Data for 1999; Source: World Development Indicators (WDI)

TABLE A6. Demographic trends

	1975	1991	2002	2017	2052	Data Description/Construction
Total population (in 000)	9.341	10.496	7.505	7.137	6.729	Total population is based on number of all residents except for refugees. Census 2002 and projections afterwards refer to the territory of SCG without Kosovo
Population under age 15 (% of total)	24,6	23,2	15,9	16,3	16,0	
Population age 65 and above (% of total)	9,24	9,92	17,0	18,1	21,3	
Age dependency ratio	0,51	0,49	0,48	0,51	0,67	Ratio of dependents –people younger than 15 and older than 64 – to the working–age population – those aged 15–64
Old–age dependency ratio	0,13	0,14	0,25	0,27	0,41	Ratio of older than 64 – to the working–age population – those aged 15–64

* All projections are based on medium–fertility variant (expected migration, normal mortality)

Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) and projections from “Improvement of socio–economic conditions of elderly in Serbia”, Economics Institute (2004)

reduced. The reform of public administration has only started. Intensified corruption and organized crime penetrated all spheres of economic and political life, which, at the beginning of 2003, culminated in the assassination of the Prime Minister.

An important reason for the failure of the second generation reforms was the increasing fear of the unemployed and a great number of citizens that the heaviest burden of reforms would be shifted to the poorest groups of the population – meaning dismissal from work, low possibili-

es for new employment, high cost of living and poor prospects for the young generation – and that they are going to be the major losers in the transition¹³¹.

On the other hand, there is a strong belief that the major winner of the first phase of transition is the elite, including those operators who became well established during the period of sanctions and the previous regime, and are now trying to

¹³¹ PRSP emphasizes that there are around 1,600,000 or 20% of the poor people in Serbia in 2002.

extend their dominant economic position to all spheres of life. These are the main reasons why there is still no consensus on reforms and the European orientation of Serbia. Many reckon that this process will be a long one and that the price reflected in the low standard of living and a high rate of unemployment could be too high. Such a situation is used by the populists, promising immediate short-term improvements in the living conditions regardless of the subsequent negative consequences (high inflation, loss of interest of foreign investors, increase in the country's debt and further social segregation).

In short, a definite breakaway with the past (in an economic and political sense, including a change in the mentality linked to the old system) has not yet been made and the reforms now stalled.

Although the main macroeconomic indicators for 2004 show a positive trend in the increase of GDP, real wages and salaries, on the negative side, there has been a dramatic increase of the foreign trade deficit, huge public expenditure, a modest increase of foreign direct investment and an unexpectedly high inflation rate of 13.7% point to the danger of future macroeconomic instability and lack of structural reforms.

MEDIUM-TERM PROJECTIONS

In October 2004, the Government of Serbia pronounced its economic policy for 2005 and projections of relevant macroeconomic indicators. For the medium-term period the Government has set the goal of maintaining macroeconomic stability while at the same time GDP is expected to grow at a 5% annual average rate.

TABLE A7. Projections of main macroeconomic indicators

	2004*	2005	2006	2007
GDP, million Dinars	1,208.4	1,475.9	1,653.3	1,841.1
Real GDP growth (%)	8	4.5	5	5.5
Inflation, end of period (%)	11.8	9.1	6	4.5
Inflation, period average, (%)	9.5	10.6	6.7	5.2

* These projections were prepared before the medium-term projections (in 2002) and therefore slightly differ, due to the

The fiscal deficit and consolidated public spending are expected to be reduced gradually in the mid-term period as the process of transformation and adjusting to market economy is to complete.

With respect to the aforementioned goals, the essential aspect is to increase domestic savings, investments and the overall competitiveness of the economy.

TABLE A8. Projections of consolidated revenues, expenditures and fiscal deficit

(% of GDP)	2004*	2005	2006	2007
Revenues (% of GDP)	43.6	44.1	43.7	42.5
Expenditures	46.1	45.5	45.1	43.9
Fiscal deficit	2.5	1.4	1.4	1.4

* Estimate; Source: Memorandum on the budget, October 2004

One of the major challenges in the medium-term period is the restructuring and privatisation of large state-owned and public enterprises as well as state-owned banks, reducing the growing trade deficit and improving the investment climate.

PROJECTIONS FOR 2004 – 2010*

The main macroeconomic projections for the period 2004–2010 (prepared for the three-year Stand-by Agreement negotiations with IMF) point to the indispensable conditions needed to be fulfilled in order to attain certain level of competitiveness of Serbian economy, as well as increase of living standards.

▪ **Firstly**, bearing in mind the very low GDP per capita (around 2500\$) as well as the huge number of unemployed (official unemployment rate of around 30%), it is essential for Serbia to achieve long-term GDP growth of at least somewhat 5% annually, and consequently attain a level of around 4000\$ GDP per capita in 2010. Only with this rate of economic growth it is possible to achieve an increase in living standards, as well as increase both employment and labour productivity, which in turn are preconditions for achievement of two major goals – unemployment reduction and enhancing competitiveness.

changed circumstances in the country, especially during 2003 (assassination of Prime Minister).

