Has China abandoned its "no first use" policy when it comes to nuclear weapons? No, says MIT's M.Taylor Fravel.
In a recent op-ed in the New York Times, nuclear expert James Acton suggests that China may be changing its nuclear doctrine. The principal basis for his argument is the absence of a specific repetition of China’s “no first-use” policy in the latest edition of Beijing’s bi-annual white paper on defense. Acton, however, misreads the recent white paper and draws the wrong conclusion about China’s approach to nuclear weapons.
First, no first use has been a core feature of Chinese defense policy for decades, having been decided by Mao himself in 1964. If China abandoned or altered this policy position, it would reflect a major change in China’s approach to nuclear weapons – and a major change in China’s international image. This would not be a casual decision by China’s top leaders but rather a radical change precipitated by a major shift in China’s security environment. Although China’s concerns about U.S. missile defense policies that Acton notes are real, these concerns have existed since the mid-1990s and shape China’s current efforts to reduce the vulnerability of its nuclear forces.
To date, China has focused on building a small but potent nuclear force with the ability to launch a secure second strike if attacked with nuclear weapons – what I call “assured retaliation.” The relatively small size of China’s nuclear arsenal and the doctrinal emphasis on survivability and reliability are consistent with a pledge to not use nuclear weapons first. Moreover, if China were to abandon or alter the no first-use policy, it would surely want to reap a clear deterrent effect from such an action and likely do so clearly and publicly, not indirectly and quietly through an omission in a report.
Second, the absence of the no first-use policy in the 2012 white paper does not support Acton’s contention that China is changing its nuclear doctrine. Here, Acton overlooks that this edition of China’s bi-annual defense white papers is different from past volumes in one important respect.
According to Major General Chen Zhou, one of the white paper’s drafters and a researcher at the PLA’s Academy of Military Science, the 2012 white paper uses a thematic model (zhuanti xing) and not a comprehensive one. In the past, the comprehensively-oriented white papers all had the same title, such China’s National Defense in 2010. The title of the 2012 edition, however, reflects the new thematic focus: Diversified Employment of China Armed Forces. By discussing in more detail the structure and missions of China’s armed forces, the 2012 white paper dropped a chapter found in all previous ones entitled “National Defense Policy.” In the past editions, this chapter contained the references to China’s no first-use policy (as well as many other defense policies). Applying Occam’s razor, the lack of a chapter on China’s national defense policies can account for the absence of a reference to the no first-use policy.
In addition, the white paper’s discussion of the use of nuclear weapons is consistent with the no first-use policy. The white paper refers to “the principle of building a lean and effective force,” repeating language from the 2006 white paper that officially detailed China’s nuclear strategy for the first time. Second, it states that China’s nuclear weapons will only be used under one condition: “If China comes under a nuclear attack, the nuclear missile force of the [Second Artillery] will use nuclear missiles to launch a resolute counterattack (jianjue fanji).” Here, the 2012 white paper uses the exact same sentence as the 2008 white paper, which did contain a reference to the no first-use policy. More generally, a nuclear counterattack is the only campaign for China’s nuclear forces that has been described in authoritative Chinese doctrinal texts, starting with the 1987 edition of the Science of Strategy (Zhanlue Xue).
Photo Credit: Wikicommons
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Roger Dong
Our policy to refuse to declare a NFU policy is illogical and irresponsible policy. The Chinese and other countries use our refusal to declare NFU against us. We are militarily superior to all, therefore there is no need to start playing the nuclear card, unless we are attacked first, even when attacked first our nuclear response must be measured and calculated. If we are not going to end the human race, we cannot launch hundreds of nuclear bombs.
Today, as all modern nations cannot survive without fundamental infrastructure, we are all very vulnerable. Takd out power and water sourcing, and no country will bd about to effectively function. Let me do the targeting. And I can shut down any major country with a dozen large war heads without a nuclear attack.
Even declaring NDU, IF we decide to use nukes first, what is anyone going to do, take us to court?
There is no rational reason not to declare NFU.
fairplay
I think the West worries too much. Don’t worry go your daily normal. If China wish to counter strikes US, definetly the US would know.
Not sure I agree
Very interesting discussion / strategically though I do wonder how the transmigration of people and capital can impact the strategic imperatives. For example how willing will the Chinese leadership be in launching a strike on an LA when so many of their countrymen and childen of the leadership are living working and studying there. Equally with the billions that have been poured into china by US companies the landscape presents a very different set of criteria to the old Cold War model that we lived with for 40 odd years. Perhaps not an ultimate deterrent but surely it must form part of the deliberations.