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Ethnicity and Politics in Bolivia

WILLEM ASSIES* & TON SALMAN**

*Van Vollenhoven Instituut, Leiden University, The Netherlands; **Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology, Free University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

ABSTRACT In recent years polarization along ethnic lines has become an important feature of Bolivian politics. In this article we examine the emergence of new indigenous movements in Bolivia and how this was eventually reflected in the adoption of multiculturalist policies by the Bolivian state. However, in an overall context of neoliberal economic policy and a party system that suffered a 'representation deficit', such policies may celebrate cultural pluralism while stopping short of addressing issues of the redistribution of power and resources. This provided the context for a series of popular protests in which indigenous people played a prominent role and which eventually carried over into the 2002 general elections. We argue that it remains to be seen if the new presence of indigenous people in Bolivia's political arena points to a constructive incorporation.

In October 2003 Bolivia made international headlines. A government proposal for the export of natural gas to the USA, via Chile, became the flashpoint for weeks of violent protests. For many Bolivians the idea of exporting the gas by way of a Chilean port, Bolivian territory until the Pacific War 140 years ago, was infuriating as Chilean–Bolivian relations have been tense ever since the war. Also, according to many, Bolivia was once again selling its natural resources for too low a price, and its sovereignty over its treasures for a song and some slush money. Additionally, the free-trade policies of the president, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, or 'Goni', and his attempt to foster Bolivian membership of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), made him a clear target for an opposition convinced that neoliberalism was behind the current Bolivian hardship. What ultimately motivated the protesters was an overall rejection of everything the government stood for, culminating in the demand for the president to step down. The feeling that the country was disintegrating into anarchy, together with the 70 deaths resulting from the confrontations, gave a devastating and this time decisive blow to the government's prestige.

The virulence of the protest lead to crisis in the coalition and, when the vice president withdrew his support, the president decided to abandon his proposal about the gas export, to ask for calm and respect for the democratic institutions, and to promise to consult 'everybody' before taking decisions. But it was too little, too late. By then, after the indigenous migrants in the city of El Alto had taken the initiative, with miners, *campesinos*,

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Correspondence Address: Willem Assies, Van Vollenhoven Instituut, Leiden University, Steenschuur 25, Postbus 9520, 2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands. Email: w.j.assies@law.leidenuniv.nl

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coca farmers, teachers, students, intellectuals and almost every group and organization not related to the government already united in the demand for the president's resignation, this eventually came on 17 October.

The presidency was assumed by vice-president Carlos Mesa. Mesa is not affiliated to any political party and is a respected journalist and intellectual. Initially, Mesa, and the way institutionality was upheld in the dramatic events, met with broad support and acclaim both within the country and internationally. But Mesa's task is huge. Slowly but surely the initial support is weakening, and a national referendum he organized over a new bill with regard to the country's hydrocarbon resources encountered much suspicion. The position of Mesa and his government is, at the time of writing, precarious.

Most of this article was written before these events took place—and we could not have predicted these outcomes during our writing. We did, however, diagnose a weak and deficient democracy and a particularly strong rejection of it by the indigenous population of the country. This article hopes to contribute to the understanding of this rejection, which eventually led to the dramatic events referred to above.

With the national elections held on 30 June 2002 Bolivia has become one of the Latin American countries where political parties with strong links to indigenous movements have become important political players.[1] Two such parties, the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement towards Socialism, MAS) and the Movimiento Indigenista Pachacuti (Pachacuti Indigenist Movement, MIP), did surprisingly well in the elections (see Table 1), and this brought MAS leader Evo Morales only one step away from the

Table 1. Percentage of votes won in national elections, 1985–2002

Party/Front	1985	1989	1993	1997	2002
MNR	*26.4*	23.0	*33.8*	18.2	*22.5*
AP (ADN/MIR)			20.3		
ADN	28.6	22.7		*22.3*	3.4
MIR	8.9	*19.6*		16.8	16.3
CONDEPA		11.0	13.6	17.2	
UCS			13.1	16.1	5.51
MBL			5.1	3.1	
IU (ASP)	0.7	7.2	0.9	3.7	
PS-1	2.2	2.8			0.7
NFR					20.9
MAS					20.9
MIP					6.1
MRTKL			2,2		
LyJ					2.7
Valid votes	1 728 363	1 573 790	1 731 309	2 177 171	2 778 808

Notes: The result of the party that eventually won the presidency is in italics. ADN = Acción Democrática Nacionalista; AP = Acuerdo Patriótico; ASP = Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos; CONDEPA = Conciencia de Patria; IU = Izquierda Unida; LyJ = Libertad y Justicia; MAS = Movimiento al Socialismo; MBL = Movimiento Bolivia Libre; MIP = Movimiento Indigenista Pachacuti; MIR = Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria; MNR = Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario; MRTKL = Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari de Liberación; NFR = Nueva Fuerza Republicana; PS-1 = Partido Socialista-Uno; UCS = Unidad Cívica Solidaridad; UDP = Unión Democrática y Popular.

Sources: Dunkerley (2000, p. 44); Gamarra & Malloy (1995, p. 432); Yaksic & Tapia (1997); Corte Nacional Electoral, www.cne.org.bo.

presidency. Together these parties gained about a quarter of the votes and, when in August a new Congress was installed, for the first time in Bolivian history indigenous delegates were prominently present. A quarter of the seats are now occupied by people not wearing suits and ties but proudly donning their Indian attire and making defiant statements in their native languages about their new-won presence in the Bolivian polity. From the MAS and MIP benches fierce criticism of the *mank'agastos* (those who eat without working, i.e. all who belong to traditional parties, and have been and still are thieves and loafers) is heard, as are grand words like '*etnocidio*' and '*economicidio*'. "We are the ones that used to work for you", said MIP leader Quispe in his provocative speech in the Congress session where a new president was to be elected (3 August 2002). "Here we are, the Indians—we have become more now, and we'll be more still" was another remark.

Since none of the candidates for the presidency had won a straight majority, according to Bolivian electoral rules Congress was to elect a new president from between the two frontrunners. The vote was between former president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, who ran for the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Nationalist Movement, MNR), and MAS candidate and leader of the coca growers (in their majority indigenous migrants from the former mining regions), Evo Morales. The 157-seat Congress elected Sánchez de Lozada with 84 votes against 43 for Morales.[2] Although the established parties retained power in the country, never since the return to democracy in 1982 had an outsider, and one with links to the indigenous–peasant movement, come that close to the presidency.

In this article we examine the background to the breakthrough of candidates with strong links to the indigenous–peasant movement. Various authors, like Grindle (2000) and Van Cott (2003), have pointed to state reforms and changes in the electoral system introduced in the mid-1990s to explain the inroads of such candidates, but as Van Cott notes, they are a necessary but not a sufficient condition. Further explanation requires an examination of the role of ethnicity in Bolivian politics and of the quality of Bolivian democracy since the country's 'transition' in 1982. We will address both issues.

In 1995 after 13 years of civilian rule in Bolivia, Mainwaring and Scully (1995, p. 19) classified the Bolivian party system as inchoate and weakly institutionalized but argued that it was "showing some signs of acquiring greater solidity". The 2002 elections, however, belie their assessment. To use O'Donnell's (1999a; 1999b) terms, the movement towards consolidation and institutionalization of democracy may well have been illusionary in the sense that, although the minimal requirements of polyarchy may hold, further transition towards a consolidated representative regime has not yet been achieved and the process seems to have stalled in what he calls a "feeble and uncertain situation". While variables such as previous regime type, income distribution and poverty, and the nature and design of party systems and electoral rules have been taken into account in the literature on democratic transitions and consolidation in Latin America, the role of ethnicity has received little attention. Although Linz and Stepan (1996) criticize this omission in a general way, their argument basically refers to the situation in post-Communist Europe. In the literature on Latin America Van Cott's (2000) work stands out as a major exception but the present situation in Bolivia shows that, in Van Cott's words, the "liquidation of the past", if it can be achieved, may be more difficult and less friendly than we might have hoped. Some steps forward may have been taken (Assies *et al.*, 2000) but, as Stavenhagen points out in his contribution to the important volume edited by Sieder

(2002), “the going will be rough from now on” (Stavenhagen, 2002, p. 34). The Bolivian case illustrates the point.

We will first outline some of the background to the present politics of ethnicity in Bolivia. Without delving deeply into the colonial and republican past, in the first section of this article we shall focus on the period after the Bolivian revolution and outline how from the 1960s onward a new indigenous–peasant movement emerged and joined the opposition to the military regimes. The second section discusses the return to democracy and the turn to neoliberalism. It was in this context that a politics of recognition emerged in Bolivia. As Hale (2002) and others have pointed out, neoliberalism is not necessarily averse to such politics (Gustafson, 2002). Commenting on our earlier work (Assies *et al.*, 2000), Hale argues that we have framed the question of the limits of neoliberal multiculturalism but that our answer remains descriptive and under-theorized. Although we think that in the concluding chapter to that book we made some headway in addressing the issues of indigenous rights, development and democracy, Hale’s comment on the paradox of simultaneous cultural affirmation and economic marginalization aptly captures the limits of neoliberal multiculturalism. Questions of the (re-)distribution of power and resources should be central in the analysis of ethnic politics. The Bolivian case illustrates the point and allows for further scrutiny of the paradox of neoliberal multiculturalism as it was introduced by the Sánchez de de Lozada government (1993–97).

The third, and central, section of the article is dedicated to the second Banzer government (1997–2002) and the renewal of popular protest during this period. Through an analysis of the major conflicts that occurred in these years it reveals the tensions generated by structural adjustment and reform policies and an unresponsive party system. The corruption and arrogance of the Banzer government only exacerbated such tensions. In the final section we discuss how such tensions contributed to the rise of ‘anti-systemic’ politicians and finally translated into the outcomes of the 2002 elections. Although one might argue that such outcomes point to a successful incorporation of sectors of the population hitherto not represented, they also brought an important shake-up of the established party system with unpredictable consequences for the future of Bolivian democracy.

