TRAN

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

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JACKSONVILLE POLICE AND FIRE .

PENSION FUND

Plaintiff . CASE NO. A-686775

VS.

. DEPT. NO. XI

CHARLES ERGEN, et al. .

. Transcript of Defendants . Proceedings

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

HEARING ON MOTION FOR EXPEDITED DISCOVERY

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2013

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF: BRIAN W. BOSCHEE, ESQ.

MARK LEBOVITCH, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS: JEFFREY S. RUGG, ESQ.

BRIAN FRAWLEY, ESQ.

MAX FETAZ, ESQ.

GREGORY MARKEL, ESQ.
MARK E. FERRARIO, ESQ.
JOSHUA M. REISMAN, ESQ.

COURT RECORDER: TRANSCRIPTION BY:

JILL HAWKINS FLORENCE HOYT

District Court Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2013, 9:35 A.M. (Court was called to order)

THE COURT: You can sit down. All right. For those of you who don't know, Mr. Fetaz was most recently my law clerk after a two-year stint. I'm now training a new law clerk. But he never worked on any of this case, because it didn't exist when he was still here, and we had blocked him from Brownstein Hyatt cases from the time he got an offer.

(Pause in the proceedings)

THE COURT: I was going to start with them and grill them first.

MR. RUGG: I just wanted to give the Court one piece of information. I shared this with all counsel last night, and I think's material for Your Honor to know.

At a board meeting, a Dish board meeting last night the board voted to put together a special litigation committee to consider the allegations made in the first amended complaint. And I think it's likely to and that we should anticipate that the special litigation committee will make an appropriate motion to stay this case while it does its investigation.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RUGG: I called counsel about that last night so they wouldn't be surprised.

THE COURT: Aren't you glad you knew that ahead of

I would have liked to know that. 1 2 MR. REISMAN: Your Honor, also just kind of a 3 housekeeping measure. Charles Ergen has his motion to 4 associate counsel pending today, and it's unopposed. 5 MR. BOSCHEE: We have no opposition to it, Your Honor. 6 7 Anything else? THE COURT: Granted. 8 MR. REISMAN: And I have an order for the Judge. Should I submit it after --9 THE COURT: You can. 10 Anything else before I grill you? 11 MR. BOSCHEE: Before I let my co-counsel --12 13 THE COURT: Because I've been on a roll grilling 14 people today. 15 MR. BOSCHEE: And I appreciate that, Your Honor. Before I let you grill my co-counsel, primarily, who is going 16 17 to directly and specifically answer all your questions this week, I did want to say we did hear Your Honor's concern. 18 19 That's why we amended the complaint. I think -- and I 20 actually did a lunch training. I think we complied with terms 21 of 227 in terms of our appendix and everything that we 22 submitted with our order, but you're probably --23 THE COURT: Your motion is too long. It's only 24 allowed to be 30 pages.

MR. BOSCHEE: How long was the motion we submitted?

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THE COURT: Thirty-seven. My kids asked me that last night when I said, I wonder if I should just stop reading at the page limit they're required to use.

MR. BOSCHEE: I was going to say I thought the authority was only 30 pages. I thought the extras was what put it over, the appendix and whatnot. But that was a clerical error on my part. I'm sorry. I thought that -- because we do have like a three-and-a-half or four-page appendix.

THE COURT: In CityCenter I actually struck one that was -- but it was like 44 pages.

MR. BOSCHEE: Well, the idea --

THE COURT: Maybe it was 66.

MR. BOSCHEE: The idea was to submit, obviously, a 30-page motion with obviously the long appendix and the properly numbered documentation.

I did want to address before I let co-counsel apparently get grilled by Your Honor, with respect to the special litigation committee we did have -- and I appreciate Counsel sending an email last night. The committee apparently was formed approximately, giving Jeff the benefit of the doubt that he let us know immediately after he knew, was formed at about 11:00 o'clock Eastern Time last night, our concern being why was a special litigation committee formed last night at 11:00 o'clock, on the eve of this hearing, as opposed to when

the Bankruptcy Court had presented issues, when we had filed our complaint, when we initially come before Your Honor. I mean, it seems a little odd to us.

THE COURT: Probably because you filed a new amended complaint and it's something they should look at.

MR. BOSCHEE: But then why didn't the committee form -- wasn't it formed at that point? That's our concern.

THE COURT: I don't know.

MR. BOSCHEE: And we also --

THE COURT: It doesn't really matter.

MR. BOSCHEE: Well, we also don't know anything about the committee was the other primary concern. We don't know who's on it, we don't know what charge it has.

THE COURT: Who's on the committee, Mr. Rugg?

MR. RUGG: We require 48 hours' notice before a meeting, so we couldn't do it right away. So --

THE COURT: Who's all on the committee?

MR. RUGG: The committee is made up of Mr. Tom
Ortolf, who's a board member, and actually the day before the
meeting a new board member was elected to the board. There's
an AK on that. I'm happy to give it to you. His name is Mr.
George Brokaw. He is appointed to the committee. Though he's
not starting as a director until October 7th, he will be
serving on the committee immediately, which is allowed under
Nevada law. As long as there's one director you can have non

directors on it. So that's the membership of the committee.

THE COURT: So it's a two-member special litigation committee?

MR. RUGG: It's a two-member special litigation committee.

THE COURT: It's okay.

MR. BOSCHEE: Charged with what doing what precisely and under what timeline is the other concern we had. that was something that wasn't addressed in the email. are just concerns we have. At this late date we don't think that should, absent a motion, interfere with anything that we're going to talk about today. It's good to know, but --

THE COURT: Let me ask Mr. Rugg a question. Is the special litigation committee going to only be concerned with this litigation, or are they also going to look at the other litigation that is identified in these pleadings?

MR. RUGG: My understanding is they're charged with investigating the complaints made by this plaintiff.

Okay. That's fine. Anything else? Is the a time -- well, yes. MR. BOSCHEE: under what timeline? Because obviously one of our concerns is

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THE COURT: I'm going to grill you now, not your co-counsel.

MR. BOSCHEE: Okay.

THE COURT:

THE COURT: One of the things that I sent you away to do after our last discussion on whether I was going to allow expedited discovery at this point in time was I need a preliminary injunction motion. I now have that. And I'm going to give you a break to answer this question.

MR. BOSCHEE: Okay.

THE COURT: What are you really seeking to enjoin?

Because I've read your motion, and it's long and it's over the page limit, but I still can't figure out, other than you want to "enjoin Ergen and his loyalists on the board from influencing or interfering with Dish's efforts to buy LightSquared asset." Figure out what you're trying to do.

So how about I take a break for -- very short break. As soon as you're done caucusing with your co-counsel I need you to tell me what you are seeking by way of the preliminary injunction so I can then make a determination if it is appropriate, especially given the special litigation committee, to allow expedited discovery before I have an evidentiary hearing on the preliminary injunction. But I need clarification.

MR. BOSCHEE: More clarification, more specificity. We will have that for you, Your Honor.

(Court recessed at 9:41 a.m., until 9:50 a.m.)

THE COURT: Sit down, please.

All right. Team Plaintiff, what's the answer?

MR. BOSCHEE: We want to enjoin -- the short answer, we want to enjoin the people currently controlling the bid process from controlling going forward. We believe that given the conflict situation and really Corporations 101, the people controlling the process in a conflict situation, the disinterested, the non-conflicted directors should be the ones that are actually controlling the process. And the fact that that isn't happening is creating an ongoing and, you know, potentially even greater harm to Dish getting this LightSquared bid. And truthfully, again, since the last time we were here the Wall Street Journal article came out, and we now know that's exactly what the special committee wanted to happen, was for the disinterested directors to control this process. And then Mr. Ergen just disbanded that committee.

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I mean, I could expound on it, if Your Honor wants, but really at the end of the day that's what we're looking for in terms of an injunction, is for the people that are with Ergen, loyal to Ergen, that Ergen clearly is controlling not be the ones directing this process, that the disinterested directors — and it sounds like we have at least two of them, because they're on the special litigation committee — would be the ones controlling this process.

Also, Your Honor, one thing that Mr. -THE COURT: And by "this process" you mean --

MR. BOSCHEE: The bidding process. 1 THE COURT: -- the bid process at the live auction 2 3 the Bankruptcy Court is going to conduct in New York. 4 MR. BOSCHEE: That's correct. And everything 5 leading up to that. Everything leading up to that, yes. 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MR. BOSCHEE: And also, Your Honor, I did note one thing that Mr. Rugg said that I think is probably important 8 9 for consideration of the preliminary injunction. think the new director starts until October 8th, is what he 10 11 said --12 MR. RUGG: 7th. 13 MR. BOSCHEE: 7th. Okay. 14 THE COURT: He's going to start on the committee 15 ahead of time because he's allowed to under Nevada law as long as there's one director on the committee. 16 17 MR. BOSCHEE: I understood that. My question was 18 going to be is he actually going to do that before he takes --19 starts as a director on October 7th. 20 THE COURT: I thought that was what Mr. Rugg said. 21 That's my understanding. MR. RUGG: 22 Okay. And --MR. BOSCHEE: 23 THE COURT: And everybody in the back row is saying 24 yes.

