



**HOME OFFICE**

**THE HILLSBOROUGH  
STADIUM DISASTER**

**15 APRIL 1989**

**INQUIRY BY  
THE RT HON LORD JUSTICE TAYLOR**

**INTERIM REPORT**

*Presented to Parliament  
by the Secretary of State for the Home Department  
by Command of Her Majesty  
August 1989*

*LONDON*  
HERMAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE





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## **THE HILLSBOROUGH STADIUM DISASTER 15 APRIL 1989**

### **INTERIM REPORT OF INQUIRY**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

1. On 15 April 1989 a football match to decide a semi-final round of the FA Cup competition was to be played between the Liverpool and Nottingham Forest Clubs. The neutral venue chosen was Hillsborough Football Stadium, Sheffield Wednesday's ground. Only six minutes into the game, play was stopped when it was realised that spectators on the terraces behind the Liverpool goal had been severely crushed. In the result, 95 died and over 400 received hospital treatment.

2. On 17 April 1989 I was appointed by you to carry out an Inquiry with the following terms of reference:

To inquire into the events at Sheffield Wednesday football ground on 15 April 1989 and to make recommendations about the needs of crowd control and safety at sports events.

3. Two Assessors were appointed to assist me: Mr Brian Johnson QPM, Chief Constable of Lancashire, and Professor Leonard Maunder OBE, BSc, PhD, ScD, FEng, FI Mech E, Professor of Mechanical Engineering at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne. Their help has been invaluable and I am very grateful for their expert advice and wise counsels. While the sole responsibility for this report is mine, I am comforted in the knowledge that both Assessors agree with it.

4. Mr Robert Whalley was appointed Secretary to the Inquiry. He and his assistants have worked prodigiously and skilfully to give me all the advice and support I could have wished. I also wish to acknowledge the help I have received, as always, from my clerk, Mr Ernest Pott.

5. The policing arrangements for 15 April were in the hands of the South Yorkshire Constabulary. The efficacy of those arrangements and their implementation was from an early stage called into question. It was therefore decided that the investigation of the disaster and the gathering of evidence for this Inquiry should be conducted by an independent police force. Mr Geoffrey Dear QPM, Chief Constable of West Midlands Constabulary, undertook this task. He was made responsible directly to me; he appointed Assistant Chief Constable Mervyn Jones to take full-time charge of the investigation. I am deeply indebted to both of them.

6. On 18 April I visited Hillsborough Stadium. I inspected the scene of the disaster on the terraces and all relevant parts of the stadium and its approaches. My Assessors and I have made further visits during the Inquiry. I also visited Liverpool on 21 and 29 April.

7. The Lord Mayor and the Sheffield City Council kindly offered to make the accommodation and facilities of Sheffield Town Hall available for the hearing of oral evidence. This offer was gratefully accepted and I would like to record my thanks for those facilities and for the co-operation afforded to the Inquiry by the authorities in Sheffield.

8. On 28 April 1989, I held a preliminary hearing to announce the date when the oral evidence would begin, to give some directions as to the procedure I intended to follow and to hear applications from those wishing to be represented at the hearing. I accorded representation to the following:

- (i) Those bereaved or injured as a result of the **disaster**.
- (ii) The Football Supporters' **Association**.
- (iii) The Football **Association**.
- (iv) Sheffield City Council.
- (v) Sheffield Wednesday Football Club together with the Football League, the Club's casual staff and their insurers, the Sun Alliance.
- (vi) South Yorkshire Constabulary.
- (vii) South Yorkshire Fire and Civil Defence Authority.

Subsequently, during the hearing, I further accorded representation to:

(viii) Trent Regional Health Authority, for the South Yorkshire Metropolitan Ambulance Service (SYMAS).

and (ix) Dr W Eastwood, consultant engineer to Sheffield Wednesday Football Club.

9. Since the circumstances of the disaster raised urgent questions of safety, especially at football grounds, you indicated at the outset that you would welcome any recommendations, even of an interim nature, which I might be able to give in advance of the new football season due to commence in mid-August 1989. I therefore announced at the preliminary hearing on 28 April that I would conduct an oral hearing with all possible expedition as the first phase of the Inquiry to discover the facts and causes of the disaster and enable me to make any immediate interim recommendations necessary in the short term.

10. The West Midlands Police investigation began on 24 April. A "Freephone" number was advertised to enable members of the public, especially those who had attended the match, to offer their evidence to the Inquiry. Initially this number was available for three days on 28 different lines. The response from the public was such that the lines were continued for a further three days by the end of which 2,666 calls had been received. There were also many written offers of help. Some 440 West Midlands officers were deployed on the Inquiry. To service this operation, special police offices were established in Birmingham, Liverpool and Sheffield and computer technology was used to the full. In all some 3776 statements were taken. There were also some 1550 letters to Ministers, to the Inquiry and to me personally all of which I read. The police, Sheffield Wednesday Football Club and the BBC had video cameras filming at the ground on 15 April. In aggregate, they recorded some 71 hours of film covering the period before, during and after the disaster. Thus the material gathered and potentially available for presentation at the oral hearing was enormous. From this mass it was essential to select only sufficient good and reliable evidence necessary to establish the facts and causes of the disaster.

11. Where it seemed likely that any allegation or criticism might be made of the conduct of any person or party, the Treasury Solicitor, after consultation with Counsel for the Inquiry, wrote to the party concerned setting out the likely grounds for complaint. This followed the practice established by the Royal Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry (the Salmon Commission).

12. The hearing began on 15 May. It continued, sitting long hours, for 31 days concluding on 29 June. In that period, 174 witnesses gave oral evidence. Counsel's submissions were delivered in writing on 7 July and on 14 July I heard their brief oral submissions supplementing the written argument.

13. Witnesses were not sworn. Since this is a departmental inquiry, there was no power to administer the oath but there was no instance of any witness giving evidence which I considered might have been different had he or she been sworn.

14. The witnesses called were only a small fraction of those from whom statements were or could have been taken. Nevertheless, I am satisfied that they were sufficient in number and reliability to enable me to reach the necessary conclusions. To have called more would have prevented me from presenting an interim report in the required time and would not have added significantly to the relevant evidence. I have, however, been able to take into account many written statements in addition to oral testimony.

15. Apart from the evidence called by Counsel for the Inquiry which was drawn from statements taken by the West Midlands Police and others volunteered by individuals, each of the represented parties was given full opportunity to put forward any witnesses they considered should be called. A final submission was made by Counsel for the South Yorkshire Police that since the investigation by West Midlands Police is still continuing, all the evidence has not been assembled and it would be unsafe for me to make findings of fact. I should therefore make clear that the investigation continues principally to furnish as much detail as possible to HM Coroner for the City of Sheffield as to the cause of death, the precise position at death and the care and movement of each of the 95 victims individually. I am assured by Chief Constable Dear and Assistant Chief Constable Mervyn Jones that it is most unlikely any further evidence gathered will significantly alter or add to the history of events which emerged at the hearing.

16. I should like to thank all those who made it possible for the oral hearing to take place so soon after the event and for evidence to be efficiently presented and tested so as to give a full and fair account of what happened in all its aspects without irrelevancy or duplication. I pay tribute particularly to the West Midlands Police for their speed and dedication in gathering the evidence and to all those responsible for processing it.

The most eloquent tribute to the fairness and thoroughness of the police investigation came from the Secretary of the Football Supporters' Association. He said there had been initial anxiety in Liverpool as to whether that investigation would be fair and objective. His Association therefore collected 200 witness statements themselves. Having heard the opening statement by Counsel to the Inquiry based upon the evidence gathered by the police, he found that it accorded entirely with his Association's evidence and the initial anxiety was wholly dispelled.

17. Before and during the Inquiry I derived great assistance on a wide range of technical issues from the Health and Safety Executive who providentially have a laboratory in Sheffield (the Research and Laboratory Services Division) where tests were conducted and reports prepared swiftly and efficiently. This was done in close consultation with Professor Maunder. I am most grateful to the Director, Dr A Jones, and to the Deputy Director, Dr C E Nicholson, for their invaluable help.

18. I wish to commend Counsel to the inquiry, Mr Andrew Collins QC, Mr Alan Goldsack and Mr Bernard Phillips for their industry, care and fairness in selecting and presenting the necessary evidence; also, Counsel for all those **represented** who tested that evidence fully but expeditiously. This Interim Report could not possibly have been prepared in so short a time had I not had the whole-hearted co-operation of all those mentioned and many others.

19. The second phase of the Inquiry will be directed to making final and long term recommendations about crowd control and safety at sports grounds. I need to consider in depth information, opinions and arguments from a wide range of sources and contributors both here and abroad. It was clear from the outset that this second phase could not be carried to completion before the next football season. However, at an early stage of the oral hearing I invited evidence from all who wished to contribute to it and specifically from many sporting, local authority, emergency service and police bodies as well as technical consultants. I asked that submissions should be in writing and should be made promptly so that the second phase of the Inquiry could follow immediately after the first. I shall now proceed to consider the large body of written evidence which has been submitted. I shall want in some instances to have further oral evidence or discussion in conjunction with my Assessors. We will also need to make a number of visits and inspections.

20. I now present my Interim Report and Recommendations. I shall prepare my Final Report and Recommendations as soon as reasonably possible.

1 August 1989

PETER TAYLOR

# PART I - WHAT HAPPENED AT HILLSBOROUGH?

## CHAPTER 1

### THE GROUND AND PRE-MATCH ARRANGEMENTS

#### Fixing The Venue

21. On 20 March 1989, the Football Association (the FA) requested that their Cup semi-final between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest be held on 15 April at Hillsborough Football Stadium. The corresponding semi-final between the same two teams had been held there in April 1988. The arrangements had been successful in the view both of the police and of the host club. Sheffield Wednesday (the Club) were therefore willing to accommodate the 1989 match. South Yorkshire Constabulary were prepared to police it but only if the ticketing arrangements were the same as those for 1988. Otherwise, the FA would have to look elsewhere. Those arrangements did not please Liverpool or its supporters either in 1988 or 1989. They thought the ticket allocation was unfair for reasons to be explained later. Reluctantly, however, the police requirement was accepted and the match was fixed for 15 April at Hillsborough.

#### The Ground

22. The Hillsborough Stadium is some 2½ miles to the north-west of central Sheffield in the district of Owlerton. The ground was opened in 1899 on what was then a greenfield site by the river Don. The pitch lies roughly east to west. A plan of the ground and its immediate environs is at Appendix 1.

23. The west end, with which this Inquiry is principally concerned, is known as the Leppings Lane end. The east end abuts on Penistone Road, the A 61. To the south is the river Don and to the north a residential street, Vere Road, which runs between Leppings Lane and Penistone Road North.

24. Alongside the river is a private roadway giving access to the south stand, to the Directors' and players' entrances, and to the administrative block under the stand. The roadway gives both vehicular and pedestrian access between Penistone Road and Leppings Lane, but there are gates which can shut it off at each end. There is some car parking along this roadway principally for Directors, players and employees of the Club. The south stand dates from 1914 and is the oldest at the ground. It is all seating with places for 8,800. 5,500 of those are roofed over and 3,300 are uncovered.

25. The north stand is also all seating and accommodates about 9,700. Behind it is a gymnasium or sports hall. There are also a first aid room and police room close by.

26. The east end is all terracing and is known as the Spion Kop. It was enlarged and roofed over in 1986 and now accommodates some 21,000 standing spectators. There are crush barriers in the Kop running parallel to the goal line but no dividing fences to prevent free movement from side to side.

27. At the west or Leppings Lane end of the ground there is terracing close to the pitch. Behind it is the west stand which provides covered seating and was built in 1965 for World Cup matches, some of which were held at Hillsborough in 1966. The covered stand accommodates 4,456 seated spectators. The terracing in front of it extends higher in the corners between the stands and its total capacity was stated to be 10,100. At both the Kop end and the west end access to the pitch is barred by perimeter fencing. The fencing is about eight feet high mounted upon the low wall at the foot of the terracing. At the top of the fencing the wire returns back at a sharp angle for some 15 inches to make it difficult for anyone to climb over towards the pitch. There are gates at intervals along the perimeter fencing to afford access between terrace and pitch. These gates are less than a metre wide and were designed to be opened only from the pitch side for police purposes or in an emergency. They are marked and numbered on the plan Appendix 1.

28. Unlike the Kop end, the west terracing has not only crush barriers parallel with the goal line but radial fences at right angles to it, dividing the area into pens. This division was begun after an FA Cup semi-final in 1981 when crushing occurred due to overcrowding and gates had to be opened. It proceeded in stages, the final arrangement being shown on the plan Appendix 1. The first section of the west terracing moving south to north contains gates 1 and 2 and is known as pens 1 and 2 although in fact constituting only one pen. Next is pen 3 with one gate; next pen 4 with one gate; pen 5, which is extremely narrow, was intended as a sterile area to divide pen 4 from pen 6. This was to isolate home and away fans on occasions when both might be accommodated on the west terracing in separate pens. Finally there is pen 7 at the north-west corner. Pens 5, 6 and 7 each have a perimeter gate. At the back of the pens, under the front of the west stand, there is a gate in

each radial fence. When those gates are open, the back row of the terracing is intended to permit access from pen to pen along the whole west side. In practice, when substantial numbers are present, those gateways are not readily visible or accessible. The present layout of the pens, fences, crush barriers and gates has resulted from a series of piecemeal changes. The nature and effect of those changes must be considered later.

### **The Turnstiles**

29. Because of the housing in Vere Road there is no access from the north side of the ground. Along Penistone Road North there are some 46 turnstiles which usually give access both to the **Kop** and to the east end of the north stand. They are marked 43 to 88 inclusive on the plan. The 12 numbered 77 to 88 are designed to feed the north stand but were not used for that purpose on 15 April in order to segregate supporters of the two teams as appears later. Two of them, 77 and 78, were however used for access to the **Kop**.

30. At the south side of the ground there were 24 turnstiles (numbered 19 to 42 on the plan). Those numbered 37 to 42 led to the **Kop** and the rest to the south stand.

31. In summary, the south and east sides of the ground accommodated some 29,800 whose access on the day was through 60 turnstiles.

32. The other two sides of the ground, north and west, with a capacity of 24,256 were fed solely from the Leppings Lane entrance where there were only 23 turnstiles.

### **Travel to the Ground**

33. Most supporters were expected to come by road although rail transport was available. Nottingham supporters travelling by train would arrive at the main line Sheffield Midland Station whence they would be directed and escorted northwards by the police. They would arrive at the ground along Penistone Road. Nottingham supporters travelling by coach, mini-bus or car would approach Sheffield from the south mainly on the **M1**. Again their arrival at the ground would predominantly be via Penistone Road or **Herries Road**.

34. Liverpool supporters travelling by normal rail service would arrive at Sheffield Midland Station just like their Nottingham counterparts. The police aimed to segregate the rival fans and put them into separate coaches. Liverpool fans could alternatively travel by special train to Wadsley Bridge, a British Rail station catering solely for football supporters and situated to the north of the ground. A police escort was available to conduct them on foot to the Leppings Lane entrance. Those coming from Liverpool by road would approach Sheffield either via the **M62** and down the **M1** from the north or across the Pennines from the north west. All such routes would bring them to the ground via one or other limb of Leppings Lane as shown on Appendix 1. Broadly, therefore, arrivals from Liverpool would be from the north and west; arrivals from Nottingham would be from the south and east.

### **Allocation of Places and Tickets**

35. Experience in recent years has produced a policy of segregation to prevent trouble between supporters of rival teams. The need for this policy to be maintained was endorsed and emphasised by the Popplewell Report following the Bradford City disaster in 1985. Accordingly, before the 1988 semi-final the police decided that sections of the Hillsborough Stadium should be allocated so as to achieve efficient segregation of Liverpool and Nottingham Forest fans. The section to be granted to each was determined by the direction whence each predominantly approached. Thus, Liverpool were allotted the north and west sides of the ground for which access was from Leppings Lane. Nottingham Forest were allotted the south and east sides with access from Penistone Road.

36. The effect of the decision was that for this all-ticket Cup Tie, Liverpool were allotted only 24,256 places as against 29,800 for Nottingham Forest. This, although average attendance of supporters at home matches was substantially higher at Liverpool than at Nottingham. Moreover, with standing tickets at £6 and seats at £12, Nottingham Forest had 21,000 standing places compared with Liverpool's 10,100. So, Liverpool's allocation was more expensive as well as smaller. Understandably, Liverpool were aggrieved by the allocation of places and tickets. They sought with some support from the host club and the FA to have it changed in 1988, but the police were adamant. To switch ends would, in their opinion, have involved rival supporters crossing each other's paths when approaching the ground thereby frustrating attempts at segregation and creating a risk of disorder. In 1989, when the same plan was proposed, Liverpool again challenged it. The police, however, maintained their view, adding that those who had attended in 1988 would be familiar with the arrangements and that any change would lead to confusion.

### **Access from Leppings Lane**

37. As the plan Appendix 1 shows, the approach to the west turnstiles is across a narrow neck or forecourt at a bend in Leppings Lane where, coming from the north, it turns to the south-west and crosses a bridge over the river Don. Parking areas for the Liverpool supporters had been arranged north and west of the ground. They were therefore expected to arrive on foot along both limbs of Leppings Lane and would converge on the forecourt at the bend. In an arc across that forecourt is a line of railings with six sets of double gates. Inside those perimeter gates is the short approach to the turnstiles. As shown in the photographs Appendix 2, the latter are in two sections divided by a fence. The northern section consists of turnstiles 1 to 16. Numbers 1 to 10 gave access to the north stand. Thus there were 10 turnstiles for the 9,700 with north stand seats. Their tickets were marked "Entrance A" and were colour-coded brown. Turnstiles 1 to 10 correspondingly had the letter A above them and brown boards on the wall.

38. Turnstiles 11 to 16 were for those with seats in the west stand. Thus 4,456 were served by six turnstiles. They were the next block to the right of those marked A. However, instead of these turnstiles and the west stand tickets being marked B as might alphabetically have been expected, they were marked C. Their colour-code on tickets and boards was red.

39. On the other side of the dividing fence in the approach area, there were only seven turnstiles to serve 10,100 with tickets for the west terracing. Those seven turnstiles were labelled A to G. This was because there had originally been 18 turnstiles at Leppings Lane and the sequential numbering continued from 19 upwards on the south side of the ground. When the number at Leppings Lane was brought up to 23 the present arrangements of 1 to 16, A to G and then 19 upwards was adopted to avoid re-numbering all round the ground. However, above the lettering A to G was a large letter B. "Entrance B" also appeared on tickets for the west terrace. Thus, the three blocks of turnstiles encountered by a ticket holder at the Leppings Lane end read from left to right A, C, B. The colour-code for west terrace tickets and the boards beside turnstiles A to G was **mauve**. To the right of turnstile G is a tubular steel barrier to divide the queue for that turnstile from the roadway to the south stand.

### **Inside the Leppings Lane Turnstiles**

40. Turnstiles 1 to 10 gave access to a passageway leading to the north stand. There is an exit gate (marked A on Appendix 1) between turnstile 1 and the adjacent housing.

41. Inside turnstiles 1 to 16 is a concourse leading to pens 6 and 7 and the steps to the west stand. There is a wall dividing this area from that inside turnstiles A to G. It had been built to segregate home and away fans at a time when the Club intended they should share the west terrace. That idea was not pursued but the wall remained. There was, however, a gateway in the wall which did permit access between the two areas. An exit gate (marked B on Appendix 1) was provided from the area inside turnstiles 11 to 16.

42. Finally, anyone using turnstiles A to G entered a concourse bounded on the left by the wall just mentioned and on the right by the wall of the private roadway coming from the south stand to Leppings Lane. There was an exit gate in the latter wall (marked C on Appendix 1) just inside turnstile G.

43. All three exit gates, A, B and C, were of concertina design. They could be opened only from the inside and were not intended for entry of spectators into the ground.

44. Those entering through turnstiles A to G had three options once inside the ground. They could by moving to the right go round the south end of the west stand and gain entry into pens 1 and 2. They could go through the gap in the dividing wall towards the concourse behind turnstiles 11 to 16 and then round the north end of the west stand into pens 6 or 7. However, there were no conspicuous signs inviting them to take either of those courses. The obvious way in was straight ahead of the turnstiles where a tunnel under the middle of the west stand gave access to pens 3 and 4. Above its entrance in large letters was the word "Standing" and a large letter "B". Thus B ticket holders were drawn towards the tunnel.

45. The length of the tunnel is some 23 metres. It rises slightly at first then levels off but finally descends towards the terraces at a gradient of 1 in 6. As it emerges onto the terrace, the way ahead is bisected by the radial fence between pen 3 on the right and pen 4 on the left. A short spur of brick wall projects forward from each side of the tunnel at its mouth. Those emerging are thus guided straight forward rather than to either side. The photograph at Appendix 3 shows the west stand and terraces.

46. As with the layout on the terraces, the configuration of the Leppings Lane turnstiles and the areas inside them was effected by a series of piecemeal changes. Again, it will be necessary to analyse their resultant effect.

### **Policing Arrangements**

47. At the 1988 semi-final, policing had been under the control of Chief Superintendent Mole, then Commander of F Division within whose area Hillsborough lies. He was still in post on 20 March 1989 when the FA broached the 1989 semi-final, but he was due to hand over command of F Division on 27 March to Superintendent Duckenfield on the latter's promotion to Chief Superintendent. Both were present at an initial meeting on 22 March, but on 27 March Mr Mole bowed out and Mr Duckenfield took over. Under him were Sector Commanders, all Superintendents with much experience of policing football matches at Hillsborough and elsewhere. In particular, Superintendent Marshall was in charge of the area outside the Leppings Lane entrance and the approaches to it. Superintendent Greenwood was in command inside the ground, but this included the area between the turnstiles and the perimeter fence. They thereby swapped roles from the previous year. Under Mr Duckenfield's overall command were some 801 officers and men on duty at the ground plus traffic officers and others from D Division to deal with the influx of supporters into the city centre. In all, therefore, some 1,122 police were deployed for this match amounting to about 38 per cent of the total South Yorkshire force. Included in the mounted section of 34 were officers from Liverpool and Nottingham to assist respectively in marshalling their home supporters. The total at the ground was divided into serials consisting usually of eight to ten Constables plus a Sergeant and an Inspector. The serials were posted to duties at various stations in and around the ground in three phases: before, during and after the match. All of this was provided for in an Operational Order which followed closely the Order drawn up for the 1988 semi-final and took into account the force's "Standing Instructions for the Policing of Football Grounds". The Order described the duties of each serial at each phase. It was supplemented by oral briefings before and on the day of the match.

### **Sheffield Wednesday's Arrangements**

48. The Club provided 376 stewards, gatemen and turnstile operators for duty on 15 April. The stewards were briefed as to their duties on the morning of the match by police Inspectors and were allocated round the ground. They wore yellow tabards. The Club's control room, situated below the south stand, could communicate by VHF radio with the stewards. Closed circuit television was installed by the Club with screens in their control room showing all the turnstiles round the ground. A computerised counting system was incorporated in the turnstiles. This flashed onto a screen in the Club control room the running total of spectators passing through the turnstiles section by section. Thus, at the Leppings Lane end, there would be separate running totals for turnstiles 1 to 10 (north stand), turnstiles 11 to 16 (west stand), and turnstiles A to G (west terraces). When the total for any section was within 15 per cent of its permitted capacity a warning pulse showed on the screen. For the west terracing that warning would occur when the numbers were within 15 per cent of the total terrace capacity of 10,100. What the system could not do was monitor the distribution of fans on the terracing, pen by pen. It could give no warning therefore if one pen was full beyond its safe capacity.