Antecedents: Revolution, Dictatorships and the Indigenous Peasantry (1952–82)

Bolivia is one of the Latin American countries with the largest proportion of indigenous population members. Estimates classify between 54% and 66% of the population as indigenous (Psacharopulos & Patrinos, 1994; Stavenhagen, 1992). According to Vadillo (1997, p. 332) 87.4% of the population speaks Spanish as their sole or second language, 34.4% speaks Quechua, 23% Ayamara and a further 1.6% speaks other indigenous languages. Whereas the highland populations of Quechua and Aymara speakers predominate, the lowlands are estimated to harbour some 220 000 indigenous persons, making up 36 indigenous peoples with populations ranging between 50 persons and 50 000 persons (Weber, 1994).

While the majority of the population can be considered indigenous, until recently they have scarcely been politically represented as such. After the 1952 Revolution, which brought the MNR to power, the term ‘Indian’ was officially abolished for being stigmatizing and replaced with ‘peasant’. The Revolution introduced ‘national developmentalism’, in which the state was assigned a key role in modernizing the country. Backed by miners in arms, the new government nationalized the principal tin mines and placed them under joint labour–state management. The miners became the backbone of the Central Obrera Bolivia (Bolivian Workers' Central, COB), intended to be the umbrella group for organized workers and peasants. Income and literacy requirements for voting were abolished, education was expanded and, in response to rural unrest, a land reform law was promulgated in 1953, which at the time gained the government a virtually unconditional allegiance of the rural population. A Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CNTCB) was created as part of the COB structure to organize and control the rural population.

In the course of the 1950s the MNR governments gradually veered to the right and eventually the MNR rank and file split into peasants on one side and miners and urban workers on the other. Peasants were even sometimes mobilized against striking miners. By the early 1960s the revolutionary alliance had fallen apart and in 1964 a coup by General René Barrientos initiated a series of military governments. Under Barrientos, who spoke fluent Quechua, a so-called Military Peasant Pact was established that initially provided support for his anti-labour policies. However, the attempt to introduce a tax on individual rural property greatly undermined Barrientos' popularity in rural areas and heralded the disarticulation of the Pact. This opened the way for the emergence of a new type of movement in the highlands in which indigenous identity was to play an ever more prominent role.

After Barrientos' death in a mysterious helicopter crash in 1969, more nationalist and reformist sectors of the armed forces came to power for a few years but, in 1971, in a climate of growing polarization, Colonel Hugo Banzer carried out a coup.[3] He remained in power until 1978 when he resigned as a result of internal resistance and pressure from the US Carter government. A period of elections and new military governments, such as the infamous narco-dictatorship of Luís García Meza, followed, until in 1982 Hernán Silez Zuazo was sworn in as president, in accordance with the outcome of elections held two years earlier (Whitehead, 1994).

After the break-up of the Military Peasant Pact the rural population of the highlands had come to play a key role in the opposition to the military regimes. By the end of the 1960s rural leaders, inspired by *Katarismo* (see below), gained important positions within the peasant union structure and began to steer a course independent of the military (Albó, 1991; Cárdenas, 1988; Ticona, 2000). The name of the *Katarista* movement refers to the leaders of the indigenous rebellions of the late 18th century. The first stirrings of this movement are usually traced back to Fausto Reinaga, who founded an Indian Party in the late 1960s. He advocated a return to Tawantinsuyu, the Inca state, and reclaimed the term 'Indian' that had been officially abolished in 1952. In the 1960s commemorations of the Tupac Katari revolt began to be held in Katari's birthplace, the township of Ayo Ayo near La Paz, and in 1970 a statue was erected that became the hub of annual celebrations to celebrate Aymara and Quechua identity. Three years later the *Manifiesto de Tiawanacu* was launched in Quechua, Aymara and Spanish. It was illegally divulged and used for the formation of cadres for the movement. It emphasized that the oppression of the Quechua and Aymara peasantry was not only economic and political but also fundamentally cultural and ideological and thus articulated a platform that combined class struggle with elements of national liberation. By the late 1970s *Katarismo* had become a leading force in rural trade unionism. In 1979 the breach between workers' and peasant unions was repaired, the CNTCB was renamed Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (Unitary Union Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers, CSUTCB) and again became a component of the COB. Roadblocks became a key element in the rural action repertory in opposition to the military dictatorships.

Although *Katarismo* played an important role in the new rural unionism in the highlands, it never came to play a significant role in the formal political arena. A small party, the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari de Liberación (Revolutionary Tupaj Katari Liberation Movement, MRTKL) represented one current of *Katarismo* that proposed to look at reality with two eyes, and thus sought to combine ideas about class struggle and anti-colonial struggle. An important leader was Victor Hugo Cárdenas who, as we shall see, in 1993 would become vice-president of the country. A more Indianist current of *Katarismo*, which above all emphasizes national liberation of the Aymara and Quechua, founded the Movimiento Indio Tupaj Katari (Indian Tupaj Katari Movement, MITKA). The leader of the MIP, Felipe Quispe, who in the 2002 elections gained 6% of the vote, is an exponent of this Indianist current. During the first two decades after the return to democracy in 1982, however, these parties hardly had any electoral impact, the *Katarista* movement splintered into various factions and ceased to be a significant organized force.

Democracy, Neoliberalism and Ethnic Politics (1982–97)

In order to understand the vicissitudes of ethnic politics in Bolivia in recent years a brief overview of developments since the return to democracy in 1982 is in order. In that year a centre-left government headed by Hernán Siles Zuazo, one of the veterans of the 1952 Revolution, was installed. He faced the task of managing a virtually bankrupt economy and meeting pent-up popular demands. The Unión Democratica Popular (Democratic Popular Union, UDP) government tried to revamp the national-developmentalist economic model but the attempt ended in dismal failure. Inflation turned into hyperinflation and social unrest was seething. Finally, in a dramatic gesture, Siles stepped down and called elections a year before ending his constitutional mandate. He was succeeded by another veteran of the Revolution, Víctor Paz Estenssoro (1985–89) of the MNR, who was elected president in Congress with the support of Hugo Banzer's Acción Democrática Nacionalista (Nationalist Democratic Action, ADN, the party Banzer founded after stepping down in 1978), after the parties signed a Pact for Democracy. At the end of August 1985 the Paz Estenssoro government introduced a New Economic Policy (NEP) through Decree 21060.

The NEP consisted of a harsh shock treatment designed by Planning Minister Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada with the help of Jeffrey Sachs. With the introduction of neoliberal policies it brought an end to the 'national-revolutionary cycle' initiated in 1952. Jeffrey Sachs famously stated that the new policies would turn Bolivia's poor and miserable economy with hyperinflation into a poor and miserable economy with stable prices. The NEP consisted of the usual Washington Consensus recipe and included an overhaul of the state-owned mining company, which was accelerated when the tin market crashed in 1985. The government opted for the dismissal—euphemistically called 'relocation'—of 23 000 miners. Such massive layoffs, carried through despite protests, marked the defeat of the once so proud COB in which miners' unions had played a key role. Quite a few found a new livelihood in the Chapare region of Cochabamba, where coca production had expanded since the 1970s when agricultural subsidies dealt out by the Banzer government were diverted to this profitable endeavour. Trade liberalization furthermore meant that

Bolivian markets were swamped with cheap imported goods, leading to the closure of many factories and a significant increase in unemployment (Baldivia, 2000, p. 76). Despite the creation of employment programmes the social cost of structural adjustment was extreme and Decree 21060 remains an emblematic target of social protest.

At the end of the Paz Estenssoro administration the MNR unilaterally broke off the Pact for Democracy and put forward Sánchez de Lozada as presidential candidate. Although he won most of the votes in the 1989 elections the bad feelings created by the unilateral rescission of the Pact drove the one-time arch-enemies Banzer and Jaime Paz Zamora of the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Movement of the Revolutionary Left, MIR) into a coalition against the MNR. They brokered a gentleman's agreement, the Acuerdo Patriótico (AP), that allowed Paz Zamora to become President (1989–93). His government essentially continued the adjustment policies. For our purposes a feature of his period of government worth mentioning is the emergence of a movement of the indigenous peoples of the eastern Bolivian tropical lowlands. Since the late 1970s anthropologists and NGOs had promoted encounters among these groups and in 1982 this led to the formation of an umbrella organization, the Confederación Indígena del Oriente, Chaco y Amazonia de Bolivia (Indigenous Confederation of the Oriente, Chaco and Amazon of Bolivia, CIDOB). Parallel to this development, new local organizations emerged. In 1990, on the initiative of one of them, the Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Beni (Central Organization of the Indigenous People of Beni, CPIB), which confronted logging interests in the Beni Department, the peoples of the lowlands undertook the broadly publicized March for Dignity and Territory. They set out from the town of Trinidad for La Paz, where they arrived 35 days later. On reaching the highlands they were joyously greeted by the local indigenous population, who until then had been virtually oblivious of their existence. It was a historic moment in which the indigenes of the lowlands forced themselves upon the national scene. President Paz Zamora personally went to meet the marchers and in the wake of the march he signed a series of decrees recognizing *territorios indigenas.* Bolivia also ratified ILO Convention 169.

Another noteworthy feature of this period was the rise of two new political parties, Conciencia de Patria (Conscience of the Fatherland, CONDEPA) and Unidad Cívica Solidaridad (Civic Union Solidarity, UCS). CONDEPA was founded by Carlos Palenque, an enormously popular radio and television host who used the Aymara language to voice popular concerns. He appealed to the migrant (*cholo*), and female in particular, populations of urban areas like the city of La Paz and its sprawling sister-city, El Alto. Attempts to close down his radio station triggered important protests that contributed to his renown. The UCS was founded by Max Fernández, who began his career shining shoes and ended up as the owner of Bolivia's largest brewery. Both were self-made men who appealed to the *cholo* population of a country in the process of becoming predominantly urban.

