

Berman Institute – North American Jewish Data Bank
University of Connecticut

World Jewish Population, 2010

Number 2 - 2010



CURRENT JEWISH POPULATION REPORTS

Successor to the Population
Articles from the *American
Jewish Year Book*

Sergio DellaPergola
The Hebrew University
of Jerusalem

Edited by

Arnold Dashefsky
University of Connecticut

Sergio DellaPergola
The Hebrew University of
Jerusalem

Ira Sheskin
University of Miami

Published by

North American Jewish Data Bank

in cooperation with

Jewish Federations of
North America

and the

Association for the Social
Scientific Study of Jewry



Mandell L. Berman Institute – North American Jewish Data Bank

A Collaborative Project of the
Jewish Federations of North America

and the

Center for Judaic Studies and
Contemporary Jewish Life

and the

Roper Center for Public Opinion Research

both at the

University of Connecticut

*Research funded by a grant from The Mandell L. and
Madeleine H. Berman Foundation in support of the
Berman Institute – North American Jewish Data Bank.*



Center for
Judaic Studies
and Contemporary
Jewish Life



The Jewish Federations
OF NORTH AMERICA



University of
Connecticut

Data Bank Staff:

Arnold Dashefsky, Director

Ron Miller, Associate Director

Cory Lebson, Associate Director for
Information Technology

Lorri Lafontaine, Program Assistant

Graphic Designer:

Carla Willey

Fact Checker:

Sarah Markowitz

Mandell L. Berman Institute
North American Jewish Data Bank
Center for Judaic Studies and
Contemporary Jewish Life
University of Connecticut
405 Babbidge Rd Unit 1205
Storrs, CT 06269-1205

Web: www.jewishdatabank.org

Email: info@jewishdatabank.org

WORLD JEWISH POPULATION, 2010

Sergio DellaPergola
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Professor Emeritus
The Shlomo Argov Chair in Israel-Diaspora Relations
The Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry
Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel
sergioa@huji.ac.il

האוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים
THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We gratefully acknowledge the collaboration of many institutions and persons in various countries who supplied information or otherwise helped in the preparation of this report. Special thanks are due to our colleagues at The Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem: Uzi Rebhun, Mark Tolts, Shlomit Levy, Dalia Sagi, and Judith Even. We are also indebted to (alphabetically by the respective cities): Chris Kooyman (Amsterdam), Ralph Weill (Basel), Simon Cohn and Claude Kandiyoti (Brussels), András Kovács (Budapest), Ezequiel Erdei and Yaacov Rubel (Buenos Aires), Tally Frankental (Cape Town), Salomon Benzaquen and Tony Beker de Weinraub (Caracas), Barry R. Chiswick and Carmel U. Chiswick (Chicago), Frank Mott (Columbus, OH), Heike von Bassewitz and Ellen Rubinstein (Frankfurt a. M.), Frans van Poppel (The Hague), Barry Kosmin and Ariela Keysar (Hartford, CT), Lina Filiba (Istanbul), Steven Adler, Benjamin Anderman, Oren Cytto, Norma Gurovich, Israel Pupko, Liat Rehavi, Marina Sheps, and Emma Trahtenberg (Jerusalem), David Saks (Johannesburg), David Graham and Marlena Schmool (London), Bruce Phillips (Los Angeles), Judit Bokser Liwerant, Susana Lerner, and Mauricio Lulka (Mexico City), Sarah Markowitz and Ira M. Sheskin (Miami), Rafael Porzecanski (Montevideo), Evgueni Andreev and Eugeni Soroko (Moscow), David Bass (Neveh Daniel), Laurence Kotler-Berkowitz, Jeffrey Scheckner, and Jim Schwartz (New York), Alberto Senderey (Paris), Allen Glicksman (Philadelphia), Sidney Goldstein and Alice Goldstein (Providence, RI), Erik H. Cohen (Ramat Gan), Gloria Arbib and Alberto Levy (Rome), René Decol and Alberto Milkewitz (São Paulo), Arnold Dashefsky (Storrs, CT), Gary Eckstein (Sydney), Gustave Goldman (Toronto), Sylvia Barack Fishman, Leonard Saxe, Charles Kadushin, and Benjamin Phillips (Waltham, MA), Thomas Buettner and Hania Zlotnik (United Nations, NY).

CURRENT JEWISH POPULATION REPORTS

INTRODUCTION

“Everything must have a beginning; and the beginning is necessarily imperfect. Errors, no doubt, abound in this volume and omissions are numerous. It is natural that these findings will at once attract attention. Future ones can be made more accurate, and hence more serviceable, if readers will be good enough to send to the Editor notice of any omissions or errors which may come to their attention.”¹ Thus wrote Cyrus Adler, the first editor of the *American Jewish Year Book*, which appeared at the end of the nineteenth century in 1899, as the preface to this new undertaking.

These words are just as appropriate at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century as we launch *Current Jewish Population Reports* as the successor to the population articles which appeared in the *American Jewish Year Book* for 108 years. The Mandell L. Berman Institute—North American Jewish Data Bank (NAJDB), the central repository of quantitative data on North American Jewry, is pleased to accept the responsibility of continuing to provide these vital statistics on the Jewish population of the United States along with those for world Jewry.

Even as Adler noted “the spread of Jews all over our vast country,” we observe this phenomenon even more so today. Basic research and policy planning require that the population statistics which have been a standard feature of the *Year Book* since 1899 be continued.

The NAJDB was established in 1986 through the generosity of Mandell L. (Bill) Berman. It was first administered by the Graduate Center of the City University of New York with the support of the Council of Jewish Federations and its successors, the United Jewish Communities and the Jewish Federations of North America. In addition, it was originally co-sponsored by Brandeis University and the Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Later, the NAJDB moved from the City University of New York to Brandeis University and since 2004 is located at the University of Connecticut.

While the divine promise that the Jewish people “will multiply . . . as the stars of heaven, and as the sand by the seashore” (Genesis 22.17) has not been actualized, we do not feel free to desist from the task of enumerating them. This is our legacy and this is our mandate.

We would like to express our appreciation to Mandell L. (Bill) Berman for his strong support of this initiative.

¹Cyrus, Adler. “Preface,” *The American Jewish Year Book* (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1899): IX.

We would also like to thank Lawrence Grossman and the American Jewish Committee (www.ajc.org) for permission to continue publishing these population articles and the Association for the Social Scientific Study of Jewry (ASSJ) (www.assj.org), the Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (<http://icj.huji.ac.il>), and the Jewish Federations of North America (JFNA) (www.jewishfederations.org) for their co-sponsorship of this endeavor.

Arnold Dashefsky
University of Connecticut
Storrs, CT

Sergio DellaPergola
The Hebrew University
of Jerusalem

Ira M. Sheskin
University of Miami
Coral Gables, FL

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | PAGE |
|--|-------------|
| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | 4 |
| Fundamentals of Jewish Population Change | 7 |
| DEFINITIONS | 8 |
| DATA SOURCES | 12 |
| Presentation and Quality of Data | 13 |
| WORLD JEWISH POPULATION SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION | 15 |
| Major Regions and Countries | 17 |
| Jews in Major Cities | 20 |
| DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF JEWISH POPULATION CHANGE | 22 |
| International Migration | 22 |
| Marriages, Births, and Deaths | 24 |
| Conversions | 27 |
| Age Composition | 29 |
| Demographic Implications | 31 |
| JEWISH POPULATION BY COUNTRY | 32 |
| The Americas | 32 |
| <i>The United States</i> | 32 |
| <i>Canada</i> | 42 |
| <i>Central and South America</i> | 44 |
| Europe | 46 |
| <i>The European Union</i> | 46 |
| <i>The Former Soviet Union</i> | 50 |
| <i>Other European Countries</i> | 51 |
| Asia | 51 |
| <i>Israel</i> | 51 |
| <i>Other Asian Countries</i> | 55 |
| Africa | 55 |
| Oceania | 56 |
| DISPERSION AND CONCENTRATION | 56 |
| OUTLOOK | 58 |
| AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY | 59 |
| APPENDIX: JEWISH POPULATION BY COUNTRY, 1/1/2010 | 60 |
| NOTES | 64 |

WORLD JEWISH POPULATION, 2010


Sergio DellaPergola, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At the beginning of 2010, the world's Jewish population was estimated at 13,428,300—an increase of 80,300 (0.6 percent) over the 2009 revised estimate.¹ The world's total population increased by 1.25 percent in 2009.² World Jewry hence increased at half the general population growth rate.

Figure 1 illustrates changes in the number of Jews worldwide, in Israel, and, in the aggregate, in the rest of the world—commonly referred to as the Diaspora—as well as changes in the world's total population between 1945 and 2010. The world's *core* Jewish population was estimated at 11 million in 1945. The *core* population concept assumes mutually exclusive sub-populations even though multiple cultural identities are an increasingly frequent feature in contemporary societies (see more on definitions below). While 13 years were needed to add one million Jews after the tragic human losses of World War II and the Shoah, 47 more years were needed to add another million.

FIGURE 1. WORLD TOTAL POPULATION AND JEWISH POPULATION (CORE DEFINITION), 1945-2010



Since 1970, world Jewry practically stagnated at *zero population growth*, with some recovery during the first decade of the 21st century. This was the result of the combination of two very different demographic trends in Israel and the Diaspora. Israel's

Jewish population increased linearly from an initial one-half million in 1945 to 5.7 million in 2010. The Diaspora, from an initial 10.5 million in 1945, was quite stable until the early 1970s, when it started decreasing to the current 7.7 million. The world's total population increased nearly threefold from 2.315 billion in 1945 to 6.900 billion in 2010. Thus, the relative share of Jews among the world's total population steadily diminished from 4.75 per 1,000 in 1945 to 1.95 per 1,000 currently.

Figure 2 shows the largest *core* Jewish populations in 2010. Two countries, Israel and the United States, account for about 82 percent of the total, another 16 countries, each with more than 20,000 Jews, accounted for another 16 percent of the total, and another more than 75 countries each with Jewish populations below 20,000 accounted for the remaining 2 percent.


Israel's Jewish population (*not* including over 312,000 immigrants admitted to the country within the framework of the *Law of Return* who were not recorded as Jews in the Population Register) surpassed 5.7 million in 2010, over 42 percent of world Jewry. This represented a population increase of 95,000 (1.7 percent) in 2009. In 2009, the Jewish population of the Diaspora decreased by about 15,000 (-0.2 percent). The *core* Jewish population in the United States was assessed at 5,275,000 and was estimated to have diminished somewhat over the past 20 years, after peaking around 1990.³

After critically reviewing all available evidence on Jewish demographic trends, it is plausible to claim that Israel now hosts the largest Jewish community worldwide, although some researchers disagree (see below). Demography has produced a transition of singular importance for Jewish history and destiny—the return of the Jews to a geographical distribution significantly rooted in their ancestral homeland. This has occurred through daily, minor, slow and diverse changes affecting human birth and death, geographical mobility, and the willingness of persons to identify with a Jewish collective concept—no matter how specified. At the same time, Israel's Jewish population faces a challenging demographic balance with its gradually diminishing majority status vis-à-vis the Palestinian Arab population that lives on the same territory.

Israel's current Jewish population growth—although slower than during the 1990s—reflects a continuing substantial natural increase generated by a combination of relatively high fertility (2.9 children per Jewish woman on average in 2009) and a young age composition (26 percent under age 15 and only 11 percent age 65 and over as of 2008). Neither of these two drivers of demographic growth exists among other Jewish populations worldwide, including the United States. Other than a few cases of growth due to international migration (Canada, Australia, and until recently, Germany, for example), the number of Jews in Diaspora countries has tended to decrease at varying rates. The causes for these decreases are low Jewish birth rates, an increasingly elderly age composition, and a dubious balance between persons who join Judaism (*accessions*) and those who drop or lose their Jewish identity (*secessions*).

All this holds true regarding the *core* Jewish population, *not* inclusive of non-Jewish members of Jewish households, persons of Jewish ancestry who profess another monotheistic religion, other non-Jews of Jewish ancestry, and other non-Jews who may be interested in Jewish matters. If an *enlarged* Jewish population definition is considered, including non-Jews with Jewish ancestry and non-Jewish members of Jewish households, the United States holds a significantly larger population aggregate than Israel (about eight million compared to six million, respectively—see **Appendix** and further discussion of definitions below).

FIGURE 2. LARGEST CORE JEWISH POPULATIONS, 2010



FUNDAMENTALS OF JEWISH POPULATION CHANGE

Jewish population size and composition reflect the continuous interplay of various factors that operate from both outside and inside the Jewish community.

Regarding **external factors**, since the end of the 1980s, major geopolitical and socioeconomic changes in the world significantly affected Jewish population trends. Leading factors included the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Germany's reunification, the European Union's gradual expansion to 27 states, South Africa's transition to a new regime, political and economic instability but also democratization and growth in several Central and South American countries, and the volatile situation in Israel and the Middle East. Large-scale emigration from the former Soviet Union (FSU) and rapid population growth in Israel were the most visible effects, accompanied by other significant Jewish population transfers, such as the movement of Jews from Central and South America to the United States, particularly South Florida and Southern California. Shifts in group allegiances, reflecting broader trends in religious and national identities, also played a role in shaping Jewish population size and composition.⁴

Reflecting these global trends, more than 80 percent of world Jews currently live in two countries, the United States and Israel, and 95 percent are concentrated in the ten largest communities. In 2010, the G8 countries—the world's eight leading economies (the United States, France, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, Germany, Italy, and Japan)—comprised 88 percent of the total Diaspora Jewish population. Thus, the aggregate of just a few major Jewish population centers virtually determines the assessment of world Jewry's total size and trends. The continuing realignment of world Jewish geography toward the major centers of economic development and political power provides a robust yardstick for further explanation and prediction of Jewish demography.⁵

Regarding **internal factors**, of the three major determinants of population change, two are shared by all populations: (a) the balance of vital events (births and deaths); and (b) the balance of international migration (immigration and emigration). Both factors affect increases or decreases in the physical presence of persons in a given place. The third determinant consists of identification changes or *passages* (accessions and secessions), and applies only to populations—often referred to as population subgroups—that are defined by some cultural, symbolic, or other specific peculiarity, as is the case for Jews. Identification changes do not affect people's physical presence but rather their willingness or ability to identify with a particular religious, ethnic, or otherwise culturally-defined group. One cannot undervalue the quantitative impact of passages that occur in either direction regarding individual perceptions and emotional attachments to group identities. Some of these passages are sanctioned through a normative ceremony, and some are not.

The Jewish population data for 2010 presented in this report were updated from 2009 or previous years in accordance with known or estimated changes in vital events, migrations, and identificational issues. In the updating procedure, whether exact data on intervening changes were available, empirically ascertained or assumed directions of change were applied and consistently added to or subtracted from previous estimates. If the evidence was that intervening changes balanced one another, Jewish population size was not changed. This procedure has proven highly effective. Most often, when improved Jewish population estimates reflecting a new census or socio-demographic survey became available, our annually updated estimates proved to be on target.

The research findings reported herein basically confirm the estimates reported in previous years and, perhaps more importantly, our interpretation of the trends now prevailing in world Jewish demography.⁶ Concisely stated, a positive balance of Jewish vital events (births and deaths) is seen in Israel and a negative balance in nearly all other countries; a positive migration balance is seen in Israel, the United States, Germany, Canada, Australia, and a few other Western countries, and a negative migration balance in Central and South America, South Africa, Eastern Europe, Muslim countries, and some countries in Western Europe; a positive balance of accessions to Judaism over secessions is seen in Israel, and an often negative, or, in any event, rather uncertain, balance elsewhere.

While allowing for improvements and corrections, the 2010 population estimates highlight the increasing complexity of socio-demographic and identificational factors underlying Jewish population patterns. This complexity is magnified at a time of pervasive internal and international migration, sometimes implying bi-local residences and, thus, a double counting of people on the move or permanently sharing their time between different places. Even more intriguing can be the position of persons who hold more than one cultural identity and may periodically shift from one to another. Available data sources only imperfectly allow documenting these complexities, hence estimates of Jewish population sizes are far from perfect. Some errors can be corrected at a later stage. Consequently, analysts should resign themselves to the paradox of the *permanently provisional* nature of Jewish population estimates.

DEFINITIONS

A major problem with Jewish population estimates produced by individual scholars or Jewish organizations is the lack of uniformity in definitional criteria—when the issue of defining the Jewish population is addressed at all. The study of a Jewish population (or of any other population subgroup) requires solving three main problems:

- 1) *defining* the target group on the basis of conceptual or normative criteria aimed at providing the best possible description of that group—which in the case of Jewry is no minor task in itself;
- 2) *identifying* the group thus defined based on tools that operationally allow for distinguishing and selecting the target group from the rest of the population—through membership lists, surnames, areas of residence, or other random or non-random procedures; and
- 3) *covering* the target group through appropriate field work—in person, by telephone, by Internet, or otherwise. Most often in the actual experience of social research, the definitional task is performed at the stage of identification; and the identificational task is performed at the stage of actual fieldwork.

It thus clearly appears that the quantitative study of Jewish populations relies only on *operational*, not *normative*, definitional criteria. Its conceptual aspects, far from pure theory, heavily depend on practical and logistical feasibility.

The ultimate empirical step—obtaining relevant data from relevant persons—crucially reflects the readiness of people to cooperate in the data collection effort. In

recent years, as cooperation rates have decreased, the amount, content, and validity of information gathered has been affected detrimentally. These declining cooperation rates reflect the identification outlook of the persons who are part of the target population—that outlook which is itself an integral part of the investigation. No method exists to break this vicious cycle. Therefore, research findings reflect, with varying degrees of sophistication, only that which is possible. Anything that cannot be uncovered directly can sometimes be estimated through various imperfect techniques. Beyond that, we enter the virtual world of myths, hopes, fears, and corporate interests. No way exists to demonstrate the actual nature of some of these claims—at least not within the limits of a non-fictional work such as this.


Keeping this in mind, three major definitional concepts should be considered to provide serious comparative foundations to the study of Jewish demography (**Figure 3**).

In most Diaspora countries, the concept of **core Jewish population**⁷ includes all persons who, when asked in a socio-demographic survey, identify themselves as Jews; or who are identified as Jews by a respondent in the same household, *and* do not have another monotheistic religion. Such a definition of a person as a Jew, reflecting *subjective* perceptions, broadly overlaps but does not necessarily coincide with *Halakhah* (Jewish law) or other normatively binding definitions. Inclusion does *not* depend on any measure of that person's Jewish commitment or behavior in terms of religiosity, beliefs, knowledge, communal affiliation, or otherwise. The *core* Jewish population includes all converts to Judaism by any procedure, as well as other people who declare they are Jewish even without conversion. It is also customary to include persons of Jewish parentage who claim no current religious or ethnic identity. Persons of Jewish parentage who adopted another monotheistic religion are usually excluded, as are persons who in censuses or socio-demographic surveys explicitly identify with a non-Jewish religious group without having formally converted out.

The *core* concept offers an intentionally comprehensive and pragmatic approach reflecting the nature of most available Jewish population data sources. In the Diaspora, such data often derive from population censuses or socio-demographic surveys where interviewees have the option to decide how to answer relevant questions on religious or ethnic identities. In Israel, personal status is subject to the rulings of the Ministry of the Interior, which relies on criteria established by rabbinic authorities and by the Israeli Supreme Court.⁸ In Israel, therefore, the *core* Jewish population does not simply express subjective identification but reflects definite legal rules. This entails matrilineal Jewish origin, or conversion to Judaism, and not holding another religion. Documentation to prove a person's Jewish status may include non-Jewish sources.

The question of whether *core* Jewish identification can or should be mutually exclusive with other religious and/or ethnic identities emerged on a major scale in the course of developing and analyzing the 2000–2001 National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS 2000-01) for American Jews. The solution—after much debate—was to allow for Jews with multiple religious identities to be included under certain circumstances in the standard *core* Jewish population definition. This resulted in a rather multi-layered definition of the United States Jewish population.⁹ A category of *Persons of Jewish Background* (PJBs) also was introduced by NJPS 2000-01. Some PJBs were included in the Jewish population count and others were not, based on a more thorough evaluation of each individual ancestry and childhood.

FIGURE 3. DEFINING CONTEMPORARY JEWISH POPULATIONS



Following the same logic, persons with multiple ethnic identities, including a Jewish one, have been included in the total Jewish population count for Canada. The adoption of such extended criteria by the research community tends to stretch Jewish population definitions with an expansive effect on Jewish population size beyond usual practices in the past and beyond the limits of the typical *core* definition. These procedures may respond to local needs and sensitivities but tend to limit the actual comparability of the same Jewish population over time and of different Jewish populations at one given time.

The ***enlarged Jewish population***¹⁰ includes the sum of (a) the *core* Jewish population; (b) all other persons of Jewish parentage who—by *core* Jewish population criteria—are *not* currently Jewish (non-Jews with Jewish background); and (c) all respective non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.).

Non-Jews with Jewish background, as far as they can be ascertained, include: (a) persons who have adopted another religion, or otherwise opted out, although they may claim to be *also* Jewish by ethnicity or in some other way—with the caveat just mentioned for recent United States and Canadian data; and (b) other persons with Jewish parentage who disclaim being Jewish. As noted, most PJBs who are not part of the *core* Jewish population naturally belong under the *enlarged* definition.¹¹

It is customary in socio-demographic surveys to consider the religio-ethnic identification of parents. Some censuses, however, *do* ask about more distant ancestry. For both conceptual and practical reasons, the *enlarged* definition usually does not

include other non-Jewish relatives who lack a Jewish background and live in exclusively non-Jewish households. Historians might wish to engage in the study of the number of Jews who ever lived and how many persons today are the descendants of those Jews—for example Conversos who lived in the Iberian Peninsula during the Middle Ages. The early Jewish backgrounds of some population groups have been uncovered in recent studies of population genetics.¹² These long-term issues and analyses are beyond the purpose of the present report.

The ***Law of Return***, Israel's distinctive legal framework for the acceptance and absorption of new immigrants, awards Jewish new immigrants immediate citizenship and other civil rights. According to the current, amended version of the *Law of Return*,¹³ a Jew is any person born to a Jewish mother or converted to Judaism (regardless of denomination—Orthodox, Conservative, or Reform), who does not have another religious identity. By ruling of Israel's Supreme Court, conversion from Judaism, as in the case of some ethnic Jews who currently identify with another religion, entails loss of eligibility for *Law of Return* purposes. The Falash Mura—a group of Ethiopian non-Jews of Jewish ancestry—must undergo conversion to be eligible for the *Law of Return*. The law as such does not affect a person's Jewish status—which, as noted, is adjudicated by Israel's Ministry of Interior and rabbinic authorities—but only the specific benefits available under the *Law of Return*. This law extends its provisions to all current Jews, their children, and grandchildren, as well as to their respective Jewish or non-Jewish spouses. As a result of its three-generation and lateral extension, the *Law of Return* applies to a large population—the so called *aliyah* eligible—whose scope is significantly wider than the *core* and *enlarged* Jewish populations defined above.¹⁴ It is actually quite difficult to estimate the total size of the *Law of Return* population. These higher estimates are not discussed below systematically, but some notion of their possible extent is given for major countries.

Some major Jewish organizations in Israel and the United States—such as the Jewish Agency for Israel, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, and the Jewish Federations—sponsor data collection and tend to influence the rules of research, rendering them more complex. Organizations are motivated by their mission toward their respective constituencies rather than by pure scientific criteria. In turn, the understandable interest of organizations to function and secure budgetary resources tends to influence them to define Jewish populations increasingly similar to the *enlarged* and *Law of Return* definitions rather than to the *core* definition. Some past socio-demographic surveys, by investigating people who were born or were raised or are currently Jewish, may have reached a population that *ever* was Jewish, regardless of its present identification.

The estimates presented below of Jewish population distribution worldwide and in each continent, individual country, and major metropolitan areas consistently aim at the concept of *core* Jewish population (**Tables 1-5** and **Appendix**). The *core* definition is indeed the necessary starting point for any admittedly relevant elaboration about the *enlarged* definition or even broader definitions such as the *Law of Return*.

DATA SOURCES

Data on population size, characteristics, and trends are a primary tool in the evaluation of Jewish community needs and prospects at the local level, nationally, and internationally. The estimates for major regions and individual countries reported herein reflect a prolonged and continuing effort to study scientifically the demography of contemporary world Jewry. Data collection and comparative research have benefited from the collaboration of scholars and institutions in many countries, including replies to direct inquiries regarding current estimates.¹⁵ It should be emphasized, however, that the elaboration of worldwide estimates for the Jewish populations of the various countries is beset with difficulties and uncertainties.¹⁶ The problem of data consistency is particularly acute, given the very different legal systems and organizational provisions under which Jewish communities operate in different countries. In spite of our keen efforts to create a unified analytic framework for Jewish population studies, users of Jewish population estimates should be aware of these difficulties and of the inherent limitations of our estimates.

The more recent data on Israel, the United States, and the rest of world Jewry reflect updated information on Jewish population that became available following the major round of national censuses and Jewish socio-demographic surveys in countries with large Jewish populations from 1999–2009. This new evidence generally confirmed our previous estimates, but sometimes suggested upward or downward revisions.

Over the past decades, the data available for a critical assessment of the worldwide Jewish demographic picture have expanded significantly. Some of this ongoing research is part of a coordinated effort aimed at updating the profile of world Jewry.¹⁷ While the quantity and quality of documentation on Jewish population size and characteristics are still far from satisfactory, over the past twenty years important new data and estimates were released for several countries through official population censuses and Jewish-sponsored socio-demographic surveys.

National censuses yielded results on Jewish populations in the Czech Republic, India, and Ireland (1991); Bulgaria and Romania (1992); Macedonia and the Russian Federation (1994); Israel (1995 and 2008); Australia, Canada, and New Zealand (1996, 2001, and 2006); South Africa (1996 and 2001); Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan (1999 and 2009); Brazil, Estonia, Latvia, Mexico, Switzerland, and Tajikistan (2000); Austria, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine (2001); Georgia, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, and Serbia (2002); and Moldova (2004). Further information will become available from several countries undertaking their national censuses in 2010, 2011, and 2012.

Population censuses in the United States do not provide information on religion, but have furnished relevant data on countries of birth, spoken languages, and ancestry. Permanent national population registers, including information on Jews as one of several documented religious, ethnic, or national groups, exist in several European countries (Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Switzerland) and in Israel.

In addition, independent socio-demographic studies have provided valuable information on Jewish demography and socioeconomic stratification, as well as on Jewish identification. Socio-demographic surveys were conducted over the past several years in South Africa (1991 and 1998); Mexico (1991 and 2000); Lithuania (1993); Chile and the

United Kingdom (1995); Venezuela (1998–99); Guatemala, Hungary, Israel, and the Netherlands (1999); Moldova and Sweden (2000); France and Turkey (2002); and Argentina (2003, 2004, and 2005). In the United States, important new insights were provided by several large surveys: the National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS 2000–01), the American Jewish Identity Survey (AJIS 2001), and the Heritage, Ancestry, and Religious Identity Survey (HARI 2001-02). Smaller Jewish samples can be obtained from the General Social Survey and similar national studies. Two major national studies including fairly large Jewish samples are the American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS 2008) and the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2008). Moreover, numerous Jewish population studies were separately conducted in major cities in the United States¹⁸ (notably in Chicago in 2000, New York City in 2002, Washington, DC in 2003, Miami in 2004, Palm Beach County (FL) in 2005, Boston in 2005—the fifth decennial study in that metropolitan area, and Philadelphia in 2009) and in other countries.