### **Police Communications**

49. The nerve centre for police control is the control room or box situated at the south-west corner of the ground between the south stand and pen 1 of the west terracing. The box is elevated and reached by a number of steps. It has windows commanding views across the pitch and straight along the line of the west perimeter fence. The box is very small and has seats for only three officers. Superintendent Murray was in control of it and was advisor to Mr Duckenfield as he had been to Mr Mole the year before. Next to him sat Sergeant Goddard who operated the radios. The third seat was for Police Constable Ryan who operated the telephone and public address systems. At the back of the box stood Police Constable Bichard who was in control of the police closed circuit television system operated by a row of consoles on a bench in front of him and behind the three seated officers.

50. There were five television screens showing views of five roving cameras fixed at high points on the stands and directed both inside and outside the ground. There was also a master screen which flicked in rotation from one camera view to another and which made a video recording. The cameras have a zoom facility to close in on any point of interest. Specifically, there were good camera views of the west terracing, of the Leppings Lane turnstiles and beyond them of Leppings Lane itself.

51. The Tannoy public address system was relayed through speakers fixed at vantage points inside the ground and outside the turnstiles. It was used by a disc jockey, housed under the police control box, to relay music before the match, but it could be overridden by the police. Messages could be relayed through all speakers or if appropriate to one area only.

53. Radio contact at Hillsborough from control to serials operating both inside and outside the ground was UHF on channel 25. There was a WI FU portable base station in the control box and if it failed there was a stand-by station under the operator's bench. Hand sets were issued to all ranks of Sergeant and above. Community Constables on duty would already have their own. Other Constables had no radio. Communication was on "talk through" i.e. any message from any source would be heard by everyone tuned in and if more than one source spoke messages could become garbled. Ear pieces were issued to some officers in an attempt to overcome the loud crowd noise which made receipt of signals very difficult. There were other radio channels open to Sergeant Goddard: VHF to police Headquarters at **Snig Hill**, channel 35 to **F1** Sub-divisional Headquarters at **Hammerton Road** and channel 19 used by **CID**. There was also a set tuned to Sheffield Wednesday's radio system between its control room and the stewards.

## CHAPTER 2

### 15th APRIL: THE BUILD-UP TO 2.30pm

#### Early Arrivals

54. 15 April 1989 was a warm sunny spring Saturday. The match was a sell-out, so 54,000 ticket holders were expected. Others would come without tickets hoping to acquire them or even to gain access otherwise. The following account concentrates, as did the evidence, on the western approaches and the Liverpool supporters since the disaster occurred at their end. They began to arrive in the **Hillsborough** area quite early in small numbers. Some brought cans of beer with them and were seen drinking as they walked; others took advantage of the weather and sat about on walls and open spaces. When the public houses opened, many resorted there, drinking inside or spilling out into the sunshine. Leppings Lane and its environs comprise a mixed shopping and residential area. Local residents saw groups of Liverpool supporters keen to find a public house or off-licence. Many were asking for tickets or "spares". There were a few touts selling them at inflated prices. From an early stage, some of the fans were using private gardens and yards to urinate. As the morning wore on, numbers increased. Requests for tickets and trespass to urinate also increased. Still the prevailing mood was one of carnival, good humour and expectation.

#### Public Houses

55. There were some 74 shops with off-licences in and around Sheffield. In general, they opened at 8 am. Liverpool supporters did visit them but the evidence did not suggest a great amount of alcoholic drink was bought there.

56. Opening time at public houses was in general 11 am. Some remained closed all day. Of the others, some 72, mostly in the city, were frequented by local patrons only. Some 23 public houses, however, served over a hundred Liverpool supporters each. Another 51 served more than 20 each. Little trouble was reported, but many supporters drank enough to affect their mood. At first excitement: later frustration.

#### The Gathering Crowd

57. Towards the end of the morning, fans gathered on and around the bridge near the Leppings Lane entrance. They seemed reluctant to enter the ground early. All turnstiles were open at 12 noon and one or two as early as 11.30 am. Some 53 police had been deployed to operate outside the turnstiles and in the Leppings Lane area. They enquired at random whether fans had tickets. Those who had not were advised to go away; nevertheless, many returned more than once. Those who had tickets were guided in the right direction. The police tried to persuade them to enter the ground early. Officers, male and female, had been posted outside each turnstile with the duty of searching entrants for weapons, drink or drugs. Once through the turnstile, an entrant was liable to be searched again by one of a serial of officers positioned just inside.

58. At about 12 noon Chief Inspector Creaser asked Superintendent Murray whether the pens on the west terrace were to be filled one by one successively, but was told that they should all be available from the start and the fans should find their own level.

59. By 2 pm it was apparent to those inside the ground and those monitoring events in the police and Club control rooms that the number of Nottingham fans in their places greatly outnumbered those from Liverpool. The **Kop** and the south stand were filling up steadily, but the north and west stands were half empty. It was noted about that time that the turnstile figures showed only 12,000 had entered as against 20,000 at the same time the previous year. On the west terraces, although pens 3 and 4 were filling, the wing pens 1, 2, 6 and 7 were nearly empty. At 2.15 pm a Tannoy message asked fans in pens 3 and 4 to move forward and make room for others.

60. There had been three special trains from Liverpool in 1988. This time, there was only one. It arrived early, just before 2 pm, at Wadsley Bridge station. The 350 passengers were met by both mounted and foot police officers who escorted them in a crocodile down Leppings Lane. They were orderly and passed through the turnstiles into the ground by about 2.20 pm without incident.

61. By this time the police Traffic Division reported that the Liverpool routes were clear, so the majority of Liverpool fans were in the Sheffield area. The numbers converging on the Leppings Lane entrance were increasing rapidly. Between the perimeter gates and the turnstiles the crowd became congested. There was no longer a separate queue at each turnstile but a single phalanx filling the whole approach area. The foot officers outside the turnstiles were no longer able to search everyone and had difficulty in searching even selectively.

Mounted officers in and outside the turnstile area were having difficulty manoeuvring in such a dense crowd. The police were beset by fans bemused by the ticket and turnstile labelling asking for directions. Many had been drinking but up to and just after 2.30 **pm** the mood remained good.

62. Superintendent Marshall was on foot amongst the crowd. He became anxious about the numbers coming down Leppings Lane and spilling out onto the roadway where buses and cars were moving. At 2.17 pm he radioed to control to have motor traffic in Leppings Lane stopped. This was eventually done at about 2.30 pm. Up to this time, despite the large mass outside the turnstiles and the numbers still approaching, there was still no panic in the crowd; no perception of crisis by the police. In the control room Mr Murray, who could see Leppings Lane on the video, advised Mr Duckenfield that they would get everyone in by 3 pm. Mr **Duckenfield** reaffirmed to him the policy about a delayed kick-off. It would be ordered only if there was some major external factor such as **fog** on the Pennines or delay on the motorway: not if spectators merely turned up late even in large numbers.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE CRISIS AT THE TURNSTILES

63. In the 20 minutes from 2.30 pm to 2.50 pm there were crucial developments both inside and outside the ground. In pens 3 and 4 there was a steady increase in pressure as more fans came through the tunnel to the favoured area behind the goal. By 2.50 pm these pens were already full to a degree which caused serious discomfort to many well used to enduring pressure on terraces. The numbers at that time were clearly in excess of the maximum density stated by the Home Office Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds (1986 Edn) (the Green Guide) i.e. 54 persons per 10 square metres. (Although the Green Guide has no statutory or legal force, it is the only official advice available about safety at sports grounds.) In the wing pens 1, 2, 6 and 7, there was still ample room and bare patches of concrete were visible.

64. Meanwhile, the crowd grew at the Leppings Lane entrance. As more arrived at the back the crush at the front grew worse. Entry to the turnstiles became more difficult. Their efficiency was impaired and their rate reduced. Arrivals at the back exceeded deliveries through the turnstiles, so the build-up increased. The foot officers outside were unable to function and in danger themselves so they went through the turnstiles and out again through gate C where they did what they could to relieve pressure by the tubular barrier. The mounted officers were surrounded by the dense mass of people and became ineffective. Superintendent Marshall was in the midst of the turmoil. He extricated himself and stood on a parapet of the bridge to get a clear view. A drunken fan tried to push him off: a beer can was thrown at a mounted officer. But these were isolated acts by individuals; the menace came from the massive numbers single-mindedly determined to be in for the kick-off with time running out. At the back of the crowd fans were frustrated by the lack of progress as 3 o'clock approached. Some, mostly young men who had been drinking, tried to push and force their way forward. At the front, people were jammed together and against the turnstile walls. Some panicked as the pressure intensified. Some youngsters and women were fainting and in distress. They were helped out through the tubular barrier by turnstile G or were passed over the turnstiles elsewhere. Fans climbed up and over the turnstile building or on to the dividing fence. This was to escape the crush rather than to gain free entry since most of them had tickets.

65. At 2.44 pm Mr Marshall radioed for reinforcements, for the Tannoy to request the crowd to stop pushing and for a vehicle with loudspeaker equipment to come and request the same. Unhappily, at about 2.40 pm, radio communication on channel 25 became defective. For a period of two or three minutes the control room lost contact. A communications officer came promptly and switched to the standby station. With the use of a handset at control, contact was restored. Despite this hiatus, two of Mr Marshall's requests were received. The Tannoy was used but with little effect. Reinforcements, including mounted officers from Penistone Road, were sent. The third request, for a Landrover, was received direct by its driver PC Buxton who arrived at 2.46 pm and urged the crowd by loudspeaker not to push. This was no more effective than the Tannoy. The mounted officers besieged near the turnstiles came outside the perimeter gates. An attempt was made to shut them against the crowd outside, to enable the throng inside to be dispersed or at least thinned through the turnstiles. The pressure from without, however, opened the gates again. Mounted officers, now reinforced to greater numbers, formed a cordon across the elbow of Leppings Lane from the sweet shop to the bridge, again with the object of reducing pressure inside the gates. They were successful in this for some minutes despite desperate individuals forcing their way under or between the horses. However, this exercise was overtaken by a more dramatic relief of the pressure.

#### "Open the Gates"

66. Between 2.40 pm and 2.45 pm the crowd inside and outside the turnstile approach had swelled to over 5,000. At the head of the phalanx conditions had become intolerable. Those who got through were short of breath and sweating profusely. Many complained to police officers on the concourse inside the turnstiles and asked them in forceful terms to do something. Exit gates A and B were being shaken. It was clear the crowd could not pass through the turnstiles by 3 pm. Police Constable Buxton radioed from the Landrover to control asking that kick-off be postponed. The suggestion was acknowledged but rejected.

67. Superintendent Marshall realised the crowd had become unmanageable. Although loth to do so, since it was contrary to basic police strategy, he decided to request the exit gates be opened to relieve the pressure. Otherwise, he feared fatalities would occur. Other senior officers outside the ground agreed. At 2.47 pm he radioed control to permit the gates to be opened. At 2.48 pm, whilst Mr Duckenfield was considering the request, gate C opened to eject a youth who had climbed in with no ticket. Immediately, fans outside took advantage and about 150 managed to get in before a mounted officer enabled the gate to be closed again. Mr Marshall repeated his request. Still no response from control. He repeated it a third time, adding that if the

gates were not opened someone was going to be killed. In the control room, Mr **Duckenfield** had not made a decision. Mr Murray asked him "Are you going to open the **gates**?". Mr Duckenfield gave the order and Sgt Goddard radioed to Mr Marshall "Open the gates". Neither the Club control room nor any police officers inside the turnstiles were told of this order before or after it was given or of any action it would require.

68. At 2.52 **pm**, gate C was opened wide. Fans behind turnstiles A to G and from the concourse beyond came round to flow through it in large numbers.

69. About two minutes later the pressure outside gate A led Sgt Higgins to radio, despite the gateman's objection, for it to be opened. If it was not, he said, "It'll go and someone will get killed". Permission was given, but this time reserve serials were alerted to monitor the inrush towards the north stand. Gate B was also briefly opened against the gateman's wishes and about 200 of those pressed at turnstiles A to G gained entry to their left.

70. The largest entry, however, was through gate C. In the five minutes it was open about 2,000 fans passed through it steadily at a fast walk. Some may have had tickets for the stands. No doubt some had no tickets at all. The majority had tickets for the **terraces**. Of these, some found their way either right to pens 1 and 2 or left through the dividing wall to 6 and 7. But a large proportion headed straight for the tunnel in front of them.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE DISASTER

71. The initial influx through gate C, augmented by entrants via the turnstiles, came through the tunnel with great momentum. Fans spoke of being swept through, feet off the ground. The 1 in 6 gradient accelerated their progress. Upon reaching the crowded pens, some wished to go back but were unable to do so. The new arrivals found themselves pushed forward and the pressure became intense. At 2.54 pm, shortly after this influx began, the teams came onto the pitch. As usual, this was greeted by a surge forward. Many were now acutely uncomfortable and some were in distress. The mass seethed about but voluntary movement by any individual was difficult; hands down could not be raised and some fans found it hard to breathe. Still the flow continued through the tunnel causing further surges forward. There were shouts for help and for the gates to be opened to the pitch. Police officers on the perimeter track did not immediately react. In the deafening noise from chanting and shouting they did not at first recognise the problem. Realisation came at different moments to different officers in different places.

72. Gate 3 sprang open under the intense pressure from within. An officer quickly closed it. Shortly afterwards, it sprang again; officers tried to shut it. Those seeking to escape were urged and pushed back. Gate 4 was opened by a policeman who noticed the crushing. People began to spill out through it and were directed to the wing pens where there was still ample room. Meanwhile, gate 4 was closed again and then re-opened. At gate 3, a Constable, now alive to the crisis, followed strictly his written orders and radioed for permission to open that gate. Receiving no reply, he took it upon himself to open it.

73. Just before 3 pm, the match kicked off. At the same time, gate C, which had been closed at 2.57 pm, was reopened and a steady trickle continued to enter through the tunnel.

74. To escape the crush, fans began climbing the radial fences out of pens 3 and 4 into pens 2 and 5. Others tried to get over the front perimeter fence but were at first turned back by police who feared a pitch invasion. Near the front, fans, mostly youngsters, were weakened to the point of collapse and in some instances death but they were held upright by pressure all round. Further back, most were so preoccupied with the pain of being pressed against barriers and with breathing problems that they saw nothing of the game. But at the rear there were many who, although cramped, were watching the football unaware of the distress at the front.

75. At 3.04 pm, Beardsley for Liverpool struck the crossbar at the Kop end. There was a roar from the Liverpool fans and at the same time a powerful surge forwards in pen 3. The several surges which occurred after the influx from gate C carried the pressure down the pens towards the pitch. The force became such as to twist and break two spans of a crush barrier towards the front of pen 3. The evidence does not establish with certainty when this happened. Probably it was triggered by the surge at 3.04 pm. But I am sure it occurred after the influx from gate C so greatly increased the pressure in the pen. When the barrier broke those whom it had supported were projected towards the perimeter fence. Many fell and the involuntary rush of those behind pressed them down. The crushing force was transmitted and dispersed so that all along the front of pen 3 fans were pressed hard up against the low wall and the wire mesh of the fence above it.

76. In pen 4 no barrier broke. Nevertheless those at the front were crushed against wall and fence. Further back, two barriers were bowed and some individuals succumbed to the pressure around them.

77. Surges on terraces are common. Usually, they go forward, then recede. Here, with the weight of numbers, there was no receding. The pressure stayed and for those crushed breathless by it, standing or prone, life was ebbing away. If no relief came in four minutes there would be irreversible brain damage; if longer, death.

78. In the control room no-one noticed the overcrowding or anything amiss in pens 3 and 4 until the first fans spilt out onto the perimeter track just before kick-off. Then, the officers in command assumed that there was an attempted pitch invasion. They called up reserve serials waiting in the gymnasium and all available officers elsewhere to go to the pitch. A request was made to HQ for dog handlers.

79. Superintendent Greenwood, the Ground Commander, was by the players' tunnel at the kick-off. He noticed fans on the track and went to the west end behind the goal. As he approached, he did not think the pens overcrowded until he was very close and saw those pressed against the fence. Even then, he thought the situation "retrievable" if those higher up the pen relieved the pressure. He climbed on the wall below the fence and signalled with both hands to those behind to move back. Other officers joined him. It was impossible. Those fans who would have wished to comply were powerless to do so. Behind them, there were still many

unaware of the crisis, watching the game. The football continued to joyous shouting and singing round the rest of the ground while those crushed and trapped slowly expired.

80. When Mr Greenwood's signals to move back proved fruitless, he tried to radio for the match to be **stopped**. At first, his message was not received by control, so he signalled with his arms towards the control box. Mr **Duckenfield** sent Mr Murray down from the box to have the match stopped via the linesman, the agreed emergency drill. Before he could do so, Mr Greenwood ran over the pitch to the referee who stopped the game. It was 5½ minutes past 3.

## CHAPTER 5

### THE AFTERMATH

#### **Rescue Attempts**

81. From 3 o'clock, gates 3 and 4 had been open and remained so. At first, fans had walked or staggered out winded and faint. But the final surge at 3.04 pm, and the struggle to reach the open gates, caused a horrendous blockage of bodies. The dead, the dying and the desperate became interwoven in the sump at the front of the pens, especially by the gates. Those with strength left clambered over others submerged in the human heap and tried to climb out over the fence. They were now helped by police and other fans who hauled them up and over. Numbers of fans were climbing over the radial fences into adjacent pens. At the back, many were hauled up into the west stand to relieve the pressure.

82. The steps from the sump at gateways 3 and 4 were so congested with bodies live and dead that each had to be prised from the pile by the police. Initially, no officer took effective charge. A number of individual officers and fans worked frantically to free those trapped but the gateways were so narrow that only two or three could get at the entwined bodies. Willing hands got in one another's way. More officers arrived from the gymnasium and elsewhere in the ground. Many used their own initiative to help those laid out on the pitch, to assist in getting others over the fencing and to comfort the distressed. But some stood in groups near the perimeter fence not knowing what to do. They had been summoned in response to what was thought to be a threat to public order. What they found was a horrific scene of carnage and some young officers were shocked into impotence by what they saw.

83. It was truly gruesome. The victims were blue, cyanotic, incontinent; their mouths open, vomiting; their eyes staring. A pile of dead bodies lay and grew outside gate 3. Extending further and further on to the pitch, the injured were laid down and attempts made to revive them. More and more walking survivors flooded out on to the pitch as the players left. The scene was emotive and chaotic as well as gruesome. As the enormity of the disaster was realised, many of the fans milling about were bitter and hostile to the police, blaming them for what had happened. Officers were confronted, abused, spat upon and even assaulted. A small number of hysterical fans had to be subdued.

84. Adding to the chaos, a number of press photographers dodged about among rescue workers apparently averse to secure photographs at point blank range of those dying through the wire mesh and those laid on the pitch. Angry fans sought to assault them. Police had to intervene.

85. At about 3.12 pm, Chief Superintendent Nesbit, Commander of the Traffic Division, arrived on the pitch. He took charge at gate 3 and organised a chain of officers to simplify and expedite the extraction of casualties from the pen. In the absence of any mechanical means, police and fans together pulled and worked at the wire mesh with their bare hands and their feet to breach the fencing. They succeeded in both pens, enabling officers to get in and fans to be got out.

86. By now, some officers of their own initiative went round from the pitch to the tunnel where they met other officers from the turnstiles and the west stand. Together, they tried to persuade fans at the rear of the pens to go back through the tunnel. Some complied, but many resisted, wishing to stand their ground. Casualties were brought out through the tunnel, and as the pressure in the pens was relieved, officers were able to get further in and bring out more casualties, dead and alive. They were laid on the ground in the concourse outside the tunnel and attempts were made to revive them.

#### **First Aid**

87. The St John Ambulance Brigade had some 30 personnel posted round the ground for the match - 25 adults and 5 junior cadets. They were quickly on the scene when the first casualties emerged and sought to revive them. Their Divisional Superintendent, Mr Wells, tried unsuccessfully to help those pressed against the fencing by feeding oxygen to them through the mesh until they could be got out.

88. Dr Purcell, Sheffield Wednesday's doctor, came from his seat in the south stand and attempted resuscitation. Assisted by a male nurse from the crowd, he moved from patient to patient doing what he could, but in most cases it was too late.

89. At 3.13 pm a St John's ambulance came onto the pitch at the north-east corner and drove to the perimeter fence close to gate 3. There was no call for doctors and nurses on the public address system until nearly 3.30 pm. Nevertheless, as the minutes ticked past, some of them came onto the pitch to help of their

own accord when they saw the casualties and the ambulance and realised the gravity of the situation. Many fans also worked prodigiously in attempts to revive the dead and the dying, in some cases their own relatives and friends. Artificial respiration, mouth to mouth respiration and cardiac massage were applied by the skilled and the unskilled but usually in vain. Those capable of survival mostly came round of their own accord. The rest were mostly doomed before they could be brought out and treated.

90. There was an urgent need to get casualties off the pitch and to hospital. There were six stretchers in the first aid room and three in the St John's ambulance. They were quickly brought into use. Then the fans improvised by tearing down the hoardings around the edge of the pitch and against the stands so that lengths of board could be used as stretchers. Improvising in this way, parties of fans and police ran repeatedly the length of the pitch bearing casualties to the north-east corner. A number were dead on arrival there.

### **In the Control Room**

91. Mr Duckenfield stayed in the control room. Chief Inspector McRobbie was there in civilian clothes as an observer. Mr Duckenfield sent him down to the track to tell a policewoman at gate 1 to admit those displaced from the centre pens. Mr Duckenfield did not realise there were injuries until he saw someone laid on the pitch. Even then, he did not realise the nature of the problem or its scale.

92. Mr Murray returned from his attempt to stop the match and Mr Duckenfield sent him down again to clear the pitch and assess the situation. A message was broadcast requesting fans to clear the pitch. This was because Mr Duckenfield could not from the control room see clearly what was happening for the milling and increasing numbers.

93. The Assistant Chief Constable (Operations), Mr Jackson, had attended the match in civilian clothes as a guest of the Club. He came from his seat in the south stand to ask what had happened. Mr Duckenfield was unable to say; he did not tell Mr Jackson that the exit gates had been opened on his authority. Mr Jackson went down to the pitch to discover the situation.

94. At 3.06 pm Mr Duckenfield, still primarily concerned about public order, caused a message to be sent to Headquarters asking for Operation Support. That was a call for all available additional police resources to come to the ground to strengthen the police presence.

95. Mr Jackson was told by Mr Greenwood that there were casualties and returned immediately to control to make sure emergency services were alerted. Meanwhile, Mr Murray had seen the plight of those behind the fence. He radioed to control that a fleet of ambulances was required. He also asked for a Tannoy broadcast to those in the pens to move back but there is no clear evidence that it was made.

96. Only when Mr Duckenfield received the request for a fleet of ambulances did he realise the nature and gravity of the situation. Then, supported by Mr Jackson, he caused messages to be sent converting Operation Support into calls for the Major Disaster Plan.

### **No Information**

97. Apart from the message to clear the pitch and the belated call for medical assistance about 3.30 pm, no information or advice was broadcast on the public address system. Mr Duckenfield feared that the crowd might turn hostile or might all attempt to leave together thereby hampering the emergency services if they were given information about what had happened. The result was that apart from those close enough at the west end to see the terrible truth for themselves, the majority of the crowd were left in ignorance. Many, especially Nottingham supporters in the **Kop**, still thought there had been a pitch invasion or other misbehaviour by Liverpool fans. They continued singing and chanting incongruously. This infuriated some Liverpool fans who were already distraught. A few began to run towards the Kop end. The police feared violence might result on top of the existing disaster. Accordingly, they deployed a large number of officers to form a line across the width of the pitch at the Kop end and advance up to the halfway line sweeping any Liverpool fans back as they moved. There the line **stood** as an insurance against disorder but doing nothing. Other officers were posted to the perimeter track facing the north stand for the same purpose. To those distressed and distraught who wanted urgent action, this large contingent of passive officers was seen as an affront. Feelings against the police intensified.

