Democratic Breakthroughs and Revolutions in Five Post-Communist Countries: Comparative Perspectives on the Fourth Wave

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The democratic breakthroughs and revolutions of 1998-2004 for Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine constituted a second stage of their transformation as post-communist states. All five countries had experienced different national revolutions that had prevented the simultaneous pursuit of nation-state building and democracy immediately after the collapse of communism. After the dissolution of the Czechoslovak state, Slovakia had to come to terms with being an independent state that would co-exist with a large Hungarian minority. Croatia's war of independence monopolized the first half of the 1990s and the Serbian threat only receded after the re-taking of Krajina in 1995. From 1988-1999, Serbia was dominated by Slobodan Milosevic and his plans for a greater Serbia that led to unprecedented war crimes, chaos and havoc in the former Yugoslavia; policies that unleashed NATO's bombing campaign in 1999. Georgia entered the post-Soviet era dominated by ethnic nationalism that led to civil war and the loss of two separatist enclaves. Ukraine was a leading country seeking the dismantling of the USSR in 1991 and a referendum on independence received overwhelming endorsement by 91 percent of Ukrainians. But, national independence came without democracy as the state was hijacked until 2004 by the former 'sovereign communists', turned centrists, under Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma. Throughout the 1990s, Ukraine's elites felt threatened by internal threats from the anti-state and anti-reform Communists,

who were the largest political force until the 2002 elections, and externally from Russia, which refused to recognize Ukraine's borders until 1997-1999.

The Slovak 98'Ok Campaign was perceived by the democratic opposition as Slovakia's opportunity to complete the Velvet Revolution that had escaped the country in 1989-1990 and remove Vladimir Meciar's populist nationalism that had until then dominated post-communist Slovakia. The Croatian opposition also sought to put great distance with the nationalist 1990s in favor of 'returning to Europe' through domestic democratic reforms. Georgia's opposition sought to overcome a failed and dismembered state, amid deep levels of stagnation under Eduard Shevardnadze. Georgian analyst Nodia believes that, 'our revolution in 2003 reminded us of the Eastern European revolution of 1989' when a new generation of non-communist elites came to power.[1] A similar sense of unfinished revolution permeated Ukraine's Orange Revolution that, for its leaders and supporters, represented the democratic conclusion to the national revolution of 1991.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first sector analyses ten causal factors that contribute towards democratic breakthroughs and revolutions in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. These factors differ in their degree of intensity for all five states. The absence of all, or some, of these factors will prevent successful democratic revolutions in Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan and other CIS states. The ten factors include the existence of a competitive authoritarian state facilitating space for the democratic opposition, 'return to Europe' civic nationalism that assists in civil society's mobilization, a preceding political crisis, a pro-democratic capitol city, unpopular ruling elites, a charismatic candidate, a united opposition, mobilized youth, regionalism and foreign intervention. The second section discusses developments following democratic breakthroughs and revolutions in the five states. The section is

divided into four themes, the new regimes ability to deal with the legacies of the past, divisions in the democratic opposition, return of the *ancien regime* and progress in democratization.

Democratic Breakthroughs and Revolutions

Ten factors have been important to the success of democratic breakthroughs and revolutions in post-communist states. These include a competitive (i.e. semi) authoritarian state facilitating space for the democratic opposition, 'return to Europe' civic nationalism that assists in civil society's mobilization, a preceding political crisis that weakened the regime's legitimacy, a pro-democratic capitol city, unpopular ruling elites, a charismatic candidate, a united opposition, mobilized youth, regionalism and foreign intervention (Russia or the EU). The latter two can be both hindrances and supportive factors, depending on the country in question and the foreign actor. This discussion of ten factors builds on McFaul who listed seven factors that include a semi-authoritarian regime, an unpopular leader and regime, a united opposition, a perception of a falsified election, some degree of independent media, ability of the opposition to mobilize and divisions in the security forces. [2]

Competitive-Authoritarian Regime

The replacement of authoritarian regimes in Slovakia (1998) and Croatia (1999-2000), and democratic revolutions in Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), and Ukraine (2004) occurred in five countries that can be classified as 'competitive authoritarian' in which hybrid regimes combined elements of both authoritarianism and democracy.[3] Slovakia and Croatia exhibited some similarities to Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine in which civil society mobilised to get out the vote and reduce election

fraud in the face of a competitive authoritarian regime.[4] But, there are also three crucial differences. First, the Slovak and Croatian regimes did not undertake mass fraud and did not plan to refuse to recognise a victory by the democratic opposition. The absence of these two factors, in turn, meant there was no need for the opposition and civil society to organise street protests which culminated in a revolution. In Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine these two factors (election fraud and an unwillingness to accept an opposition victory) were present and instrumental in leading to democratic (or electoral) revolutions. Second, the Slovak and Croatian regimes were thought unlikely to use violence to suppress the opposition or crush street protests. In Slovakia under Vladimir Meciar the security forces were involved in illegal activities against the opposition and in Croatia some elements of the internal security forces may have participated in the war of independence in 1991-1995 or in war crimes. In Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine the bloated internal security forces had, in the case of Serbia, committed war crimes in neighbouring territories and in Ukraine undertaken violence against journalists and opposition leaders. In these three countries the interior ministries also had strong links to organised crime. In Ukraine, hard line elements in the security forces may have received encouragement from Russia during a crisis. Third, external factors played a different role in all five cases, with the EU playing a positive role encouraging a democratic victory in Slovakia and Croatia by holding out the ‘carrot’ of membership, a factor which was absent in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. In Georgia and Ukraine the main external factor was Russia which played a negative role in freezing two conflicts in the former and heavily intervening in the latter’s 2004 election. The EU’s only positive role was in the convening of a round table to defuse the political crisis arising during the Orange Revolution.

The presence of competitive authoritarian regimes has profound implications for the likely success of the democratic opposition in elections in all five cases and of the success of democratic revolutions following fraudulent elections in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. Competitive authoritarian regimes provide space for the opposition, civil society, a limited number of media outlets, democratic opposition, the ability of the opposition to participate in state institutions (i.e. parliament and local government) and the ability of international organisations to freely operate in the country. Competitive authoritarian regimes are vulnerable during elections and succession crises as it is then that the regime can either tip towards democratic breakthrough, as in these five countries, or towards authoritarian consolidation (if the democratic opposition had failed). The democratic opposition will find it difficult to organise a democratic breakthrough in a consolidated authoritarian regime, and when the regimes commits election fraud the democratic opposition will be thwarted in its ability to mobilise protests. Aside from Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, which the New York-based Freedom House think tank classifies as 'Transitional Governments' or 'Hybrid Regimes', the remaining nine CIS states are 'Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian' or 'Consolidated Authoritarian' regimes. Attempts at launching democratic revolutions in protest at election fraud in Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Uzbekistan have failed due to weak democratic oppositions and the use of violence to repress the opposition, the most notorious case being in Andijon, Uzbekistan in May 2005.