Additional evidence on Jewish population trends comes from the systematic monitoring of membership registers, vital statistics, and migration records available from Jewish communities and other Jewish organizations in many countries or cities, notably in Buenos Aires, Germany, Italy, São Paulo, and the United Kingdom. Detailed data on Jewish immigration routinely collected in Israel help to assess Jewish population changes in other countries.

It is quite evident that the cross-matching of more than one type of source about the same Jewish population, although not frequently feasible, can provide either mutual reinforcement of or important critical insights into the available data.

PRESENTATION AND QUALITY OF DATA

Estimates in this report refer to January 1 of the current year. Efforts to provide the most recent possible picture entail a short span of time for evaluation of available information, hence a somewhat greater margin of inaccuracy. Indeed, where appropriate, we revised our previous estimates in light of newly acquired information (**Tables 1 and 2**). Corrections were also applied retroactively to the 2009 totals for major geographical regions so as to ensure a better base for comparisons with the 2010 estimates. Corrections of the latest estimates, if needed, will be presented in future annual reports.

We provide separate estimates for each country with approximately 100 or more resident *core* Jews. Estimates of Jews in smaller communities have been added to some of the continental totals. For each country, the first four columns in the **Appendix** provide an estimate of mid-year 2010 total (both Jews and non-Jews) country population,¹⁹ the estimated January 1, 2010 *core* Jewish population, the number of Jews per 1,000 total population, and a rating of the accuracy of the Jewish population estimate. The fifth column provides an estimate of the *enlarged* Jewish population for selected countries, including all countries with at least 9,000 *core* Jews. The quality of such *enlarged* estimates is usually lower than that of the respective *core* Jewish populations.

A wide variation exists in the quality of the Jewish population estimates for different countries. For many Diaspora countries, it might be best to indicate a range (minimum, maximum) rather than a definite estimate for the number of Jews. It would be confusing, however, for the reader to be confronted with a long list of ranges; this would also complicate the regional and world totals. The estimates reported for most of the Diaspora communities should be understood as being the central value of the plausible range for the respective *core* Jewish populations. The relative magnitude of this range varies

inversely with the accuracy of the estimate.

One issue of growing significance is related to persons who hold multiple residences in different countries. Based on available evidence, we make efforts to avoid double counts. Wherever possible we strive to assign people to their country of permanent residence, ignoring the effect of part-time residents.

The three main elements that affect the accuracy of each estimate are: (a) the nature and quality of the base data, (b) how recent the base data are, and (c) the updating method. A simple code combines these elements to provide a general evaluation of the reliability of data reported in the detailed tables below. The code in the **Appendix** indicates different quality levels of the reported estimates:

- (A) Base estimate derived from a national census or reliable Jewish population survey; updated on the basis of full or partial information on Jewish population movements in the respective country during the intervening period.
- (B) Base estimate derived from less accurate but recent national Jewish population data; updated on the basis of partial information on Jewish population movements during the intervening period.
- (C) Base estimate derived from less recent sources and/or unsatisfactory or partial coverage of a country's Jewish population; updated on the basis of demographic information illustrative of regional demographic trends.
- (D) Base estimate essentially speculative; no reliable updating procedure.

In categories (A), (B), and (C), the year in which the country's base estimate or important partial updates were obtained is also stated. This is not the current estimate's date but the basis for its attainment. An X is appended to the accuracy rating for countries whose Jewish population estimate for 2010 was not only updated but also revised in light of improved information. This was the case for Latvia, Lithuania, and Israel (see below).

One additional tool for updating Jewish population estimates is provided by several sets of demographic projections developed by the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.²⁰ Such projections, based on available data on Jewish population composition by age and sex, extrapolate the most recently observed or expected Jewish population trends over the first decade of the 21st century. Even where reliable information on the dynamics of Jewish population change is not available, the powerful connection that generally exists between age composition, birth rates, death rates, and migration helps provide plausible scenarios for the developments bound to occur in the short term. Where better data were lacking, we used indications from these projections to refine the 2010 estimates against previous years. It should be acknowledged that projections are clearly shaped by a comparatively limited set of assumptions and need to be periodically updated in light of actual demographic developments.

WORLD JEWISH POPULATION SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION

The size of world Jewry at the beginning of 2010 was assessed at 13,428,300. World Jewry constituted 1.95 per 1,000 of the world's total population of 6.900 billion. One in about 510 people in the world is a Jew (**Table 1**).

According to the revised estimates, between January 1, 2009 and January 1, 2010, the Jewish population increased by an estimated 80,300 persons, or about 0.6 percent. This compares with a total world population growth rate of 1.25 percent (0.1 percent in more developed countries, 1.5 percent in less developed countries). Despite the imperfections in Jewish population estimates, world Jewry continued to be close to zero population growth, with the increase in Israel (1.7 percent) overcoming the decrease in the Diaspora (−0.2 percent).

Table 1 offers an overall picture of the Jewish population at the beginning of 2010 as compared to 2009. For 2009, the originally published estimates are presented as are somewhat revised estimates that reflect retroactive corrections made in certain country estimates given improved information. These corrections resulted in a net increase of 39,200 persons in the 2009 world Jewry estimate. Most of the corrections concern Israel. Explanations are given below for these corrections.

The number of Jews in Israel increased from a revised estimate of 5,608,900 in 2009 to 5,703,700 at the beginning of 2010, an increase of 94,800, or 1.7 percent. In contrast, the estimated Jewish population in the Diaspora decreased from 7,739,100 (according to the revised estimates) to 7,724,600—a decrease of 14,500, or −0.2 percent. These changes reflect continuing Jewish emigration from the former Soviet Union and other countries to Israel, and the internal decrease typical of the aggregate of Diaspora Jewry. In 2009, the estimated Israel-Diaspora net migration balance (immigration minus emigration, including immigrant citizens, i.e., foreign-born Israelis entering the country for the first time) amounted to a gain of 11,700 *core* Jews for Israel.²¹ This estimate includes tourists who changed their status to immigrants and Israeli citizens born abroad who entered Israel for the first time. Therefore, internal demographic change (including vital events and conversions) produced nearly 90 percent of the recorded growth in Israel's Jewish population as well as most of the Diaspora's estimated decrease. Israel's population gained a further net migration balance of 1,700 non-Jews under the comprehensive provisions of the Israeli *Law of Return* and *Law of Entrance*.²²

By subtracting the 11,700 Israel-Diaspora net migration balance from the total estimated decrease of 14,500 in the Diaspora's *core* Jewish population, one obtains a 2,800 negative residual, which comprises the excess of deaths over births and of secessions over accessions. This is quite certainly an underestimate resulting in higher than real population estimates being reported for the aggregate of Diaspora Jewry. Such an underestimate will be a matter for adjustments in future population reports.

Recently, more frequent instances of conversion, accession, or "return" to Judaism can be observed in connection with the absorption in Israel of immigrants from Eastern Europe, Ethiopia, and, to a lesser extent, countries such as Peru and India. The return or first-time accession to Judaism of such previously non-belonging or unidentified persons contributed both to slowing the decrease in the relevant Diaspora Jewish populations and to some of the increase in the Jewish population in Israel.

**TABLE 1. ESTIMATED CORE JEWISH POPULATION, BY CONTINENT AND MAJOR REGIONS
2009 AND 2010^a**

| Continent and Region | 2009 | | | 2010 | | Percentage Change 2009-2010 | Jews per 1,000 Total Population in 2010 |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|---|
| | Original | Revised ^b | | Number | Percent ^c | | |
| | Number | Number | Percent ^c | | | | |
| WORLD TOTAL | 13,308,800 | 13,348,000 | 100.0 | 13,428,300 | 100.0 | 0.6 | 1.9 |
| Diaspora | 7,739,600 | 7,739,100 | 58.0 | 7,724,600 | 57.5 | -0.2 | 1.1 |
| Israel ^d | 5,569,200 | 5,608,900 | 42.0 | 5,703,700 | 42.5 | 1.7 | 755.2 |
| America, Total | 6,040,600 | 6,040,600 | 45.3 | 6,039,600 | 45.0 | 0.0 | 6.5 |
| North ^e | 5,650,000 | 5,650,000 | 42.4 | 5,650,000 | 42.1 | 0.0 | 16.5 |
| Central | 54,700 | 54,700 | 0.4 | 54,500 | 0.4 | -0.4 | 0.3 |
| South | 335,900 | 335,900 | 2.5 | 335,100 | 2.5 | -0.2 | 0.9 |
| Europe, Total | 1,468,900 | 1,468,400 | 11.0 | 1,455,900 | 10.8 | -0.9 | 1.8 |
| European Union ^f | 1,122,900 | 1,122,400 | 8.4 | 1,118,000 | 8.3 | -0.4 | 2.2 |
| FSU ^g | 305,000 | 305,000 | 2.3 | 297,100 | 2.2 | -2.6 | 1.5 |
| Other West | 19,500 | 19,500 | 0.1 | 19,400 | 0.1 | -0.5 | 1.5 |
| Balkans ^g | 21,500 | 21,500 | 0.2 | 21,400 | 0.2 | -0.5 | 0.2 |
| Asia, Total | 5,607,700 | 5,647,400 | 42.3 | 5,741,500 | 42.8 | 1.7 | 1.4 |
| Israel ^d | 5,569,200 | 5,608,900 | 42.0 | 5,703,700 | 42.5 | 1.7 | 755.2 |
| FSU ^g | 19,200 | 19,200 | 0.1 | 18,600 | 0.1 | -3.1 | 0.2 |
| Other Asia | 19,300 | 19,300 | 0.1 | 19,200 | 0.1 | -0.5 | 0.0 |
| Africa, Total | 76,500 | 76,500 | 0.6 | 76,200 | 0.6 | -0.4 | 0.1 |
| Northern ^h | 4,000 | 4,000 | 0.0 | 3,900 | 0.0 | -2.5 | 0.0 |
| Sub-Saharan ⁱ | 72,500 | 72,500 | 0.5 | 72,300 | 0.5 | -0.3 | 0.1 |
| Oceania, Total^j | 115,100 | 115,100 | 0.9 | 115,100 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 3.2 |

a January 1.

b Based on updated or corrected information.

c Minor discrepancies due to rounding.

d Israel's Jewish population includes residents in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. The respective total population includes non-Jews in Israel, including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, but does not include Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. The latter are included in Other Asia in the calculation of "Jews

per 1,000 Total Population in 2010."

e United States and Canada.

f Including Baltic republics.

g Asian regions of the FSU and Turkey included in Europe, excluding the Baltic republics.

h Including Ethiopia.

i Including South Africa, Zimbabwe.

j Including Australia, New Zealand.

As noted, we corrected previously published Jewish population estimates in light of new information. **Table 2** provides a synopsis of world Jewish population estimates for 1945–2010, as first published each year in the *American Jewish Year Book (AJYB)* and as corrected retroactively, incorporating all subsequent revisions.

These revised estimates depart, sometimes significantly, from the estimates published until 1980 by other authors and since 1981 by ourselves. Thanks to the development over the years of an improved database, these new revisions are not

necessarily the same revised estimates that appeared annually in the *AJYB* based on the information that was available on each date. It is likely that further retroactive revisions may become necessary reflecting ongoing and future research.

The time series in **Table 2** clearly portrays the decreasing rate of Jewish population growth globally from World War II until 2005. Based on a post-Shoah world Jewish population estimate of 11,000,000, a growth of 1,079,000 occurred between 1945 and 1960, followed by increases of 506,000 in the 1960s, 234,000 in the 1970s, 49,000 in the 1980s, and 32,000 in the 1990s. While 13 years were necessary to add one million to world Jewry's postwar size, 47 years were needed to add another million. Since 2000, the slow rhythm of Jewish population growth has somewhat recovered, with an increase of 528,300 through 2010, reflecting the robust demographic trends in Israel and Israel's increasing share of the world total. **Table 2** also outlines the slower Jewish population growth rate compared to global growth, and the declining Jewish share of world population. In 2010, the share of Jews among world population (1.95 per 1,000) was less than half the 1945 estimate (4.75 per 1,000).

TABLE 2. WORLD JEWISH POPULATION ESTIMATES: ORIGINAL AND REVISED, 1945-2010

| Year | World Jewish Population | | | World Population | | Jews per 1,000 Total Population |
|--------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|
| | Original Estimate ^a | Revised Estimate ^b | Annual Percentage Change ^c | Total (Thousands) ^d | Annual Percentage Change | |
| 1945, May 1 | 11,000,000 | 11,000,000 | | 2,315 | | 4.75 |
| 1950, Jan. 1 | 11,303,400 | 11,297,000 | 0.57 | 2,524 | 1.74 | 4.48 |
| 1960, Jan. 1 | 12,792,800 | 12,079,000 | 0.67 | 3,027 | 1.83 | 3.99 |
| 1970, Jan. 1 | 13,950,900 | 12,585,000 | 0.41 | 3,702 | 2.03 | 3.40 |
| 1980, Jan. 1 | 14,527,100 | 12,819,000 | 0.18 | 4,447 | 1.85 | 2.88 |
| 1990, Jan. 1 | 12,810,300 | 12,868,000 | 0.04 | 5,282 | 1.74 | 2.44 |
| 2000, Jan. 1 | 13,191,500 | 12,900,000 | 0.02 | 6,075 | 1.41 | 2.12 |
| 2005, Jan. 1 | 13,034,100 | 13,032,600 | 0.20 | 6,487 | 1.32 | 2.01 |
| 2006, Jan. 1 | 13,089,800 | 13,102,100 | 0.53 | 6,568 | 1.25 | 1.99 |
| 2007, Jan. 1 | 13,155,200 | 13,180,700 | 0.60 | 6,649 | 1.23 | 1.98 |
| 2008, Jan. 1 | 13,231,700 | 13,261,700 | 0.61 | 6,732 | 1.25 | 1.97 |
| 2009, Jan. 1 | 13,308,800 | 13,348,000 | 0.65 | 6,815 | 1.23 | 1.96 |
| 2010, Jan. 1 | 13,428,300 | | 0.60 | 6,900 | 1.25 | 1.95 |

a Core definition. As published in *American Jewish Year Book*, various years. Some Jewish population estimates reported here as of January 1 were originally published as of December 31 of the previous year.

b Based on updated or corrected information. Original estimates for 1990 and after, and all revised estimates: Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics, The A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

c Based on revised estimates, excluding latest year.

d Mid-year total population, based on revised estimates.

MAJOR REGIONS AND COUNTRIES

About 45 percent of the world's Jews reside in the Americas, with over 42 percent in North America. Over 42 percent live in Asia, mostly in Israel. Asia is defined as including the Asian republics of the FSU, but not the Asian parts of the Russian Federation and Turkey. Europe, including the Asian territories of the Russian Federation and Turkey, accounts for about 11 percent of the total. Fewer than 2 percent of the world's Jews live in Africa and Oceania.

Among the major geographical regions shown in **Table 1**, only the number of Jews in Israel (and, consequently, in Asia as a whole) increased in 2009. We estimate the Jewish population to have remained stable in North America and in Oceania. We estimate that Jewish population size decreased to variable extents in Central and South America, Europe, the FSU (both in Europe and Asia), the rest of Asia, and Africa. These regional changes reflect the trends apparent in the Jewish population in the major countries in each region. We now turn to a review of the largest Jewish populations.

TABLE 3. COUNTRIES WITH LARGEST CORE JEWISH POPULATIONS, 1/1/2010

| Rank | Country | Jewish Population | Percent of Total Jewish Population | | | |
|------|---------------------|-------------------|------------------------------------|--------------|-----------------|--------------|
| | | | In the World | | In the Diaspora | |
| | | | % | Cumulative % | % | Cumulative % |
| 1 | Israel ^a | 5,703,700 | 42.5 | 42.5 | ^b | ^b |
| 2 | United States | 5,275,000 | 39.3 | 81.8 | 68.3 | 68.3 |
| 3 | France | 483,500 | 3.6 | 85.4 | 6.3 | 74.5 |
| 4 | Canada | 375,000 | 2.8 | 88.2 | 4.9 | 79.4 |
| 5 | United Kingdom | 292,000 | 2.2 | 90.3 | 3.8 | 83.2 |
| 6 | Russian Federation | 205,000 | 1.5 | 91.9 | 2.7 | 85.8 |
| 7 | Argentina | 182,300 | 1.4 | 93.2 | 2.4 | 88.2 |
| 8 | Germany | 119,000 | 0.9 | 94.1 | 1.5 | 89.7 |
| 9 | Australia | 107,500 | 0.8 | 94.9 | 1.4 | 91.1 |
| 10 | Brazil | 95,600 | 0.7 | 95.6 | 1.2 | 92.4 |
| 11 | Ukraine | 71,500 | 0.5 | 96.1 | 0.9 | 93.3 |
| 12 | South Africa | 70,800 | 0.5 | 96.7 | 0.9 | 94.2 |
| 13 | Hungary | 48,600 | 0.4 | 97.0 | 0.6 | 94.8 |
| 14 | Mexico | 39,400 | 0.3 | 97.3 | 0.5 | 95.3 |
| 15 | Belgium | 30,300 | 0.2 | 97.5 | 0.4 | 95.7 |
| 16 | Netherlands | 30,000 | 0.2 | 97.8 | 0.4 | 96.1 |
| 17 | Italy | 28,400 | 0.2 | 98.0 | 0.4 | 96.5 |
| 18 | Chile | 20,500 | 0.2 | 98.1 | 0.3 | 96.8 |

a Includes Jewish residents in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights.

b Not relevant.

Reflecting global Jewish population stagnation along with an increasing concentration in a few countries, 98.1 percent of world Jewry live in the largest 18 communities, and excluding Israel from the count, 96.8 percent of Diaspora Jewry live in the 17 largest communities of the Diaspora, including 68.3 percent who live in the United States (**Table 3**). Besides the two major Jewish populations (Israel and the United States) each comprising over five million persons, another seven countries each have more than 100,000 Jews. Of these, three are in Western Europe (France, the United Kingdom, and Germany), one is in Eastern Europe (the Russian Federation), one is in North America (Canada), one is in Central and South America (Argentina), and one is in Oceania (Australia). The dominance of Western countries in global Jewish population distribution is a relatively recent phenomenon and reflects the West's relatively more hospitable socioeconomic and political circumstances *vis-à-vis* the Jewish presence.

The growth, or at least the slower decrease, of Jewish population in the more developed Western countries is accompanied by a higher share of Jews in a country's total population. Indeed, the share of Jews in a country's total population tends to be related to the country's level of development (**Table 4**). Regarding *core* Jewish populations in 2010, the share of Jews out of the total population was 755.2 per 1,000 in the State of Israel (including Jews in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, but excluding Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza), which obviously is a special case, but also quite a developed country; 17.1 per 1,000 in the United States; 4.0 per 1,000 on average in the other seven countries with over 100,000 Jews; 0.8 per 1,000 on average in the other nine countries with over 20,000 Jews; and virtually nil in the remaining countries.

TABLE 4. LARGEST CORE JEWISH POPULATION PER 1,000 OF TOTAL POPULATION, 1/1/2010

| Rank | Country | Jewish Population | Total Population | Jews per 1,000 Total Population | HDI ^a Rank |
|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1 | Israel ^b | 5,703,700 | 7,552,100 | 755.2 | 27 |
| 2 | United States | 5,275,000 | 309,000,000 | 17.1 | 13 |
| 3 | France | 483,500 | 62,670,000 | 7.7 | 8 |
| 4 | Canada | 375,000 | 33,890,000 | 11.1 | 4 |
| 5 | United Kingdom | 292,000 | 62,129,000 | 4.7 | 21 |
| 6 | Russian Federation | 205,000 | 140,367,000 | 1.5 | 71 |
| 7 | Argentina | 182,300 | 40,666,000 | 4.5 | 49 |
| 8 | Germany | 119,000 | 82,057,000 | 1.5 | 22 |
| 9 | Australia | 107,500 | 21,512,000 | 5.0 | 2 |
| Total Ranks 3-9 | | 1,764,300 | 443,291,000 | 4.0 | |
| 10 | Brazil | 95,600 | 195,423,000 | 0.5 | 75 |
| 11 | Ukraine | 71,500 | 45,433,000 | 1.6 | 85 |
| 12 | South Africa | 70,800 | 50,492,000 | 1.4 | 129 |
| 13 | Hungary | 48,600 | 9,973,000 | 4.9 | 43 |
| 14 | Mexico | 39,400 | 110,645,000 | 0.4 | 53 |
| 15 | Belgium | 30,300 | 10,698,000 | 2.8 | 17 |
| 16 | Netherlands | 30,000 | 16,653,000 | 1.8 | 6 |
| 17 | Italy | 28,400 | 60,098,000 | 0.5 | 18 |
| 18 | Chile | 20,500 | 17,135,000 | 1.2 | 44 |
| Total Ranks 10-18 | | 435,100 | 516,550,000 | 0.8 | |
| Rest of the world | | 250,200 | 5,623,653,900 | 0.0 | |

a HDI is the The Human Development Index, a synthetic measure of health, education, and income (in terms of U.S. Dollar purchase power parity) among the country's total population. See: United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2009 – Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development* (New York, 2009).

b Israel's Jewish population includes residents in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. The respective total population includes non-Jews in Israel, including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, but does not include Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

To better illustrate the increasing convergence between the Jewish presence and the level of socioeconomic development of a country, **Table 4** also reports the Human Development Index (HDI) for each country. The HDI—a composite measure of a society's education, health, and income—provides a general sense of the context in which Jewish communities operate, although it does not necessarily reflect the actual characteristics of

the members of those Jewish communities. The raw data of the HDI reported here refer to 2007. Of the 18 countries listed, four (France, Canada, Australia, and the Netherlands) are included among the top ten HDIs among nearly 200 countries, another five (United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, and Italy) are ranked better than 25th, four (including Israel) are better than 50th, four are better than 100th, and only one (South Africa) occupies a lower rank pointing to lesser development in the host society. But again, one should be aware that Jewish communities may display social and economic data significantly better than the average population of their respective countries.

The increasing overlap of a Jewish presence with higher levels of socioeconomic development in a country, and at the same time the diminution or gradual disappearance of a Jewish presence in less developed areas, is a conspicuous feature of the 20th and early 21st centuries. The emerging geographical configuration carries advantages concerning the material and legal conditions of the life of Jews, but it also may generate a lack of recognition of, or estrangement toward, Jews on the part of societies in less developed countries that constitute the overwhelming majority of the world's total population.

JEWIS IN MAJOR CITIES

Changes in the geographic distribution of Jews have affected their distribution not only among countries, but also within countries. The overwhelmingly urban concentration of Jewish populations globally is shown by the fact that in 2010 more than half (52.5 percent) of world Jewry lived in only five metropolitan areas.²³ These areas—including the main cities and vast urbanized territories around them—were Tel Aviv, New York, Jerusalem, Los Angeles, and Haifa (**Table 5**). Over two-thirds (67.5 percent) of world Jewry lived in the five previous areas plus the South Florida, Be'er Sheva, San Francisco, Paris, Chicago, and Philadelphia areas. The 24 largest metropolitan concentrations of Jewish population encompassed 80.2 percent of all Jews worldwide.²⁴

The Jewish population in the Tel Aviv urban conurbation, extending from Netanya to Ashdod and approaching 3 million Jews by the *core* definition, now exceeds by far that in the New York Standard Metropolitan Area, extending from southern New York State to parts of Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, with over 2 million Jews. Of the 24 largest metropolitan areas of Jewish residence, 14 were located in the United States, four in Israel, two in Canada, and one each in France, the United Kingdom, Argentina, and the Russian Federation. Nearly all of the major areas of settlement of contemporary Jewish populations share distinct features, such as being a national or regional capital, having a high standard of living, having a highly developed infrastructure for higher education, and having transnational connections.

Unlike our estimates of Jewish populations in individual countries, the data reported here on urban Jewish populations do not fully adjust for possible double counting due to multiple residences. The differences in the United States may be quite significant, in the range of tens of thousands, involving both major and minor metropolitan areas. Estimates of part-time residents for the two main receiving areas of South Florida and Southern California are reported in the footnotes to **Table 5**. The respective estimates of part-year residents were excluded from the estimates in the table. Part-year residency is related to both climate differences and economic and employment factors. Such multiple residences now also increasingly occur internationally. A person from New York or Paris may also hold a registered apartment in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, or viceversa.

TABLE 5. METROPOLITAN AREAS WITH LARGEST CORE JEWISH POPULATIONS, 1/1/2010

| Rank | Metropolitan Area ^a | Country | Jewish Population | Share of World's Jews | |
|------|--------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|--------------|
| | | | | % | Cumulative % |
| 1 | Tel Aviv ^b | Israel | 2,979,900 | 22.2 | 22.2 |
| 2 | New York ^c | U.S. | 2,007,850 | 15.0 | 37.1 |
| 3 | Jerusalem ^d | Israel | 703,600 | 5.2 | 42.4 |
| 4 | Los Angeles ^e | U.S. | 684,950 | 5.1 | 47.5 |
| 5 | Haifa ^f | Israel | 671,400 | 5.0 | 52.5 |
| 6 | South Florida ^g | U.S. | 485,850 | 3.6 | 56.1 |
| 7 | Be'er Sheva ^h | Israel | 367,600 | 2.7 | 58.8 |
| 8 | San Francisco ⁱ | U.S. | 345,700 | 2.6 | 61.4 |
| 9 | Paris ^j | France | 284,000 | 2.1 | 63.5 |
| 10 | Chicago ^k | U.S. | 270,500 | 2.0 | 65.5 |
| 11 | Philadelphia ^l | U.S. | 263,800 | 2.0 | 67.5 |
| 12 | Boston ^m | U.S. | 229,100 | 1.7 | 69.2 |
| 13 | Washington, DC ⁿ | U.S. | 215,600 | 1.6 | 70.8 |
| 14 | London ^o | United Kingdom | 195,000 | 1.5 | 72.3 |
| 15 | Toronto ^p | Canada | 180,000 | 1.3 | 73.6 |
| 16 | Buenos Aires ^q | Argentina | 165,000 | 1.2 | 74.8 |
| 17 | Atlanta ^r | U.S. | 119,800 | 0.9 | 75.7 |
| 18 | Moscow ^s | Russian Federation | 95,000 | 0.7 | 76.4 |
| 19 | Baltimore ^r | U.S. | 91,400 | 0.7 | 77.1 |
| 20 | San Diego ^r | U.S. | 89,000 | 0.7 | 77.8 |
| 21 | Denver ^r | U.S. | 83,900 | 0.6 | 78.4 |
| 22 | Phoenix ^r | U.S. | 82,900 | 0.6 | 79.0 |
| 23 | Cleveland ^r | U.S. | 81,500 | 0.6 | 79.6 |
| 24 | Montreal ^p | Canada | 80,000 | 0.6 | 80.2 |

a Most metropolitan areas include extended inhabited territory and several municipal authorities around the central city. Definitions vary by country. Some of the estimates may include some non-core Jews.

b Includes Tel Aviv District, Central District, and Ashdod Subdistrict. Principal cities: Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, Bene Beraq, Petach Tikwa, Bat Yam, Holon, Rishon LeZiyon, Rehovot, Netanya, and Ashdod, all with Jewish populations over 100,000.

c New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA Metropolitan Statistical Area. Principal Cities: New York, NY; White Plains, NY; Newark, NJ; Edison, NJ; Union, NJ; Wayne, NJ; and New Brunswick, NJ.

d Includes Jerusalem District and parts of Judea and Samaria District.

e Includes Los Angeles, Orange, Ventura, Riverside, and San Bernardino Counties. Not including 5,000 part-time residents.

f Includes Haifa District and parts of Northern District.

g Includes Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties. Not including 69,275 part-time residents.

h Includes Be'er Sheva Subdistrict and other parts of Southern District.

i Our adjustment of original data. Includes the San Francisco area (San Francisco County, San Mateo County, Marin County, and Sonoma County), as well as Alameda County, Contra Costa County, and Silicon Valley. Assumes the San Francisco area currently comprises 60 percent of the total Bay area Jewish population, the same as in the 1986 demographic study of that area.

j Departments 75, 77, 78, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95.

k Includes Clark County, DuPage County, and parts of Lake County.

l Includes the Cherry Hill, NJ area.

m Includes North Shore.

n Includes DC, Montgomery and Prince Georges Counties in Maryland, and Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William Counties in Virginia.

o Greater London and contiguous postcode areas.

p Census Metropolitan Area.

q Capital Federal and Gran Buenos Aires Partidos (AMBA).

r Statistical Metropolitan Area.

s Territory administered by City Council.