The 1993 elections yielded an MNR government headed by 'Goni' Sánchez de Lozada (1993–97), with Aymara leader Víctor Hugo Cárdenas as his vice-president. It was a surprising alliance (Albó, 1994) between the MNR, now strongly committed to neoliberalism, and one of the small *Katarista* parties, the MRTKL. Cárdenas' nomination as a running mate was in good part the outcome of a political marketing study and was designed to attract electors who otherwise would have voted for CONDEPA or the MIR. Cárdenas by then had turned himeself into a more intellectual, and therefore to the mestizo electorate, more digestible, indigenous leader who championed the cause of multiculturalism and multi-ethnicism. As noted, in the course of the 1980s *Katarismo* had declined as an organized force. Ideas about multiculturalism (Salman, 1999), however, had gained widespread acceptance among the Bolivian population and among politicians who saw it paying off handsomely. After the elections the MNR government signed a 'governability pact' with the UCS, while on the other hand it came to an agreement with the small Movimiento Bolivia Libre (Free Bolivia Movement, MBL), thus assuring itself of sufficient parliamentary support. The make-up of this coalition between a core of MNR neoliberal technocrats and MBL and MRTK-L reformers resulted in a policy mix of 'neoliberal social reformism'.

The Sánchez de Lozada government was characterized by its reform drive. It introduced a comprehensive package of 'second generation reforms' that were to complement the neoliberal reforms introduced in 1985 with Decree 21060. Besides a series of other reforms this package included a 'capitalization policy', the Bolivian variant of privatization, and in 1996 it introduced new agrarian and forestry legislation. Although the new agrarian legislation was not all-out neoliberal and, formally at least, benefited the indigenous peoples of the eastern lowlands, it utterly failed to address the problems in the highlands (Urioste & Pacheco, 2000)—and in the end also in the lowlands. In the highlands the 1953 agrarian reform had brought about the break-up of the hacienda system but in the course of time peasant holdings had become increasingly fragmented and productivity declined, resulting in increasing impoverishment. While hardly benefiting the highland peasantry, the sluggish and often landlord-biased implementation of the new 1996 legislation only generated frustration among the majority of the rural population. The same can be said of the new forestry legislation.

While in the context of this article it is impossible to discuss all the reforms, it is important to single out a few and to note in the first place that it was in this context that a reform of the Constitution was carried through in 1994–95, which recognized the 'pluri-multi' composition of the population. A Law on Popular Participation, introduced in 1994, was intended to make this recognition more concrete and consequential. This law brought an extensive decentralization of the country's political-administrative structure through the upgrading of the, until then insignificant, municipal level of government.[4] The new law meant that over 300 municipalities now became meaningful administrative entities that received a significant share of the national budget.[5] The municipality became a significant political arena. Among the municipal councillors elected in 1995 some 460, or 29%, had a peasant–indigenous background (Albó, 1999; Ayo, 1999). The law furthermore stipulated that in each of the municipalities a Vigilance Committee was to be created, composed of representatives of local territorial organizations such as indigenous or peasant communities or neighbourhood associations. The Vigilance Committees were to guide and oversee the municipal governments and indigenous communities could be represented by their traditional authorities. The Law on Popular Participation thus decentralized administration and opened up local government to indigenous participation. The National Secretary of Popular Participation stated that "Bolivia municipalizes and at the same time assumes its multicultural and pluriethnic character" (MDH-SNPP, 1997).

In 1996 the Sánchez de Lozada government furthermore carried through a modification of the electoral system with the creation of 68 single-member electoral districts for the election of the Chamber of Deputies. Out of the 130 seats of the Lower House 68 were to be occupied by representatives of the new districts and it was expected that local interests would be better represented. The remaining 62 seats were filled through nationwide proportional vote.

The new prominence of indigenous people in the Bolivian polity has been attributed to these modifications. In a recent study of the benefits of the popular participation policy and the new electoral rules Albó (2002, p. 63) concludes, however, that "a gulf exists between grandiose rhetorical dreams and the little that can be concretely achieved, even in relatively favourable contexts". He points out that, although advances can be registered in local government, they are much more modest than has often been claimed and that the presence of indigenous representatives in parliament may mean sacrificing valuable leaders in a forum which tends to crush ideals, since the correlation of political forces is permanently against them (Albó, 2002, p. 96). Comparing a 'popular mobilization road' and a 'parliamentary road' he suggests that the former may be more effective in pressing for indigenous demands. Paradoxically, Albó's article was published at the time of the June 2002 elections, which significantly increased indigenous presence in the national Congress. The changes in the electoral system may have been a necessary condition for such an outcome, but not a sufficient one. The elections suggest an upheaval in the party system that requires further explanation.

In the following section we shall analyse various episodes of popular mobilization that help illuminate the outcomes of the 2002 elections. This analysis will show that the concrete effects of recognizing the 'pluri-multi' were limited since they were embedded in a more general neoliberal policy framework that brought little benefit to large sectors of the population and often directly hurt their interests. While the social costs of adjustment policies has been very high, the established Bolivian political and party system gave little opening for the expression of popular feelings and demands. The polity is characterized by a "representation deficit" (Tapia & Toranzo, 2000) that forces popular feelings and demands to be expressed in extra-institutional or even anti-institutional ways. This is reflected in Albó's (2002) suggestion that the popular mobilization road may be more effective than the parliamentary road. It is also reflected in the rise of what in Bolivia are called the 'anti-systemics', who became increasingly prominent during the second Banzer government (1997–2002). Although the corruption, self-serving insensitivity, arrogance and political mismanagement that characterized the second *banzerato* greatly contributed to fuelling discontent and anti-systemic outbursts, this should not keep us from seeing more structural causes, such as the impoverishing adjustment policies and the deficits of the established party system. As we shall see, while popular protest had not been absent before, 2000 marked a turning point as protest became broader and more vehement and finally spilled over in the political system with as yet unforeseeable consequences.

The Second *Banzerato* and the Renewal of Popular Protest (1997–2002)

Hugo Banzer Suárez competed in the 1997 elections with a discourse emphasizing the need for a more 'social' turn with respect to the implementation of the neoliberal reforms. On the one hand, he exploited Goni's critics' phrase of calling the latter a *vendepatria*, a 'fatherland-seller', but, on the other hand, he was reluctant to affirm a reversal of these policies. In the elections he obtained only a meagre first majority, and needed to negotiate with various other parties to get a parliamentary majority together. In the days after the elections a coalition was brokered that basically united against the MNR and assured that Banzer would be elected in Congress. The new 'mega-coalition' consisted of the ADN, MIR, CONDEPA and UCS. Before the elections the ADN had already established a pact with NFR and some minor parties. CONDEPA, UCS and NFR[6] were new parties and, as we shall see below, can be interpreted as forerunners of what became known as the 'anti-systemics'. However, despite occasional rhetoric critical of the traditional parties, the former parties were eager to participate in the established power game and spoil-system. Their rise, nevertheless, suggests a process of dealignment from the established parties.

In the absence of any defined government programme the new government came up with an innovation which turned out to be an excellent international marketing gimmick. It called for a National Dialogue that was to unite various social actors, civil society as well as the opposition to define the pathways to be followed to project the country into the next century. By November the dialogue was declared to have yielded a government programme that revolved around four vaguely defined 'pillars'. Opportunity, was to be achieved through economic growth, aiming for a growth rate of 7% by the end of the administration; equity was to cover human development, health, education and struggle against poverty; institutionality included the strengthening and modernization of democratic institutions and the judiciary, administrative decentralization and a struggle against corruption; and dignity would involve the struggle against the drugs trade and the aim of eradicating all 'excess' coca.

While during the first year of the Banzer administration it was observed to be making a slow start, it would become increasingly clear that it had scarcely got involved in governing at all. The 'mega' was a heterogeneous and unstable coalition and the government was plagued by an unending series of scandals and incidents. A rather inept government faced a series of problems that were aggravated by an economic downturn. In 1999 the growth rate of the Bolivian economy slumped from 4.7% in the previous year to less than 1%. This was partly a result of the aftershocks of the 1997 Asian crisis and the effect of the 1999 financial crisis in Brazil, but also of the fact that such effects were not mitigated by any measures on the part of the Bolivian government, which talked of a temporary 'de-acceleration' and belatedly came up with a rather ineffective Economic Reactivation Programme in March 2000. The situation was worsened by a surge in social protest.

Protests had not been absent during the first years of the Banzer administration. An initial 'historic' agreement with the *cocaleros* soon turned awry as the Chapare region was increasingly militarized and the *cocaleros* undertook a March For Life, Sovereignty, Land and Coca in August 1998. The COB had also staged a series of 'national strikes' to protest at economic policies and pressure for wage increases but the organization was no more than a phantom of what it used to be. 2000, however, was a turning point. Early that year a series of conflicts, the so-called Water War,[7] developed in the city of Cochabamba. The conflict was triggered by the privatization of the water supply in the city, but it involved more than that. For decades water has been a scarce commodity in the Cochabamba region and for many years a mega-project to solve the problem had been on the books. By late 1999 this MISICUNI project had been put out to tender in a package deal that would also turn over the municipal water company to the new private concession holder. After far from transparent negotiations a transnational company, Aguas del Tunari, was awarded the concession and charged with the construction of the MISICUNI project. The contract was immediately criticized because it had been reduced to a much smaller version than earlier had been promised and because it foresaw new water rates that implied a stiff price hike that might reach 180% for some sectors of the population. Moreover, Aguas del Tunari would become the owner of all the water in the concession area, which would affect the local agriculturalists. Although government officials denied that water prices would rise significantly, the water bills that reached Cochabamba's population in January 2000 showed the contrary. The contract with Aguas del Tunari was opposed by a coalition of urban and rural organizations, called the *Coordinadora*, which staged a series of protests. The government responded with repression, which led to violent confrontations in January, February and finally in April, when the government saw itself forced to rescind the contract with Aguas del Tunari and to modify legislation on water management that had been introduced a few months earlier. The outcome of the Water War was significant because many regarded it as a first victory of popular movements after 15 years of defeats in the face of neoliberal policies. Somewhat exaltedly, it was claimed that the conflict marked the "return of plebeian Bolivia" (García *et al.*, 2000; Spedding, 2001).