### **Misinformation**

98. At about 3.15 pm, Mr Graham Kelly, Chief Executive of the FA, Mr Kirton also of the FA and Mr Graham Mackrell, Secretary of Sheffield Wednesday, went to the control room for information. Mr Duckenfield told them he thought there were fatalities and the game was likely to be abandoned. He also said a

gate had been forced and there had been an inrush of Liverpool supporters. He pointed to one of the television screens focussed on gate C by the Leppings Lane turnstiles and said "That's the gate that's been forced: there's been an inrush". Inevitably Mr Kelly was interviewed a little later live on television. He spoke of the two stories concerning the gate - the fans' account that the police had opened it, the police assertion that the fans had forced their way in.

99. About 3.30 pm there was a further meeting in the Club's boardroom. Mr Duckenfield went there and met Mr Kelly, the referee and representatives of the three clubs. ACC Jackson was also there. Mr Duckenfield indicated the match was likely to be abandoned although no firm ruling was given. He added that he did not want people to know it was to be abandoned lest the dispersing crowd hamper the emergency operations.

#### **Public Announcements**

100. Later the managers of the two teams were asked to go to the control room. They were invited there to make a public announcement to calm the crowd. Mr Kenny Dalglish agreed to do so. He told the crowd that there were problems and asked them to assist the police and those rendering first aid. He asked for calm and his message was well received. It was then 3.56 pm. At 4.10 pm it was announced that the match was abandoned for that day. Again that message was received calmly by the crowd most of whom behaved responsibly as they dispersed.

#### **Fire Brigade**

101. Meanwhile the emergency services had been in action. At about 3.10 pm a request came from the perimeter fence to control for bolt croppers to cut the wire mesh. Sergeant Goddard contacted the police garage close by without success. At 3.13 pm, PC Bichard requested Headquarters to call the fire service to bring hydraulic cutting equipment to the Leppings Lane entrance.

102. There was no arrangement for a fire officer to be present during the match. However, the Major Disaster Plan required all emergency services to be alerted. After 'phone messages which must be described later, fire appliances arrived at both Leppings Lane and Penistone Road at 3.22 pm. At both entrances their arrival surprised police who were uninformed as to why they had been called or where they should go.

103. At Leppings Lane a police Inspector told Station Officer Swain "I don't really think we need you". Another police officer then asked for more resuscitators as people were dying so Mr Swain radioed for ten fire appliances. Each carries oxygen and resuscitation equipment.

104. At the Kop end, Leading Fireman Housley arrived with an emergency tender and Station Officer Fletcher in another appliance, each with a crew. The emergency tender came along the roadway by the south stand but owing to its height was unable to proceed further. It therefore backed out and went to the Leppings Lane entrance losing some eight minutes. From there, Mr Housley and his crew went onto the pitch with resuscitation equipment. They rendered help there and later at the gymnasium. Mr Fletcher and his men ran along behind the south stand carrying cutting equipment and oxygen cylinders. When they arrived at the fence, the cutting equipment was not required as by then the last of the dead and injured were being removed from the pens. Mr Fletcher set up a casualty clearing area under the police box and firemen assisted in carrying victims as well as rendering first aid on the pitch.

#### **South Yorkshire Metropolitan Ambulance Service (SYMAS)**

105. Before 1986 there had been no SYMAS representative routinely present at Hillsborough matches. The Club was content, as indeed are many other clubs, to rely upon the St John's Ambulance Brigade and a 999 call if necessary. From 1986 onwards, after representations, the Club provided two seats in the south stand for SYMAS staff at League matches. At one stage it was suggested they would be best placed in the north stand close to the gymnasium which had been designated as the casualty centre in the event of a major incident. The south stand seats were allotted as they placed the SYMAS staff closer to the players' tunnel should a player be injured. These seats were, however, not available at Cup semi-finals. SYMAS representatives nevertheless attended at the semi-finals by arrangement with the police in 1988 and again in 1989. The SYMAS officers stood on the ramp leading to the pitch at the north-east corner. They had one ambulance outside the ground and one on standby.

106. On 15 April 1989, Officers Higgins and Eason were at the ground with an ambulance and crew. They noticed fans on the track and went to the Leppings Lane end whilst the game was still in progress. They began to attend to casualties. Meanwhile, at 2.59 pm, there had been a call from Police Constable Waugh at police

Headquarters to the Hillsborough police control asking if ambulances were required. This was on the instruction of Chief Inspector Edmundson who had heard over the radio, as had Police Constable **Waugh** himself, crowd noise and snatches of speech from Hillsborough suggesting distress and possible injuries. The reply from the control box was: no reports of injuries but keep standing by. At 3.07 pm after hearing from the ground that there might be injuries, police Headquarters notified SYMAS that ambulances might be required. Then, seconds later, Mr Murray's request for a fleet of ambulances was relayed to SYMAS. They reacted at once. Ambulances began to arrive at the Leppings Lane entrance at 3.13 pm and at the Penistone Road entrance at 3.17 pm. In all, some 42 ambulances attended, 31 of them from SYMAS and 11 from neighbouring authorities. By 4.30 pm, they had conveyed some 172 casualties to the Northern General Hospital and the Royal Hallamshire Hospital.

### **Gymnasium**

107. The gymnasium had been in use for serving meals to the police. When the Major Disaster Plan was ordered, it was cleared and divided into two. One end became a temporary mortuary; the other was used as a casualty clearing area for the injured. As the stretchers, designed and improvised, brought in more and more casualties, the scene was initially and inevitably chaotic and harrowing. There was intense distress amongst the injured and bereaved; relatives were reluctant to be parted from the dead and sought to revive them. There were people looking for missing friends and relations; there were recriminations, there were scuffles. Some of those involved were the worse for drink. Doctors and nurses had followed the casualties in from the pitch and sought to attend the injured as best they could in the adverse circumstances. Those in most urgent need of hospital treatment were taken to ambulances as they arrived, triage being employed to determine priorities. Doctors were requested by the police to examine each person thought to be deceased to confirm and certify death. A police Constable was detailed to attend and guard each of the dead and a photograph of each was taken by a police photographer so that relatives coming to identify bodies could be spared the ordeal of searching amongst all who had died.

### **The Dead and the Injured**

108. Of the 95 who died, the evidence suggests that at least 16 and probably 21 came through gate C after it opened at 2.52 pm. That is established by the statements of relatives and friends who came through with them but survived.

109. By commendable hard work, a team of **pathologists** headed by Professor Usher completed post-mortem examinations on all the deceased within 48 hours. They found that 88 of the victims were male and seven female. Thirty-eight were under 20 years of age, 39 were between 20 and 29 years and only three were over 50. In virtually every case the cause of death was crush asphyxia due to compression of the chest wall against other bodies or fixed structures so as to prevent inhalation. In all but nine cases that was the sole cause. In one, pressure on the chest had been so great as to rupture the aorta; in six cases there were also injuries to the head, neck or chest; in the remaining two cases, natural disease was a contributory factor. In 18 cases bones were fractured. Thirteen of those were rib fractures. However, one was a fractured femur, one a fractured radius and the remaining three involved fractures of bones or cartilages round the voice box. These injuries suggest the victims may have been trodden while on the ground.

110. Blood samples were taken from the dead. No alcohol was found in any of the females. Of the males, 51 had no more than 10 milligrams per cent in their blood which is negligible; 15 had over 80 milligrams per cent and six over 120 milligrams per cent.

111. Although the great majority of those who died were in pen 3, at least five were in pen 4. Most deaths occurred at the front of the pens but there were a few fatalities further back.

112. In all, some 730 people complained of being injured inside the ground and 36 outside it. Of the 730, about 30% are thought to have entered through gate C after 2.52 pm. The largest category of injury was bruising, especially to the ribs and chest.

## CHAPTER 6

### SPECIFIC INCIDENTS

113. I have given my findings as to the basic factual background and the main sequence of events in narrative form. There was very little conflict as to the principal events save as to some timings and numbers. Indeed, the consistency of the evidence has been a remarkable feature of this Inquiry. The experiences of most witnesses were unforgettable and no doubt the early hearing helped to preserve accurate memory. Also, the existence of timed videos and photographs and of logged and taped messages provided reliable checks by which to prompt and test witness recollection. Accordingly, I have not for the most part burdened the narrative with citations from the evidence of individual witnesses.

114. However, there were several instances of detailed evidence and assertions being highlighted by the media in dramatic and emotive terms during the hearing. Since some of those much-publicised incidents gave rise to unfair criticism, they ought to be the subject of specific findings. I have therefore dealt with them individually at Appendix 6.

## PART II - WHY DID IT HAPPEN?

*"Events of the magnitude of Hillsborough don't usually happen just for one single reason, nor is it usually possible to pin the blame on one single scapegoat . . . Disasters happen because a whole series of mistakes, misjudgments and mischances happen to come together in a deadly combination."*

Dr John Habgood, Archbishop of York, preaching at the Hillsborough Memorial Service on 23 April 1989.

115. This disaster was the worst in the history of British football. It happened because pens 3 and 4 became grossly overcrowded. They were uncomfortably overcrowded by 2.50 pm at least to a degree which required that they should be closed to further arrivals. Even the numbers coming through the turnstiles in the last 10 minutes would have increased the pressure beyond danger point and there would have been injuries if not fatalities. As it was, the influx through gate C after 2.52 pm so increased the pressure in the two pens as to cause fatal crushing.

116. The overcrowding up to 2.52 pm was due to a number of factors which can be considered broadly under three heads.

- (i) The layout at the Leppings Lane end.
- (ii) Lack of fixed capacities for the pens.
- (iii) Lack of effective monitoring of the terraces.

117. The crushing and fatalities after 2.52 pm must be considered under a number of headings.

- (iv) The build-up at the turnstiles.
- (v) The blunder on opening the gates.
- (vi) The barriers in pen 3.
- (vii) The crushing not recognised.
- (viii) The response of the police.
- (ix) The perimeter gates were too small.

## CHAPTER 7

### THE LAYOUT AT THE LEPPINGS LANE END

118. I have already observed that the layout of the turnstile area, of the terraces and of the concourse between them was the result of piecemeal changes. A brief history of these changes is now necessary.

#### The History

119. Before 1965, the Leppings Lane end consisted entirely of terracing like the Kop. In that year, the west stand was built and the terraces remaining in front of it were truncated to their present depth, front to back. As to width, they consisted of a single standing area with no dividing fences. During the early 1970's, hooliganism and pitch invasions made it necessary to prevent access to the playing area and the perimeter fences were therefore erected in 1977.

120. Section 1 of the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 empowered the Secretary of State to designate a sports stadium having, in his opinion, accommodation for more than 10,000 as a stadium requiring a certificate from the local authority. **Hillsborough** was so designated with effect from 1 January 1979 by SI 1978/1091. In anticipation of that date, Sheffield Wednesday instructed Eastwood and Partners, a firm of consulting engineers, to act on their behalf especially in their dealings with the local authority. Dr Eastwood, the principal of the firm, is a highly experienced civil and structural engineer and has advised several major football clubs. He recommended that a number of additional crush barriers should be added since those already in place were insufficient to comply with the Green Guide (1976 edition). That work was approved and carried out during 1979.

121. The relevant local authority at the time was the South Yorkshire County Council. It set up an Officer Working Party consisting of representatives of the police, the fire service, its own building surveyor's division and its own legal and administration department. The Working Party made inspections and consulted with the Club and Dr Eastwood. A Safety Certificate was issued on 21 December 1979 for an indefinite period. It has remained in force ever since and has not been amended.

122. Schedule 3 of the certificate sets out the maximum crowd capacity for various areas in the ground. The figure for the west terrace is 7,200 and for the north-west terrace 2,900. These figures were intended to be in accordance with the Green Guide (1976). Paragraph 15.4 provided for a maximum "packing density" of between 54 and 27 persons per 10 square metres depending on the condition of the terrace. Dr Eastwood had calculated 8,000 for the west terrace on the basis of 54 per 10 square metres. He thought this a justified starting figure in view of his improved system of barriers. However, he reduced it to 7,200 because there were no gangways on the terrace and he did not think it feasible to provide any. So, the total figure for the Leppings Lane terraces was and is 10,100.

#### The 1981 Semi-Final

123. As already mentioned, there was crushing at the Cup semi-final in 1981. The match was between Tottenham Hotspur and Wolverhampton Wanderers. The police debriefing minutes after the incident prophetically refer,

"to the late arrival of a large number of spectators who were still waiting to enter the Leppings Lane enclosure when the match started. The flash point occurred when Tottenham scored" (at the Kop end) "after only three minutes. The spectators just entering pushed forward to see what was happening and caused a crush, which resulted in the injuries".

124. Those being crushed called for the perimeter gates to be opened onto the track. There was no immediate reaction, according to Mr Vaux who was there, but fortunately a police Inspector gave instructions and the gates were then opened. About 250 came out onto the track. There were broken arms, legs and ribs and 38 were treated either in hospital or by the St John Ambulance Brigade. It is clear from the documents (a) that the turnstile readings showed the capacity figure of 10,100 had been exceeded by over 400 (b) that the police shut off further access to the terraces because of crushing, and (c) the police view after the event was that the capacity figure of 10,100 in the Safety Certificate was too high. This latter view was communicated to the Club by the Chief Superintendent then in command of F Division but it was not pursued.

### **Three Pens**

125. After this incident in April 1981 the police requested that the terrace should be divided into sections. The object was to improve crowd control by reducing sideways movement. Division would enable more even distribution to be effected when there was a capacity crowd. It would also enable the west end to be used for both home and away supporters who could be segregated in separate pens, if necessary with an empty pen between them.

126. This proposal was agreed by the Club and the Officer Working Party and was approved by the local authority. Two radial fences were accordingly fitted in November 1981. They are the fence now separating pens 2 and 3 and that now separating 5 and 6. The result was to divide the whole terrace into three pens. Access from the concourse to the middle pen was through the tunnel and to the wing pens round the sides of the west stand. Dr Eastwood suggested and illustrated an altered layout which would have provided separate access through separate banks of turnstiles to the north stand, to each end of the west stand, and to each of the three pens. Whilst the main object of this was segregation, such a layout would have enabled each of those areas to be monitored numerically via the turnstiles so as to ensure its maximum capacity was not exceeded. The plan was not adopted. The maximum capacity for the new centre pen was calculated at 2,200, but no alteration was made to the Safety Certificate so to limit it nor was there any means mechanically of counting the numbers going into that pen.

### **The 1985 Changes**

127. By 1985, Sheffield Wednesday had been promoted to the First Division and was drawing larger crowds. The improvement of the Leppings Lane end was raised again by the Club and Dr Eastwood prepared a number of drawings. These illustrated various schemes for achieving segregation by providing more turnstiles in separate banks and divisions of the concourse. The police wanted further divisions of the terrace itself, again to improve control and segregation. There was much discussion of these schemes which included suggestions of 29 and even 34 turnstiles in total. In the result, the following alterations were carried out in 1985.

### **New Radial Fences**

128. On the terraces, two more radial fences were fitted. One divided the existing central pen into the present pens 3 and 4. Gates were fitted at the mouth of the tunnel to enable each of those pens to be closed off. The second fence was placed in the new pen 4 so as to create the narrow pen 5 intended to be a sterile area. Until those two fences were added there existed only perimeter gates 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6. The creation of pen 3 required a new gate 3 to be fitted which was done.

### **Barriers**

129. The lines of the new radial fences ran across existing crush barriers so that without modification those barriers would have run through the fencing. The police considered the barriers would be used by fans as convenient mounting points to scale the new fences, thereby defeating their object. They therefore wished spans to be removed from the barriers. Had their wishes been met in full the result would have been an unimpeded run in pen 3 from the mouth of the tunnel down the south side of the new fence to the perimeter. Dr Eastwood dug his heels in against that proposal which he rightly regarded as dangerous. He did however agree to some modification to the middle row of barriers in the newly created pen 3, chiefly to facilitate access. Likewise in the new pen 5, The 1985 modifications to the pens are shown on the plan Appendix 4.

### **The Turnstiles and Concourse**

130. At the entrance, modification but no increase in number was made at the turnstiles. The bank 1 to 16 was divided from A to G by the metal fence now in place and that division was projected across the concourse inside the turnstiles in the form of a brick wall. A personnel gate was provided for access through that wall but was enlarged to its present size at the request of the police. Those alterations were made in the interests of segregation. The more elaborate divisions which Dr Eastwood had suggested, giving separate access to each sub-division of the accommodation, were not pursued for financial reasons. In May 1985 the Bradford disaster occurred. The south stand at Hillsborough had wooden decking and the Club realised it would have to undertake expensive remedial works there. The cantilever roof of the same stand was also discovered to require expensive repairs.

131. In fact, shortly after the new dividing fence and wall had been built at the Leppings Lane entrance and concourse, the Club, by agreement with Chief Superintendent Mole, ceased to accommodate home supporters at the Leppings Lane end. There was therefore no longer any need for segregation at that end, but the wall remained.

132. Also in 1985, electronic counting equipment was installed at all turnstiles. This conveyed the running count for each bank of turnstiles, for example A to G, to a television screen in the Club control room where the figures were displayed. In 1986, an electronic eye was installed in each turnstile booth to catch and record anyone who climbed over the turnstile.

#### **Barrier 144**

133. In June 1986, the police requested that the crush barrier nearest to the tunnel at the entrance to pens 3 and 4 should be removed to assist the flow of fans into the pens. They found it caused obstruction because it was in a good viewing position and spectators liked to stand against it in numbers thereby blocking access by others further into the pens. The police also suggested it might hamper effective evacuation through the tunnel especially in an emergency. Dr Eastwood considered the pros and cons of this proposal and accepted the police view. The Officer Working Party approved the proposal at a meeting on 7 August 1986 on site. Authority was given then and there by Mr Bownes on behalf of the Sheffield City Council which had taken over responsibility for the Safety Certificate from South Yorkshire County Council on 1 April 1986. Two spans of the barrier were therefore removed, leaving only one span in pen 4 as shown on Appendix 4.

#### **Effects of the Layout**

134. The result of these changes was to divide the terrace into a number of small areas without providing any computerised or mechanical means of limiting entry numerically into any one area if all areas were open for choice. Before the fences and pens had divided the terrace, the overall figure of 10,100 could be monitored via the turnstiles and in theory the crowd could even itself out laterally. Even then, it was not possible strictly to ensure compliance with Schedule 3 Part 1 of the Safety Certificate which prescribed a maximum of 2,900 for the north-west terrace and 7,200 for the west terrace. Paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 of the Safety Certificate provides:

"The number of spectators admitted to the Stadium and to the several areas of spectator accommodation within the Stadium shall not exceed the figures specified in Part 1 of Schedule 3".

The Club had to rely upon visual monitoring.

135. The situation became worse however with the division of the west terrace into pens. Not only were there more and smaller discrete areas but some were likely to attract more than their appropriate share of the 10,100 total. It is well recognised that the area behind the goal is very popular. Moreover, the position of the tunnel *vis-a-vis* the turnstiles A to G, its labelling and the absence of signposts advertising the wing pens would draw to it those with terrace tickets. It was therefore highly likely that pens 3 and 4 would fill to capacity and indeed exceed it unless preventive steps were taken. Had Dr Eastwood's plan for separate turnstile access to separate sections with separate toilet and refreshment facilities been implemented, total computerised control could have been kept.

## CHAPTER 8

### LACK OF FIXED CAPACITIES FOR THE PENS

136. In 1981, when the terrace was divided into three areas, Dr Eastwood gave the Club the figure of 2,200 capacity for the centre pen. He based this on the Green Guide, making such allowances as he thought right. No doubt the numbers could have been counted in via the turnstiles if only that pen was in use or if such pens as were in use were filled sequentially, but not otherwise.

137. After the 1985 changes, Dr Eastwood did not himself give any figures for the new pens 3 and 4. Someone on his staff however split the figure 2,200 into 1,200 for pen 3 and 1,000 for pen 4. Those figures did not even take account of the fact that pen 5 had been carved out of pen 4 which was bound to have a reducing effect on capacity. Nevertheless, the figures of 1,200 and 1,000 were put on a drawing emanating from Eastwood and Partners and the figures have been notionally regarded since as applicable by the Club and the police. They are in fact too high.

138. Dr Nicholson, at the Research and Laboratory Services Division of the Health and Safety Executive, has calculated that the figures for pens 3 and 4 respectively would be 1,015 and 1,036 if the strength and spacing of the crush barriers had complied with the Green Guide. But they did not.

#### Departures from the Green Guide

139. In pen 3, four out of five gaps in the lines of crush barriers do not conform with paragraph 115 of the Green Guide (1986). In pen 4, nine out of ten do not conform. In particular, the spans taken out of the barriers in pen 3 in 1985 left gaps well in excess of the maximum of 1.4 metres prescribed. One gap was 57% wider than the Green Guide maximum. Moreover, that gap was in direct diagonal line from the mouth of the tunnel to the barrier which collapsed. Dr Eastwood justified these larger gaps by the absence of gangways. Fans had to be able to get in and out and standard gaps tended to get blocked up. The effect of his reasoning was that the absence of gangways, recognised as having a safety function, led to the sacrifice of a second safety feature, namely gaps of strictly limited width.

140. Again, the removal of barrier 144 was bound, as Dr Eastwood conceded, to affect capacity. In fact it did more, as I shall indicate later.

141. Capacity should also have taken account of two further departures from the Green Guide. If, as was the case, the perimeter gates were not regarded as exits, some 40% of those in pens 3 and 4 were more than 12 metres from an exit (and there was no gangway) contrary to the aim of paragraph 96. Four out of five of the crush barriers in pen 3 and six out of nine in pen 4 were below the height prescribed in paragraph 110. These were the old barriers which had been repaired and plated where their bases had corroded and fresh concrete had been applied, raising the level of the steps. The point is not academic since, in the event, many fans were bent painfully over barriers under great pressure.

142. Dr Nicholson calculated that when all relevant factors regarding the configuration and the Green Guide are taken into account, the maximum capacity for pen 3 should have been 822 and for pen 4, 871.

#### Safety Certificate

143. Whatever should have been the maximum capacities for pens 3 and 4, the fact is that no figures at all in respect of them were put into the Safety Certificate. Despite all the changes in layout of the fences and barriers, the two figures, 2,900 for the north-west terrace and 7,200 for the west terrace, have remained as the only maxima with which the Club has to comply.

144. Section 2(1) of the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 provides (so far as is relevant):

"A Safety Certificate shall contain such terms and conditions as the local authority consider necessary or expedient to secure reasonable safety at the stadium when it is in use . . ."

Section 2(2) provided (so far as is relevant):

"Without prejudice to sub-section (1) above, a Safety Certificate—

- (a) shall specify the maximum number of spectators to be admitted to the stadium;
- (b) may specify the maximum number to be admitted to different parts of it;
- (c) shall include terms and conditions—
  - ... (iii) as to the number, strength and situation of any crush barriers."

Section 2(2) was repealed by the Fire Safety and Safety of Places of Sport Act 1987, section 19, which gave power to the Secretary of State to lay down, by order, terms and conditions. No order has yet been made and guidance from the Home Office has recommended local authorities to approach their function under section 2(1) in accordance with the criteria in the repealed section 2(2). (See Home Office Circular 71/1987 dated 25 November 1987, Annex A, paragraph 6.)