Source: See footnote 23. Note that some of the metropolitan areas are defined differently than in *Current Jewish Population Report 2010-1*.

DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF JEWISH POPULATION CHANGE

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

Shifts in Jewish population size in the major regions of the world were primarily determined by large-scale international migration. Unfortunately, the international migration of Jews is only imperfectly documented. Currently, only Israel annually records Jewish immigrants by country of origin. Israeli data, compared over several successive years, may provide, under certain conditions, a sense of the intensity of parallel migration movements of Jews to other countries, although there also are differences in the timing, volume, direction, and characteristics of migrants.

Jewish international migration reached one of its highest peaks ever when the former Soviet Union (FSU) opened its doors at the end of 1989. **Table 6** shows a summary of the estimated total number of FSU migrants between 1989 and 2009 by main countries of destination.²⁵ The 1.633 million total migrants include non-Jewish household members. About one million migrated to Israel, nearly 300,000 to the United States, and about 225,000, to Germany. Israel's share of the total increased from 18 percent in 1989 to 83 percent in the peak years 1990-1991. It then decreased to 41 percent in 2002-2004 and increased again to 85 percent in 2009. The decrease of the United States as a destination for FSU migrants in the first decade of the 21st century is noticeable, as is the parallel decrease in the attractiveness of Germany in the second half of the same decade.

These significant increases and decreases reflect the changing incidence of push factors in the FSU during a time of rapid geopolitical and economic change and real or expected disruptions in the environment for Jewish life, namely the relationship between the larger society and Jews. They also reflect the different and significantly variable legal provisions and socioeconomic opportunities in the destination countries.

TABLE 6. MIGRATION OF JEWS (*ENLARGED DEFINITION*^a) FROM THE FORMER SOVIET UNION TO OTHER COUNTRIES, 1989-2009 (THOUSANDS)

| Year | Total ^b | Migration Thereof to: | | | Percent to Israel |
|--------------|--------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| | | Israel ^c | US ^d | Germany ^e | |
| Total | 1,633.0 | 997.6 | 299.2 | 223.9 | 61 |
| 1989 | 72.0 | 12.9 | 56.0 | 0.6 | 18 |
| 1990-1991 | 400.0 | 333.0 | 41.7 | 16.5 | 83 |
| 1992-1996 | 586.0 | 323.1 | 155.9 | 60.6 | 55 |
| 1997-2001 | 420.0 | 251.8 | 38.2 | 88.6 | 60 |
| 2002-2004 | 101.0 | 41.0 | 5.2 | 45.9 | 41 |
| 2005-2009 | 54.0 | 35.8 | 2.2 | 11.7 | 66 |
| 2008 | 8.0 | 5.6 | 0.2 | 1.4 | 70 |
| 2009 | 8.0 | 6.8 | 0.2 | 0.7 | 85 |

a Including non-Jewish members of Jewish households.

b Including migration of Jews to other countries not shown.

c Total number of immigrants under *Law of Return*.

d Under Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) auspices. Including non-Jewish members of Jewish households.

e Immigrants who were registered in Jewish communities and non-Jewish members of Jewish households.

TABLE 7. NEW IMMIGRANTS TO ISRAEL,^a BY LAST COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE, 2008-2009

| Country | 2008 | 2009 | Country | 2008 | 2009 | Country | 2008 | 2009 |
|------------------------------------|---------------|---------------|--------------------------|--------------|--------------|---------------------------|--------------|------------|
| GRAND TOTAL^b | 13,699 | 14,567 | Greece | 1 | 9 | Kazakhstan | 129 | 160 |
| America – Total^b | 3,241 | 3,818 | Hungary | 54 | 90 | Kyrgyzstan | 31 | 21 |
| North America | 2,286 | 2,756 | Italy | 52 | 62 | Tajikistan | 5 | 20 |
| Canada | 264 | 283 | Netherlands | 30 | 51 | Turkmenistan | 38 | 53 |
| United States | 2,022 | 2,473 | Poland | 24 | 18 | Uzbekistan | 362 | 366 |
| Central America | 93 | 149 | Portugal | 1 | 5 | Other Asia | 134 | 136 |
| Costa Rica | 1 | 5 | Romania | 29 | 35 | China | 4 | 3 |
| Dominican Republic | - | 3 | Slovakia | 6 | 7 | Hong Kong | 3 | 4 |
| El Salvador | 2 | 1 | Spain | 22 | 29 | India | 61 | 30 |
| Guatemala | 1 | 8 | Sweden | 7 | 24 | Iran | 48 | 45 |
| Honduras | 2 | 2 | United Kingdom | 505 | 708 | Iraq | 4 | - |
| Martinique | 1 | 1 | FSU in Europe | 4,500 | 5,598 | Japan | 4 | 3 |
| Mexico | 83 | 121 | Belarus | 337 | 407 | Lebanon | - | 4 |
| Panama | 3 | 8 | Estonia | 5 | 12 | Pakistan | 1 | 1 |
| South America | 799 | 872 | Latvia | 31 | 68 | Philippines | 8 | 1 |
| Argentina | 188 | 284 | Lithuania | 17 | 12 | Taiwan | - | 1 |
| Bolivia | 7 | 6 | Moldova | 182 | 236 | Thailand | 1 | 2 |
| Brazil | 208 | 236 | Russian Federation | 2,600 | 3,244 | Yemen | - | 42 |
| Chile | 71 | 68 | Ukraine | 1,310 | 1,602 | | | |
| Colombia | 55 | 52 | FSU unspecified | 18 | 17 | Africa – Total | 1,892 | 561 |
| Ecuador | 4 | 2 | Other West Europe | 63 | 81 | Northern Africa | 1,632 | 279 |
| Paraguay | 3 | 4 | Andorra | 1 | - | Eritrea | - | 1 |
| Peru | 138 | 102 | Gibraltar | 1 | - | Ethiopia | 1,582 | 239 |
| Uruguay | 79 | 87 | Monaco | - | 1 | Morocco | 42 | 25 |
| Venezuela | 46 | 31 | Norway | 1 | 1 | Tunisia | 8 | 14 |
| | | | Switzerland | 60 | 79 | Sub-Saharan Africa | 260 | 282 |
| Europe – Total | 7,191 | 8,707 | Balkans | 112 | 158 | Angola | 1 | - |
| European Union^c | 2,516 | 2,870 | Croatia | 1 | - | Kenya | 1 | 1 |
| Austria | 17 | 11 | Macedonia | 5 | 3 | Madagascar | - | 1 |
| Belgium | 84 | 125 | Serbia | 8 | 11 | Mauritius | - | 4 |
| Bulgaria | 21 | 17 | Turkey | 98 | 144 | Niger | - | 1 |
| Cyprus | - | 6 | Asia – Total | 1,237 | 1,364 | Nigeria | - | 1 |
| Czech Republic | 3 | 1 | Israel ^d | - | 10 | South Africa | 257 | 274 |
| Denmark | 12 | 10 | FSU in Asia | 1,103 | 1,218 | Uganda | 1 | - |
| Finland | - | 10 | Armenia | 15 | 43 | | | |
| France | 1,562 | 1,556 | Azerbaijan | 194 | 221 | Oceania – Total | 119 | 112 |
| Germany | 86 | 96 | Georgia | 329 | 334 | Australia | 109 | 107 |
| | | | | | | New Zealand | 10 | 5 |

a Including non-Jewish members of Jewish households. Not including immigrant citizens.

b Including countries unknown.

c Not including Baltic republics, here included in FSU in Europe.

d Israel-born children of new immigrants who previously were tourists or foreign workers.

Table 7 shows the number of immigrants to Israel by country of origin in 2008 and 2009. The data reflect the *Law of Return*, not the *core* Jewish population, definition.

In recent years, Jewish international migration has tended to decrease due to the concentration of Jews in more developed countries. Historically, a negative relationship emerged between the quality of life in a country and the propensity of Jews to emigrate.²⁶ This logical connection helps to predict the continuation of rather low levels of migration, provided current conditions prevail for the foreseeable future. Despite this, in 2009, 14,567 new immigrants arrived in Israel, compared to 13,699 in 2008—a 6 percent increase. This represents a reversal of the decreases that had prevailed for several years, although the 14,567 is still among the lowest immigration levels in Israel's history. Notable features in 2009 were increases of some 1,200 immigrants from the FSU, 500 from North America, 350 from the European Union, and 130 from Central and South America. On the other hand, immigration from Ethiopia decreased by 1,300, reflecting new more restrictive policies concerning family reunification of the Falash Mura. Clearly, this migration decreases the Diaspora Jewish population and increases Jewish population size in Israel.

On the other hand, Israel is a source of Jewish emigration, mostly to the United States and other Western countries.²⁷ In recent years, some Israelis have migrated to the FSU.²⁸ Good estimates of total emigration range from 5,000 to 15,000 annually, despite much higher numbers mentioned in the press. The level of emigration from Israel is consistent with expectations for a country at Israel's level of economic development. These findings are in contrast with the widespread assumption that the volume and timing of Israeli immigration and emigration are primarily motivated by ideological and security factors, and not by socioeconomic determinants.

MARRIAGES, BIRTHS, AND DEATHS

Another major determinant of demographic change at the global level is family formation and childbearing and its consequence for age composition. When international migration stands at moderate levels, as in recent years, the most important determinant of long-term population change is the birth rate, which reflects both the average number of children born per women age 15-49 (the *fertility rate*) and the size of (potential) parental cohorts. In contemporary societies, the latter is, in turn, affected by the number of births in previous years, by international migration, and to some extent by the level of mortality. This circular process between childbearing and age composition is worthy of special attention and indeed plays an important role in the case of world Jewry. In addition, the question of the Jewish identity of the children of intermarriage now plays a significant role in the overall pattern of Jewish demographic development.²⁹

Low birth rates and relatively high intermarriage rates have prevailed among some European Jewish communities since the beginning of the twentieth century. After World War II, the United States and several Western European countries experienced a prolonged rise in fertility, which did not occur in Eastern Europe. These trends were matched by their respective Jewish communities, though at lower levels. Where the baby boom occurred, it generated large age cohorts born between 1945 and 1965, who in turn reached the age of procreation between the 1970s and the 1990s. An “echo effect” of more births might have been expected, but fertility rates, general and Jewish, have decreased sharply since the 1970s. Jews usually anticipated by several years these developments, resulting in lower birth rates across the board. Significant internal

differentiation persisted according to religiosity and other social characteristics among Jewish populations, with Orthodox Jews generally maintaining higher fertility rates than other groups.

Table 8 provides examples of the balance between Jewish births and deaths in four countries over the past two decades. The number of Jewish births was usually exceeded by the number of Jewish deaths in the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and Germany. This gap was strikingly high in the Russian Federation and in other European republics of the FSU.³⁰ In the Russian Federation in 2000 there were only 600 recorded Jewish births compared to over 8,200 recorded Jewish deaths—a net loss of 7,600.

In Western Europe, the negative gap was somewhat smaller, yet consistent. In the United Kingdom in 1991, the 3,200 Jewish births were exceeded by 4,500 Jewish deaths—a net loss of 1,300. The most recent United Kingdom data available from Jewish community sources indicate a reversal of this trend in 2006, showing an increase in the number of births and a decrease in the number of deaths.³¹ The decrease to fewer than 3,000 Jewish deaths in 2007 may indicate a significantly reduced Jewish community or a significant under-reporting of Jewish deaths, or both.

In Germany, the Jewish community experienced a threefold population increase due to a significant inflow of FSU immigrants since 1989. However, while in 1990 there were 100 Jewish births and 400 Jewish deaths—a net loss of 300, in 2009, 200 Jewish births were recorded compared to 1,200 Jewish deaths—a net loss of 1,000.³²

TABLE 8. JEWISH VITAL STATISTICS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1988-2009

| Country and Year | Births | Deaths | Difference |
|---------------------------|--------------------|--------|------------|
| Russian Federation | | | |
| 1988 | 3,710 ^a | 13,826 | -10,116 |
| 2000 | 613 ^b | 8,218 | -7,605 |
| United Kingdom | | | |
| 1991 | 3,200 | 4,500 | -1,300 |
| 2000 | 2,786 | 3,791 | -1,005 |
| 2006 | 3,314 | 3,107 | +207 |
| 2007 | N.A. | 2,948 | N.A. |
| Germany | | | |
| 1990 | 109 | 431 | -322 |
| 2008 | 171 | 1,038 | -867 |
| 2009 | 183 | 1,187 | -1,004 |
| Israel | | | |
| 1990 | 73,851 | 25,759 | +48,092 |
| 2000 | 91,936 | 33,421 | +58,515 |
| 2008 | 112,803 | 34,075 | +78,728 |
| 2009 | 116,599 | 33,248 | +83,351 |

a Births to Jewish mothers, of which 2,148 are to non-Jewish fathers. Assuming as many births to Jewish fathers and non-Jewish mothers, the total births would be 5,858.

b Births to Jewish mothers, of which 444 are to non-Jewish fathers. Assuming as many births to Jewish fathers and non-Jewish mothers, the total births would be 1,057.

Source: Tolts (2002), Schmool (2005), Graham and Vulkan (2008), Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle (1991, 2009, 2010), and Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (2010).

Israel is the only exception to these recessive demographic trends. Steady immigration produced a doubling of Israel's Jewish population between 1970 and 2004, which was reinforced by a significant Jewish natural increase. In 1990, 73,900 Jewish births and 25,800 Jewish deaths produced a natural increase of 48,100. In 2004, for the first time, more than 100,000 Jewish babies were born in Israel. In 2009, 116,600 Jewish births and 33,200 Jewish deaths produced a net increase of 83,400. A strong demand for children (among both the religious and the secular), rooted partly in Jewish community identity and partly in a broader sense of economic optimism and life satisfaction, are important factors in high Jewish fertility rates in Israel.³³ This resulted in significantly larger families than among Jews in other countries.

Low Jewish birth rates and population aging in the Diaspora are enhanced by high and continually increasing rates of intermarriage (**Table 9**).

TABLE 9. WORLD JEWISH POPULATION DISTRIBUTION, BY FREQUENCY OF RECENT INTERMARRIAGES, 2010

| Current rate of Jews marrying non-Jews ^a | Country ^b | Jewish Population | |
|---|--|-------------------|--------------|
| | | Thousands | Percentage |
| | World | 13,428 | 100.0 |
| 0-0.9% | West Bank ⁴ | 290 | 2.2 |
| 1-4.9% | Israel ¹ , Yemen ⁴ | 5,414 | 40.3 |
| 5-14.9% | Mexico ¹ , Gibraltar ⁴ , China ⁴ , Iran ⁴ , Syria ⁴ , Northern Africa ⁴ | 56 | 0.4 |
| 15-24.9% | Bahamas ⁴ , Costa Rica ⁴ , Guatemala ² , Panama ⁴ , Venezuela ¹ , India ³ , Japan ⁴ , Singapore ⁴ , South Africa ³ | 101 | 0.8 |
| 25-34.9% | Canada ¹ , Chile ² , Central and South America not elsewhere reported ⁴ , Turkey ² , Asia not elsewhere reported ⁴ , Africa not elsewhere reported ⁴ , Australia ¹ , New Zealand ³ | 540 | 4.0 |
| 35-44.9% | Argentina ³ , Brazil ² , Uruguay ² , France ¹ , United Kingdom ¹ , Western Europe not elsewhere reported ³ | 1,144 | 8.5 |
| 45-54.9% | United States ¹ , Italy ² , Netherlands ¹ , Switzerland ¹ , FSU in Asia ³ | 5,370 | 40.0 |
| 55-74.9% | Austria ¹ , Germany ¹ , Eastern Europe (excluding FSU) ³ | 216 | 1.6 |
| 75% + | FSU in Europe ² , Cuba ³ | 298 | 2.2 |
| Average rate | | | |
| 42.2% | Diaspora | | |
| 26.1% | World | | |

a Not Jewish at time of marriage. Intermarriage estimates are national or regional estimates and ignore geographic variations within countries. Demographers refer to this intermarriage rate as the "individual intermarriage rate." Rates are for marriages in the past 5-10 years.

b Data quality rated as follows: 1: Recent and reliable data; 2: Partial or less recent data of sufficient quality; 3: Rather outdated or incomplete data; 4: Conjectural.

Source: Adjusted from DellaPergola (2009), see endnote 36.

Overall, the rate of intermarriage has been increasing among Jews, but significant differences persist by country.³⁴

In recent years, in the Russian Federation, about 70 percent of recently married Jewish women and 80 percent of recently married Jewish men married non-Jews. In the United States, and in several medium-size European Jewish communities, the intermarriage rate was over 50 percent; in France and the United Kingdom, it was over 40 percent; in Canada and Australia, over 25 percent; and in South Africa and Venezuela, over 15 percent. Of the major Jewish communities, probably only Mexico had an intermarriage rate lower than 15 percent. In Israel, the rate of intermarriage is less than 5 percent, reflecting the growing size of the non-Jewish population who immigrated under the *Law of Return*, particularly from the FSU. Many of these intermarriages are performed in Cyprus.³⁵ The absence of civil marriage in Israel raises the intriguing question of the inability of the Israeli legal system to face the family formation needs of an increasing number of citizens whose religion is not Jewish. On average, based on the 2010 Jewish population distribution and recent intermarriage rates in different countries, about 26 percent of all recently married Jews worldwide, and 42 percent of all recently married Jews in the Diaspora, are intermarried.

A further factor in Jewish population change is the Jewish identity of the children of intermarriages. The percentage of the children of intermarriage being raised as Jews during the early 1990s was about 20 percent in both the United States³⁶ and the Russian Federation.³⁷ In 2001, this percentage had increased in the United States to more than one-third,³⁸ but was still well shy of the 50 percent that would be required so as not to contribute to a decrease in the number of Jews. The non-identification with Judaism of many children of intermarriages, added to low levels of Jewish fertility, produces an even lower “effective Jewish birth rate.”

In addition, disenchantment and disaffiliation among young Jewish adults is a phenomenon comparatively more frequent among the intermarried. This may also be associated with a determination to have fewer children. This whole complex of family-related factors leading to Jewish population erosion is far less significant in Israel than elsewhere.

CONVERSIONS

Given the increasing number of Jewish households (defined as a household containing one or more self-identified Jews) some of whose members are not Jewish, the number of persons converting to Judaism is highly relevant to Jewish population change.

Table 10 provides data on converts through the Israel Conversion Courts from 1999 to 2009. The data cover conversions certified through both the civilian and military (Israel Defense Forces) conversion (*giyur*) systems. Most civilian conversions have been of new Ethiopian immigrants who, in recent years, almost exclusively have included over 3,000 Falash Mura annually. Within the military conversion system, the demand for conversion has been among young adults mostly born in the FSU or Israel to non-Jewish immigrant mothers. About 500-800 young military have been converted annually from 2005 to 2008. Only a small number of converts are civilians from countries other than Ethiopia who immigrated to Israel under the *Law of Return*. Only in 2005, and again in 2007 and 2008, did Conversion Courts certify somewhat higher numbers of converts. The 2009 provisional estimate is much lower due to reduced immigration from Ethiopia and ongoing controversies within the Israeli Rabbinate about the general validity of

conversion procedures. Some members of the Israeli Rabbinate have indeed requested that thousands of conversions performed in the framework of the Israeli Defense Forces be annulled, and the matter was not finally adjudicated at the time of this writing.

Overall, from 1999 to 2009, 48,098 persons converted to Judaism through Israeli rabbinical channels. Given the opposition to conversion that exists within some branches of the Israeli Rabbinate, the actual number of *gerim* (Jewish neophytes) is not low and is reflected in Israel's Jewish population growth. However, the total number of "others," i.e., *Law of Return* immigrants and their children not registered as Jews, increased from 171,600 in 1999 to 312,600 in 2009. In 2007 and 2008, for the first time, the number of converts was greater than the annual increment in the "others" population. The 2009 cumulative total estimate is lower than the 2008 estimate due to a revision of the overall population estimate undertaken by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) in conjunction with the 2008 Census.

TABLE 10. CONVERSIONS TO JUDAISM IN ISRAEL, 1999-2009^a

| Year | Civilian | Israel Defense Forces | Total Converts | "Others" ^b in Israel | |
|--------------|---------------|-----------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|
| | | | | Annual Increase | Cumulative Total |
| Total | 43,905 | 2,693 | 48,098 | | |
| 1999 | 3,648 | | 3,648 | | 171,600 |
| 2000 | 2,570 | | 2,570 | 37,200 | 208,800 |
| 2001 | 3,816 | | 3,816 | 32,000 | 240,800 |
| 2002 | 4,031 | | 4,031 | 23,800 | 264,600 |
| 2003 | 4,550 | | 4,550 | 12,600 | 277,200 |
| 2004 | 3,599 | | 3,599 | 9,300 | 286,500 |
| 2005 | 5,279 | 789 | 6,068 | 9,300 | 295,800 |
| 2006 | 3,811 | 480 | 4,291 | 9,100 | 304,900 |
| 2007 | 7,280 | 601 | 7,881 | 7,800 | 312,700 |
| 2008 | 5,321 | 823 | 6,144 | 4,400 | 317,100 |
| 2009 | | | 1,500 ^c | -4,500 ^d | 312,600 ^d |

a Conversion certificates issued by Israeli Conversion Courts.

b Immigrants under the *Law of Return* who were not recorded as Jewish in the Population Register.

c Provisional estimate.

d After adjustments following the 2008 population Census.

Source: Israel Conversion Courts and Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics.

Data on conversions to and from Judaism in Diaspora countries exist but have not been compiled systematically. The consistent evidence from socio-demographic surveys is that more people were born Jewish than consider themselves currently Jewish, reflecting the net effect of accessions and secessions. The main evidence for this loss derives from the Jewish population surveys undertaken in the United States in 2000-2001 (see below). The American Jewish Identity Survey (AJIS 2001) estimated 170,000 Jews-by-choice, i.e., persons not born Jewish who adopted a Jewish identity by 2001.³⁹ This matched an estimate of 174,000 according to the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS 1990),⁴⁰ showing no growth in the total pool of accessions to Judaism. In contrast, the AJIS 2001 estimated 1,470,000 non-Jewish adults with Jewish

parents, as against a comparable estimate of 625,000 in NJPS 1990. Thus, secessions—whether by own or by the parents' decision—are clearly on the increase. Perhaps more significantly, the gap between accessions and secessions is definitely increasing resulting in a decrease in the number of Jews.

Another, admittedly small, example illustrative of a more general trend comes from the 2001 Census of Scotland, the data from which are available separately and in greater detail than the data from other parts of the United Kingdom. In 2001, 8,233 persons in Scotland declared that either they were raised Jewish or their current religion was Jewish. Of these, 5,661 (69 percent) were both raised Jewish and Judaism was their current religion; 1,785 (22 percent) were raised Jewish but were not currently Jewish; and 787 (9 percent) were not raised Jewish but were currently Jewish. Thus, the total number with Jewish upbringing was 7,446, and the number currently Jewish was 6,448, a difference of 998—a net loss of 13 percent.⁴¹

AGE COMPOSITION

Age composition plays a crucial role in population change. **Table 11**, covering 1970-2009, exemplifies the extreme variations that can emerge in age composition following the transition from higher to lower birth rates and death rates. Jewish populations are classified into five demographic types: traditional, transitional, moderate aging, advanced aging, and terminal.

Traditional Jewish populations, characterized by very high percentages of children, have disappeared. Jews in Ethiopia, here portrayed just before their mass immigration to Israel in 1991, were the last example.

The **transitional** type occurs as fertility is controlled and mortality is lowered due to better health care. Such populations feature a relatively high percentage of children, an increasing percentage of adults, and a median age of 30 or under. Israel is today the only Jewish population where the percentages in each major age group tend to decrease regularly from the younger age groups to the older age groups.

In **moderately aging** communities, the center of gravity moves to age 45-64, but children under age 15 are still more numerous than adults age 65 and over. This type, whose median age is about 35, was still evident during the 1970s and through the 1990s in the United States and later in some communities in Central and South America.

More recently, Jewish communities in the United States and Canada, major Jewish communities in Western and Central European countries, Central and South communities like Argentina and Brazil, as well as Australia and Turkey, joined the **advanced aging** type, where the elderly outnumber children and median ages are mostly between age 40 and 45 but also tend to approach 50. The exception may be France in 2002, still in the moderately aging type with 19 percent age 65 and over, and possibly a similar percentage of children under age 15.⁴²

The **terminal** age composition type, typical of the Russian Federation, the other FSU republics, Germany, and several other Eastern European countries, comprises elderly percentages that are double or more than the percentage of children, with a median age of 50 or higher, and eventually a median age tending toward 60.