The violent clashes in the city of Cochabamba in April had been one of the reasons for the government to declare a state of siege. Another was the wave of indigenous–peasant protests and roadblocks that erupted around the same time. In the following we shall focus on the protest movements of the highland indigenous peasantry and of the coca growers of the Cochabamba region. It should be noted, however, that such protests are part of what Bolivians call 'social convulsions', conjunctures of generalized popular protest in which a great variety of groups, ranging from teachers to the police to defrauded pensioners and micro-credit takers, mobilize to press their specific demands.

The Highland Peasantry and Radicalized Katarismo

States of siege have frequently been decreed since 1985 to repress protests against unpopular, read neoliberal, policies. The April 2001 state of siege, however, was the most deadly. When, on 20 April on the eve of the Easter weekend, it was lifted, confrontations had claimed five lives of which four civilians, three of them peasants. The wave of peasant protests was remarkable for being the largest peasant protest in two decades and for suggesting a resurgence of the CSUTCB, which had been passing through an organizational crisis that some observers considered potentially terminal. Here we shall discuss the peasant protests and the role of Felipe Quispe, who with his *Movimiento Indio Pachakuti* gained 6% of the vote in the 2002 elections.

As we saw, the CSUTCB had emerged in 1979 under the strong influence of the *Katarista* movement but in the course of the 1980s the significance of organized *Katarismo* waned. The election of *Katarista* leader Víctor Hugo Cárdenas as vice-president in the Sánchez de Lozada government contributed to further divisions and the erosion of organized *Katarismo*, since he was accused of being servile to neoliberal policies. Within the CSUTCB hegemony shifted from the (Aymara-speaking) *Kataristas* to the (Quecha-speaking) coca growers of the Chapare and the defence of the 'sacred leaf' from eradication became a major item on the CSUTCB agenda (Loyaza, 2000; Ticona, 2000). However, a leadership dispute between *cocalero*-leaders Evo Morales and Alejo Véliz became evident at the VIII CSUTCB Congress in the town of Trinidad in June 1998. It was in this context that leadership shifted to another sector within the organization. At the November 1998 Congreso de Unidad Campesino (Peasant Unity Congress) in La Paz Felipe Quispe was elected executive. The regained strength demonstrated by the CSUTCB in recent actions is often attributed to this shift within the CSUTCB (Patzi, 1999, p. 121). Quispe had prepared his election by patient "work with the bases" (*Pulso*, 21–27 April 2000, p. 21; *Pulso*, 28 April–4 May, 2000, p. 8; Patzi, 1999).

Felipe Quispe Huanca was born in the Jisk'a Axariya community of the Achacachi municipality in 1942 and joined the MITKA in the late 1970s. He participated in the foundation of the CSUTCB and by the late 1980s had founded the radical Ofensiva Roja de Ayllus Tupakataristas (Red Offensive of Tupakatarista Ayllus).[8] Guerrilla activities led to his arrest in 1992. He was released without trial in 1997 and joined the peasant movement again. On his election as CSUTCB executive in 1998 he took up the title of *Mallku* (condor), an Aymara authority title, and stated that he should be regarded as the chief of the Aymara–Quechua Nation. In interviews he does not hesitate to express repugnance towards the *k'aras* (white, mestizo, dominant sectors) or to state that once he is president he will create a Ministry for White Affairs. The earlier hegemonic *Katarista* discourse of the 'pluri-multi', articulated by people like Víctor Hugo Cárdenas, was displaced by an ethno-nationalist variety of 'the two Bolivias'.

The CSUTCB *pliego de reclamos* (list of demands), which had been filed with the government in October 1998, was a mixed bag covering four main themes: land and territories, and political, economic and social issues. By early April 2000 Agriculture Minister Oswaldo Antezana was claiming that 75% of the demands were being attended to but he forgot that the remaining 25% constituted key demands such as the joint elaboration of a Sovereignty Plan on coca production, monitoring of ministries, a Peasant Bank, an Agrarian University, immediate titling of indigenous areas and direct administration of protected areas by their indigenous inhabitants. In the course of the mobilizations after April 2000 the ethnic element would become increasingly pronounced.[9] In March the CSUTCB had agreed to start actions by April. By then the water issue had become explosive and suspension of a General Water Law project moved upwards in the list of demands.

Peasant roadblocks started on 3 April in the Departments of La Paz, Oruro, Cochabamba, Chuquisaca and Tarija. Mostly they are simple affairs: 'sow' sufficient medium size stones across the road so that cars have to slow down or cannot pass at all, mount the guard and build a fire to keep warm. The military failed in attempts to control the main roads and by 5 April the Departments of Beni and Potosí joined the actions. The arrest of Felipe Quispe in La Paz on 7 April and his deportation to San Joaquín, the 'Bolivian Siberia' in the tropical Beni Department, only added another issue to the agenda: the liberation of *el Mallku.* La Paz started to run out of chicken and vegetables and, fuelled by Quispe's rhetoric, the imagery of the late 18th century siege of the city by Tupac Amaru and the 19th century rising led by Zárate Willka cropped up in the minds of many Paceños.

The peasant–indigenous protests led to a violent confrontation in the locality of Achacachi on 9 April. Two peasants and an army captain were killed, government offices were set on fire and officials fled the town, which thus became a 'liberated zone'. In an attempt to depict the Aymara inhabitants of Achacachi as irrationally violent and cruel Defence Minister Jorge Crespo and army sources claimed that Captain Omar Téllez had not only been beaten to death but had also been quartered and had his eyes torn out. These claims would later be denied by the director of the local hospital and by Ombudsman Ana María Romero, who denounced the abusive actions of the military and noted that Captain Téllez had been the first to shoot to kill (*La Prensa*, 5 June 2000).

Negotiations between a CSUTCB delegation and a government delegation started on 11 April after mediation by the Church, the Asamblea Permante de Derechos Humanos de Bolivia (Permanent Human Rights Assembly of Bolivia, APDHB) and the national

Ombudsman. From the viewpoint of the CSUTCB delegation these were at best negotiations over the conditions to negotiate, that is the liberation of the detained, including *el Mallku*. On 14 April CSUTCB and government delegates finally signed an agreement. It stipulated the immediate release of *el Mallku*, ratified agreements on CSUTCB demands from October 1998, determined trade-union participation in the elaboration of a General Water Law, regulation of agrarian legislation, the formation of commissions to resolve various problems and compensation for the wounded and the families of the dead. The government was to carry out the agreement within 90 days. If not, roads would be blocked again. Upon his release Felipe Quispe declared that peasant protests had only been a foretaste of what could come and he invoked the possibility of an alliance with military sectors, as in Ecuador; "I will be back in September", he stated. In this way he not only astutely harked back to Tupaj Katari's last words when he was quartered in 1781, "I will come back and I will be millions" (see also Quispe, 1999, p. 116), but also announced what would become known as 'black September' and what *El Mallku* regarded as a 'second test' in promoting Aymara–Quechua nationalism.[10] Quispe's announcement not only reflected the agricultural cycle—sowing taking place in August—but also a lack of confidence that the government would really comply with the earlier agreement (Cajías, 2001). What nobody, including Quispe, could foresee was that September 2000 would be another moment of 'social convulsion', surpassing that which took place in April.

In September trouble started when teachers demanded a 50% salary raise and the government laconically stated that this was out of the question for lack of funds. While that conflict escalated, the coca growers of the Chapare initiated roadblocks to protest against forced coca eradication and militarization. With these two conflicts well on the way, on 13 September the CSUTCB broke off negotiations with the government, saying that it was not complying with the April agreements, but also taking advantage of a moment of extreme weakness of the 'mega'. *El Mallku* installed his *Estado Mayor* (headquarters) in Achacachi and throughout the highlands roads were littered with stones. Meanwhile, a series of other conflicts erupted and by the end of September some 10 different conflicts were ongoing. Food scarcity began to be felt in the cities and by the end of the month food had to airlifted to La Paz. The government sent thousands of military and police to counter the roadblocks but, despite creating a significant number of casualties,[11] they were helpless in the face of strategies like Quispe's *Plan Pulga* (Flea Plan) of flash roadblocks.

Amid mounting demands that Banzer resign, as he turned out to be the 'dictator of old' and 'dialogued with bullets', the government started to negotiate in the different conflicts. Mediators arranged a meeting between *El Mallku* and a delegation of ministers set for 1 October in the Caritas offices in La Paz. Some days before the meeting was due, however, the army and air force attacked a gathering of peasants in the township of Huarani, leaving three dead. The meeting in the Caritas offices was soon over. Quispe arrived with tears in his eyes, proffered an infuriated harangue, and walked out:

> We have received you, we gave you our territory, we lodged you strangers, and now? Now you kill us, butchers! Why don't you kill me now? Why do you kill my Quechua brothers? Why do you kill my Aymara brethren? Why? I want to know the answer. The only crime we committed is to ask for justice and liberty; our only offence is to claim that you return us our political power. Murderers! Why do you kill us? The people want to know, the world needs to know. It hurts

> me to look at you bloodthirsty people stained with Indian blood. . .I am not going to look you in the eyes, because your eyes are stained with Indian blood. I am not going to look at your faces, because they are bathed in indigenous blood. As a *Mallku Mayor* this hurts me. I am not a political *pongo* [servant]. It hurts me because you, tenants, have appropriated our lands.[12]

The ministerial delegation, comprising Guiteras (Presidency), Lupo (Economic Development), Vásquez (Labor) and Antezana (Agriculture) was stunned. Never had an Indian dared to address them like that. Guiteras commented that the *Mallku* is "a man who does not recognize the country, who does not recognize our national anthem, and who in his book even uses adjectives against the Catholic Church" (*La Prensa*, 2 October 2000).