I didn't -- that wasn't clear to me.

MR. BOSCHEE:

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THE COURT: Thank you, gentlemen, for that.

MR. BOSCHEE: And with that I will --

THE COURT: Okay. Let me tell what I have so -because, as you can see, I have a large pile, so that if
someone thinks you submitted something that I don't have that
you can tell me.

I have the amended complaint that I reviewed with interest last night, I have the motion for preliminary injunction, I have Ergen's opposition, I have Dish Network's supplemental opposition, I have Goodbarn's response, I have a really fine appendix that makes other appendixes pale in comparison, and I have two motions to associate counsel.

Mr. Ferrario, do you want me to grant Mr. Markel's request?

MR. FERRARIO: Yes, Your Honor. And I have an order here --

THE COURT: Okay. You can approach.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ FERRARIO: -- that I can submit after the hearing.

THE COURT: And I think that's all I have. Does someone think I have something more that's not in here? This is from our prior hearing, this part of the pile.

MR. MARKEL: Your Honor, Gregory Markel. I'm not sure if you want to include it, because I'm not sure it's relevant to today, but there also was a motion to dismiss by a

couple of the parties, as well.

THE COURT: I don't have those on today.

MR. MARKEL: No, they're not on today. I didn't know whether you wanted to --

THE COURT: I'm not going to do them, because they're not on today.

All right. It's plaintiff's motion.

MR. LEBOVITCH: Your Honor, would you prefer to grill me while I'm standing here, or at the lectern?

keep voice up. As I think I said -- I don't know if you were in the room when I said this last time you were here. We use a digital audio-video recording system, and it triggers by who's talking. So sometimes it's really important that if more than one of you talk at a time that we wait and be polite and let others talk, because my record gets screwed up if too many people try and talk at once. It will pick you up at either the table or the lectern, but it is important that you keep your voice up. And the recorder will give you a high sign or something if she's having trouble hearing you. And if it's really bad, the marshal will come hit you on the shoulder.

MR. LEBOVITCH: I will speak slowly, which is my normal problem. Volume has never been --

THE COURT: Never been your issue, huh?

MR. LEBOVITCH: -- never been a problem for me.

THE COURT: I look forward to that.

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MR. LEBOVITCH: Most people complain about me being too loud.

Well, thank you, Your Honor. And, as Mr. Boschee said, we took to heart Your Honor's comments. We realized that it made sense, and it really was an opportunity to update our complaint to take into account the many new facts that had arisen since we filed the initial complaint. Also to organize The defendants had said that they weren't sure which counts were implicated by our request for injunctive relief, and so that's really the change that was made, is having Count 1 articulate our basis for injunction. And, of course, there was a Wall Street Journal article. And our complaint really tried -- our amended complaint tried to crystallize the problem that Dish faces, Your Honor. Put simply, if not for the baggage from Charles Ergen's prior and ongoing breaches of duty, Dish would participate in a strategically critical bidding process just like any other third-party bidder. That's all Dish and its shareholders would ask for here.

And what we see now is that Harbinger and LightSquared, which is the debtor and its lead shareholder, they had pitted Ergen and Dish against each other, and they've done so through a series of filings challenging -- they seek to disallow Ergen's debt claims. That's a billion-dollar

personal investment by Charles Ergen that LightSquared and Harbinger are seeking to disallow. They're also seeking to disallow his vote, so he would lose voting rights.

They put Dish and Ergen together because Dish and Ergen are acting in unison, and they say Dish is not a good-faith bidder and therefore it should not get the benefits of its stalking horse status. That's extremely valuable in an auction, to get the bankruptcy law benefits of a stalking horse. If Your Honor wants any clarification of what those benefits are, I could talk about them, but --

THE COURT: No. I understand what they are.

MR. LEBOVITCH: They're very significant. Okay.

And Harbinger is proposing -- so you have LightSquared

proposing a bidding process that does not give Dish stalking

horse status. That's a bidding advantage. Harbinger is

proposing a reorganization plan that, as I said, attacks

Ergen's position and also would keep the spectrum in the first

place. So you have very -- numerous competing interests among

Dish and Ergen.

The <u>Wall Street Journal</u> article that came out the day of hearing, I guess later that night, we did feel -- we recognized that in our initial complaint we were making some inferences. We said, this is very unusual to have Mr. Howard resign in the time that he did. We understood that we didn't know exactly why we were asking the Court to make an

inference. The <u>Wall Street Journal</u> article confirms that he resigned in protest. It confirmed something we didn't know, which is that the committee was actually disbanded before Dish even made its initial bid. It confirmed that the board only put two members on. That was in our initial complaint, but it was an inference. The board essentially conceded there's only two people that could be on the independent committee, Mr. Howard and Mr. Goodbarn.

Now, why did the committee get disbanded? Because it tried to act independently. It wanted to control the bidding process going forward, and it wanted the ability to have Mr. Ergen disgorge some of his profits on the debt that he had purchased.

Now, why did the special committee have these conditions? We talk about the \underline{DBSD} litigation, which was a prior negative event.

THE COURT: And that's before the bankruptcy judge?

MR. LEBOVITCH: It's before the same Bankruptcy

Court. I can't represent that it's the same judge, Your

Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ LEBOVITCH: I could look -- I could look that up, but I don't know offhand.

THE COURT: If you don't know the answer, don't guess.

MR. LEBOVITCH: I will not. But the special committee and the board, having just lived through this, of course they're aware of the prior debacle that Dish had to suffer, and so it makes sense for them to say, we need to control the process here because what you're doing is upsetting LightSquared and Harbinger and we want to make friends with them. And, of course, they say, we're not going to let you make a bid if it means you get to keep all the profits. We think there is a question about why you made those — about why you made those debt purchases and whether, irrespective of what any charter says, you used confidential corporate information —

THE COURT: And some of those purchases were made prior to the bankruptcy filings.

MR. LEBOVITCH: Some of those were prior to the bankruptcy filing. There was some small -- I mean, well, hundreds of millions of dollars, but we're talking about I think a billion dollars of debt was purchased at discounts, I believe it was like somewhere between seven or \$800 million out of pocket for Mr. Ergen. But we know when the committee said, here's our conditions, he disbanded the committee, makes the offer for LightSquared afterwards.

Now, all we're asking for today, Your Honor, is discovery. We can talk about it, but we obviously think it's very narrowly tailored, and it's -- we want to show the

predicate breach and the harm. Those are the elements of an -- the key elements of an injunction that you prove through discovery. We want to show that Mr. Ergen's handling of the special committee was itself a predicate breach, his insistence on controlling the process right now is an ongoing breach, and that those breaches create the ongoing risk of irreparable harm. That's what we're focused on.

Now, I want to on for now some of the defendants' arguments that we saw in last night's briefs. So I tried to prepare some responses very quickly. Start really with Mr. Goodbarn's motion and perhaps highlight what it doesn't say.

Mr. Goodbarn's focus -- he never says -- he's one of the two members, of course. He never says you shouldn't grant the injunction, he never says it wouldn't help the company if independent directors were in control of the process, he never says there's no harm. What he basically says is, I don't want to be deposed, I don't want to have to produce my own documents. Of course, a lot of our requests, as I'll explain, really go to the company anyway, but there are requests that would go to the committee's files and to Mr. Goodbarn.

The fact is, Your Honor, these cases -- these cases of breach of fiduciary duty that turn on bad on faith, they're very sensitive to the evidence. We cited to leading cases that I'll talk about, the Hollinger case and the T. Rowe Price case, and, you know, what I can say with personal experience

on <u>T. Rowe Price</u>, because I was the clerk for Vice Chancellor Lamb when he wrote that opinion, the end product, that opinion was nowhere to be found when the complaint was filed, nowhere to be found. And in fact the defendants in that case, as I know the defendants in the <u>Hollinger</u> case also, started out saying, demand is not excused and business judgment rule applies and there's nothing to see here, please move on, Your Honor. And on the discovery it was a close call, because there were strong arguments of why you might apply the business judgment rule in the <u>T. Rowe Price</u> fact pattern. They went all out on that. And the court made a decision, which, you know, I think the court said —

THE COURT: You know our statute's a little bit different than the Delaware statute; right?

MR. LEBOVITCH: For good cause? I guess which statute are we talking, Your Honor?

THE COURT: When there is an acquisition our statute is slightly different on what we're supposed to consider.

MR. LEBOVITCH: Your Honor, the differences I don't think would make a difference here, because we still look at the conflicts and the fairness. In other words, there's still a duty of loyalty, and here we're not talking about a duty to maybe maximize value or something like that. We're talking about a conflict transaction, okay, a bid by the company that's being controlled by Mr. Ergen. And you still need

good- faith loyalty and independent -- an independent process.

And so I understand that there's differences, but I don't think those differences would change an outcome here, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Under the Nevada analysis you think that there is the same analysis for disinterestedness as there is in Delaware?