TABLE 11. SELECTED JEWISH POPULATIONS, BY MAIN AGE GROUPS, 1970-2009

| Country ^a | Year | Total | 0-14 | 15-29 | 30-44 | 45-64 | 65+ | Median Age ^b |
|----------------------------|------|-------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------------------------|
| Traditional type | | | | | | | | |
| Ethiopia | 1991 | 100 | 51 | 20 | 13 | 11 | 5 | 14.7 |
| Transitional type | | | | | | | | |
| Israel | 1970 | 100 | 30 | 27 | 16 | 20 | 7 | 26.1 |
| Iran | 1976 | 100 | 30 | 28 | 19 | 17 | 6 | 25.7 |
| Israel | 1985 | 100 | 30 | 24 | 20 | 16 | 10 | 27.5 |
| Mexico | 1991 | 100 | 24 | 27 | 20 | 22 | 7 | 29.3 |
| Israel | 2008 | 100 | 26 | 23 | 19 | 21 | 11 | 30.8 |
| Moderate Aging type | | | | | | | | |
| South Africa | 1970 | 100 | 24 | 23 | 16 | 25 | 12 | 32.8 |
| United States | 1970 | 100 | 22 | 24 | 17 | 26 | 11 | 35.5 |
| Canada | 1971 | 100 | 21 | 25 | 15 | 27 | 12 | 34.2 |
| Greater Paris | 1975 | 100 | 21 | 25 | 18 | 25 | 11 | 34.1 |
| France non-Paris | 1978 | 100 | 17 | 28 | 18 | 23 | 14 | 34.2 |
| United States | 1990 | 100 | 19 | 19 | 26 | 19 | 17 | 37.6 |
| South Africa | 1991 | 100 | 19 | 22 | 22 | 21 | 16 | 36.1 |
| Brazil | 1991 | 100 | 17 | 21 | 22 | 24 | 16 | 37.9 |
| Venezuela | 1998 | 100 | 24 | 19 | 21 | 24 | 12 | 36.0 |
| Guatemala | 1999 | 100 | 24 | 19 | 22 | 23 | 12 | 34.8 |
| Mexico | 2000 | 100 | 20 | 24 | 25 | 24 | 7 | 33.6 |
| Advanced Aging type | | | | | | | | |
| Russian Federation | 1970 | 100 | 10 | 16 | 23 | 31 | 20 | 45.5 |
| Yugoslavia | 1971 | 100 | 10 | 23 | 17 | 29 | 21 | 45.0 |
| Russian Federation | 1979 | 100 | 8 | 15 | 21 | 31 | 25 | 49.2 |
| Switzerland | 1980 | 100 | 18 | 18 | 19 | 22 | 23 | 41.1 |
| Italy | 1986 | 100 | 14 | 23 | 18 | 26 | 19 | 40.8 |
| United Kingdom | 1986 | 100 | 17 | 19 | 19 | 21 | 24 | 41.1 |
| Lithuania | 1993 | 100 | 14 | 15 | 18 | 27 | 26 | 47.7 |
| Hungary | 1995 | 100 | 14 | 18 | 19 | 23 | 26 | 44.4 |
| Brazil | 2000 | 100 | 16 | 19 | 22 | 25 | 18 | 40.3 |
| United States | 2001 | 100 | 16 | 20 | 19 | 26 | 19 | 41.5 |
| United Kingdom | 2001 | 100 | 16 | 17 | 19 | 26 | 22 | 44.2 |
| Canada | 2001 | 100 | 18 | 19 | 18 | 27 | 18 | 40.7 |
| Turkey | 2002 | 100 | 10 | 16 | 22 | 34 | 18 | 47.2 |
| Greater Buenos Aires | 2004 | 100 | 15 | 21 | 16 | 28 | 20 | 43.3 |
| Australia | 2006 | 100 | 17 | 18 | 18 | 28 | 19 | 42.6 |
| Italy | 2009 | 100 | 15 | 16 | 19 | 27 | 23 | 44.9 |
| Terminal type | | | | | | | | |
| Romania | 1979 | 100 | 5 | 11 | 10 | 34 | 40 | 59.1 |
| Ukraine | 2001 | 100 | 6 | 10 | 14 | 35 | 35 | 56.4 |
| Russian Federation | 2002 | 100 | 5 | 11 | 14 | 33 | 37 | 57.5 |
| Germany | 2009 | 100 | 7 | 14 | 15 | 29 | 35 | 54.3 |

a Countries sorted by date within type. The largest age group in each population is in bold font.

b The median is the age in reference to which one-half of the population is younger and one-half is older. Some of the median ages were computed from more detailed age distributions than those shown here.

DEMOGRAPHIC IMPLICATIONS

The corollary of the advanced aging and terminal Jewish age composition types is that the annual number of deaths must outnumber the annual number of births. Such a skewed age composition also clearly reflects the non-incorporation within the Jewish collective of many children of intermarriages, which is bound to lead to a numerical decrease in Jewish population in future years, as in fact has been the case in the Diaspora over the past decades.

Table 12 shows estimated and actual vital statistics per 1,000 Jewish population in several large Jewish communities. For the relevant countries, the actual rates reflect the absolute numbers reported above in **Table 8**. Estimates were derived from a set of population projections where age-specific fertility rates and death rates were applied to the known age composition of the given Jewish population. Death rates were based on Israeli Jews' detailed schedules—Israel being a country with high life expectancies of about 84 years for women and about 80 years for men in 2008. Birth rates reflect varying assumptions about the effective Jewish fertility rate—i.e., estimated average children born, discounted for the non-inclusion of variable shares of the children of intermarriages.

TABLE 12. ESTIMATED^a AND ACTUAL JEWISH VITAL STATISTICS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, RATES PER 1,000 JEWISH POPULATION, ABOUT 2005-2010

| Country | Birth Rate | | Death Rate | | Difference | |
|--------------------|------------|--------|------------|--------|------------|--------|
| | Estimated | Actual | Estimated | Actual | Estimated | Actual |
| Germany | 3.6 | 1.6 | 14.3 | 11.3 | -10.7 | -9.8 |
| United Kingdom | 10.2 | 10.2 | 15.0 | 11.4 | -4.8 | -1.2 |
| Russian Federation | 2.6 | 2.2 | 30.2 | 29.9 | -27.6 | -27.7 |
| Ukraine | 4.1 | | 37.8 | | -33.7 | |
| Canada | 10.5 | | 12.4 | | -1.9 | |
| United States | 10.1 | | 11.7 | | -1.6 | |
| Argentina | 10.4 | | 15.2 | | -4.8 | |
| Australia | 11.7 | | 12.3 | | -0.6 | |
| Israel | | 19.9 | | 6.4 | | +13.5 |

^a Based on assumptions about current effective Jewish fertility and life expectancy.

For countries for which the comparison between actual and estimated birth and death rates data is feasible (Germany, United Kingdom, Russian Federation), a reasonable amount of consistency appears, but the death rates based on actual burial returns for the United Kingdom and Germany appear to be much lower than the expected ones—a sign of possible under-reporting. Regarding other Jewish populations, Ukraine is expectedly very similar to the Russian Federation, while Canada, the United States, Argentina, and Australia, with variations, are similar to the situation in the United Kingdom. The fundamental commonality is that in each case both actual and estimated vital rates produce a negative vital balance, i.e., a current Jewish population decrease.

Jews in Israel are the notable exception. Their vital rates not only *do* generate Jewish population growth, but the size of the natural increase is high in comparison with other developed societies, and in fact very similar to that of the world's total population.⁴³ Contemporary Jewish demography is split between an Israeli component that features consistent increase and a Diaspora component which—though some internal variation exists—is bound to decrease.

JEWISH POPULATION BY COUNTRY

THE AMERICAS

The Jewish population in the Americas is predominantly concentrated in the United States (5,275,000, or 87 percent of the continental total), followed by Canada (375,000, 6 percent), South America (335,100, 6 percent), and Central America (54,500, 1 percent) (see **Appendix**).

The United States

The Jewish population in the **United States** approached 4.4-4.5 million in 1945,⁴⁴ and according to a multiplicity of available sources it increased by about one million by 1990.⁴⁵ In 1957, according to the Current Population Survey undertaken by the United States Census Bureau, the total United States Jewish population was estimated at 5,013,000.⁴⁶ The 1971 National Jewish Population Study (NJPS 1971) provided an estimate of 5,420,000,⁴⁷ which had grown to 5,515,000 according to the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS 1990).⁴⁸

Two competing major socio-demographic surveys independently conducted in 2000-2001—the National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS 2000-01)⁴⁹ and the American Jewish Identity Survey (AJIS 2001)⁵⁰—reported a *core* Jewish population of 5,200,000 and 5,340,000, respectively. Since the findings of NJPS 1971, analysts who undertook population projections had predicted an eventual decrease in *core* Jewish population in the United States.⁵¹ This would expectedly result from a long-term decline in international immigration, postponed Jewish marriages, increasing singlehood, rising rates of intermarriage (over 50 percent of Jews currently intermarry), low Jewish fertility (less than 2 children per woman), only perhaps one-third of the children of intermarriages being raised as Jews according to the highest national projection, and noticeable aging (nearly 20 percent of the Jewish population is age 65 and over).

Our estimate of 5,275,000 *core* Jews in the United States at the beginning of 2010 is a cautious compromise between NJPS 2000-01 and AJIS 2001, also adjusting for the findings of many other American general social surveys and other institutional data, and allowing for evidence of overall Jewish population stability, or zero population growth, in the intervening time period. It should be stressed that these estimates are the product of statistical procedures that have known margins of error. Any estimate 100,000 or 200,000 higher or lower would fall within the reasonable range allowed.

NJPS 2000-01. NJPS 2000-01 (National Jewish Population Survey) was sponsored by the United Jewish Communities (UJC, now the Jewish Federations of North America), the coordinating body of Jewish Federations in the United States. The study was advised by a National Technical Advisory Committee (NTAC) chaired by the late Vivian Klaff and by Frank Mott. The NTAC included several leading experts on Jewish population studies and senior Jewish community planners. A national random digit dialing (RDD) sample covered all 50 states and was subdivided into seven geographic strata based on pre-survey estimates of Jewish population density. Sampling probabilities were proportional to Jewish density in each stratum. Over 175,000 households were screened using four questions for possible inclusion: (1) What is your

religion (or that of other adults in the household), if any? (2) Do you, or does any other adult in the household, have a Jewish mother or a Jewish father? (3) Were you or any other adult in the household raised Jewish? (4) Do you, or does any other adult in the household, consider your/him/herself Jewish for any reasons? Answers to these questions included options other than yes or no, thus allowing for a nondichotomous resolution of Jewish population. Such screening criteria were designed to produce results reflecting United Jewish Communities' planning needs, but were not strictly comparable with NJPS 1990.

The final unweighted sample included 4,523 Jewish respondents (including 303 originally misclassified as non-Jews), 625 non-Jews of Jewish background, and 4,027 non-Jews, for a total sample size of 9,175. The 4,027 non-Jewish households, interviewed for a National Survey of Religion and Ethnicity (NSRE), supplied data needed to weight and estimate Jewish population size, and to provide comparative socio-demographic background. The response rate to the screening interview was 28 percent and the cooperation rate was 40 percent. Weights were directly or indirectly estimated and applied to adjust for the number of telephone lines in the household, and to match sample household and respondent data to the United States Census totals for sampling strata, age, gender, and region.⁵²

Following claims of excessively low respondent rates, selective population undercounts, and other inappropriate procedures during and following the fieldwork, NJPS 2000-01 was submitted to independent professional scrutiny, which concluded that the study—while handicapped by methodological shortcomings such as low response rates, inconsistent survey coverage of relevant population subgroups, and loss of documentation—stood within the range of professionally acceptable research standards and biases.⁵³

The total Jewish population was estimated at 5.2 million, including 4.3 million with a clear Jewish identification, 800,000 persons of Jewish background with no religion and whose Jewish identification was less explicit, and over 100,000 persons in institutions who were not interviewed. Respondents from the first group, representing the 4.3 million, were administered a long-form questionnaire, while most respondents from the second group, representing the 800,000, were administered a short-form questionnaire that covered a limited selection of the survey's variables—with very little investigation about Jewish identification. The total number of persons in households with at least one Jewish adult was estimated at 6.7 million, with an average of 2.3 persons per household, of which 1.8 persons were Jewish (76 percent) and 0.5 persons were non-Jewish (24 percent).

As in any sample survey, NJPS population estimates are subject to sampling error, estimated at ± 2.8 percent (146,000 persons) for the national population count.⁵⁴ Therefore, the 5.2 million estimate is the central point of a population which, at the 95 percent confidence level, ranges between 5.0 and 5.4 million Jews.

AJIS 2001. AJIS 2001 (American Jewish Identity Survey), directed by the late Egon Mayer and by Barry Kosmin and Ariela Keysar, was privately sponsored, testifying to substantive disagreements within the Jewish community and among its researchers about the relationship between social scientific research and community planning. AJIS 2001 was based on a national RDD sample that replicated the methodology of NJPS 1990. Of all successful contacts, 50,238 respondents agreed to be interviewed. Through

screening questions, 1,668 respondents qualified for the survey of American Jewish households with a response rate of 18 percent.⁵⁵ The estimated *core* Jewish population, including Jews with no religion and Jews-by-choice, as well as Jews in institutions, was 5,340,000. Of these, 3,460,000 were born Jews whose religion was Judaism, 170,000 were converts to Judaism (Jews-by-choice), and 1,710,000 were born Jews with no religion. The total expanded Jewish population, including Jews and non-Jews of Jewish parentage, was estimated at 7,690,000. The total number of persons including all non-Jewish household members was 10 million. The AJIS 2001 data, more than the NJPS 2000-01 data, conceptually matched NJPS 1990 data.⁵⁶

Combining the findings of the two major surveys, NJPS 2000-01 and AJIS 2001, suggests a *core* Jewish population in the 5.2-5.3 million range in 2001. Even accepting the higher estimate, the revised 2001 estimate was about 300,000-400,000 short of the 5.7 million we had projected based on the NJPS 1990 estimate of 5.515 million.⁵⁷ Indeed, during the 1990s there was an influx of at least 200,000 new Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union, Israel, Central and South America, South Africa, Iran, and Western Europe, which was expected to have increased the total United States Jewish population.

The *core* Jewish population apparently continued to decrease because Jewish fertility continued to be low, the population continued to age, intermarriage rates continued to increase, and propensities to identify with Judaism among younger adults of intermarriages continued to remain low. In the historical perspective of Jewish population research in the United States over the past 50 years, the new findings were consistent with estimates and projections based on earlier sources, such as the 1957 Current Population Survey, NJPS 1971, and NJPS 1990. The emerging population decrease was more likely the product of actual demographic trends than an artifact of insufficient data.⁵⁸

HARI 2001-02. HARI 2001-02 (Heritage, Ancestry, and Religious Identification Survey) was conducted in two phases by the late Gary Tobin and by Sid Groeneman for the Institute for Jewish & Community Research.⁵⁹ A total of 10,204 persons were screened to determine Jewish identify using RDD with a response rate of 29 percent. This sample was considerably smaller than NJPS 2000-01 (over 175,000 households were screened) and AJIS 2001, so the sampling error is much larger. HARI 2001-02 estimated 6.0 million Jews, defined as persons who indicate that Judaism is their religion or who had a Jewish background (parent or upbringing). Since this definition did not specify the current Jewish identification status of adults and children, it is conceptually closer to an *enlarged* Jewish population than to a *core* Jewish population as defined above. Another 4.2 million persons were defined as of *Jewish heritage*, and a further 2.5 million were *connected non-Jewish adults*. The grand total of 12,735,000 tends toward and beyond the extensive criteria of the *Law of Return*.

ARIS 2008. ARIS 2008 (American Religious Identification Survey), conducted by Barry Kosmin and Ariela Keysar of Trinity College, two researchers involved with AJIS 2001, provides a more recent estimate of the number of Jews in the United States. Analysis of the Jewish subsample in this large-scale national survey allows one to assess the pace and direction of more recent demographic changes.⁶⁰

Previously, ARIS 2001 found 2,837,000 Jewish adults age 20 and over in the United States, 1.4 percent of the total adult population. In this survey, over 40 million Americans (19.5 percent of total adults age 20 and over) did not indicate a religious preference, and allocating accordingly to the Jewish group, the estimate of the total number of Jewish adults age 20 and over would increase to 3,524,000 (1.6 percent of total adults age 20 and over).

ARIS 2008 found 2,680,000 Jewish adults (a 5.5 percent decrease from ARIS 2001), representing 1.2 percent of the total adult population age 20 and over. The number of persons without a religious preference increased to nearly 46 million (20.2 percent of total adults age 20 and over). Again, allocating the corresponding share of unknowns to the Jewish group, the number of Jewish adults age 20 and over would increase to 3,358,000, representing 1.5 percent of that age group, and a decrease of 4.7 percent compared to the corrected estimate for 2001.

Since these data refer to the population age 20 and over, they should be integrated by adding an estimate of the Jewish population under age 20. In 2001, the latter's share of the total Jewish population was 22.4 percent. Thus, the corrected estimate, including all age groups, is 4,541,000. In 2008, no estimate is available for the share of Jewish population under age 20. Assuming the same share as in 2001—a generous assumption—the corrected total would rise to 4,327,000 Jews in 2008, implying a decrease of 4.7 percent over seven years, or 0.7 percent annually.

We should stress that these estimates refer to a Jewish population estimate that already incorporates an allocation of about 20 percent for persons who did not declare their religious preference, either because they do not have one or they do not wish to reveal it. There is no doubt that these unknowns include their share of Jews—ethnic, cultural, secular, or otherwise. Nonetheless, the somewhat stretched 4.3 million estimate obtained for ARIS 2008 is intriguingly similar to the 4.3 million Jewish (by religion) population found by NJPS 2000-01. Possibly these ARIS findings hint at the existence of a higher proportion of unaccounted Jews among those not identified by religion in the United States. But in the end, both NJPS 2000-01 and the similar AJIS 2001 final estimates seem to have adequately allocated for identificationally marginal Jews.

AJC Survey. Evidence of a decrease in Jewish population is seen in a survey by Tom Smith for the American Jewish Committee (AJC Survey) on lifetime religious affiliation changes.⁶¹ Examining shifts in religious preference in American society—comparatively more frequent than in other societies—some denominations tend to benefit, while others lose. Catholics and older established Protestant denominations tend to lose, while Evangelical denominations, Eastern cults, and especially the “religiously undefined” tend to gain.

Regarding Jews in 2008, of overall lifetime Jewish identification, 76 percent had a stable identification—meaning they were Jewish both at birth and at the time of the survey; 9 percent were gains—meaning they were Jewish at the time of the survey but were not Jewish at birth; and 15 percent were losses—meaning they were Jewish at birth but were not Jewish at the time of the survey. A significant part of the losses was to the non-religiously identified. The overall finding is that American Jewry is neither gaining nor losing large numbers due to conversions to and from other religions. However, nearly twice as many secessions as accessions are seen.

Current Jewish Population Report 2010-1. Other scholars (in addition to the HARI 2001-02 survey discussed above) have suggested that the number of Jews in the United States has been underestimated and in fact might be one million higher than reported by NJPS 2000-01 and AJIS 2001. One research strategy used by Ira Sheskin and Arnold Dashefsky compiles the results of many dozens of local Jewish community studies plus hundreds of other local Jewish population estimates and then sums these estimates to develop a national estimate. Such an effort undertaken on the basis of data available in 2010 suggested a United States Jewish population of possibly 6.0 to 6.4 million.⁶² At least five observations may be made about the validity of this approach.

First, it should be noted that the United States Census Bureau has conducted a decennial national population count since 1790 and has never relied on summing estimates from local authorities or on population updates of older databases. The United States Census is expensive, but essential to provide current information for planning. Interestingly, census results never produce figures that are identical to those extrapolated from a previous census after accounting for known factors of change. The reason is that each census carries its own peculiar biases, such as undercoverage, overcoverage, and other factors that may impinge upon the findings and their interpretation. Simply updating the previous census results would perpetuate its biases over time. A fresh baseline is periodically needed so as to not carry over past errors. The same rationale should plausibly apply to Jewish population studies.

Second, for Jewish populations, as with any minority group, the situation is even more problematic. Over time, dozens of local Jewish community studies are completed by different researchers with different sponsors, different purposes and agendas, different Jewish population definitions, different data collection methods, and different contents. Often, Jewish communities wait 20 or more years between surveys and some major communities have never completed studies. Lack of synchronization and consistency constitutes a significant flaw in the methodology of using the sum of local studies to develop a national estimate.

Third, the fact that some households are being counted in two local Jewish community studies results in an over count. This happens, first, because of the very high geographical mobility of American Jews—mainly from the Northeast and the Midwest to the South and the West. Recent studies of Jewish mobility show that one in six residents moved into their current community within the past five years, and another one in six moved there between five and nine years ago.⁶³ This means that a household could be counted in a local Jewish community study as living in Milwaukee in 1996 and then by a similar study in Sarasota in 2001. Thus, this household would be double counted using the Sheskin and Dashefsky methodology. A household moving from Sarasota to Milwaukee would be missed by both surveys.

In addition, many households, particularly retirees who spend part of the year in a retirement community and part of the year in the community in which they raised their families, as well as college students who reside off-campus, are sometimes double counted. While Sheskin and Dashefsky make an effort to eliminate double counting, the sources at their disposal do not always allow for perfect results. In an effort to improve the accuracy of population estimates, some useful lessons can be learned. In a not distant past, internal migration within the United States often went from smaller to larger population centers. Currently, the contrary may often be true, as part of the suburbanization process but also reflecting the changing location of employment

opportunities. In this context it is important to consider the high level of education of Jews and their frequent specialization in professional activities, some of which are located in major urban centers but some of which are not. The fundamental notion is that Jewish population geography changes all the time, and rather quickly.

Fourth, some local studies partially rely on List Samples that tend to reflect the more Jewishly-connected portion of the population, who have a higher Jewish household size, which results in an overestimation of the Jewish population. The Distinctive Jewish Name (DJN) sampling method is superior to List Sampling, but carries its own biases. The better sampling method is random digit dialing (RDD), but it is very expensive. In most studies, RDD sampling is combined with either List Sampling or DJN Sampling, but the methodology for merging and weighting DJN and List Samples with RDD Samples is not perfect.

Fifth, a few local surveys do not adequately distinguish between the *core* and *enlarged* Jewish population concepts, thus providing inflated numbers reflecting the broader definition. In addition, about 20 percent of the national Jewish population estimate derived from summing the local studies, reflects estimates for Jewish communities for which no local Jewish community study has been completed in the past seventeen years. These estimates are provided by local Jewish community informants, such as directors of Jewish Federations and rabbis. While a recent analysis showed that informant estimates may not be as inaccurate as often thought, this remains a significant shortcoming.⁶⁴ It is agreed that the results for the 80 percent of the Jewish population covered by local studies is not representative of the remaining 20 percent, since the 80 percent covered by local studies live, for the most part, in the largest Jewish communities.

Without detracting from the importance of local studies—still the most important tool for Jewish community planning—the methodology of summing the local studies to obtain a national estimate is highly problematic, as is recognized by Sheskin and Dashefsky,⁶⁵ and that is why this Report relies upon the large national studies (with all their acknowledged weaknesses) for the estimate of the United States Jewish population.

SSRI Meta-Analysis. A different approach has been suggested by the ambitious and innovative project of the Steinhardt Social Research Institute (SSRI) at Brandeis University.⁶⁶ A large number of national social surveys completed for a wide variety of reasons by reputable survey research teams were gathered, each including a Jewish subsample. The number of Jewish cases in such national surveys is usually small, but combining many relatively small subsamples allows for a meta-analysis of a much larger United States Jewish sample, which entails significant analytic benefits.⁶⁷

When first released, this new effort seemed to confirm the estimates of Jewish population size suggested by NJPS 2000-01 and AJIS 2001. Based on an initial review of 74 studies from 1990-2005, the median percentage of Jews among total respondents was 1.94 percent. Because of the low percentage of Jews under age 20 found in NJPS 2000-01, we argue that the percentage of Jews among the total United States population, including adults and children, should be decreased by a factor of 0.935 to 1.814 percent. The 2000 United States Census reported a total United States population of 281,421,906. A median of 1.814 percent Jewish suggests 5,104,993 Jews. On

average, for the 74 surveys, 95 percent of respondents answered the question on religion. Adjusting the Jewish population for non-response on the religion question, suggests an estimate of 5,373,677 Jews. This estimate is almost identical to AJIS 2001, but is spread over more than 15 years, with a mid-term date in the late 1990s. As noted, both NJPS 2000-01 and AJIS 2001 suggest an ongoing Jewish population decrease. Projecting the SSRI data to 2010, would yield a number somewhat lower than the 5,373,677 suggested above.

In a later report, however, SSRI suggested a much higher United States Jewish population estimate of at least 6.5 million.⁶⁸ The new study relied on 31 surveys selected from the 74 studies originally used. They also compared a few age cohorts from this new database of 31 surveys to NJPS 2000-01 (AJIS 2001 was not discussed) and evaluated Jewish school enrollment according to various available sources.

There are strengths, but also weaknesses, to the SSRI approach. **First**, the decision to narrow the analysis to only 31 surveys deemed to be the best of the 74 available surveys seriously detracts from the randomness of the data. It is in fact the unbiased collection of as many sources as possible—each with its own strengths, weaknesses, and idiosyncrasies—that constitutes the main advantage of the original SSRI meta-analysis.

Second, because all surveys included in the SSRI approach asked a question about religion and not ethnicity, the meta-analysis can only consider persons explicitly identified by religion and then use conjecture to extrapolate the number of Jews by religion to a total estimate of American Jews. Such conjecture is significantly affected by the knowledge that emerges from existing data sources, and by the analysts' own hypotheses. One important SSRI finding is the correlation that exists between survey sponsoring agencies, survey response rates, and percent of Jews among the total sample.⁶⁹ The more broadly representative the agency is (such as the United States government as against the patron of a narrowly defined special constituency), the higher is the response rate; and the higher the response rate is, the higher is the percentage of Jews in the sample. It is understood that some people who are not ready to participate or to report themselves as Jewish in a Jewish-sponsored survey, are ready to report themselves as Jews by religion in a general social survey. Since NJPS 2000-01 and AJIS 2001 had narrowly defined sponsorships (easily identifiable with the Jewish community), they expectedly had relatively low response rates and their ability to uncover a Jewish population was admittedly on the low side of the range. On the other hand, one could argue that Jewish sponsorship might have led to Jews remaining on the phone and non-Jews hanging up, yielding a higher percentage of Jews. Indeed, NJPS 2000-01 and AJIS 2001 investigators made concerted efforts to find Jews with a series of detailed questions on personal identity. Thus, while the large Jewish national surveys were possibly plagued by low response rates and possibly low rates of Jewish response, they were able to compensate for these shortcomings with high rates of recovery of identificationally marginal cases. This opportunity to delve in depth into family origins, cultural persuasions, and patterns of behavior does not exist with general social surveys, which rely on both smaller samples and shorter questionnaires.

Consequently, the NJPS/AJIS efforts to cover a Jewish population defined more broadly than by mere religion tend to generate total (or *core*) Jewish population estimates significantly higher than the number of Jews initially identified by religion, which were inherently low because of a low response rate. Some of those who were not

initially identified through religion eventually do acknowledge Jewish religious identification. Given these basic differences in survey response rates and identification patterns, it is inappropriate to apply the low NJPS/AJIS initial ratio of Jews by religion to total Jews to other general social surveys which have much better response rates—hence higher ratios of Jews by religion to total Jews. But this appears to be what the meta-analysis does, resulting in inflated Jewish population estimates.