Negotiations started nevertheless, and on 8 October the government accepted the full list of 50 demands presented by the CSUTCB. The agreement included repeal of water legislation, revision of agrarian legislation, withdrawal of biodiversity law projects, various social demands and the implementation of a peasant-friendly rural development policy. A panicked government produced decree after decree and elevated the Vice Ministry of Indigenous and Originary People's Affairs to the rank of a Ministry for Peasant, Indigenous and Originary People.[13] Meanwhile, in November, Quispe created his own 'political instrument', the MIP. He never stopped threatening new mobilizations and in April 2001 he set a date: 1 May.

Other sectors, such as the coca growers and COMUNAL, which had been founded in the wake of the Water War to succeed the *Coordinadora*, saw this as an opportunity to press their deferred demands. They started to prepare for the May convulsion, initiating marches to arrive in La Paz on time. By that time, however, the CSUTCB was deeply divided. A 'Unity Congress' had taken place in January in Oruro. Although neither Felipe Quispe nor Evo Morales were present, their factions clashed, leaving one person dead, and the congress gave rise to a parallel CSUTCB, headed by Humberto Choque and sympathetic to Evo Morales. In late April Quispe staged a 'Unity Congress' of his own in La Paz. After having been duly elected and having 'expelled' Evo Morales from his CSUTCB, Quispe tuned down his rhetoric and at the last moment postponed the mobilization he had announced. Meanwhile, the police and army had succeeded in dispersing the coca growers marching on La Paz, while only a reduced number of COMUNAL marchers managed to reach the city, where they met little support. The announced mobilization seemed to have petered out and Quispe was accused of being a traitor and having connections with government party, MIR.

Nonetheless, when the government sent troops to the Yungas region of La Paz to eradicate coca, *El Mallku* declared that one of the points of the October 2000 agreement was being violated and initiated roadblocks in the highland region. Although this was a nuisance and damaged the tourism industry in the area, the government paid little attention and even felt itself in a position to send Quispe an ultimatum, threatening to arrest him for sedition. Troops would clear the roads, starting on 13 July. This was a huge miscalculation. One word from *El Mallku* sufficed to mobilize around 25 000 peasants, who massively resisted the army and forced it to withdraw. State authorities were ousted from many communities, creating virtually 'liberated territories'. On top of that, a few days later Quispe, Evo Morales, COMUNAL leader Oscar Olivera and yunga cocalero leader Dionisio Nuñez were photographed happily shaking hands after having concluded a pact of mutual support against neoliberalism. The government was pushed onto the defensive again and peasant demands now went well beyond the earlier lists, and included the repeal of Decree 21060 and of Law 1008 on coca eradication, as well as of the 1996 agrarian legislation. According to various ministers such demands were impossible to meet. Nonetheless, on 23 August the *Acta de Pucarani* was signed which included clauses on agrarian legislation and Law 1008. Ethnic demands had become far more pronounced this time and were reflected in proposals to declare 21 June, the Andean new year *Inti Raymi*, a national holiday and to create an indigenous university. The act also promised to distribute 3.8 million hectares among the peasantry,[14] to initiate a US$47 million Integral Development Programme for the La Paz Department, to buy 1000 tractors and to initiate an $11 million micro-credit programme for peasants and small producers. The government was given 90 days to comply with the Act. After this 'third test' the highland region remained relatively quiet, however, until in January 2002 Evo Morales was expelled from parliament, a point to which we return below.

El Mallku has been able to create a strong support base among the rural communities of the La Paz Department and with his confrontational style has given a voice to the resentment of a marginalized population through a new radicalized *Katarista* discourse, which has particularly boosted Aymara pride among his supporters. Through the CSUTCB mobilizations attention has been refocused on the plight of the rural highland population. On the other hand, however, this radical brand of *Katarismo* also resonates among sectors of the urban population of, for example El Alto; a population that earlier responded to the appeal of Palenque and Max Fernández. While political *Katarismo* always seemed to be doomed to insignificance and never won more than 2% of the vote, in the 2002 elections the MIP emerged as a significant political force.

The Coca Growers and the Movimiento al Socialismo

The party that came second in the 2002 elections has its roots in CSUTCB-linked peasant organizations of the mostly Quecha-speaking coca growers of the Chapare. In the 1980s they dominated the CSUTCB and turned the struggle against forced eradication of the 'sacred leaf' into a major item on the agenda. Coca growing in this region is not very old. It grew spectacularly fast under Banzer's first *de facto* regime (1971–78) and in the 1980s. Whereas the military at the time were heavily involved in the cocaine circuit, there is no evidence of peasant producers being involved in organized crime. At best, they are the 'proletarians of the cocaine trade'. Under the leadership of people like Evo Morales, they have become a well organized group, desperate enough to fiercely defend their newly acquired livelihood after having migrated to the region as low agricultural yields on the Altiplano and mass lay-offs in the mining branch forced them to develop another survival strategy.

In contrast to other countries, resistance against eradication policies has taken the form of trade union and political action (Albó, 2003). Peasants are organized in six federations and in the mid-1990s forged a 'political instrument', the Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (Assembly for the Sovereignty of the Peoples, ASP), led by Evo Morales, Alejo Véliz and CSUTCB executive Román Loyaza. The new organization first showed its electoral strength in the 1995 municipal elections when it won 11 mayorships and 47 municipal council seats in its home base, Cochabamba (Yaksic & Tapia, 1997, pp. 166, 175). In the 1997 general elections it gained four single-member district national deputies on the borrowed Izquierda Unida (United Left) ticket,[15] among them Morales and Loyaza.

Morales achieved 70% of the vote in the Chapare electoral district, which made him the single-member district deputy with the most votes (Yaksic & Tapia, 1997, p. 211). After the 1998 leadership dispute, which also opened the way for Felipe Quispe in the CSUTCB, Alejo Véliz stayed with the remainders of the ASP while Evo Morales adhered to the MAS. In the 1999 municipal elections ASP won 28 municipal council seats and five mayorships in Cochabamba. MAS won 79 council seats nationwide, of which 40 in Cochabamba (Van Cott, 2003), where it also won six mayorships. In a national perspective such outcomes correspond to about 3% of the vote, far from the 20.9% that brought Morales only one step away from the presidency in 2002. Although Morales, who is of Aymara origin, symbolized the recent resistance against Banzer's policy to eradicate 'redundant' (cocaine-suspect) coca (Albó, 2003), we shall show this was not exactly what propelled him and MAS to second place among the political forces in the country.

One of the few 'achievements' claimed by the Banzer government has been the substantial reduction of coca production in Bolivia. Whereas in 1997 it was estimated that some 38 000 hectares were cultivated with coca, by 2001 estimates ranged from 3000 to 6000 hectares. Over the past five years the 'war on coca' has claimed over 50 lives and 500 wounded, while about 400 people were detained under Law 1008 of 1988 on coca and controlled substances, a law that is absolutely at odds with the human rights regime.[16]

Initially, in October 1997, the Chapare coca growers had decided to cooperate with voluntary eradication, but things changed when in January 1998 the government made public its Plan Dignidad (Dignity Plan). As usual under the *banzerato* the Plan had four 'pillars': alternative development, prevention and rehabilitation, eradication of illegal and redundant coca, and interdiction. For the 1998–2002 period $952 million was budgeted, of which $700 would be destined to alternative development. In early February, in the context of the new strategy and bilateral agreements with the USA, Banzer tacitly authorized the 'amplified' involvement of the armed forces in the war against drugs. The Chapare prepared resistance to the Plan. Conditions for dialogue deteriorated when in March the government announced that economic compensation for eradication of a hectare of coca would be reduced from $2500 to $1650. In April action against roadblocks in the Chapare claimed its first victims among the peasantry and the region was increasingly militarized under the pretext that armed groups were operating there. Militarization went together with human rights abuses, arbitrary detentions, torture, rape and theft by the military. Meanwhile, the alternative development policies produced more glossy folders and large newspaper ads than tangible benefits for the peasantry. By 2000 the confrontations had claimed the lives of 11 peasants and six policemen.

When in September of that year the CSUTCB roadblocks started, the *cocaleros* seized the occasion to press their own demands and to protest in particular at the government's intention to construct three new military barracks in the Chapare. Besides better conditions for the marketing of alternative development products they also demanded to be allowed to cultivate a *cato* (1600 square meters) of coca per family. While in the first weeks of October the other conflicts ended in negotiations, the conflict in the Chapare dragged on and escalated. Various police and eradicators were ambushed and killed and the government accused Evo Morales of being the intellectual author of the crimes. It called for the lifting of his parliamentary immunity, although it never managed to provide substantial proof to sustain the accusation.[17] One of the *cocalero* leaders who was arrested on the charge had to be released again when it became absolutely clear that she could not have been at the scene of the crime. Morales, for his part, suggested that the killings might well have been provocations to justify militarization, a suggestion that gained credibility when in November 2001 it became clear that a special irregular parallel force of between 1000 and 2000 mercenaries had been recruited to carry out a 'dirty war' on drugs.

Meanwhile, in December 2000 the government had declared that it had achieved its aim of *coca cero* in the Chapare. The claim was instantly disputed and gave rise to quite some haggling about how much was left. Thus Plan Dignidad ended in endless quarrels over how much was eradicated, how much was left, and how well the programmes for alternative crops and compensation for the farmers were doing. The Plan claimed variable numbers of death every year it was in force and finally became 'enduring eradication', as the 'last 600 acres left' at one moment turned out to be 6000 the next month ... Violent confrontation again took place in the last months of 2001, and in November five peasants were killed in the suppression of roadblocks and 30 women allegedly were raped by the military. Information Minister Mauro Bertero commented that the rape was the "product of the intolerance of the *cocaleros*".

At that time, pressured by the US embassy, President Quiroga sharpened the anti-coca policies and named an 'anti drugs tzar'. The government stubbornly stuck to its fundamentalist obsession with *coca cero* in the Chapare and, on the basis of two decrees of November 2001, decided to control all transport of coca leaf and to close the legal market for coca in Sacaba on 15 January 2002.[18] This provocation did not fail to lead to a violent confrontation during the next few days (*Pulso*, 18–24 January 2002). Twenty-five cars of the drugs control agency were burned, three peasants and two soldiers died in the confrontations, and a few days later two soldiers were found cruelly assassinated.