MR. LEBOVITCH: I think under the <u>Amerco</u> case, which for demand futility --

THE COURT: Some of us call it Schoen II.

MR. LEBOVITCH: Schoen II. Okay.

THE COURT: Not the Supreme Court, but those of us who've lived through all these --

MR. LEBOVITCH: Every time I come here, Your Honor, I'll learn more of the local tendencies.

THE COURT: You'll learn something new, yes.

MR. LEBOVITCH: I will.

Nevada courts will look to Delaware. Obviously there could be places where there's differences. I think on the facts here, and we could talk about the independence of the board, it's — I'm not aware of any state in the country that would actually look and conclude that half or a majority of this board is independent. And we can get to that. But, again, we say we need to show the predicate breach. And, again, in the

Hollinger case and <u>T. Rowe Price</u> they're a close call till you get the records. And even the records -- in <u>T. Rowe Price</u> I can tell you, and it's in the opinion, the minutes are sanitized. The key fact in the <u>T. Rowe Price</u> case was the special committee members' handwritten notes. And I remember because I found them, Your Honor. Those notes during meetings that they took and kept said, how can this be fair, what are we supposed to do when he's forcing it on us no matter what we do. And that shows itself in the opinion, Your Honor. That's what these cases are made of.

Now, the defendants say that we're seeking relief, you know, based on future facts and that's prospective. In a certain respect that's obviously true. That's what injunctive relief is for. You have to show a predicate breach and ongoing prospective harm that you're trying to stop, enjoin, avoid. And so in the end that discovery that we're seeking goes to the heart of what the Court would need to essentially even consider the elements of an injunction and also to consider how to fashion the relief in an appropriate way. This is a unique fact pattern, although, again, I think the legal principles of loyalty and good faith are -- should be clear, and I think the evidence will make even clearer.

One last point about Mr. Goodbarn before I move on is he says -- kind of says he shouldn't be deposed and that his counsel should not be deposed. As to him we put in a

wanted to flag it, Your Honor -- it may be that we take one of committee members and one of the other directors. We said that. And, again, you know, if we had had a chance to discuss it with Mr. Goodbarn's counsel, that may have been something we would do, because we may not need both special committee members. Clearly we think we need one.

As far as counsel goes, we're not trying to get someone's privileged advice unless it's going to be waived. But in a corporate transactional context lawyers are -- the corporate lawyers, not Mr. Markel, but he's going to have a corporate partner who is advising the committee just like a banker. They negotiate with the other side, with Ergen. They're adversarial, and it is very typical that lawyers there would be deposed. Again, in the T. Rowe Price case my recollection is that that happened. I don't remember if the opinion identifies that. And the Hollinger case was very heavily lawyered. Some of the lawyers in this room or at least their firms were involved, and lawyers were being deposed, because I remember I was on the defense side for one of the parties at that time.

The relief we're seeking is really not radical. The defendants like to say we've changed our whole complaint, abandoned our whole complaint. I think we dealt with that.

We simply reorganized it, because it was true with all these

new facts we have to clarify for the Court and for everyone what is the relief we're seeking, but the relief we're seeking is not this mandatory injunction. In fact, part of the relief that was granted in the Hollinger case is very similar. the Hollinger case Mr. Black, when he decided that the special committee, the independent directors were being too independent, posed a threat to him, he disbanded it. did it through bylaws, but he disbanded that committee. that committee kept fighting. And what the court said on the record that was before the court is, this disbanding is of no use, it's not a valid act, it's a breach of fiduciary duty because it was disloyal and not taken in good faith. That was then Vice Chancellor Strine's -- now he's a chancellor -- but that was based on a very full record. And so this is not -it may be unusual because the situation doesn't come up, but there's precedent for saying, I'm not going to let you take away from independent directors something that you had granted to them for good reason and in part because that's creating an ongoing harm.

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The assertion that we're supporting Harbinger or supplanting the Bankruptcy Court doesn't really fly. Just the opposite. Any independent board facing this situation, Your Honor -- and I don't know -- we'll try to present evidence if that's helpful to the Court -- any independent board here would say, we need an independent process, because of the

ongoing lawsuits we need independent process, and so all we're trying to do is make it harder for the Bankruptcy Court to hurt Dish here by getting a ruling here, absent any agreement with the defendants, to send the message to the Bankruptcy Court Dish is acting independently, you shouldn't punish Dish even if you're not happy with what Mr. Ergen did. That's we believe Corporate Governance 101, and that's really what -- we're just trying to bring the parties back to that situation.

Now, again, there's an ongoing problem. It's not hypotheticals, who you see a lot in our papers it's hypotheticals of what may or could happen, it's the nature of injunctions, but our facts that will support the injunction are based on ongoing breaches, which is, we allege, buying the debt without telling the board, knowing that it's going to put Dish in a precarious position when it tries to pursue a strategic objective that Mr. Ergen himself has said is essential, and also disbanding the committee to ensure that he controls what Dish does, rather then face the chance that the committee actually goes against his wishes.

And, again, there's ongoing harm. And I want to talk about the conflict, because there's a fair amount of discussion that there's really not a conflict. If you assume the only question is will Ergen be paid and you assume the bidding has already cleared his price, well, that's what the defendants want to focus on, that's he'll be paid as long as

the bidding goes there. But they're just ignoring the key facts that we put in the complaint, put in the brief.

Harbinger and LightSquared are attacking his position.

They're seeking to invalidate it, they're seeking to disallow his economic claims. A billion-dollar personal investment that he that has is under attack is under attack. Dish has a very significant strategic objective that it's trying to pursue. And the only reason why it faces a risk from the Bankruptcy Court -- I mean, in other words, it's always going to face a risk of losing in the bidding, but the only risk it faces of losing its stalking horse status or other equitable relief the Bankruptcy Court can provide is because Ergen's not letting go.

So we have a very real conflict, because there's a real lawsuit, they're real claims, and really, you know, again, had Ergen not bought the debt and not disbanded the committee, these risks either would not exist or would be significantly mitigated. And what we're asking the Court to do is take a look at a real-world problem and provide a real-world solution to it.

Now, the <u>DBSD</u> case, there's an argument that the defendants make that, you know, the facts of <u>DBSD</u> are different. We don't dispute that. The facts are different. The point is that to show the broad equitable powers that the Bankruptcy Court has and, more importantly, show that the

board knows that Dish itself has already gotten into trouble in the past in being found to have acted in bad faith. just supports why any board acting in good faith, acting independently of Ergen would kick him out of the room. It's just what happens. You say, Mr. Ergen, you've got a conflict, get out of the room. And I think we -- I don't remember if it was in our brief or not, Your Honor, but picture a slightly alternative scenario. Picture a board that doesn't have a controlling shareholder, picture a board that has some activist, a Carl Icahn or a Bill Ackman or, you know, you name it, someone who gets himself on the board and the company's looking to buy a bankrupt entity, and then Carl Icahn, who's not in control of the board, says, oh, by the way, I bought a billion dollars of the target's debt. There should be no doubt in anybody's mind that that board would say, Carl, you're out of the room, you're not part of this process at all, we're not going to debate it, we're not going to justify it, you're out. And I don't think Mr. Icahn would have any problem with that, because he'd understand he has to be isolated.

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Demand. I think that -- I believe it was the Dish brief -- and, again, we got them late last night, but I believe it was the Dish brief that talks about demand. And it's interesting, they cite a lot of law that you have to establish demand. They don't actually give any facts that

show that the board is independent. And that's because they can't, Your Honor. All they say is there's no conflict.

They'd have to show that a majority of the board could consider a demand. There's an eight-member board at the time this complaint was filed. Mr. Ergen, Mrs. Ergen, his best friend and business partner for 40 years, and the CEO, that's half the board right there. And I am -- again, you know, I don't think there's any basis in Nevada law or the law of essentially any state that looks at independence to say that ties like that, I mean, family relations, a CEO with a controlling shareholder or a best friend and business partner for 40 years would not be disqualified for demand purposes. And then obviously we also talk about the other three directors who were question because of their longstanding ties with Ergen and being current or former executives.

But in the end it's about the conflict, Your Honor. They say there's no conflict, therefore you don't have to consider demand because there's no reason to look at independence. It Your Honor sees that there's no conflict here, then that position is going to be ripe. But if Your Honor sees the potential for conflict that warrants discovery and a possible hearing, which we think should be eminently reasonable, if not very much a given, then demand is going to be excused for these purposes.