145. It is clear that when the certificate was first issued the South Yorkshire County Council went further than simply to fix the maximum numbers for the whole Stadium. They prescribed figures for each part of the ground not merely by the four points of the compass but by specified sections.

146. Section 8(1) of the 1975 Act requires the holder of the certificate before carrying out any proposals to alter or extend the stadium or any of its installations while a Safety Certificate is in operation to give notice of those proposals to the local authority. That obligation is specifically repeated in Sheffield Wednesday's certificate at Schedule 2 Paragraph 5(2). The Club complied with the requirement. Having received notice of the alterations to the pens and the barriers, the local authority ought, in my view, to have amended the Safety Certificate accordingly. They did not do so.

Why was the Safety Certificate not Amended?

147. Although Dr Eastwood acknowledged that the various changes to the layout would have had an effect on capacity, he did not take active steps to see that appropriate amendments were made. He says he mentioned from time to time that the alterations would have an effect on capacity and that he did not realise the Safety Certificate was not regularly updated. However, I find two memoranda in early 1987 highly significant. Dr Eastwood's assistant Mr Strange was concerned with queries from the FA as to Hillsborough's capacity for a semi-final. Mr Strange recorded these questions in a memorandum:-

"Has any account been taken for alterations done on Leppings Lane over the last few seasons? Is the 10,200 or so figure still correct? I said that in my opinion it needs to be adjusted, better do it now than later."

148. Mr Strange's next memo (a few days later) records as follows:-

"Dr Eastwood says leave the capacity at Leppings Lane end as it is, providing police have gates under West stand open so that people can distribute throughout the terrace evenly."

Although he says the last nine words do not report him accurately, Dr Eastwood accepts the rest of that message.

149. In my view the provisions as to capacity in the Safety Certificate ought to have been reviewed and altered. The unhappy situation is that the police believed even the overall figure of 10,100 to be too high as far back as 1981. That was reported to the Club but apparently not to Dr Eastwood. Meanwhile, that global figure had been rendered academic by the sub-division of the terrace which was not reflected in the Safety Certificate at all. If proper maximum figures had been inserted in the certificate for each of the pens, the Club and the police might well have been prompted to find some means of limiting the numbers entering those pens other than by visual monitoring. This could have been done by implementing one of Dr Eastwood's plans for totally separate sections, turnstile to viewing area. It could have been done by insisting on sequential filling of pens at all matches; alternatively, by counting fans into each viewing area.

The City Council

150. That the Safety Certificate was not amended and individual capacities not reviewed cannot be laid solely at Dr Eastwood's door. He was, after all, consultant engineer to the Club and responsibility for the certificate was that of the local authority. When the South Yorkshire County Council handed over to the Sheffield City Council, the latter delegated all its powers and duties under the 1975 Act to its General Purposes Panel. Apparently, therefore, the decision-making body on behalf of the Council was that Panel, although two specific functions were delegated to the Head of Administration and Legal Department - the power to issue a prohibition under section 10 of the 1975 Act and the power of entry and search under section 11 of the Act.

151. In practice, Mr Bownes, the Council's Chief Licensing Officer in the Administration and Legal Department, bore the brunt of the Council's duties under the Act.

152. The Officer Working Party was superseded by a Safety of Sports Grounds Advisory Group, but apart from the change of the name the system continued as before. Mr Bownes attended the inspections and meetings of the Advisory Group together with the representatives of the police, the fire service, the department of health and consumer services, and the building engineer's division of the Council. The latter was an engineer and ought therefore to have been alive to the same issues as Dr Eastwood.

153. The Advisory Group seems to have worked in a very informal manner. A short passage from Mr Bownes' evidence gives the flavour of it:-

“Q Who was taking the lead in the working party as you understood it?

A That is a good question, sir. Leads were coming from several different directions really.

Q Who chaired it, if anyone?

A Nobody as such, sir. It was an inspection rather than a meeting as I understand it.

Q Who decided what should be inspected?

A Effectively the group itself, sir, it seemed to me. There was also some input from the Club representative as to, if you like, an element of direction as to what should be looked at.

Q Apart from the inspections the working party met, presumably, or did they only meet on inspections?

A No, sir, I have referred to three previous meetings.

Q Who took the chair when it met?

A I suppose it could be said that I did, to some extent.

Q There is no point in having inspections unless you form conclusions as a result of that inspection, is there?

A That is correct.

Q There must presumably have been some meeting following the inspection at which you all sat down together and decided what, if anything, should be done.

A There was not, to my recollection, no.

Q How did you decide what should be done, if anything needed to be done?

A There were discussions on the site, particularly in relation to barrier 144, which took place at the time.

Q Nothing more than that and no record anywhere of any decisions that were made?

A No, **sir.**”

The decision to remove barrier 144 was assented to on behalf of the City Council by Mr Bownes. It was not referred to the General Purposes Panel. Whether Mr Bownes strictly had any power to assent to it is to say the least very doubtful. But he himself admits that he was ill-equipped to do so. He knew very little about football grounds. He had read the file passed on from South Yorkshire County Council and assumed all had been run satisfactorily by them.

154. It was recorded, however, in a report which Mr Bownes drafted that "the conditions (in the Safety Certificate) give some cause for concern as they appear to be inadequate or inappropriate in some areas". The report to the General Purposes Panel suggested that new Safety Certificate conditions should be drafted.

155. The task of revising the Safety Certificate was begun in June 1986. In July 1987, a draft was sent to the fire service to which they replied in August. In September 1987, the Panel was informed that the redrafting was

"progressing steadily" and should be submitted to the Panel in October. The final draft was not circulated until 30 March 1989, 16 days before this disaster.

156. Meanwhile, the Safety Certificate has remained unamended since 1979. The enlargement of the Kop in 1986 increased its capacity to 21,000. Although this was known and agreed by the Council it had not been the subject of any change in the certificate which still showed the capacity of the Kop as 16,850. Mr Mackrell, Sheffield Wednesday's Secretary, raised the question of amendments to the Safety Certificate and in particular with regard to the Kop in April 1987 with Eastwood and Partners but nothing resulted.

157. Sheffield United Football Club was designated under the 1975 Act on 3 July 1984. A Safety Certificate was about to be issued by South Yorkshire County Council at the time it handed over to the Sheffield City Council on 1 April 1986. No certificate has yet been issued to Sheffield United.

158. The explanation given for these delays was pressure of work. Mr Bownes as Chief Licensing Officer was responsible for 32 other licensing systems when this one was added to his burden. He had a staff of only five. I fully accept that the addition of further statutory responsibilities to the already heavy workload of a local authority with curbs on its expenditure creates problems. But it is clear that the attention given to this important licensing function was woefully inadequate.

### **Summary**

159. The Safety Certificate contained no maximum figures for individual pens. There was therefore no sanction or provision focussing attention as to the need to limit entry to the pens by numbers. The layout at Leppings Lane as it evolved made electronic or mechanical control over numbers entering individual pens impracticable if all pens were to be available. Given an important match and a capacity attendance, fans were likely to crowd into popular sections like pens 3 and 4. Those pens were likely to become overfull well before warning came from the turnstiles that numbers were approaching the terrace maximum of 10,100. Control over numbers and the avoidance of overcrowding therefore depended entirely on visual monitoring of the crowd.

## CHAPTER 9

### LACK OF EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF THE TERRACES

160. Monitoring the spectators on the terraces so as to avoid overcrowding involves observing the numbers and their distribution in each **area**, making decisions as to when an area is "full", taking steps to close it off and moving spectators from one area to another, if necessary. It is a function beset by three problems. 1) Who should carry it out? 2) When is an area "full"? 3) Fear of hooliganism.

#### Who should Monitor the Terraces?

161. Should it be the host club via its stewards? Should it be the police? Should it be both? Or should it be by arrangement, depending upon the ground or section of the ground in question?

162. In principle, a football club which invites the public to a match on its premises for reward is responsible for securing safety at that event. The Green Guide (1986) provides:

“ 23. The safety of the public inside the ground is the responsibility of those who stage the event and administer the ground in which it is held, *ie* the "management". This responsibility applies in both normal and emergency situations...

195. ...there are five basic duties which stewards are called upon to carry out. These are:

- (a) controlling or directing members of the public who are entering or leaving the ground, to help achieve an even flow of people to the viewing areas and safe dispersal of spectators on the terraces or viewing slopes;
- (b) patrolling the ground to deal with any emergencies, *eg* raising alarms or extinguishing fires;
- (c) manning entrances, exits and other strategic **points**, especially exit doors and gates which are continuously open whilst the ground is in use;
- (d) assisting police as appropriate or as requested with crowd control; and
- (e) undertaking specific duties in an emergency."

#### The Interim Popplewell Report

163. There was considerable controversy in the course of the public inquiry held by Mr Justice Popplewell in 1985 as to the responsibility of the club and the police. In paragraph 3.6 of his interim report, Mr Justice Popplewell quoted from a report produced for the Minister of Housing and Local Government in 1969 as follows:-

“The responsibility for controlling crowd behaviour is divided between the police and the club operating the ground. The **broad** line of division being that police are responsible for movement of spectators in public thoroughfares and from public thoroughfares into the ground, while the club is responsible for the control of spectators once they are on the club's premises . . .”

Mr Justice Popplewell said he did not quarrel with that view and went on to observe that in practice the police have to take charge and be responsible for controlling crowd behaviour. He then said (paragraph 3.8):

"It follows, therefore, that as a matter of practice, while the physical safety of the building and the maintenance and good housekeeping of the ground must always be the responsibility of the club, the police have to take the *defacto* responsibility of organising the crowd, with all that entails, during the game . . .”

Mr Justice Popplewell went on to instance evacuation of the ground as a procedure in which only the police could bear the responsibility of supervising the organisation of the crowd.

#### The Final Popplewell Report

164. He harked back to this subject in chapter 4 of his Final Report. There, he came down more firmly in favour of holding the club responsible for crowd safety. At paragraph 4.13 he said "Because, as a matter of

practice, police officers have regularly attended in large numbers at football grounds, it has somehow been assumed by the clubs that the responsibility for control of what goes on inside the ground has passed from them to the police. A police presence is there to assist in the enforcement of law and order. Those responsible for organising a private function, however, have the primary and continuing obligation and responsibility to ensure reasonable safety for those who are invited on to their premises." Mr Justice Popplewell ended that section as follows: "It cannot be too strongly emphasised that it is upon the club, or the occupier of the ground who is putting on the function, that the primary and continuing obligation rests."

165. There remains, however, the question whether there are some grounds or parts of grounds where the club may need to rely upon the police (whom they pay to attend) to control filling of pens and monitoring them for overcrowding. In other words, whilst the duty in law to ensure safety rests upon the club, they may need, and by agreement be entitled, to employ the police to act as their agents in certain circumstances. This very difficult and grey area as to club and police responsibility will need to be reviewed in greater depth at stage two of this Inquiry.

#### **Arrangements at Hillsborough**

166. What is clear, **however**, is that *de facto* the police at Hillsborough had accepted responsibility for control of the pens at the Leppings Lane end. The evidence of the senior officers who had been concerned with policing at Hillsborough over the years was all one way on this point. Only Mr **Duckenfield**, who had not policed at Hillsborough for some 10 years prior to 15 April, took a different view.

167. Mr Lock is now security officer at Sheffield Wednesday and was formerly a police Superintendent at Hillsborough matches occupying Mr Murray's role. He claimed there had been a formal although unwritten agreement between the Club and the police in about 1982, whereby the police agreed to steward the Leppings Lane end of the ground. Such a formal agreement is denied by other senior officers and I do not accept that any formal agreement was reached. Nevertheless, a practice or arrangement did develop which was known and accepted by both Club and police. Its effect was that throughout the ground the stewards were responsible for manning exits and entrances, for controlling entry into the stands, for assisting spectators to their seats in the stands and for helping to control the exits after the match. They were also responsible at the Kop end on the terraces for keeping gangways clear and helping to control the crowd which usually consisted of home supporters. At the Leppings Lane end, however, there were no gangways on the terraces and the crowd consisted usually (and always since 1987) of away supporters. Mr Mole and other senior officers accepted that it would have been unreal and unreasonable to expect stewards to go onto those Leppings Lane terraces. They would not have been effective there; moreover, they could well have been in some danger from hostile away supporters. The police accepted, therefore, that the proper filling of the pens and monitoring them for overcrowding could and would not be carried out by stewards. Many stewards have tended to be either extremely young or somewhat elderly. They are paid only a modest sum (£9 at Hillsborough) and they are not suitable either by physique or by training to cope on a crowded terrace with no gangways.

#### **Case for the South Yorkshire Police**

168. Notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence from senior police as already mentioned and from the Club, Counsel for the South Yorkshire Police continued throughout the hearing to contend that the Club and not the police were responsible for filling and monitoring the pens and that this was well known to both parties. He maintained that the police were there essentially to secure and preserve law and order. Quite apart from the police evidence to the contrary at this Inquiry, the official stance of the South Yorkshire Police has not always been to that effect.

#### **Harris -v- Sheffield United Football Club Limited**

169. In March 1986, the South Yorkshire Police Authority obtained a judgement against Sheffield United Football Club for money due for police services provided at Sheffield United's matches. The defence had been, *inter alia*, that the police were not providing "special police services". They were doing no more than performing their normal police duties of securing and preserving law and order amongst a crowd. The police argument was that they had additional duties. In his judgement, Boreham J summarised the instructions for policing as providing for:-

- “(a) the maintenance of enforcement of law and order;
- (b) the enforcement of the Club's ground regulations, many of which are concerned with law and order;
- (c) the safety and comfort of the spectators, officials and players.”

He referred to the argument of Counsel for the South Yorkshire Police as follows:-

"Thirdly, here the police were not discharging their own duty to the public; they were in fact discharging the Club's duties to the spectators whom the Club invited to the ground. The Club chose to invite large numbers to their private premises; it was the Club's duty to provide for their safety, health and comfort. They could have employed a security firm as banks and others have to do to protect their interests; they chose to request the police to perform those duties knowing that the police expected payment. Fourthly, the police within the ground provided services which it was not within the scope of their public duty to perform. For instance, they assisted in crowd management and in the enforcement of such ground regulations as refused entry to those who tried to enter without paying or prohibited spectators encroaching on parts of the ground which their entry fee did not entitle them to enter. It may be, submits Mr Bentley, that the maintenance of law and order was the predominant aim but there were other services performed."

The learned Judge found:-

"In addition to what may be called their law and order role the police were expected and did take part in crowd management, ensuring the safety of spectators, the enforcement of the Club's regulations and to be on hand to assist in the event of some emergencies such as fire or accidental injury."

### **Police Practice at the Leppings Lane End**

170. At League matches at Hillsborough, the police practice was to decide in advance how many and which pens would be used. If a modest crowd was anticipated only one or two pens might be needed. It was better to confine the fans to limited spaces (a) to prevent them running about and (b) to reduce the number of police required. The practice was then to fill the pens one by one. This involved making a judgement as to when a pen was full. There would then be a police decision to close that pen and fill another. It was regarded as impractical and unsafe for police officers (just like stewards) to go onto the Leppings Lane terraces with away supporters. This meant that monitoring the numbers in any pen had to be done from vantage points outside it. Here, the police were much better placed than the stewards. There was a good view from the control box and the television screens there. There were officers on the perimeter track. No stewards were placed there because having both police and stewards interfered with the viewing. There were also police in the west stand who could look down on the pens. Intelligence from all these sources could give the police a good appreciation of the state of the terraces. When it was necessary to shut off access to the pens officers on the concourse could be informed by radio and could take the necessary steps.

### **"Find Their Own Level"**

171. At Cup semi-finals, a different approach was adopted. All the pens were opened from the start and the policy was "to let the fans find their own level". This phrase was repeated again and again by police officers at the Inquiry. What it meant was that no specific direction was given to fans entering through the turnstiles. They were free to go wherever they wished on the terraces. If they became uncomfortable or wished for any other reason to move their position, then theoretically they could move elsewhere. In this way it was hoped that the fans on the terraces would level themselves out and that distribution would be achieved without police intervention. On these occasions, the gates at the top of the radial fences were locked in the open position. It was sought to argue, therefore, that there was freedom of movement from one pen to another enabling fans to "find their level".

172. This argument was bad both in theory and in practice. In theory, the whole object of the radial fences had been to achieve even distribution by directing fans into desired positions. To say then that they could move freely from one pen to another would defeat the object and enable fans to go from a less popular to a more popular area without inhibition. In practice this did not happen because the position and size of the gates was such that once a substantial number of spectators were in, the gates were unnoticeable and inaccessible especially to those towards the front who might have most need of them.

173. The same argument was deployed to suggest that individual maximum capacities for individual pens need not be assessed since the presence of the open radial gates still meant that the terrace was one area. In practice this simply was not so. The photograph at Appendix 5 taken from the north stand at 2.59 pm shows very clearly the congestion in pens 3 and 4 contrasted with the sparseness in pen 6. This gives the lie to the suggestion that the fans could, if uncomfortable, "find their own level".

174. The effect of this policy was that whereas at League matches the police had to make a positive decision when to close one pen and open another, at semi-finals, where overcrowding was much more likely, the police

left it to the fans themselves to "find their own level". Effectively, they were left to monitor their own comfort and safety so as to avoid overcrowding. The police would only intervene when there was some overt sign that an area was "full".

### **When is an Area "Full"?**

175. Over the years, spectators on terraces have come to accept conditions which are often very uncomfortable and not infrequently downright dangerous. They are subjected to buffeting and squeezing to get in and out of the terraces. They are packed tightly and exposed to surging and swaying during the match. They put up with these conditions because they are devoted to the game and because there is little they can do about them. They believe the discomfort will pass and nothing very untoward will happen. Usually that is the case and they are reassured by it. Most clubs have not, until very recently, consulted their supporters as to their grievances or suggestions. The practice has been to pack them in on the assumption that if they are prepared to put up with it the conditions must be tolerable. Although crowd figures at football grounds have been reduced in recent years, this has been due principally to the increased proportion of seating as against standing accommodation. Terraces have still been packed.

176. It is said that many fans enjoy these features of terrace viewing. Clearly close proximity, shared discomfort, weathering sways and surges together and chanting the same songs and slogans *en masse* do evoke good humour and have produced a spirit or cult of the terraces which many enjoy. Equally there are many who simply endure these things for the football, for a cheap ticket or indeed for the chance of getting in at all. And before Hillsborough most fans on the terraces, even if they enjoy the hurly-burly, had not realised the narrow margin of safety between an uncomfortable crush and a fatal one.

177. The Green Guide sought to improve safety and comfort by laying down criteria for maximum capacity, *ie* defining what is "full". The standard set was 54 persons per 10 square metres in favourable conditions but fewer, down to 27, in less favourable conditions. The tendency may have been to aim off too little from the higher figure for shortcomings in the layout. Certainly the figures considered appropriate in pens 3 and 4 at Hillsborough were too high, as already indicated.

178. Even taking the highest figure suggested in the Green Guide, the problem remained that those supposed to be monitoring pens visually had and have little idea of what 54 persons per 10 square metres look like. Mr Duckenfield's opinion was that when a pen was full to capacity, the spectators would be "shoulder to shoulder and chest to back". That view may derive from seeing the sort of density crowds regularly endure without injury resulting. But it is much more dense than the Green Guide maximum.

179. The South Yorkshire Fire Brigade provided the Inquiry with photographs of people standing in an area of 10 square metres at various densities of packing. Together with my Assessors and others, I took part in a similar experiment at the Health and Safety Executive's Sheffield laboratory. We stood in a room of measured area at densities of 54, 80 and 100 per 10 square metres. It was clear from the photographs and from our experiment that the maximum density set out in the Green Guide left considerably more room than those monitoring the terraces would have left before declaring an area "full".

180. The tendency has been to allow the pens to fill until the fans complain or show signs of discomfort. If the density at the front appeared less than at the back, the Tannoy would invite the fans to move forward to make room for more. The evidence before the Inquiry and many anecdotal letters I have received clearly show there have been frequent occasions when the packing on terraces, not only at Hillsborough, has caused discomfort and sometimes, for brief periods, fear. Usually the surge recedes, the sway returns, the pressure eases and the incident passes unrecorded.

181. After the crushing at the 1981 semi-final, Hillsborough was not chosen again by the FA until 1987. There was evidence that the central pens were uncomfortably overcrowded on that occasion and again at the 1988 Cup semi-final, although entry to the tunnel was blocked off by police shortly before kick-off in 1988 because the pens were deemed to be "full".

### **Fear of Hooliganism**

182. Over the last few years, hooliganism at and associated with football matches has strongly influenced the strategy of the police. In their plans and management they have concentrated on averting or containing threats to public order. This is understandable and indeed commendable. But it has led to an imbalance between the need to quell a minority of troublemakers and the need to secure the safety and comfort of the majority. In the police Operational Order, the emphasis was upon prevention of disorder and in particular prevention of access to the field of play. There was no express requirement that officers on the perimeter track

or in the west stand should keep watch for any possible overcrowding on the terraces. Indeed, the view was expressed in evidence that packing fans close together on the terraces assisted in controlling the unruly since the less room they had the less scope there was for misbehaviour.

### **Summary**

183. Although the police had accepted *defacto* responsibility for monitoring the pens, their policy on the day was to leave fans to “find their own level” and to concentrate their own attention on possible disorder. Whilst in **theory** the police would intervene if a pen became “full”, in practice they permitted the test of fullness to be what the fans would tolerate.

184. By 2.52 **pm** when gate C was opened, pens 3 and 4 were over-full even by this test. Many were uncomfortable. To allow any more into those pens was likely to cause injuries; to allow in a large stream was courting disaster.

## CHAPTER 10

### THE BUILD-UP AT THE TURNSTILES

185. The decision to open gate C, and subsequently gates A and B too, was forced on to the police by the crowd conditions which developed outside the turnstiles. The crush was so severe that injuries were being suffered and deaths were feared unless the pressure could be swiftly relieved. Why the crowd pressure had built to such intensity was one of the principal issues during the hearing. The suggested causes must be considered in turn.

#### The Physical Layout

186. I have already described and illustrated the approach to the turnstiles (Appendices 1 and 2). At Penistone Road and at many other grounds, turnstiles are in a straight line, adequately spaced and with a sufficient waiting area for queues to form. Not so at Leppings Lane. The building line, the bridge over the Don and the bend in the road, left a wedge-shaped approach to perimeter gates set in an arc, and across a short forecourt, to turnstiles also set in an arc. The pairs of turnstiles were close together and the forecourt, especially as divided by the metal fence, provided little space for a waiting crowd.

#### The Number of Turnstiles

187. The decision to fill the whole of the north stand from the Leppings Lane end required the 23 turnstiles there to admit 24,256 spectators. Of those, the seven turnstiles (A to G) serving the terraces had to admit 10,100, *ie* an average of just under 1,450 through each turnstile. At the Penistone Road end, 29,800 were served by 60 turnstiles, or just under 500 per turnstile.

188. The Green Guide recognises (paragraph 47) that the rate at which spectators can pass through turnstiles depends on a variety of local circumstances but states "in general based on observation and experience, it is unlikely that the maximum notional rate per turnstile would exceed 750 per hour". Since the semi-final was an all ticket match requiring no cash transactions, the Club considered that a higher rate of about 1,000 per hour per turnstile could be expected. Even at this higher rate, which assumes the turnstiles working at maximum efficiency non-stop, it would have taken nearly 1 1/2 hours to admit all those with terrace tickets. At 750 per hour, it would have taken nearly two hours.