TABLE A9. GDP and its structure

	2004.	2005.	2006.	2007.	2008.	2009.	2010.
GDP, current prices, billion SCD	1,263.0	1,402.4	1,535.9	1,677.2	1,831.5	2,000.0	2,148.0
GDP, million \$	20,441.2	21,634.3	22,909.1	24,301.9	25,779.5	27,346.9	29,009.6
GDP p.c., \$	2,703.9	2,850.4	3,006.4	3,176.7	3,356.7	3,546.9	3,748.0
GDP, real growth	4.1	4.5	4.5	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
Structure, in % of GDP							
Domestic demand	119.0	118.0	116.0	114.5	114.0	113.0	112.0
Spending	101.8	98.0	95.0	92.5	91.0	89.0	87.0
<i>Private spending</i>	84.6	81.5	79.0	76.5	75.0	73.0	71.5
<i>Public spending</i>	17.2	16.5	16.0	16.0	16.0	16.0	15.5
Investment	17.2	20.0	21.0	22.0	23.0	24.0	25.0
Net export of goods and services	- 19.0	- 18.0	- 16.0	-14.5	-14.0	-13.0	-12.0

Source: „Poverty Reduction Strategy for Serbia”, Government of Serbia, Belgrade, 2003

▪ **Secondly**, one of the preconditions of dynamic and sustainable economic growth is macroeconomic stability, attained by achieving internal and external balances. In order to achieve this, the budget deficit is to be reduced gradually and financed from real sources, preferably non-credit. Achieving external balance (halving the current account deficit as a share of GDP from 12% to 6%) is an even more challenging task, and the only way to succeed is by a significant increase in export (from current around 19% of GDP to 35% in 2010) and an inflow of FDI of over billion \$ annually.

▪ **Thirdly**, in the following period a switch in GDP spending is essential – and a significant decrease of personal and public spending in favour of increase of saving i.e. investments is required.

The aforementioned relations are quantified in the tables A9 and A10.

Furthermore, this projection assumes a gradual decrease in the share of public spending in GDP, from around 46% in 2003 to 43% in 2010. Within public spending, the change in its structure is quite indicative as well – the share for education is increasing, while shares for pensions, social protection, defence and public order and safety are decreasing. The rationale for this change in social spending is that current expenditure for education (measured as % of GDP) is lower than EU standards, while a decrease in expenditure for defence is possible due to the reforms of the defence system and therefore lowering the number in the armed services.

TABLE A10. Consolidated public spending (2004–2010.)

	2004.	2005.	2006.	2007.	2008.	2009.	2010.
Total expenditure (% GDP)	45.6	45.2	44.8	44.3	43.9	43.5	43.1
1. General public services	4.5	5	5.4	5.7	5.8	5.9	5.9
2. Defence	3.3	2.9	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.2
3. Public order and safety	2.7	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.1
4. Economic affairs	3.4	3.2	3	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.6
5. Environment protection	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
6. Housing construction and utilities	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1
7. Health	5.3	5.4	5.5	5.5	5.6	5.6	5.6
8. Recreation, culture and religion	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
9. Education	3.8	3.8	4	4.2	4.3	4.5	4.5
10. Pensions and social protection	17.8	17.6	17.3	16.7	16.2	15.7	15.4

Source: “Poverty Reduction Strategy for Serbia”, Government of Serbia, Belgrade, 2003.

2. THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX – HDI

There are multiple reasons that have prevented the HDI (and other related development indicators) to be calculated for 2003 and 2004. The first is the lack of data due to unavoidable delay in raw data compilation based on official statistics. The reports are not yet available, especially specific data by municipalities and by gender. Another factor is the GDP PPP conversion; this was done using the draft PPP estimate for 2001, prepared by the Federal Statistical Office. However, there are no regular annual PPP estimates available; the available estimate for 2001 would not be appropriate to calculate the HDI in 2003 and 2004, keeping in mind the significant price changes. Therefore the human development indicators have been calculated until 2002.

2.1. Methodology

Data for calculating the human development indices is available from the Republic Statistical Office for 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002. The Index was calculated using the standard HDI methodology, at the republic and county levels. Additionally, some expert estimates of GDP purchasing power parity (PPP) as well as adjusted GDP PPP were used as well.

2.2. Basic findings

The HDI is a composite index measuring (human) development level in terms of average achievements in three basic dimensions of human development:

- Quality of life (long and healthy life) measured by life expectancy at birth
- Literacy and education, being one of the major factors of development (measured by the adult literacy rate and primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio),
- Standard of living measured by GDP p.c. based on purchasing power parity (PPP).

The Human Development Index is a simple average mean of three basic indices:

$$HDI = (I1 + I2 + I3)/3,$$

I1 – Life expectancy index

I2 – Education index

I3 – GDP index

These three indices (I) are adjusted in the following way:

$$(I - I_{min}) / (I_{max} - I_{min})$$

Minimal and maximal values of these indices are given.

11 – Life expectancy index for 2002.

Life expectancy 2002 = 71,8 years

Life expectancy MIN = 25 years

Life expectancy MAX = 85 years

$$I1 = (71,8 - 25) / (85 - 25) = 0,780$$

12 – Education index

The Education index is a weighted arithmetic mean of the adult literacy index (weighted with 2), and gross enrolment index (weight is 1).

I3 – GDP index

The GDP index is calculated using the adjusted GDP per capita (PPP US\$).