Irreparable harm. Again, we think the defendants

try to change the story. They say, well, we're going to have a bidding process for the spectrum so we know what it's worth. That's really not the issue from a Dish perspective. question is what is the benefit to Dish of getting the spectrum and what is the harm from Ergen's breaches. And our point, Your Honor, is there may be scenarios where with hindsight we could say, well, you know, Ergen cost the company an extra \$200 million or \$400 million, and we could award money damages. But there's a lot of very obvious scenarios where it would be very difficult to quantify that in court. If they could have gotten the company at 2 billion and now they have to bid 2.4, how much of that extra cost will be attributable to the problems Dish has because of what I'll call the Ergen baggage? If they lose the bidding -- if there's no sale of the spectrum -- you know, that's what Harbinger's proposing; they're also attacking Ergen's debt, so is it possible that the spectrum would be sold if you didn't have all this distraction with Ergen's debt purchases and controlling Dish? That's entirely possible, Your Honor. so while anyone can talk about what, you know, scenarios can result in money damages, and we recognize that there were scenarios that can result in money damages, there's a high likelihood that Ergen's breaches are currently impairing Dish, and if there's going to be any harm, it may well be irreparable harm. So that's really what we're trying to do.

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And, again, Dish just wants to be treated like a third-party bidder. They just want to top anyone else that's out there, win the bidding. Ergen's involvement is impeding that, and that's what the special committee told Your Honor.

Pretty much at the end, and then I'll turn to the discovery requests, if Your Honor would like. But the balancing of harms and the public policy, we see an argument from I guess it was Dish or Ergen that the board has done a good job for the company, that was kind of the argument. We don't dispute that. When there's no conflict of interest between Ergen and the shareholder -- and the other shareholders, they do a good job of running the business. That's not uncommon with a controlled company. The whole question is what happens when there's a conflict between the controller and the shareholders. That's the point. And so the fact that they're good at other times doesn't mean you shouldn't have an independent process when there's a conflict.

Again, with the Bankruptcy Court, Your Honor would not be supplanting the Bankruptcy Court's findings at all.

All Your Honor would be doing, if we can convince Your Honor on the evidence, is saying, Dish is going to act independently, that can only send a positive message to the court — the Bankruptcy Court to say, there's no reason to hurt Dish here.

And then really, on the discovery, I can go -- I

don't know if Your Honor wants me to go through the requests,
but they are very focused --

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THE COURT: I don't want you to go through the requests. I read them. I understand them. I know what they say.

MR. LEBOVITCH: Okay. They're very focused on the special committee's actions and what's happening now. And if there's --

THE COURT: Talk to me about the impact of the special litigation committee.

MR. LEBOVITCH: Okay. Okay. There's -- the special litigation committee is not taking over the process right now. As far as I could tell and as far as any special litigation committee I've seen, particularly one that I guess may or may not be getting off the ground before October 7th, they're not going to reach a conclusion and take action by the end of October, early November, which is when we believe injunctive relief is warranted. They might look into the debt purchases, but we're not even seeking to expedite that. That's a long-So we don't know their charge, we don't know term process. We have a history, obviously, with Mr. Ergen their timing. disbanding the last special committee. All we got is an 11:00 p.m. email saying, a committee's been created. information about what it does.

Now, what would -- and I understand Nevada can

approach these things differently, but we did find some precedent in Delaware where the Delaware courts have said, I'm not going to slow things down because of a special litigation committee. And particularly because the board member's not officially joined until October 7th and we don't know what role will be had or what timing is being imposed on the committee, so it's very possible that the irreparable harm will come and pass long before the committee gets off the ground, much less takes action. And I say that because, from experience, these committees do investigations -- when they're thorough and not just a whitewash it takes time. They hire their own lawyers, it takes time.

But in the <u>Kaufman versus Computer Associates</u> I believe it was Vice Chancellor Lamb who said that, "A sham SLC that is established merely as a device for delaying litigation will receive little respect from the court." And I do note, Your Honor, that Dish has already said they're going to be moving to dismiss. We were surprised to hear that Mr. Goodbarn is not on the special litigation committee, that it's a different director whose independence has been challenged here, he's a former executive. And what you have, though, is in the <u>Kaufman</u> case Vice Chancellor Lamb actually explains, you know, these people, they're not only named as defendants that comprise now this newly created special litigation committee, they move to dismiss. And he

says, "Rather than taking steps to investigate at the time the allegations were brought, they filed a motion to dismiss. How can I ignore that?" And, again, Your Honor, the cite -- the cite for it is 2005 WL 3470589, (Del.Ch. December 21st, 2005).

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So we think that the special litigation committee, maybe it's going to do a great job down the road, maybe it's going to find that the charter provision, notwithstanding what Mr. Ergen and Dish have said, you know, is an absurd argument, maybe they'll find it's a good argument. We know the old special committee thought it was good enough that they wanted the ability to disgorge. But that's not going to solve the immediate problem, and we don't think that getting the limited discovery we seek in any way impairs the special committee's efforts. We think if there's confidentiality concerns, it is standard, as all the lawyers here sign all time, we could do attorneys' eyes only confidentiality agreements to preserve the confidentiality of anything that's sensitive. And again, if the special litigation committee looks at our complaint and finds it meritorious, in our experience they'd talk to us and That's almost universally what happens if work with us. they're actually finding merit in the cases. And so the fact that we get some discovery now over the next few weeks, before the committee even gets off the ground, is frankly completely relevant. And, again, I think it would be very prejudicial to assume the independence of the committee right now knowing

that one of the members, his independence is already being questioned in this litigation and also the timing of the committee's creation and the lack of clarity about what they're doing, coupled with the near impossibility that this special litigation is actually going to have the time or ability to take over the process to save Dish now while we're seeking injunctive relief. Does that satisfy Your Honor, or at least answer your question?

THE COURT: Thank you. I'll let you have a chance to stand up again if you want.

MR. LEBOVITCH: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Rugg.

MR. RUGG: Thank you, Your Honor.

This case is really not complex. The complex machinations of plaintiff set aside, the issues presented to the Court are pretty straightforward. Number one, is there a conflict that needs to be enjoined? Plaintiff can't point to a conflict. They keep looking backwards, they keep saying that the debt creates a conflict. We've presented and the facts support that Mr. Ergen's affiliates' ownership of the debt is not creating an ongoing conflict at this point. Everybody's interests are in line in seeing Dish succeed in the bidding process. What plaintiffs want is the extreme remedy of taking out the duly elected board, setting them aside, and leaving -- I'm still not exactly sure -- I think

one board member, Mr. Goodbarn. But they sued him, too, so I'm not even sure that he qualifies under their independence rules, to make very important decisions on a multibillion-dollar transaction going forward. That is an extreme remedy and is not something that you can point to precedent that's been allowed by anything. Nevada in Schoen and its statutes say that a board controls the business of the company. Nevada also has a statute, as Your Honor has pointed out, 78.140, that deals with transactions that might involve a conflicted director. It doesn't mean that you have to take out the conflicted director. There are several ways that a board can act within it's fiduciary duties and conduct a transaction where there's an interested director.

So we think that either way, even if there was a conflict here -- and we don't think there's a conflict going forward at this point. But even if there was a conflict here, it can be resolved by the Court by looking and being advised on 78.140 and actng in compliance with it. If down the line plaintiff still contends that that transaction is then -- wasn't appropriately handled, that's a case plaintiff can bring at that time. But there's no need to enjoin the duly elected directors from doing their job.

And coming back to the conflict, all they point to is the debt. Now, they talked to Harbinger, as well. Now, Harbinger is a --

THE COURT: Under the items in the Nevada statute that doesn't seem to be a conflict, the debt.

MR. RUGG: Yeah. Harbinger --

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THE COURT: I mean, there's certainly issues, but --

MR. RUGG: Right. Because in some ways by arguing Harbinger they're saying that whenever a corporation is sued its board must have breached its fiduciary duties. And we know that's not the case. Harbinger, by the way, is suing everybody in the industry to try to stop them from getting the debt. I mean, they've started -- I understand from my New York colleagues they've started actually a RICO case against pretty much everybody in the GPS industry to try to keep them away from their spectrum. Harbinger is desperate to go through bankruptcy, get rid of its debt, but keep its asset. I'm not going to comment here on the bankruptcy process. had my own experiences over there in Bankruptcy Court that color it to some extent, but that's a question for the Bankruptcy Court. And let the Bankruptcy Court deal with it. It's not something for this Court, and it doesn't -- just the fact that Harbinger has sued Dish doesn't mean that Dish has done anything wrong or that its board has breached its fiduciary duties or that there's an existing conflict going forward. Otherwise, as we've said, once a company is sued they'd have to appoint non directors to figure out how to handle even a lawsuit against the company.

Now, just to be clear about the facts that I think motivated the amended complaint. They want to point to a <u>Wall Street Journal</u> article. The <u>Wall Street Journal</u> article, bunch of unnamed sources. And if we're going to go by the <u>Wall Street Journal</u> article, we've provided a different <u>Wall Street Journal</u> article to Your Honor that says the Dish board is actually doing pretty well by its spectrum and it's increased it by --

THE COURT: And I try not to worry about what the media says.

MR. RUGG: And I think that's fair. So we set aside the <u>Wall Street Journal</u> article. We've already talked about the Harbinger complaint. Let's talk about the other facts that caused plaintiff to amend its complaint.

known, the articles of Dish. The articles of Dish deal with the situation. They accuse Mr. Ergen of having stolen a compare opportunity. The articles dealt with it, it's proper under Nevada law, 78.080. The articles say -- and this is a place where plaintiffs kind of pervert what the articles say. The articles say that amongst the three items that are part of the test is that the opportunity must have been presented to the board member solely in his role, or her role, as a board member. They pervert that to he learned of it. That's not what the articles say, and you don't get to go there.