Third, general social surveys typically only cover adult respondents. Thus, they do not collect information about each individual in the household; in particular, no information is usually gathered for children under age 18, as did both NJPS 2000-01 and AJIS 2001. It is problematic to assume that the percentage of Jews among total *respondents* can be applied to the percentage of Jews among the total *population*. Indeed, we have argued that each Jewish respondent represents fewer children because fertility is lower for Jews than for the total population. In addition, Jewish household size is lower than that for the total population because the Jewish population is older and contains many more one-person households. The meta-analysis ignores these adjustments.

Fourth, while a generic respondent represents other generic members of the household, determining a certain multiplier, a *Jewish* respondent represents both other Jewish and non-Jewish household members, thus determining a lower multiplier. This seems to have been overlooked in the meta-analysis.

Fifth, the main thrust of the age cohort comparisons between the meta-analysis and NJPS 2000-01 is that they are significantly consistent, which would support and not contradict the basic reliability of NJPS. There is, however, the important exception of one or two baby boom age cohorts: Jewish adults age 35-44 and age 45-54. In 2001 these adults were born, respectively, between 1957-1966 and 1947-1956. Indeed, a reduction in the number of Jews born in those specific years (which can be defined as *cohort erosion*) had already been noted when comparing NJPS 2000-01 with NJPS 1990. Perhaps more interestingly, erosion among the same cohorts had already been noted when comparing NJPS 1990 with NJPS 1971.⁷⁰ This continued diminution in the number of adults born in a given year who report being Jewish is probably not due to data quality, but to the cultural-ideational patterns of the American baby-boomers, where Jewish identification based on religion has shown a steady transition to one grounded in ethnicity, culture, or being “Just Jewish.” Again, an analysis that relies primarily on the religion category, as in the meta-analysis, is more likely to miss this phenomenon than would NJPS/AJIS who rely on more complex definitions. The corrective is not a matter for inference; rather, it must be empirically tested.

Sixth, whenever an estimate provided by NJPS 2000-01 can be checked against a similar estimate from another source, the comparison usually holds—with the possible exception of Jewish Community Center (JCC) membership. Examples of such good matches are the estimated numbers of children enrolled in Jewish day school compared with actual school enrollment⁷¹ and the estimated number of documented immigrants compared with actual institutional data.⁷² For Jewish day school, both NJPS 2000-01 and actual pupil records suggest that 25 percent of all school-age Jewish children are enrolled in a Jewish day school. Such a percentage—high in American Jewish history but quite low in comparison with most other Jewish communities worldwide⁷³—may defy the intuition of some observers but is consistent with the growing percentage of Orthodox among younger cohorts of United States Jews, which in turn reflects the latter

group's higher birth rates and fewer losses due to assimilation. The meta-analysis does not estimate Jewish day school enrollment well.

In sum, general social surveys are mostly based on respondents, and only a few such surveys collect information on a full roster of all household members. Religion is seldom the main focus of investigation of these surveys, and usually only one question on religion is asked. Thus, in most general social surveys not only is no direct knowledge of household size and composition available, but the lack of depth concerning Jewish identity measures also detracts from the analyst's ability to determine the identificational configuration of the group at stake, its cultural boundaries, and population size. These various considerations support the general plausibility of the Jewish population estimates provided by NJPS/AJIS/ARIS. The SSRI suggestions that United States Jewry might comprise 6.0-6.5 million, or perhaps even as many as 7.5 million persons, or that 70,000 Jewish babies are born annually, become plausible only if referring to the *enlarged* concept of total population in households and not the *core* concept of individually-identified Jews.⁷⁴

In addition, both the compilation of local studies and the meta-analysis approaches share two critical weaknesses:

The **first** weakness is their inability to provide an integrated age-composition of the United States Jewish population inclusive of all Jewish adults and Jewish children, as the NJPS/AJIS studies do. As noted above, age composition is a most basic analytic referent, which both synthesizes past changes and functions as an agent of future changes. Current age is an intermediary between the demography of two successive generations, and its absence seriously impairs discourse about population trends.

The **second**, even more crucial, shared weakness of the two alternative approaches is their lack of historical perspective for current estimates. If it is true that today there are more than 6 million Jews in the United States, we expect to be told how many there were in 1990 and at previous dates back to the end of World War II, or even before. A population, as we have argued, increases or decreases as a consequence of a limited set of factors whose impact must be assessed along with the overall estimate. A much higher estimate in 2001 and later implies either that United States Jewry recently experienced a fast pace of growth—against all existing evidence—or that all previous estimates should be significantly raised—implying over fifty years of gross mistakes in Jewish population studies.

Alternatively, the new higher estimates suggest that the current assessment of United States Jewry can be severed from its past history. This is tantamount to discovering or constructing a new entity without historical continuity. While there surely is ample space for a discussion of contemporary United States Jewry as a cultural phenomenon not necessarily stemming from its own past or from other strands of Jewish history, this is not appropriate in the realm of population studies.

In the light of this abundant and intriguing evidence, the United States Jewish population estimate of 5,275,000 presented in this report reflects what seems to be a well documented pattern of recent Jewish population stagnation or decrease in the United States. As noted, United States Jewry is characterized by an aging population composition and low fertility rates well below generational replacement. In addition, a low percentage of children of intermarriage are being raised as Jews⁷⁵—a feature that might change in the future as suggested by the much higher percentages found by the

2005 Boston study⁷⁶ and by the Middlesex County, NJ study of 2008.⁷⁷

A reading of the current age composition of United States Jewry and other current evidence suggests that about 50,000 Jewish births occur annually in the United States versus nearly 60,000 Jewish deaths. The number of Jewish immigrants to the United States has diminished significantly, especially from the former Soviet Union. Current permanent emigration from Israel to the United States is limited to a few thousand annually. In 2008 and 2009, a total of 4,500 new immigrants moved from the United States to Israel, while a growth in Israeli returning and immigrant citizens from the United States was also recorded. We estimate a net migration into the United States of 5,000 Jews.

Besides the number of Jews, it is essential to assess the nature of the underlying demographic dynamics. We therefore turn to an evaluation of the direction of change in the size of the United States Jewish population in recent years and make projections for the foreseeable future. Assuming no major geopolitical changes intervene that might affect the pace and direction of international migration, one can compare different scenarios mostly based on the actual trends of the past ten or twenty years. The interplay of effective fertility rates and international net migration balances can produce variable effects on Jewish population size.

Table 13 assesses these effects based on an initial population size as of 2001—the year of the last NJPS/AJIS. The initial estimate is set here at an arbitrary value of 100. An effective Jewish fertility rate of 1.5 seems to be the most realistic, taking into account the impact of intermarriage on the Jewishness of children. Assuming that Jewish migration to the United States will continue at its current rather modest level, the number of Jews would remain unchanged between 2001 and 2011 (as well as in 2016). Lesser migration, or an even lower Jewish fertility rate, would be sufficient to produce a decrease of several percentage points in the estimate. One percentage point, it should be noted, is the equivalent of more than 50,000. For the United States Jewish population to show an increase since 2001, an increase in the effective Jewish fertility rate to a level of 1.9 should have occurred. This is highly implausible in view of the Jewish fertility rates documented by NJPS 2000-01 and the age composition of American Jewry and its relationship to birth rate.

TABLE 13. CORE JEWISH POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES PROJECTED BY ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND EFFECTIVE JEWISH FERTILITY, 2001-2016 (2001 = 100)

| Year | With Migration, Effective Jewish Fertility: | | | No Migration, Effective Jewish Fertility: | | |
|------|--|-----|-----|--|-----|-----|
| | 1.1 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 1.9 |
| 2001 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 2006 | 99 | 100 | 102 | 98 | 99 | 100 |
| 2011 | 98 | 100 | 103 | 96 | 98 | 101 |
| 2016 | 96 | 100 | 104 | 93 | 97 | 101 |

These evaluations provide evidence to support our assumption that the size of the United States Jewish population has changed little since 2001 and will probably not change for several more years. The assumption of growth in American Jewry over the first decade of the 21st century does not look tenable. Following these data and

assumptions, our 2001 estimate was adjusted to 5,275,000 and the same was retained unchanged for 2010.

Admittedly, the quality of United States Jewish population estimates cannot be compared to the more rigorous sources in Israel and in a few other countries. In the absence of better data, comparisons among countries tend to be speculative. Even more significantly, Jewish identification tends to reflect the very different constraints and opportunities of the relatively open environment of the United States where a multiplicity of overlapping identities can be legitimately held under the general American panoply, as against a closed society still surrounded by a hostile environment, as in Israel, or the more rigid rules that inform identification preferences in other societies. But this seems to be the better baseline for additional discussion about the present and future trends of the American Jewish population.

While, by the *core* concept, the number of Jews in the United States today plausibly is lower than the number in Israel, it is beyond dispute that the United States has a far larger *enlarged* and *Law of Return* population. The former comprises at least 6.7 million persons who live in Jewish households, the same number who have some recent Jewish ancestry, and a combined 7.7-8.7 million persons in all households with at least one Jew and/or one non-Jew of Jewish parentage. We estimate that the rules of the *Law of Return*—which along with Jews also entitles their non-Jewish children, grandchildren, and the respective spouses to Israeli citizenship—would apply in the United States to 10 to 12 million persons.

In the United States, the debate about numbers has been invested with an importance and symbolic meaning that transcends by far the social scientific arguments. In the public debate, perceptions of Jewish population size have tended to become a proxy for honor, legitimacy, relative visibility in the Jewish world, and probably predominance in its politics and resource allocation. This is, in the end, the main gist of what is perceived by some as a *competition* between population estimates for the United States and Israel.⁷⁸ In Israel, having a Jewish population estimate for Israel that is higher than the United States estimate also is fraught with political implications as both a point of national pride and a resource in Israel-Diaspora relations.

One method of solving this conundrum would be to continue the routine of periodic data collection that the Council of Jewish Federations and United Jewish Communities (UJC) had established with NJPS 1971, NJPS 1990, and NJPS 2000-01. A new national study would signal an attitude of respect for research and development in national community planning and might allow for new comparisons, evaluation of any changes in the observed trends, deepened insights, correction of past mistakes, and improved projections for the future. But in 2007, UJC (now the Jewish Federations of North America) decided not to sponsor a new NJPS in 2010, while at the same time copyrighting the NJPS logo for itself. These momentous decisions highlight perceptions of the organized community about their own mandate, namely the role of research as a basis for planning and resource allocation. It can be hoped that research on United States Jewish population and communities will continue through other avenues that will include collaboration between central Jewish institutions and private initiatives.

Canada

In **Canada**, the situation is significantly different than in the United States concerning both available databases and substantive population trends. The release of the 2006

Census results by Statistics Canada, which included a question on ethnic ancestry, provided an important new piece of data (**Table 14**).⁷⁹ Estimates of Jewish ethnicity, released every five years, can be compared with estimates of religion, released every ten years. Both types of information can be used to provide an estimate of Canada's *core* Jewish population. Ethnic Jews, as defined by the Canadian Census, include persons who hold a non-Jewish religion, but these persons are not included in the *core* concept used herein. On the other hand, persons without religion may declare a Jewish ethnicity in the Canadian Census and are included in the *core*. The Jewish Federation of Canada addresses this as the *Jewish Standard Definition*.

Data on religion and ancestry are collected through open-ended questions, with examples and instructions provided. Since 1981, Canadians can declare either a single or a multiple ethnic ancestry (up to four categories, one for each grandparent). Consequently, people can be ethnically Jewish only, or Jewish and something else, being the descendants of intermarriages or expressing multiple cultural identities.

Following Jewish ethnicity throughout the past 25 years provides interesting clues on Jewish population and identification in Canada. An initial estimate of 293,000 ethnic Jews in 1981 increased to a peak of 370,000 in 1991, and has since decreased to 349,000 in 2001 and 315,000 in 2006—a decrease of 9.6 percent in five years.

More striking changes affected the distribution of Canadians and of the Jews among them between single and multiple ethnicities. Among Canada's total population in 2006, 5.7 million (31 percent) of the 18.3 million who provided a single ethnic response declared themselves to be Canadian, and 4.3 million (33 percent) of the 12.9 million who provided a multiple response did so. All in all, 10 million of a total population of over 31 million reported a Canadian ethnicity—which in other epochs was thought to be a nonexistent construct.⁸⁰ Most likely, the rapid growth of *Canadian* as a primary or additional ethnic category affects identification perceptions among Jews. In 1981, 90 percent of total ethnic Jews declared a single ethnicity, but this share had decreased to 66 percent in 1991, 53 percent in 2001, and 43 percent in 2006. For the first time, in 2006 the Canadian Census shows that less than half who claim a Jewish ethnic ancestry do not mention an additional ancestry. The proportion of Jews (57 percent) with a multiple ethnicity is today much higher than among the total population (41 percent).⁸¹

TABLE 14. JEWISH POPULATION IN CANADA, BY DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS, 1981-2006

| Year | Jewish Ethnicity | | | Jewish Religion | Core Jewish Population |
|------|--------------------|---------|----------|-----------------|------------------------|
| | Total ^a | Single | Multiple | | |
| 1981 | 293,175 | 264,025 | 29,150 | 296,425 | 312,060 |
| 1986 | 343,505 | 245,855 | 97,650 | | |
| 1991 | 369,565 | 245,850 | 123,725 | 318,070 | 356,315 |
| 1996 | 351,705 | 195,810 | 155,900 | | |
| 2001 | 348,605 | 186,475 | 162,130 | 329,995 | 370,520 |
| 2006 | 315,120 | 134,045 | 181,070 | | |

^a Minor discrepancies due to rounding.
Source: Statistics Canada.

Thus, the sharp decrease from 1991 to 2006 in Jewish ethnic identification does not necessarily provide evidence of a decrease in total Jewish population size, although it clearly points to a powerful process of acculturation. Intermarriage is on the increase,

but the share of children of intermarriage reported to be Jewish is also increasing. Significant gender differences emerged in this respect: The likelihood of a child of intermarriage being raised Jewish is four times higher with a Jewish mother than with a Jewish father.⁸²

The number of Canada's Jews according to religion increased from 296,000 in 1981 to 318,000 in 1991 (an increase of 7.3 percent) and to 330,000 in 2001 (an increase of 3.7 percent). As noted, an estimate according to religion is not available from the 2006 Census. It should be stressed, though, that between 1991 and 2001, 22,365 Jews immigrated to and were counted in Canada, while the Jewish population increase according to religion was only 11,925. Consequently, the Jewish population according to religion would have decreased by 10,440 (a decrease of 3.3 percent) were it not for this immigration. Emigration is moderate, with 547 persons moving to Israel in 2008-2009.

Keeping in mind that some ethnic Jews are not Jewish by religion and that an even greater number of Jews by religion do not declare a Jewish ethnicity, a combined estimate of 312,000 for Canada's Jewish population in 1981, increasing to 356,000 in 1991 and 371,000 in 2001 seems reasonable.⁸³ Assuming continuing immigration to Canada, but also some internal attrition, we estimate the Jewish population to have increased to 375,000 in 2010, the world's fourth largest Jewish community. This estimate is not strictly comparable with the concept of *core* Jewish population as it includes a fast increasing number of persons for whom Jewish is only one among multiple ethnic identities, and some of whom may not readily identify as Jewish if asked. Some of these would probably better be included among the non-Jewish component of the *enlarged* Jewish population. Taking into account all ethnic Jews who profess a non-Jewish religion, and other non-Jewish household members, an *enlarged* Jewish population of over 450,000 would probably obtain.

Central and South America

In Central and South America, the Jewish population generally has been decreasing, reflecting recurring economic and security concerns.⁸⁴ However, outside the mainstream of the established Jewish community, an increased interest in Judaism appeared among real or putative descendants of Conversos whose ancestors left Judaism and converted to Christianity under the pressure of the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal. Some of these Converso communities have been trying to create a permanent framework for their Jewish identity, in part manifested through formal conversion to Judaism and migration to Israel. In the long run, such a phenomenon might lead to some expansion in the size of some Jewish communities, especially smaller ones located in the peripheral areas of Brazil, Peru, Colombia, and other countries.

Argentina has the largest Jewish community in Central and South America. Nearly 6,000 Jews emigrated from Argentina to Israel in 2002—the highest number ever in a single year from that country—due to dire economic conditions in Argentina and to special incentives offered by Israel. In 2003, the Argentinean economic situation eased somewhat and Israel restricted its incentives, resulting in much lower levels of emigration. About 1,500 persons left Argentina for Israel in 2003, decreasing steadily to 188 in 2008 and 284 in 2009.⁸⁵ Based on the experience of previous years, approximately 20 percent of these migrants were non-Jewish household members. Partial evidence from different sources indicated that less than half of total Jewish emigration from Argentina was to Israel, with most others going to South Florida.

Permanence in Israel of the new immigrants was high, at least during the first year after immigration, with an attrition of about 10 percent emigrating within the first three years.⁸⁶

In 2004 and 2005, two Jewish population surveys were undertaken in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area (AMBA). Initial claims of a Jewish population of 244,000⁸⁷ were based on significantly extended definitional criteria. Of the 244,000, 64,000 were Christians and about another 20,000 reported some Jewish ancestry, but did not consider themselves Jewish. Overall, 161,000 people in the AMBA considered themselves as totally or partly Jewish—consistent with our own previous estimate of 165,000. This estimate for the major urban concentration appeared consistent with our national *core* estimate. The 244,000 estimate would be a good estimate of the *enlarged* Jewish population (including non-Jewish members of Jewish households) in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area, while over 300,000 persons were identified in the same survey who were in some way of Jewish origin or attached to a person of Jewish origin. Another survey, limited to the City of Buenos Aires, suggested significant aging of the *core* Jewish population, reflecting the emigration of younger households in recent years.⁸⁸ The current situation implies an annual loss of about 500-1,000 persons through a negative balance of Jewish births and deaths and emigration. Argentina's Jewish population is assessed at 182,300 in 2010, the world's seventh largest Jewish community.

In **Brazil**, the second largest Central and South American Jewish community, the 2000 Census indicated a rather stable Jewish population of 86,828, up from 86,416 in 1991.⁸⁹ Considering the possible omission of persons who did not answer the Census question on religion, we assessed Brazil's Jewish population at 97,000 in 2003 and, allowing for moderate emigration (444 persons went to Israel in 2008-2009), at 95,600 in 2010—the world's tenth largest Jewish community. The Census data were consistent with systematic documentation efforts undertaken by the Jewish Federation of São Paulo that showed a total of 47,286 Jews,⁹⁰ and an assumption that about one-half of Brazil's Jews live in that city. According to the Census data, the Jewish population in São Paulo decreased from 41,308 in 1980 to 37,500 in 2000.⁹¹ Brazil's *enlarged* Jewish population (including non-Jewish members of Jewish households) was assessed at 132,191 in 1980 and 117,296 in 1991⁹² and reached 119,430 in 2000.⁹³ It is assessed at 125,000 in 2010.

In **Mexico**, the third largest Jewish community in Central and South America, the 2000 Census reported a Jewish population of 45,260 age 5 and over.⁹⁴ Of these, 32,464 lived in the Mexico City metropolitan area, while a most unlikely 12,796 were reported in states other than the Federal District and Mexico State—consistent with erratic estimates in past Censuses. Allocation of the 0-4 age group based on a 2000 Jewish survey suggested an estimate of about 35,000 Jews in the Mexico City metropolitan area and 40,000 nationwide. A Jewish population survey undertaken in 2000 provided a national estimate of 39,870 Jews, of whom 37,350 lived in Mexico City,⁹⁵ confirming the results of a previous 1991 survey.⁹⁶ A new survey in 2006 confirmed the previous results.⁹⁷ Mexican Jewry still displayed a relatively young age profile compared to other Jewish populations on the continent, but some aging was visible during the past decade. In 2010, allowing for some emigration to the United States and Israel (some 200 persons moved to Israel in 2008-2009), we estimated the Jewish population at 39,400, the fourteenth largest Jewish community.

Chile has the fourth largest Jewish community in Central and South America.⁹⁸

This relatively stable Jewish population of over 20,000 is now larger than **Uruguay**⁹⁹ and **Venezuela**.¹⁰⁰ Both latter countries experienced significant Jewish emigration in recent years. In 2000, about 20 percent of the former students of Jewish schools in Uruguay, and over one-third of the adult children of Caracas Jews, lived in a different country. Based on recent evidence, including over 150 migrants to Israel in 2008-2009, the Jewish population estimate for Uruguay was reduced to 17,500 in 2010. The estimate for Venezuela was reduced to 12,000, reflecting the ongoing political concerns in that community and significant emigration (only 77 persons to Israel, but higher numbers to other countries, particularly South Florida, in 2008-2009).

In Central America, **Panama**'s Jewish population was estimated at 8,000 following some Jewish immigration from other Central and South American countries. **Costa Rica**, as well as **Colombia** and **Peru**, had Jewish populations below 3,000.

EUROPE

The Jewish population in Europe, estimated at 1,455,900 in 2010, is increasingly concentrated in the western part of the continent and within the European Union (EU) (see **Appendix**). The EU, after the addition of Bulgaria and Romania, reached an estimated total of 1,118,000 Jews in 2010 (77 percent of the continent's total). The former Soviet republics in Europe outside the EU comprised 297,100 Jews (20 percent). All other European countries combined comprised 40,800 Jews (3 percent).

The momentous European political transformations since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet Union have brought about significant changes in the structure of Jewish community organizations, with an expanded presence of Israeli and American organizations in Eastern European countries. The latter have played an important role in strengthening or even creating anew the possibilities of Eastern European Jewish life in the fields of religion, education, culture, social service, and support to the needy. The revitalization of Jewish community life may have some impact on demographic trends, primarily through the revival of submerged Jewish identities and the stimulus of greater social interaction with other Jews, possibly leading to Jewish marriages and children. Europe is much more politically fragmented than the United States, making it more difficult to create a homogeneous database. Nevertheless several works have attempted to create and expand such analytic frames of reference.¹⁰¹

The European Union

In 2004, the EU expanded from 15 to 25 countries, incorporating the three Baltic FSU republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), another five that had been part of the Soviet area of influence in Eastern Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia), and two southern European insular countries (Cyprus and Malta). In 2007, two more countries that had been part of the Eastern Europe sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, Romania and Bulgaria, were admitted to the EU. The EU's expanded format symbolized an important historical landmark: the virtual boundary between Western and Eastern Europe was erased. Croatia and Macedonia are the next candidates for EU membership. Ongoing disagreements about the future membership of Islamic Turkey reflect a dilemma in the definition of Europe's own cultural and geopolitical boundaries.

The largest Jewish community in Europe is **France**, where a 2002 national survey suggested 500,000 *core* Jews plus an additional 75,000 non-Jewish members of Jewish households.¹⁰² Jewish population is slowly decreasing, primarily due to emigration, mainly to Israel, but also to Canada, the United States, and other countries. Migration to Israel, after surpassing 2,000 annually for several years, decreased to 1,562 in 2008 and 1,556 in 2009. Jewish emigration levels reflected the continuing sense of uneasiness in the face of acts of anti-Jewish intolerance, including physical violence.

A survey of Jewish tourists to Israel from France in 2004 unveiled a remarkable estimate of 125,000 visitors, or more than 30 percent of all French Jews age 15 and over.¹⁰³ Much higher percentages have ever been to Israel. Of the 125,000, 23 percent (about 29,000) affirmed their intention to move to Israel in the near future. The United States was a distant second candidate for possible emigration. Migration intentions are not a proxy for actual migration decisions, but in the past such intentions proved quite reliable in the case of French Jews.¹⁰⁴ The diminishing feeling of security among French Jewry and the actual movement of thousands of persons is undisputable. Our 2010 estimate for French Jewry, the third largest in the world, was therefore decreased to 483,500.

In the **United Kingdom**, the 2001 national population Census included a voluntary question on religion for the first time since the nineteenth century.¹⁰⁵ The total Jewish population of 266,741 for England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland closely approximated our previous 273,500 estimate for 2002. One interesting Census finding was that the Jewish population was dispersed over the whole national territory, including all Counties but one—the Scilly Islands. The presence of Jews in areas lacking Jewish infrastructure suggests a lower degree of affiliation with the organized community than previously assumed. British Jewry is aging, with 16 percent of persons under age 15, compared to 22 percent age 65 and over. As already noted, more detailed data for Scotland (where some Census questions were asked differently than in other areas of the United Kingdom) showed 6,448 people currently reporting Jewish religion as compared to a total of 7,446 who said they were raised as Jews—a net lifetime loss of 13 percent.¹⁰⁶

About 23 percent of the United Kingdom total population reported no religion and another 7 percent did not answer the question. Note that the organized Jewish community publicly supported participation in completing the optional religion question on the Census. In the meantime, detailed Census tabulations were obtained by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research and the Board of Deputies of British Jews from the Office for National Statistics. An in-depth profile of the socio-demographic profile of British Jewry thus emerged, along with a better evaluation of the quality of Jewish population estimates.¹⁰⁷ Analyses of data for detailed geographical precincts allowed for estimates of non-response in areas with higher and lower Jewish shares of the total population. A significant correlation was found between the known Jewish religiosity (in terms of the local presence of very Orthodox Jews) of a ward, and non-response to the religion question. This might raise fears of substantial undercoverage of the Jewish population in those areas. On the other hand, post-Census surveys of Jews in London and Leeds did not reveal high percentages declaring they had not answered "Jewish" to the question on religion.

Vital statistics routinely collected by the Board of Deputies of British Jews Community Research Unit on the annual number of Jewish births were quite consistent with the Census returns. Comparing the uncorrected Census returns for the age 0-9 group and the recorded number of Jewish births over the past ten years preceding the Census, the discrepancy was only 2.5 percent. This confirms some undercount, but not on a scale that would significantly impact Jewish population Census estimates. The same vital statistics indicated a continuing excess of Jewish burials until 2004 (3,672 in 2002, 3,592 in 2003, and 3,257 in 2004) over Jewish births (2,748 in 2002, 2,648 in 2003, and 3,076 in 2004).¹⁰⁸ Since 2005 the trends apparently reversed (3,221 deaths in 2005 and 3,107 in 2006, compared to 3,339 births in 2005 and 3,314 in 2006).¹⁰⁹ The decreasing number of deaths is an obvious symptom of a shrinking population which loses several hundred people annually through a negative vital balance, and of under-reporting of Jewish deaths. Another indicator is that synagogue membership has been decreasing in the United Kingdom. Household membership decreased by 17.8 percent between 1990 and 2000, and by 4.5 percent (about one percent annually) between 2001 and 2005.¹¹⁰ This declining membership trend, however, seems to have abated, as in 2010 household membership was 82,963 households, compared to 83,567 households in 2005.¹¹¹ At the same time, the denominational balance has shifted toward strictly, often called right-wing, Orthodox (whose membership doubled between 1990 and 2010) and Masorti (tending to American Conservative, with an 85 percent membership increase), as against a reduction in the Central (mainstream) Orthodox (a 30 percent membership decrease).¹¹² This may plausibly explain the apparent increase in the birth rate. But the decreasing number of recorded burials is most likely explained by an increasing number of families who do not choose Jewish burial societies.