'Return to Europe' Civic Nationalism

'Return to Europe', civic nationalism mobilised the democratic opposition and civil society in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, particularly among

young people. In Slovakia and, to a lesser extent in Croatia, the EU directly intervened by dangling the ‘carrot’ of future membership to encourage a democratic breakthrough. The civic nationalism of the democratic opposition in Slovakia and Croatia competed with the regimes own brand of extreme right or populist nationalism. In Slovakia the Meciar regime had built an authoritarian-populist regime whose nationalism was directed not at ‘returning to Europe’ but against Czech rule and the country’s Hungarian minority. In Croatia, the Franjo Tudjman regime had dominated the country throughout the 1990s through a political regime built on extreme right nationalism that partially drew its inspiration from the World War II Ustacha Nazi puppet state. A central demand of the EU was for Croatia to cooperate with the International War Crimes Tribunal that the democratic opposition, once in power, to some degree fulfilled.

In Serbia, the democratic opposition associated a break with the Slobodan Milosevic regime as returning Serbia to a European path, a path which Yugoslavia had strong connections to as a communist state that had been outside the Soviet empire. Yugoslavs had long been able to travel, work and visit Europe and the outside world when this was impossible for those living in the Soviet empire. In Georgia and Ukraine, ‘return to Europe’ civic nationalism built on a dream of integrating their countries with Trans-Atlantic structures, of moving away from the vacuous, fluctuating and unclear multi-vector foreign policies of the Edward Shevardnadze and Leonid Kuchma eras. The EU did not though, dangle any ‘carrot’ of membership in both countries. Opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko’s political platform supported a pro-European orientation for Ukraine that built on a national identity that placed Ukraine within ‘Europe’ and outside Eurasia. But, in Ukraine ‘return to Europe’ civic nationalism is not uniformly strong throughout the country, being weaker in eastern

Ukraine where the Orange Revolution found little support. In Georgia, the ethnic Georgian nationalism of the early 1990s, when the country was briefly ruled by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, had been replaced by Georgian opposition leader Mikhail Saakashvili's civic nationalism. Saakashvili has worked to rebuild trust among Georgians in the state and its institutions, 'to inject national pride without making it ethnic pride'.[5] He has emphasised state symbols, the hymn and state seal and the national flag has been changed.

Different types of nationalism can be used to establish either a democratic regime and promote the country's 'return to Europe' or to institutionalise an authoritarian regime and turn the country's back on 'Europe'. Two other types nationalism – Soviet and Great Power – are supportive of the establishment of authoritarian regimes with a disinterest in returning their countries to 'Europe'. In Belarus the Soviet nationalism exhibited and institutionalised by Alaksandr Lukashenka has a stronger support base than that of 'return to Europe' civic nationalism promoted by the democratic opposition led by Alaksandr Milinkevich.[6] In Russia, Vladimir Putin has successfully marginalised the democratic opposition and promoted a Great Power nationalism that combines Soviet, Tsarist and Eurasian symbolism.[7] Belarus and Russia are ardent supporters of CIS integration, members of the CIS Collective Security Organization (CIS CSO) and do not seek EU (or NATO) membership. Georgia and Ukraine have reservations about CIS integration, have never been members of the CIS CSO and seek NATO and EU membership.

Preceding Political Crisis

The nature of competitive authoritarian regimes inevitably produces an unstable political environment that can tip towards democratic breakthrough or

authoritarian consolidation. Prior to the elections there were scandals and crises of varying types in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. The use of violence, kidnapping, and murder against citizens led to growing protests and a desire to thwart the further consolidation of an authoritarian regime by the incumbent in Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine. In Croatia, the Tudjman regime had been involved in ethnic cleansing of Serbs and other war crimes during the war of independence. In Serbia, the Milosevic regime had lost three nationalist wars in Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo after committing untold war crimes. Serbia's intervention in Kosovo in 1999 led to NATO's bombing campaign, a prelude to the democratic revolution a year later under the opposition slogan 'Gotov Je' (He is Finished).

In Georgia, Shevardnadze's decade in office had led to stagnation with a large part of the economy pushed underground where it established ties with organised crime. Two frozen conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia had been ignored and Ajaria had been granted *de facto* autonomy in exchange for political loyalty to Shevardnadze. In Ukraine it was to be the Kuchmagate crisis, when a tape was released showing President Kuchma having authorised violence against opposition journalist Heorhiy Gongadze, that became the precursor to the Orange Revolution.[8] The Kuchmagate crisis of 2000-2001 did not lead to Kuchma's downfall, but it did mobilize a large opposition movement in the Ukraine Without Kuchma and Arise Ukraine! protests in 2000-2003. The opposition - Our Ukraine, Tymoshenko Bloc, Socialists – won the 2002 elections and went on as the Orange coalition to win the 2004 elections. The 2002 elections were symbolically important in the Communists losing their first place as Ukraine's main opposition force. The Kuchmagate crisis severely undermined the legitimacy of the ruling elites, discredited Kuchma, created a hard core group of activists and awakened young people from their political apathy.

Many of the activists from the Kuchmagate crisis went on to play key roles in the 2002 and 2004 election campaigns of the opposition and strategic roles in the Orange Revolution.

Democratic Capitol City

Competitive authoritarian regimes do not completely marginalise the democratic opposition, unlike in authoritarian systems. In the pre-democratic breakthrough era, the democratic opposition will have had the ability to be elected to local governments, to control Mayors and to have seats in parliament. These local institutional bases of support become important springboards for launching democratic challenges to competitive authoritarian incumbents in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. The National Movement-Democratic Front (EM-DP) won the Tbilisi City council in June 2002 after Shevardnadze's For a New Georgia failed to win a single seat. EM-DP leader Saakashvili became Mayor of Tbilisi City council. In the 2002 elections, the For a United Ukraine bloc and Social Democratic united Party (SDPUo) failed to win large numbers of seats in Kyiv city council. Kyiv's Mayor Oleksandr Omelchenko had long been sympathetic to Yushchenko and had blocked one of the three oligarchic clans, the SDPUo, from establishing Kyiv as its base, the only oligarch party unable to establish a home base. Kyivites have voted since 1994 for reformers and the opposition. In the 1994 elections, Kyiv voted for Leonid Kravchuk, not Kuchma, and in 2004 for Yushchenko, not Yanukovych. The city of Kyiv is a bastion of support for opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko.

