Department of Sociology and Anthropology
Faculty of Social Sciences
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WORKING PAPER SERIES

Socioeconomic Status and Demographic Behavior of Adult Multiethnics: Jews in Israel

Working Paper No. 2006-01

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January 2006

Abstract
We examine the socioeconomic status and demographic behavior of Jewish adults of mixed ethnic ancestry, relative to those of the two major Jewish ethnic groups in Israel. Our results consistently show that for educational attainment and occupational status, multiethnics have outcomes which are in between – and very close to the middle of – those of the two major ethnic groups. In contrast, the marriage and fertility behavior of multiethnic adults is nearly identical to that of the more socially advantaged ethnic group, and quite distinct from that of the less advantaged ethnic group. We discuss interpretations of our findings, and suggest the importance of our results for understanding the evolution of ethnic differences in socioeconomic and demographic behavior in the context of societies with significant rates of ethnic intermarriage.

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The research reported here was made possible in part by a grant from the Spencer Foundation. Funding was also provided by The Shaine Center for Research in Social Sciences and The Harvey L. Silbert Center for Israel Studies, both of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The data presented, the statements made, and the views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors.

INTRODUCTION

This paper is motivated by an attempt to tie in literatures on ethnic/racial intermarriage and ethnic/racial stratification by describing and analyzing a wide range of socioeconomic outcomes and demographic behaviors of adult multiethnics. In the intermarriage literature, research has documented increases in interethnic and interracial marriage in many developed societies, as well as selective outmarriage of the more educated members of disadvantaged ethnic/racial groups (Eisenbach 1992; Goldscheider 1996; Okun 2001; Qian 1997; Fu 2001).[1] It has come to increasing attention that trends in ethnic intermarriage rates coupled with larger flows of immigrants from diverse countries of origin have led to growing proportions of persons of mixed ancestry and backgrounds in many societies (e.g. Jones and Smith 2001). Recent research in the ethnicity literature has concerned itself with the ethnic and racial identity of persons of mixed backgrounds; moreover, previous concepts of race and ethnicity are being challenged by the complex realities presented by multiethnic and multiracial individuals (Harris and Sim 2002; Hirschman 2003; Rockquemore and Brunsma 2002).

However, little or no research in the stratification literature has focused on the potentially important macro-level implications of ethnic intermarriage and a growing proportion of persons of mixed background on ethnic inequality and group differences in demographic behavior. Questions that arise include whether and how ethnic intermarriage, operating through the formation of successive generations of multiethnic individuals, ultimately affects ethnic differences in socioeconomic status and demographic behavior at the aggregate level. In particular, do persons of mixed ethnicity cause a blurring of previously defined ethnic lines and ultimately lead to a reduction in the salience of ethnic inequality? Or alternatively, does the selective nature of ethnic intermarriage, coupled with the intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic status and demographic patterns, result in growing disparities between ethnic groups, and a consequent growing salience of ethnicity? The former possibility implies that

[1] For the sake of brevity, throughout the paper we refer to ethnic or racial intermarriage as ethnic intermarriage, and to ethnic or racial groups as ethnic groups.

ethnic differences in socioeconomic status and demographic behavior are "averaged" out over successive generations, while the latter possibility suggests that ethnic intermarriage may not be a vehicle for reducing group differences over time, or for reducing the salience of ethnicity.

The current paper is a first step in examining these questions. We begin by documenting trends in the proportions of multiethnic Jewish Israelis and describing a wide range of socioeconomic outcomes as well as demographic behaviors of multiethnic Jewish adults in Israel. As far as we know, this is the first paper to analyze a wide range of outcomes among multiethnic adults, as prior research has been largely limited to examining the educational and psychological outcomes of multiethnic children and adolescents. We also extend previous research by examining evidence of possible change in the characteristics of multiethnics over successive cohorts and between groups defined by immigrant generation (e.g. second vs. third and higher generations). In addition, we focus on differences among multiethnics with regards to family structure (ethnic make-up of biological mother and father), and by gender.

Finally, we begin to address an intriguing question for future research: Do ethnic intermarriage patterns have an important effect on the reproduction of ethnic inequality? We provide one partial answer to this question by considering a hypothetical scenario that could have resulted if ethnic intermarriage had not occurred in the past. In particular, we ask whether ethnic differences in socioeconomic status and demographic behavior would be larger or smaller than are observed, if we "reassign" multiethnic individuals to one or the other of the monoethnic groups. We end the paper with a discussion of our findings, and plans for further study.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

There has been increasing interest over the last few years in the socioeconomic and psychological outcomes of school-aged children of racially mixed couples in the U.S. (e.g.

Gullickson 2003; Harris and Thomas 2002; Kao 1999; Wells 2003). An early study of multiethnics in Israel, published roughly twenty years ago, was a forerunner of this literature (Yogev and Jamshy 1983). Most of the research in this area has focused on testing different versions of Parks' (1928) well-known "marginal man" hypothesis, which holds that multiracial and multiethnic individuals suffer psychological distress and anxiety because they do not 'fit in' with any racial group and feel marginal to all societies. This distress may impact on their educational outcomes. Research has found little support for the notion that multiethnic or multiracial individuals have poorer educational outcomes than their monoracial counterparts. Rather, most findings show that multiracials have outcomes that are intermediate to those of their component groups (Farley 2002).

A different theoretical perspective emphasizes the importance of the social and economic background of parents on children's outcomes. Given that ethnic intermarriage tends to be selective on socioeconomic background, it is likely that parents of children of mixed ethnic ancestry differ in terms of their background characteristics from parents of monoethnic children. Moreover, it is likely that these differences affect the relative socioeconomic and demographic outcomes of children of mixed ethnic origins (Wells 2003). Theories of intermarrage that revolve around the concept of assimilation suggest that ethnic intermarriage is more common among upwardly-mobile members of disadvantaged ethnic groups (Alba 1990; Qian, Blair and Ruf 2001). If this is the case, then the children of interethnic couples would tend to have more positive family background characteristics – at least on the side of one parent – than children of endogamous couples from disadvantaged ethnic groups. The implication that comes out of assimilation theory is thus that, based on their family characteristics, children of mixed ethnic ancestry have higher relative socioeconomic outcomes than monoethnic children from disadvantaged ethnic groups. While the assimilation hypothesis suggests that upwardly mobile persons from disadvantaged ethnic groups are more likely to marry exogamously than are other persons from disadvantaged ethnic groups, the hypothesis is silent regarding the educational background of *spouses* of upwardly mobile members of disadvantaged groups.

Thus, there is no clear prediction based on assimiliation theory as to the status of multiethnics relative to monoethnics from advantaged ethnic groups.