Now, plaintiffs try to distance themselves for purposes of this hearing and say, well, we're just focused on forward conflicts, but then they argue that everything in that happened in the past somehow should cause Your Honor to grant them expedited discovery and in the future a preliminary injunction. And the articles deal with that issue clearly, not in a complex fashion.

The other thing that came out from our prior opposition, which is why I think it's still effective, and we did a supplement for the company, is the credit agreement. It goes back to what Harbinger's motivation here is. Harbinger was in the process of trying to keep everybody out of its debt so that none of them when it went bankrupt could come in and buy its assets from the preferred position of the stalking horse. They knocked out Dish. We don't dispute that. That's [unintelligible] an issue that's before the Bankruptcy Court. But they did not knock out Mr. Ergen, and Mr. Ergen made the purchases. So it can't be that he stole a corporate opportunity, because Dish never had that corporate opportunity. It was disallowed by Harbinger, the folks that plaintiffs align themselves with.

Now, that -- to move us past the simple aspect of this case that is not complex, because we're just focused on expedited discovery, and I'm not going to try to argue the whole preliminary injunction here, though it does go to the

issue of good cause. When you talk about good cause you have to have some reason to do this. We focus on Count 1. That's the only count that plaintiffs say that they're going to move for injunction on. So is there any substance to Count 1, the demand futility issue?

Count 1 can be knocked out on demand futility.

Demand futility is appropriately heard on a case-by-case basis. Demand futility happens to be one of the rare places in Nevada law where the Nevada Supreme Court has said, by the way, we'll look at Delaware for this aspect of law. I know Your Honor has heard many lawyers come in here and say that Nevada should look to Delaware corporate law on almost anything; but this was a very unique place where the Nevada Supreme Court has been clear and said, for demand futility we'll look to Delaware law, [unintelligible].

So let's look -- but that does wrap us back into where there's a conflict, because the question is independence. And independence is whether there's a conflict. Going forward on this prospective-looking claim there is no conflict. The board that's in place is actually more interested in its own personal holdings in Dish than they could possibly interested in Mr. Ergen's affiliates' ownership of the debt. Even Mr. Ergen himself, as we put together some math for Your Honor, is more interested in his holdings in Dish than he would be by any possible profit he could make on

the affiliates' ownership of the debt. So if the demand had been made, this board would have been on this claim to consider with its independent judgment and decide going forward.

And that goes to really plaintiffs are seeking.

Plaintiffs are seeking to displace the judgment of the board on an issue that's really just a matter of business judgment; because there is no conflict. All they're talking about is what's the best way to proceed to get in the bidding process to win the bid. And that's just a matter of business judgment. Nevada has a statutory business judgment rule, and it should be applied here and allow the board to do its job.

Other things that the plaintiff has thrown out in its pleadings that don't stand up. Number one, they do admit that the Dish board's actions so far has actually put it in a pretty good position in the bankruptcy. They got aligned with the ad hoc group of lenders -- actually, they negotiated with an independent group of the ad hoc group of lenders -- that was presented and attached to our prior opposition -- and put themselves as the cornerstone of that ad hoc group's proposed claim, which could make it the stalking horse in the process.

Additional facts that go against what plaintiffs claim is the problem here. They actually ignore what the market has done. And we've talked about the <u>Wall Street</u>
Journal, but we've also attached an analyst's report. The

analyst's report from City Research shows that Dish has put itself in position to make a seventeen -- to increase the stock price by \$17. That's actually a pretty good position, and plaintiffs should be happy about that.

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Additionally, they talk about Mr. Howard's resignation as meaning something and being in protest. It's actually not even what their Wall Street Journal article says. Mr. Howard resigned. There's not really much more I can say about it without -- without potentially violating federal securities law. I don't really know much more about it. also, plaintiffs haven't told you a case that says because somebody resigned you should issue an injunction or you should issue expedited discovery or there's any good cause for a claim. Mr. Howard resigned. It's a fact. We can get away They claim that that was going to put us in danger with it. of delisting with NASDAQ. That was never really the case. NASDAQ has a rule. The rule allows for between six months and a year, depending on where your annual meeting is, to replace a board member. The company has already done it. announced it two days ago. There's now a new independent board member coming on. He'll be effective October 7th. that was just a red herring from plaintiffs.

And now, even though plaintiff would rely on their allegation or assertion that there's a breakdown in corporate governance, the corporate board of Dish has taken another

logical step and put together a special litigation committee. It's hardly unusual, and I'm going to try to talk at the end a bit about why the special litigation committee should be considered by Your Honor on --

THE COURT: Why don't you talk about it now.

MR. RUGG: Sure. And actually we did take time -- I appreciate that it was 11:00 a.m. on East Coast. It was actually 8:00 p.m. here --

THE COURT: You mean 11:00 p.m.?

MR. RUGG: They said 11:00 p.m. on the East Coast.

And I thought we were all here on the Pacific Time Zone, so it was actually at 8:00. But -- and that was when I found out and I was able to provide the information. So I did.

But this is an interesting area, because it does cross into the question of whether Nevada should follow Delaware. There's not a lot of Nevada law, if any, on the question of what to do with the special litigation committee. I don't know if Your Honor has been -- had seen a case on a -- THE COURT: I've had special litigation committees before.

MR. RUGG: Okay. Not something I'd seen in front of you, so I didn't know. And, of course, not a lot of published caselaw out there. But it is -- it is an aspect that follows the issue raised in Schoen of demand futility, because it does relate to the demand futility question and whether the board

can step in and do a special litigation committee. Delaware has some pretty clear caselaw -- the key case is Zappata -- that says that what you do with a special litigation committee is you test its independence after it reaches conclusions. So we let the special litigation committee go forward with an investigation. There's also a Delaware case, Abbey [phonetic], that talks about why it stays important to allow that to happen. I was only aware of one Nevada case that talks about special litigation committees. It's over in the Federal Court. It's actually not published. It involves Sands Corp. And in that case Judge Du followed Delaware law and granted a stay to allow the special litigation committee to do its work.

We did take a little bit of time -- we had a short, four-page memorandum of law, if Your Honor wants it, that goes through some of the <u>Zappata</u> -- you know, what happened in the <u>Sands</u> case and <u>Zappata</u> and --

THE COURT: No. I've had special litigation committee cases before.

MR. RUGG: Okay. So I think that in this case -THE COURT: And they predated Max. So they're old
cases.

MR. RUGG: I've got to hire more of your clerks, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Why don't you call Steve Peek and ask

him what he did, you know.

MR. RUGG: But the bottom line is that the special litigation committee is an extension of what Nevada appreciates in both <u>Schoen</u> and its statute to allow the board to operate the company. And this is a way for the special litigation committee, as delegated the power by the full board, to investigate these claims and act for the company.

THE COURT: I need two things from you on the special litigation committee. Tell me what their scope of their authority is. Hold on. Let me go to my statutes.

What is the committee's designated authority?

MR. RUGG: I don't believe there's a formal resolution yet, so I'm only going to tell you what I understand. But I would rather present you with the formal resolution so that I'm not misspeaking for the board. Because that's not my place.

THE COURT: Tell me what you think the designated authority is.

MR. RUGG: They've been designated to investigate the claims brought in this case, the Jacksonville Fire and Police case, and make a decision for the corporation how to proceed or whether to seek a dismissal or whether to act on behalf of the company on these claims.

THE COURT: Okay. And what is the timing of the special litigation committee's investigation?

MR. RUGG: That I don't have an answer for, because it's going to be up to that committee that was just formed last night. So you have Mr. Ortolf, who is an independent member of the board, he's on the audit committee, and Mr. Brokaw, who is coming as a citizen, a non board member, but will be a board member within a couple weeks.

THE COURT: And do we know if the special committee has yet hired counsel to assist them in their investigation?

MR. RUGG: That -- I'm fairly sure they have not yet hired counsel.

THE COURT: Not since 8:00 o'clock last night.

MR. RUGG: Right. Though I understand that's going to be one of the things that they look at first, which, you know, puts me in an awkward position, I suppose. But still we're here right now.

THE COURT: Usually they have separate counsel from everybody else in this room.

MR. RUGG: I understand, Your Honor. But given that they're --

THE COURT: It's important to know what their -- the reason I'm going to back to the statute is we have a Nevada statute that relates to an overlapping issue. I need to know what their designated authority is.

MR. RUGG: And as soon as we have the resolution we can provide that for Your Honor. I don't think it's

appropriate for me to paraphrase it any more than I have.

THE COURT: I understand what you're saying, Mr. Rugg.

MR. RUGG: So I do think that down that line -THE COURT: So they're not investigating the ongoing
transaction and bidding process or having any responsibility
of that; they're looking at what is alleged in the complaint
to be the prior conflicts and potential breaches.