189. The Green Guide provides (paragraph 44):-

"Turnstiles should be of such numbers as to admit spectators at a rate whereby no unduly large crowds are kept waiting for admission . . .".

190. The Officer Working Party had discussed in 1985 the need, and Dr Eastwood's various schemes, for improvement of the turnstile arrangements. The mathematics are elementary. Both the police and the Club should have realised that the Leppings Lane turnstiles and the waiting area outside them would be under strain to admit all the Liverpool supporters in time. Success depended on the spectators arriving at a steady rate from an early hour and upon the maximum turnstile rate being maintained. In fact neither of these requirements, which are inter-linked, was fulfilled. That they might not be so was in my view foreseeable.

#### The "Late" arrival of Liverpool Fans

191. Between 2.30 pm and 2.40 pm the crowd waiting for the turnstiles swelled to over 5,000 and became unmanageable. The case made for the police was that large numbers of Liverpool supporters arrived late; a high proportion of them were drunk and unco-operative; a high proportion had no tickets; all of them were hell-bent on getting in on time. They say this was unforeseeable and explains why they lost control.

192. Whether those who arrived between 2.30 pm and 2.40 pm were "late" was much debated. The ticket simply requested its holder "to take up [his] position 15 minutes before kick-off. That may have been intended to persuade those with stand tickets to take their seats, but it would not be unreasonable for a standing spectator to arrive at the turnstiles between 2.30 pm and 2.40 pm. Whether they were "late" or not, however, there was certainly a large concentration of Liverpool fans arriving at about 2.30 pm and after.

#### Traffic Delays

193. It is unlikely that traffic conditions had any significant effect on this. True, there were delays on the Liverpool traffic routes. There were roadworks on the M62 which was the recommended route. At various points the carriageway was reduced from four lanes or three lanes to two, but no serious delays were reported.

On the M63 there were longer delays due to a contraflow and at its junction with the A560 there was heavy congestion due to volume of traffic. However, the Liverpool routes were clear by 2.20 pm and those witnesses who complained of delays en route had nevertheless managed to be in range of the ground in ample time.

### **Fine Weather and Drinking**

194. The likeliest explanations for the sparse Liverpool attendance in the ground before 2.30 pm were four-fold - the warm weather, drinking, disinclination to enter the ground early and prolong the standing, and a tendency of Liverpool supporters to cut it **fine**.

195. The police emphasised that at the 1988 semi-final there was no comparable build-up of "late" arrivals. They claim, therefore, that they had no reason to foresee it in 1989. However, in 1988, although the weather was **fine**, it was 11 °F cooler than in 1989. 15 April was the sort of fine spring day which tempted fans to sit or stand about in the sun with a drink. If you had a ticket it would seem more pleasant and sensible to relax in that way than to enter the ground early and stand on the terrace for an extra hour. **Pre-match** entertainment in the ground had been advertised but did not take place. Even if it had, it may not have been an encouragement to many fans to enter so early.

### **Was Drunkenness a Major Factor in the Crisis at the Turnstiles?**

196. Of those who arrived at 2.30 pm or after, very many had been drinking at public houses or had brought drink from home or an off-licence. I am satisfied on the evidence, however, that the great majority were not drunk nor even the worse for drink. The police witnesses varied on this. Some described a high proportion as drunk, as "lager-louts" or even as "animals". Others described a generally normal crowd with an unco-operative minority who had drunk too much. In my view some officers, seeking to rationalise their loss of control, overestimated the drunken element in the crowd. There certainly was such an element. There were youngsters influenced by drink and bravado pushing impatiently at the rear of the crowd thereby exacerbating the crush. But the more convincing police witnesses, including especially Detective Superintendent McKay and Chief Inspector Creaser as well as a number of responsible civilian witnesses, were in my view right in describing this element as a minority. Those witnesses attributed the crush to the sheer numbers of fans all anxious to gain entry. There was no criticism of the crowd by any of the witnesses in the period up to 2.30 pm or even 2.35 pm. What happened then was not a sudden deterioration in the mood or sobriety of those assembled there. No doubt those coming behind would have had more to drink and would have included the unruly minority. But the crisis developed because this very large crowd became packed into a confined turnstile area and its very density hampered its passage through the turnstiles.

197. Superintendent Marshall and other officers criticised the crowd as unco-operative because police exhortations to stop pushing and to ease back were not heeded. How could they be? In that crush most people had no control over their movements at all. Two incidents involving police horses illustrate the point. One horse was found afterwards to have cigarette burns on its rump. Clearly that was the despicable work of a hooligan whether in drink or not. However, there were also eyewitness accounts of a horse being physically lifted off its feet by the crowd. That occurred, as the police accepted, without malice or intent but as an involuntary consequence of crowd pressure which those by the horse's flanks could not resist any more than the horse itself.

### **Reduced Efficiency of the Turnstiles**

198. The labelling of the turnstiles in the order A, C, B was confusing. A fan with a B ticket who went by mistake to the wrong side of the metal fence would have had the greatest difficulty in getting back and round to the correct side. The colour coding was inefficient because the coloured wooden panels were affixed to the turnstile walls so low that they were not easily visible through a crowd. The information on the ticket printed by Sheffield Wednesday Football Club was misleading and its layout unhelpful, as Mr Mackrell frankly conceded.

199. The result was that in the early stages, police officers were pestered by fans for help as to where they should go. Later, as the crowd became more dense, fans were presenting their tickets at the wrong turnstiles. There were also Liverpool supporters who had acquired tickets for the **Kop** end but sought entry at Leppings Lane. They caused delays in the turnstile operation when entry was refused and after a while the police instructed the operators to let them through. There was further delay because the crush made it difficult for fans to get into the turnstile entrances. Once there, the pressure from behind was such as, on occasions, to jam them in the doorway or against the paddle of the turnstile. Finally, there were fans without tickets who sought to enter by offering payment, by seeking to go over or under the paddle or by sliding through with a ticket holder. All of these activities slowed down the turnstile rate which at the worst period was only about 600 per hour per turnstile. The waiting crowd therefore expanded and as the minutes passed frustration grew. Visitors

who had paid for tickets and travelled from afar realised they were making little forward progress. Frustration increased pressure and induced panic at the front. Determination to get into the match was intensified by determination to get out of the crush.

### **Were Fans Without Tickets a Major Factor in the Build-Up?**

200. It has become a fact of football life that fans do turn up at all-ticket matches without tickets. It is not possible to give an accurate figure or even a reliable estimate of the number without tickets on 15 April. Police estimates varied from about 200 to about 2,000. There were certainly frequent requests for tickets or "spares" during the hours before the build-up. Many of those warned off by the police were seen to return to the area. Some were hanging about on the bridge. Again, however, the police witnesses who most impressed me did not consider the number of ticketless fans to be inordinately large. This accords with two other sources of evidence.

201. First, there was a wide range of witnesses who observed inside the ground that the Liverpool end was at a late stage well below capacity save for pens 3 and 4. The north stand still had many empty seats and the wing pens were sparse. The match being a sell-out, there were clearly many ticket holders to come and they could account for the large crowd still outside the turnstiles. Had the Liverpool accommodation been full by 2.40 pm, one could have inferred that most or much of the large crowd outside lacked tickets.

202. Secondly, such figures as are available from the Club's electronic monitoring system and from analyses by the HSE suggest that no great number entered without tickets. They show that the number who passed through turnstiles A to G plus those who entered through gate C roughly equalled the terrace capacity figure of 10,100 for which tickets had been sold. The Club's record showed 7,038 passed through turnstiles A to G. However, the counting mechanism on turnstile G was defective, so the HSE did a study using the video film and projecting figures from the other turnstiles. This gave an assessment of 7,494, with a maximum of 7,644 passing through A to G. Again, using the video, the HSE assessed the number who entered the ground whilst gate C was open at 2,240 with a maximum of 2,480. Accordingly, the HSE's best estimate of the total entering through gate C and turnstiles A to G was 9,734 with a maximum of 10,124. I recognise that these can only be rough checks because, for example, some with terrace tickets were allowed through turnstiles 1 to 16 and there would be other similar factors which have not formed part of the assessment. Nevertheless, the figures do suggest that there was not a very significant body of ticketless fans in the crowd which built up.

### **The "Conspiracy" Theory**

203. On behalf of South Yorkshire police, the theory was advanced that the "late" arrival of so many Liverpool supporters was planned to buck the system. The suggestion was that fans without tickets conspired to arrive late and create such trouble as would force the police to admit them to the match. The slender evidence upon which this theory rested came from two sources: overheard conversations in public houses and the antecedent history of Liverpool supporters at away matches.

204. One witness said he heard three Liverpool supporters saying, in effect, that they would manage to get in without tickets by causing trouble so that police would open a gate, and that they had done this before. Another witness heard two of a group of Liverpool supporters say they had no tickets, that they would go to the ground just before kick-off, that no-one would stop them getting in and that they had not been stopped yet. Statements were put in relating to two other small groups talking in similar terms.

### **Liverpool Supporters at Away Matches**

205. The South Yorkshire police prepared a dossier of reports on the behaviour of Liverpool fans at away matches with the object of showing a pattern of troublesome behaviour by large numbers either without tickets or with forged tickets. Without setting out the whole history, it can be summarised as follows.

206. On three occasions Liverpool fans without tickets were allowed into all-ticket matches upon payment. (At Watford on 13 February 1988, 1,500 were admitted; at Southampton on 24 September 1988, 150 were admitted; at Southampton again on 12 December 1988, 750 were admitted.) At Norwich on 1 April 1989, Liverpool supporters arrived without tickets but 1,272 tickets had been returned and fans from both Liverpool and Norwich were allowed to buy them for cash. A similar situation occurred at Wimbledon on 13 May 1989. There were six other occasions from 1986 to date, including the Cup finals of 1986 and 1989, when numbers of Liverpool supporters turned up without tickets or otherwise behaved badly.

207. Four points must be noted, however. On none of the occasions when ticketless fans were admitted for payment was the match a sell-out. There was therefore room in the ground on each occasion. At a sell-out fans

might not expect to be allowed in, even for payment. Secondly, no trouble of the kind alleged was encountered at the 1988 semi-final when Liverpool visited Hillsborough. Thirdly, Liverpool visited Hillsborough again in January 1989 without any trouble. Finally, no forged tickets were in use on 15 April apart from three crude photocopies.

### **No Conspiracy**

208. I have already found that there was not an abnormally large number of fans without tickets on this occasion. With one or two exceptions, the police witnesses themselves did not subscribe to the "conspiracy" theory. I am satisfied that the large concentration at Leppings Lane from 2.30 pm to 2.50 pm did not arrive as a result of any concerted plan. There were, I accept, small groups without tickets who were willing to exploit any adventitious chance of getting into the ground. They, together with the minority who had drunk too much, certainly aggravated the problem faced by the police. But that main problem was simply one of large numbers packed into the small area outside the turnstiles.

### **The Police Operation at Leppings Lane**

209. The Operational Order for 15 April followed closely that laid down for the 1988 semi-final. The emphasis was on maintaining law and order. Side roads were to be blocked off to prevent damage in residential areas. Pairs of officers were to patrol streets to prevent "clash of rival supporters". Officers were to watch public houses, shops and supermarkets "where looting could take place". Outside the turnstiles, officers were to ensure supporters entering did not have banners, weapons, missiles or alcohol.

210. Unfortunately, hooligan behaviour has made all these steps necessary. But the only written provision aimed at effecting controlled entry to the turnstiles was one enjoining officers "to ensure orderly queues are formed". There was no provision for controlling the entry of the crowd into the turnstile area.

211. As long ago as 1924, the Departmental Committee on Crowds stated:-

"The control of crowds should begin at a point some considerable distance from the entrance to the ground. The advantages of an arrangement of this kind are ... in preventing congestion at the entrances to grounds."

This was particularly important at Leppings Lane where the turnstile area was so small and awkwardly laid out. If a large crowd was permitted uncontrolled entry through the perimeter gates, the forming of queues at the turnstiles and control by officers, whether on foot or mounted, would become impracticable. Those waiting at the turnstiles would become a single growing mass. Once that happened, it would be difficult to retrieve the situation.

212. Whether steps were taken and what steps to avoid this happening was left to oral briefing and *ad hoc* instructions on the day.

### **Previous Experience**

213. The senior police officers said it had never happened before so there was no reason to foresee it. In fact, the only two previous occasions when the Leppings Lane terraces had been used to fill the whole of the north and west sides of the ground were at the two semi-finals, in 1987 and 1988. In 1987, the match was on a Sunday, scheduled for 12 noon, and kick-off was postponed for a quarter of an hour because of late arrivals.

### **Policing in 1988**

214. As to 1988, there was a very large and consistent body of evidence that, on the day, the police in Leppings Lane conducted an efficient filtering exercise designed to keep away those without tickets and control the flow of fans towards the ground. I do not believe that so many witnesses without either opportunity or reason to put their heads together could be mistaken about what they experienced on that occasion. Yet, the police maintain that no filtering exercise other than on a random basis was conducted in 1988 and that their policy and practice then were no different from those of 1989.

215. The answer to this conflict must, I think, be that whilst the policy may have been no different, in practice the policing in 1988 was more efficient and was not put to the same test and strain as a year later. There was not so large a swell in numbers approaching the ground from 2.30 pm to 2.50 pm as in 1989. Nevertheless, there had been warning signs in 1988. Detective Superintendent McKay gave the following evidence:

“Q Were you aware of a build-up of numbers last year towards the latter stages at the turnstiles?

A Yes. . . There was a huge build-up around 10 minutes to 3 when many, many Liverpool supporters came at that time. They had been drinking, the ones that I saw and there was quite a sizeable crush built-up - sizeable queue.

Q Queue or crush?

A Compacted queue, built-up in the area by the turnstiles which I believe are marked A to G. That crowd reached back almost to the gates. It never got any bigger than that and the turnstiles operated relatively freely and they dealt with that crowd. Fans were still arriving at about 10 past 3 but by then **the** . . .

Q This crowd that you have described of the late arrivals at about 10 to - was it an orderly crowd?

A Oh no. No. The orderly crowd had gone in, and when I say they were not an orderly crowd, obviously mixed amongst those people **were** . . .

Q Of course, but taking it generally?

A But by and large they had taken a lot of drink on board and they were in such numbers that excluding them from the ground was completely out of the question.

Q Were they standing in an orderly queue or was there some pushing and shoving?

A There was a lot of pushing and shoving. There was an urgency to get into the ground.

Q But fortunately it does not appear to have been in nearly such numbers as this year.

A It wasn't."

#### **Police Intelligence in Advance**

216. Apart from that experience in 1988, the tendency of Liverpool supporters to arrive late was not unknown. Witnesses said that they get through the turnstiles at their home ground, **Anfield**, quite quickly and tend therefore not to arrive early. Indeed, a general recent tendency to postpone arrival was noted by the Sheffield City Council Advisory Group, with police present, on 23 March 1988. The minute reads:-

“As far as the turnstile question was concerned, a pattern has developed of people arriving some 15 minutes before the start of the game hoping to gain admission. This trend may be due to the banning of alcohol at sports grounds which could lead to people going elsewhere for refreshment prior to the football match. As the available turnstiles operated quite effectively for the majority of the time, and that the late arrival problem could perhaps only be dealt with by education of the spectators" (*sic*).

217. In so far as Liverpool supporters' behaviour at away matches may have been indicative of what police problems might arise on 15 April, most of the facts should have been available at the planning stage. As in other forces, South Yorkshire Police had a liaison officer whose job was to seek, receive and collate relevant information as to the visiting supporters. The Association of Chief Police Officers' Guide to Policing Football highlights the importance of such liaison:-

“It is important that the officer responsible for policing the match determines the **pre-match** planning in the light of the intelligence at hand. Whilst that intelligence can be obtained from a variety of sources, the prime source for football intelligence is the Police National Intelligence System which is based on the network of police liaison officers. Summaries completed by police officers of the home club force are forwarded to the visiting club's liaison officer making available intelligence about fans' behaviour at both home and away fixtures. This information will be collated and made available for future matches involving that club".

218. The FA had also laid down in a memorandum issued in the 1985/6 season measures to be adopted by the away club which included the following:-

“It is the responsibility of the away club to advise the home club of the recent behaviour of their supporters at away matches, irrespective of whether the behaviour has resulted in disciplinary action by the Football Association or **not**".

219. It does not seem that information of this kind was passed to the Sheffield Wednesday Club or played

any part in the South Yorkshire Police plans. Had the latter been informed of the history contained in the dossier and summarised above it may well have influenced police strategy in Leppings Lane.

220. There is presently a proposal that a national computer-based police football intelligence system should be set up to make the necessary information readily available.

#### **Police Intelligence on the Day**

221. The unfilled space in the Liverpool areas inside the ground, the figures for entry available from the Club's computer and observations on the video screen should have enabled those in the control room to monitor the numbers arriving and still to arrive at Leppings Lane. Radio contact with mobile (Tango) patrols detailed to monitor licensed premises in the district could have indicated the numbers still to come. But at 2.30 pm when Mr Murray told Mr **Duckenfield** they would "get them all in by 3 o'clock" he seems not to have appreciated that in addition to those visible at the turnstiles there were many more still to come. **Certainly**, Mr Marshall outside the turnstiles was not told and could not otherwise have known that there were still many Liverpool ticket holders to arrive.

#### **Mr Marshall and Mr Greenwood**

222. The division of command between these two officers did not help. Mr Marshall was in charge of the serials outside the perimeter gates in the Leppings Lane area and in the roads beyond. In practice he operated inside and just outside the turnstile area. Mr Greenwood's area as Ground Commander extended from the pitch to the perimeter gates. He in fact stationed himself **near** the players' tunnel. He was wholly unaware of the growing problems at the turnstiles and was in no position to exercise control over his officers who were under pressure there. No-one in the control room thought to tell him.

#### **Control Lost**

223. In the result, the large concentration of arrivals from 2.30 pm to 2.40 pm pressed unrestrained into the turnstile area through the perimeter gates which were fully open. When that area was full, later arrivals swelled the crowd out to the forecourt and even into the road. As already recounted, the foot officers at the turnstiles became trapped and endangered and retired through the turnstiles. The mounted officers could not operate amidst such a dense crowd in a confined space. They came out of the turnstile area. There were then the belated attempts to close the perimeter gates and prevent more fans joining the mass until it had a chance to diminish through the turnstiles; still later the attempt to put a cordon of horses across the entrance.

224. Despite knowledge of the difficult layout, the very large number of fans to be got through so few turnstiles and the tendency of fans to arrive in the last half hour, no contingency plans were made to avoid a crush such as occurred. Even on the day, the need to close Leppings Lane to traffic before 2.30 pm and the other available intelligence already summarised, should have prompted those in command to take precautions against such a crush. If some of the perimeter gates had been **closed** and cordons of mounted and foot officers had been placed a little distance from those gates, the flow of fans into the turnstile area could have been controlled before that area became engulfed. It was the crush itself which produced the frustration and the panic and brought out the worst in those who had drunk too much. Earlier control of entry would have prevented the crush and maintained the good mood which had prevailed until 2.30 pm.

225. It should moreover have been obvious by 2.40 pm, if not earlier, that a large part of the crowd could not be admitted until well after 3 pm. Had a decision to postpone kick-off been made and announced much of the frustration and with it the impetus crushing the crowd would have been reduced. A combination of controlled filtering and a postponed kick-off would probably have obviated the need to open the gates.

#### **Postponement of Kick-off**

226. At various stages in his evidence, Mr Duckenfield gave three accounts of why he thought it too late to postpone kick-off. Once it was that one of the teams had already come onto the pitch. Then it was that a group of photographers at the tunnel had wrongly led him to think that the teams were coming out. Finally, he did not know why he thought the teams were coming out. They did not in fact come onto the pitch until 2.54 pm, two minutes after gate C was opened. Police Constable Buxton had asked for a postponement of kick-off before gate C was opened. It should not, however, have needed a police Constable in the thick of the crowd (and there were others of like mind) to think of postponing the kick-off. The need should have been clear in the control room.

227. The truth was that Mr Duckenfield applied inflexibly the policy he had discussed with Mr Murray. Kick-off would not be postponed unless there were some major cause for delayed arrivals *eg* a jam on the

motorway or fog. I accept that the thinking behind this policy was not callous or punitive. If kick-off is postponed whenever a proportion of fans choose to leave the public houses late, the practice may grow and kick-off times would become meaningless. But, a commander must deal with the problem of the day. Faced with a situation which was becoming dangerous, crowd safety should have been his paramount consideration. Kick-off should have been delayed.

### **Summary**

228. The layout of the turnstiles and the number they were required to serve left no margin of safety against an uneven flow of fans. Because police strategy in advance and on the day did not cater for it, the arrival of a large number of supporters between 2.30 pm and 2.40 pm created an unmanageable crush. The presence of a substantial minority of fans who had drunk too much aggravated that problem. Having lost control and rejected the option of postponing kick-off, the police were faced with a serious danger of deaths or injuries. They were left therefore with no alternative but to open the gates. Superintendent Marshall was right at that stage to ask for it and Mr **Duckenfield** was right to agree. But the possible effects of so dramatic a step required other action.

## CHAPTER 11

### THE BLUNDER ON OPENING THE GATES

229. The decision to order the opening of the gates was not accompanied or followed by any other order to deal with the consequences. When gate C was opened, a steady stream of about 2,000 fans poured through it over some five minutes. Clearly they were going to go into the ground somewhere and unless they were diverted their likeliest route was through the tunnel for reasons already given. No warning was issued from the control room that the gate was to be opened. Serials on the concourse were not alerted. Neither the Club control room nor the Chief Steward at the Leppings Lane end was warned. Not even Mr Greenwood, the Ground Commander, was informed. From 2.47 pm when Mr Marshall made his first request until 2.52 pm when Mr **Duckenfield** acceded to it, there were five minutes in which orders could have been given as to how the influx was to be absorbed. It was not done. In evidence, Mr Duckenfield began by saying that no officer made any wrong decision but he later conceded he had erred in this regard. He said he did not consider where the people would go when the gate opened. Even after it opened, when he could see the influx on the television screen, no order was given to steer the fans to the wing pens. Mr Duckenfield said it did not cross his mind to detail officers on the concourse to shut off the tunnel. Those officers could not have known from their position how full pens 3 and 4 were. That was a matter for the control room to monitor from its own observations and using intelligence from around the ground.

230. Since pens 3 and 4 were full by 2.50 pm, the tunnel should have been closed off whether gate C was to be opened or not. The exercise was a simple one and had been carried out in 1988. All that was necessary was for a few officers to act as a cordon at the entrance to the tunnel and divert fans elsewhere. Unfortunately, the 1988 closure seems to have been unknown to the senior officers on duty at the time. It did not figure in the debriefing notes. It therefore had no influence on the planning for 1989.

231. Planning apart, however, it should have been clear in the control room where there was a view of the pens and of the crowd at the turnstiles that the tunnel had to be closed. If orders had been given to that effect when gate C was opened, the fans could have been directed to the empty areas of the wings and this disaster could still have been avoided. Failure to give that order was a blunder of the first magnitude.

232. Significantly, when permission was given to open gate A, Mr Duckenfield did order serials to go to that part of the concourse to monitor the influx towards the north stand. He did this because he feared that if fans went to the north stand without tickets, they would not get seats and, there being no perimeter fences at the north side, they might invade the pitch. This illustrates again the preoccupation with avoiding pitch invasion as against safety and the risks of overcrowding. Because those entering through gate C could not get onto the pitch, it was not thought necessary to alert officers to monitor them. The possibility of overcrowding simply was not considered.