A different characteristic of interethnic marriage, which is often discussed in the literature, is that of 'exchange' (Rosenfeld 2005). The exchange hypothesis addresses the relative socioeconomic status of both spouses. According to 'exchange' theory, individual members of ethnic groups that have low social prestige are more likely to marry members of ethnic groups with high social prestige, if they offer high socioeconomic status in return (Davis 1941; Merton 1941). If a rigid social hierarchy in terms of ethnicity exists, then boundaries are crossed primarily in cases when higher education or income can compensate for loss of ethnic prestige, and when prestige from membership in a higher-status ethnic group compensates for lower education or income. Children of interethnic couples that are characterized by exchange unions would thus have, on average, parents of intermediate social status, because the parent from the disadvantaged ethnic group would be relatively high status, whereas the parent from the more advantaged ethnic group would be relatively low status. Under the assumption that the educational attainment of both parents are important in determining the socioeconomic status of their offspring, we expect that children of interethnic unions would have intermediate outcomes between those of monoethnics from the primary ethnic groups.

Yet another characterization of interethnic marriage, which we refer to as the universalistic hypothesis, is that of high educational status among both spouses. This view posits that because higher education is associated with more universalistic values, the ethnicity of potential spouses matters less to more educated persons than to less educated persons. The implication is that ethnic endogamy is weaker among more educated couples (Qian 1997), and that children of ethnic intermarriage tend to have more educated parents than monoracials. If this is the case, we would expect that the socioeconomic status of children of interethnic

couples would be higher than those of monoethnics from the disadvantaged ethnic group, and perhaps as high or higher than those of monoethnics from the more advantaged ethnic group.

Thus, theoretical perspectives which consider the different characterizations of ethnic intermarriage predict that the outcomes of multiethnics will be at least as good as those of their monoethnic counterparts from disadvantaged ethnic groups, and perhaps worse than (exchange) or as good or better than (universalism) those of their monoethnic counterparts from advantaged ethnic groups. These predictions contrast with those of the 'marginal man' hypothesis, which suggests poorer outcomes for multiethnics than for both monoethnic groups. As will be discussed in the next section of the paper, previous research on assortative mating in Israel indicates that ethnic intermarriage in the past was characterized more by 'exchange', than by 'assimilation' or 'universalism' (Okun 2001, 2004). The implications of 'exchange' for the intermediate status of multiethnics will then be tested in the main section of the paper.

BACKGROUND

Because immigration is of such critical importance to the evolution of Israel's Jewish population, we briefly describe here immigration history following foundation of the State in 1948.[2] Between 1948 and 1951, on the order of 700,000 immigrants arrived, thereby doubling the Jewish population within four years. Substantially lower, but still significant levels of immigration in the rest of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s continued to contribute to the diversity of Israeli society. Differences in socioeconomic status, culture, language, and demographic regimes were especially dramatic between Jews from Eastern and Central Europe, Muslim North Africa, and the Muslim Middle East (Friedlander and Goldscheider 1979). Following a lull in immigration during the 1980s, the early 1990s brought another substantial wave of immigrants from the former Soviet Union.

[2] Because intermarriage rates between the Jewish and minority Arab populations of Israel remain strikingly low, we limit our analyses to multiethnic adults with two Jewish parents.

Despite the immigration of Jews from diverse origins, Israeli society has been dominated by Ashkenazim (immigrants from Europe and their descendants) since the foundation of the State. Some of these Jews were the first to immigrate to preindependence Israel and were the founders of most political, economic, and cultural institutions. In general, Jewish immigrants from Muslim countries in North Africa and the Middle East were characterized by lower levels of socioeconomic status, as well as higher levels of fertility and mortality. For a variety of reasons, including differential placement of newly-arrived immigrants in geographically and economically peripheral regions, as well as differential veteranship in Israel, Jews of North African and Middle Eastern ancestry have been disadvantaged socioeconomically (Cohen and Haberfeld 1998; Friedlander et al. 2002; Khazzoom 2005).

Over time, ethnic flux in Israel has led to the evolution of new ethnic groups (Goldscheider 1996; Khazzoom 2003; Matras 1973; Shavit and Stier 1997). For example, a broadening of the basis of ethnicity has resulted in the creation of a new panethnic identity - Israelis of Middle Eastern or North African descent - known in Hebrew as Mizrahim (persons of Eastern or Oriental origin). It is likely that the creation of the panethnic identity came out, despite cultural and socioeconomic diversity among Israelis of Middle Eastern and North African descent, for several reasons. Broad differences between these groups and the dominant Ashkenazi group in terms of socioeconomic status, geographic concentration in peripheral areas in Israel, cultural and religious practices, and differences in skin phenotype probably contributed to the formation of the Mizrahi panethnic group . Khazzoom (2003) emphasizes Ashkenazi exclusion of Mizrahim in the context of the Ashkenazi “identity project”, which aimed at emphasizing the western character of their new State of Israel, and in distancing themselves from Oriental cultures thought inferior to the modern West. The split between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim has become a dominant one in contemporary Israeli Jewish society, especially because it is understood largely in terms of class inequality and historical discrimination (Ben-Rafael 1982; Smooha 1993).

There are two aspects of the Israeli case that make for interesting comparisons with the U.S. and other multiethnic societies. First, large socioeconomic gaps remain between the major Jewish ancestry groups, and residential segregation is pronounced in certain regions of the country (Cohen and Haberfeld 1998; Friedlander et al. 2002). This situation contrasts with the case of the Southern and Eastern European immigrants in the U.S., who benefited from sustained economic expansion after 1940 and have been able to close socioeconomic gaps vis a vis earlier immigrants from Northern and Western Europe (Alba 1990). The situation regarding ethnic gaps in socioeconomc status is similar, however, to that of some immigrant Hispanic and Asian groups in the U.S. (Waters and Eschbach 1995).

Second, Israel may be unique in the sense that its dominant national Zionist ideology has been, at least until recently, that the State should be a 'melting pot' of Jewish ethnicity, with an emphasis being placed on the creation of a single, unified culture - an amalgam of the diverse peoples represented by Jewish immigrants (Ya'ar 2005). In particular, Zionist ideology largely denies the importance of ethnicity that reflects Jewish experience in the Diaspora. Rather, Zionism has idealized a new national Israeli Jewish culture, at the same time that official Israeli policy has envisioned the complete assimilation of Jews from diverse countries of origin within three generations (Goldscheider 1996). This long-term adherence to melting pot ideology and the formation of a new Israeli identity for Jews suggests that the negative effects that Parks' hypothesized in his 'marginal man' may not be applicable in the Israeli context, where the children of ethnic intermarriage would be, at least on an ideological level, accepted and even idealized as a new form of Jew.

Ethnic intermarriage has been seen as a primary means of achieving the 'melting pot' idealized by Zionism (Rosen 1982). Previous research on Jews in Israel has documented interethnic marriage patterns that are relevant for the present paper. First, census data show a clear trend in terms of increasing rates of ethnic outmarriage over the years, from a level of roughly 14% in

the period 1957-1961 to levels of approximately 28% in the early 1990s (Author calculations). Moreover, Gshur and Okun (2003) document that rates of ethnic intermarriage increase over successive generations, so that native-born Israelis are more likely to outmarry than are their foreign-born counterparts. Okun (2001) has also shown that Jewish ethnic intermarriage in Israel during the late 1950s, 1960s and 1970s was characterized by "exchange" whereby a Mizrahi spouse was more likely to marry "up" in ethnic prestige to an Ashkenazi spouse, if the former spouse had higher socioeconomic status than the latter. Over time, as ethnic intermarriage became more widespread, it became less characterized by exchange, reflecting instead increasing educational homogamy among ethnically intermarried couples (Okun 2001). In recent periods, ethnic intermarriage is usually more common among more educated spouses than less educated spouses (Okun 2004). The implications of these marriage patterns will be discussed below in the context of the relative socioeconomic status of persons of mixed ethnic origins.

RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

How do the socioeconomic status and demographic patterns of multiethnic adults compare to those of their monethnic counterparts? Does the relative status of multiethnics change over time in accordance with the prevalence and nature of ethnic intermarriage?[3] Are multiethnics among the third generation different in their characteristics than those in the second generation? Is father's ethnicity more dominant than mother's ethnicity in affecting the life chances and outcomes of the offspring of mixed unions? Below, we discuss each of these issues in further detail.

Hypothesis 1: Multiethnic offspring have socioeconomic and demographic outcomes that reflect the nature of interethnic unions during the period in which their parents married. Since most of

[3] We refer throughout the paper to Jewish "multiethnics", although the term "biethnics" could be appropriate, as we refer to the children of interethnic unions from two major ancestry groups. For the sake of generality, we prefer the term multiethnics.

the multiethnics that we can examine (see data selection below) were born during the late 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, when interethnic marriage was characterized by 'exchange', we predict that multiethnics will have socioeconomic and demographic outcomes that are intermediate to those of their monoethnic counterparts.

Hypothesis 2: Third-generation multiethnics, both of whose parents were born in Israel, are likely to have better relative outcomes than second-generation multiethnics, both of whose parents are immigrants to Israel. As mentioned above, previous research indicates that ethnic intermarriage is more common among native-born (second-generation) Israelis than among first-generation immigrants to Israel (Gshur and Okun 2003). Previous research has not addressed possible differences in the character or nature of ethnic intermarriage by generational status in Israel. We suggest here, however, that because ethnic intermarriage is more widespread and accepted among second-generation Israelis than among first-generation Israelis, the price of ethnic intermarriage may be less exacting. If so, ethnic intermarriage among second-generation Jews may be characterized less by exchange and more by educational homogamy and higher educational status of spouses. Following this line of reasoning, we hypothesize that third-generation multiethnics (the children of second-generation Israelis who intermarried) will have relatively higher status than second-generation multiethnics (the children of first-generation Israelis who intermarried). Moreover, we predict that multiethnics who have one parent that is foreign-born and one parent who was born in Israel (whom we consider as 2.5 generation) will have relatively higher socioeconomic status than 2nd generation multiethnics, but lower than the status of 3rd generation multiethnic.

Hypothesis 3: Father's ethnicity is more dominant than mother's ethnicity in affecting the socioeconomic and demographic outcomes of the offspring of mixed ethnic unions. Theoretical considerations suggest that father's ethnicity is dominant for at least two reasons: (1) father's ethnicity usually determines the surname of the offspring of mixed ethnic marriages, thereby

defining ethnicity in at least one clearly observable manner; (2) because men have traditionally been the primary breadwinners and determinants of social status for the family, father's ethnicity is expected to be more important in affecting outcomes of their children (Qian 2003).

Thus, we expect that the children of an Ashkenazi father and a Mizrahi mother will have better socioeconomic outcomes than children of a Mizrahi father and an Ashkenazi mother. Yogev and Jamshy (1983) found this to be true, but mostly because in their sample, couples composed of Mizrahi women and Ashkenazi men were characterized by higher socioeconomic status than were couples with Ashkenazi wives and Mizrahi men.

DATA, VARIABLES, AND METHODS

Data Sources

We base our research on two data sets,both of which stem from Israeli Census sources. Each of the two data sets offers us advantages for addressing different questions of interest. We begin our analysis with the 20% sample of the 1995 Israeli Census. The advantages of this data set are fourfold: (1) the large sample size allows us to extract a reasonably sized sample of multiethnics, who will be a minority of all birth cohorts; and (2) the 1995 Census was the first Israeli Census which collected information on respondent's *mother's* place of birth as well as respondent's *father's* place of birth. Therefore, the data allow us to identify second-generation multiethnic Israelis as those whose parents were immigrants to Israel from various origin countries; (3) because the data we analyze provide objective information on country of births of respondents, as well as their parents, our research does not suffer from the distortion in reported ethnicity and race which is common in subjective questionnaires, such as that included in the U.S. Census (Lieberson and Waters 1988); (4) the Census includes a wide variety of socioeconomic and demographic outcome variables. We consider a wide range of indicators: educational and occupational status; labor force participation (among women); geographic area of residence; housing density; proportions ever-married and divorced; and parity (among women). This data set will allow us to identify second-generation multiethnics

(native-born Israelis of mixed ethnic ancestry with foreign-born parents) and to examine their outcomes over various birth cohorts, and by the gender make-up of their parents.

The second data set which we use is a special file that contains *linked* records from the 1995 20% sample of the Israeli Census and the 1983 100% sample of the Israeli Census. The linked records are necessary in order to define the ethnicity of individuals with one or both parents born in Israel (Friedlander et al. 2002). As described above, census data from 1995 contain information on respondents' country of birth as well as information on country of birth of the respondents' parents. However, the 1995 data do not contain information on grandparental place of birth – this lack of information poses a problem for defining ethnicity among Israelis whose parent(s) were born in Israel. Therefore, we turned to the special linked data file. Persons in the 1995 Census are linked to the 1983 Census records of their parents. In the 1983 census records, the parents of the individuals in the sample responded to questions on *their* fathers' country of birth (that is, country of birth of the grandfathers of the respondents of interest in 1995). This file allows us to make comparisons between second-generation multiethnics and third-generation multiethnics. The disadvantage of this file vis a vis the 20% 1995 Census file is its smaller sample size (due to incomplete linkage) and a smaller subset of outcome variables available for analysis.

Descriptive statistics are compiled for various groups of multiethnic and monoethnics: (1) those with two parents of Ashkenazi (European/American) origin; (2) those with two parents of Mizrahi (Asian or African) origin; and (3) those with one parent of Ashkenazi origin and one parent of Mizrahi origin. In some cases, results are presented for two subgroups of the last multiethnic group: (3a) those whose mothers are Ashkenazi and whose fathers are Mizrahi and (3b) those whose fathers are Ashkenazi and whose mothers are Mizrahi.

Where possible, we also present descriptive results separately by generational status. We limit all analyses to individuals who were born in Israel, and we define three generational states: (1) 2nd generational status for those whose parents were both born outside of Israel; (2) 2.5 generational status for those with one parent who was born outside of Israel and one parent who was born in Israel; and (3)3rd generational status for those whose parents were both born in Israel.

RESULTS

We begin by charting the evolution in terms of size and nature of the population of Jewish multiethnics in Israel. Figure 1 presents the ethnic distribution of the native-born Jewish population in the three main ethnic groups, by birth cohorts aged 10-11 to 40-43 in 1995. Table 1 presents the distribution of the population defined by generation and ethnicity for the same birth cohorts. The Appendix describes in detail the derivation of the Figure and Table.