GDP index (PPP) 2002 = 4948 US\$

GDP index (PPP) MIN = 100 US\$

GDP index (PPP) MAX = 40,000 US\$

$$I3 = (\log_{10}(4948) - \log_{10}(100)) / (\log_{10}(40,000) - \log_{10}(100)) = 0,651$$


$$HDI = (0,780 + 0,885 + 0,651) / 3 = 0,772$$

Table A11 shows that the HDI index in the observed three-year period increased by 6%. Although the first two components of HDI (life expectancy and education) generally do not vary significantly in the short periods of time, there was an improvement even with these indicators in the observed period. The major source of the increase in HDI index was GDP growth, which increased by 16% (cumulatively).

TABLE A11. HDI in 1999. and 2002.

	Education index	Life expectancy index	GDP index	HDI
1999	0.850	0.773	0.563	0.729
2002	0.885	0.780	0.651	0.772
Change %	4%	1%	16%	6%

CHART A1. HDI ranking in 2002 (178 countries)



2.3. International comparisons

With the HDI value of 0.772, Serbia ranks 74 out of 178 countries for which the HDI index for 2002 has been calculated¹³². This rank places Serbia in the category of **upper medium (human) developed countries**¹³³.

According to the life expectancy index, with the value of 0.78 for 2002, Serbia ranks 73 out of 178 countries. It is rated the best when it comes to the education index – with the value of 0.882, Serbia ranks 62nd of 178 countries. Finally, with the GDP index of 0.692, Serbia ranks 92nd.

It is indicative that Serbia attains relatively high human development standards in terms of life expe-

ctancy and educations, while it lags significantly when it comes to economic performance. Consequently, for the improvements of HDI, acceleration of the economic growth is essential for Serbia.

2.4. Regional differences in the level of human development

The calculation of HDI at regional level for 2002 confirms what has already been known about regional differences in the level of development in Serbia. Belgrade, as the Capital of the country, which is considered as a region by itself, is the clear leader in the education level and in economic performance, but slightly lagging when it comes to life expectancy.

 TABLE A12. HDI and its components¹³⁴ at the county level, Serbia 2002

	REGION			TOTAL	
	Belgrade	Vojvodina	Central Serbia	Mean	Std Deviation
	Mean	Mean	Mean		
Education index	0.984	0.873	0.825	0.885	0.072
Life expectancy index	0.782	0.760	0.803	0.780	0.091
GDP index	0.711	0.672	0.586	0.651	0.071
HDI	0.826	0.768	0.738	0.772	0.049

¹³² Ranking was determined comparing obtained HDI value for Serbia with the values for 177 countries in HDR (2004). Therefore, this is not an official comparison, as the result for Serbia was not obtained through the international procedures used for other countries.

¹³³ The HDI for high human developed countries takes the value of 0.8 and higher. The medium developed countries are in the interval [0.5 – 0.8], while the HDI for low developed countries takes the values 0.5 and lower.

¹³⁴ Average indices weighted by the population number.

However, results indicate that the difference in HDI between Vojvodina and Central Serbia are not that significant and is not in line with the usual notion that Vojvodina is the most developed part of Serbia. Obviously, the deep economic crises in the 90s also affected Vojvodina severely.

The biggest variance was in the education index, followed by the GDP index. The Life

expectancy index does not vary significantly by municipalities.

Differences in HDI values are even more apparent at the county level. There are 25 counties in Serbia. HDI values by each county are given in the table A13.

TABLE A13. HDI by counties, 2002

	Education index	Life expectancy index	GDP index	HDI
City of Belgrade	0.984	0.782	0.711	0.826
Severno-bački	0.892	0.796	0.676	0.788
Srednje-banatski	0.863	0.826	0.656	0.782
Severno-banatski	0.831	0.815	0.677	0.774
Južno-banatski	0.840	0.800	0.682	0.774
Zapadno-bački	0.827	0.782	0.696	0.769
Južno-bački	0.931	0.756	0.525	0.737
Sremski	0.802	0.751	0.615	0.723
Mačvanski	0.827	0.731	0.595	0.718
Kolubarski	0.813	0.815	0.607	0.745
Podunavski	0.794	0.753	0.588	0.712
Braničevski	0.818	0.852	0.642	0.771
Šumadijski	0.909	0.817	0.416	0.714
Pomoravski	0.845	0.845	0.624	0.771
Borski	0.784	0.762	0.613	0.720
Zaječarski	0.814	0.935	0.601	0.783
Zlatiborski	0.825	0.714	0.600	0.713
Moravski	0.808	0.780	0.636	0.741
Raški	0.846	0.780	0.557	0.728
Rasinski	0.808	0.815	0.603	0.742
Nišavski	0.921	0.911	0.644	0.825
Toplički	0.813	0.837	0.559	0.736
Pirotski	0.776	0.919	0.597	0.764
Jablanički	0.843	0.813	0.549	0.735
Pčinjski	0.730	0.685	0.575	0.663