During the Orange Revolution this mayoral, political and civic sympathy played an important role in providing infra structure for the protestors. The city authorities did not order security forces to forcibly remove protestors who blocked

Kyiv's main thoroughfare for three weeks in November-December 2004. Revolutions traditionally take place in capitol cities and a supportive population and sympathetic politicians are therefore strategically important to their success. The anti-democratic environment in Minsk, Moscow, Tashkent and Baku therefore creates insurmountable difficulties for the democratic opposition to launch sustained street protests, as seen in Minsk in March 2006 following Alyaksandr Lukashenka's re-election for a third term..

Unpopular Ruling Elites

The Kuchmagate crisis undermined the commonly held view in post-Soviet states that the leader is not at fault, but those around him, commonly referred to as the 'good Tsar, bad Boyars' syndrome. Kuchma had successfully deflected blame from himself in the 1999 elections, but following the Kuchmagate crisis this syndrome could no longer be used by the authorities. In countries where the 'good Tsar, bad Boyars' syndrome still operates, such as in Russia, the chances for a democratic breakthrough are slim. An unpopular incumbent, unable to deflect blame on to his 'Boyars', provides the incentive for a democratic opposition to unite, and a target for them to focus their energy on, in defeating. Kuchma was exposed by the Kuchmagate crisis, Putin and Lukashenka remain popular because the population do not blame them directly for their country's problems and no major scandals have besmirched their reputations. Democratic breakthroughs and revolutions in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine took place in configurations with an unpopular incumbent and a popular opposition.

The Meciar regime in Slovakia exhibited similar characteristics to those found in hybrid regimes, such as Croatia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. An executive

seeking to concentrate power, statist economic policies, no separation of the ruling party of power from the state, clientalism during the privatisation process, interference in the media and attempts to marginalise the opposition. The urgency of halting this entrenchment of an authoritarian regime came from two fears. First, fear that if Meciar's HZDS won the 1998 elections that Slovakia would move towards a consolidated authoritarianism. Second, fear that such a trend would irrevocably harm Slovakia's opportunity of integrating into the EU and NATO.

Croatia during the 1990s was dominated by the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and Tudjman. The HDZ claimed credit for Croatia's successful war of independence, maintaining the country's territorial integrity and removing the Serbian foreign and perceived domestic threat. This nationalist success made it difficult for the democratic opposition to challenge the Tudjman-HDZ regime which regularly resorted to calling it 'treasonous' and in the pay of the US. Such accusations of being an 'American puppet' were also made in a massive campaign directed against Yushchenko in the 2004 Ukrainian elections The retaking of the Serb enclave of Krajina in 1995 removed the Serbian minority as a threat that could rally Croatians around the HDZ, in the same way as Meciar had successfully used the Hungarian minority to bolster support for the HZDS. The death of Tudjman in 1999, on the eve of the January 2000 elections, proved fortuitous for the democratic opposition. The removal of Tudjman from Croatian politics opened up divisions in the HDZ between hardliners and softliners over the need to continue with a nationalist regime or accept democratisation as a precondition for EU membership. The democratic opposition remained divided over whether to cooperate with, or oppose, the HDZ.

Such divisions in tactics plagued the democratic oppositions in all five countries. In Ukraine, Yushchenko was loyal to Kuchma until April 2001 when his

government was removed. After that he created Our Ukraine as a 'constructive (i.e. loyal) opposition' force that vacillated between cooperating with the anti-Kuchma opposition (grouped in the Ukraine without Kuchma and Arise Ukraine! movements) or cooperate with pro-Kuchma centrist political forces.[9] In states undergoing state and nation building, calls to rally around the head of state attract support on the right of the democratic opposition who are willing to temporarily sacrifice democratisation in exchange for state and nation building. 'Constructive oppositions' can have strange bedfellows, not only Rukh and former Communist Party ideological secretary Leonid Kravchuk, , but also in Russia between the Union of Right Forces and Putin when he rose to power.

Shevardnadze's For a New Georgia bloc, which had been hastily created after his Union of Citizens of Georgia had disintegrated in Summer 2001, had begun to fall apart after the November 2002 elections, thereby creating a crisis within the Georgian ruling elites on the eve of the 2003 Rose Revolution. Kuchma's For a United Ukraine bloc, which came second to Our Ukraine in the 2002 elections, disintegrated a month into the newly elected parliament. Georgia and Ukraine are examples of the failure of competitive authoritarian regimes to establish ruling parties of power. In Slovakia and Croatia the HZDS and HDZ failed in their bids to monopolise power. In authoritarian regimes, such as Russia and Azerbaijan, ruling parties of power have assisted in the regimes authoritarian consolidation. Two attempts in Russia to create parties of power, Russia's Choice and Our Home is Russia, failed in Borys Yeltsin's Russia which was a competitive authoritarian regime. In Belarus, Lukashenka has consolidated authoritarianism without a ruling party.[10]

The pro-Kuchma ruling elites divided during Kuchma's second term with some oligarchs, such as the Industrial Union of the Donbas, favoring Yushchenko while its Donbas competitor, Systems Capitol Management, supported Yanukovych. Ukraine's ruling elites entered the 2004 elections disunited and unsure about the post-Kuchma era with many within the pro-Kuchma camp unsympathetic to Yanukovych as the regime's candidate. They therefore either sat on the fence or unofficially backed the Yushchenko campaign. Parliamentary speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn, head of the Agrarian Party, was the atypical fence sitter who assured parliament operated throughout the 2004 elections. During the Orange Revolution, parliament issued a resolution refusing to recognise the official Central Election Commission results that had declared Yanukovych elected as President. Parliament also voted no confidence in the Yanukovych government.

In authoritarian regimes, such as Russia, Belarus and Azerbaijan, the incumbent remains popular while the democratic opposition has been marginalised through what Silitski terms 'preemptive strikes' or 'preemptive authoritarianism'.[11] Democratic breakthroughs and revolutions are impossible in countries with popular incumbents and marginalized oppositions. In Russia this is made more difficult by Soviet political culture which sees democratic revolutions as an 'American conspiracy' directed against Russia. Young Russians therefore, are more likely to join anti-revolutionary, pro-Putin NGO's, such as Nashi (Ours), rather than back an Orange Revolution inside their country. In Azerbaijan the authorities regularly defeat the democratic opposition in semi free presidential and parliamentary elections. In Russia and Belarus, popular incumbents would probably win free elections.

Charismatic Candidate

In Slovakia, Croatia and Georgia the need for charisma proved less important as their democratic breakthroughs occurred during parliamentary elections. In Georgia, presidential elections followed the Rose Revolution and led to the sweeping victory of Saakashvili with 96 percent of the vote. Undoubtedly his charisma played an important role in the success of the Rose Revolution, his election and continued popularity. In Serbia, the virtues of the candidate of the democratic opposition, Vojislav Kostunica, lay less in his charisma than in his twin appeals; first to the opposition because of his non-corrupted past and lack of association with the Milosevic regime, while for the softliners in the Milosevic regime his moderate nationalist credentials made him a safe successor candidate. In this manner, Kostunica played a similar role to Yushchenko in Ukraine whose candidacy assured softliners in the Kuchma regime, a role that the more radical Tymoshnko could never have played.