We increased the United Kingdom Jewish population estimate from the Census count of 266,741 to 300,000 for 2001 (about 12 percent), assuming a lower rate of non-response among Jews than in the general population. All in all, this seems a fair resolution. The updating must account for the negative balance of births and deaths, after correcting for under-reporting, as well as a moderate increase in emigration (505 persons went to Israel in 2008 and 708 in 2009). We estimated the United Kingdom's total Jewish population at 292,000 in 2010, the world's fifth largest Jewish community.

In **Germany**, Jewish immigration, mainly from the FSU, added over 200,000 Jews and non-Jewish household members between 1989 and 2005 (see **Table 6**). This immigration has now significantly diminished. The German government, under pressure because of growing unemployment and a crumbling welfare system, limited Jewish immigration from the FSU in 2005. On January 1, 2005, the previous special quota immigration law (*Kontingentsflüchtlingsgesetz*) was replaced by new more restrictive rules (*Zuwanderungsgesetz*). Jews lost their privileged quota status. The new law elevated integration into German society and good economic prospects above other considerations and required Jews aspiring to immigrate to Germany to first prove that a community would accept them as members. Prior knowledge of the German language was required. Potential Jewish immigrants now also had to prove that they would not be dependent on welfare and were willing to enter the German labor market.¹¹³

In 2009, based on German Jewish community sources, 704 Jewish immigrants from the FSU were recorded as new members of German Jewish communities, as compared to 862 in 2008, 1,296 in 2007, 1,971 in 2006, 3,124 in 2005, 4,757 in 2004, 6,224 in 2003, and 6,597 in 2002.¹¹⁴ Admission criteria to the central Jewish community

follow Jewish rabbinical rules. The total number of *core* Jews registered with the central Jewish community, after increasing consistently since 1989 to a peak of 107,794 on January 1, 2007, diminished to 107,330 on January 1, 2008, 106,435 in 2009, and 104,241 in 2010. Of the current total, only 5,000-6,000 were part of the original community of 28,081 members at the end of 1990. The remainder were recent immigrants and their children. Between 2002 and 2004, the *enlarged* total of Jews and non-Jewish family members who came to Germany from the FSU was larger than the number of FSU migrants to Israel, but Israel regained primacy as of 2005.

The age composition of the 5,000-6,000 long-time Jewish residents of Germany—and even more so of the newcomers—is extremely skewed toward the elderly. In 2009, 183 Jewish births and 1,187 Jewish deaths were recorded by the Jewish community in Germany, a loss of more than 1,000 Jews. While 398 Jews joined the Jewish communities in 2009, 182 persons emigrated to Israel in 2008-2009 and 1,808 Jews withdrew membership from German Jewish communities. This explains why the recorded size of the central Jewish community decreased by over 2,000 in spite of immigration. Allowing for delays in joining the organized community on the part of new immigrants and a preference on the part of some Jews not to identify with its official institutions, we assessed Germany's *core* Jewish population at 120,000 in 2008 and 119,000 in 2010, the world's eighth largest Jewish community. The *enlarged* Jewish population, inclusive of the non-Jewish relatives of immigrants, is 250,000, and creates new opportunities for Jewish religious, social, and cultural life in Germany. It also suggests significant dependence on welfare and a significant need for elderly services.¹¹⁵

In **Hungary**, our *core* estimate of 48,600 Jews (the world's thirteenth largest Jewish community) reflects the negative balance of Jewish births and deaths in a country whose total population's vital balance has been negative for several years. A Jewish survey in 1999 reported a conspicuously larger *enlarged* Jewish population than expected.¹¹⁶ However, a demographic extrapolation based on the usually accepted number of post-Holocaust *core* Jewish survivors and accounting for the known or estimated numbers of births, deaths, and emigrants to Israel and other countries since 1945 closely matches our assessment. The *enlarged* Jewish population in Hungary is assessed at about 100,000 in 2010. In the 2001 Hungarian Census, only 13,000 reported themselves Jewish by religion. In 2008-2009, 144 persons emigrated to Israel.

Belgium's Jewish population was estimated at 30,300, the world's fifteenth largest Jewish community. Quite stable numbers reflected the presence of a traditional Orthodox community in Antwerp and the growth of a large European administrative center in Brussels that has attracted Jews from other countries. In 2008-2009, 209 Jews emigrated to Israel, reflecting concerns similar to those of French Jewry. Local Jewish population estimates are quite obsolete in comparison with most other EU countries, but the reported order of magnitude is supported by indirect evidence such as the number of votes collected by Jewish candidates in the 2003 legislative elections.¹¹⁷

The next two largest Jewish communities in the EU, and globally, were those in the Netherlands and Italy. In the **Netherlands**, a 1999 survey estimated a Halakhic Jewish population of 30,072 (which is the basis of our estimate of 30,000), of which perhaps as many as one-third were immigrants from Israel, and an *enlarged* Jewish population of 43,305.¹¹⁸ In **Italy**, total Jewish community membership—which historically comprised the overwhelming majority of the country's Jewish population—decreased

from 26,706 in 1995 to 25,143 in 2001 and 24,930 at the end of 2009.¹¹⁹ Our estimate of 28,400 adequately allocates for non-members.

Next in Jewish population size among European Union countries are **Sweden**, estimated at 15,000,¹²⁰ and **Spain**, estimated at 12,000.¹²¹ No other Jewish community in the European Union reaches 10,000 by the *core* definition. In some European Union countries national censuses offered a rough baseline for Jewish population estimates. In **Austria**, the 2001 Census reported 8,140 Jews, of which 6,988 lived in Vienna.¹²² We estimated the *core* community at 9,000. In **Romania**, the 2002 Census reported a Jewish population of 6,179, but we assessed the community at 9,700. In **Poland**, where the 2002 Census reported a Jewish population of 1,100, we estimated 3,200. For Austria, Romania, and Poland, available data on Jewish community membership helped improve the estimates.

The Former Soviet Union

In the former Soviet Union, Jewish population decrease continued, reflecting an overwhelming excess of Jewish deaths over Jewish births, high rates of intermarriage, low rates of Jewish identification among the children of intermarriages, and significant, though decreasing, emigration. Our 2010 assessment of the total *core* Jewish population for the 15 republics of the FSU is 330,000, of whom 311,400 lived in Europe and 18,600 in Asia. Almost as many non-Jewish household members were part of this large migration stream, creating an *enlarged* Jewish population nearly twice as large as the *core*.¹²³ A similar number of further eligible persons would probably lead to an estimated *Law of Return* population approaching one million. The ongoing process of demographic decrease was alleviated to some extent by the revival of Jewish cultural and religious activities, including Jewish education.¹²⁴

In the **Russian Federation**, the October 2002 Census reported 233,600 Jews, compared to our *core* Jewish population estimate of 252,000 for the beginning of 2003 (derived from a February 1994 Russian Microcensus estimate of 409,000 Jews).¹²⁵ Allowing for some Census undercount after the compulsory item on ethnicity (*natsyonalnost*) on identification documents was canceled and the Census ethnicity question was made optional for the first time, we evaluate the Jewish population at 205,000 in 2010, the world's sixth largest Jewish community.

Jewish population size was clearly more stable in the Russian Federation than in the other republics of the FSU. This partly reflected Jewish migration among the various republics as well as lower emigration from Moscow and other important urban areas in the Russian Federation.¹²⁶ Nevertheless, the striking imbalance of Jewish births and deaths, and continuing emigration (2,600 persons to Israel in 2008 and 3,244 in 2009, including non-Jewish household members) implies continuing population decrease and an increasing elderly age composition. The number of births to couples with two Jewish parents decreased from 1,562 in 1988 to 169 in 2000. Births to couples with at least one Jewish parent were estimated at 5,858 in 1988 and 1,057 in 2000. Recorded Jewish deaths were 13,826 in 1988 and 8,218 in 2000. As a result the estimated negative balance of these vital events was -7,978 in 1988 and -7,161 in 2000.¹²⁷ These changes occur in the context of a steady net population decrease being experienced by the Russian Federation in general, as well as by other European republics of the FSU.

In **Ukraine**, the December 5, 2001 Census, yielded an estimate of 104,300 Jews, not significantly different from our estimate of 100,000 on January 1, 2002. Given that

our baseline for the latter estimate was the 487,300 Jews counted in the Census of January 1989, the fit between the expected and actual was remarkable.¹²⁸ Given the dramatic pace of emigration since 1989 and continuing emigration at the end of 2001, the Census fully confirmed our previous assessment of ongoing demographic trends. Adding continuing emigration (1,310 persons to Israel in 2008 and 1,602 in 2009) that, among other things, reflects the instability of Ukraine's politics, we assess the 2010 *core* Jewish population at 71,500, the world's eleventh largest Jewish community.

Of the other European republics of the FSU, the largest Jewish population is in **Belarus**. The Belarus Census of October 2009 found 12,926 Jews, with 2.4 percent of the population not reporting an ethnicity/nationality.¹²⁹ Our estimate, also considering 744 migrants to Israel in 2008-2009, was provisionally adjusted to 16,500. Following EU membership in 2004 by the three Baltic republics of **Latvia**, **Lithuania**, and **Estonia**, the Jewish population has been fairly stable. After some adjustments, partly reflecting revisions of the Latvian and Lithuanian national population registers, and accounting for 145 migrants to Israel in 2008-2009, we assessed a combined 14,300 for the three countries in 2010.¹³⁰

A survey in **Moldova** found an *enlarged* Jewish population of 9,240 in 2000.¹³¹ The Moldova Census of October 2004 reported 3,628 Jews, although it did not cover the Russian controlled Moldovan territory east of the Dniester River. According to unofficial results of a separate Census of November 2004, about 1,200 Jews lived east of the Dniester River. Considering 418 emigrants to Israel in 2008-2009, we assess the *core* Jewish population of Moldova at 4,100 in 2010.

Other European Countries

As a result of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania joining the EU, only 40,800 Jews lived in Europe outside of the EU and the FSU. Of these, 19,400 lived in Western Europe, primarily in **Switzerland** (17,600),¹³² which in 2008-2009 sent some 144 migrants to Israel, and 21,400 lived in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, primarily in **Turkey** and mostly in Istanbul's European neighborhoods. A 2002 survey in Istanbul suggested widespread aging in a community that has experienced significant emigration (242 persons emigrated to Israel in 2008-2009). In Istanbul, 10 percent of the Jewish population was under age 15, compared to 18 percent age 65 and over.¹³³ *Enlarged* Jewish populations are significantly higher in Eastern Europe, reflecting the high levels of intermarriage among the dramatically reduced communities following the Shoah and massive emigration.

ASIA

The Jewish population in Asia is mostly affected by trends in Israel (see **Appendix**). Israel accounts for more than 99 percent of the total Jewish population in Asia. The former republics of the FSU in Asia and the aggregate of the other countries in Asia each account for less than one-half of one percent of the continental total.

Israel

After World War II, **Israel's** (then still Palestine) Jewish population was just over one-half million.¹³⁴ This population increased more than tenfold over the next 60 years due to mass immigration and a fairly high and uniquely stable natural increase. Israeli

population data are regularly produced by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).¹³⁵ Israel also has a permanent Population Register maintained by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Annual data derive from periodic censuses and detailed annual accountancy of intervening events (births, deaths, immigrants, emigrants, and converts). The most recent Census was in December 2008 and, as is usual, resulted in a correction to the current Jewish population estimates extrapolated from the previous 1995 Census. Thus, the original estimate of 5,569,200 for the end of 2008/beginning of 2009 was raised to 5,608,900—a 39,700 person increase. Two main reasons necessitated this update. The first is the normal discrepancy that may occur between repeated population counts. The second is possible delays in the reclassification of persons following conversion to (or from) Judaism.

At the beginning of 2010, Israel's *core* Jewish population reached 5,703,700, and, when combined with 312,800 non-Jewish members of Jewish households, formed an *enlarged* Jewish population of 6,016,500.¹³⁶ For the past several years, the main component of Jewish population growth in Israel has been the natural increase resulting from an excess of births over deaths. In 2004, for the first time, more than 100,000 Jews were born in Israel. In 2009, 116,599 Jewish births and 33,248 Jewish deaths produced a net Jewish natural increase of 83,351 persons. Israel's Jewish fertility rate increased slightly to nearly 2.9 children per woman, higher than in any other developed country and twice or more the effective Jewish fertility rate in most Diaspora Jewish communities. This reflected not only the large family size of the Jewish population's more religious component, but also a diffused desire for children among the moderately traditional and secular, especially remarkable among the upwardly mobile.¹³⁷

In 2009, 14,600 new immigrants, plus another 5,700 immigrant citizens, arrived in Israel, for a total of 20,300 immigrants, of whom 15,400 were Jewish.¹³⁸ Current emigration (estimated at 6,900, of whom 3,400 Jewish) reduced this to a net migration balance of 13,400, of whom 11,700 were Jewish. The number of converts to Judaism remained only a tiny percentage of the non-Jewish members of Jewish households in Israel, especially among recent immigrants. However, evidence from Israel's Rabbinical Conversion Courts indicates some increase in the number of converts. Overall, between 1999 and 2009, over 48,000, some of whom are not permanent Israeli residents, were converted to Judaism by Rabbinical Conversion Courts. Most converts were new immigrants from the Ethiopian Falash Mura community, but their number has greatly diminished. Consequently, in 2009, the number of converts approached 1,500. In 2008, the total number of converts was 6,144, of whom 5,321 were civilians and 823 were processed through the Rabbinate of the Israeli Defense Forces. The respective grand totals were 7,881 in 2007, 4,291 in 2006, and 6,068 in 2005.¹³⁹

To clarify the intricacies of demographic data in Israel and the territories of the Palestinian Authority, **Table 15** reports numbers of Jews, Others (i.e., non-Jewish persons who are members of Jewish households and Israeli citizens by the provisions of the Law of Return), Arabs, and foreign workers. Each group's total is shown for different territorial divisions: the State of Israel within the pre-1967 borders, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and Gaza. The percentage of Jews (by the *enlarged* definition) in each division is also shown.

Of the 5,703,700 *core* Jews in 2010, 5,413,800 lived within the State of Israel (as defined by Israel's legal system). Of these, 5,207,000 lived inside the pre-1967 borders, 189,000 in East Jerusalem, and 18,000 in the Golan Heights. Another about 290,000

lived in the West Bank. Of the 313,000 non-Jewish household members included in the *enlarged* Jewish population, 300,000 lived within the pre-1967 borders, 6,000 in East Jerusalem, 1,000 in the Golan Heights, and 6,000 in the West Bank.

Core Jews represented 75.5 percent of Israel's total population of 7,552,100, including East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the Israeli population in the West Bank, but not the Arab population in the West Bank and Gaza. Israel's *enlarged* Jewish population of 6,016,500 represented 79.7 percent of Israel's total population of 7,552,100. The enlarged Jewish population represented 79.0 percent of the total within pre-1967 borders, 41.4 percent in East Jerusalem, 46.3 percent in the Golan Heights, and 11.9 percent in the West Bank. If one also considers the Arab population of Gaza, *core* Jews constituted 7.3 percent (7.5 percent based on the *enlarged*) of the total population of the West Bank and Gaza. Israel's Arab population, including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, was 1,535,600, or 20.3 percent of the total population thus territorially defined.

TABLE 15. CORE AND ENLARGED JEWISH POPULATION, ARABS AND FOREIGN WORKERS IN ISRAEL AND PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, BY TERRITORIAL DIVISIONS, 1/1/2010^a

| Area | Core Jews | Others | Jews and Others ^b | Arabs | Foreign workers ^c | Total | % Jews and Others ^b |
|------------------------------|------------------|----------------|------------------------------|------------------|------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------|
| Total | 5,704,000 | 313,000 | 6,017,000 | 5,206,000 | 222,000 | 11,445,000 | 52.6 |
| State of Israel ^d | 5,414,000 | 307,000 | 5,721,000 | 1,536,000 | 222,000 | 7,479,000 | 76.5 |
| <i>Thereof:</i> | | | | | | | |
| Pre-1967 borders | 5,207,000 | 300,000 | 5,507,000 | 1,238,000 | 222,000 | 6,967,000 | 79.0 |
| East Jerusalem | 189,000 | 6,000 | 195,000 | 276,000 | N.A. | 471,000 | 41.4 |
| Golan Heights | 18,000 | 1,000 | 19,000 | 22,000 | N.A. | 41,000 | 46.3 |
| West Bank | 290,000 | 6,000 | 296,000 | 2,200,000 | N.A. | 2,496,000 | 11.9 |
| Gaza | - | - | - | 1,470,000 | N.A. | 1,470,000 | 0.0 |

a Rounded figures.

b *Enlarged* Jewish population.

c All Foreign workers were allocated to Israel within pre-1967 borders.

d As defined by Israel's legal system.

Table 16 reports the percentage of Jews according to the *core* and *enlarged* definitions out of the total population of an area from which we gradually and cumulatively subtract from the initial maximum possible extent the Arab population of designated areas. The result is a gradually growing Jewish share of the total population according to the different territorial configurations considered. This allows a better evaluation of the extent of a Jewish majority out of the total population under alternative assumptions.

Considering the total combined Jewish and Arab population of 11,222,100 (excluding foreign workers) living in Israel and the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza, the *core* Jewish population represented 50.8 percent of the total between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. If the 312,800 non-Jewish members of Jewish households are added to the *core* Jewish population, the *enlarged* Jewish population of 6,016,500 represented 53.6 percent of the total population of Israel and the Palestinian territories.

If we also add to the permanent population 222,000 non-Jewish foreign workers

who are not permanent residents, the *core* and *enlarged* Jewish populations represented, respectively, 49.8 percent and 52.6 percent of the total population present in Israel and the Palestinian territories, estimated at 11,444,100 in 2010. The Jewish majority is constantly decreasing—if extant at all—over the whole territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, and more particularly within the State of Israel.¹⁴⁰

TABLE 16. PERCENT OF CORE AND ENLARGED JEWISH POPULATION IN ISRAEL AND PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT TERRITORIAL DEFINITIONS, 1/1/2010

| Area | Percentage of Jews ^a , by definition | |
|--|---|-------------|
| | Core | Enlarged |
| Grand Total of Israel and Palestinian Territory | 49.8 | 52.6 |
| Minus Foreign workers | 50.8 | 53.6 |
| Minus Gaza | 58.5 | 61.7 |
| Minus West Bank | 75.5 | 79.7 |
| Minus Golan Heights | 75.7 | 79.9 |
| Minus East Jerusalem | 78.6 | 82.9 |

a Total Jewish population of Israel including East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights.

These estimates reflect our own assessment of the total Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza. In 1997, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) conducted a Census in the West Bank and Gaza and reported a combined population of 2,602,000, plus 210,000 in East Jerusalem. The PCBS subsequently released population projections based on fertility and migration assumptions.¹⁴¹ We judged the projected estimate of 4,081,000, including East Jerusalem, for the end of 2007, to be too high since it assumed a continuing immigration of Palestinians to the West Bank that did not materialize and was instead replaced by some out-migration (particularly of Christians). The latter estimates were also debated by a group of American and Israeli investigators who maintained that current population estimates from Palestinian sources were inflated by one and one-half million.¹⁴²

In November 2007, a new PCBS Census reported 3,542,000 in the West Bank and Gaza (plus 225,000 in East Jerusalem, clearly an undercount). The new Census total not unexpectedly was more than 300,000 lower than the PCBS projected estimate. Our own independent assessment, after subtracting East Jerusalem (which has been allocated to the Israeli side), accounting for a negative net migration balance of Palestinians, and some further corrections, was about 3,500,000 toward the end of 2007, and 3,670,000 on January 1, 2010. Of these people, about 2,200,000 were in the West Bank and 1,470,000 in Gaza. Our adjustment for the beginning of 2010 is quite close to the Palestinian Census of November 2007, thus reducing the estimate by the equivalent of about two years of natural increase. We assume the original figures had been overestimated by counting persons, students, and others who resided abroad for over one year.

By our estimates, the 1997-2009 yearly average Palestinian population increase in the aggregate of the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem) and Gaza would be 2.91 percent. This strictly matches a 2.91 percent yearly growth rate for Arabs in Israel over the same period.¹⁴³ The growth rate of Israel's Arab population was slowly declining

and in 2009 was 2.5 percent, as against 1.7 percent for the Jewish population with immigration and 1.5 percent without immigration. The Palestinian population's growth rate in the aggregate of the West Bank and Gaza was probably decreasing as well to a level very similar to that of Israel's Arabs.

The Arab population of East Jerusalem, which we have included in Israel's population count, was assessed at 276,000 at the end of 2009, at an average growth rate of 3.2 percent in 1997-2009, and constituted 35.6 percent of Jerusalem's total population of 773,000.¹⁴⁴ By adding East Jerusalem's Arabs to the 3,670,000 who live in the West Bank and Gaza, a total of 3,946,000 would obtain.¹⁴⁵ The total of the 1,536,000 Arab population of Israel and the total of the 3,670,000 Arab population of the West Bank and Gaza is 5,206,000.

In sum, Jews (by the *core* definition) constitute 49.8 percent of the total population present on the territory between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River, including foreign workers; 50.8 percent after subtracting foreign workers; 58.5 percent after subtracting Gaza; 75.5 percent after subtracting the Arab population of the West Bank; 75.7 percent after subtracting the Arab population of the Golan Heights; and 78.6 percent after subtracting the Arab population of East Jerusalem. If the *enlarged* rather than the *core* Jewish population is considered, each of these percentages increases by 3-4 percentage points.

Other Asian Countries

In the rest of Asia, the Jewish population consisted mainly of the rapidly decreasing communities in the eight Asian FSU republics, the largest of which were **Azerbaijan** (6,400 Jews in 2010), **Uzbekistan** (4,500), **Kazakhstan** (3,700), and **Georgia** (3,200).¹⁴⁶

The largest Jewish population in a single country in Asia besides Israel was Iran. Our estimate of 10,400 Jews in **Iran** reflects an effort to monitor intensive emigration to Israel, the United States, and Europe since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Large scale emigration, selectively inclusive of younger adults, typically engenders significant aging among the extant remaining communities.

Small Jewish populations, partly formed by temporary sojourners, exist in various South Asian and East Asian countries. Rapid economic development and increasing relations with Israel render these countries receptive to a small but clearly increasing Jewish presence.

AFRICA

The Jewish population in Africa was mostly concentrated in **South Africa** (93 percent of the continental total, see **Appendix**). According to the 2001 Census,¹⁴⁷ the white Jewish population was 61,675. Factoring in the national white non-response rate of 14 percent, led to a corrected estimate of 72,000. Allowing for a certain proportion of actual Jews among the higher self-reported numbers among South Africa's nonwhites (11,979 blacks, 1,287 coloreds, and 615 Indians, many of whom practice other religions), we assessed the total size of the Jewish community at 75,000 in 2001. Following a continuation of moderate emigration to Israel (over 500 persons in 2008-2009) and other countries, we estimate South Africa's Jewish population at 70,800 in 2010, the world's twelfth largest Jewish community.

Our revised estimates for Northern Africa acknowledge the ongoing reduction in the small Jewish populations remaining in **Morocco** and **Tunisia**, now assessed at 3,700 combined.

Virtually the entire Jewish population is estimated to have emigrated from **Ethiopia**. The question that remains open concerns the Falash Mura—a Christian community of Jewish ancestry. Upon migration to Israel, all Falash Mura undergo conversion. Their quest for family reunification creates a never-ending potential stream of unskilled non-Jewish immigrants and is the subject of continuing discussion. Since 3,589 Falash Mura emigrated to Israel in 2007, the flow decreased to 1,582 in 2008 and only 239 in 2009. Several thousand members of the community are still waiting in Ethiopia hoping to emigrate to Israel. It is not known how many more might apply.

OCEANIA

Continuing immigration produced some increase in Jewish population in Oceania. **Australia's** 2006 Census reported a Jewish population of 88,831, up about 5,000 from 2001.¹⁴⁸ Accounting for such factors as continuing immigration, moderate rates of intermarriage,¹⁴⁹ non-response to the Census question on religion, and the community's rather old age composition, we increased the *core* Jewish population estimate to 107,500 in 2010, the world's ninth largest Jewish population. The 2006 Census of **New Zealand** suggested a Jewish population increase to 6,858.¹⁵⁰ We assessed the total at 7,500 in 2010.

DISPERSION AND CONCENTRATION

In 2010, 93 countries had at least 100 Jews (**Table 17**). Two countries had Jewish populations of over 5 million each (Israel and the United States), another seven had more than 100,000 Jews, three had 50,000 to 99,999, five had 25,000 to 49,999, nine had 10,000 to 24,999, eight had 5,000 to 9,999, 24 had 1,000 to 4,999, and 35 had less than 1,000. The 67 communities each with less than 10,000 Jews together accounted for 1 percent of world Jewry.

In only six Diaspora countries did Jews constitute at least 5 per 1,000 (0.5 percent) of the total population. In descending order by the relative share (not size) of their Jewish population, they were Gibraltar (19.4 Jews per 1,000 inhabitants), the United States (17.1), Canada (11.1), France (7.7), Uruguay (5.2), and Australia (5.0).

The case of Israel is evidently different, with a *core* Jewish population that represent 75.5 percent of the total population, and an *enlarged* Jewish population that represents 79.7 percent of the total population (**Table 15**). In both Israel and the Diaspora, the percentage of Jews out of the total population is decreasing.

By combining the two criteria of Jewish population size and percentage of Jews, we obtain the following taxonomy of the 25 countries with Jewish populations over 10,000 (excluding Israel).

Four countries have over 100,000 Jews and at least 5 Jews per 1,000 total population: the United States, France, Canada, and Australia.

Four more countries have over 100,000 Jews and at least 1 Jew per 1,000 total population: the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, Argentina, and Germany.

One country has 10,000 to 99,999 Jews and at least 5 Jews per 1,000 total population: Uruguay.

Nine more countries have 10,000 to 99,999 Jews and at least 1 Jew per 1,000 total population: Ukraine, South Africa, Hungary, Belgium, the Netherlands, Chile, Switzerland, Belarus, and Sweden.

Seven countries have 10,000 to 99,999 Jews and less than 1 Jew per 1,000 total population: Brazil, Mexico, Italy, Turkey, Venezuela, Spain, and Iran.

