In the 1960s, NASA expended nearly as much study money and effort on manned Mars and Venus flyby mission planning as it did on its more widely known plans for manned Mars landings. Italian aviation and rocketry pioneer Gaetano Crocco had first described a free-return manned Mars/Venus flyby mission in 1956. Manned flyby studies within NASA began with the EMPIRE study the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Future Projects Office initiated in 1962 and culminated in the NASA-wide Planetary Joint Action Group (JAG) study of 1966-1967.
The Planetary JAG, led by the NASA Headquarters Office of Manned Space Flight, brought together engineers from MSFC, Kennedy Space Center, the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), and Washington, DC-based planning contractor Bellcomm. It issued a Phase I report in Oct. 1966 and continued Phase II study work in Fiscal Year (FY) 1967. The Phase I report emphasized a manned Mars flyby mission in 1975, but included Mars and Venus flyby opportunities through 1980. All would be based on hardware developed for the Apollo Program and for its planned successor, the Apollo Applications Program (AAP). The piloted flyby spacecraft would carry automated probes, including one type that would land on Mars, collect a sample of surface material (containing, it was hoped, evidence of life), and launch it back to the flyby spacecraft for immediate analysis.
According to Edward Clinton Ezell and Linda Neuman Ezell, writing in their 1984 history On Mars, MSC was largely responsible for the demise of 1960s manned flyby mission planning. On Aug. 3, 1967, the Houston-based center, home of the astronaut corps and Mission Control, distributed to 28 aerospace companies a Request for Proposal (RFP) for a manned Mars flyby spacecraft sample-returner design study. By doing this, MSC appeared to disregard warnings from Congress that no new NASA programs would be tolerated.
In the summer of 1967, NASA was preoccupied with recovery from the Jan. 27, 1967 Apollo 1 fire, which had killed astronauts Virgil Grissom, Roger Chaffee, and Ed White. Many in Congress felt that NASA had been lax in maintaining quality and safety standards, so deserved to be punished for the accident. They did not, however, wish to cut Apollo funding and endanger accomplishment of Apollo’s very public goal of a man on the moon by 1970. In addition, by August 1967, the Federal budget deficit for FY 1967 had reached $30 billion. Though negligible by modern standards, this was a shocking sum in 1967. The deficit was driven in large part by the cost of fighting in Indochina, which had reached more than $2 billion a month, or the entire Apollo Program budget of $25 billion every 10 months.
After learning of MSC’s RFP, long-time House Space Committee Chair and NASA supporter Joseph Karth declared angrily that “a manned mission to Mars or Venus by 1975 or 1977 is now and always has been out of the question – and anyone who persists in this kind of misallocation of resources … is going to be stopped.” On Aug. 16, the House cut all funding for advanced planning from NASA’s FY 1968 budget bill and slashed the budget for AAP from $455 million to $122 million. Total cuts to President Lyndon Johnson’s January 1967 NASA budget request amounted to more than $500 million, or about 10 percent of NASA’s FY 1967 budget total.
Though he opposed the cuts, President Johnson bowed to the inevitable and signed the budget into law. The Planetary JAG and Bellcomm tied up loose ends of the manned flyby study during FY 1968, but most work on the concept ended little more than a month after the Houston center issued its ill-timed RFP.
It is ironic, then, that NASA’s next piloted Mars flyby study took place in Houston, at Johnson Space Center (JSC), as MSC had been rechristened following President Johnson’s death in January 1973. Barney Roberts, of JSC’s Engineering Directorate, reported on the study to the joint NASA-Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Manned Mars Missions workshop in June 1985. Continue Reading “Shuttle-Era Manned Mars Flyby (1985)” »