## CHAPTER 12

### THE BARRIERS IN PEN 3

#### Barrier 144

233. The removal of barrier 144 in 1986 should have reduced the notional capacity of pen 3 as already mentioned. But it did more. In the absence of barrier 144, the influx of fans after 2.52 pm met no retarding structure as it came into pen 3. The pressure created was free to push fans straight down by the radial fence to the lowest line of barriers. The pressure diagonally from the tunnel mouth down to barrier number 124a which collapsed was unbroken by any intervening barrier. 124a was also vulnerable to pressure straight down the pen through the gap in the barrier above it created in 1985.

234. Inspector Bullas, positioned in the west stand, described what he saw looking down on the pens around 3 pm.

"... I saw from the direction of the tunnel a kind of movement down the **terracing** ... the type of thing that you see on the nature programmes, **the** molten lead flowing down the side of the mountainside, the molten **lava** ... a "river of people" ... going directly towards the pitch but there again **spreading** ... out."

235. Dr Eastwood conceded in evidence that the removal of barrier 144 was likely to have contributed to the collapse of 124a. Later, he sought to resile from that answer, but I think his earlier admission was correct. It was argued that if barrier 144 had remained, the influx from gate C would have built up further back and the tragedy might have occurred in the tunnel or might have broken barrier 144 itself. This is speculative and I think unlikely. What remained of barrier 144 in pen 4 did not cause a build-up; nor did it collapse. But its remaining in position may well have accounted for no barrier further down pen 4 collapsing and for the lesser carnage in that pen.

#### When did Barrier 124a Fail?

236. Counsel for the South Yorkshire Police sought to argue that this barrier collapsed or may have collapsed at about 2.47 pm. His purpose was to suggest that the opening of gate C was not causally linked with the crushing and fatalities resulting from that collapse. I have already found that whilst the evidence does not permit the time of collapse to be fixed with certainty, it was after 2.52 pm. I now give my reasons:

- (a) I have several times watched the BBC video tape on which Counsel relied. I do not find the incident he identifies at 2.47 pm suggestive of a collapse at that time;
- (b) the evidence of fans who were near or at the barrier was overwhelmingly to the effect that the collapse occurred at or after 3 pm;
- (c) the biggest group of witnesses was that which related the collapse to the surge following Beardsley's "near-miss" at the **Kop** end at 3.04 pm;
- (d) the appearance on video and photographs of fans in the area of barrier 124a after the incident at 2.47 pm and before the final crush is not consistent with it having collapsed so early;
- (e) it is highly unlikely that if so catastrophic an event had occurred as early as 2.47 pm, the police on the track and elsewhere would have taken until nearly 3 o'clock to realise something was seriously wrong. Indeed, if Counsel for the South Yorkshire Police were correct in his timing of the collapse, the failure of the police to respond for so long would expose them to even graver criticism than that made in this Report.

#### Dr Eastwood's Testing of the Barriers

237. Two sections of barrier 124a in pen 3 collapsed as a result of the overcrowding. That collapse caused a number of deaths. Dr Eastwood and his staff had undertaken the periodical testing of crush barriers required by the Green Guide and by the Safety Certificate. Barrier 124a had been tested in July 1988 and passed.

238. The test had been carried out in accordance with Dr Eastwood's interpretation of Annex C to the Green Guide. That requires an evenly distributed force of 6.0kN/metre width to be applied for 3 five minute

periods, the interval between applications to be as short as possible. A record has to be kept of the amount of deformation during each loading and of the percentage of recovery. If the recovery is less than 50% after the third application of force, the barrier has failed the test. If recovery is between 50% and 75%, there must be a re-test. The question is: 50% or 75% of what? Is the recovery to be in relation to the position of the barrier before the first application of force or before the third? If the former, a span of 124a recorded 53% at the 1988 test and should have been re-tested. If the latter, it recorded 100% and passed. Unfortunately the Green Guide is unclear as to the correct interpretation. Dr Eastwood took the latter view and so passed the barrier. He justified his interpretation in evidence. He said failure to recover to the original position could be due to a "shake-down" effect related to some giving in the ashes under the concrete or to some other extraneous factor rather than to any defect in the material of the barrier itself.

239. I think, after consulting Professor Maunder, that safety ought to have dictated recovery should be by reference to the position of the barrier before the first application of force. I accept, however, that the Green Guide is ambiguous and Dr Eastwood's interpretation is tenable. It has some support from the British Standards tests on steel structures. Clearly, however, for the future, the Green Guide should be clarified on this point.

### **Corrosion**

240. Inspection of barrier 124a, and indeed other barriers at Hillsborough, by the HSE showed considerable corrosion of the metal at vulnerable points where water could accumulate. Dr Eastwood agreed that if a significant degree of corrosion was observed on visual inspection, a barrier should be condemned.

241. The Green Guide does not specifically refer to corrosion. Paragraph 39 provides, *inter alia*:

"Crush barriers and balustrades should be examined for deformation or any other overt signs of weakness".

Paragraph 6 of Annex C provides:

"If during any test, even though the **barrier** ... satisfies the above loading requirements, doubt should arise for any reason (including such matters as cracking of the terracing or distortion of connections) as to the safety of the **barrier** ... a detailed investigation should be carried out. Unless the results of this investigation remove the doubt as to safety of the **barrier** ... (it) should be deemed to have failed the test".

242. Since corrosion is a likely cause of deterioration, a revision of the Green Guide should make specific reference to it.

### **Causation**

243. Tests done by the HSE suggest that although barrier 124a passed the loading test in 1988 and probably would have been able to sustain a force which did not exceed the test load, it was unable to resist the load imposed upon it by reason of the numbers in pen 3, the excessive gap in the barrier higher up the pen and the absence of barrier 144. Corrosion probably played a part, but the effective cause of the collapse was the excessive and unanticipated pressure to which the barrier was exposed.

## CHAPTER 13

### THE CRUSHING NOT RECOGNISED

#### Observation from Control Room

244. As the stream from gate C flowed through the tunnel, the officers in the control room could be expected to keep a close watch on pens 3 and 4. They had a direct view of them from an elevated position through their window. Although they had no field-glasses, there was the zoom facility on the TV camera. The radio was by then working again and although reception was difficult due to crowd noise and possibly excessive air traffic on channel 25, attempts could have been made to alert officers on the perimeter track to watch for overcrowding and report their observations. In the event, pens 3 and 4 became more and more crowded, surges took place, fans were showing and signalling distress. None of this was seen or recognised in the control room.

#### Officers on the Track

245. The 20 officers detailed to the perimeter track were distributed round the pitch so that some five officers were at the west end. Their written instructions made no reference to the avoidance or detection of overcrowding. The same applied to the officers in the west stand. Mr Greenwood admitted that his oral briefings also contained no mention of monitoring the pens for overcrowding.

246. The Operational Order for 1988 had instructed officers to forbid anyone "access to the track from the terraces without the consent of a senior officer (except to receive medical **attention**)". At the end of the 1988 semi-final, there was a minor pitch invasion. Accordingly, that prohibition was emphasised in the 1989 Operational Order by being put into capital letters. The combination of no instructions as to overcrowding and a strong prohibition on opening the gates was likely to make police recognition of crushing slow and their response reluctant. Small wonder that the growing pressure and congestion between 2.50 pm and 2.59 pm went unheeded or certainly unremedied. Even when officers recognised there was a problem, the rule required consent of a senior officer before a gate could be opened.

247. "Senior officer" meant an officer of Inspector rank or higher. The Inspector in charge of the 20 officers on the track was Mr Darling. He stationed himself by the players' tunnel, the most central position for supervising his men. In evidence he said:

"I would only take action if I thought crowding had got to such a stage that the fans were in danger. I'd then inform ground control and I would expect someone deployed to the back of the stand."

That underlines the inhibition against opening perimeter gates. So did the evidence of one Constable who said it had been so drummed into officers not to open the gates that when he saw distress in pen 4, he "debated" with himself before opening the gate, thinking: "If I'm wrong, I'm going to get a right bollocking for this." Naturally, one would hope that common sense and humanity would make some officers cut through the rules and open a gate if fans were clearly in distress.

248. This is what happened, but not until officers recognised the distress and even then not immediately. Hence, gates 3 and 4, having been opened, were shut again before they were finally opened and at first those seeking to climb out over the fence were pushed back. This reaction of the police did not go on for as long as some witnesses believed. They probably misinterpreted the hand movements from Mr Greenwood and others aimed at persuading fans to move back and relieve the pressure as attempts to stop those climbing out at the front.

249. Nevertheless, there was a period during which the failure to recognise the problem and the inhibition against tackling it caused vital time to be lost.

## CHAPTER 14

### THE RESPONSE OF THE POLICE

#### The Officers in Command

250. Even when realisation of the problem came to officers on the track, it was some minutes before it reached the control room. When spectators first appeared on the track, the immediate assumption in the control room was that a pitch invasion was threatened. This was unlikely at the beginning of a match. It became still less likely when those on the track made no move towards the pitch. Mr Motson, the BBC commentator, recognised and said, well before the match was stopped, that the trouble seemed to be overcrowding and not misbehaviour. Still, the assumption to the contrary persisted in the control room. Until Mr Murray radioed for a fleet of ambulances, about 3.06 pm, Mr Duckenfield continued to treat the incident as a threat to the pitch and to public order. The message calling up all available officers mentioned a pitch invasion. Operation Support was initiated and dog handlers were requested.

251. Until Chief Superintendent Nesbit arrived, there was no effective leadership either from control or on the pitch to harness and organise rescue efforts. No orders were given for officers to enter the tunnel and relieve pressure. Some officers did this on their own initiative. Apart from the Tannoy request to clear the pitch, no attempt was made to clear and mark off a casualty area where first-aid could be given without hindrance by fans and photographers milling about between the bodies. There was no co-ordination of the early provision of first-aid or of stretcher parties or of the rescue effort through gates 3 and 4. No request for help was broadcast to doctors and nurses in the crowd until about 3.29 pm when it was too late. Probably, there was little that could have been achieved in most cases however soon doctors had been summoned, but there were marginal cases where earlier attention might have made a difference.

252. The plight of those behind the fencing and the existence of injuries were known to officers at the scene from 3 pm. But the Major Disaster Plan was not started until 3.06 pm at earliest when the ambulance service was called. No request for cutting gear or for the fire brigade was made until 3.13 p.m. Again, it is unlikely that these services could have saved lives if they had been called promptly, but it is possible.

#### Police on the Pitch

253. Despite the initial lack of leadership, many officers did all they humanly could to rescue and revive the victims. Many supporters who gave evidence paid tribute to these efforts. It is also fair to say that the number of officers who could at first be usefully involved at the two open gates was necessarily limited.

254. Chief Superintendent Nesbit's action in deploying a line of officers across the middle of the pitch has already been mentioned. I can well understand the resentment it caused. However, the police assertion that a rush by some fans towards the Kop end raised fears of conflict are well borne out by the video tape. In my judgement, Chief Superintendent Nesbit was well justified in using some of the many officers called up pursuant to Operation Support to prevent possible violence. To have had open fighting in a ground where some 90 spectators already lay dead would have been an unthinkable and obscene development.

#### Fans on the Pitch

255. Many fans who escaped onto the pitch alive were in a state of collapse or close to it. Most of those who retained their strength strove magnificently to assist the victims. They helped pull them clear; they helped with first-aid; they helped carry the improvised stretchers.

256. There were fans, however, who were distraught, angry, **drunk**, or all three. Their conduct in abusing, assaulting and spitting at the police was disgraceful, the more so since earlier police failures had little to do with those officers now doing their best for the injured. In addition, there were abuse and assaults on ambulance men and firemen in the course of their rescue work. This was probably because their similar uniforms caused them to be mistaken for police. However, although the abuse was widespread, the number of assaults and spittings was on the evidence comparatively small. In deploring them, one must recognise the uniquely horrifying experience which those responsible had just suffered and were still suffering.

#### False Reports

257. Before this Inquiry began, there were stories reported in the press, and said to have emanated from police officers present at the match, of "mass drunkenness". It was said that drunken fans urinated on the police while they were pulling the dead and injured out, that others had even urinated on the bodies of the dead and stolen their belongings. Not a single witness was called before the Inquiry to support any of those allegations although every opportunity was afforded for any of the represented parties to have any witness called whom they wished. As soon as the allegations I have mentioned were made in the press, Mr Peter Wright, Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, made a dignified statement dissociating himself from such grave and emotive calumnies. Those who made them, and those who disseminated them, would have done better to hold their peace.

## CHAPTER 15

### THE PERIMETER GATES WERE TOO SMALL

258. The perimeter gates in the pens were not designed as exits. They were intended to afford access by the police to cope with any local disorder or with an emergency. The kind of emergency contemplated was not massive crushing but, for example, the collapse or illness of an individual. Emergency evacuation of the pens had been considered by the Officer Working Party. Although fire risk was minimal since the terraces, west stand and tunnel were of concrete construction, the fire brigade were the principal arbiters of evacuation procedure. They aimed to be able to empty the pens in six minutes. The plan was to evacuate spectators *via* the tunnel. If for any reason that option became impracticable, *eg due to* a bomb threat, then the alternative route would be along the back of the terraces, through the gates in the radial fences and round the sides of the west stand. The fire brigade were satisfied that each of these routes would enable the pens to be evacuated in less than six minutes, without relying on the gates to the pitch. Those gates would also be available, but their use was excluded from the calculation of evacuation time.

259. The need to provide for speedy and large scale evacuation from the front of the pens to the pitch was not anticipated. The Green Guide (1986) provides as follows:

"209. Access to the pitch must be made as difficult as possible in normal circumstances while at the same time ensuring that the police have effective access to the terraces for the purpose of crowd control and enabling the pitch **to be** used (where appropriate) **in** the event of serious emergency . . .

214. . . . at some major soccer stadia, where restriction on crowd movement forms a necessary part of the safety measures, it may be necessary to have a fence which prevents access to the pitch in normal circumstances . . . but allows for access in emergency.

215. For most major stadia, whether used for association football or other sports, the pitch perimeter fence will be required either to prevent access to the pitch as mentioned above, or at least to discourage attempts by spectators to enter the playing area. Gates or other access points (minimum width 1.1 metres) should nonetheless be provided for use in an emergency . . . Provision of such gates or access points is particularly important to allow full access to the playing area (or track) where it is likely to be used as a place of safety in an emergency. Such gates or access points should be properly stewarded and clearly marked so that immediate access to the playing area or perimeter track can be ensured".

260. Gate 3 was .82 metres in width; gate 4 was .79 metres in width. There were therefore clear departures from the Green Guide standard.

261. The Safety Certificate provided (by Schedule 2 Paragraph 24) as follows:

The (club) shall arrange for the Stadium to be inspected by a suitably qualified Chartered Engineer . . . at least once each period of 12 months . . . and . . . shall as soon as possible after each inspection supply to the . . . Council a Certificate **by the** said Chartered Engineer **as to** the current compliance or non-compliance with . . . the appropriate provisions and recommendations **of the** (Green) Guide **of all** structural parts **of the** Stadium . . .

262. It was argued that there was no breach of the Safety Certificate since the Green Guide specifically provides for flexibility. However, in my view the Safety Certificate cannot and certainly should not be interpreted so liberally as in effect to leave such basic requirements as the size of exit gates to the total discretion of the club and its advisers. One of the matters for consideration at stage two of this inquiry will be whether, and in what respects, the Green Guide needs to be clarified and toughened.

263. Dr Eastwood explained the small width of the gates by reference to the dilemma facing the police. They wanted a gate sufficient for its intended purpose *ie* police access and small scale emergencies. On the other hand, they did not want a flood gate of such size as to endanger the prime principle of preventing pitch invasions. In the light of Hillsborough, this is perhaps the most poignant example of the difficulty of achieving a balance between stopping hooliganism and ensuring crowd safety.

264. Even if the width of gates 3 and 4 had complied with the present Green Guide standard, they would have been wholly inadequate to relieve pressure and release spectators swiftly on 15 April. Moreover, the Green Guide says nothing about the number of gates required for a pen of given size. Whilst the Club,

Dr Eastwood, the Officer Working Party and the local authority can be criticised for failing strictly to conform to the Guide, the real failure was common to all those who have been responsible for considering safety on the terraces. The anxiety to protect the sanctity of the pitch has caused insufficient attention to be paid to the risk of a crush due to overcrowding. Certain it was, that once the crush occurred on 15 April gates 3 and 4 were wholly inadequate for rescue purposes.

## **PART III - CONCLUSIONS**

### **CHAPTER 16**

#### **BRIEF SUMMARY OF CAUSES**

265. The immediate cause of the gross overcrowding and hence the disaster was the failure, when gate C was opened, to cut off access to the central pens which were already overfull.

266. They were already overfull because no safe maximum capacities had been laid down, no attempt was made to control entry to individual pens numerically and there was no effective visual monitoring of crowd density.

267. When the influx from gate C entered pen 3, the layout of the barriers there afforded less protection than it should and a barrier collapsed. Again, the lack of vigilant monitoring caused a sluggish reaction and response when the crush occurred. The small size and number of gates to the track retarded rescue efforts. So, in the initial stages, did lack of leadership.

268. The need to open gate C was due to dangerous congestion at the turnstiles. That occurred because, as both Club and police should have realised, the turnstile area could not easily cope with the large numbers demanded of it unless they arrived steadily over a lengthy period. The Operational Order and police tactics on the day failed to provide for controlling a concentrated arrival of large numbers should that occur in a short period. That it might so occur was foreseeable and it did. The presence of an unruly minority who had drunk too much aggravated the problem. So did the Club's confused and inadequate signs and ticketing.

## CHAPTER 17

### THE FA's CHOICE OF GROUND

269. The FA were strongly criticised by the Football Supporters' Association and others for having imposed the Hillsborough venue on Liverpool for a second year running. The Liverpool supporters had to travel much further to Sheffield than their Nottingham rivals. The police required that if the match was to be at Hillsborough at all, Liverpool would have to have the west and north side accommodation. The disadvantages of that and the disparate numbers of home supporters of the two clubs have already been set out. Liverpool had had to knuckle under to the arrangement in 1988. They resented having it imposed in 1989. To hold the match at Old **Trafford** would have been a perfectly good and acceptable alternative. Indeed, the FA nominated Old **Trafford** as the venue for the replay should there be a draw at Hillsborough.

270. Mr Kelly, the FA's Chief Executive, sought to give reasons for preferring Hillsborough, but the only one which seemed to have any validity was that the 1988 match had been considered a successfully managed event. He admitted that a telephone call from the Chief Executive of the Liverpool Club protesting and putting Liverpool's case had not been mentioned to the FA committee which finally decided the venue. Mr Kelly frankly conceded that "there was an element of unfairness" to Liverpool in choosing Hillsborough for a second time. I think the decision was ill-considered. No doubt in future the FA will be more sensitive and responsive to reasonable representations.

271. However, it was not suggested that the choice of venue was causative of this disaster. The only basis on which that could be said would be that, because of its layout, the **Leppings** Lane end was incapable of being successfully policed for this semi-final. I do not believe that to be so.

## CHAPTER 18

### POLICE

#### Choice of Ends by the Police

272. There was much bitterness amongst Liverpool supporters that they had to make do again for the second year with the Leppings Lane end. But, cogent as their complaints were, they amounted to reasons for choosing a different ground altogether. Given **Hillsborough** as the venue, I think the police were right to allocate the sections of the ground as they did. The direction of arrival and the need for segregation made it sensible and to reverse the **1988** arrangements would have made for confusion. As with choice of venue, I do not consider choice of ends was causative of the disaster. Had it been reversed, the disaster could well have occurred in a similar manner but to Nottingham supporters.

#### Police Planning

273. The Operational Order for **1989** left much unsaid. Apart from the lack of any provision for late or congested arrivals, or any provision for the avoidance of overcrowding on the **terraces**, there was a number of other omissions. For example, there was no specific deployment of officers to man the perimeter gates. The Order did not detail the duties of the mounted officers deployed at the Leppings Lane entrance, who included Liverpool officers to assist in marshalling their own fans. The duties of Superintendents (especially Mr Greenwood and Mr Marshall) were not defined so as to achieve clarity and efficiency. By an oversight, the provision requiring mobile (Tango) patrols to assist the emergency services was omitted from the text.

274. The **1988** Order was never substantially reviewed save to reduce the number of officers deployed in shopping areas and to emphasise in capital letters the embargo on fans having access to the pitch. Satisfaction with the **1988** event led to complacency. That some thought the pens overfull in **1988** and that the tunnel was closed off on that occasion did not figure in or influence the plan for **1989**.

275. Mr **Duckenfield** was promoted and put in charge of F Division only **21** days before this semi-final. The pre-planning was already in progress under Mr Mole who had been in command both in **1987** and in **1988**. It might have been wiser to have left Mr Mole in charge of this operation. On the other hand, it is quite understandable that Mr Duckenfield should have been expected to take command of events in his Division from the date of his promotion. In view of his lack of experience at Hillsborough and of a semi-final match, however, it was imperative that he be fully briefed and that he should also brief himself.

276. He was not informed of the crushing incident in **1981** nor did he make inquiries which would have revealed it. He did not know the arrangement as between Club and police for monitoring the Leppings Lane terraces. He did not visit and tour the ground before approving the Operational Order. Although he attended a match on 2 April, there was only a small crowd present and he left control of the game to the Superintendents.

#### Policing on the Day

277. One of the regrettable features of the football scene as it has developed is the enormous expenditure of money, time and effort in employing large numbers of police all over the country to guard against the sort of disorder and misbehaviour which have become endemic. Police management of a game of football has become a military operation. The problems faced and the responses received must be disheartening and may have tended to harden police attitudes to supporters in general.

278. It is fair to state that over many years the South Yorkshire Police have given excellent service to the public. They have handled crowd problems sensitively and successfully at a large number of football games including major matches, during strikes in the coal industry and the steel industry, and in other contexts. Unfortunately, their policing on 15 April broke down in the ways already described and, although there were other causes, the main reason for the disaster was the failure of police control.

279. In all some 65 police officers gave oral evidence at the Inquiry. Sadly I must report that for the most part the quality of their evidence was in inverse proportion to their rank. There were many young Constables who as witnesses were alert, intelligent and open. On the day, they and many others strove heroically in ghastly circumstances aggravated by hostility to rescue and succour victims. They inspired confidence and hope.

280. By contrast, with some notable exceptions, the senior officers in command were defensive and evasive witnesses. Their feelings of grief and sorrow were obvious and genuine. No doubt those feelings were intensified by the knowledge that such a disaster had occurred under their management. But, neither their handling of problems on the day nor their account of it in evidence showed the qualities of leadership to be expected of their rank.

281. Mr Duckenfield leant heavily on Mr Murray's experience. Between them they misjudged the build-up at the turnstiles and did little about it until they received Mr Marshall's request to open the gate. They did not, for example, check the turnstile figures available from Club control or check with Tango units as to the numbers still to come. They did not alert Mr Greenwood to the situation at the fringe of his area of command. They gave no instructions as to the management of the crowd at Leppings Lane. Inflexibly they declined to postpone kick-off.

282. When Mr Marshall's request came, Mr Duckenfield's capacity to **take** decisions and give orders seemed to collapse. Having sanctioned, at last, the opening of the gates, he failed to give necessary consequential orders or to exert any control when the disaster occurred. He misinterpreted the emergence of fans from pens 3 and 4. When he was unsure of the problem, he sent others down to "assess the situation" rather than descend to see for himself. He gave no information to the crowd.