A charismatic candidate who has no visible corrupt past is vital both for the opposition around which to unite and to give hope to voters that not all politicians are 'corrupt', a view of politicians that is widely believed in post-communist states. Opinion polls in post-communist states regularly show that voters believe that politicians are interested in enriching themselves, not in voters rights or the country's national interests. In Ukraine, public opinion polls in 2003-2004 pointed to only two politicians with high moral standing, Yushchenko and Socialist leader Oleksandr Moroz. As a moderate and positively received candidate, Yushchenko was assisted by his main opponent, Yanukovych, representing a negative alternative. Yanukovych's twice criminal record, the widespread perception of Donetsk as a 'Wild West' where everything goes, his low educational level and rough personality haunted him throughout the 2004 elections. Ukrainian youth NGO's learnt from their Slovak, Croatian and Serbian counterparts that using humor and political theatre would help to

break down fear. Yanukovych proved to be a perfect candidate to implement this humor strategy.

United Opposition

A united opposition showed voters that politicians could stand above narrow personal interests and unite around an election platform. The opposition had remained disunited and fractured throughout the 1990s in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. Only during the political crises on the eve of the democratic breakthroughs did the opposition unite, often following pressure from youth NGO's, civil society and, in the case of Slovakia and Croatia, with the assistance of the EU. In authoritarian regimes the democratic opposition is marginalised, imprisoned or in exile and therefore unable to offer a series challenge to the regime.

The Slovakia Democratic Coalition united in 1997 around four main democratic parties and aligned with the OK'98 civic campaign that brought together 35 NGO's. The Slovaks focused on voter education, getting out the vote, candidate forums and election monitoring. The democratic opposition innovated ten strategies that were later diffused to other post-communist states. These included steps to overcome passivity and fear, being creative, using all possibilities afforded to you by independent media, and influencing the public discourse. In Croatia, six opposition parties met in September 1998 and they created two opposition coalitions to stand against the HDZ. These two coalitions were backed by the large civic NGO coalition Glas 99. Their strategy drew on the success of the Slovak OK'98 campaign.

The Democratic Opposition of Serbia, DOS, united 19 parties and NGO's who had hitherto been severely fractured. DOS included a major fault line running between Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, assassinated in March 2003, and President

Kostunica. This division in the democratic opposition between radicals (Djindjic) and moderates (Kostunica) is common to democratic coalitions in post-communist states who are united more by what they oppose than what they support.

In Georgia the opposition united around the EM-DP during the Rose Revolution and is the only example of their merging into one party, the United National Movement. There was little opposition to the EM-DP from pro-Shevardnadze political forces, unlike in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia and Ukraine from political forces led by Meciar, Tudjman, Milosevic and Kuchma. Georgia also fundamentally differed from Ukraine in not having a powerful domestic pro-Russian political force as the Communist Party is weak. Igor Giorgadze heads a small pro-Russian force but he is in exile in Russia following accusations of his involvement in assassination attempts on Shevardnadze. Giorgadze's pro-Russian Party of Justice has minimal support in Georgia. In Ukraine a triangular opposition consisting of Yushchenko (Our Ukraine), the Tymoshenko bloc and Socialists had existed since 2001. This triangular alliance re-emerged in round two of the 2004 elections and played a vital role in creating a broad-based Orange Revolution coalition. The only opposition group marginalized from the Orange Revolution coalition was the Communist Party which declared its neutrality in round two but its voters probably backed Yanukovych.

In authoritarian states the democratic opposition is often fractured, divided, and marginalized from public life and state institutions. In Russia, the Union of Right Forces and Yabloko failed to enter the 2003 State Duma. Both political forces have failed to unite in the face of the threat from an authoritarian regime. In Belarus the regime places heavy restrictions on the activities of the democratic opposition and blocks them from obtaining large numbers of deputies in parliament. In Azerbaijan,

the oppositions attempts at creating united coalitions (New Politics [YeS], Azadliq) have been accompanied by bitter in fighting and an inability to put forward convincing alternatives to the ruling Yeni Azerbaycan party.

Youth Politics[12]

Young people played strategic roles in democratic breakthroughs and revolutions in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. They provided the numbers for the civic NGO campaigns in all five cases and encouraged established politicians to overcome their differences and unite into democratic opposition coalitions. Young people represent the non-communist generation which grew up in the 1980s and 1990s whose political culture is minimally influenced by communist and Soviet political culture. The 1998 (Slovak), 2000 (Croatia, Serbia), 2003 (Georgia), 2002 and 2004 (Ukraine) elections were the first occasions when this younger generation emerged as a serious actor in these countries domestic politics.

Youth had already developed their political skills during the preceding political crises when they learnt from tactical mistakes and honed their organisational skills. The mass civic mobilisations in the 1998 Slovak and 2000 Croatian and Serbian campaigns were diffused to Georgia and then Ukraine through shared training, publications and internet discussions, often with the assistance of Western foundations and think tanks.[13] Young people were most adapt at using modern communications tools, such as the internet (e-mail, a source of news, discussion forums), and mobile phones (communications, SMS, camera telephones). Besides the internet as a source of news, cable domestic and international television played an important role in breaking the state's monopoly on information and in mobilizing voters.

In these five states, youth created a large number of NGO's that took the initiative in the mobilization of civil society. The most well known are Otpor, Kmara and Pora in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine respectively. In addition to these well known NGO's, others focused on election monitoring, mobilizing students for civil society activities and strikes, and those which monitored the media. Polls and surveys in these countries showed that youth tended to be pro-Western and hold democratic values. The exception to this is Russia where young people have largely bought into the Putin nationalist project of rebuilding Russia as a great power only a minority of young Russians support a democratic revolution in their own country.[14]

Regionalism

Regionalism can be both a contributing factor and an inhibitor in democratic breakthroughs and revolutions. The misplaced use of ethnic nationalism by Meciar, Tudjman and Milosevic was one factor that the democratic opposition, who espoused a civic inclusive nationalism, opposed. Saakashvili's civic nationalism followed the disastrous ethnic nationalism of Gamsakhurdia that had led to defeat in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and these regions transformed into frozen conflicts. Regionalism in Ukraine is a two edged sword. On the one hand, it inhibits a sweeping landslide for democratic forces in the Orange Revolution throughout Ukraine while, on the other, it inhibits the monopolization of power by potential autocrats either in power (as in the Kuchma era) or after they return to power (Yanukovych in 2006). The anti-Kuchma opposition dominated western and central Ukraine during most of Kuchma's second term in office.