TABLE 17. DISTRIBUTION OF WORLD'S CORE JEWISH POPULATION, BY NUMBER AND PROPORTION PER 1,000 INHABITANTS IN EACH COUNTRY, 1/1/2010

| Number of Jews in Country | Jews per 1,000 Population | | | | | |
|--|-------------------------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|------------------|------------------|
| | Total | 0.0-0.9 | 1.0-4.9 | 5.0-9.9 | 10.0-24.9 | 25.0+ |
| Number of Countries | | | | | | |
| Total^a | 93 | 64 | 22 | 3 | 3 | 1 |
| 100-999 | 35 | 32 | 2 | - | 1 | - |
| 1,000-4,999 | 24 | 22 | 2 | - | - | - |
| 5,000-9,999 | 8 | 3 | 5 | - | - | - |
| 10,000-24,999 | 9 | 4 | 4 | 1 | - | - |
| 25,000-49,999 | 5 | 2 | 3 | - | - | - |
| 50,000-99,999 | 3 | 1 | 2 | - | - | - |
| 100,000-999,999 | 7 | - | 4 | 2 | 1 | - |
| 1,000,000 or more | 2 | - | - | - | 1 | 1 |
| Jewish Population Distribution (Number of Core Jews) | | | | | | |
| Total^a | 13,428,300^a | 297,700 | 1,166,700 | 608,500 | 5,650,600 | 5,703,700 |
| 100-999 | 11,000 | 9,300 | 1,100 | - | 600 | - |
| 1,000-4,999 | 57,800 | 51,900 | 5,900 | - | - | - |
| 5,000-9,999 | 61,700 | 21,100 | 40,600 | - | - | - |
| 10,000-24,999 | 139,100 | 52,000 | 69,600 | 17,500 | - | - |
| 25,000-49,999 | 176,700 | 67,800 | 108,900 | - | - | - |
| 50,000-99,999 | 237,900 | 95,600 | 142,300 | - | - | - |
| 100,000-999,999 | 1,764,300 | - | 798,300 | 591,000 | 375,000 | - |
| 1,000,000 or more | 10,978,700 | - | - | - | 5,275,000 | 5,703,700 |
| Jewish Population Distribution (Percentage of World's Jews) | | | | | | |
| Total^a | 100.0 | 2.2 | 8.7 | 4.5 | 42.1 | 42.5 |
| 100-999 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | - | 0.0 | - |
| 1,000-4,999 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.0 | - | - | - |
| 5,000-9,999 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.3 | - | - | - |
| 10,000-24,999 | 1.0 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.1 | - | - |
| 25,000-49,999 | 1.3 | 0.5 | 0.8 | - | - | - |
| 50,000-99,999 | 1.8 | 0.7 | 1.1 | - | - | - |
| 100,000-999,999 | 13.1 | - | 5.9 | 4.4 | 2.8 | - |
| 1,000,000 or more | 81.8 | - | - | - | 39.3 | 42.5 |

^a Grand total includes countries with fewer than 100 Jews, for a total of 1,100 Jews worldwide. Minor discrepancies due to rounding. In Israel Jewish population includes residents in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Total population includes East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, but not Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

OUTLOOK

Beyond the many and arguable problems related to Jewish population definitions, and beyond data availability and accuracy, it is important to recognize that powerful and consistent trends constantly shape and reshape the demographic profile of world Jewry. It is important that we read current data in historical and comparative context. The recent momentum of Jewish population change in the United States—at best tending to zero growth—contrasts with that of Israel—characterized by significant natural increase. While the transition of Israel to the largest Jewish population in the world is grounded on solid empirical foundations, the United States remains a very large, culturally and socioeconomically powerful, creative, resilient, and influential center of Jewish life. The aggregate weight of other Jewish communities globally—aside from their continuing cultural relevance—is gradually decreasing. In a Jewish world that has become demographically more bi-polar, the cultural and institutional projection and influence of the two major centers has become more significant in other geographical areas of Jewish presence.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Sergio DellaPergola, born in Italy, has lived in Israel since 1966. He holds a Ph.D. from The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is former Chairman and Professor of Population Studies at The Hebrew University's Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, where he has directed the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics and holds the Shlomo Argov Chair in Israel-Diaspora Relations. An internationally known specialist on the demography of world Jewry, he has published numerous books and over one hundred papers on historical demography, the family, international migration, Jewish identification, and population projections in the Diaspora and in Israel. He has lectured at over 50 universities and research centers worldwide and served as senior policy consultant to the President of Israel, the Israeli Government, the Jerusalem Municipality, and many major national and international organizations. He served on the National Technical Advisory Committee for the 1990 and 2000-01 National Jewish Population Surveys. In 1999 he won the Marshall Sklare Award for distinguished achievement from the Association for the Social Scientific Study of Jewry (ASSJ). He was Visiting Professor at the University of Illinois at Chicago (UIC) in 2009 and at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) in 2010.

APPENDIX: JEWISH POPULATION BY COUNTRY, 1 / 1 / 2010

| Country | Total Population ^a | Core Jewish Population ^b | Jews per Total 1,000 Population | Accuracy Rating | Enlarged Jewish Population ^c |
|---|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|---|
| WORLD TOTAL | 6,900,047,000 | 13,428,300 | 1.9 | | |
| AMERICA TOTAL | 931,666,000 | 6,039,600 | 6.5 | | |
| Canada | 33,890,000 | 375,000 | 11.1 | B 2006 | 450,000 |
| United States | 309,000,000 | 5,275,000 | 17.1 | B 2001 | 6,700,000 ^d |
| Total North America ^e | 343,018,000 | 5,650,000 | 16.5 | | |
| Bahamas | 346,000 | 300 | 0.9 | D | |
| Costa Rica | 4,640,000 | 2,500 | 0.5 | C 1993 | |
| Cuba | 11,204,000 | 500 | 0.0 | C 1990 | |
| Dominican Republic | 10,225,000 | 100 | 0.0 | D | |
| El Salvador | 6,194,000 | 100 | 0.0 | C 1993 | |
| Guatemala | 14,377,000 | 900 | 0.1 | B 1999 | |
| Jamaica | 2,730,000 | 200 | 0.1 | C 2010 | |
| Mexico | 110,645,000 | 39,400 | 0.4 | B 2006 | 42,000 |
| Netherlands Antilles | 308,000 | 200 | 0.6 | C 1998 | |
| Panama | 3,508,000 | 8,000 | 2.3 | C 2000 | |
| Puerto Rico | 3,998,000 | 1,500 | 0.4 | C 2000 | |
| Virgin Islands | 109,000 | 500 | 4.6 | C 2006 | |
| Other Central America | 27,143,000 | 300 | 0.0 | D | |
| Total Central America | 195,427,000 | 54,500 | 0.3 | | |
| Argentina | 40,666,000 | 182,300 | 4.5 | B 2003 | 270,000 |
| Bolivia | 10,031,000 | 500 | 0.0 | C 1999 | |
| Brazil | 195,423,000 | 95,600 | 0.5 | B 2001 | 125,000 |
| Chile | 17,135,000 | 20,500 | 1.2 | C 1991 | 30,000 |
| Colombia | 46,300,000 | 2,700 | 0.1 | C 1996 | |
| Ecuador | 13,775,000 | 900 | 0.1 | C 1995 | |
| Paraguay | 6,460,000 | 900 | 0.1 | B 1997 | |
| Peru | 29,496,000 | 2,000 | 0.1 | C 1993 | |
| Suriname | 524,000 | 200 | 0.4 | D 1990 | |
| Uruguay | 3,372,000 | 17,500 | 5.2 | B 2006 | 25,000 |
| Venezuela | 29,044,000 | 12,000 | 0.4 | B 2000 | 13,500 |
| Total South America ^e | 393,221,000 | 335,100 | 0.9 | | |
| EUROPE TOTAL | 809,344,000 | 1,455,900 | 1.8 | | |
| Austria | 8,387,000 | 9,000 | 1.1 | B 2001 | 15,000 |
| Belgium | 10,698,000 | 30,300 | 2.8 | C 2002 | 40,000 |
| Bulgaria | 7,497,000 | 2,000 | 0.3 | C 2001 | |
| Czech Republic | 10,411,000 | 3,900 | 0.4 | C 2001 | |
| Denmark | 5,481,000 | 6,400 | 1.2 | C 2001 | |
| Estonia | 1,339,000 | 1,800 | 1.3 | B 2009 | 3,000 |
| Finland | 5,346,000 | 1,100 | 0.2 | B 1999 | |
| France ^f | 62,670,000 | 483,500 | 7.7 | B 2002 | 580,000 |
| Germany | 82,057,000 | 119,000 | 1.5 | B 2009 | 250,000 |

| Country | Total Population ^a | Core Jewish Population ^b | Jews per 1,000 Population | Accuracy Rating | Enlarged Jewish Population ^c |
|---|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|---|
| Greece | 11,183,000 | 4,500 | 0.4 | B 1995 | |
| Hungary | 9,973,000 | 48,600 | 4.9 | C 2001 | 100,000 |
| Ireland | 4,589,000 | 1,200 | 0.3 | B 2001 | |
| Italy | 60,098,000 | 28,400 | 0.5 | B 2009 | 35,000 |
| Latvia | 2,240,000 | 9,700 | 4.3 | B 2009 X | 19,000 |
| Lithuania | 3,255,000 | 2,800 | 0.9 | B 2009 X | 5,000 |
| Luxembourg | 492,000 | 600 | 1.2 | B 2000 | |
| Netherlands | 16,653,000 | 30,000 | 1.8 | B 1999 | 43,000 ^g |
| Poland | 38,038,000 | 3,200 | 0.1 | C 2001 | |
| Portugal | 10,732,000 | 500 | 0.0 | C 1999 | |
| Romania | 21,190,000 | 9,700 | 0.5 | B 2001 | 18,000 |
| Slovakia | 5,412,000 | 2,600 | 0.5 | C 2001 | |
| Slovenia | 2,025,000 | 100 | 0.0 | C 1996 | |
| Spain | 45,317,000 | 12,000 | 0.3 | D 2006 | 15,000 |
| Sweden | 9,293,000 | 15,000 | 1.6 | C 1999 | 25,000 |
| United Kingdom ^h | 62,129,000 | 292,000 | 4.7 | B 2001 | 350,000 |
| Other European Union ⁱ | 1,290,000 | 100 | 0.1 | D | |
| Total European Union | 497,795,000 | 1,118,000 | 2.2 | | |
| Belarus | 9,588,000 | 16,500 | 1.7 | B 2009 | 33,000 |
| Moldova | 3,576,000 | 4,100 | 1.1 | B 2004 | 8,000 |
| Russian Federation ^j | 140,367,000 | 205,000 | 1.5 | B 2002 | 400,000 |
| Ukraine | 45,433,000 | 71,500 | 1.6 | B 2001 | 145,000 |
| Total FSU Republics | 198,964,000 | 297,100 | 1.5 | | 586,000 |
| [Total FSU in Europe] ^k | 205,798,000 | 311,400 | 1.5 | | 613,000 |
| Gibraltar | 31,000 | 600 | 19.4 | B 2001 | |
| Norway | 4,855,000 | 1,200 | 0.2 | B 1995 | |
| Switzerland | 7,595,000 | 17,600 | 2.3 | B 2000 | 25,000 |
| Total Other West Europe ^e | 13,016,000 | 19,400 | 1.5 | | |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | 3,760,000 | 500 | 0.1 | C 2001 | |
| Croatia | 4,410,000 | 1,700 | 0.4 | C 2001 | |
| Macedonia | 2,043,000 | 100 | 0.0 | C 1996 | |
| Serbia | 7,656,000 | 1,400 | 0.2 | C 2001 | |
| Turkey ^j | 75,705,000 | 17,600 | 0.2 | B 2002 | 21,000 |
| Other Balkans | 5,995,000 | 100 | 0.0 | D | |
| Total Balkans | 99,569,000 | 21,400 | 0.2 | | |
| ASIA TOTAL | 4,090,156,000 | 5,741,500 | 1.4 | | |
| Israel ^l | 7,255,400 | 5,413,800 | 746.2 | A 2010 X | 5,719,800 |
| West Bank and Gaza ^m | 3,966,700 | 289,900 | 73.1 | A 2010 X | 296,700 |
| Total Israel and Palestine | 11,222,100 | 5,703,700 | 508.3 | | 6,016,500 |
| Azerbaijan | 8,934,000 | 6,400 | 0.7 | C 2009 | 12,000 |
| Georgia | 4,219,000 | 3,200 | 0.8 | B 2002 | 6,000 |
| Kazakhstan | 15,753,000 | 3,700 | 0.2 | C 2009 | 7,000 |
| Kyrgyzstan | 5,555,000 | 600 | 0.1 | C 2009 | 1,000 |
| Turkmenistan | 5,177,000 | 200 | 0.0 | D 1989 | 300 |

| Country | Total Population ^a | Core Jewish Population ^b | Jews per 1,000 Population | Accuracy Rating | Enlarged Jewish Population ^c |
|--|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|---|
| Uzbekistan | 27,794,000 | 4,500 | 0.2 | D 1989 | 8,000 |
| Total FSU in Asia ⁿ | 77,597,000 | 18,600 | 0.2 | | 35,000 |
| China ^o | 1,361,763,000 | 1,500 | 0.0 | D 2008 | |
| India | 1,214,464,000 | 5,000 | 0.0 | B 1996 | |
| Iran | 75,078,000 | 10,400 | 0.1 | D 1986 | 12,000 |
| Japan | 126,995,000 | 1,000 | 0.0 | D 2003 | |
| Korea, South | 48,501,000 | 100 | 0.0 | C 1998 | |
| Philippines | 93,617,000 | 100 | 0.0 | D | |
| Singapore | 4,837,000 | 300 | 0.1 | C 1990 | |
| Syria | 22,505,000 | 100 | 0.0 | C 1995 | |
| Taiwan | 23,000,000 | 100 | 0.0 | D | |
| Thailand | 68,139,000 | 200 | 0.0 | D 1998 | |
| Yemen | 24,256,000 | 200 | 0.0 | C 2005 | |
| Other Asia | 938,181,900 | 200 | 0.0 | D | |
| Total Other Asia | 4,001,336,900 | 19,200 | 0.0 | | |
| AFRICA TOTAL | 1,033,043,000 | 76,200 | 0.1 | | |
| Egypt | 84,474,000 | 100 | 0.0 | C 2008 | |
| Ethiopia | 84,976,000 | 100 | 0.0 | C 2008 | |
| Morocco | 32,381,000 | 2,700 | 0.1 | C 2006 | |
| Tunisia | 10,374,000 | 1,000 | 0.1 | C 2003 | |
| Total Northern Africa ^e | 297,896,000 | 3,900 | 0.0 | | |
| Botswana | 1,978,000 | 100 | 0.1 | C 1993 | |
| Congo D.R. | 67,827,000 | 100 | 0.0 | C 1993 | |
| Kenya | 40,863,000 | 400 | 0.0 | C 1990 | |
| Namibia | 2,212,000 | 100 | 0.0 | C 1993 | |
| Nigeria | 158,259,000 | 100 | 0.0 | D | |
| South Africa | 50,492,000 | 70,800 | 1.4 | B 2001 | 80,000 |
| Zimbabwe | 12,644,000 | 400 | 0.0 | B 2001 | |
| Other Sub-Saharan Africa | 400,872,000 | 300 | 0.0 | D | |
| Total Sub-Saharan Africa ^p | 735,147,000 | 72,300 | 0.1 | | |
| OCEANIA TOTAL | 35,838,000 | 115,100 | 3.2 | | |
| Australia | 21,512,000 | 107,500 | 5.0 | B 2006 | 125,000 |
| New Zealand | 4,303,000 | 7,500 | 1.7 | A 2006 | |
| Other Oceania | 10,023,000 | 100 | 0.0 | D | |

a Source, with minor adjustments: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, *World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision. Volume I: Comprehensive Tables* (New York, 2009). Mid-year populations.

b Includes all persons who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews or who are identified as Jews by a respondent in the same household, and do not have another monotheistic religion. It also includes persons of Jewish parentage who claim no current religious or ethnic identity.

c Includes the sum of (a) the core Jewish population; (b) all other persons of Jewish parentage who are not Jewish currently (or at the date of reference or investigation); and (c) all respective non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.).

d Includes core Jewish population plus non-Jewish members of the respective households. A similar figure of 6.7 million obtains for total persons of Jewish parentage, regardless of current identification. Further adding all the respective non-Jewish household members generates an aggregate of about 8 million. By the criteria of the *Law of Return*, the total number of eligible persons might approximate 10 to 12 million Americans.

e Including countries not listed separately.

f Including Monaco.

g Total persons with Jewish parentage.

h Including Channel Islands and Isle of Man.

i Cyprus and Malta.

j Including Asian regions.

k Including Baltic republics.

l Total legal population of Israel, including Jews and non-Jews in East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights and Jews (enlarged definition) in the West Bank, but excluding the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza, 1/1/2010: 7,552,100.

m Total Palestinian population on 1/1/2010 in the West Bank (without East Jerusalem): 2,200,000; Gaza: 1,470,000; Total: 3,670,000 (our revised estimate).

n Including Armenia and Tajikistan with less than 100 Jews each. Not including Asian regions of the Russian Federation.

o Including Hong Kong and Macao.

p Sudan and Ethiopia included in Northern Africa.

NOTES

¹Previous estimates, as of January 1, 2008, were published by this author in the *American Jewish Year Book*, 108 (New York, American Jewish Committee, 2008), 569-620. This was the last time the *American Jewish Year Book (AJYB)* appeared, after 108 years, beginning in 1899. The *AJYB* documented the Jewish world and gave significant attention to Jewish population issues. Since 1981, responsibility for the preparation of annual population estimates for world Jewry was the responsibility of the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The Division was founded by Roberto Bachi in 1959, headed by Uziel O. Schmelz until 1986, and, since, by the present author. We express our appreciation to the editors of *AJYB* during the past thirty years: Morris Fine, Milton Himmelfarb, David Singer, Ruth Seldin, and Lawrence Grossman. The interested reader may consult *AJYB* volumes for further details on how the respective annual estimates were obtained. World Jewish population estimates as of January 1, 2009 were prepared for publication but not issued. See also Sergio DellaPergola, Uzi Rebhun, and Mark Tolts, "Prospecting the Jewish Future: Population Projections 2000–2080," *American Jewish Year Book*, 100 (New York, American Jewish Committee, 2000), 103–146.

²Population Reference Bureau, *2010 World Population Data Sheet* (Washington, DC, 2010).

³Jewish population estimates in the United States have been the subject of a lively debate. This author's findings are further elaborated later in this report. For a different approach, and higher Jewish population estimates, see: Ira M. Sheskin and Arnold Dashefsky, *Jewish Population in the United States, 2010, Current Jewish Population Reports*, Report 2010-1 (Storrs, CT, The North American Jewish Data Bank, the Association for the Social Scientific Study of Jewry, and the Jewish Federations of North America, 2010).

⁴See below the discussion on intermarriage and conversion.

⁵See Sergio DellaPergola, Uzi Rebhun, and Mark Tolts, "Contemporary Jewish Diaspora in Global Context: Human Development Correlates of Population Trends" *Israel Studies*, 11, 1, 2005, 61-95.

⁶For historical background, see Roberto Bachi, *Population Trends of World Jewry* (Jerusalem, 1976); U.O. Schmelz, "Jewish Survival: The Demographic Factors," *American Jewish Year Book*, 81 (New York, American Jewish Committee, 1981), 61–117; U.O. Schmelz, *Aging of World Jewry* (Jerusalem, 1984); Sergio DellaPergola, "Some Fundamentals of Jewish Demographic History," in Sergio DellaPergola and Judith Even (eds.), *Papers in Jewish Demography 1997* (Jerusalem, The Hebrew University, 2001), 11-33; Sergio DellaPergola, "Changing Cores and Peripheries: Fifty Years in Socio-demographic Perspective," in Robert S. Wistrich (ed.) *Terms of Survival: The Jewish World since 1945* (London, 1995), 13-43; Sergio DellaPergola, *World Jewry beyond 2000: Demographic Prospects* (Oxford, 1999).

⁷The term *core Jewish population* was initially suggested in Barry A. Kosmin, Sidney Goldstein, Joseph Waksberg, Nava Lerer, Ariela Keysar, and Jeffrey Scheckner, *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey* (New York, 1991).

⁸Michael Corinaldi, *The Enigma of Jewish Identity: The Law of Return, Theory and Practice* (Srigim-Lion, 2001, in Hebrew).

⁹In the NJPS 2000-01 version initially processed and circulated by UJC, a Jew is defined as a *person whose religion is Judaism, OR whose religion is Jewish and something else, OR who has no religion and has at least one Jewish parent or a Jewish upbringing, OR who has a non-monotheistic religion and has at least one Jewish parent or a Jewish upbringing*. See Laurence Kotler-Berkowitz, Steven M. Cohen, Jonathon Ament, Vivian Klaff, Frank Mott, and Danyelle Peckerman-Neuman, with Lorraine Blass, Debbie Bursztyn, and David Marker, *The National Jewish Population Survey 2000–01: Strength, Challenge, and Diversity in the American Jewish Population* (New York, 2003). The issue of *Contemporary Jewry* (the scholarly journal of the Association for the Scientific Study of Jewry, edited by Samuel Heilman), 25, 2005, is devoted to critical essays and analyses of NJPS method and findings.

¹⁰The term *enlarged Jewish population* was initially suggested by Sergio DellaPergola, "The Italian Jewish Population Study: Demographic Characteristics and Trends," in U.O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and S.J. Gould, (eds.) *Studies in Jewish Demography: Survey for 1969–1971* (Jerusalem-London, 1975), 60–97.

¹¹Kotler-Berkowitz et al., *National Jewish Population Survey 2000–01*, cit.

¹²Michael Hammer et al., "Jewish and Middle Eastern non-Jewish populations share a common pool of Y-chromosome biallelic haplotypes," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, June 6, 2000, 97,

12, 6769–6774; Doron M. Behar et al., "MtDNA evidence for a genetic bottleneck in the early history of the Ashkenazi Jewish population," *European Journal of Human Genetics*, 2004, 1–10; Doron M. Behar et al., "The genome-wide structure of the Jewish people," *Nature*, <http://www.nature.com/dofinder/10.1038/nature09103>, 1-6.

¹³Ruth Gavison, *60 Years to the Law of Return: History, Ideology, Justification* (Jerusalem, Metzilah Center for Zionist, Jewish, Liberal and Humanistic Thought, 2009).

¹⁴For a concise review of the rules of attribution of Jewish personal status in rabbinic and Israeli law, including reference to Jewish sects, isolated communities, and apostates, see Michael Corinaldi, "Jewish Identity," Chapter 2 in his *Jewish Identity: The Case of Ethiopian Jewry* (Jerusalem, 1998).

¹⁵Many of these global activities are executed by, or in coordination with, the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics at The A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry (ICJ), The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

¹⁶For overviews of subject matter and technical issues see Paul Ritterband, Barry A. Kosmin, and Jeffrey Scheckner, "Counting Jewish Populations: Methods and Problems," *American Jewish Year Book*, 88 (New York, American Jewish Committee, 1988), 204–21; Sergio DellaPergola, "Demography," in Martin Goodman (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Jewish Studies* (Oxford, 2002), 797–823.

¹⁷Among initiatives aimed at strengthening Jewish population research, initiated by the late Roberto Bachi of The Hebrew University and sponsored by major Jewish organizations worldwide, an International Scientific Advisory Committee (ISAC) was established under the chairmanship of Sidney Goldstein. See Sergio DellaPergola and Leah Cohen (eds.), *World Jewish Population: Trends and Policies* (Jerusalem, 1992). An Initiative on Jewish Demography, sponsored by the Jewish Agency, facilitated data collection and analysis from 2003-2005. Between 2003 and 2009, the Jewish People Policy Planning Institute (JPPPI) provided a framework for Jewish population policy analysis and suggestions. See Sergio DellaPergola, *Jewish Demography: Facts, Outlook, Challenges*, JPPPI Alert Paper 2 (Jerusalem, 2003); *The Jewish People Policy Planning Institute Annual Assessment 2004-2005, Between Thriving and Decline* (Jerusalem, 2005); The Jewish People Policy Planning Institute, *The Conference on the Future of the Jewish People 2007, Background Policy Documents* (Jerusalem, 2007); The Jewish People Policy Planning Institute, *Tomorrow* (Jerusalem, 2008); Sergio DellaPergola, *Jewish Population Policies: Demographic Trends and Options in Israel and in the Diaspora* (Jerusalem, forthcoming).

¹⁸See a synopsis of the main findings in Ira M. Sheskin, *How Jewish Communities Differ: Variations in the Findings of Local Jewish Demographic Studies* (New York, City University of New York, North American Jewish Data Bank, 2001).

¹⁹Country data and estimates derived from United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, *World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision. Volume I: Comprehensive Tables* (New York, 2009).

²⁰See DellaPergola et al., "Prospecting the Jewish Future," cit., and unpublished tabulations. A new round of population projections undertaken in the light of the latest data helped in the current assessment.

²¹Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 61 (Jerusalem, 2010).

²²As noted, the *Law of Return* applies to Jews and their extended families. The Law of Entrance and Law of Citizenship apply to all other foreign arrivals, some of whom ask for Israeli citizenship.

²³For definitions of Metropolitan statistical areas in the United States see: United States, Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, *OMB Bulletin No. 09-91, Update of Statistical Area Definitions and Guidance on Their Uses* (Washington, DC, 2008).

²⁴For Israel estimates see Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, cit., table 2-16. For United States estimates, see Ira M. Sheskin and Arnold Dashefsky, *Jewish Population in the United States, 2010*, cit. Some of the latter figures refer to different years and roughly compare with each other regarding definitions and methods.

²⁵Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, cit.; HIAS, *Annual Report* (New York, annual); Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland (ZWJD), *Mitgliederstatistik; Der Einzelnen Jüdischen Gemeinden und Landesverbände in Deutschland* (Frankfurt a. M., annual).

²⁶Sergio DellaPergola, "International Migration of Jews," in Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yitzhak Sternberg (eds.), *Transnationalism: Diasporas and the advent of a new (dis)order* (Leiden/Boston, Brill, 2009), 213-236.

²⁷See Uzi Rebhun and Lilach Lev Ari, *American Israelis: Migration, Transnationalism, and Diasporic Identity* (Leiden/Boston, Brill, 2010).