283. Most surprisingly, he gave Mr Kelly and others to think that there had been an inrush due to Liverpool fans forcing open a gate. This was not only untruthful. It set off a widely reported allegation against the supporters which caused grave offence and distress. It revived against football fans, and especially those from Liverpool, accusations of hooliganism which caused reaction not only nationwide but from Europe too. I can only assume that Mr Duckenfield's lack of candour on this occasion was out of character. He said his reason for not telling the truth was that if the crowd became aware of it there might be a very hostile reaction and this might impede rescue work. He did not wish to divulge what had happened until he had spoken to a senior officer. However, reluctance to tell Mr Kelly the truth did not require that he be told a falsehood. Moreover, although Assistant Chief Constable Jackson was at hand, Mr Duckenfield did not disclose the truth to him until much later.

284. The likeliest explanation of Mr Duckenfield's conduct is that he simply could not face the enormity of the decision to open the gates and all that flowed therefrom. That would explain what he said to Mr Kelly, what he did not say to Mr Jackson, his aversion to addressing the crowd and his failure to take effective control of the disaster situation. He froze.

#### **The Police Case at the Inquiry**

285. It is a matter of regret that at the hearing, and in their submissions, the South Yorkshire Police were not prepared to concede they were in any respect at fault in what occurred. Mr Duckenfield, under pressure of cross-examination, apologised for blaming the Liverpool fans for causing the deaths. But, that apart, the police case was to blame the fans for being late and drunk, and to blame the Club for failing to monitor the pens. It was argued that the fatal crush was not caused by the influx through gate C but was due to barrier 124a being defective. Such an unrealistic approach gives cause for anxiety as to whether lessons have been learnt. It would have been more seemly and encouraging for the future if responsibility had been faced.

## CHAPTER 19

### THE CITY COUNCIL AND THE SAFETY CERTIFICATE

286. The performance by the City Council of its duties in regard to the Safety Certificate was inefficient and dilatory. The failure to revise or amend the certificate over the period of three years preceding this disaster, despite important changes in the layout of the ground, was a serious breach of duty. There were, as a result, no fixed capacities for the pens. The certificate took no account of the 1981 and 1985 alterations to the ground.

287. A number of breaches of Green Guide standards were permitted and persisted *eg* the spacing of the crush barriers, the width of perimeter gates and the gradient in the tunnel (1 in 6 as against the Green Guide maximum of 1 in 10).

288. The Advisory Group lacked a proper structure; its procedure was casual and unbusinesslike. Its accountability to the General Purposes Panel was ill-defined. Decisions were taken informally and too much was left to Mr Bownes. In particular, the decision to remove barrier 144 was not referred to the Panel and ought not to have been made.

## CHAPTER 20

### THE CLUB AND DR EASTWOOD

289. It should be recorded that in general the Club has over the years adopted a responsible and conscientious approach to its responsibilities. It retained the services of Dr Eastwood as consultant engineer and abided by his advice. For *his* part, Dr Eastwood is skilled and experienced in this field, as already indicated, and he sought I have no doubt to act efficiently and professionally in his advice and practical work. The Club also retained Mr Lock who had acquired great experience and knowledge of Hillsborough during his police service. A number of witnesses described Hillsborough as a very good ground, "one of the best in the country". The police agreed that relations between them and the Club were good. Over the last four years, the Club had spent **some £1 ½ million** on ground improvements.

290. Nevertheless, there are a number of respects in which failure by the Club contributed to this disaster. They were responsible as occupiers and **invitors** for the layout and structure of the ground. The Leppings Lane end was unsatisfactory and ill-suited to admit the numbers invited, for reasons already spelt out. The Club was aware of these problems and discussed solving them in various ways between 1981 and 1986. In the result, there remained the same number of turnstiles, and the same problems outside and inside them. The plan for this semi-final, involving as it did the loss of 12 turnstiles for the north stand and large numbers to be fed in from Leppings Lane, was one agreed between the Club and the police. The Club knew best what rate of admission the turnstiles could manage and ought to have alerted the police to the risks of the turnstiles being swamped.

291. The alterations inside the turnstiles and on the terraces clearly affected capacity, but no specific allowance was made for them. In that respect, both Dr Eastwood and the Club should have taken a more positive approach. Either a scheme such as one of those Dr Eastwood put forward should have been adopted giving more turnstiles and total separation of areas or at the very least the capacity of the new pens and of the terraces as a whole should have been treated more cautiously. The police view in 1981 that 10,100 was too high a figure was known to the Club (although Dr Eastwood says not to him). Yet, despite that and the sub-division into pens, the figure remained.

292. Although the police had assumed responsibility for monitoring the pens, the Club had a duty to its visitors and the Club's officials ought to have alerted the police to the grossly uneven distribution of fans on the terraces. The Club operated and read the closed circuit television and the computer totaliser. Liaison between Club and police on the day failed to alert the latter to the number of Liverpool supporters still to come. The onus here was on the Club as well as on the police.

293. The removal of barrier 144 was the responsibility of the Club although it clearly acted on the advice of Dr Eastwood and the Advisory Group which in this instance was misguided.

294. Likewise, the breaches of the Green Guide were matters which the Club should have appreciated and remedied.

295. Lastly, as already indicated, the poor signposting on the concourse tended to produce under-filling of the wing pens and over-filling of pens 3 and 4. Poor signposting outside the turnstiles and the unhelpful format of the tickets also led to confusion aggravating the build-up in the turnstile area.

## CHAPTER 21

### FIRST AID AND EMERGENCY SERVICES

#### No Fault by the Emergency Services

296. I say at the outset of this chapter that no valid criticism can be made of the response by the St John Ambulance Brigade, by SYMAS or by the fire brigade on 15 April. Indeed, no represented party ventured any criticism of them. The only attack on SYMAS came from two Liverpool doctors. One claimed that ambulances did not arrive swiftly or with **sufficient** equipment and that there was a lack of triage. He was proved to be wrong in all three respects. Unfortunately he had seen fit to go on television on 15 April when he said more lives could have been saved if staff and equipment had arrived earlier. Apart from being proved wrong in fact as to the times of arrival of ambulances, he conceded in evidence that it was not possible to say whether lives could have been saved. His comments on television were irresponsible. The other doctor complained of the absence of **defibrillators**. I am satisfied on overwhelming evidence that to attempt to use a **defibrillator** on the pitch with people milling about would have been highly dangerous owing to the risk of injury from the electric charge.

297. I find that all three of the emergency services named above responded promptly when alerted, that they brought appropriate equipment and that their personnel operated efficiently.

298. It would be unreasonable to expect, at any sports stadium, medical facilities capable of dealing with a major disaster such as occurred. To have in advance at the ground, oxygen, resuscitators, stretchers, other equipment and medical staff sufficient to deal with over 100 casualties is not practicable.

299. What is required is a basic level of provision for first aid, for professional medical attention and for ambulance attendance, together with a system of co-ordination with the emergency services which will bring them to the scene swiftly in whatever numbers are required. What will amount to an appropriate basic provision for the future *eg* the equipment in a first aid room, requires expert evaluation and advice.

300. On the day, there was no clear understanding between the Club and Dr Purcell as to his role. He believed he was primarily there to attend to the players. The Club regarded him also as the "physician available to attend at the first aid room if required", as laid down in the Safety Certificate.

301. There was insufficiently close co-operation between the police and the emergency services. It is clear that SYMAS and the fire brigade should have been called earlier than they were. However, in view of the nature and extent of the crushing, the time when police rescue began and the pathetically short period for which those unable to breathe could survive, it is improbable that quicker recourse to the emergency services would have saved more lives.

302. Finally, there was evidence that an advertising board had to be knocked down at the north-east corner of the ground to allow an ambulance onto the pitch and that at the top of the ramp leading to the pitch the access for ambulances was inadequate. There was also evidence that the **pre-match** arrangement for ambulances to use the two gates from Penistone Road at the north-east end of the ground as in and out routes was frustrated by the presence of vehicles just inside the ground. In the event, none of these matters affected operations. The hoarding was quickly knocked down. The difficult access to the ramp was negotiated and ambulances used one entrance satisfactorily by backing out when loaded.

## CHAPTER 22

### COMMUNICATIONS

303. One problem which impeded police control and the gathering of intelligence was the intermittent failure of communication by radio. There was the period of two or three minutes when the control room was out of radio contact. Even when that was remedied, it was only by using a hand set in the control room. This meant that control could not override any other messages. No effective radio communication seems to have reached control from the perimeter track at the relevant time. Mr Greenwood's request for the match to be stopped and various messages from Constables reporting the distress in the pens did not register. Likewise, communication from Leppings Lane to control was unreliable. Undoubtedly these breakdowns made it more difficult for those in command to make proper assessments and exercise effective command.

## PART IV - INTERIM RECOMMENDATIONS

### CHAPTER 23 - INTRODUCTION

#### Limited Objectives

304. It is important to stress the limited objectives of the interim recommendations I can make in this Report. My purpose is to propose instant measures capable of being implemented forthwith and where possible before the commencement of the 1989/1990 season. They are designed to prevent overcrowding and crushing on terraces in the short term and to improve safety procedures. They do not and cannot meet all the problems or address all the issues of **post-Hillsborough** football. Wider issues such as membership schemes, identity cards, **all-seater** stadia, super-stadia and long term recommendations fall to be considered in my Final Report. So do a number of other specific matters such as a comprehensive review of the Green Guide, the problem of excessive **pre-match** drinking, fans without tickets and ticket touts. I mention these matters lest it be thought I have decided no recommendations need be made concerning them. I have not. But before deciding what if any recommendations to make about these and other matters, more evidence and study is required.

305. Accordingly, the main thrust of these interim recommendations, as a holding exercise, is to reduce numbers on the **terraces**, to increase vigilance and to achieve a proper balance in crowd control between prevention of disorder and maintenance of safety.

#### Perimeter Fences

306. It would be impractical and unwise to recommend works of construction or radical structural changes now, before completing the extensive study and consultation which will form stage two of this Inquiry. Hasty interim recommendations of that kind might well prove to be ill-judged after further study and require to be changed in a matter of months.

307. In particular, I do not at this stage make any recommendation as to removing perimeter fences or replacing them with structures of different design. Understandably, there was a wave of popular feeling against such fences in the immediate aftermath of Hillsborough. The horrifying spectacle of people being crushed against the fencing focussed blame for the disaster on the fences themselves. There were pleas to dismantle them and emotive references to the fans being treated like "caged animals". Some clubs removed their fencing straightaway. It was therefore very tempting to consider at an early stage making a recommendation that the fences should be removed. I confess to being so tempted.

308. Regrettably, only a month after Hillsborough, there were incidents which showed that violence and hooliganism are still liable to erupt at football grounds. On 13 May at Selhurst Park, Birmingham City supporters invaded the pitch and fought with supporters of the home club, Crystal Palace. Five police officers and 16 supporters were injured and required treatment at a local hospital. On the same day at a match between Bristol City and Sheffield United, spectators spilt onto the pitch and there was fighting on the terraces. At the Cup Final between Liverpool and **Everton** on 20 May, there was a pitch invasion, albeit a comparatively benign one.

309. Even the Football Supporters' Association (FSA) felt it necessary to say in their final submission,

"With some reservations, the FSA accept that perimeter fences are necessary for crowd control."

310. Bearing in mind those matters, and the need to consider further expert evidence, I have decided that it would be unwise and premature for me to make any recommendations now either to remove or to preserve or to alter the structure of perimeter fences. I shall make recommendations about them in my Final Report.

311. For the present, I would emphasise that, although the fencing prevented escape, the real cause of the Hillsborough disaster was overcrowding and it is against that danger that my interim recommendations are primarily directed. Whilst declining to recommend the removal of the fences, I do consider that the gates to the pitch should be kept open whilst the terraces are occupied. This will have, I hope, three beneficial effects. Obviously, an open gate is a more ready escape route than one which has to be locked. Secondly, the sight of open gates will be reassuring to spectators on the terraces. Thirdly, the existence of gaps in the fencing by reason of the open gates will concentrate the minds of police officers or stewards on the track to the need for careful monitoring of those on the terraces.

312. It will of course be necessary to have a police presence sufficient to prevent pitch invasion for improper reasons through the open gates. However, I am encouraged to think that this is not an insuperable problem by the fact that, for example at **Anfield**, Liverpool's ground, there were no gates in the perimeter fencing before it was taken down. There were instead gaps or "access points" as they are called in the Green Guide (paragraph 215). Their existence did not, so far as I am aware, prevent the authorities from maintaining order. Also, the gates were open throughout the replay of this ill-fated **semi-final** at Old **Trafford** on 7 May 1989.

#### **Reduced Numbers**

313. In the assessment of figures for capacity, the criteria in Chapter 16 of the Green Guide were not at Hillsborough, and may not elsewhere, have been applied with sufficient rigour. Therefore, in addition to reminding and enjoining local authorities and clubs to make all necessary deductions when assessing the figure for maximum capacity in accordance with the Green Guide, I recommend reducing that figure by a further 15% as an interim measure.

#### **Safety Certificate**

314. The Safety Certificate procedure should, if it is properly administered and enforced, go far towards achieving crowd safety. Whether it succeeds depends upon the vigilance and commitment of the local authority issuing the Certificate. I do not know whether the poor performance of the local authority at Hillsborough was typical. Arguments have been put to me suggesting the need for some national oversight or inspection of local authority certification procedures. This raises complex issues which I shall want to consider further at stage two of the Inquiry. For the present, I make recommendations as to the content of Safety Certificates and arrangements for issuing, monitoring, enforcing, reviewing, amending and renewing them.

## CHAPTER 24 – THE RECOMMENDATIONS

315. The recommendations which follow are the minimum necessary to ensure that existing football grounds can for the present be safely used, based upon the evidence which I have heard at Sheffield and other information I have received. They complement the recommendations which Mr Justice Popplewell set out after his inquiry at Bradford.

316. Those which are asterisked should be carried out before the 1989/90 season starts. The rest should be started forthwith and completed as soon as possible.

### Maximum Capacities for Terraces

- \* 1. Where a viewing terrace is divided into pens or areas which are **self-contained**, the Safety Certificate should specify the maximum number of spectators to be admitted to each such pen or area.

A pen or area is to be deemed "self-contained" notwithstanding that it has a gate or gates affording access to another pen or area and whether such gate or gates be open or shut.

- \* 2. Each figure for maximum capacity should be assessed in accordance with Chapter 16 of the Green Guide ("the Green Guide figure") subject to the following **qualifications**:-

(a) in arriving at "the Green Guide figure", proper and realistic allowance must be made for all factors which should reduce the permissible density in accordance with the range of maximum figures specified in paragraphs 221 and 222 of the Green Guide;

(b) after assessing "the Green Guide figure", a deduction of 15% should be made to improve the safety margin.

- \* 3. Arrangements should be made:-

(a) to limit the number of spectators entering each self-contained pen or area to the maximum capacity figure assessed in accordance with Recommendation 2 above either electronically, mechanically, by a ticketing arrangement, by counting or otherwise, and

(b) to close off further access to such pen or area when its maximum capacity is about to be reached.

### Filling and Monitoring Terraces

- \* 4. There should be a written agreement between the club and the police setting out their respective responsibilities for crowd safety and control and in particular for the filling of each self-contained pen or other terraced area and the monitoring of spectators in each such pen or area to avoid overcrowding. Any variation of the agreement in respect of an individual match should be agreed in writing in advance.

- \* 5. At each match, there should be on the perimeter track, for each self-contained pen or other terraced area, a steward (if the club is monitoring that area) or a police officer (if the police are monitoring it) whose sole duty is to check crowd conditions in that area for possible overcrowding or distress throughout the period the area is occupied by spectators. Whoever is so appointed should be in addition to any other steward or police presence. He should have ready access to the police officer authorised under Recommendation 9 below, and by radio to the control room.

### Fences and Gates

6. All police officers and stewards with duties in relation to the terraced areas and especially those with duties under Recommendation 5 above, should be fully briefed and trained with regard to the recognition of crowd densities, to the recognition of signs of distress and to crowd dynamics. Training should include demonstrations at the ground and photographs, designed to enable stewards and officers to recognise different crowd densities.

- \* 7. All gates in radial or perimeter fences of pens or other self-contained areas should be painted in a different colour from the rest of the fence and marked "Emergency Exit".

- \* 8. Where there are perimeter fences, all gates to the pitch should be kept fully open during the period when spectators are on the terrace.
- \* 9. There should be in respect of each gate in a perimeter fence (or group of gates if they are close together) a police officer authorised to decide whether or not to allow spectators through a gate to relieve overcrowding. The officer so authorised in respect of each gate should be identified for each match and known to be so by all stewards and police officers in that vicinity. He should be able to make radio contact with the control room either himself or via an officer close at hand.
- ★ 10. Suitable and sufficient cutting equipment should be provided by the club at each ground where there are perimeter fences to permit the immediate removal of enough fencing to release numbers of spectators if necessary. Agreement should be reached as to whether the equipment should be used by police, the fire brigade or stewards. Whoever is to use it should be trained to do so. Whether to use it should be a decision of a nominated senior police officer at the ground.

### **Crush Barriers**

- \* 11. All crush barriers should be visually inspected immediately for signs of corrosion. Any barrier found to be affected by a significant degree of corrosion should be repaired or replaced.
- \* 12. The layout of barriers in each pen or terraced area should be reviewed immediately to ensure that it complies with the criteria contained in Chapter 9 of the Green Guide. If it does not, the assessment of the maximum capacity figure for that pen or terraced area, in accordance with Recommendation 2 above, should reflect the fact.

### **Safety Certificates**

13. There should be an immediate review of each Safety Certificate by the responsible local authority, which should consult the club in respect of which the Certificate is issued, the police, the fire service, the ambulance service and the building authority. Such a review should include an inspection of the stadium. Its object should be to ensure that the operative conditions of the Certificate are complied with and to add or substitute any condition shown to be necessary as a matter of urgency following the findings and recommendations in this report.

14. Any local authority within whose area there exists a sports stadium designated under the 1975 Act for which no Safety Certificate has yet been issued should proceed forthwith to remedy the situation.

15. Every Safety Certificate should be reviewed by the local authority at least once annually and each Certificate should require to be renewed annually.

16. Each local authority should review its arrangements for issuing, monitoring, enforcing, reviewing, amending and renewing Safety Certificates. Such review should require that there exists or is provided an accountable administrative structure whereby the functions of the local authority are regularly and effectively supervised by senior officers and elected members and decisions are properly taken in accordance with the local authority's rules.

17. To assist the local authority in exercising its functions, it should set up an Advisory Group consisting of appropriate members of its own staff, representatives of the police, of the fire and ambulance services, of the building authority, of the club and of a recognised supporters' club. The Advisory Group's terms of reference should encompass all matters concerned with crowd safety and should require regular visits to the ground and attendance at matches. The Advisory Group should have a chairman from the local authority, and an effective procedure. Its resolutions should be recorded and it should be required to produce regular written reports for consideration by the local authority.

### **Duties of each Football Club**

- \* 18. Each turnstile should be inspected and its potential rate of flow measured. Thereafter, regular inspections should be made to ensure that each turnstile remains capable of admitting spectators at the rate anticipated.

- \* 19. The correlation between each viewing area in the stadium and the turnstiles serving it should be such as to ensure that all the spectators intended to be admitted to that viewing area can pass through the turnstiles within one hour. If that cannot be done, the capacity of that viewing area should be reduced accordingly.
- \* 20. Turnstiles should be closed when the permitted capacity of the area served by them is about to be reached and arrangements should be made to ensure quick and effective communication with turnstile operators for this purpose.
 

21. Closed circuit television should be so installed as to enable crowd densities outside the ground, within concourse areas and in pens and other standing areas, to be monitored before and throughout a match.
- \* 22. All signposting for spectators both outside and inside the ground should be comprehensively reviewed. It should, in relation to the arrangements for each match, be unambiguous, eye-catching, simple and clear and should be designed to ensure the rapid movement of spectators to their appropriate viewing area.
- \* 23. Information on tickets should be unambiguous, simple and clear and should correlate absolutely with the information provided in respect of each match both outside and inside the ground. Retained ticket stubs should contain information necessary to guide spectators once inside the ground.
- \* 24. Information on tickets requesting spectators to be in position by a particular time should be reviewed by clubs in conjunction with the police to ensure that it corresponds with the planned arrangements for admitting spectators to the ground.
 

25. Each club should consult with a recognised supporters' club as to the provision of pre-match entertainment aimed at attracting spectators to the ground in good time.

### **Police Planning**

- \* 26. The Chief Constable of each police force in whose area there is one designated stadium or more should nominate a chief officer to liaise with the management of each football club and local authority concerned in respect of the safety and control of crowds.
- \* 27. The Operational Order for each match at a designated stadium and the pre-match briefing of all officers on duty there should alert such officers to the importance of preventing any overcrowding and, if any is detected, of taking appropriate steps to remedy it.
- \* 28. The Operational Order for each match at a designated stadium should enable the police to cope with any foreseeable pattern in the arrival of spectators at a match and in their departure. It should provide for sufficient reserves to enable rapid deployment of officers to be made at any point inside or outside the ground.
- \* 29. The option to postpone kick-off should be in the discretion of the officer in command at the ground. Crowd safety should be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to exercise it.
 

30. There should be available in the police control room the results of all closed circuit television monitoring outside and inside the ground and the record of any electronic or mechanical counting of numbers at turnstiles or of numbers admitted to any area of the ground. Officers in the control room should be skilled in the interpretation and use of these data.

### **Communications**

- 31. There should be sufficient operators in the police control room to enable all radio transmissions to be received, evaluated and answered. The radio system should be such as to give operators in the control room priority over, and the capacity to override, others using the same channel. Additional channels should be used, where necessary, to prevent overcrowding of the airwaves. Consideration should be given to sound-proofing the control room against excessive crowd noise.

32. To complement radio communications, there should be a completely separate system of land lines with telephone links between the control room and key points at the ground.

33. Within the control room, there should be a public address system to communicate with individual areas outside and inside the ground, with groups of areas or with the whole ground. Important announcements should be preceded by a loud signal to catch the attention of the crowd despite a high level of noise in the ground. This arrangement should be prominently advertised on every programme sold for every match.

34. Use should be made where possible of illuminated advertising boards to address the crowd. Consideration should also be given to the use by police officers of a simple code of hand signals to indicate to the control room the existence of certain emergencies or requirements.

### **Co-ordination of Emergency Services**

- \* 35. The police, fire and ambulance services should maintain through senior nominated officers regular liaison concerning crowd safety at each stadium.
- \* 36. Before each match at a designated stadium, the police should ensure that the fire service and ambulance service are given full details about the event, including its venue, its timing, the number of spectators expected, their likely routes of entry and exit, and any anticipated or potential difficulties concerning the control or movement of the crowd. Such details should be readily available in the control rooms of each of the emergency services.
- \* 37. Contingency plans for the arrival at each designated stadium of emergency vehicles from all three services should be reviewed. They should include routes of access, rendezvous points, and accessibility within the ground itself.
- \* 38. Police officers posted at the entrances to the ground should be briefed as to the contingency plans for the arrival of emergency services and should be informed when such services are called as to where and why they are required.

### **First Aid, Medical Facilities and Ambulances**

- \* 39. There should be at each stadium at each match at least one trained first aider per 1,000 spectators. The club should have the responsibility for securing such attendance.

40. There should be at each stadium one or more first aid rooms. The number of such rooms and the equipment to be maintained within them should be specified by the local authority after taking professional medical advice and should be made a requirement of any Safety Certificate.
- \* 41. The club should employ a medical practitioner to be present at each match and available to deal with any medical exigency at the ground. He should be trained and competent in advanced first aid. He should be present at the ground at least an hour before kick-off and should remain until half an hour after the end of the match. His whereabouts should be known to those in the police control room and he should be immediately contactable.
- \* 42. At least one fully equipped ambulance from the appropriate ambulance authority should be in attendance at all matches with an expected crowd of 5,000 or more.