Hostility against Slovakia's Hungarian minority was utilized by the HZDS and its nationalist allies to mobilize nationalist-populist support. In contrast, the

democratic opposition promoted an alternative inclusive civic nationalism that included the Hungarians. Similar alliances between democratic oppositions and national minorities have taken place in Bulgaria and Romania. Croatia became a mono-ethnic state following the outflow of its Serbian minority, removing a domestic Serbian threat after 1995. Excluding Kosovo, ethnic Serbs in Serbia comprises 83 percent of the population with minorities only concentrated in Vojvodina. Some democratic parties, such as the Vuk Draskovic's Serbian Renewal Movement and Kostunica's DSS, supported a greater Serbia in the 1990s.

The democratic opposition in Georgia inherited a fractured and failed state. Two regions remain frozen conflicts from the early 1990s, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Georgian Muslim enclave of Adjaria on Georgia's border with Turkey acted as a de facto independent state. Shevardnadze struck a deal with Adjaria leader Aslan Abashidze whereby he would provide political backing for Shevardnadze in return for Tbilisi not interfering in Ajaria, long known as a highly corrupt and autocratic region. Abashidze's supporters were bused into Tbilisi to back Shevadnadze during the 2003 elections and Shevardnadze sought to rule with the assistance of mass election fraud conducted in Ajaria where the Democratic Revival Union won 95 per cent of the vote in the 2003 elections. In Ukraine an unofficial agreement also existed between Kuchma and Donetsk leaders, such as Renat Akhmetov, Ukraine's wealthiest oligarch, that Kyiv would turn a blind eye as to how local elites ran their fiefdom in exchange for political loyalty to Kuchma and the non-infringement of Ukraine's territorial integrity. This loyalty was seen in the 2002 elections when the pro-Kuchma For a United Ukraine bloc came first only in Donetsk oblast (in all other Ukrainian oblasts, Our Ukraine or the Communists came first place).

Following the Rose Revolution, Ajaria was peacefully re-integrated into Georgia and the corrupt and autocratic Abashidze clan was removed from power. In Nodia's view, this was Saakashvili's greatest accomplishment in his first year in power.[15] In Ukraine, the Donetsk clan lost the 2004 elections, but, unlike in Georgia, Yushchenko never attempted to take on the Donetsk clan and remove its political, economic and administrative grip on the region. Leading Donetsk oligarchs, such as Akhmetov, entered the 2006 parliament in the Party of Regions. The Donetsk clan, operating through the Party of Regions, has the largest parliamentary faction (186 deputies). Party of Regions leader and defeated candidate Yanukovych heads the Anti-Crisis coalition government. Yushchenko's handling of Donetsk has therefore been very different to Saakashvili's policies towards Ajaria.

Of the five countries where democratic breakthroughs and revolutions took place, Slovakia is ethnically divided and Ukraine is the most regionally divided. Ethnic and regional divisions should be though, not conflated. Regional divisions, as in Ukraine, can lead to tension in the design of constitutions and power sharing arrangements between the center and periphery but are unlikely to lead to violence. Ethnic divisions are more likely to lead to ethnic conflict. The one similarity that ethnic and regional divisions have is in voting preferences. Only Hungarians in Slovakia vote for Hungarian parties. In Ukraine, voting patterns in the 2004 and 2006 elections closely follow linguistic cleavages that are similar to regional divisions (i.e. western-central Ukrainophone regions voted Orange, eastern-southern Russophone regions voted Blue).

During the 2004 elections, Yushchenko won by only an eight percent margin. In the 2004 and 2006 elections, Yanukovych and the Party of Regions garnered 44 and 32 percent of the vote respectively and Orange forces have largely been unable to

break into eastern Ukraine. Ukraine differed from Serbia and Georgia in that the Communist Party remained more antagonistic to the democratic candidate, Yushchenko, than to Yanukovych and the oligarchs. The Communists are members of the Anti-Crisis coalition and government led by Prime Minister Yanukovych. In Serbia the left were in control of the country and as much nationalist as they were Socialists. The democratic opposition was therefore hostile to the extreme left and right. In Georgia the pro-Russian Justice and Communist Parties did not participate in the 2003 elections and both are marginal forces.

Foreign Intervention

Foreign intervention can be benign or negative. The former can take the form of the EU intervening in support of the democratic opposition in these five democratic breakthroughs and revolutions. The EU's intervention was particularly noticeable in Slovakia and Croatia where it held out the 'carrot' of membership. In Serbia, NATO played a positive role in 'softening' up the regime in its 1999 bombing campaign. This was followed a year later by widespread US support for the Serbian democratic opposition. The intention of NATO and the US was clear: to remove Milosevic from power. In Georgia and Ukraine there have been allegations by Russia and a minority of Western reports that their democratic revolutions were 'US conspiracies' but these allegations have never been substantiated. The West has played a positive role in isolating the Lukashenka regime after he manipulated constitutional changes to permit him to stand for a third term. The West's weak responses to democratic failings in Azerbaijan and Russia to some democracy activists in the region suggests that great power politics and oil may trump democracy.

Of the five countries, the Russia factor has only played a role in Georgia and Ukraine. Russia did not intervene in Slovakia, Croatia or Serbia, although it backed the Meciar and Milosevic regimes. Russia also condemned NATO's bombing campaign in Kosovo and Serbia. In Georgia, Russia has chosen to freeze two conflicts, rather than attempt to undertake peacekeeping operations and hold negotiations on reunifying Georgia. The inhabitants of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been illegally granted Russian citizenship and the Russian State Duma called in December 2006 for the unification of both enclaves with Russia. Russia intervened in a massive manner in the 2004 Ukrainian elections by providing political technologists and a reported $300 million for the Yanukovych election campaign. Russia was also allegedly behind two of the three known assassination attempts on Yushchenko, the September 2004 poisoning and an attempted bombing of Yushchenko's election headquarters in November 2004.

Post-Democratic Breakthrough and Revolution

Democratic breakthroughs and revolutions were never the end of the story as difficult reforms need to be implemented after democratic oppositions took power. In Slovakia and Croatia, the reform process was quicker than in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. The speed of the reforms and their success was related to each countries path dependence; that is, the legacies inherited by democratic oppositions as well as the availability of external incentives to overcome these path dependencies.

Dealing With the Past

Dealing with the previous regime has proven difficult in many transition countries, whether Spain following Franco, Chile following Augusto Pinochet or Greece after the military junta. Most post-communist states never undertook lustration or condemned communism. In most CIS states and some central European states the former communist elites continue to rule their countries after the collapse of the USSR. Indeed, many senior leaders of democratic oppositions (i.e. Saakashvili, Yushchenko) were themselves former regime officials. Dealing with the inherited past has pre-occupied and divided the democratic opposition in Serbia, Croatia and Ukraine, but not in Slovakia and Georgia. The crimes and abuse of office committed by Meciar and Shevardnadze pale in comparison to those committed by Croatian, Serbian and Ukrainian leaders.