We note from Figure 1 the increase over birth cohorts in the proportion of multiethnics. While only 5.3% of those aged 40-43 are multiethnics, the proportion increases to 10.2% at ages 30-31, 16.5% at ages 20-21, and 25.1% at ages 10-11. On average, the share of multiethnics increases by slightly more than 0.5 percentage point per single year of age. The consistent and continuous rise in the share of multiethnics is especially noteworthy considering the variety of parameters influencing change in the ethnic makeup of the population. These factors include: (1) the timing and size of immigration flows from diverse countries of origin; (2) subsequent changes in the generational distribution of the population; and (3) differential mortality, nuptiality, and fertility patterns across ethnic groups.

Referring to Table 1, we note the the proportion of multiethnics in each birth cohort varies greatly by generational status, and that second-generation Israelis tend to have much lower proportions multiethnic than do 2.5 and third-generation Israelis. For example, among

individuals aged 10-11 in 1995, 11.3% of second-generation members of the birth cohort are characterized as multiethnic, while among 2.5 and third-generation Israelis, 28.8% and 29.6% are multiethnic. We also note that across birth cohorts, there is evidence of increases in the proportions multiethnic within each generational status.

The differential share of multiethnics by generational status is consistent with the previously noted finding that, controlling for the ethnic and generational composition of the population, rates of ethnic intermarriage are more common among the native-born than among the foreign-born (Gshur & Okun, 2003).[4] One implication of the differential proportion of multiethnics by generational status is that changes in the generational composition of the population will tend to be associated with changes in the overall proportions multiethnic.

Figure 2 and Table 2 present the generational distribution of the Jewish native-born population by birth cohort. As can be seen, almost 90% of those born in the first half of the 1950's (aged 40-43 in 1995) are the second-generation children of foreign-born parents, and only 2.6% are 3rd or higher generation. However, some time after the immigration waves subside, the proportion of the second generation children of immigrants also decreases. Figure 2 illustrates the dramatic decline in the second-gneration among persons younger than 30 in 1995. Indeed, the majority of Israeli-born children aged 0-9 in 1995 are third-generation and higher, so that both of their parents, and many of their grandparents were born in Israel. Among Israeli-born children aged 0-1 in 1995, nearly 30% have at least one grandparent who was born in Israel (generation 3.5 – 4 in the Figure and Table).

[4] Following this line, we would have expected to find a higher proportion of multiethnics in the 3rd generation than in the 2.5 generation. However, the proportion of multiethnics is nearly identical for these two generational groups in the younger age groups, and in the older age groups we even find a larger relative share of multiethnics in the 2.5 generation than in the 3rd generation. Part of the explanation for these patterns lies in the timing of immigration, which influences the *marginal distributions* of generation and ethnicity, and thus the likelihood of interethnic marriage according to generation. For example, the parents of our 3rd generation subjects aged 36-37 in 1995 were born in Israel sometime around the 1930's, a period when persons of Middle Eastern and North African origin were a small minority among the native-born. In contrast, the Mizrahi foreign-born parents of the 2.5 generation subjects aged 36-37 are a much larger segment of the population. Hence, during these early periods, interethnic marriage is less common among couples with both spouses who are native-born Israelis than among couples where one partner is foreign-born, despite the fact that ethnic intermarriage *rates* are generally higher among the native-born.

Changes in the generational distribution of the Jewish population are important for this study because of differences in the proportions of multiethnics across generations. In particular, as the proportions of second-generation Israelis decline, the overall proportions of the multiethnic increase.[5] We can utilize the information in Tables 1 and 2 to estimate the ethnic makeup of younger birth cohorts, for whom data limitations prevent the direct computation of ethnic distribution (see Appendix). Applying the conservative assumption that the shares of multiethnics within each generation remain constant at the levels recorded among those aged 10-11 in 1995, we estimate that 26.3% of Israeli-born Jews aged 0-1 in 1995 are multiethnics. The relatively small increment in the proportion of multiethnics from 25.1% among those aged 10-11 is the result of a small decline in the proportion of second-generation Israelis between those aged 10-11 and those aged 0-1 in 1995. This small decline in the proportion of the second-generation is the product of the immigration wave from the former USSR during the early 1990's, which had a positive impact on the number of 2nd generation Israelis. Thus, despite the likely deceleration in the growth rate of the multiethnics in the early 1990s, even conservative estimates indicate a continued increase in the share of multiethnics over birth cohorts. We can therefore safely conclude that in the coming 10 to 25 years, more than one-fourth of prime-age Israeli-born adults will be multiethnics.

We now turn to our descriptive results regarding the relative socioeconomic and demographic outcomes of multiethnic individuals. We begin with educational outcomes, for which we have the richest collection of information. Then we examine economic outcomes followed by deomgraphic outcomes. Cell sizes are provided in Appendix Tables 1 and 2.

[5] Using a simple mathematical procedure, we quantify the relative contribution of the two different components of the change in the share of multiethnics (changes in the share of multiethnics within each generation, and changes in the generational composition of the population). We find that over 75% of the more recent increase in the proportion of multiethnics – between age groups 18-19a and 10-11 – arises from changes in the generational distribution across birth cohorts, while less than 25% is the consequence of changes in the share of multiethnics within each generation

Educational outcomes

Figures 3.1 and 3.2 present results on the mean years of schooling reported by second-generation Jews. While years of schooling is a rather crude measure of educational attainment, it serves as a summary indicator, and the Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate results which are typical of others shown below. Figure 3.1 presents results for men and women in four ethnic groups, aged 25-29 in the 20% sample of the 1995 Census. These persons are presumably old enough to have nearly completed their education, so that a study of total years of schooling is reasonable. Figure 3.2 presents analogous results for older individuals aged 40-44 in 1995.

It is clear from Figures 3.1 and 3.2 that multiethnic men and women (those with one Ashkenazi parent and one Mizrahi parent) have an average number of years of education that is substantively and statistically different from and intermediate to their counterparts of Mizrahi origin (with two Mizrahi parents) and those of Ashkenazi origin (with two Ashkenazi parents). For example, among men aged 25-29, those of mixed ethnic origins have between 12.8-13.0 years of schooling on average, depending on whether the mother or the father is of Ashkenazi origin. In contrast, men of Ashkenazi origin have 13.5 years of schooling on average, while men of Mizrahi origins have 12.1 years of schooling on average. The average number of years of education among both multiethnic groups is statistically significantly different at the 5% level from the Mizrahi group and from the Ashkenazi group.[6] While multiethnics are statically distinguishable from their monoethnic counterparts, and the monoethnic groups are clearly different one from the other, we note that in no cases do the two multiethnic groups (defined by which parent is Ashkenazi and which is Mizrahi) differ from each other statistically or substantively.

[6] Because of the large number of intergroup comparison, Bonferroni tests of statistical significance were employed in all multiple comparisons.