Another murky killing, attributed to the *cocaleros*, provided President Quiroga with the opportunity to again demand the lifting of Evo Morales' parliamentary immunity. After a summary trial by the Ethics Commission, 104 of the 130 members of the Chamber of Deputies voted for the 'definitive separation' of Morales, which meant his virtual 'eradication' from the political scene. He not only lost his immunity, but his popular mandate was also annulled. ADN Lower House member and former Minister Fernando Kieffer, himself immune from being processed for various corruption cases, made quite clear that the objective was to eliminate the political and trade-union expression of the *cocalero* movement (*Pulso*, 25–31 January 2002).

The majority that had voted against Morales did not expect this to have any consequences; "nothing, absolutely nothing will happen", Kieffer stated. He could not have been more mistaken (see, for example, Figure 1). After four years of Banzerism the government and most of the political class were widely, and with very good reason, perceived as utterly corrupt and arrogantly contemptuous of most of the population. When Morales was expelled from Congress people felt deeply offended and humiliated by a political class that had staged a sham process against one of their number; moreover, it was felt that they had dared to do this because Morales was an Indian. The racist contempt of the governing class rebounded on them like a boomerang. The usually divided factions of the peasant movement closed ranks. The CSUTCB of Felipe Quispe, in Congress in Sucre, called for roadblocks, the *cocaleros* of the Yungas did the same, and those of the Chapare marched to Cochabamba where Morales was on a hunger strike in the offices of the Workers Union. They camped on the campus of Cochabamba University, from which they marched daily to the central square to salute Morales. Once again the city became the scene of violent confrontations between protesters and police forces. On 6 February


¿Con qué moral los diputados expulsaron del parlamento a Evo Morales?
Apoyar a nuestros dirigentes es defendernos a nosotros mismos
¡¡¡ Es hora de la dignidad !!!
Es hora de la unidad !!!

Figure 1. An example of the uniting influence of Morales' expulsion

Fernando Kieffer had to admit that "The country is living a dramatic situation that gets more complicated by the minute" (*Pulso*, 8–14 February, 2002).

Two days later the government and Evo Morales reached an agreement. Basic points were that the decrees on coca leaf drying and transportation would be suspended and that a new scheme for the commercialization of legal coca was to be worked out between the parties. Morales' political and trade union rights would be respected and the Church and the APDHB would start a procedure with the Constitutional Tribunal to annul his expulsion from the Chamber of Deputies. The government would also attend the claims of a variety of other movements and respect the agreements that had been reached with Felipe Quispe (*La Prensa*, 9 February 2002).

One question Morales raised was how much the US embassy had paid for all the 'ethical' votes against him. In fact, besides popular outrage against the government and the political class and the discontent with neoliberal policies, which Morales had always vehemently opposed, US Embassy meddling in Bolivian politics was extremely helpful in propelling him to his electoral victory. His rise in pre-election surveys worried the US ambassador so much that a few days before the elections he warned Bolivians—after having affirmed that theirs was a free and independent country—not to vote for Morales if they did not want to lose US support.[19] His statements boosted Morales from fourth to second place and, when election results began confirming the landslide, Morales joked that he could not have wished himself a better campaign leader.

Other Emergent Actors

While until now we have focused on the highland region and the Cochabamba Department, here we will briefly discuss the indigenous peoples' movement of the eastern lowlands and the movement of landless peasants that emerged in 2000, as well as a very different movement staking ethnic claims: the Nación Camba.

At the end of June 2000 indigenous people and peasants from the lowlands undertook their Third March[20] under the banner of 'Land, Territories and Natural Resources'. The march was provoked by a Supreme Decree issued in October 1999 that allowed former rubber estates in the northern Bolivian Amazon region—now dedicated to the production of Brazil nuts and timber—to be converted into new concessions under the 1996 Forestry Law.[21] This decree was clearly a favour to the ADN-linked politicians of the region. After it was issued the Agrarian Superintendency calculated the claims staked by the estate owners, which are based on 'customary rights', or rather the law of the jungle. It concluded that, if these claims were to be honoured, there would be hardly any land left for peasant and indigenous communities in the region. Given the potential for conflict, the Superintendency suggested that the property rights of communities and others should be clarified before proceeding with any 'conversion', but its warning fell on deaf ears. In April 2000 an 18-point Peasant–Indigenous Manifesto was launched, which in June was followed by a 31-point platform of demands to be pressed for with the Third March. While the decree was the principal issue that triggered the March, conflicts over indigenous territories and peasant lands in the Santa Cruz region and the Gran Chaco of Tarija also figured on the list of demands.

The March started at the end of June with the aim of participating in the Gran Asamblea Nacional de los Pueblos Indígenas (Great National Assembly of Indigenous Peoples, GANPI) that was to take place in Santa Cruz under the auspices of the lowland indigenous organization CIDOB. The CIDOB leadership,[22] however, brokered a deal with a government delegation that caused dissident factions to continue their March, this time heading for La Paz by way of Cochabamba. The government panicked at the prospect of them being joined by *cocaleros* and other discontents and sent a delegation of ministers that finally gave in to most of the demands and signed an agreement in the township of Montero on 16 July. The Decree was repealed, clarification of property rights in the northern Amazon region and the Gran Chaco were to be concluded within a year, the titling of indigenous territories (Tierras Comunitarias de Origen, TCOs) in Santa Cruz and other areas would be speeded up, and procedures of titling in favour of indigenous peoples, peasants and colonists would be simplified (Assies, 2002; CEJIS, 2000)

Rather than complying with the agreement, however, the government sought new ways to allow for the conversion of the old rubber estates and dragged its feet where clarifying ownership rights in the Gran Chaco was concerned. What is more, in September 2001 the government signed an agreement with the Cámara Agropecuaria del Oriente (Chamber of Agriculturalists of the Oriente, CAO) that was absolutely contrary to the agreement signed in Montero. One of its most scandalous clauses was that it promised a Supreme Decree on the 'animal charge' for land in the lowlands, the CAO pressuring to allow extensions of between six and 47 hectares per animal (CEJIS, 2001). It was bitterly commented that in Bolivia it would be better to be a cow than a human being.

The lack of action in the Gran Chaco contributed to the eruption of violence in the region in November 2001, when the Pantani settlement of landless peasants near

Yacuíba was attacked by allegedly paramilitary 'peasants with land'. Seven people died, among them one attacker. This is only one example of the increasingly violent reactions of landowners against the Movimiento Sin Tierra (Movement of the Landless, MST) that had emerged in May 2000. Not only have their settlements been attacked, but indigenous and peasant advocacy NGOs have also come under attack by landowners and cattle raisers, as well as by the Banzer government, which directed much of its effort to 'regulate' NGO activity against the more critical organizations (CEJIS, 2001).

The climate for such attacks was created by lack of progress in implementing the 1996 agrarian legislation and by organizations such as the Comité Pro Santa Cruz, the CAO and the virulently right-wing Santa Cruz-based regionalist movement Nación Camba (Camba Nation), which emerged in early 2001 and claims to represent not only Santa Cruz, but the whole eastern lowland region.[23] This movement claims that the *cambas* (the mestizo lowland population) is an "emerging nation" based in "tradition, blood and ethnic–cultural unity". It calls for the defence of eastern Bolivia against the highland *kollas* who invade those lands and speaks of an Aymara "occupation police". The movement claims self-determination as a nation-state (Sandoval, 2001). However, it cannot be said to be sympathetic to the indigenous peoples of the lowlands. Nación Camba is thus a new manifestation of Cruceño regionalism, which cannot be expected to display much sympathy for lowland indigenous groups or, for that matter, for landless *camba* peasant movements. The movement essentially claims the lowlands for the dominant mestizo population or, more precisely, for the mestizo dominant class.

The tensions described here are one of the indications that the 1996 agrarian and forestry legislation has failed to resolve the problems in the lowland region. At the same time this legislation did not address the problems in the highlands at all (Urioste & Pacheco, 2000). The agrarian question in both these regions has, as we have seen, prompted the emergence of new movements.[24] Together with the other movements described, and notwithstanding the tensions among them and their frequent failure to cooperate, these movements express the multiple tensions generated by the implementation of adjustment policies, the war on drugs, racism and a dominant party system insensitive to popular feelings—and deeply corrupt to boot. Undeniably, with the 2002 elections a new political constellation has emerged. It is time to have a closer look at the Bolivian political system and how it has fared during the past few years.

The Politics of Ethnicity in Bolivia

The outcome of the 2002 elections belies Mainwaring and Scully's (1995, p. 19) assessment that the Bolivian party system might be on the way to acquiring greater solidity. The evolution of the party system can be seen in the outcomes of general elections between 1985 and 2002 (see Table 1). Three parties, the MNR, ADN and MIR, were at the core of the political party system that emerged in 1985, after the left-wing Unión Democrático Popular episode under Siles Suazo. By the late 1980s, however, two new forces had emerged: CONDEPA and UCS.[25] These two parties heralded a new form of populism. Besides them MBL, a centre-left split-off from the MIR, emerged briefly in the 1993 elections. These elections resulted in a new constellation. Whereas until then the game of coalition making had been played among the three 'traditional' players in alternating partnerships, ADN and MIR were now both relegated to the opposition. The new coalition revolved around the MNR, which had achieved an exceptionally strong vote, with the

MBL, UCS and MRTK-L as minor coalition partners. Victor Hugo Cárdenas, outranking by far the popularity of his party (MRTK-L), became vice-president.