MR. RUGG: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

(Pause in the proceedings)

MR. RUGG: As Mr. Frawley was sharing with me, of course, the complaint does add that aspect. The complaint says there's an ongoing complaint.

THE COURT: That's Claim 1, injunctive relief.

MR. RUGG: Right. So it is part of their task in investigating these claims to address that issue, but it's not specific. And I thought that's what Your Honor was asking about.

THE COURT: Well, no. I was going to my statutory language of what the committee's designated authority is.

For those of you who aren't familiar with Nevada statutes, that's in 78.138(2)(c).

MR. RUGG: It's pretty much right below the business judgment rule.

THE COURT: It's part of the business judgment rule.

MR. RUGG: I think that answers the Court's questions about the special litigation committee. I'm not sure.

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THE COURT: That did. I was just trying to find out where I was going to be on this.

MR. RUGG: On other issues of whether there's good cause to issue -- demand expedited discovery there is a question here of whether what plaintiffs are asking the Court to do is prejudge an issue that's before the Bankruptcy Court, whether it be the -- what Bankruptcy refers to as designation of Mr. Ergen's affiliates' vote or whether it be the role of Dish where Harbinger wants to say Mr. Ergen's acting for Dish in order to get around -- you know, in order to meet the issue of their credit agreement. Plaintiffs seem to want to take the position that Mr. Ergen is controlling Dish, as opposed to Dish controlling Mr. Ergen, back and forth. Either way, those are issues that are before that Bankruptcy Court. There is a motion to dismiss that's been filed by Dish in the adversary proceeding brought by Harbinger and LightSquared that will be heard at a hearing on October 29th. I'm not counsel there, so I can't say much more than that. But that's something that the Bankruptcy Court's already prepared to address, and I think it's an area where this Court's discretion comes into play and whether it should allow the Bankruptcy Court to make

a decision that's appropriately before the Bankruptcy Court and that the <u>DBSD</u> case that plaintiffs like to rely on actually says is something for the expertise of a bankruptcy judge. And, with all due respect to Your Honor, there is —there are differences over there in that bankruptcy world.

THE COURT: Yes. I understand that. And I never practiced in Bankruptcy Court on purpose.

MR. RUGG: I was just -- just to supplement that, the bankruptcy judge has indicated that she intends to rule either on October 29th or soon thereafter on that issue.

THE COURT: Who's the bankruptcy judge?

MR. FRAWLEY: Your Honor, it's Shelly Chapman in the Southern District of New York.

MR. RUGG: So when we look down -- and the reason to look at the injunction claim right now on good cause is just to see whether there's any likelihood of success and whether there's irreparable harm. For likelihood of success we've already been through the issue of whether there's a conflict. Mr. Ergen's getting -- Mr. Ergen's affiliate is going to be paid on the debt, the rest of the board and Mr. Ergen all have a strong financial interest in Dish and are motivated to help Dish. So in terms of their ongoing conflict claim there does not appear to be a likelihood of success on the merits.

With regard to the \underline{DBSD} case there are significant differences, and it's kind of interesting, because plaintiff

in their complaint suggest that if dish had been given the corporate opportunity, if it had been a corporate opportunity, to buy the debt, they would have found a way to do it; but that would have put them closer to the facts of <u>DBSD</u> and more dangerously closer to the facts of <u>DBSD</u>, though --

THE COURT: And arguably violated the credit agreement.

MR. RUGG: And arguably violate the credit agreements and be knocked out for that. But the real issue in DBSD that the court was concerned about was what interest did the creditor have. And in that case the DBSD debt had been bought at 100 percent par when you already knew the bankruptcy plan was going to pay you at 100 percent par. So there wasn't an interest on a return. Here plaintiffs trumpet the fact that Mr. Ergen's affiliate entity stands to make a return on its debt, and that takes it outside the DBSD context and takes it outside of the caselaw, because the caselaw is focused on what is your real interest, do you have an interest as a creditor. And plaintiffs themselves say that Mr. Ergen's affiliate entity has an interest as a creditor. The interest happens not to be in conflict with Mr. Ergen's interest in Dish.

We've already talked about Mr. Howard's resignation and that being relatively meaningless.

On irreparable harm, you know, the money amounts

here are not insignificant, obviously, but they really are just money amounts. There are analysts ready and able to consider what a spectrum is worth. In fact, that's what the Dish board, whether it be the existing Dish board that's duly elected or the Dish board that plaintiff wants to make this decision, will have to decide on a dollar figure that the spectrum's worth. And that's not irreparable harm once you have a dollar figure.

On the relevancy of discovery. Everything plaintiffs are looking at is backward looking. The special committee -- the previous special committee, not as special litigation committee, considered an individual question. That question is no longer relevant to what is going forward in terms of conflict of interest. That question was about whether to make an initial bid. They made a recommendation, the board followed the recommendation, initial bid is made.

Nothing that can be undone by an injunction at this point. So looking at that won't tell the Court anything about whether there's going to be a future problem.

In terms of whether there's a future problem it's really just two questions, and we put this in our brief.

It's, you know, they want to say that it's a conflict because of the debt. That fact's known. They want to say that Mr.

Ergen controls the board. The proxies that we can produce for the Court, they're all public, that show what Mr. Ergen's

interest is in the company and what his relationship is with the other board members, you know, they're a huge stack of documents, but they all say the same thing. Plaintiff knows this. It's a controlled company. Nothing improper about that. It's fully disclosed. If plaintiffs think that's enough, then we can go forward on their preliminary injunction motion just on that, and we'll argue that at the appropriate time.

In terms of the depositions, a little bit of a moving target here, because now I think plaintiffs have moved from five depositions to two. One of those depositions seems to -- Mr. Howard, I don't know how Mr. Howard's going to tell you what the board's doing now. He resigned. So that's not forward looking. If it's Mr. Goodbarn, Mr. Goodbarn has addressed the issues for the Court, and I don't need to go over those again. But it's still not going to tell the Court whether there's a future breach of fiduciary duty that the Court has to prevent through an injunction.

I know I was a little haphazard there, but I'm mixing between myself and responding to some of what plaintiffs said. So unless the Court has further questions, I'll sit down.

THE COURT: I don't have any more questions.

MR. RUGG: Thank you.

MR. REISMAN: We're just going to rest on our

briefs, Your Honor.

MR. MARKEL: Your Honor, if I may be heard briefly.

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. MARKEL: And thank you for that. My name is Gregory Markel, representing Mr. Goodbarn. And I just have a couple of very brief points I would like to make.

As a matter of background, we have -- and this is just a brief background -- we have moved to dismiss -- I know it's not on today -- but the reason for that is because there are no allegations of wrongdoing by Mr. Goodbarn. He doesn't belong as a defendant in this case. And in fact in their preliminary injunction motion, and this is a quote, plaintiff goes so far as to say that, "Mr. Goodbarn possibly engaged in fiduciary duties." It doesn't allege that he did -- breaches of fiduciary duties. It doesn't say that he did, it says "possibly" he did. So that's a bit of background here that we think that he is not a proper defendant and -- but that's not for today's decision.

I think the two points I do want -- that I do think are for today, and Mr. Rugg has already mentioned one of them, but I just want to emphasize that Mr. Goodbarn was a member of the special committee that operated earlier this summer, and the plaintiff nowhere alleges that he lacked independence in both his qualifications and in the way he acted as a member of that committee. He is -- that committee is no longer in

existence. He has not -- he has not -- and I don't know the details about the formation of the new special committee, I found out about it last night, but he is not on that committee.

THE COURT: But he remains on the board.

MR. MARKEL: He remains on the board. And so if we're looking at the difference between -- and I thought Your Honor's questions were very clear, both last time and today, how does the proposed discovery relate to the requested relief on the preliminary injunction. If that is what we're focused on today, then as I understand it, although I may have it wrong, but I've heard a few times and read it several times, my understanding is that the relief that's being requested on the preliminary injunction is that in the future somehow Mr. Ergen be barred from interfering with the process of bidding on this spectrum. That's what I understand is being requested.

Whatever happened with respect to the special committee that no longer is, I suggest to Your Honor, irrelevant to the question of whether or not an injunction in the future should be granted. And so, as Mr. Lebovitch said, they have — they're focusing their discovery requests here on this preliminary injunction motion, expedited discovery that they're asking for, they're focusing that on something that happened in the past and that involves different people and

has nothing to do with what they're requesting from this Court on a preliminary injunction motion. And that is, as I understand, Your Honor -- and correctly me, obviously if I've got it wrong -- that's the only issue on which we are talking about expedited discovery.

So, Your Honor, I would respectfully request that the discovery of the activities of the special committee and Mr. Goodbarn in particular and all of the people whose depositions are being requested with respect to this expedited discovery are unnecessary in connection with the preliminary injunction.

The only other point, and it's even briefer, Your Honor, is my understanding is that under Nevada law that discovery of counsel for a party is only granted in exceptional circumstances.

THE COURT: That is Nevada law.