-
- ²⁸Yinon Cohen, "Migration to and from Israel," *Contemporary Jewry*, 29, 2, 2009, 115-125; Mark Tolts, *Some Demographic and Socio-Economic Trends of the Jews in Russia and the FSU* (Jerusalem, The Hebrew University, The A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics, 2009).
- ²⁹Shulamit Reinharz and Sergio DellaPergola, *Jewish Inter-marriage around the World* (New Brunswick-London, Transaction, 2009).
- ³⁰Mark Tolts, "The Post-Soviet Jewish Population in Russia and the World," *Jews in Russia and Eastern Europe*, 1 (52), 2004, 37-63.
- ³¹David Graham and Daniel Vulkan, *Britain's Jewish Community Statistics* (London, Board of Deputies of British Jews, 2008).
- ³²Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland (ZWJD), *Mitgliederstatistik; Der Einzelnen Jüdischen Gemeinden und Landesverbände in Deutschland* (Frankfurt a. M., annual).
- ³³Sergio DellaPergola, "Actual, Intended, and Appropriate Family Size among Jews in Israel," *Contemporary Jewry*, 29, 2, 2009, 127-152.
- ³⁴Sergio DellaPergola, "Jewish Out-Marriage: A Global Perspective," in Shulamit Reinharz and Sergio DellaPergola (eds.), *Jewish Inter-marriage around the World*, cit., 13-39.
- ³⁵Nurit Dvorin, "Marriages of Israelis Abroad and the Role of Former Soviet Union Immigrants," *Megamot*, 44, 3, 2006, 477-506.
- ³⁶Bruce A. Phillips, *Re-examining Inter-marriage: Trends, Textures, Strategies*. (New York, The Susan and David Wilstein Institute of Jewish Policy Studies, and the American Jewish Committee, The William Petschek National Family Center, 1997).
- ³⁷Goskomstat (1994) *Mikroperepisis' naselenii Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1994*. (Moscow, 1995, author's own processing).
- ³⁸Kotler-Berkowitz et al., *The National Jewish Population Survey 2000–01*, cit.
- ³⁹Egon Mayer, Barry Kosmin, and Ariela Keysar, *American Jewish Identity Survey 2001—AJIS Report—An Exploration in the Demography and Outlook of a People* (New York, 2002).
- ⁴⁰Kosmin et al., *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey*, cit.
- ⁴¹David J. Graham, *The socio-spatial boundaries of an 'invisible' minority: a quantitative (re)appraisal of Britain's Jewish population*. Thesis submitted for the degree of DPhil in Geography, St Catherine's College, University of Oxford, Michaelmas Term, 2008.
- ⁴²Estimated because of the lack of a fully detailed age distribution. See Erik H. Cohen with Maurice Ifergan, *Les Juifs de France: Valeurs et identité* (Paris, Fonds Social Juif Unifié, 2002).
- ⁴³Population Reference Bureau, *2010 World Population Data Sheet* (Washington, DC, 2010).
- ⁴⁴See Ira Rosenwaike, "A Synthetic Estimate of American Jewish Population Movement over the Last Three Decades," in U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola (eds.), *Papers in Jewish Demography 1977*. (Jerusalem, The Hebrew University, 1980), 83-102.
- ⁴⁵Sources and findings are reviewed in Sergio DellaPergola, "Was It the Demography? A Reassessment of U.S. Jewish Population Estimates, 1945–2001," *Contemporary Jewry*, 25, 2005, 85-131.
- ⁴⁶United States Census Bureau, "Religion Reported by the Civilian Population in the United States, March 1957," *Current Population Reports, Population Characteristics, Series P-20, No. 79* (Washington, DC, 1958); United States Census Bureau, "Tabulations of Data on the Social and Economic Characteristics of Major Religious Groups, March 1957" (Washington, DC, 1968); Paul C. Glick, "Inter-marriage and Fertility Patterns among Persons in Major Religious Groups," *Eugenics Quarterly*, 7, 1960.
- ⁴⁷Fred Massarik, "National Jewish Population Study: A New United States Estimate," *American Jewish Year Book*, 75 (New York and Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society and American Jewish Committee, 1974), 296-304.
- ⁴⁸Kosmin et al., *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey*, cit.
- ⁴⁹Kotler-Berkowitz et al., *The National Jewish Population Survey 2000–01*, cit.
- ⁵⁰Mayer et al., *American Jewish Identity Survey 2001*, cit.; Barry A. Kosmin, Egon Mayer, and Ariela Keysar, *American Religious Identification Survey 2001* (New York, 2001).
- ⁵¹U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, "The Demographic Consequences of U.S. Jewish Population Trends," *American Jewish Year Book*, 83 (New York, American Jewish Committee, 1983), 141-87; U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, *Basic Trends in American Jewish Demography* (New York, American Jewish Committee, 1988).

-
- ⁵²Kotler-Berkowitz et al., *National Jewish Population Survey 2000–01*, cit. See also Charles Kadushin, Leonard Saxe, and Benjamin Phillips, "National Jewish Population Survey 2000-10: A Guide for the Perplexed," *Contemporary Jewry*, 25, 1, 2005, 1-32.
- ⁵³Mark Schulman, "National Jewish Population Survey 2000–01: Study Review Memo," prepared for United Jewish Communities (New York, 2003).
- ⁵⁴Kotler-Berkowitz et al., *The National Jewish Population Survey 2000–01*, cit.
- ⁵⁵Mayer et al., *American Jewish Identity Survey 2001*, cit.; and Barry A. Kosmin, personal communication.
- ⁵⁶For a comparison of the two studies see Joel Perlmann, *Two National Surveys of American Jews, 2000-01: A Comparison of the NJPS and AJIS*, Working Paper No. 501 (Annandale-on-Hudson, The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, 2007).
- ⁵⁷See Kosmin et al., *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey*, cit.
- ⁵⁸Sergio DellaPergola, "Was It the Demography?" cit.
- ⁵⁹Gary Tobin and Sid Groeneman, *Surveying the Jewish Population in the United States. Part 1: Population Estimate. Part 2: Methodological Issues and Challenges*. (San Francisco, Institute for Jewish & Community Research, 2003).
- ⁶⁰Barry A. Kosmin and Ariela Keysar, *American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS 2008) Summary Report* (Hartford, CT, Trinity College, 2009).
- ⁶¹Tom W. Smith, *Religious Switching Among American Jews* (New York, The American Jewish Committee, 2009).
- ⁶²Ira M. Sheskin and Arnold Dashefsky, *Jewish Population of the United States, 2010, Current Jewish Population Reports, Report Number 2010-1*, cit.
- ⁶³Uzi Rebhun and Sidney Goldstein, "Changes in the Geographical Dispersion and Mobility of American Jews, 1990-2001," *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, 48, 1, 5-33, 2006; Sid Groeneman and Tom W. Smith, *Moving: The Impact of Geographical Mobility on the Jewish Community* (New York, The Jewish Federations of North America, 2009).
- ⁶⁴Ira M. Sheskin and Arnold Dashefsky, "Jewish Population of the United States, 2007," *American Jewish Year Book*, 107 (New York, The American Jewish Committee, 2007) 136-138 and 198-199.
- ⁶⁵Ira M. Sheskin, "Four Questions about American Jewish Demography," *Jewish Political Studies Review*, 20, 1-2, 2008, 23-42.
- ⁶⁶Elizabeth Tighe, David Livert, Melissa Barnett, and Leonard Saxe, "Cross-Survey Analysis to Estimate Low Incidence Religious Groups" (Waltham, MA, Brandeis University, Steinhardt Social Research Institute, 2009). The project was directed by Leonard Saxe.
- ⁶⁷See Elizabeth Tighe, Leonard Saxe, Darren Brown, Jennifer Dillinger, Aron Klein, and Ashley Hill, *Research Synthesis of National Survey Estimates of the U.S. Jewish Population; Project Summary, Method and Analysis Plan* (Waltham, MA, Brandeis University, Steinhardt Social Research Institute, 2005).
- ⁶⁸Leonard Saxe, Elizabeth Tighe, and Benjamin Phillips with Ariel Libhaber, Daniel Parmer, Jessica Simon, and Graham Wright, *Understanding Contemporary American Jewry* (Waltham, MA, Brandeis University, Steinhardt Social Research Institute, 2006).
- ⁶⁹Elizabeth Tighe, Charles Kadushin, and Leonard Saxe, *Jewish Population in the US: 1990 vs. 2000* (Waltham, MA, Brandeis University, Steinhardt Social Research Institute, 2009).
- ⁷⁰DellaPergola, "Was it the Demography?," cit.
- ⁷¹Marvin Schick, *A Census of Jewish Day Schools in the United States 2003-2004* (Jerusalem, Avi Chai, 2005).
- ⁷²HIAS, *Statistical Report* (New York, The Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, annual).
- ⁷³For systematic international comparisons at an earlier point in time see Sergio DellaPergola and Uziel O. Schmelz, "Demography and Jewish Education in the Diaspora: Trends in Jewish School-Age Population and School Enrollment," in Harold S. Himmelfarb and Sergio DellaPergola, *Jewish Education Worldwide: Cross-Cultural Perspectives* (Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 1989), 43-68.
- ⁷⁴Elizabeth Tighe, Charles Kadushin, Leonard Saxe, *Jewish Population in the US: 1990 vs. 2000*, cit.
- ⁷⁵See the assessment based on both quantitative and qualitative data in Sylvia Barack Fishman, *Double or Nothing? Jewish Families and Mixed Marriage* (Hanover and London: Brandeis University Press, 2004). See also: Arnold Dashefsky in collaboration with Zachary I. Heller, *Intermarriage and Jewish Journeys in the United States* (Newton Centre, MA, The National Center for Jewish Policy Studies at Hebrew College, 2008).

⁷⁶See Leonard Saxe, Charles Kadushin, and Graham Wright, *2005 Boston Jewish Community Study* (Waltham, MA, Brandeis University, Steinhardt Social Research Institute, 2006).

⁷⁷Ira M. Sheskin and Arnold Dashefsky, *Jewish Population of the United States, 2010*, cit.

⁷⁸See, for example, the rhetoric drive in J.J. Goldberg, "A Jewish Recount," *The New York Times*, September 17, 2003, 27.

⁷⁹Detailed information on Canadian Census returns is available from Statistics Canada. See <http://www.statcan.ca>. For the 2006 Census, see, among other links:

<http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census06/data/highlights/ethnic/pages/Page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo=PR&Code=01&Data=Count&Table=2&StartRec=1&Sort=3&Display=All&CSDFilter=5000> (Ethnic origins, 2006 counts, for Canada, provinces and territories - 20% sample data).

⁸⁰The growth of a new Canadian ethnic identity from the merger of pre-existing ethnicities is parallel to the development of a new American ethnic identity in the United States, discussed by Stanley Lieberman and Mary C. Waters, *From Many Strands: Ethnic and Racial Groups in Contemporary America*, The Population of the United States in the 1980s, A Census Monograph Series (New York, Russell-Sage, 1988).

⁸¹Apparent inconsistencies in the ratio between the number Jews by religion and by ethnicity depend on changes in classification definitions and modes of data processing at Statistics Canada.

⁸²Gustave Goldman, "Intermarriage among Jews in Canada: A Demographic Perspective," in Shulamit Reinharz and Sergio DellaPergola, *Jewish Intermarriage around the World*, cit, 105-114.

⁸³Charles Shahrar, *The Jewish Community of Canada* (Toronto, 2004).

⁸⁴For overviews of demographic patterns of Jews on the continent see: U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, "The Demography of Central and South American Jewry," *American Jewish Year Book*, 85 (New York-Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society and American Jewish Committee, 1985), 51-102; Sergio DellaPergola, "Demographic Trends of Latin American Jewry" in J. Laikin Elkin and G. W. Merx (eds.), *The Jewish Presence in Latin America* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987), 85-133. Sergio DellaPergola, "Autonomy and Dependency: Latin American Jewry in Global Perspective" in Judit Bokser Liwerant, Eliezer Ben-Rafael, Yosef Gorni, and Raanan Rein (eds.), *Identities in an Era of Globalization and Multiculturalism: Latin America in the Jewish World* (Leiden/Boston, Brill, 2008), 47-80.

⁸⁵See Israel Central Bureau of Statistics: <http://www.cbs.gov.il>.

⁸⁶Shmuel Adler, *Emigration among Immigrants from Argentina that Arrived During the Period 1.1.89-31.12.02* (Jerusalem, State of Israel Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, Division of Planning and Research, 2004).

⁸⁷Adrian Jmelnizky and Ezequiel Erdei, *Estudio de Población Judía en Ciudad de Buenos Aires y Gran Buenos Aires (AMBA)* (Buenos Aires, Media, Centro de Estudios para las Comunidades Judías de Latinoamérica, American Joint Distribution Committee, 2005).

⁸⁸Yaacov Rubel, *La Población Judía de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Perfil Socio-Demográfico* (Buenos Aires, Agencia Judía para Israel, Iniciativa de Demografía Judía, 2005).

⁸⁹See <http://www.ibge.br>; René D. Decol, "Brazilian Jews: a Demographic Profile," unpublished paper delivered at the International Conference, Jewish Agency Initiative on Jewish Demography (Jerusalem, 2002).

⁹⁰Federação Israelita do Estado de São Paulo (FISESP), *Recadastramento comunitário 2000-01* (São Paulo, 2002).

⁹¹Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística IBGE, *Population Census* (Rio de Janeiro, various years).

⁹²René Decol, *Imigrações urbanas para o Brasil: o caso dos Judeus* (Campinas, Universidade Estadual, 1999, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation).

⁹³René Daniel Decol, "A Demographic Profile of Brazilian Jewry," *Contemporary Jewry*, 29, 2, 2009, 99-113.

⁹⁴See Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática, *XII Censo General de Población y Vivienda 2000* (México City, 2002).

⁹⁵Comité Central Israelita de México, *Estudio sobre tendencias de la educación judía en México. Censo socio-demográfico de la comunidad judía de México* (México, 2000).

⁹⁶Sergio DellaPergola and Susana Lerner, *La población judía de México: Perfil demográfico, social y cultural* (México-Jerusalén, 1995). The project, conducted in cooperation among the Centro de Estudios Urbanos y de Desarrollo Urbano (CEDDU), El Colegio de Mexico, and the Division of Jewish Demography

and Statistics of The A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University, was sponsored by the Asociación Mexicana de Amigos de la Universidad Hebrea de Jerusalén.

⁹⁷Comité Central Israelita de México, *Estudio poblacional de la comunidad judía de México* (México, 2006).

⁹⁸Gabriel Berger et al., *Estudio Socio-Demográfico de la Comunidad Judía de Chile* (Santiago-Buenos Aires, 1995).

⁹⁹Nicole Berenstein and Rafael Porzecanski, *Perfil de los egresados de la Red Formal de Educación Judía Uruguaya* (Montevideo, 2001).

¹⁰⁰Sergio DellaPergola, Salomon Benzaquen, and Tony Beker de Weinraub, *Perfil sociodemográfico y cultural de la comunidad judía de Caracas* (Caracas, 2000). The survey was sponsored by the Asociación Israelita de Venezuela, the Union Israelita de Caracas, and the Asociación de Amigos de la Universidad Hebrea de Jerusalén.

¹⁰¹Sergio DellaPergola, "Jews in the European Community: Sociodemographic Trends and Challenges. *American Jewish Year Book*, 93 (New York, American Jewish Committee, 1993), 25-82; David Graham, *European Jewish Identity at the Dawn of the 21st Century: A Working Paper*. A report for the American Joint Distribution Committee and Hanadiv Charitable Foundation (Budapest, JPR-Institute for Jewish Policy Research, 2004); Andras Kovacs and Ildiko Barna, *Identity à la carte: Research on Jewish identities, participation and affiliation in five European countries. Analysis of survey data* (Budapest, The American Joint Distribution Committee, 2010); Sergio DellaPergola, "Jews in Europe: Demographic Trends, Contexts, Outlooks," in Julius Schoeps and Eliezer Ben-Rafael (eds.), *European Jewry: A New Jewish Center in the Making?* (Potsdam, Moses Mendelssohn Zentrum für europäisch-jüdische Studien, Boston/Leiden, Brill, 2010).

¹⁰²See Erik H. Cohen with Maurice Ifergan, *Les Juifs de France: Valeurs et identité*, cit.

¹⁰³Erik H. Cohen, *Les touristes de France en Israël 2004* (Jerusalem, 2005).

¹⁰⁴Erik H. Cohen, *Heureux comme Juifs en France? Étude sociologique* (Jerusalem, Elkana et Akadem, 2007).

¹⁰⁵See Barry Kosmin and Stanley Waterman, *Commentary on Census Religion Question* (London, JPR-Institute for Jewish Policy Research, 2002). The Census is available at <http://www.ons.gov.uk>.

¹⁰⁶United Kingdom, Scotland, *General Register Office* (Edinburgh, 2002). Also see *JPR/News*, Spring 2003, 6.

¹⁰⁷David Graham, Marlena Schmool and Stanley Waterman, *Jews in Britain: A Snapshot from the 2001 Census* (London, 2007), JPR Report No. 1; David Graham and Stanley Waterman, "Underenumeration of the Jewish Population in the UK 2001 Census," *Population, Space and Place*, 11, 2005, 89-102; David Voas, "Estimating the Jewish Undercount in the 2001 Census: a Comment on Graham and Waterman (2005)," *Population, Space and Place*, 13, 2007, 401-407; David J. Graham and Stanley Waterman, "Locating Jews by Ethnicity: A Reply to David Voas (2007)," *Population, Space and Place*, 13, 2007, 409-414.

¹⁰⁸The Board of Deputies of British Jews, Community Research Unit, *Report on Community Vital Statistics 2004* (London, 2005). See also Stephen Miller, Marlena Schmool, and Antony Lerman, *Social and Political Attitudes of British Jews: Some Key Findings of the JPR Survey* (London, 1996).

¹⁰⁹David Graham and Daniel Vulkan, *Britain's Jewish Community Statistics* (London, 2007).

¹¹⁰Rona Hart and Edward Kafka, *Trends in British Synagogue Membership, 1990–2005/6* (London, The Board of Deputies of British Jews, 2006).

¹¹¹David Graham and Daniel Vulkan, *Synagogue Membership in the United Kingdom in 2010* (London, JPR-Institute for Jewish Policy Research and The Board of Deputies of British Jews, 2010).

¹¹²Daniel Vulkan and David Graham, *Population Trends among Britain's Strictly Orthodox* (London, 2008); Graham and Vulkan, *Synagogue Membership*, cit.

¹¹³Yinon Cohen and Irena Kogan, "Jewish Immigration from the Former Soviet Union to Germany and Israel in the 1990s," *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book L* (Berlin, 2005), 249-265; Barbara Dietz, Uwe Lebok and Pavel Polian, "The Jewish Emigration from the Former Soviet Union to Germany," *International Migration*, 40, 2, 2002; [Simon Erlanger], *Jewish People Policy Planning Institute Annual Assessment 2006, Deltas Creating Opportunities and Threats*, Executive Report 3 (Jerusalem, JPPPI, 2006).

¹¹⁴Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland (ZWJD), *Mitgliederstatistik; Der Einzelnen Jüdischen Gemeinden und Landesverbände in Deutschland* (Frankfurt a. M., annual).

¹¹⁵Julius H. Schoeps, Willy Jasper, and Bernard Vogt (eds.), *Ein neues Judentum in Deutschland? Fremd und Eigenbilder der russisch-jüdischen Einwanderer* (Potsdam, 1999).

¹¹⁶András Kovács (ed.), *Jews and Jewry in Contemporary Hungary: Results of a Sociological Survey*, JPR Report No. 1 (London, 2004). The report reconstructs Jewish population changes between the end of World War II and 1995 based on Tamás Stark, *A magyar zsidóság statisztikája: Kutatási jelentés* (Budapest, 1995). The latter study, however, significantly underestimates emigration over time to countries other than Israel, as well as to Israel, outside the major migration periods.

¹¹⁷Simon Cohn, *Résultats élections législatives* (Brussels, 2003, unpublished manuscript).

¹¹⁸Hanna van Solinge and Marlene de Vries (eds.), *De Joden in Nederland Anno 2000: Demografisch profiel en binding aan het joodendom* (Amsterdam, 2001). The survey was a collaborative effort between the Stichting Joods Maatschappelijk Werk and NIDI (Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute). See also Chris Kooyman and J. Almagor, *Israelis in Holland: A Sociodemographic Study of Israelis and Former Israelis in Holland* (Amsterdam, 1996).

¹¹⁹Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane, *IV Congresso, Relazione del consiglio* (Roma, 2002); Yaakov Andrea Lattes, *Sull'assimilazione in Italia e i metodi per affrontarla* (Ramat Gan, 2005); Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane, *Indagine demografica – Numero degli iscritti delle comunità* (Roma, 2010).

¹²⁰Lasse Dencik, *'Jewishness' in Postmodernity: the Case of Sweden*, Paideia Report (Stockholm, The European Institute for Jewish Studies, 2003)

¹²¹Oren Cytto, *Jewish Identification in Contemporary Spain – A European Case Study* (Jerusalem, European Forum at The Hebrew University, Helmut Kohl Institute for European Studies in collaboration with Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007).

¹²²Statistik Austria, *Volkszählung 2001: Wohnbevölkerung nach Religion und Staatsangehörigkeit für Bundesländer* (Wien, 2003).

¹²³Mark Tolts, "Contemporary Trends in Family Formation among the Jews in Russia," *Jews in Russia and Eastern Europe*, 2006, 2 (57), 5-23; Mark Tolts, "Post-Soviet Jewish Demography, 1989-2004," in Zvi Gitelman and Yaacov Ro'i (eds.), *Revolution, Repression, and Revival: The Soviet Jewish Experience* (Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 283-311.

¹²⁴Zvi Gitelman, "Becoming Jewish in Russia and Ukraine," in Zvi Gitelman, Barry Kosmin, and András Kovács (eds.), *New Jewish Identities: Contemporary Europe and Beyond* (Budapest/New York, 2003), 105-137.

¹²⁵Mark Tolts, "Post-Soviet Jewish Demography," cit. For a German translation see *Menora: Jahrbuch für deutsch-jüdische Geschichte* 2004, 15 (Berlin/Wien, 2005), 15-44; Mark Tolts, "The Post-Soviet Jewish Population in Russia and the World," *Jews in Russia and Eastern Europe*, 1 (52), 2004, 37-63.

¹²⁶Mark Tolts, "Mass Aliyah and Jewish Emigration from Russia: Dynamics and Factors," *East European Jewish Affairs* 33, 2003, 71-96.

¹²⁷Mark Tolts, "Post-Soviet Jewish Demography," cit.; Mark Tolts, "Demographic Trends among the Jews in the Three Post-Soviet Slavic Republics." Paper presented at the 14th World Congress of Jewish Studies (Jerusalem, 2005).

¹²⁸Ukrainian Ministry of Statistics, *Population Census 2001* (Kiev, 2002); Mark Tolts, *Main Demographic Trends of the Jews in Russia and the FSU* (Jerusalem, 2002).

¹²⁹See http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/perepic/2009/vihod_tables/5.8-0.pdf.

¹³⁰See also Sidney Goldstein and Alice Goldstein, *Lithuanian Jewry 1993: A Demographic and Sociocultural Profile* (Jerusalem, The Hebrew University, The Institute of Contemporary Jewry, 1997).

¹³¹Malka Korazim and Esther Katz, "Patterns of Jewish Identity in Moldova: The Behavioral Dimension," in Gitelman, Kosmin, and Kovács (eds.), *New Jewish Identities*, cit, 159-170.

¹³²Bundesamt für Statistik, *Wohnbevölkerung nach Religion 2000* (Neuchatel, 2005).

¹³³Data provided through the courtesy of the Istanbul Jewish Community Council. See also Shaul Tuval, *The Jewish Community of Istanbul, 1948-1992: A Study in Cultural, Economic and Social Processes* (Jerusalem, The Hebrew University, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, 1999).

¹³⁴Roberto Bachi, *The Population of Israel* (Paris, CICRED, and Jerusalem, The Hebrew University, and Demographic Center, Prime Minister's Office, 1977).

¹³⁵See <http://www.cbs.gov.il>.

¹³⁶Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, cit. See also <http://www.cbs.gov.il>.

¹³⁷Sergio DellaPergola, "Fertility Prospects in Israel: Ever Below Replacement Level?" *United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Recent and Future Trends in Fertility* (New York, United Nations Secretariat, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, December 2009).

¹³⁸Immigrant citizens are the foreign-born children of Israelis on their first-time entrance into the country. Not included are foreign workers and illegal residents. See Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, cit.

¹³⁹Personal communication by Rabbi David Bass, Head of Tribunal, Israel Special Rabbinical Conversion Courts.

¹⁴⁰For an extensive discussion of the background, thrust, and implications of past and current population changes, see Sergio DellaPergola, "Demographic Trends in Israel and Palestine: Prospects and Policy Implications" *American Jewish Year Book*, 103 (New York, American Jewish Committee, 2003), 3-68; Sergio DellaPergola, "Population Trends and Scenarios in Israel and Palestine," in Arie M. Kacowicz and Pavel Lutomski (eds.) *Population Resettlement in International Conflicts: A Comparative Study* (Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 183-207. See also Arnon Sofer and Yevguenia Bistrow, *Israel Demography 2004-2020 in the Light of Disengagement* (Haifa, 2004, in Hebrew).

¹⁴¹See www.pcbs.org.

¹⁴²See Bennett Zimmerman, Roberta Seid, Michael Wise, Yoram Ettinger, David Shahaf, Ezra Sohar, David Passig, and Avraham Shvout, *Arab Population In the West Bank and Gaza: The Million and a Half Person Gap* (Washington, 2005); Bennett Zimmerman, Roberta Seid, and Michael L. Wise, *The Million Person Gap: The Arab Population in the West Bank and Gaza* (Ramat Gan, The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 2005) Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 65. For a rebuttal, see Sergio DellaPergola in *Azure*, 27, 2007, 3-33.

¹⁴³Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, cit.

¹⁴⁴Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, cit.; Maya Choshen, Eitan Bluer, Yair Assaf-Shapira, Inbal Doron (eds.), *Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem 2009/2010*, 24 (Jerusalem, Jerusalem Municipality and the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 2010). See also: Sergio DellaPergola, "Demography, Planning and Policy, 2000-2020," in Ora Achimeir and Yaacov BarSimantov (eds.), *40 Years in Jerusalem* (Jerusalem, Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies, 2008, in Hebrew), 39-59 .

¹⁴⁵The figure of 4.0 million suggested by the Population Reference Bureau, *World Population Data Sheet, 2010* (Washington, DC, 2010) for mid-2010 is quite on target.

¹⁴⁶Mark Tolts, "Demographic Trends," cit.

¹⁴⁷See David Saks, "Community Stable, Ageing – Census," *South African Jewish Report* (Johannesburg, 2003). See also Barry A. Kosmin, Jaqueline Goldberg, Milton Shain, and Shirley Bruk, *Jews of the New South Africa: Highlights of the 1998 National Survey of South African Jews* (London, 1999); Shirley Bruk, *The Jews of South Africa 2005 – Report on a Research Study* (Cape Town, 2006).

¹⁴⁸Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Population Census 2006* (Canberra, 2007); Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Population Census 2001* (Canberra, 2002). See also Gary Eckstein, *Demography of the Sydney Jewish Community 2001* (Sydney, 2003).

¹⁴⁹Gary Eckstein, "Intermarriage among Jewish Australians," in Shulamit Reinharz and Sergio DellaPergola, *Jewish Intermarriage around the World*, cit, 139-152.

¹⁵⁰Statistics New Zealand, *2006 Census of Population and Dwelling* (Auckland, 2007).



Mandell L. Berman Institute – North American Jewish Data Bank

A Collaborative Project of the
Jewish Federations of North America

and the

Center for Judaic Studies and
Contemporary Jewish Life

and the

Roper Center for Public Opinion Research

both at the

University of Connecticut

*Research funded by a grant from The Mandell L. and
Madeleine H. Berman Foundation in support of the
Berman Institute – North American Jewish Data Bank.*



Center for
Judaic Studies
and Contemporary
Jewish Life



The Jewish Federations
OF NORTH AMERICA



University of
Connecticut

Data Bank Staff:

Arnold Dashefsky, Director

Ron Miller, Associate Director

Cory Lebson, Associate Director for
Information Technology

Lorri Lafontaine, Program Assistant

Graphic Designer:

Carla Willey

Fact Checker:

Sarah Markowitz

Mandell L. Berman Institute
North American Jewish Data Bank
Center for Judaic Studies and
Contemporary Jewish Life
University of Connecticut
405 Babbidge Rd Unit 1205
Storrs, CT 06269-1205

Web: www.jewishdatabank.org

Email: info@jewishdatabank.org