3. GENDER-RELATED DEVELOPMENT INDEX – GDI

The Gender-related Development Index (GDI) is the HDI adjusted for gender inequality. GDI actually measures the achievements in the same dimensions as HDI (and using the same indicators – education index, life expectancy index and GDP index) while capturing inequalities between women and men. Based on its three components, The GDI is calculated as a simple arithmetic mean, where each of the indices is the harmonic mean of each component index by gender (male and female). Weights in the harmonic mean are the shares of the male/female in the total population. The GDI is simple arithmetic mean of three basic indices.

$$GDI = (I1 + I2 + I3) / 3$$

The greater the gender disparity in basic human development, the lower is a country's GDI relative to HDI

TABLE A14. I1 – Equally distributed life expectancy index

	Population 2002, share	Life expectancy, 2002	Life expectancy, MIN	Life expectancy, MAX
Female	0.514	75.1	27,5	87,5
Male	0.486	70.1	22,5	82,5

$$I1f = (75,1 - 27,5) / (87,5 - 27,5) = 0,793$$

$$I1m = (70,1 - 22,5) / (82,5 - 22,5) = 0,793$$

$$I1 = (0,514 * (0,793)^{-1} + 0,486 * (0,793)^{-1})^{-1} = 0,793$$

TABLE A15. I2 Adult literacy index

	Population 2002, share	Literacy index, 2002	Literacy index, MIN	Literacy index, MAX
Female	0.514	94,3	0	100
Male	0.486	98,9	0	100

$$I21f = (94,3 - 0) / (100 - 0) = 0,943$$

$$I21m = (98,9 - 0) / (100 - 0) = 0,989$$

$$I21 = (0,514 * (0,943)^{-1} + 0,486 * (0,989)^{-1})^{-1} = 0,965$$

TABLE A16. I22 – Gross enrolment index

	Population 2002, share	Education index, 2002	Education index, MIN	Education index, MAX
Female	0.514	71,1	0	100
Male	0.486	73,7	0	100

$$I22 = (0,514 * (0,711)^{-1} + 0,486 * (0,737)^{-1})^{-1} = 0,724$$

$$I2 = (2 * 0,965 + 0,724) / 3 = 0,885$$

TABLE A17. I3 – Equally distributed income index

	Population 2002, thousands	Economically active population 2002, share	Ratio of average wages, 1999
Female	3848	0,424	0,826
Male	3642	0,576	1,000

It is assumed that the average pay ratio between men and women reflects their share in the creation of GDP. Wf and Wm are the shares of women and men in the GDP indices.

$$Wf = (\log(3638) - \log(100)) / (\log(40000) - \log(100)) = 0,600$$

$$Wm = (\log(6330) - \log(100)) / (\log(40000) - \log(100)) = 0,692$$

$$I3 = (0.514 * (0,600)^{-1} + 0,486 * (0,692)^{-1})^{-1} = 0,642$$

$$GDI = (0,793 + 0,885 + 0,642) / 3 = 0,773$$

GDI values and its components for the years 1999/2002 are presented in Table A18. There is an obvious improvement in gender equality in Serbia in this period, driven by all GDI components.

TABLE A18. GDI and its components

	Education index	Life expectancy index	GDP index	GDI
1999	0,850	0,790	0,554	0,731
2002	0,885	0,793	0,642	0,773
Change -%	4,1%	0,4%	15,9%	5,7%

The following table provides cross-country comparison of GDI in a number of middle and high development countries:

TABLE A19. Value of GDI index (2002) across selected countries

Sweden	0.946
Austria	0.924
Greece	0.894
Slovenia	0.892
Hungary	0.847
Croatia	0.827
Romania	0.775
Serbia	0.773

It follows that, although there has been an improvement in gender equality over the observed period 1999–2002, Serbia (together with Romania) still lags significantly behind developed and neighbouring countries.

4. GENDER EMPOWERMENT MEASURE – GEM

The Gender empowerment measure (GEM) measures women participation in a country's political and economic life. This measure focuses on gender inequality in key areas of economic, political and decision-making spheres. The GEM is a simple arithmetic mean of three basic indices: political participation index (women parliamentary representation), economic activity index (women participation in administrative and managerial posts) and GDP share index (women contribution to creation of GDP).

$$GEM = (I1 + I2 + I3) / 3$$

I1 – Political Participation Index

In Republican Parliament, out of 250 parliamentary seats, 35 of them were held by women (14.0% parliamentary share)

$$I1 = (0.514 * (14,0)^{-1} + 0,486 * (86,0)^{-1})^{-1} = 0,245$$

Then this initial result is indexed to an ideal value of 50%.

$$I1 = 0,245 / 0,50 = 0,489$$

I2 – Economic Activity Index

Of the total number of administrator and manager position, 27.9% are held by women. Likewise, 59.4% of women are professional or technical workers.

$$I211 = (0.504 * (27,9)^{-1} + 0,496 * (72,1)^{-1})^{-1} = 40,000$$

$$I221 = (0.504 * (59,4)^{-1} + 0,496 * (40,6)^{-1})^{-1} = 48,309$$

$$I21 = 40,000 / 50 = 0,800$$

$$I22 = 48,309 / 50 = 0,966$$

$$I2 = (0,800 + 0,966) / 2 = 0,883$$

I3 – GDP Share Index

In 2002, women and men created per capita GDP to the amount of 3638 PPP US\$ and 6330 PPP US\$ respectively

$$I3f = (3638 - 100) / (40000 - 100) = 0,089$$

$$I3m = (6330 - 100) / (40000 - 100) = 0,156$$

$$I3 = (0.514 * (0,089)^{-1} + 0,486 * (0,156)^{-1})^{-1} = 0,112$$

$$GEM = (0,489 + 0,883 + 0,112) / 3 = 0,495$$

Comparing GEM values for the group of selected developed and transition countries, it can be seen that Serbia lags behind in this index of human development as well, but less than with GDI.