Figures 4.1 and 4.2 present analogous results for percents of groups holding a post-secondary certificate or an academic degree. The former is usually a teaching certificate, while the latter generally refers to a B.A degree or higher. Post-secondary and academic schooling in Israel is a fairly selective level of education as evidenced by the fact that in most cases, the majority of individuals do not attain a certificate or degree of this nature.

Here again, we note that in all cases, men and women of multiethnic background have outcomes that are statistically different from and intermediate to those of their monoethnic counterparts. It is striking that in a few cases, the proportions of multiethnics holding post-secondary or academic degrees are nearly exactly in the middle between the analogous proportions of monoethnics. Once again, we note that differences between multiethnics and their monoethnic counterparts are sizable and statistically significant, while differences between the two different groups of multiethnics are negligible in size.

Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show results analogous to those of Figures 4.1 and 4.2, with proportions limited to those who hold an academic degree (B.A. or higher). Those who hold a B.A. degree are a select subset of those represented in Figure 4. The patterns of results are much the same as in Figures 3 and 4.

We note that sample sizes are large enough to have been able to detect statistical significance between multiethnic groups, but that the size of the differences are generally quite small in size. Moreover, we note that no systematic pattern of differences across gender groups or birth cohorts emerges in terms of the relative standing of multiethnics. For example, it does not appear to be the case that the relative position of multiethnics in the older cohort differs in an important manner from their relative position in the younger cohort, nor is their relative position much different among women than among men.

Figures 3, 4 and 5, as well as additional results that will be presented below, do not reveal any systematic difference between the two multiethnic groups defined by mother's and father's ethnicity. Thus, we do not find empirical support for the hypothesis that father's ethnicity has greater influence than mother's ethnicity on social status of persons of mixed ethnicity (hypothesis 3 above). Nor do we find systematic empirical support for the existence of consistent gender asymmetry among men and women multiethnics in terms of the differential impact of father's or mother's ethnicity.

Because we found no systematic or statistically significant differences between the two multiethnics groups in Figures 3,4 and 5, we have combined the two multiethnic groups into one when presenting additional results on educational outcomes below. The advantage of collapsing these two groups is in terms of simplicity of presentation and exploitation of larger cell sizes. The latter issue is especially important when looking at 2.5 and 3rd generation groups, for whom cell sizes tend to be smaller in total size than for second generation groups.

As mentioned above, in order to examine outcomes of individuals with at least one parent born outside Israel, we must turn to the 20% 1995 Census linked with the 100% 1983 Census.[7] Figures 6.1 – 6.10 present the proportions of various groups who have at least twelve years of formal schooling, broken down by birth cohort (cohorts aged 18-21 through 35-39 in 1995), gender, generation (2nd, 2.5 and 3rd) and ethnicity (in three categories). Twelve years of schooling is roughly equivalent to the completion of a high school education. We note that the large majority of Jewish Israelis in all subgroups have at least twelve years of schooling.

[7] When we compare results for the second generation based on the linked file, we find that they are consistent with those based on the 20% sample of the 1995 census. This consistency of results suggests that the linked file provides a representative sample for research. We do not present here results from the linked file that replicate those from the 20% Census file.

Nevertheless, we do see statistically significant and sizable differences between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim in all cases.[8]

More important for us, in every birth cohort, gender and generational subgroup, multiethnic persons have outcomes that are intermediate to those of their Mizrahi and Ashkenazi counterparts. This major result is consistent with that presented in Figures 3, 4 and 5, and is our most consistent finding throughout the paper. In addition, if we look at the numbers in Figures 6.1-6.5 from a slightly different perspective, we note that within each Figure, a fairly consistent hierarchy in terms of ethnic-generation groups emerges. In particular, within ethnic groups, higher generational status usually implies higher educational status,[9] but it is still the case that Mizrahim of all generations are at the lowest levels, multiethnics of all generations are above Mizrahim, and Ashkenazim of all generations are at the highest levels. This pattern holds true for men as well as for women; that is, we do not find evidence of gender asymmetry in the relative position of multiethnics. Neither do we find consistent or important changes over different birth cohorts or generations in the relative position of multiethnic men or women. The latter point suggests that we do not find strong empirical support for hypothesis 2, which states that 3rd generation multiethnics should have better *relative* outcomes than 2.5 and 2nd generation multiethnics,

[8] It is not the focus of this study to examine changes over birth cohorts or generations in the ethnic gap in educational attainment between Mizrahim and Ashkenazi. Previous research has addressed this issue in depth. We do note, however, that generally, ethnic gaps in proportions attaining various levels of education decline in absolute percentage point terms across *birth cohorts*. The results concerning reductions in ethnic gaps across generations are less consistent or clear-cut. Thus, ethnic inequality appears to be reduced over consecutive birth cohorts, but not necessarily over different generations within the same birth cohort. These findings, which contrast somewhat with those of previous research (Friedlander et al. 2002; Dahan et al. 2003), should be interpreted in light of the different ways ethnicity and generation are defined in the above studies.

[9] We note that generally, there is a positive association between generation and educational status within ethnic groups, but that the association is not always consistent, particularly for Mizrahim. Moreover, for all ethnic groups, it is generally the case that outcomes for persons in the 2.5 generation tend to be more similar to those in the 3rd generation than to those in the 2nd generation. Apparently, having only one native-born parent, who is familiar with and involved in the various facets of the Israeli society, suffices to improve the status of the child.

Turning to Figures 7.1-7.5, we see very similar results concerning proportions who hold a matriculation diploma or higher. The matriculation diploma is an important stage in the educational process, as it is a prerequisite for most forms of post-secondary schooling. We note that our results for the cohort aged 18-21 in 1995 are very similar to those reported in Dahan et al. 2003. Once again, results show that multiethnic men and women are consistently positioned in between their monoethnic counterparts. While there is some indication that the status of 3rd generation multiethnics relative to their 3rd generation counterparts is better than the status of 2nd generation multiethnics relative to their 2nd generation counterparts, the change over generations is not very clear or consistent.

Similar patterns are obtained when the outcome variables are proportions with at least thirteen years of schooling (Figures 8.1-8.4), proportions with a post-secondary or academic degree (Figures 9.1-9.3), and proportions with an academic degree (Figures 10.1-10.3).[10] We note that thirteen years corresponds roughly to at least some post-secondary or academic education, but includes those who did not complete their post-secondary certificate or degree. We limit our examination of thirteen years of schooling to birth cohorts aged 22-24 through 35-39, as younger cohorts may not have had time to begin post-secondary studies.[11] Also, when examining proportions who have earned a post-secondary or an academic degree (Figures 9.1-9.3), and proportions who have earned an academic degree among the same birth cohorts (Figures 10.1-10.3), we limit our examination to birth cohorts aged 25-29, 30-34 and 35-39 in 1995, because it is likely that younger cohorts may not have completed their degree programs at the time of observation.[12] In all of these figures, we find that multiethnics have outcomes that are intermediate to those of their monoethnic counterparts. No consistent changes in the relative status of multiethnics emerge when comparing across age groups or generations.