MR. MARKEL: Right. Thank you. And, Your Honor, what I hear is, well, sometimes it's happened in other cases that Mr. Lebovitch has been involved in. I don't question that it may have happened in other cases, perhaps in other jurisdictions with perhaps very different fact patterns. I don't know specifically. But what I do know is that at least in my humble opinion nothing close to exceptional circumstances have been demonstrated here for taking discovery from counsel to that special committee. Thank you very much

for hearing me, Your Honor. 1 2 THE COURT: Thank you. 3 Can I ask one question of Mr. Rugg before we go back 4 to the plaintiffs. Mr. Rugg, Exhibit 5 to your brief that was 5 filed yesterday is the report from the City Research folks. MR. RUGG: Yes, Your Honor. 6 7 That is a report that was not requested THE COURT: 8 by the corporation or the board or special committee, it was just something in the market; is that correct? 10 MR. RUGG: Correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: I just wanted to make sure. 11 Thank you. Independent piece of research. 12 MR. RUGG: Yeah, 13 they do these all the time. 14 THE COURT: Somebody in the market doing whatever the market's going to do. 15 MR. RUGG: Correct, Your Honor. 16 17 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 18 MR. BOSCHEE: I have -- I have one request of Your 19 Honor before we rebut or -- I have calendar call in nine 20 minutes in front of Judge Bare. THE COURT: Okay. We'll take a short break for you 21 22 to go to the third floor.

THE COURT: How long are you going to be?

MR. BOSCHEE: Fair enough. I will be back.

If you

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want to --

MR. BOSCHEE: I'm happy to let Counsel continue without me.

THE COURT: No. Go. How long are you going to be?

MR. BOSCHEE: I shouldn't be more than 10 or 15

minutes, I hope.

THE COURT: I'll see you when you get back.

Everybody else feel like taking a personal comfort break?

(Court recessed at 10:49 a.m., until 11:08 p.m.)

THE COURT: Anybody want to add anything before I hear rebuttal? Okay.

MR. LEBOVITCH: Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you for your patience.

Let's briefly start with where we ended, and then I'll go through Mr. Rugg's arguments. But as far as Mr. Goodbarn goes we do concede his independence, Your Honor, and, frankly, in terms of an injunction that would bring back, you know, the status quo, the appropriate position — I mean, one way to implement the injunction, an obvious way would be to put Mr. Goodbarn and if there's another independent director — apparently the company just hired — just retained a new director. If there's two independent directors, that would be a logical way to cure essentially any injunction that's granted. It's the easiest thing. We did name Mr. Goodbarn. There's really multiple reasons, and, I'll be very frank about it, we didn't want an argument that he's an indispensable

party if he's not named, even tough we concede his independence -- to the extent we concede his independence, because he is the person who we're saying should be in charge. So that's one issue.

And also, he didn't resign. Mr. Howard resigned. We believe it was a protest. We think that's confirmed. We didn't know what happened, but, you know, frankly the focus is we're seeking relief, which logically gets cured by empowering Mr. Goodbarn and, if there is another truly independent director, perhaps another independent director. But we think that and our approach always has been if it turns out he really has been acting independently and perhaps without resigning trying to fight for the shareholders, we would not be continuing the claim against him.

I'll get to Mr. Markel's discovery points in the context of dealing with Mr. Rugg's other issues. I'll try to be very efficient. We're really not asking to take out the duly elected board. I mean, again, I think — that's the way companies work. They set up a board however they want to. This board happened to have two independent directors initially. They expect that when there's a conflict they're going to have an independent committee take over. That's what happens. It happened in Hollinger, it's what happens many companies that are controlled companies. Here our view is Mr. Ergen changed his mind. He didn't want to let the independent

directors have their authority. That's exactly the problem here. But, again, there's nothing radical about it, that the conflicted directors routinely step aside and let the independent directors do their thing.

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Section 78.140, it doesn't have -- it talks about what's void or voidable, Your Honor, the statute. It also talks about fairness, and it doesn't say anything about injunctive relief. And so our position on it is this provision, 78.140, is similar to other interested transaction statutes in other states. While the words will be different, there's going to be nuances, we don't see anything in that provision that goes beyond saying a transaction is not void or voidable -- a transaction that has taken place is not void or voidable solely because of a conflict if you have certain criteria met. But many, if not most or all, of the courts who've interpreted similar positions have said that this doesn't eliminate fiduciary duties. The statute does talk about a transaction still be fair. And, again, I think there's a lot of precedent that says, well, we read that fairness as an overlay to the provision, and so you're protecting third parties who engage in transactions with the company, you're protecting the contracts themselves that get executed. It doesn't mean there can't be equitable relief.

Mr. Rugg spoke about Harbinger, saying, well, they're suing everyone. We're not -- we're not trying to

prove Harbinger's claims, okay. Our point is that the board, by allowing Ergen to control its process, is lending credence to Harbinger's claims, whereas, again, obviously if the independent directors were controlling Dish's process, harbinger's claims against Dish would be fair less forceful.

The articles, the articles of incorporation, the charter, that -- really we tried to be very express. That claim for corporate opportunity, which we do think is valid, we think the special committee must have seen some validity to it, we're prepared to litigate that on a non-expedited schedule, but I will note, Your Honor, there is no reading of the charter that would permit Mr. Ergen to misappropriate corporate information in order to identify his business opportunities, nor would it absolve him of his duty of loyalty such that even if he's allowed to pursue an opportunity under the charter, he can't pursue an opportunity which knowingly, predictably will cause harm to Dish. And so that's a breach of the duty of loyalty independent of the charter.

Now, Harbinger knocked out Dish with its investments contract, its loan contract. It didn't knock out Ergen. I mean, that's an issue that is being litigated in Bankruptcy Court. We're not trying to prove that Ergen could or could not have bought the debt pursuant to the investment agreement. It is possible that that provision will be struck down, in which case Dish could have done something. But that's not the

issue now. Again, our point, simple point is Ergen, by buying the debt knowing he's the controller of Dish, it's not surprise that he and Dish would get sued for the way he bought the debt, which we've alleged was secretive and indirect.

That is bad faith. He used corporate information about where Dish would look to buy spectrum, to find his target, and he also knew that that was going to expose Dish to a lawsuit which -- it's Exhibit 2 to my affidavit, Your Honor. I mean, they're seeking \$4 billion in damages and various other remedies against Ergen, and there's other filings that seek remedies against Dish.

The point about the lack of a conflict, Your Honor, and Ergen's interest in Dish being very significant, the board's stock in Dish, I just want to start, I guess, with maybe the basic premises. I'm not aware of any precedent that would say that the fact the directors own stock in a company will outweigh them otherwise being beholden to a director. The cases -- I'm not aware of anyone -- any situation where a director -- where a court says, well, this director under the law would be beholden but they own stock and so therefore they're not. I've never even heard of that.

But let's talk about the argument about Ergen's incentives. It's a billion-dollar personal investment. Now, he's a wealthy man, but he has a billion-dollar personal investment that faces going to zero. That's what Harbinger

and LightSquared are trying to do if they disallow the claims or he'll take a huge loss on it.

THE COURT: And you're talking about the debt purchases.

MR. LEBOVITCH: The debt purchases that he made in his own account. So let's assume he's allowed to pursue that opportunity, Your Honor. He's facing economic risk. He's facing the loss of his voting rights. That's real and immediate. The City Group report that the defendants put in, which I'll talk about a little bit more, I mean, analysts will say a lot of things. This analyst is saying something which we agree with, is buying the spectrum would be a really good thing. It's not a controversial statement. It doesn't establish I think for the Court's purposes what in fact the market thinks or does. I mean, that's done with expert reports and submissions.

But that's one analyst's report that says it would be a good thing. We agree. We want Dish to get the spectrum. But that's not proof that Ergen is going to see the stock drop -- his stock drop if they fail. In fact, because of the Wall Street Journal article, because of knowledge coming out that Ergen is dominating the process, it's entirely possible that other analysts would say, well, yeah, the reason there's \$17 of upside is because the market right now is skeptical because Ergen is interfering, he is dominating the process. That's

creates a discount on the stock. Well, what there's no showing of, and I could go back, but what there's no showing of, Your Honor, is that Ergen has a choice of I'm going to lose a couple hundred million dollars here or I'm going to lose anything on the Dish side. The lost opportunity may already be priced into the stock. There's no evidence to say right now on a motion to expedite to allow discovery for the Court to essentially adopt and say, well, he's going to lose much more if Dish is hurt than he would preserve by preserving his debt at Dish's expense. We know there's an immediate risk, and there's a completely abstract, hypothetical possibility that Dish stock would go down if they don't get the spectrum, and yet there's equal reason to believe that right now Dish stock has upside because it's been depressed by controlling shareholder misconduct.

The SLC very briefly. Again, I'm not aware of any precedent that says that the creation of an SLC can override the Court's ability to expedite and consider an injunction. I'm not arguing a case where that's actually happened.