TABLE A20. Value of GEM index* across selected countries

Sweden	0.854
Austria	0.770
Slovenia	0.584
Croatia	0.560
Hungary	0.529
Greece	0.523
Serbia	0.495
Romania	0.465

*index for Serbia is calculated for 2002 for other countries, index is calculated based on data of the most recent year available

GDP Index by District, Serbia 2002



Education Index by District, Serbia 2002



Life Expectancy Index by District, Serbia 2002



HDI by District, Serbia 2002



SUPPLEMENT:

TABLE A21. Education and literacy by gender and nationality/ethnicity (%)

	Share of illiterate	Total	No qualifications	1–3 grades of elementary school	4–7 grades of elementary school	Elementary education	Secondary education	Higher education	University education	Unknown
Serbian										
Total	3,35	100,00	5,42	1,94	13,73	23,06	42,23	4,65	6,69	2,29
Male	0,88	100,00	2,09	1,15	12,13	22,19	47,15	5,09	7,49	2,71
Female	5,67	100,00	8,54	2,67	15,22	23,87	37,63	4,23	5,95	1,89
Montenegrin										
Total	1,07	100,00	2,49	0,95	5,00	16,83	48,14	8,72	16,35	1,52
Male	0,17	100,00	0,84	0,26	2,56	12,71	50,56	10,80	20,56	1,71
Female	2,16	100,00	4,50	1,80	7,98	21,85	45,19	6,19	11,21	1,29
Yugoslav										
Total	0,96	100,00	2,16	0,87	7,22	22,81	48,70	6,13	10,86	1,25
Male	0,46	100,00	1,53	0,54	5,27	21,12	51,47	6,65	12,05	1,37
Female	1,39	100,00	2,69	1,15	8,85	24,21	46,38	5,70	9,87	1,15
Albanians										
Total	7,70	100,00	12,38	1,10	13,58	44,96	16,63	1,87	2,36	7,12
Male	3,77	100,00	7,96	0,99	8,64	39,83	25,10	2,77	3,79	10,92
Female	11,69	100,00	16,85	1,22	18,57	50,14	8,07	0,96	0,92	3,27
Bosniaks										
Total	4,99	100,00	8,74	1,11	11,03	37,65	33,13	2,40	3,07	2,86
Male	2,01	100,00	5,16	0,77	7,35	36,42	39,50	3,22	4,16	3,43
Female	7,85	100,00	12,13	1,44	14,51	38,82	27,11	1,63	2,04	2,33
Hungarian										
Total	4,99	100,00	2,11	3,09	20,95	29,76	37,34	3,28	3,03	0,45
Male	2,01	100,00	1,68	2,03	16,19	28,25	44,97	3,10	3,25	0,53
Female	7,85	100,00	2,48	4,00	25,08	31,07	30,72	3,43	2,83	0,39
Muslims										
Total	4,69	100,00	7,56	1,66	11,29	34,06	37,88	2,85	3,12	1,58
Male	1,95	100,00	4,27	1,22	8,85	31,61	44,64	3,52	3,91	1,98
Female	7,40	100,00	10,80	2,10	13,69	36,48	31,22	2,19	2,33	1,19
Bulgarian										
Total	5,45	100,00	7,16	3,91	20,86	24,28	28,30	5,64	6,76	3,08
Male	1,37	100,00	2,30	2,39	17,78	26,07	32,73	6,27	8,70	3,75
Female	9,87	100,00	12,47	5,57	24,23	22,33	23,46	4,94	4,65	2,35
Croatians from Backa										
Total	1,09	100,00	2,08	2,40	22,91	27,81	38,77	3,06	2,84	0,12
Male	0,63	100,00	1,48	1,44	16,64	28,45	45,42	3,47	3,00	0,11
Female	1,47	100,00	2,59	3,22	28,24	27,26	33,12	2,72	2,71	0,13
Vlasi										
Total	10,52	100,00	12,75	3,87	38,47	26,86	13,90	0,90	0,80	2,45
Male	3,14	100,00	5,03	2,89	33,96	31,28	20,62	1,26	1,23	3,74
Female	17,59	100,00	20,07	4,80	42,75	22,67	7,53	0,56	0,39	1,22

TABLE A21. Education and literacy by gender and nationality/ethnicity (%) (cont.)