[10] Similar results for academic degree attainers are reported in Cohen, Haberfeld and Kristal (2004).
[11] Mandatory military service for Jewish men and women usually involves soldiers aged 18-20 or 21; most students begin their post-secondary studies after completing their military service.
[12] We note that the results reported for those with a post-secondary or academic degree among the birth cohort aged 25-29 in Figures 8.1 and 8.2 who are 2nd generation are quite close to those reported in Figures 3a and 3b above. That is, although the two sets of results are based on different samples, they are nearly identical.

Economic Outcomes

We limit our examination of economic outcomes to those variables for which there are substantial and statistically significant differences between the two monoethnic groups.[13] Figures 11.1 and 11.2 present the proportions of employed individuals who work in a high-status occupation, among second-generation Jews. High status occupations were defined as work in the professional, managerial, and technical fields, and the definitions are based on self-reported occupational categories. Given the large proportion of cases that are missing on household income variables in the Census, and the consequent difficulty in analyzing these income data, we prefer to use occupational information as an indicator of economic status.

Figure 11.1 presents results for second-generation men and women in four ethnic groups, aged 25-29 in the 20% sample of the 1995 Census. These persons are presumably old enough to have at least begun their working careers; therefore, an examination of current occupation seems justified in terms of their life cycle position. Figure 11.2 presents analogous results for older individuals aged 40-44 in 1995.

Figures 11.1 and 11.2 reveal patterns that are quite similar to those seen above with regards to educational outcomes. In particular, multiethnic men and women tend to have outcomes that are significantly different from, and intermediate to those of their monoethnic counterparts. In addition, no statistically signficant or systematic differences exist between the two multiethnic groups, defined by mothers' and fathers' ethnicity. The similarity between occupational and educational outcomes is not surprising, given the strong statistical association between the two.

Figures 12.1-12.3 present occupational status for men and women aged 25-29 through 35-39, broken down by generational status as well as ethnicity (in three categories). In general, the

[13] For example, there were very small ethnic differences in the extent of home ownership or in the proportions of employed men and women who worked part-time as opposed to full-time; distributions for these variables are therefore not presented.

patterns here are similar to those described for second-generation Israelis only, in Figures 11.1-11.2. Multiethnic women and men appear to have occupational status that is roughly intermediate to that of their monoethnic counterparts in the two main ethnic groups. As was the case with respect to educational attainment, there are no clear patterns that emerge in terms of changes in the relative status of multiethnics over the generations or age groups.

Figures 13.1 and 13.2 present results regarding the percent of birth cohorts living in metropolitan areas in Israel for second generation Israelis aged 25-29 and 40-44. Metropolitan areas are those in the Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem or Haifa rings. These areas represent the central geographic, economic, and population bases, and contrast with the non-metropolitan areas, which include the more peripheral and socioeconomically less-developed northern and southern regions of Israel.[14] Results here contrast with those presented above. Among women and men aged 25-29, multiethnics tend to live in metropolitan areas nearly to the same extent as do Ashkenazim, and much more so than do Mizrahim (Figure 13.1). It is possible that this finding can be understood in light of patterns of local-area marriage markets. Because non-metropolitan areas are heavily populated by Mizrahim, ethnic intermarriage is presumably less likely to occur there than in metropolitan areas, which are more ethnically integrated. As a result, persons of mixed origins are presumably more likely to be born in metropolitan areas. Moreover, this pattern may be reinforced by internal migration, whereby upwardly mobile persons of mixed ethnic ancestry are more likely to migrate to the center of the country, leaving a heavier concentration of low-status Mizrahim in the peripheral areas. It is interesting to note that among women and men aged 40-44, ethnic differences in metropolitan residence are not large, and the relative position of multiethnics is not as clear as in the case of the younger cohort. It may be that the effects of internal migration are less pronounced among the older cohort.

[14] Non-metropolitan areas include big and small cities outside the Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem and Haifa rings, towns and rural areas.

Figures 14.1 and 14.2 present analogous results regarding housing density, which is defined as the number of persons per room in the household. The results regarding housing density mirror those regarding metropolitan residence – both subgroups of multiethnic adults live in only slightly denser households than do Ashkenazim, while Mizrahim live in much denser households than all other groups. Below, we will show differences in fertility patterns across ethnic groups, and we suggest that these patterns may account for the variation in housing density, because Mizrahim have larger families than all other groups, while multiethnics have families that are roughly similar in size to those of Ashkenazim.

Finally, Figures 15.1-15.3 present proportions of women in various age groups (25-29 through 35-39) and generations who were currently employed at the time of the census.[15] We focus on these age groups both because these women are unlikely to be full-time students, and because they are at the ages when they are most likely to have young children at home – a factor that is often in conflict with women's employment. Employment probabilities are quite high – above 70% in all cases – which is consistent with what we know about the high labor force participation of Jewish women in Israel (Stier et al., 2001). In most cases, multiethnic women have employment probabilities that are intermediate to those of their Mizrahi and Ashkenazi counterparts. The pattern is clearest among the 2nd generation groups, where ethnic gaps in employment probabilities are most pronouced. Particularly in the 3rd generation, ethnic gaps are rather small and differences among groups are often not statistically signficant.

Demographic Outcomes

Finally, we turn to an examination of a variety of demographic outcomes related to marriage, divorce, and childbearing behavior. In Figure 16, we present the proportions of second-generation men and women aged 20-24, who have ever been married. While among men in

[15] Ethnic differences in the proportions of men employed were quite small, and will not be presented here.

1995, ethnic differences in marriage behavior by ages 20-24 is negligible, Figure 16 suggests that differences are apparent among women of the same age group. In particular, nearly one-third (32.1%) of Mizrahi women have married by that age, while only one-quarter (25.1%) of Ashkenazi women have married. What is most interesting for us is the relative position of multiethnic women, who have marriage patterns that are nearly identical to those of Ashkenazi women (between 24.1% and 25.3% ever-married), and substantially and statistically significantly different than those of Mizrahi women. Differences between the two mixed ethnic groups of women are not statistically significant or sizable.

Figure 17 presents proportions ever-married by ages 24-26, broken down by generational status as well as ethnicity. We focus on this age group, as proportions ever-married at these ages generally presents the greatest ethnic variance among women. Among men, ethnic differences in proportions ever-married are fairly small. For women, percents ever-married are substantively and consistently closer to those of Ashkenazim than to those of Mizrahim. These results are consistent with those reported above in Figure 16. Moreover, the resemblance of multiethnic women to their Ashkenazi, rather than Mizrahi counterparts, increases between the second-generation to the third-generation. While results for men are less consistent, the general picture suggests that at least in terms of marriage patterns, persons of mixed ethnic origin are more similar to Ashkenazim than to Mizrahim. These findings contrast with most of those reported for most educational and economic outcomes, where multiethnics were not found to be consistently more similar to either one of the monoethnic groups.

We now turn to an examination of fertility behavior. Historically, Jewish immigrants from Muslim countries in Asia and Africa experienced much higher fertility than did their European-born counterparts in the years prior to and following arrival in Israel. While Jewish immigrants from the Muslim countries experienced rapid and large fertility declines in the 1950s, 1960s,

and 1970s (Friedlander and Goldscheider 1979), fertility differences between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim are still apparent in 1995 among Israeli-born women.