Shevardnadze and Kuchma were granted immunity during their democratic revolutions. This immunity deal would seem to have been extended to other Kuchma era officials and no senior official has been put on trial. As Mason writes about Georgia, 'Arresting officials of the old regime and their cronies has been a hallmark of Saakashvili's tenure'.[16] Issues that divided the Orange Revolution coalition after coming to power rested over dealing with past abuse of office, the organizers of the murder of Gongadze, election fraud and whether to re-privatise enterprises from oligarchs. Many members of Our Ukraine, including Yushchenko, had been loyal to Kuchma for seven of his ten years in office until 2001 and proved unwilling to open investigations of former Kuchma regime officials. The unwillingness to criminally charge the organizers of Gongadze's murder and election fraud rests on secret provisions of immunity granted during round table negotiations in the Orange Revolution. The issue of re-privatization divided Our Ukraine, which opposed the steps, and the Tymoshenko bloc, which supported such a policy. If re-privatization

was to be conducted, it remained unclear who draw up any list and if re-privatization would be undertaken through a corrupt court system or by parliament?[17]

Dealing with war crimes in the case of Serbia, or crimes against opposition politicians and journalists in the case of Ukraine, is a test of the political will of the president and the ability of law enforcement to prosecute. In Serbia and Ukraine, law enforcement have failed the test. Kostunica and Yushchenko differ in the former denying these crimes all together and the latter raising them in the 2004 elections and Orange Revolution in his call for 'Bandits to Prison' to only forget about this compromise after being elected. Not a single criminal case against senior former leaders has made any progress in Ukraine with most senior officials involved in election fraud in 2004 re-elected to the 2006 parliament within the Party of Regions. Indeed, the only senior Ukrainian official to ever have been charged and sentenced is former Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko, but this was by the US, not Ukraine.

Investigation into the assassination of Djindjic and three attempted assassinations of Yushchenko in 2004 have made little progress. Supporters of a 'hard' transition desire a more radical break with the former regime that would include punishment for their crimes. On these issues Yushchenko, like Kostunica, has lacked political will and revealed a preference to provide immunity. An opportunity was missed immediately after the Serbian and Ukrainian revolutions to quickly bring the former regime to account. Serbia has shown the danger of adopting the 'soft' transition because it permits the old guard a chance to regroup. This danger was evident in Serbia where those who committed war crimes under Milosevic went on to assassinate Dzindjic. In Ukraine the *ancien regime* regrouped after the implosion of the Orange camp in September 2005 and used public dissatisfaction and Orange in-fighting to win the 2006 elections.

Divisions in the Democratic Opposition

The democratic opposition is inevitably divided into moderates and radicals Slovakia and Georgia have the best records of the democratic opposition staying in power longest. Divisions between radicals and moderates in these two states did not lead to open splits in the democratic opposition.. In Ukraine, the Orange Revolution coalition was dissolved by President Yushchenko in September 2005 when he removed the Tymoshenko government. Georgia is the only case where the Rose Revolution democratic coalition has remained united and the moderate and radical parties in the EM-DP, led by parliamentary speaker Nina Burjanedze and President Mikhail Saakashvili, merged into the United National Movement after the Rose Revolution. The opposition remains weak and fractured within the New Rights-Industrialists and Democratic Front factions in parliament.

A major difference between Georgia and Ukraine has been in the type of leader who came to power. In effect, the radical wing of the Georgian Rose Revolution won the presidency; in other words, the equivalent of Tymoshenko winning in Ukraine. Saakashvili's victory has brought three factors in the post-revolutionary era that are therefore absent in Ukraine. First, it brought to power an 'extremely motivated, extremely impatient' group of younger politicians. Nodia points to Saakashvili's 'massive energy' in pushing forward reforms. The drawback is that Saakahvili may have 'modernizing authoritarian instincts'.[18] Second, Saakashvili defines himself in opposition to his predecessor, Shevardnadze. Kuchma is only the 'Other' for Tymoshenko; Yushchenko has never criticised Kuchma after he was elected even though Orange voters expected at the minimum a moral denunciation of the Kuchma regime and at the maximum his trial for abuse of office. The lack of any

criminal charges led to widespread disillusionment among Orange voters and their defection from Yushchenko to Tymoshenko, as clearly seen in the 2006 election results.[19] Third, Saakashvili has self confidence in his policies and actions domestically and abroad; the same is not true of Yushchenko's dealings with Russia, particularly in the energy sector.

Of the five countries with successful democratic breakthroughs and revolutions, Serbia and Ukraine have many similarities. Presidents Yushchenko and Kostunica and former Prime Ministers Tymoshenko and Djindjic represent moderate and radical divisions in the Serb and Ukrainian oppositions. Gordy classifies Kostunica as supporting a 'soft transition' while Djindjic backs a 'hard transition',[20] with Yushchenko and Tymoshenko representing Kostunica and Djindjic respectively. The difference between 'soft' and 'hard' transition rests upon their attitudes towards dealing with, and breaking from, the *ancien regime.*

In Serbia, Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and Yushchenko's Our Ukraine lost popularity after they were elected presidents, a factor that assisted in the return to power of *ancien regime* parties (i.e. the Radical Party in Serbia, the Party of Regions in Ukraine). President Yushchenko's Our Ukraine came third in the 2006 elections with 13.95 percent, a major decline on its 23.57 percent in the 2002 elections. Orange voters had migrated from Our Ukraine to the Tymoshenko bloc which increased its support from 7.26 percent in 2002 to 22.29, giving it second place. Since the 2006 elections, Our Ukraine has continued to decline in popularity as a consequence of public reaction to its failed coalition negotiating strategies after the 2006 elections. The Tymoshenko bloc's continued popularity has prevented the marginalisation of Orange Revolution political forces, unlike in Serbia where the

popularity of former Prime Minister Dzindjic's Democratic Party (DS) has also declined.