	Share of illiterate	Total	No qualifications	1–3 grades of elem. school	4–7 grades of elem. school	Elementary education	Secondary education	Higher education	University education	Unknown
Albanians from Gora										
Total	2,16	100,00	3,66	0,56	7,86	39,93	43,29	1,93	1,15	1,62
Male	0,80	100,00	1,80	0,27	3,27	29,01	58,62	3,16	1,64	2,24
Female	3,60	100,00	5,63	0,86	12,69	51,44	27,15	0,63	0,63	0,98
Roma										
Total	19,65	100,00	25,60	6,85	29,42	29,01	7,81	0,20	0,11	1,00
Male	11,84	100,00	16,97	6,45	29,38	34,14	11,15	0,29	0,18	1,44
Female	27,56	100,00	34,28	7,26	29,46	23,84	4,44	0,10	0,04	0,57
Romanian										
Total	4,64	100,00	6,23	3,26	28,59	30,08	22,37	3,49	4,43	1,54
Male	3,07	100,00	4,61	2,93	28,56	30,83	23,98	2,84	4,92	1,31
Female	5,92	100,00	7,53	3,53	28,62	29,49	21,08	4,01	4,03	1,72
Rusini										
Total	0,40	100,00	1,48	1,63	19,89	22,12	43,81	4,43	5,52	1,13
Male	0,26	100,00	1,40	0,79	14,34	19,98	52,00	4,16	5,77	1,55
Female	0,54	100,00	1,56	2,39	24,95	24,08	36,32	4,67	5,29	0,75
Slovaks										
Total	0,67	100,00	1,60	1,70	22,82	31,99	34,87	2,99	3,20	0,83
Male	0,48	100,00	1,31	1,24	16,51	30,79	42,98	2,58	3,61	0,98
Female	0,85	100,00	1,86	2,11	28,47	33,06	27,62	3,37	2,83	0,70
Croatians										
Total	1,97	100,00	3,51	2,02	16,66	24,48	41,31	4,97	6,20	0,85
Male	0,76	100,00	1,79	1,02	12,18	22,55	48,08	5,64	7,79	0,95
Female	2,78	100,00	4,64	2,67	19,61	25,76	36,86	4,53	5,15	0,79

SOURCE: Ethnic mosaic of Serbia, 2004, Ministry of human and minority rights SCG

TABLE A22. Population by nationality/ethnicity and economic activity (shares, %)

	Total	Economically active	Population with personal income	Supported population	Persons working abroad
Serbian	100	46,0	20,2	33,6	0,2
Montenegrin	100	46,7	23,7	29,5	0,2
Yugoslav	100	47,0	21,6	31,2	0,2
Albanian	100	34,7	5,9	58,8	0,7
Bosniaks	100	40,2	11,5	47,7	0,6
Hungarian	100	43,6	25,5	30,8	0,1
Muslim	100	44,5	16,8	38,2	0,5
Bulgarian	100	42,0	29,6	28,3	0,1
Croatians from Bačka	100	44,0	32,2	23,7	0,0
Vlachs	100	41,6	25,0	32,9	0,5
Albanians from Gora	100	43,1	9,3	47,0	0,6
Roma	100	32,8	12,1	54,5	0,6
Romanian	100	45,0	14,7	39,8	0,6
Ruthenian	100	45,5	23,5	30,9	0,0
Slovak	100	46,2	19,2	34,3	0,3
Croatian	100	40,9	31,9	27,0	0,2

Source: Ethnic mosaic of Serbia, 2004, Ministry of human and minority rights SCG

Annex 2. METHODOLOGY AND LIST OF THE ROUND TABLE PARTICIPANTS

METHODOLOGY

The process of preparation of the Serbian Human Development Report 2005 on Multiculturalism – Strength of Diversity – commenced in June 2004. The research work has been undertaken by two prominent Serbian institutions – the Economics Institute (EI) and the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights (BCHR).

Given the basic guidelines on the framework of the Report and the ideas and concepts of multiculturalism presented by UNDP, with the technical support of UNDESA, the two national consultancy teams jointly formulated the draft contents and basic points of the Report. The basic principles and concept of the Report, went through a series of consultations with national stakeholders, other experts and civil society. Based on these initial contents, the team prepared the first draft version of the Serbian HDR in September 2004.

The Belgrade Centre for Human Rights has taken responsibility for the lead role in the production of the Report and for preparation of the sections dealing with the basic concepts and definitions of multiculturalism, its political and legal dimensions, while the Economics Institute was concerned with the socio-economic aspects, and with calculations and analysis on the Human Development Index (HDI), Gender Development Index (GDI), and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) (and other relevant economic and social data contained in the Report). The Report has benefited greatly from the use of survey data on different socio/cultural groups and their inter-group relations. Detailed information on these surveys is provided in the references of the Report.

The First Draft of the Report completed in September 2004, was distributed to the Government and international organizations, public officials, local self-government representatives, representatives of the civil society, as well as to statistical institutions and independent statisticians. During October and November 2004, a series of consultations (in the form of round tables) were conducted.

These consultations were designed to solicit relevant feedback on the sensitive issues discussed in the Report and to get better understanding of the specific problems encountered by ethnic minorities in Serbia, to check on the

reliability of data and to engage in a dialog with the government and local officials on the policy implications. In total three workshops were organised in a multiethnic environment in the urban centers of Novi Sad and Novi Pazar and in Southern Serbia.

Taking into account the comments and suggestions that were made during the various consultations, the expert team prepared the Second draft of the Report in December 2004. This draft was further discussed by UN experts (Peter Gudgeon, UNDESA Interregional Adviser and Andrey Ivanov, Human Development Advisor at the UNDP Regional Centre in Bratislava). Incorporating their comments, a final version of the Report was prepared by the beginning of January 2005. The final editing of the Report was done by Peter Gudgeon in March 2005.

