CIC [Combat Information Center] Operation in an AGC
[Amphibious Force Flagship equipped with special communications facilities]
The Eldorado reports:
Prior to the Iwo Jima Operation Combat Information Center had been afforded numerous training exercises which started immediately after the commissioning of the ship on the East Coast and continued until its arrival at Pearl Harbor three months later. Nearly all of these exercises, however, were performed within the CIC itself and only on a few occasions was it possible to conduct exercises with the Combat Information Centers of other ships or actually control aircraft.
After arrival at Pearl Harbor in late November 1944 there were training periods off Oahu during which this CIC had extensive practice in working with the other ships of the disposition and in controlling aircraft. This training proved most beneficial in that it not only trained the personnel of the CIC, but also made clear for the first time what would be expected from CIC. Through the close cooperation of the Force Fighter Director and CIC officers the function of CIC was determined and the organization and physical equipment were changed to best produce the results required.
The following is a summary of several of the changes made in CIC prior to this operation which subsequently proved most beneficial:
(1) Upon arrival at Pearl Harbor the Officer personnel of CIC consisted of nine Fighter Directors Officers trained at NRTS [Navy Radar Training School], St. Simons Island, Georgia. Due to the need of Fighter Director Officers elsewhere and the fact this vessel did not have any Officers specially trained in Radar Navigation aboard, two of the Fighter Director Officers of the Eldorado were transferred to other Fighter Director ships and two
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Officers trained at the Radar School at Hollywood, Florida, were transferred to this ship. The special training these Officers had received in Radar Navigation considerably improved the value and amount of surface information produced by CIC. Upon approaching Saipan the weather was so bad that Navigation by Radar was used exclusively and found most satisfactory. The SP [Air and surface search] radar is a great asset to navigation due to its long range on land and surface targets. Briefing sessions of the off duty section of CIC were held during morning General Quarters and on some afternoons each day while enroute to the objective. These sessions insured that both officers and men knew the details of the operation plan and were familiar with other pertinent publications. They also provided a forum for solution of problems of a general nature which came up during watches. The CIC personnel consists of nine officers and forty men. The battle bill was rearranged so that there were two complete and separate teams, the port and starboard General Quarters sections consisting of four officers and twenty men each, the ninth officer acting as Visual Fighter Director Officer. In each of these sections the senior officer was responsible for and in charge of his General Quarters section and acted as Evaluator. In addition in each General Quarters section there was intercept officer, a Surface Navigation Officer, and a Radar Control Officer. The condition watches were arranged on a four section basis. It was possible to switch form a condition to a General Quarters watch or back without causing officers or men to stand more than their share of the watch. This type organization proved highly satisfactory for extended cruising and long periods of time at the objective.
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Chronological SummaryDuring the Iwo Jima Operation CIC on the Eldorado was operated on a watch-and-watch basis commencing at 0400 on D Day. However, a relatively small percentage of the time spent at the objective was taken up with the tracking of “bogies” and “friendlies” on actual intercept flights. The average day-to-day routine in CIC may be broken down as follows, with little real variance being noted: |
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DAY FIGHTER DIRECTION
Due to the fact that the Force Fighter Director was located in the USS Eldorado CIC, Fighter Direction on this ship was primarily concerned with identification of all aircraft in the vicinity of Iwo Jima. The primary responsibility of the Intercept Officer during daylight hours was to keep track of all combat air patrol aircraft. This was accomplished by his maintaining close supervision of the air status board and keeping the position of the planes tracked on a remote PPI [Plan position indicator (radar scope). The average number of planes in the day-light CAP [Combat air patrol] ranged from sixteen to twenty-four on station for an interval of approximately one and one-half hours. These planes were launched by nearby CVE’s and reported to the Eldorado for assignment. The Intercept Officer assigned the divisions of the CAP to the Fighter Director Ships in the screen and to outlying Radar Pickets at stations and at altitudes desired by the Force Fighter Director. Pursuant to the policy of the Force Fighter Director no daylight interceptions were planned to be controlled from this ship, but the Intercept Officer was prepared to take over this function in the event that it could not be performed by the Fighter Director ships because of failure of communications or any other reason. Planes of the CAP which became lost in bad weather were “homed” by the fighter direction team of this ship.
Upon completion of duty on combat air patrol the retiring CAP was made available to CASCU for short missions before returning to their base. As CASCU is located adjacent to CIC on the Eldorado and other AGC’s it was possible to determine before the CAP was relieved whether planes were desired for missions or not.
Identification of all aircraft in this area was facilitated materially by close cooperation with CASCU. All planes on the anti-submarine patrol were controlled by an officer of CASCU who made frequent checks on their location on the Main Display board of CIC; and when any of these planes failed to show proper identification signals he issued instructions to the plane in question. By displaying in CIC expected friendly air contacts, including special flights, and by coordinating the radar reports of all Fighter Director Ships of the task force, CIC was able to identify successfully all friendly aircraft in the vicinity of Iwo Jima. Consequently there were only two false alerts, and these were caused by ships other than fighter director ships reporting a skunk or bogey over TBS [Radio transceiver (VHF). Likewise on the occasion of real raids, CIC was able to evaluate them as such and the task force was alerted in sufficient time to take proper defensive measures.