43. The number of ambulances to be in attendance for matches where larger crowds are expected should be specified by the local authority after consultation with the ambulance service and should be made a requirement of the Safety Certificate.

## **APPENDICES**



Appendix 1:

Sheffield Wednesday Football Club.  
Hillsborough Ground.




Appendix 2:

Leppings Lane: the perimeter gates and turnstiles.





Appendix 3: The west stand and terraces.



- Barriers... Pre 1979
  1981 - 2 radial fences
  1985 - Removal of some posts and rails
  1986 - Removal of Barrier No. 144 and some on S West Terrace
- 1979... Additional barriers
  1985 - 2 more radial fences

### Arrangement of Barriers at West Terrace

Prepared by The Health & Safety Executive



Appendix 5: The west terraces at 2.59 p.m.



## APPENDIX 6

### SPECIFIC INCIDENTS

#### **Mr Hicks' Evidence**

1. Mr and Mrs Hicks' two daughters died in the disaster. They had arrived early en famille but had tickets for different sections. The two daughters had standing tickets; they went into pen 3. Mrs Hicks had a seat in the north stand. Mr Hicks took up a standing position in pen 1 just below and to the west of the police box at about 2.15 pm. From there, he had a view of the centre pens. He kept an eye on them as they filled up since he knew his daughters to be there.

2. His evidence was that by 2.50 pm he could see people were in distress. At about 2.55 pm he and others called to a senior police officer at the top of the steps to the control box to draw his attention to the crushing. Mr Hicks was only about 10 feet from the officer. He described him as wearing a flat cap with gold or silver braid and a light coloured anorak. Mr Hicks believed he was the officer who stopped the match. Mr Greenwood, who did stop the match, was certainly not wearing a light coloured anorak, as can clearly be seen on the video.

3. Mr Hicks says that he and others shouted several times to this officer in attempts to alert him to the distress in the pens. There was no reaction although Mr Hicks believes the officer must have been in earshot.

4. That officer descended from the steps and two cameramen whom Mr Hicks believed were from television came and appeared to direct their cameras towards the pens. Another senior officer appeared two steps down from the platform. He was a stocky figure; he also wore a flat cap but with black braid. Mr Hicks says that he and two or three others tried several times to capture this officer's attention without success. Then Mr Hicks says he shouted "For Christ's sake! Can't you see what's going on? **We can, and you have cameras**". The officer is said to have replied dismissively "Shut your fucking prattle".

5. When the disaster occurred the two Hicks girls were crushed. Victoria was put in an ambulance and Mr Hicks accompanied her to hospital where she was found to be dead. Sarah died at the ground.

6. Mr Hicks was an impressive witness **and**, despite his grievous loss, remarkably stoical. He gave his evidence clearly and without rancour. He was certainly mistaken about Mr Greenwood being one of those on the steps and it has not been possible to identify either officer from Mr Hicks' descriptions. He may well also have been imprecise as to timings. Nevertheless, I see no reason to doubt that what he described did occur in relation to two officers. As Mr Hicks generously said himself, the dismissive abuse from the second officer (although reprehensible) may have been due to his being preoccupied with trying to see what was happening at pens 3 and 4 around kick-off time.

#### **The Goalkeeper and Gate 4**

7. Mr Barnbrock, a Liverpool supporter, said he went through the tunnel. He would have liked to have turned back when he saw how crowded the pens were. He went with his father and 13 year old brother Stephen towards the front of pen 4. He saw the teams come onto the pitch. Conditions at the front were, he said, alright until about 2 minutes to 3. Then the pressure in the pen increased and he and his father became separated. His feet came off the ground. He shouted to police officers through the fence to get them out and help them. The police did not react. The Liverpool goalkeeper, Bruce Grobbelaar, spoke to a policeman on the track. The gate was then opened by a blonde policewoman and about 25 to 30 people went through it. They included the witness's father **and** his brother Stephen who had a broken arm. A police Constable shut the gate. It was then reopened by the same **policewoman**, the witness thought, and he got out.

8. Mr Eccleston, a male nurse and an impressive witness, was sitting in the north stand. He noticed pens 3 and 4 were full and realised something was wrong when fans started coming over the perimeter fence but did not invade the pitch. He said the Liverpool goalkeeper appeared to notice this too.

9. Mr Grobbelaar was out of the country during the Inquiry and was therefore not called. However, he made a statement which was put in as his evidence. In the course of it he said:-

**"Kick-off happened and we got into our stride pretty quickly - we forced a corner pretty early on and the ball came down to my end - I rolled it out to the full back once and play went on until Peter Beardsley hit the crossbar of the Nottingham Forest goal from a corner and came back into play. I remember just after that there were shouts and screams from the crowd just behind me, it was different; not the ordinary crowd noise and I turned around to look. What amazed me first was the concentration and squash of fans in the centre**

section, the end areas still had plenty of space. It was only then I became conscious that the crowd was squashing forward and wasn't able to go sideways and that's when I noticed the fencing alongside them holding them in. I saw fans being pulled up into the stand above the terraces, I saw fans climbing over into the empty areas at the side and I saw fans climbing out over the front onto the pitch which was particularly difficult because of the spikes on the top of the fencing but they were getting out.

"Play was still going on and I was in a terrible position trying to concentrate on play and having my attention taken by what was happening behind me. The ball came down to our end and Nottingham Forest won a corner, it was taken and we cleared our box area and as play was going forward over the centre line I heard a shout, '**Bruce** - please **help**' - a desperate shout from a fan squashed up against the fencing to the right of my goal as I looked at Leppings Lane terraces. He **screamed**, '**Please** get the fucking gate open - **Help, help**'. All the people who could speak were pleading for help. There were two policemen near the gate right alongside the fan who had shouted to me and so I shouted to them, '**Get** the gate **open**'. I was still trying to concentrate on play and was still having my attention taken by what was happening behind me - there were lots of fans on the pitch behind the goal area by them too. I called again to the policemen, '**Open** the fucking **gate**' and one just turned away from me and looked back at the crowd but the other went to the gate and opened it and it was like taking the top off a shaken coke bottle - people were everywhere on the play area around my goal. Play was still going on and it came down towards me again for the left hand corner. It was a Nottingham Forest throw-in, away to my left, the ball was out of play and a fan came up to me on the pitch and said, '**Bruce**, they're killing us'. I said '**Who's** killing you?', and he said '**They're** crushing us-our fans'. I said '**Go** and get some **help**', and then a policeman came on and spoke to this fan. I don't know who the fan was, and then he led him off. It was about this time I saw a policeman running onto the pitch from my right across my box and to the referee who blew up, recovered the ball and told all players to clear the pitch."

10. It is clear from the video that Mr Grobbelaar's recollection of the sequence of events, even with regard to the game, is inaccurate in a number of respects. For example, the two Nottingham Forest corner kicks occurred minutes before Beardsley struck the bar. Further, it seems highly probable from other evidence that gates 3 and 4 were open continuously well before Mr Grobbelaar says the fan asked him to get the gate open. It seems surprising too that with all the noise Mr Grobbelaar would hear the precise words of an individual fan, let alone respond twice to them, whilst the game was in progress.

11. As to Mr Barnbrock's account, the evidence of PC Fiona Richardson was that she was the only policewoman on the track in the early stages although others came from the seated area as the incident developed. PC Richardson began at gate 1 and, although she did go and help people out through gate 3, she did not go to gate 4, and did not open it twice or even once. The two officers who spoke of opening gate 4 were both male.

12. I think Mr Grobbelaar did become conscious of distress in the crowd behind him and did speak to a police officer at some stage, probably earlier than he now thinks. Not to reach that broad conclusion would involve attributing his whole account to invention or fantasy and I see no grounds for doing so. However, his detailed account was not tested in cross-examination and its inconsistencies and errors when compared with other incontrovertible evidence would make it unsafe to derive more than the broad conclusion stated above. The incident shows how honest witnesses can become confused and their evidence flawed when recollecting events experienced under tension or emotion.

13. As to the opening of gate 4 there was an apparent conflict of evidence. PC Illingworth said that about five minutes to 3 he opened it and guided fans emerging through it to gate 5. PC Hooson said that it was he who opened gate 4 just before kick-off. I am satisfied from the evidence of a number of fans that, like gate 3, gate 4 was opened more than once. The probability is, therefore, that whilst PC Illingworth was shepherding fans to gate 5, gate 4 had been closed again until it was re-opened by PC Hooson two or three minutes later.

### Oxygen

14. It was alleged by a doctor that an oxygen cylinder provided to him on the pitch was empty. Dr Phillips, a Liverpool supporter, had been in pen 3 with his brother and others. He came under pressure and climbed into pen 2. When the disaster occurred and gate 2 was opened, he went through it, injuring his head as he did so. He came onto the pitch sometime after 3.10 pm and started resuscitation procedures. He was given an oxygen cylinder. He believes this was from St John Ambulance. It was, he thought, too early to be the fire service. The cylinder was switched on but Dr Phillips says it gave no oxygen since it was empty. There was one oxygen cylinder on the St John's ambulance which came to the scene. Mr Wells, the Divisional Superintendent of St John, took that cylinder onto the pitch. He said it was effective. In particular, he recalls going to a patient being treated by Dr Phillips and says that oxygen was flowing into that patient. Moreover, Mr Wells tested the cylinder afterwards and found it was still half full. It has a capacity that will last for 5 hours 40 minutes on a high setting.

15. There was evidence from Assistant Chief Fire Officer Hornsby that a Maxaman resuscitator had failed to work properly. It was delivering an oxygen flow appropriate to a "child" setting rather than a full "adult" flow. On examination, it was found that a retaining nut in the control knob had worked loose, possibly due to vibration in transit, and this had affected the flow of oxygen. The device had last been tested on 10 April 1989.

16. I accept the evidence of Mr Wells that the St John Ambulance cylinder was charged with oxygen and working properly. In my view, Dr Phillips may have been mistaken as to the cylinder of which he complains being empty. He **agreed** he was under great pressure, in an awkward situation; his head was injured and he became very angry at what he regarded then as wholly the fault of the police. He conceded that if the cylinder was not empty there was a possible alternative - that the master tank top valve was shut. It seems unlikely that he could have been referring to the fire service resuscitator as he was clear that the bottle he received was a simple piece of equipment not designed to breathe for the patient but merely to supply oxygen.

17. I conclude that on a balance of probabilities the evidence does not justify a finding that an empty cylinder was brought to the scene.

#### Calling the Fire Service

18. PC **Bichard's** call to police Headquarters at 3.13 pm for the fire service to bring hydraulic cutting equipment to cut metal fences (see paragraph 101 supra) was heard by Chief Inspector Edmundson. He went into the adjacent operations room to give instructions for the message to be passed to the fire service. There, a temporary control room assistant was already speaking to the fire service about a house fire. Mr Edmundson interrupted the call and asked the assistant to tell the **fire** service that cutting equipment was wanted at Hillsborough. There followed a conversation between the assistant and Miss Davies at the fire service in the following **terms:-**

Police Can we have cutting gear for Hillsborough, please - straight away?  
Fire Control Just a minute. Right - what's the address?  
Police Cutting equipment for Hillsborough football ground - straight away.  
Fire Control Hillsborough football ground?  
Police Yes, Hillsborough football ground.  
Fire Control What road is that on? Do you know?  
Police There has been a major accident, all the ambulances are up there.  
Fire Control What road is it on?  
Police I have no idea; Hillsborough football ground.  
Fire Control What road is it on? Do you know?  
Police "Hillsborough football ground - what road is it on?" (this was said to someone in Police Force Control) - "**Penistone Road**" (to Fire Control).  
Fire Control Penistone Road.  
Police Penistone Road, OK.  
Fire Control Penistone **Road, just** a minute - what's exactly involved?  
Police It's football, a big match, Liverpool v Notts Forest.  
Fire Control Yes, but why do you want us; you said it was an RTA [Road Traffic **Accident**].  
Police No, no, no; major incident inside the ground.  
Fire Control Major incident inside - do you know exactly what it is?  
Police No, I don't; they want all the cutting gear.  
Fire Control For what - do you know?  
Police Hang on a sec.

At that point Chief Inspector Edmundson intervened and spoke for the police. The conversation concluded:-

Police (Male voice) - Hello!

Fire Control Hello! Now you **wnt** some cutting gear - what exactly is it for?

Police There has been a major accident at Hillsborough football ground where the semi-final is; the crowds have forced their way in, they have broken fences and gates down. I don't know exactly what it is but there are people trapped.

Fire Control Right! OK - leave it with us.

That conversation took 1 minute **13** seconds. It was published in a number of newspapers with strong critical comment mostly against the fire service. The thrust of the criticism was that valuable time was wasted by the fire service asking unnecessary questions as to where and why cutting equipment was required.

19. There was a meeting of the emergency services in August **1988** to discuss procedure in the event of a major disaster at Sheffield Wednesday's ground. It was pointed out and minuted that "It was imperative that the Police Control give the exact location of any fire or incident and as much detail as possible. No senior fire officer is on duty at the **match**. . . Fire service will attend via Penistone Road or Leppings Lane as directed by the police."

20. The message from PC Bichard contained all the necessary information - Leppings Lane end, hydraulic cutting equipment, to cut metal fences. Regrettably, it was not passed on by Headquarters in those terms. Miss **Davies** had rightly been trained to require a precise location and needed **to** know the problem which would face the fire service so that the appropriate response could be made. In fact, there are several football grounds in the **Hillsborough** district although clearly Sheffield Wednesday's ground is the principal one. In the result, although Chief Inspector Edmundson clarified, to an extent, the nature of the problem, the locus which emerged in the course of the conversation (Penistone Road) was not that contained in the original message from ground control (*ie* "Leppings Lane **end**."") Whilst on the face of the conversation the fire service may seem to have been slow in the uptake or perhaps pedantic, in my view the police ought to have been more specific. They had the necessary information to be so.

21. I am satisfied, however, that the delay of 1 minute **13** seconds over the call, and even the delay occasioned by the cutting equipment going to Penistone Road rather than Leppings Lane, did not affect the outcome. Even had those with cutting equipment gone directly after a briefer '**phone** call they would not have arrived at a stage early enough to make cutting the fencing a helpful exercise.

#### **Mr Kenny Dalglish**

22. When the Liverpool manager went to the control room and agreed to make the announcement broadcast at 3.56 **pm**, he says in a statement that he could not get the Tannoy to work. Spectators could see him trying to address them and indicated to him manually that nothing could be heard. An officer pressed buttons on the machine and Mr Dalglish says he tried again with similar lack of success. He was then taken under the police box to the room used by the disc jockey to broadcast **pre-match** music. There, the microphone worked and he broadcast his message.

23. Mr Dalglish was not called. There was no other evidence about this incident. I accept it occurred as he described. Why the Tannoy could not at that time be successfully operated from the police box is, however, strange and unexplained. Unlike the radio, it had operated satisfactorily from the police box at the critical times save that its messages may not always have been heard above the prevailing noise. It had worked at about **3.30 pm** when it called for medical staff. I can see no grounds for criticising the police in regard to this incident and certain it is that the brief delay in relaying Mr Dalglish's message can have had no significant effect.

## APPENDIX 7

### LIST OF PARTIES AND THEIR REPRESENTATION

1. Mr Andrew Collins QC, Mr Alan Goldsack and Mr Bernard Phillips of Counsel, instructed by the Treasury Solicitor, appeared on behalf of the Inquiry.
2. Mr Benet Hytner QC and Mr Timothy King of Counsel, instructed by the Hillsborough Steering Committee, appeared on behalf of the bereaved and injured.
3. Mr John **Jackson** of Counsel, instructed by Messrs Hill Dickinson, appeared on behalf of the Football Supporters' Association.
4. Mr John Dyson QC and Mr David **Gibson-Watt** of Counsel, instructed by Messrs **Freshfields**, appeared on behalf of the Football Association.
5. Mr Richard Maxwell QC and Mr Michael Murphy of Counsel, instructed by Messrs **Keeble** Hawsons, appeared on behalf of Sheffield City Council.
6. Mr Edwin Glasgow QC and Mr Stuart Catchpole of Counsel, instructed by Messrs Davies Arnold Cooper, appeared on behalf of Sheffield Wednesday Football Club.
7. Mr William Woodward QC and Mr Patrick Limb of Counsel, instructed by Messrs Hammond Suddards, appeared on behalf of the South Yorkshire Police.
8. Mr Franz Muller QC and Mr Andrew **Robertson** of Counsel, instructed by Messrs Crutes, appeared on behalf of the South Yorkshire Fire and Civil Defence Authority.
9. Mr Michel Kallipetis QC, instructed by Messrs Dibb Lupton **Broomhead**, appeared on behalf of Trent Regional Health Authority.
10. Mr Roger Toulson QC, instructed by Messrs Reynolds Porter Chamberlain, appeared on behalf of Dr W. Eastwood.

## APPENDIX 8

### LIST OF THOSE GIVING ORAL EVIDENCE TO THE INQUIRY IN ORDER OF APPEARANCE

Stephen Martin FOSTER  
Michael Joseph BRADLEY  
Peter William JACKSON  
**Alison Jane BENNETT**  
Daniel Joseph HENNESSEY  
**Keith GOLDING**  
**Ian John CLARKE**  
David PERRY  
David Anthony CRUICE  
**Patrick CUNNINGHAM**  
Keith LEONARD  
Wayne David WINDEVER  
Gary GAINS  
**Mark Ian HUGHES**  
David HUGHES  
Anthony BARNBROCK  
David CUNNINGHAM  
**Peter DARCY**  
**Ian Kenneth DEVINE**  
Peter Joseph GARRETT  
David **Peter** LOWE  
**Geoffrey Nigel MOODY**  
Christopher MORAN  
Roy PARRY  
John Stewart PHIMESTER  
David POSTLETHWAITE  
Thomas Kenneth HILTON  
Nicholas BELL  
Stephen Mark WESTERGREEN  
**Trevor HICKS**  
**Ian William BURKE**  
William Hamilton COMERFORD  
Diane Susan CONNOLLY  
Peter Jeffrey GARRETT  
David HARTLEY  
Thomas Bentley MATTHEWS  
David Thomas JONES  
Paul McCAFFREY  
David Stephen MOORE  
Maxwell ROSS  
Anthony Christopher SMITH  
Steven ALLEN  
P. MAHER  
Michael Gerrard HILL  
**Neil FITZMAURICE**  
Angela HOCKENHULL  
Lee **Edward OXLEY**  
Constance SWEET  
Janet Ann ELLIS  
Frederick James ECCLESTON  
Adam James PEMBERTON  
John Randolph Tom BARTHOLOMEW  
Judith WATSON  
Duncan STURROCK  
Susan DAWES  
**Albert LINDLEY**  
PC **Ian BROWN**

## APPENDIX 8

### LIST OF THOSE GIVING ORAL EVIDENCE TO THE INQUIRY IN ORDER OF APPEARANCE

Chief Superintendent Brian Leonard MOLE  
Chief Superintendent David Godfrey DUCKENFIELD  
Assistant Chief Constable Walter JACKSON  
Superintendent Roger MARSHALL  
Superintendent Bernard Dean MURRAY  
Superintendent Roger GREENWOOD  
**Bruce** David **GROBBELAAR\***  
Chief Superintendent John Arthur NESBIT  
Superintendent John Harris BROUGHAM  
Detective Superintendent Graham **McKAY**  
Inspector Paul **HAND-DAVIS**  
Chief Inspector Robert Wallace CREASER  
Inspector Peter **Colin** DARLING  
Inspector David BULLAS  
Inspector Gordon **SYKES**  
Inspector Robert PURDY  
Inspector Stephen **ELLIS**  
Inspector John Joseph BENNETT  
Sergeant Stephen John PAYNE  
PC **Graham** DUFFY  
**PC D. EVANS**  
PC Andrew BEST  
PC Brian Robert HUCKSTEPP  
PC Alistair John TAYLOR  
Sergeant John MORGAN  
WPC Alison TAGG  
Sergeant Lionel PROCTOR  
WPC Jane **Borthwick** BURNLEES  
Sergeant Philip Sidney SMITH  
PC Stephen Frank FRY  
**PC F. N. GRUNNILL**  
WPC Elizabeth Jayne WILSON  
Sergeant William Cameron CRAWFORD  
**PC Paul BRANSTON**  
WPC Jacqueline BURTON  
Sergeant Robert BURNS  
WPC Helen Kay PEARSON  
PC **Alexander** AITKIN  
Sergeant Paul BURMAN  
PC Stephen Andrew **SHEARWOOD**  
Sergeant Edward HIGGINS  
Sergeant Peter CHAPMAN  
PC Peter Edward SMITH  
PC Gerrard St Clare FINNEGAN  
PC David Alfred ILLINGWORTH  
WPC Fiona RICHARDSON  
PC James Oscar PACKER  
PC Michael BUXTON  
Detective Sergeant Paul MORTON  
Detective Sergeant David GUTCHER  
PC Michael Vincent RYAN  
Sergeant Michael GODDARD  
Peter WELLS  
**PC Trevor BICHARD**  
John Edmund TOWLER  
**Frank** GODLEY  
Philip Martin SAXTON

PC Harold GUEST  
Inspector **Ian** TURNER  
Chief Inspector McROBBIE  
PC Kenneth ROOK  
FC OP Susan Elizabeth DAVIES  
Station Officer J SWAIN  
Station Officer FLETCHER  
A.C.O. A. D. HORNSBY  
Leading Fireman HOUSLEY  
George LLOYD  
Raymond John LLOYD  
**Brian**SAYLES  
Randolph SAYNOR  
Stephen Michael COPELAND  
Albert RHODES  
Steven Charles RHODES  
Wayne Austin HALL  
Allan **John** HASKINS  
Stuart Roland THORPE  
Kenneth CASTLEY  
John **Philip** CASTLEY  
Albert Ronald MARSH  
Robert William COBB  
Brian RIDGE  
Richard William BEADSLEY  
Malcolm BAIN  
Stephen **Craig** CARDWELL  
**Gary** VAUX  
Alan Keith SEAMAN  
**Frederick** MADDOX  
**Dr William** PURCELL  
Station Officer Patrick HIGGINS  
Station Officer Paul Anthony James EASON  
Control Superintendent Raymond CLARKE  
Deputy Chief Metropolitan Ambulance Officer Alan HOPKINS  
Chief Metropolitan Ambulance Officer Albert PAGE  
**Lawrence** YOXALL  
David John WALKER  
**Maurice** KAY QC  
Dr Andrew Jolyon BYRNE  
Graham KELLY  
**Dr John** ASHTON  
Dr Naderassen Carpoosamy CURPEN  
Kenneth EVANS  
Glen KIRTON  
**Dr Wilfred** EASTWOOD  
**Dr Glyn** PHILLIPS  
Ferenc MORATH  
**Andrew** SANDERSON  
PC **Philip** HOOSON  
PC **Gary** CAMMOCK  
David BOWNES  
Inspector **Clive** William CALVERT  
Graham Henry **MACKRELL**  
Inspector Steven Robert SEWELL  
Douglas John LOCK  
**Garry** TAYLOR  
David George Lawrence WATTS  
Superintendent Terence Willis STUART  
PC Brian WAUGH

In addition, statements of evidence from many others were admitted to the Inquiry. Some 80 letters were received from Members of the House of Commons and three from Members of the House of Lords. Some 1,470 letters from the general public were received. Organisations who have submitted evidence addressed to Part II of the Inquiry will be specifically listed in the Final Report.

\* Statement read to the Inquiry







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