During the whole process of the preparation of the HDR, beside the consultations described above in the form of round tables, the individual authors had a number of individual consultations regarding their specific contributions. In general, bearing in mind the specific topic of multiculturalism and its sensitivity, the consultation process was especially useful, particularly with regard to the views of civil society and of local level representatives.

ROUND TABLES

■ ROUND TABLE WITH CIVIL SOCIETY REPRESENTATIVES, ACADEMIA AND OTHER RELEVANT THINK TANKS

Date: 11 October

Venue: UNDP Office, Internacionalnih brigada 69, 11000 Belgrade

Note taker: Ružica Žarevac

NHDR team participants:

Vojin Dimitrijević, Dragan Popadić, Tamas Korhecz, Vidan Hadži-Vidanović, Jurij Bajec, Katarina Stanić, Dragan Popadić

Participants:

Ms. Jasmina Kuka, Catholic Relief Service

Mr. Daniel Galun, Caritas

Ms. Smiljka Tomanović, Institute for Sociological Research

Ms. Vesna Golić, Group 484

Mr. Miljenko Dereta, Civic Initiatives

Ms. Đurđica Zoric, Bibija (Roma women's group)

Mr. Slavoljub Đorđević, Roma Information Centre – RIC
 Ms. Aleksandara Mitrović, Society for the Improvement of Local Roma Communities
 Mr. Branislav Čubrilo, SDC
 Mr. Goran Basić, Ethnicity Research Centre
 Ms. Paola Pagliani, UNDP
 Mr. Milan Vemić, UNDP
 Mr. Daniel Varga, UNDP

▪ **LOCAL LEVEL CONSULTATIONS: SANDŽAK**

Date: 12 October 2004

Venue: Novi Pazar, SEDA, Vuka Karadžića bb

Note taker: Vidan Hadži–Vidanović

NHDR team participants:

Vojin Dimitrijević, Ružica Žarevac

Participants:

Mr. Esad Zornić, Mayor of Sjenica
 Mr. A. Fazlić, Municipality of Tutin
 Mr. Hadžić Harun, International University of Novi Pazar
 Ms. Aida Ćorović, Urban–in
 Mr. Sead Biberović, Urban–in
 Ms. Zibija Dervišhalilović–Šarenkapić, DamaD Cultural Centre
 Ms. Samiha Kačar, Sandžak Human rights Committee
 Mr. Ramiz Crnišanin, Sandžak Intellectual Circle
 Ms. Ferzo Čelović, Economy and Democracy Initiative
 Mr. Džemail Halilaigić, Human Rights Committee –Priboj
 Mr. Irfan Šarenkapić–SEDA
 Ms. Lucie M. Steinkemp, Social Investment in Novi Pazar
 Mr. Alan Bennet, Mercy Corps
 Ms. Paola Pagliani, UNDP
 Mr. Daniel Varga, UNDP

▪ **LOCAL LEVEL ROUND TABLES VOJVODINA**

Date: 22 October 2004

Venue: The Executive Council of AP Vojvodina (Blue Room), Mihajlo Pupin Bulevar 16, Novi Sad.

Note taker: Ružica Žarevac

NHDR team participants: Tamas Korhecz, Vidan Hadži–Vidanović,

Participants:

Mr. Stanko Vojteš, Caritas, Novi Sad
 Ms. Mira Kranjac, Jewish Community, Novi Sad
 Mr. Sabo Jan, Mayor of Bački Petrovac

Mr. Predin Đorđe, Mayor of Bečej
 Ms. Jarmila Cendić, Mayor of Kovačica
 Mr. Sidji Ištvan, Mayor of Mali Idjos
 Mr. Slobodan Jovanović, Architect, Novi Sad
 Mr. Slavković Jovan, Mayor of Sombor
 Mr. Juhasz Attila, Mayor of Senta
 Mr. Mijić Predrag, Mayor of Čoka
 Prof. Zoroslav Spevak, Faculty of Philosophy
 Ms. Tatjana Vranješević, University of Novi Sad
 Ms. Danica Stefanović, Panonija
 Mr. Aleksandar Popov, Center for Regionalism
 Ms. Alisa Halak, Civil Society Development Centre
 Mr. Klemm József, National Council of the Hungarian National Minority
 Ms. Ana Tomanova Makanova, National Council of the Slovak National Minority
 Mr. Nikola Babić, National Council of the Bunjevac National Minority
 Mr. Aleksandra Vujić, Vojvodina Human Rights Centre
 Ms. Katarina Ćirić, Sterija Theatre
 Mr. Milan Vemić, UNDP
 Mr. Daniel Varga, UNDP

▪ **ROUND TABLE ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX, DATA ON MULTICULTURALISM, AND OTHER RELATED STATISTICS**

Date: 27 October 2004

Venue: UNDP Office, Internacionalnih brigada 69, 11000 Belgrade

Note taker: Katarina Stanić

NHDR team participants: Vlada Vukojević, Gorana Krstić, Jurij Bajec

Participants:

Ms. Borka Vujinović, Independent Consultant
 Ms. Rukavina Suzana, Ministry of Human and Minority Rights
 Mr. Edvard Jakopin, Republic Development Bureau
 Mr. Ranko Nedeljković, SCG Statistical Office
 Mr. Predrag Canović, Serbian Statistical Office
 Ms. Paola Pagliani, UNDP
 Mr. Daniel Varga, UNDP

▪ **ROUND TABLE WITH GOVERNMENTAL/PARLIAMENTARIAN STAKEHOLDERS, AND INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES**

Date: 02 November 2004

Venue: UNDP Office, Internacionalnih brigada 69, 11000 Belgrade

Note taker: Vidan Hadži–Vidanović

NHDR team participants: Vojin Dimitrijević, Dragan Popadić, Tamas Korhecz, Vidan Hadži–Vidanović, Jurij Bajec, Katarina Stanić, Ružica Žarevac

Participants:

Mr. Rajko Atanacković, Ministry of Justice
 Ms. Zorica Cucić, Ministry of Education and Sport
 Ms. Violeta Corić, Ministry of Culture
 Mr. Dragan Novaković, Ministry of Religion
 Ms. Tanja Bošković, World Bank
 Ms. Maria Agnese Giordano, OSCE
 Mr. Aleksandar Stojanović, Council of Europe
 Ms. Mary Black, UNICEF
 Mr. Ranko Petrović, UNAIDS
 Mr. Rastislav Vrbensky, UNDP
 Ms. Paola Pagliani, UNDP
 Mr. Milan Vemic, UNDP
 Mr. Daniel Varga, UNDP

▪ **LOCAL LEVEL ROUND TABLE: SOUTHERN SERBIA**

Date: 10 November 2004

Venue: UNDP Sub Office– Vranje

Note taker: Vidan Hadži–Vidanović

NHDR team participants: Vojin Dimitrijević, Tamas Korhecz, Ružica Žarevac

Participants:

Mr. T. Milić, Municipality of Vranje
 Mr. Miodrag Nikolić, Municipality of Trgovište
 Mr. Jovica Arandelović, Mayor of Bojnik
 Mr. Željko Plavšić, Educational Center – Leskovac
 Mr. Nenad Spasić, Čovekoljublje
 Mufti Nexhmedin Saqipi, Presheve Mufti
 Mr. Stamenković Bratislav, CHF
 Mr. Nebojša Salistarević, Roma Cultural Center
 Mr. Radoman Irić, ABC – Center for Peace, Security and Tolerance
 Ms. Suzana Popović – ABC – Center for Peace, Security and Tolerance
 Mr. Dobrosav Nešić, Committee for Human Rights –Leskovac
 Mr. Carsten Niebhur, EU Monitoring Mission
 Mr. Ejonta Pashaj, DAI/SLGRP
 Mr. Rexhep Ilari, CHF Presheve
 Ms. Paola Pagliani, UNDP
 Mr. Daniel Varga, UNDP

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PRONI2002

Survey on life of youngsters in Serbia

Sample: Representative sample of 1,591 young people of the age 16–25, Serbian territory (without Kosovo)

Survey period: June 2002

Agency/organization that conducted the survey: CPS, Belgrade, coordinators D. Popadić and S. Mihailović.

In organization of: PRONI Institute of Social Education, Sweden, and Ministry of Education and Sports of Republic of Serbia

CPIJM2002

Public Opinion Survey in Serbia

Sample: Representative sample of 2057 adults drawn from Serbian territory (without Kosovo)

Survey period: December 2002

Agency/organization that conducted the survey: Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute Of Social Sciences, Belgrade

CPS2003

Survey on life of youth in Serbia

Sample: Representative sample covered total of 3,174 respondents falling in the age groups among 16 – 36 ages, na teritoriji Srbije (without Kosovo)

Survey period: May 2003

Agency/organization that conducted the survey: CPS, Belgrade, coordinators D. Popadić i S. Mihailović.

SMMRI2003

Public opinion on national minorities

Sample: Representative sample covered total of 1,566 adult respondents of Serbian nationality, from Serbian territory (without Kosovo)

Survey period: August 2003

Agency/organization that conducted the survey: SMMRI

Commissioned by: Ministry of Human and Minority Rights

BCHR2003

Citizens' perceptions of human rights law and practice in Serbia and Montenegro

Sample: Representative sample covered total of 1,540 adult respondents of Serbian nationality, from Serbian territory (without Kosovo)

Survey period: September 2003

Agency/organization that conducted the survey: SMMRI

Commissioned by: Belgrade Center for Human Rights

BCHR2004

Citizens' perceptions of multiculturalism, human rights law and practice in Serbia and Montenegro

Sample: Representative sample covered total of 1,276 adult respondents of Serbian nationality, from Serbian territory (without Kosovo)

Survey period: July 2004+

Agency/organization that conducted the survey: SMMRI

Commissioned by: Belgrade Center for Human Rights

IP2002

Knowledge, perception and behavior of young from Belgrade relating to the HIV/AIDS issues

Sample: Representative sample covered total of 1,546 pupils (pupils from primary and secondary schools from the broader territory of Belgrade)

Survey period: May–Jun 2002

Agency/organization that conducted the survey: Institute for psychology of the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade (team coordinator: Prof. B. Kuzmanović)

Commissioned by: UNICEF