Figure 18 presents the percentages of second-generation currently married women aged 40-44 in 1995 with at least four children.[16] The patterns are striking. While only 20.1% of Ashkenazi women have completed fertility of four or more children, 39.4% of their Mizrahi counterparts have attained this level. More important for us, the fertility patterns of women of mixed ethnic origin is much closer to that of Ashkenazi women than to that of Mizrahi women. In fact, the proportions with four or more children among the two groups of multiethnic women (15.5% and 22.2%) do not differ statistically from each other or from the analogous proportion among Ashkenazi women, but are significantly smaller than that of Mizrahi women. Thus, as was the case in terms of women's marriage patterns, fertility patterns indicate that multiethnic women resemble Ashkenazim much more closely than Mizrahim.

This pattern also emerges when considering ever-married women aged 22-43, who are spread more broadly across the childbearing years. Figure 19 presents percentages of women with high cumulative fertility, broken down by generational status. High fertility is defined as a dichotomous variable, with differing cut-off values across age-groups, to reflect differential exposure to childbearing by age.[17] Once again, multiethnic women of all generations have fertility which is nearly identical to that of their Ashkenazi counterparts, and which is statistically significantly and sizably lower than that of their Mizrahi counterparts. These fertility patterns shed light on our findings above regarding levels of housing density. Given that multiethnics have fertility levels that are roughly commensurate with those of Ashkenazim, and lower than those of Mizrahim, it is not surprising that housing density (which takes household size as one

[16] Israeli census data provides information on children ever born for women only.
[17] Women were considered as having high fertility if they were aged 22-24 and had at least 1 child, or aged 25-29 and had at least 2 children, or aged over 30 and had at least 3 children.

of its components) among multiethnics is similar to that of Ashkenazim, and lower than that of Mizrahim.

The last demographic outcome that we consider is related to divorce behavior. We consider the percent ever-divorced among ever-married, second-generation men and women aged 40-44 in 1995 (Figure 20). Because divorce probabilities are rather low among Israeli Jews at the younger ages, we prefer to focus on a somewhat older age group, in order to allow time for the cumulative probabilities of divorce to become substantial. While ethnic differences in divorce probabilities among men aged 40-44 are small, striking differences emerge between multiethnic women and their monoethnic counterparts. In particular, while Mizrahi and Ashkenazi women have divorce probabilities ranging from 11.8% to 13.3%, both groups of multiethnic women have divorce probabilities of more than 20% - probabilities that are statistically significantly larger than the probabilities for the monoethnic groups. Unfortunately, an examination of divorce patterns broken down by generational status yielded unreliable results because there are too few 2.5 and 3rd generation multiethnics at the older ages . Nevertheless, the results presented in Figure 20 for second-generation Jewish women are outstanding and suggestive of a unique pattern of high divorce risk among multiethnic women. This is the one and only indicator we have encountered that, at least at face value, is consistent with the notion that multiethnics may face psychological distress resulting from their outsider status vis a vis monoethnic groups (Parks 1928).

Ethnic differences that could have emerged in the absence of ethnic intermarriage

Motivation for this study stems in part from interest in the following question: Do ethnic intermarriage patterns in one generation have important effects on the reproduction of ethnic inequality in subsequent generations? In other words, does ethnic intermarriage reduce the salience of ethnic differences, or does it reinforce ethnic differences? In the former possibility, we envision the impact of ethnic intermarriage as leading to an “averaging out” of ethnic

differences, whereby a non-select, but growing proportion of Mizrahim and Ashkenazim marry each other, thereby increasing proportions of multiethnics whose very numbers decrease the importance of ethnicity in the two major ancestry groups.

In the latter scenario, we envision possible effects operating through the selective nature of ethnic outmarriage, which affects the pool of marriage partners available for ethnic inmarriage – still the most common form of union. Marriage patterns exhibited by ethnically endogamous couples, together with their subsequent fertility and divorce behavior, and the intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic status and demographic behavior, partially determine the characteristics of children of endogamous unions. Ethnic differences between the two major ancestry groups in the next generation are thereby also partially determined.

Despite important increases over time in the proportion of marriages that are ethnically exogamous, it is clear that at least in the short-term, ethnic endogamy will still characterize the large majority of unions. For example, only about one-quarter of recent marriages were ethnically exogamous in the early 1990s (Authors' calculations). Our estimates are that roughly three-quarters of the prime-aged population 30 - 34 in 2015 will be characterized as belonging to one of the two major ethnic groups (Table 1). Therefore, it seems that at least in the coming ten or twenty years, the first scenario described above whereby ethnic intermarriage strongly dilutes the salience of ethnicity as we currently understand it, is unlikely to take hold. In what follows, we make an initial attempt to address the potential impact of ethnic intermarriage in the second scenario by asking the following question: Under the hypothetical situation in which ethnic intermarriage in the past had not occurred, how might ethnic differences in socioeconomic status and demographic behavior have evolved?

The children of ethnic intermarriage – the multiethnics who are the focus of our study – are the offspring of interethnic marriage, and thus offer us one avenue of investigation. While we

certainly do not believe that the answers we outline here are the final word, they hint at the potentially significant impact of ethnic intermarriage on ethnic inequality, and suggest the need for further research in this area. We perform a straightforward simulation whereby we hold the socioeconomic and demographic outcomes of multiethnics at their observed values, but "reassign" all multiethnics alternatively to one or the other of the two monoethnic groups. We thus perform two different simulations, the first in which multiethnics are reassiged to Ashkenazi ethnicity, and the second in which they are reassigned to Mizrahi ethnicity. The naïve assumption underlying the two simulations is that the socioeconomic and demographic outcomes observed among multiethnics would have been the same if their parents had married endogamously rather than exogamously.

Table 3 illustrates the type of results we obtain and reports the observed and simulated ethnic gaps in attainment of a post-secondary certificate or academic degree among men and women aged 25-29, by generation.[18] For example, if we consider ethnic gaps among third-generation men, we note that there is an observed 23.5 percentage point gap between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim (with 44.6% of Ashkenazim and 21.1% of Mizrahim with postsecondary diplomas or higher). Under the hypothetical scenario that ethnic intermarriage in the past had not occurred, and that multiethnics were reassigned as Mizrahim, the ethnic gap would fall by thirty per cent, to 16.4 percentage points (with the simulated proportion among Mizrahim with diplomas rising to 28.2%). On the other hand, if the multiethnics are reassigned as Ashkenazim, the ethnic gap would fall by only six per cent, to 22 percentage points (with the simulated proportion among Ashkenazim with diplomas falling to 43.1%). The magnitude of the effect of reassignment depends on the group to which multiethnics are reassigned, because among third-generation men aged 25-29 in 1995, Mizrahim are a much smaller group than

[18] Generally, the effects of reassignment on reducing ethnic gaps are somewhat smaller among older age groups, because multiethnics make up smaller proportions of the birth cohorts.