Typically an SLC happens where there's a non-expedited matter, there's no irreparable harm. What we -- what I think I heard is there's no resolution yet even creating this SLC. There's a decision to do so. And I've not heard any explanation how the SLC could actually provide the relief sought in Count 1 if it finds it meritorious. And I think that's critical, because

it's not good enough for our friends to say, well, they're going to have authority over the amended complaint. Well, as a particular matter the committee is putting the proverbial rabbit in the hat, because there's no way they can give the relief sought in Count 1, well, then what they're doing is they've already denied Count 1 through their creation, because Count 1 either will -- it'll rise and fall over the next few It's not a count that can be remedied in six months, nine months, or a year. So really what they're saying is, well, we'll consider the non-expedited matters, but they have no practical ability to consider the expedited matters. And I just think that, again, the SLC's existence can be a factor for the other claims. But if Your Honor believes we should get the chance to get discovery, what we think is limited, and present the record to Your Honor, it is no offense to the SLC to say, you go do your thing but right now I'm not going to stop my process, because I know that if I stop my process plaintiff's lose Count 1, they'll never get a remedy if I rely on you.

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Mr. Rugg said something about Harbinger's theory is that Ergen's acting for Dish and our theory is Dish is acting at the whim of Ergen. I think -- I think it's a little bit semantic. Your Honor, our whole point is that right now today Dish needs to act independently of Ergen. That's the Corporate Governance 101 point that we make, that's the point

that in light of the creation of a special committee, its subsequent disbanding when they try to act independently, that's the remedy that we seek, which unquestionably can only help Dish in connection with its problem, which is a lawsuit that it never wanted. And that's Exhibit 2.

I talked about Ergen's financial interest.

The <u>DBSD</u> case, again, Mr. Rugg talked about, you know, how this isn't <u>DBSD</u>. The fear we have is not that the Court's going to say <u>DBSD</u> is being repeated, let's impose bad faith. The fear we have is the Harbinger complaint and the other filings in the Bankruptcy Court that do put Dish at risk today. The <u>DBSD</u> point is really to show this board knows it can get in trouble, should be hypersensitive even though we think any independent board would keep Ergen out of the process here.

The discovery. I'm getting down to the end, Your Honor. The discovery, I believe Mr. Rugg said it's all backwards looking, Mr. Markel said the special committee -- you know, what happened there was irrelevant to what's happening today. We disagree and we think again we're putting the rabbit in the hat. I'm sure that if that argument had any validity, then there would be no discovery until what happened in the Conrad Black case, because he had already disbanded his committee. And so if that committee disbanded and it's not relevant because that's all old history, why would you ever

have a record developing how you got here. And in the end, Your Honor, I believe anytime that Your Honor or frankly any judge has considered a basis for injunctive relief, to the extent there's any record it's a record of what has happened to date. So there's always a backwards-looking view. what we say is the way to identify the predicate breaches and the harm and to shape the relief that Your Honor may grant is to say, okay, we know a committee was created, the defendants stipulated to that, but why were they created, what was their charge, what did they do, what were their conditions. there's a representation that they authorized a bid to be made. Well, I do think that that Journal article substantiates our concerns that maybe there were conditions to the bid. we know the committee wasn't around when the bid was actually made, so we don't know what problems that committee had. And by finding out what they expected in the process, what the independent directors wanted to see in the process then Your Honor can say, okay, I can see that having the independent process would put Dish in a better position and I can craft my remedy around essentially what the correct process looked like, assuming the special committee's process was a truly independent process. This is what I'm now seeing. So to say that we don't get to prove the predicate breach in an injunction hearing is, again, to put the rabbit in the hat and to just say, well, you'll never prove your claims.

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So if Your Honor has concerns, thinks it's conceivable that you will grant an injunction, we -- I respectfully submit that we should get the discovery until what happened with the committee.

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The depositions, I think Mr. Rugg said we seek two. We seek Mr. Ergen, who knows what's going on now. We asked for Mr. Goodbarn, and I said that, you know, maybe that's a conversation that can happen. We ask for Mr. Howard. Again, you know, maybe we would drop one of those and take one of the current directors. And we ask for the advisors. on the advisors, I mean, the banker -- to the extent that Perella Weinberg did an analysis and gave advice to the committee and negotiated, those negotiations clearly are fair game, and we think the bankers' advice is not subject to attorney-client privilege. And for the lawyers I don't know how much more I can say. Unless they waive a privilege, we're not trying to force them to waive a privilege, but when you have a contract negotiated by lawyers or a transaction or a proposal negotiated typically by lawyers and bankers, not the special committee members handling those negotiations, they are the best source of that evidence, and I do think, Your Honor, when the lawyers are the ones doing the negotiation it's routine. If it turns out, Your Honor, that the lawyers here were not having the negotiations --

THE COURT: It's not routine here.

MR. LEBOVITCH: I understand. And again, we're not asking for litigation counsel --

THE COURT: I mean, in Nevada it's clearly not routine when they're negotiating deals. Even though it may not be privileged, it's clearly not routine.

MR. LEBOVITCH: You know, I appreciate that, Your Honor. And in the end I think that if we get other -- if we have another ability to provide discovery and the fact that we may not have a principal negotiator I guess used against us, then I'm not going to -- I'm not going to push for the lawyer. I just am trying to go to the best source of what happened in the discussions. But if it's -- you know, we think it would be appropriate, and we're not going to try to pierce a privilege, but if Your Honor would prefer we not do it, then I'm not going to push it.

THE COURT: It's not me. It's the Nevada Supreme Court, those guys in Carson City.

MR. LEBOVITCH: Understood, Your Honor. We think that if someone was leading a negotiation that that would be acceptable. But --

THE COURT: I understand what you're saying.

MR. LEBOVITCH: Yes.

THE COURT: I'm just telling you that's not it here.

MR. LEBOVITCH: I don't dispute that it's not

routine.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else you want to tell me?

MR. LEBOVITCH: I believe the answer to that is no. I think that covers it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I want to thank counsel for the arguments you've made today. They are very informative, and I want to tell you they are very well done. I sat on a panel with Chief Justice Steel earlier in the week, so I'm familiar with Delaware law and the quality of practitioners, and it's been refreshing to have that quality of folks in front of me.

The formation of the special litigation to me -committee to me is a very important step that the company has
made, and I'm going to give the special litigation committee a
little bit of leeway to do some things. So here's the plan.

The plaintiff's going to make a demand on the special litigation committee within 24 hours. So that means by Monday at maybe 10:00 a.m. Pacific Time you're going to have your demand to the special litigation committee.

The special litigation committee by noon Pacific

Time on October 3rd will respond to that demand. That does

not mean they have to complete their investigation; it simply

means they must respond to that demand.

I need a status report by counsel by close of business Pacific Time on October 3rd. The matter will be on my chambers calendar on Friday, October 4th, and I will issue

a written decision on the motion for expedited discovery.

MR. LEBOVITCH: Your Honor, may I ask one question?

THE COURT: You can ask as many questions as you want.

MR. LEBOVITCH: I just -- we will follow the Court's instructions, make a demand. And I may be unfamiliar with this aspect of Nevada law. I just don't want to concede any challenge to independence particularly to Mr. Ortolf.

THE COURT: You're not conceding anything.

MR. LEBOVITCH: Okay. Just sometimes making a demand is a concession. I just -- as long as we preserve our arguments --

THE COURT: I'm not saying you've conceded anything.

MR. LEBOVITCH: That's fine, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm telling you I want to give the special litigation committee the benefit of the doubt and the opportunity to act. They can't do that if you don't make the demand on them.

MR. LEBOVITCH: We will make a demand as Your Honor instructed.

THE COURT: You probably don't know the <u>Schoen</u> case went up and down, up and down, and up and down, and I think Steve Peek and the others settled it, what, on the fourth attempt in front of Brent Adams. So, I mean, it's --

MR. LEBOVITCH: We'd hope to avoid that kind of

rollercoaster.

frames.

THE COURT: We're not going to do that. We're just going to do this. I understand it may have issues, it may cause concerns. We're going to make the demand, I'm going to then make a decision. What you put in the status reports may influence what I decide to do. But I've heard the documents, I have an idea about what I think we should do, but I want to wait and give the special litigation committee the opportunity to do something.

Mr. Ferrario, go catch your plane.

MR. FERRARIO: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You're supposed to be in Cleveland at a deposition.

MR. BOSCHEE: And all the parties are going to file a separate status report? Is that what Your Honor's contemplating, just so I'm clear?

THE COURT: I would prefer separate status reports, because my guess is you guys won't see eye to eye, and by giving you the very short time frame I did it will be impossible to work out the issues that would permit it to be a joint status report.

MR. BOSCHEE: I just want to make sure, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Remember, I gave you very short time

MR. LEBOVITCH: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And the reason is because I'm cognizant about the issues related to the injunctive relief that's being requested. Anything else? MR. LEBOVITCH: Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you for hearing us. THE PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 11:28 A.M.

<u>CERTIFICATION</u>
I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.
<u>AFFIRMATION</u>
I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.
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