The Orange Revolution coalition has not only been divided between the moderate Our Ukraine and radical Tymoshenko bloc. Our Ukraine had always been a 'constructive (loyal) opposition' with close ties to softliners in the Kuchma regime. The Tymoshenko bloc and Socialists formed the basis of the real opposition to Kuchma during the Ukraine Without Kuchma and Arise Ukraine! protests. A second fault line ran through Our Ukraine between national democrats and business centrists. The former refused to countenance any relationship with the Party of Regions while the latter preferred to work with the Party of Regions over working with Tymoshenko. Our Ukraine leader and former Prime Minister Yekhanurov is closer to the Party of Regions than to Tymoshenko whom he routinely compares to Argentina's Eva Peron. The dual track negotiating strategy of Our Ukraine following the 2006 elections therefore was not only because of personal distaste for Tymoshenko's return to government but also a reflection of the existence of two wings inside Our Ukraine, the pro-Tymoshenko national democrats and pro-Regions business centrists. Each wing sought to negotiate its own parliamentary coalition, Our Ukraine national democrats with its Orange allies and Our Ukraine business centrists with the Party of Regions in a Grand coalition. Such a duplicitous and fractious strategy opened the way for the return of the *ancien regime* in the Anti-Crisis coalition.

Return of Former Regime Parties

Democratic breakthroughs in Slovakia and Croatia and democratic revolutions in Serbia and Ukraine did not indefinitely remove the *ancien regime;* this was only to take place in Georgia where pro-Shevardnadze forces were routed. In Slovakia,

Croatia, Serbia and Ukraine the *ancien regime* retained a support base that enabled it to return to power either reformed (Croatia), unreformed (Serbia) or its policies unknown (Ukraine). The HZDS and its nationalist allies continued to command the support of 30 percent of Slovaks in the 2002 elections on the eve of NATO and EU membership.

Following the defeat of the *ancien regime* in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, and Ukraine the democratic opposition coalitions disintegrated, permitting the return of former *ancien regime* parties in subsequent elections. Often this followed strategic policy mistakes committed by the democratic opposition and the opening up of divisions between moderates and radicals. Meciar's HZDS won the 1994 and 1998 elections in Slovakia and only in 2002 did it receive fewer votes than the left or center-right. With its nationalist allies, the HZDS won 40.5, 36.1 and 29.8 percent of the vote in these three elections. By the 2002 elections, Slovakia had achieved a democratic breakthrough over populist-nationalist forces who could not derail democratic progress and the country's membership of NATO and the EU. In Croatia softliners in the HDZ supported its transformation into a center-right conservative party, a process similar to reformers from the Franco regime's National Movement (Spanish Traditionalist Phalanx of the Assemblies of National-Syndicalist Offensive) who created the center-right Popular Party led by Jose Maria Aznar. In Croatia the HDZ returned to power in 2003 after defeating the centre-left coalition that had been elected four years earlier. Its return to power did not derail Croatia's democratic progress and likely membership of NATO and the EU at the end of the decade.

In Georgia there is no likelihood of the return of political forces loyal to Shevardnadze. In Serbia and Ukraine the *ancien regime* is more entrenched. In Serbia two pillars of the Milosevic regime, the Socialist and Radical Parties, continue to

command popular support. The Radical Party won the December 2003 and January 2007 elections in spite of (or because of?) its leader, Vojislav Šešelj, being on trial in The Hague for war crimes.

In Ukraine the former pro-Kuchma and oligarch Party of Regions won the March 2006 elections with 32.14 percent of the vote. The three members of the Orange Revolution coalition had agreed that whoever came first had the right to nominate their candidate for Prime Minister. The victory of the Tymoshenko Bloc therefore meant the return of Tymoshenko to head the government. Our Ukraine and President Yushchenko duplicitously held two negotiations with their Orange partners and separately with the Party of Regions for a Grand Coalition. In the first half of June 2006, a Grand Coalition had been agreed with the Party of Regions which was ready to compromise by agreeing to Our Ukraine leader Yekhanurov staying as Prime Minister. This agreement collapsed when Yushchenko switched his support, allegedly after US pressure, to an Orange coalition in the second half of the same month. Having taken three months to decide over who was to be Prime Minister (Yekhanurov [Grand], Tymoshenko [Orange]), the next struggle rested between Our Ukraine and the Socialists over who will be parliamentary speaker. The refusal of Our Ukraine to consider Socialist leader Moroz's candidacy led to their defection and the collapse of the short lived Orange coalition. The Socialists aligned with the Party of Regions and Communists in an Anti-Crisis coalition with Yanukovych as Prime Minister. The Yanukovych government has returned many senior members of the Kuchma regime. After initially flirting with the idea of joining the Anti-Crisis coalition, as agreed during August 2006 round-table negotiations and the signing of the Universal agreement, the badly fractured Our Ukraine declared its opposition in October 2006.

Therefore, of these five countries a threat to democratization from the *ancien regime* exists only in Serbia and Ukraine. In Serbia the extreme left and right are supported by a stable 30-40 percent popular base which is more united than the country's fractured democratic parties who led the 2000 democratic revolution. Serbia's democratic path will therefore be tortuous and difficult. In Ukraine the Party of Regions is the only former pro-Kuchma party to have entered the 2006 parliament. The SDPUo, a party that provided much of the framework for creeping authoritarianism during Kuchma's last two years in office, failed to enter the 2006 parliament after two terms in the 1998 and 2002 parliaments.

The return of the Party of Regions leads to two major questions facing Ukraine.[21] First, can the Party of Regions transform itself into a post-oligarch, democratic party? Such transformations have taken place in other post-communist states but these states were in central-eastern Europe and the Baltic states. No successful transformation of such a party has taken place in the CIS. Businessmen and former oligarchs in the Party of Regions do desire to achieve respectability and legitimacy, both in Ukraine and in the West. But, they sit alongside former Communists and corrupt Kuchma era officials in a party that can be more readily classified as an eastern Ukrainian (anti-Orange) popular front, than a real political party. The Party of Regions, like all former pro-Kuchma centrists, is also ideologically amorphous and opportunist, therefore creating a gulf between its rhetoric and policies.

Second, will the return of Yanukovych to government lead to a reversal of the democratic gains of the Orange Revolution? As the *Financial Times* points out, 'it would be wrong to conclude that little has changed. Ukraine today is a different country from the timid nation that existed before the Orange Revolution. There is a

greater sense of freedom and a stronger sense of national identity'.[22] A reversal of the Orange Revolution gains is unlikely as the Party of Regions has insufficient all-national popularity to monopolize power. Ukraine's regional diversity works against any political force dominating the country; this factor prevented Yushchenko from obtaining a landslide victory in 2004 (unlike Saakashvili in Georgia) and will prevent the Party of Regions from monopolising power and establishing an authoritarian regime.[23] While a reversal of Orange Revolution gains is unlikely, stagnation is nevertheless possible. Further progress in Ukraine's democratisation by building on the gains of the Orange Revolution could be blocked by the Party of Regions and because of in-fighting between the executive-parliament/government and within the Orange Revolution camp. Serbia has one distinct advantage over Ukraine, the 'carrot' of future EU membership, that could encourage its democratic progress. The EU is only offering Ukraine a Free Trade Zone, following its accession into the WTO, and an Enhanced Agreement to replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, but not future membership.

