May 07, 2013 16:44 UTC
Latest updates[?]: Budgets 2012-2018; FY 2014 budget in detail; $110M Fleet support contract; What next for the fleet?
ER/MP, armed
In August 2005, “Team Warrior” leader General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. in San Diego, CA won a $214.4 million cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) of the Extended Range/ Multi Purpose Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System (ER/MP UAS). That was just the first step along the US Army’s $5 billion road to fielding a true Medium Altitude, Long Endurance, armed UAV, modified from the USAF’s famous MQ-1 Predator.
The ER/MP program was part of the US Army’s reinvestment of dollars from the canceled RAH-66 Comanche helicopter program, and directly supports the Army’s Aviation Modernization Plan. Its position got a boost when a 2007 program restructuring cut the Future Combat Systems Class III UAV competition, in favor of ER/MP. Next, the US Air Force saw this Predator derivative as a threat and tried to destroy it, but the program survived the first big “Key West” battle of the 21st century. Now the MQ-1C “Gray Eagle” is moving into full production, as the US Army’s high-end UAV. This FOCUS article offers a program history, key statistics and budget figures, and ongoing coverage of the program’s contracts and milestones.
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May 07, 2013 13:00 UTC
Latest updates[?]: Support contract; US Navy shifting its basing plans out of Hawaii.
P-8A Poseidon
Maritime surveillance and patrol is becoming more and more important, but the USA’s P-3 Orion turboprop fleet is falling apart. The P-7 Long Range Air ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) Capable Aircraft program to create an improved P-3 began in 1988, but cost overruns, slow progress, and interest in opening the competition to commercial designs led to the P-7′s cancellation for default in 1990. The successor MMA program was begun in March 2000, and Boeing beat Lockheed’s “Orion 21″ with a P-8 design based on their ubiquitous 737 passenger jet. US Navy squadrons finally began taking P-8A Poseidon deliveries in 2012, but the long delays haven’t done their existing P-3 fleet any favors.
Filling the P-3 Orion’s shoes is no easy task. What missions will the new P-8A Poseidon face? What do we know about the platform, the project team, and ongoing developments? Will the P-3′s wide global adoption give its successor a comparable level of export opportunities? Australia and India have already signed on, but has the larger market shifted in the interim?
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May 06, 2013 15:02 UTC
Latest updates[?]: France preparing to contribute to ground systems budget; Airspace certification problems in Germany, and what they mean for AGS; Do USAF budgets threaten to make AGS an orphan system?
What is it good for?
Northrop Grumman’s E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS) uses a powerful ground-looking Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) mounted on a Boeing 707-300 airframe, giving American commanders combat-changing battlefield surveillance and communications relay capabilities. The Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system originally aimed to create a similar capability as a pooled NATO asset, based on a mix of smaller Airbus A321 airframes and RQ-4B Global Hawk UAVs, coupled with ground stations.
AGS started in 1995, and it has taken a very long time. Its MoU was late, its contract will be both late and smaller in scope, and it won’t meet even a revised 2012-2014 fielding window. At long last, however, one can be assured that it will exist. This is DID’s in-depth FOCUS Article covering the AGS program, from its platforms to its program structure to its long-awaited contracts.
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May 05, 2013 18:30 UTC
Latest updates[?]: Australia's Labor government picks the riskiest possible way forward, with a poor track record of success, for the strategic centerpiece of Australia's maritime power. In exchange, it lets the politicians pay off domestic interest groups; Does Australia even own the IP rights for what it seems to want to do?
Bridge to the future?
In its 2009 White Paper, Australia’s Department of Defence and Labor Party government looked at the progress being made in ship killing surveillance-strike complexes, and at their need to defend large sea lanes, as key drivers shaping future navies. These premises are well accepted, but the White Paper’s conclusion was a surprise. It recommended a doubling of Australia’s submarine fleet to 12 boats by 2030-2040, all of which would be a new successor design that would replace the RAN’s Collins Class submarines.
The surprise, and controversy, stem from Australia’s recent experiences. The Collins Class was designed with the strong cooperation of ThyssenKrupp’s Swedish Kockums subsidiary, and built in Australia by state-owned ASC. The class has had a checkered career, including significant difficulties with its combat systems, issues with acoustic signature and propulsion, major cost growth to A$ 5+ billion, and schedule slippage. Worse still, reports indicated that the RAN can only staff 2 of its 6 submarines. High-level attention led to a report and recommendations to improve the force, but whether they will work remains to be seen. Meanwhile, the nature of Australia’s SEA 1000 future submarine project – and its eventual cost – remain unclear, with estimated costs in the A$ 36-44 billion range. This FOCUS article covers Australia’s options, decisions, and plans, as their future submarine program slowly gets underway.
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