By 1997 the founders of the new populist parties had both died; Max Fernández in a plane crash and Carlos Palenque from a heart attack. As noted, after the elections Hugo Banzer brokered the mega-coalition that brought him to the presidency: ADN, MIR, CONDEPA, UCS and the NFR of Cochabamba's Mayor Manfred Reyes Villa jumped on the wagon of what would turn out to be a roller-coaster. Haggling over shares of power started immediately and president Banzer and his entourage repeatedly had to call the partners to respect the President. CONDEPA, which after Palenque's death had started decomposing, with various factions fighting over its heritage, was kicked out of the coalition in August 1998. The next party to leave, or rather to be given leave of the coalition was the NFR. Although the party was fully responsible for the MISICUNI contract, including the water price hike, in the midst of the Water War raging in its home base it chose to criticize the hike. In a flurry of mutual accusations the NFR left the 'mega' in February 2000.

What remained was not a particularly stable or coherent ensemble either. The MIR was a highly ambiguous coalition partner that in times of crisis often stated that it was not responsible for certain government decisions. For the UCS one good reason for staying in the coalition was because then the Fernández family would not have to pay an outstanding tax debt incurred by its breweries. The ADN was divided into *dinosaurios*, Banzer's old cronies from the 1971 coup and the like, and *pitufos* (chicks, career politicians), grouped around Jorge Quiroga. Overall, the Banzer government was plagued by an endless series of scandals and corruption cases.

Although the vote for the MIR remained relatively stable from 1997 to 2002, parties like ADN and UCS lost out heavily in 2002, while CONDEPA was virtually wiped out. Three new parties obtained prominence, the NFR, the MAS and the MIP. It should be noted that, in a way, the rise of such parties was preceded by the brief prominence of some 'anti-system' politicians. One of the most notable among them was Alberto Costa Obregón, a maverick judge who had handled some famous corruption cases until he was suspended for 'abuse of power'. That had launched him into politics and after 'black September' (the protest peak) he gained quite an audience in calling for a Constituent Assembly and arguing that to stop corruption one should do away with the political parties. At a certain moment he scored some 15% in electoral preference polls, but then rapidly faded away again. His brief rise, as well as that of a few others, reflected the disgruntlement with the second *banzerato.* However, while the rise of the NFR, MAS and MIP can also be partly attributed to such disgruntlement, its impact may well reflect more structural causes.

The NFR need not detain us very long for the purposes of this article. The party was founded as a personal vehicle by Cochabamba's Mayor, Manfred Reyes Villa, and, although it sometimes poses as an 'anti-systemic',[26] it is essentially a rather opportunistic and populist party that gained from the collapse of some of the parties that had formed the 'mega'.

The MAS and MIP are the clearest exponents of the growing significance of ethnicity in Bolivian politics. In this article we have sought to outline the multiple roles ethnicity has played in Bolivia. In the first place we drew attention to the emergence of *Katarismo* in the highlands from the 1960s onwards and from new indigenous peoples' organizations in the lowlands in the course of the 1980s. While *Katarismo* at the time spawned some political parties that failed to attract voters, CIDOB president Marcial Fabricano unsuccessfully ran for the vice-presidency on the MBL ticket in the 1997 elections, which caused a crisis in the organization. Second, we briefly discussed the rise of CONDEPA and the UCS. Both parties appealed to the *cholo* population of migrants to urban areas. While the UCS basically relied on the 'self-made-man' integrationist imagery projected by its founder, Max Fernández, without discounting the impact of swapping votes for beer and foodstuffs, CONDEPA explicitly sought to tap ethnicity to attract votes. Both parties, however, can be regarded as indicative of a new populism emerging alongside the established parties. Their emergence basically reflected the increasing importance of the *cholo* electorate and in this way contributed to an increased prominence of ethnicity in Bolivian politics. Their emergence furthermore suggests a tendency toward de-alignment from the established parties.[27]

Third, we suggested that the electoral market value of ethnicity was an important factor in the surprising alliance between the MNR and the MRTKL in the 1993 presidential elections. Rather than a matter of conviction, the choice of Víctor Hugo Cárdenas as a candidate for the vice-presidency, beside MNR candidate Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, was the outcome of an electoral preference poll. And it paid off very well. The fact that the team ended clearly ahead of its competitors is often attributed to the alliance between the neoliberal MNR and moderate *Katarismo*. This set the stage for a brand of neoliberal or 'managed' multiculturalism, to use Hale's (2002) term. This expressed itself in reform of the Constitution and the Law on Popular Participation, and to a certain extent in the new agrarian and forestry legislation, as well as in reform of the education system. As noted, such reforms were embedded in a comprehensive package of 'second generation' reforms. With regard to the Law on Popular Participation one may ask whether its primary objective was to recognize the 'pluri-multi' composition of the population or to carry through a decentralization and administrative modernization according to neoliberal precepts. At the same time, it entailed a tightening of the grip of the party system on local affairs, often to the detriment of indigenous authority systems. It may furthermore have contributed to a re-empowerment of local mestizo elites that had been weakened by the 1953 agrarian reform, rather than to an empowerment of indigenous peoples (Calla, 2000). The ways in which the Banzer administration stalled and distorted implementation of the law further contributed to this effect. In any case, the effects fell short of what was promised (Albó, 2002; Gray Molina, 2003; Van Cott, 2002). On the other hand, the modification of the electoral system through the introduction of single-member districts was quite probably meant to strengthen the grip of the existing party system and did not foresee the rise of new, and still less of 'anti-system', parties. The impact in the 2002 elections was thus an unintended consequence that reflected the failure of other reforms to respond to certain demands, as well as channelling frustration with the general policy drift since 1985 and with the Banzer government in particular.

As to the 1996 agrarian legislation, it can be said that, on paper at least, the great beneficiaries were the indigenous peoples of the lowlands, since the law included stipulations on the consolidation and titling of *tierras comunitarias de origen* (Original Communitarian Lands, TCOs).[28] For the highland population, however, the new legislation brought little solace and neither did more general agrarian policies. The new legislation failed to address many of the problems of the rural sector and its slow and biased implementation has become a source of conflict. In similar ways the new forestry legislation became a source of, rather than a solution to, conflicts. In the lowlands such issues triggered the Third March in 2000 and in the highlands the failure to address increasing problems in the rural areas fuelled discontent and outbursts of violence.[29]

The Water War in Cochabamba sheds some light on these issues in the sense that the water policies and legislation the Banzer government sought to introduce are a paradigmatic example of the policy framework that basically also orients agrarian and forestry legislation, as well as the 1997 Mineral Code. Even if reference is made to indigenous peoples' rights, the general objective is to create a legal framework for market-driven resource management and distribution according to neoliberal tenets, which threatens or negatively affects the livelihoods and interests of important sectors of the population.

In sum, in various ways ethnicity has become an increasingly important factor in Bolivian politics. The reforms introduced since 1993 can be characterized in terms of neoliberal multiculturalism and have only partly addressed the problems of multicultural Bolivia. While celebrating cultural pluralism they mostly stopped short of addressing issues of the distribution of power and resources and rather sought to construct a new 'governmentality' through limited and ambiguous institutional engineering (Hale, 2002). This is reflected in Albó's (2002) comparison of the 'popular mobilization' and 'parliamentary' roads, as well as in the discussions of the 'representation deficit' of the Bolivian party system (Tapia & Toranzo 2000). The latent tensions generated in this context were exacerbated by the Banzer government which in a most grotesque way exhibited some of the features of the "governmentality" of Bolivia's established political class and party system.

As Dunkerley (2000, p. 50n) notes, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) describe the Bolivian party system as 'inchoate', but the chapter in their book that deals with Bolivia (Gamarra & Maloy, 1995) describes it as patrimonialist. Given the corruption scandals that plagued the Banzer government, we might also use the term 'prebendalist' . This largely accounted for the popular outrage when Evo Morales was expelled from parliament; as noted, the outrage was exacerbated by the sentiment that anti-Indian motives also played a role. A legacy of oppression and discrimination can easily be documented and its actual forms surface in, for example, the attitude of a minister like Wálter Guiteras who, in negotiations with the CIDOB, once stated that "white men never lie". Somebody like Felipe Quispe astutely capitalizes on the resentment generated by such attitudes, as when the same Guiteras was found to have been lying about mistreating his wife in early 2001.[30]

Contempt for and insensitivity to popular needs and feelings is a feature of Bolivia's established political class that goes well beyond anything like a 'representation deficit'. The way in which the Banzer government sought to handle the Water War is a case in point. At first it ignored protests against the Aguas del Tunari contract staged by a small group of middle class professionals and it denied that any significant price hike was in the offing. When protests broadened under the leadership of the *Coordinadora*, the government denied the legitimacy of the organization, despite its broad popular support, and refused to talk to its representatives. This attitude was formally justified by invoking the articles of the Bolivian Constitution that define the political parties and civic groups with 'recognized personality' as the legitimate channels of popular participation. Popular participation thus becomes no more than what Habermas (1992, p. 236) once called a "fiction of constitutional law". Despite its rhetoric about dialogue, the government refused to engage with *Coordinadora* representatives and instead sought to negotiate with the unrepresentative Civic Committee of Chochabamba, while repressing the *Coordinadora* protests with a violence that one of the national newspapers characterized as a "surgical operation with a kitchen knife" (*La Prensa*, 9 April 2000). This is only one example of what sociologist Roberto Laserna (1999), who developed the concept in his analysis of government–*cocalero* relations, has described as a pattern of 'forced negotiation'. Typically, Bolivian governments ignore early signs of protest and then seek to delegitimate them and to repress the protest leaders. This only triggers further protests, while other groups join the fray to press their own demands, to which the government responds with increasingly violent repression, which only leads to more protests and more violence. Finally, the government sees itself forced to negotiate and gives in to demands without any intention of complying with the agreements and this sets the stage for the next round of protests, which repeats the same dynamic and catches the parties in conflict in a downward spiral of increasing mistrust.

A final feature to be mentioned is the role of the USA and its embassy. The ambassador's warnings about Evo Morales are only one example of often arrogant US interference in Bolivian affairs or of the simple imposition of policies 'made in the USA' (Gamarra, 1999). Such meddling generates resentment that feeds on an undercurrent of subaltern discourse with roots going back to the revolutionary rhetoric of 1952; the same applies to the policy packages imposed by the multilateral agencies, such as Decree 21060.