NIGHT FIGHER DIRECTION
For the first time in any amphibious operation an AGC was equipped for night fighter direction for the assault on Iwo Jima. In solving problems of operations and equipment, much was learned for future operations.
From the night of D-Day until the ship departed from the objective, a night combat air patrol of two night fighters was maintained for the protection of the force and the objective. On the last night, during which a raid occurred, shore based Army P-61 night fighters were used. An additional dusk CAP patrolled each night from 1730 until 1900. This CAP varied in number from eight to twelve. On two occasions weather forced the pancaking of the night CAP planes for several hours.
The night fighter planes were used to investigate various surface contacts, were placed in position to investigate planes which were not identifying themselves or were showing questionable identification, and to combat each raid upon the objective area.
In opposing enemy raids, there were no “kills” although numerous contacts were made on enemy planes which evaded the fighters by violent course and altitude changes. On one occasion the night fighter was about to open fire on a “Helen” after a visual identification at a range of 1000 feet when the “Helen” eluded the pilot by a violent maneuver. Several times night fighters were broken off contacts when they approached the effective range of our anti-aircraft fire.
It is considered very probable that the enemy planes were aware of the night fighters and were consequently hurried in the attacks and unwilling to make steady bombing runs. It is believed that the night fighters harassed the enemy to the extent that he was unable to spend any time outside of AA range in picking targets and planning attacks on them.
The night fighter pilots from the Saratoga and Enterprise were most cooperative and performed most capably. Not a single night fighter plane or pilot from these carriers was lost at the objective due to enemy action, our anti-aircraft fire, or navigational errors, even though control of these planes was constantly shifted from their own base to other ships at the objective.
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AUBURN USED TWO WATCH BILLS
The Auburn employed two watch bills, one for cruising and one for the objective. They seem to be somewhat different from the set-up used by the Eldorado apparently had only 20 enlisted men on watch at General Quarters, while the Auburn had 29. This may be due to the fact that the radiomen used on nets guarded by CIC were considered a part of CIC complement on the Auburn while on other ships they may be borrowed from Air Support teams or from the ship’s communications complement.
THE AUBURN'S UNDERWAY WATCH BILL
POSITION |
COND. No.3
|
GQ | COMMUNICATIONS | |
---|---|---|---|---|
OFFICERS |
||||
Duty Eval. |
X
|
X
|
All Circuits | |
Interceptor |
X
|
X
|
All Circuits | |
Surface |
X
|
X
|
All Circuits | |
FFDO |
Available
|
X
|
All Circuits | |
Evaluator |
Available
|
X
|
1JS | |
Radar Control Officer |
X
|
All Radar Circuits | ||
Snapper |
X
|
VHF 2ch., (608) | ||
RMO |
Available
|
X
|
SP to Xmtr. Rm | |
ENLISTED MEN | ||||
SK Op. |
X
|
X
|
21 JS | |
SK Vertical Plot. |
X
|
X
|
21 JS | |
SK Recorder |
X
|
X
|
21 JS | |
Status Board |
X
|
X
|
VHF (4 Ch.) | |
Dead Reckoner |
X
|
VHF (4 Ch.) | ||
Horizontal Air Plot. |
X
|
X
|
21 JS | |
SG2 (CIC) |
X
|
X
|
22 JS | |
DRT Operator |
X
|
X
|
22 JS | |
Visual Recorder |
X
|
X
|
22 JS | |
6JF Talker |
X
|
X
|
6JF | |
SG1 (Fwd) |
X
|
X
|
23 JS | |
Summary Plot & VG |
X
|
X
|
23 JS | |
JA Talker |
X
|
X
|
JA, 2JF | |
RCM Operator |
X
|
X
|
JX | |
Lkt. Outside |
X
|
X
|
1JS, 2JF | |
IFD (s) Radio Monitor |
X
|
X
|
IFD (s) Freq. | |
VHF Radio Monitor |
X
|
X
|
VHF 4 Ch. | |
IFD (p) Radio Monitor |
X
|
X
|
30.2, 37.6 Freq. | |
TBS Radio Monitor |
X
|
X
|
TBS A and B | |
Radio Tech. |
X
|
X
|
SP to Xmtr. RM | |
Lookout Standby |
X
|
|||
RCM Standby |
X
|
X
|
||
DRT Standby |
X
|
|||
TBS Plotter |
X
|
TBS A and B | ||
IFD Plot |
X
|
IFD | ||
Radar Standby (CIC) |
X
|
|||
Radar Standby (Fwd) |
X
|
|||
1JS Talker |
X
|
1JS | ||
Supervisor of Watch |
X
|
X
|
||
The objective watch bill is the same as shown above for officers, but minor changes are made for the enlisted men. A messenger is provided, the fighter net is monitored at all times, a man is assigned to dead reckon ASP planes at all times, only one SG is manned, and one plotter is assigned to plot contacts reported over the IFD net. Otherwise the bill is substantially the same. |
Source: CIC [Combat Information Center] 2, no.7 (July 1945): 1-5
Related Sources:
- CIC Operations on a Night Carrier
- CIC Yesterday and Today
- Combat Information Center Manual - Radar Bulletin No. 6
- Cursor Scales for the VG
- Post Mortem CIC Notes
- Target Information from CIC