Democratisation

The Slovak and Croatian victories of democratic oppositions over competitive authoritarian regimes in 1998 and 1999-2000 respectively constituted real democratic breakthroughs in both countries. Success in Slovakia's democratic reforms and the dismantling of the Meciar legacy led to the countries membership of NATO and the EU in 2004. NATO invited Croatia into the Membership Action Plan in May 2002 and the country may be invited to join NATO in 2008 followed by membership in 2010. Croatia is also the only country that could be an exception, as a consequence of

enlargement fatgue, in being invited to join the EU following Romania and Bulgaria in 2007.

Three of the five countries have more difficult legacies to overcome, entrenched remnants of the *ancien regime* (in Serbia and Ukraine) and no 'carrot' of EU membership.[24] Serbia could be included within the group of western Balkan states for future EU membership.[25] Georgia and Ukraine only have the 'carrot' of NATO membership, a 'carrot' that has less positive impact on domestic reforms than the prospect of joining the EU.

Basic democratic freedoms, such as support for civil society, media freedom, free elections, support for democracy over the alternative of authoritarianism, are positive outcomes of the democratic breakthroughs and revolutions in all five countries. Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine have poorer records of democratic progress than Slovakia and Croatia. Slovakia is classified in Freedom House's 2006 *Nations in Transit* as a 'consolidated democracy' whereas Croatia and Serbia are defined as 'semi-consolidated democracies'. Georgia and Ukraine are considered to be 'transitional' or 'hybrid' regimes. Freedom House's 2006 *Freedom in the World* survey upgraded Ukraine in 2006 to 'Free', the first CIS state to attain this level, joining Slovakia, Croatia and Serbia. Georgia, Moldova and Kyrgyzstan are classified as 'Partly Free', two of whom experienced democratic revolutions. The remaining eight CIS states are defined as 'Unfree' and therefore countries where it is difficult to envisage democratic revolutions.[26]

Democratization in Georgia and Ukraine has improved following their democratic revolutions. Both countries hold free elections and enjoy free media. The Interior Ministries in both countries, which had ties to organised crime and had been involved in extra-judicial violence against regime opponents and journalists, have

been cleaned up. Freedom House's 2006 *Nation in Transit* survey gives credit to Georgia for enhancing local government capability, launching a struggle against corruption, and improving the protection of human rights. Freedom House registered no change in Georgia's election administration, civil society, media and national governance. One reason that civil society activity had declined following the Rose Revolution is because 'half' of the civil society network, according to Nodia, moved into government. In Ukraine, Freedom House registered a vastly improved media environment with the ending of censorship, greater transparency in government and state activities and policies and a free election environment. Nevertheless, problem areas exist. Georgia lacks a strong opposition, partly because of the high seven percent threshold to enter parliament, and the judiciary is subject to political interference. Political parties in Georgia and Ukraine remain weak and tied to personality politics, rather than to ideologies. This is especially true on the radical wing of democratic oppositions that came to power in 2003-2004, Saakashvili and Tymoshenko.

Democratisation has proceeded faster in post-communist states which have introduced parliamentary systems, systems that are common place in central-eastern Europe and the three Baltic states. During post-communist transitions, abuse of office, election fraud and corruption has tended to occur around the executive. Of the twelve CIS states, ten have super presidential systems with emasculated parliaments; the exceptions are a parliamentary-presidential system in Ukraine and a fully parliamentary system in Moldova. Alone among the three states which experienced democratic revolutions has been Georgia which moved to a superpresidential system a month after Saakashvili's election.

The victory of democratic oppositions in Slovakia and Croatia convinced their leaders of the need to temper executive power that had been abused during the Meciar and Tudjman competitive authoritarian regimes. In 2000, Croatia moved from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary system and from a bicameral into a unicameral parliament. Round table negotiations during the Orange Revolution led to a political compromise within the ruling elites that included three elements: an unwritten agreement on immunity from prosecution, reform of the election law and constitutional reforms in 2006. These three elements were premised on the acknowledgement of Yushchenko's certain victory in the re-run of round two of the elections. Yushchenko agreed to a pacted transition between softliners in the regime and opposition, sidelining radicals in the opposition (Tymoshenko) and in the regime (Yanukovych).[27] Only the Tymoshenko bloc voted on 8 December 2004 against the compromise package that grew out of the pacted transition sealed during round table negotiations. Constitutional reforms introduced two years later transformed Ukraine from the 1996 semi-presidential system to a parliamentary-presidential republic. The President's powers were reduced and transferred to the Prime Minister with governments no longer controlled by the executive but by parliamentary majorities. The first Prime Minister to benefit from these enhanced powers is Party of Regions leader Yanukovych.

Conclusion

Slovakia re-joined 'Europe' relatively quickly following the 1998 democratic breakthrough. This, in of itself, showed that Meciar's populist nationalism was more of an aberration than a factor that could permanently de-rail Slovakia's democratization. Croatia has also quickly moved forward in capitalizing on its 1999-

2000 democratic breakthrough that will lead to NATO and EU membership later in the decade.

The record is mixed in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. Only in the former is there a distant 'carrot' of future EU membership that could encourage democratic political forces in the face of a still large domestic support base for *ancien regime* parties. Serbia will not overcome its Milosevic legacy quickly as the extreme left and nationalist right continue to have a strong base of support. In Georgia and Ukraine, democratization will be complicated by the lack of offer of EU membership and, in the case of Ukraine, by the return to power by a political party associated with the *ancien regime*, the Party of Regions. Democratic freedoms (free elections, independent media, political competition) have progressed in Georgia and Ukraine since their democratic revolutions but both countries still face major hurdles in reforming deep seated problems, such as the rule of law and battling corruption. Ukraine's regionalism is a double edged sword; while it prevents the Party of Regions from monopolizing the country it also prevented Yushchenko from achieving a landslide victory in 2004 when 44 percent of Ukrainians voted for the anti-Orange candidate, Yanukovych.

Georgia has made democratic progress since the Rose Revolution but its Achilles heels are geography as it is possible to see Georgia inside NATO but not necessarily inside the EU, and it continues to have two frozen conflicts. Serbia is located in a neighborhood where most states are consolidated democracies, a factor that could lead to democratic diffusion. Ukraine borders four NATO and EU members and semi-democratic Moldova, as well as authoritarian Belarus and Russia. 'Europe' moved to Ukraine's western borders in 2004. Georgia borders only one democracy, Turkey, and three authoritarian states, including a large and threatening neighbor,

Russia, that controls its two separatist enclaves and opposes its integration into Trans-Atlantic structures. The democratic revolutions that took place in Georgia and Ukraine are nevertheless testament to their countries desire to pursue democratization to facilitate their integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions.

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