The 2002 elections were about more than the 'punishment' of the incumbent parties, and about more than growing sympathy for radical protest voices. To be sure, the outcomes suggest that the government—and all 'established' parties, for that matter—failed to disqualify the main protagonists of the protest cycles as extremist and democracy-unworthy politicians, and at the same time failed to qualify themselves as the exclusively legitimate representational 'game in town'. Both Quispe and Morales obtained a vote that belies attempts simply to dismiss them as irresponsible agitators and anti-democratic troublemakers. Precisely in that sense, their success points to more than just a shift in preference and the suspicion arises that a questioning of the whole system of claimed democratic legitimacy is at stake (Gamboa, 2001, p. 102). A politico-cultural challenge surfaces in which the legitimacy of the division between included and excluded citizens, and the status of the dominating group as 'rightful representatives', is questioned. Behind this is a radicalized, albeit not programmatically articulated, demand for democratic representation and civic participation (Lievesley, 1999, p. 126), and for a U-turn in political-economic direction. What is at stake is not merely a demand for effective inclusion in currently ongoing economic transformations, but a demand for a voice in the formulation and conceptualization of what development and democracy stand for (see Alvarez *et al.*, 1998; Assies *et al.*, 2000).

That, however, often appears only as a subtext in discourses that tend to be framed in terms of ethnic polarization and thus make a simple reconciliation unlikely. Both Morales and Quispe tend to evoke longstanding socioeconomic, regional and ethnic clefts in at times Manichean terms. Besides focusing on concrete issues and topical confrontations, they recur to identity politics and include tropes suggesting incompatibilities between Western globalization and the roots and values of their social bases (Edelman, 2002, pp. 419–420). With such discursive resources, uneasiness among political contenders easily turns into fear and mutual demonization.

However, it should be noted that, although Morales' discourse at times harks back to Andean tradition, it is essentially an anti-imperialist discourse that centres on 'dignity' and 'sovereignty', as opposed to the proposals of the Banzer government that equated dignity with (coca) eradication and thus did not uphold sovereignty in the face of US demands. MAS discourse thus combines the defence of the 'sacred leaf' with anti-imperialism and a—perhaps not altogether up-to-date—socialist programme. In contrast to Quispe, Morales can draw on electoral support beyond his home base and among various sectors of the population. On the other hand, Quispe's belligerent discourse is also nuanced in a search for equitable dialogue and an, albeit perhaps provisional, adherence to democracy which he combines with the threat of new roadblocks if agreements are not complied with. On occasion he emphasizes that his is not a discourse of revanchism and that not taking into account the interests of the poor *k'aras* would be political suicide. He also rejects the accusation of 'reverse racism' and often insists that he is not demanding "tanks and guns but tractors and ploughs". In September 2002, threatening roadblocks, he invited the incoming government to a dialogue in the hardly accessible community of Amaguaya "where there is no water or electricity" in order to make them "descend from their palaces and know reality on the ground". He invited the president and his ministers to share in a *fricasé de vicuña* to which they finally acceded. With his peculiar sense of humour, Quispe commented that the presidential delegation left the place with diarrhoea (personal communication, 7 October 2002, Mexico).

Precisely because of these thorny features of the entry of the Indian to parliament, it has become clear that the message digs beyond an giving the government an electoral whipping because of corruption. It reveals the failure of Bolivian neoliberal multiculturalism as a governance strategy. If, on the one hand, multiculturalism brought a limited incorporation into the polity, on the other, it failed to address issues of poverty and frustrated aspirations with deep historical roots that have their counterpart in the governmentality of the dominant sectors and the political class. While one may welcome the new presence of Bolivia's indigenous people in the political arena as a sign of their incorporation, it remains to be seen whether this will result in some sort of constructive cooperation and a more consequential multiculturalism that addresses issues of the distribution of power and resources. For the moment we can only say that, with renewed ethnic polarization, Bolivia's democracy has harvested its systemic deficiencies.

Notes

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1. Ecuador is the other country where such a party has become a key player, while in Colombia and Venezuela parties with links to the indigenous movement have also become significant (Van Cott, 2003).
2. The Congress is made up of a Senate (27 seats) and a Chamber of Deputies (130 seats). When the new president was elected, supporters of Manfred Reyes Villa, who ran for the Nueva Fuerza Republicana (New Republican Force, NFR) and had come in third with some hundreds of votes behind Morales, annulled their vote. There were two blank votes and two absentees.
3. For an unauthorized biography of Hugo Banzer, see Sivak (2001).
4. In 1995 a Law on Administrative Decentralization was introduced that basically concerned the Departmental level.
5. The share in total government investment by local governments rose from about 9% in 1994 to about 25% by the end of the 1990s, while the share of central government declined from 65% to 29%.
6. NFR was founded some years earlier by Cochabamba's Mayor Manfred Reyes Villa, who had started his political career as a Banzer protégé (Mayorga, 1997, pp. 129–224).
7. The Water War was important in initiating a protest cycle. Here we discuss the episode very briefly. For more extensive accounts see Assies (2003) and Nickson and Vargas (2002).
8. For an insight into the mindset of Ofensiva Roja see Calla *et al.* (1989, pp. 298–312).
9. This is very well documented in an excellent analysis by Magdalena Cajías (2001) on which this section relies in good part.
10. Occasionally other indigenous peoples of the lowlands are also mentioned but relations, as we will see, are somewhat tense.
11. By the end of September the number of dead amounted to at least 15 and some 100 people had been wounded.

12. The speech is reproduced in an interview with Felipe Quispe (2001).
13. The Ministry came to be occupied by a candidate indicated by Felipe Quispe, Wigberto Rivero, linked to the MIR. He also received the support of Marcial Fabricano, the controversial leader of the lowland indigenous organization CIDOB, and from the Confederation of Colonists, but not from the Santa Cruz-based indigenous organization CPESC, which, as we shall see, played an important role in the Indigenous and Peasant March for Land, Territory and Natural Resources of June–July 2000. According to Felipe Quispe, he had nominated Wigberto Rivero because no Aymara or Quechua was disposed to take a post in the Banzer government (personal communication, 7 October 2002, Mexico). Relations between highland and lowland indigenous organizations are often tense and Quispe's remark reflects the highlanders' view that the lowlanders are more accommodating.
14. This figure sparked some concern among the lowland indigenous peoples since it corresponded to the figure of 3.8 million hectares in the lowlands which, according to government sources, would be returned to the state as a result of the new agrarian and forestry legislation. It remained unclear where the 3.8 million hectares for the highlanders would come from and how this figure had been reached.
15. Because of problems with registration as a party, the ASP candidates ran for the nearly extinct Izquierda Unida.
16. For a discussion of policy development, see Laserna (1997; 1998) and Gamarra (1999).
17. Neither has it ever been able to substantiate Morales's alleged links to the cocaine mafia (Albó, forthcoming).
18. The Sacaba market is rather insignificant in comparison to the La Paz market, but it is an important outlet for a few tons of legal leaves produced by the Chapare peasantry. Because of the eradication policies the quantity of leaves sold was reduced by 90% and turnover dropped from around Bs 20 000 000 in 1997 to Bs 6 000 000 in 2001 (Bs = Bolivianos).
19. For suggestive analyses on the interlinking of geopolitical and other interests and the motives behind 'development assistance' and the 'war on drugs', see Duffield (2001) and Joyce (1999).
20. The First March had taken place in 1990 and a Second March took place in 1996 to press indigenous demands to be incorporated into the new agrarian legislation, under the banner 'Land and Territory' (Albó, 1994; Assies, 2000; Van Cott, 2000).
21. For a detailed analysis see Assies (2002).
22. Headed by the controversial Marcial Fabricano, who was to become a Vice-Minister in the new Sánchez de Lozada government.
23. Such regionalism, and particularly Cruceño regionalism, should be understood against the background of shifts in the Bolivian economy. While the highland mining industry declined, Santa Cruz emerged as the dynamic centre of a new agro-export economy. Although Bolivia still is known as an Andean country, in fact it is increasingly 'Amazonian'.
24. In October 2001 the Bolivian government convoked an 'Earth Summit' which was later renamed 'Encounter' as expectations were reduced, because the conditions for resolving problems had worsened after the Pantani massacre. The principal peasant organizations did not participate in the encounter and announced that they would convoke a summit of their own.
25. For technical problems with registration the UCS did not participate in the 1989 elections.
26. At some point in mid-2000 it was rumoured that an alliance was in the making between Manfred Reyes Villa, Johnny Fernández of the UCS and Evo Morales, but this never materialized and it would hardly have been a credible coalition.
27. Where ethnicity is concerned, among the established parties the MIR was a partial exception in exhibiting some populist features and showing some sympathy for the indigenous population. In 1990 Paz Zamora went to meet the First March of the lowland indigenous peoples and under his government Bolivia ratified ILO Convention 169. The MIR also has an important following among the population of El Alto.
28. The notion of 'territory' was expressly avoided in order to convey the idea that the TCOs are a form of property and should not be understood as constituting administrative units, since it was thought that this might constitute a threat to governability and national intregity (Vadillo, 1997, p. 343).
29. In January 2000, in the border region between the Oruro and Potosí Departments, the Quechua-speaking Laime and Jucumani had set aside 'ancestral' rivalries and boundary disputes and turned against their Aymara-speaking Qaqachaca neighbours in a particularly violent round of border disputes which claimed 33 lives. The government sent in troops and first aid kits and started to study the 'permanent presence of the army'. Such violence can hardly be explained in terms of ancestral rivalries. Instead, one should look at things like desperate poverty and secular government neglect.

30. The affair which finally lead to his resignation was another of the scandals that plagued the Banzer government and constituted something like a real-time *telenovela* (soap opera). Episodes of police accusing the minister of threats and attempts at bribery, even though they may have been exaggerated, sounded quite plausible to the Bolivian public, used to the arrogance of the average politician. Quispe stated that he would not negotiate with such a liar and that indigenous people at least respected their wives.

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