Ashkenazim, so the impact of reassignment is greater among the former than the latter. Results regarding the second generation show that in the absence of ethnic intermarriage, ethnic gaps would have been 4-18% smaller than observed, while among the 2.5 generation, gaps would have been 17-25% smaller than observed. Taking all generations together, ethnic differences would have been reduced by 9-15% in the absence of ethnic intermarriage. Thus, the potential impact on ethnic inequality could be substantial and is likely to vary by generation.

As seen above, with regards to most socioeconomic outcomes, adult multiethnics fell roughly in the middle between the monoethnic groups. Therefore, reassignment of multiethnics to either of the two monoethnic groups results in a reduction in ethnic inequality, as multiethnics either raise the average outcomes among Mizrahim or lower them among Ashkenazim. In other words, under the assumption stated above and the counterfactual scenario in which ethnic intermarriage in the past had *not* occurred, ethnic inequality among prime-aged men and women would have been smaller than it actually is. The results of our simulations indicate that in many cases, these hypothesized effects of ethnic intermarriage on ethnic inequality are substantial, although the effects range widely in magnitude.

Regarding demographic outcomes, the results differ because multiethnics are quite close to Ashkenazim in terms of their patterns of marriage and fertiltiy. Thus, when multiethnics are "reassigned" to Ashkenazim, ethnic group differences are largely unaffected, or may even increase. Only when multiethnics are "reassigned" to Mizrahim are ethnic group differences reduced (results not presented here).

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Our major findings regarding the socioeconomic characteristics - particularly educational attainment and occupational status - of multiethnic adults show their position to be consistently

intermediate to those of their monoethnic counterparts. We examined a wide range of different outcome variables among different birth cohorts, and uncovered similar patterns in all cases. Often, multiethnics fall right in the middle between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim, and they almost always fall somewhere in the range between them. We do not find consistent or substantively important variation in the relative socioeconomic position of multiethnics as a function of their generation in Israel (i.e. the children vs. the grandchildren of immigrants), their family make-up (i.e. which of the parents was Mizrahi, and which was Ashkenazi), or their gender. In a different, ongoing research project focusing on the *type* of matriculation diplomas awarded to Israeli examinees in the 1990s, findings clearly indicate that multiethnic Jews are more likely than their Mizrahi counterparts to earn "high-quality" diplomas with a heavy emphasis on mathematics, English language, and the natural sciences, but are less likely than their Ashkenazi counterparts to do so (Friedlander, personal communication). These results are in line with the general set of findings reported here.

The "in-between" socioeconomic status of multiethnic adults is consistent with our primary hypothesis, which suggests that multiethnic adults have socioeconomic outcomes that reflect the nature of interethnic unions during the periods in which their parents married. Given that ethnic intermarriage was characterized by unions of 'exchange' during the late 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, multiethnic persons born during and somewhat after these periods are likely to have one Mizrahi parent with relatively high educational or occupational attainment, and one Ashkenazi parent with relatively low attainment. Thus, on average, the parental characteristics of persons of mixed ethnic ancestry born during those periods are likely to be intermediate to those of their monoethnic counterparts. Because parental characteristics are known to be very important predictors of their children's status, we hypothesized that persons of mixed ethnic origins would have socioeconomic characteristics that are better than those of Mizrahim, but worse than those of Ashkenazim in their birth cohorts. Our findings regarding the socioeconomic status of multiethnics are consistent with this hypothesis, and are contrary to

predictions based on the marginal man hypothesis (Parks 1928), whereby multiethnics are expected to have worse outcomes than both of the monoethnic groups.

In contrast to the results obtained for educational and occupational distributions, strikingly different patterns emerge regarding other dimensions such as metropolitan residence, housing density, marriage and fertility behavior, and divorce risk. With regards to all of these variables – with the exception of divorce behavior – the position of multiethnics is nearly identical to that of Ashkenazim, and quite different than that of Mizrahim. Like their Ashkenazi counterparts, multiethnic adult women tend to marry relatively later in life and to have smaller families. Similarly, multiethnic women and men tend to live under less dense housing conditions, as do their Ashkenazi counterparts. In addition, multiethnic adults, like Ashkenazim, are more likely to live in the central, metropolitan areas of Israel, rather than in the peripheral areas than are their Mizrahi counterparts.

As mentioned above, the metropolitan status of multiethnic adults can be understood in light of a combination of marriage and migration behavior. Since metropolitan areas are more ethnically integrated than are peripheral areas, which are more heavily Mizrahi in terms of their population, ethnic intermarriage is more likely to occur in the former areas than in the latter. Moreover, selective outmigration of upwardly mobile multiethnics to metropolitan areas may explain their greater concentration there than in peripheral areas. The results in terms of housing density can also be understood in terms of demographic behavior. Larger families with more children tend to live in denser quarters. Like Ashkenazim, multiethnics tend to have smaller families than Mizrahim, and this may explain the patterns of housing density revealed by the data.

The marriage and fertility behavior present more of a puzzle. Why do we see rapid assimilation of multiethnics in terms of demographic behavior, to patterns which are quite similar to those of

their more advantaged Ashkenazi counterparts, and which set them apart from Mizrahim? Why is the assimilation of multiethnics in terms of educational attainment and occupational status slower? We suggest here that demographic behavior – as reflected in marriage and fertility patterns – is more amenable to choice on the part of multiethnics and therefore more easily subject to change. In contrast, measures of social and economic status – the outcomes of competitive processes in the educational and labor market arenas – are more hierarchical in nature and thus less amenable to rapid change. Moreover, we suggest that the intergenerational processes by which parental characteristics affect their children's educational and occupational status are more deterministic than are those which influence their children's marriage and fertility behavior. The former may thus leave less room for change than the latter.

Previous research on ethnic differences among Jews in Israel suggests that ethnic differences in some areas tend to converge faster than in others (Goldscheider 1996). For example, ethnic differences in mortality, particularly among children, between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim were reduced rapidly following mass migration in the 1950s (Peritz et al. 1973), while ethnic differences in income have proved more stubborn (Cohen and Haberfeld 1998). The reasons for the differential convergence in various arenas of life are complex and may involve factors such as changes in cultural norms, perceived benefits to changed behavior, and access to the resources necessary to implement change (Friedlander et al. 2002). While previous research has not specifically addressed the case of multiethnic Jews in Israel, we see similar patterns here, whereby their assimilation in terms of demographic behavior appears to occur more rapidly than that of their educational and occupational status.

Perhaps the most surprising finding that we document here refers to the high divorce probabilities among multiethnic women, in comparison with their monoethnic counterparts who have ever been married. This result is the only one which can be understood in light of Parks' "marginal man" hypothesis, whereby persons of mixed ethnic ancestry face psychological

difficulties and stress due to their outsider status. Research on the marriage patterns of persons of mixed ethnic ancestry suggest that they do not predominantly marry other persons of mixed ethnic ancestry, but rather mate at roughly equal rates with Ashkenazim and Mizrahim (Okun 2004). It may be the case that women of mixed ethnic ancestry experience greater conflict in marriage as a result of cultural and other differences with their spouse. This suggestion is consistent with previous research which shows that, in the past, ethnic intermarriage between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim was more likely to end in divorce than were other marriages that were ethnically endogamous (Khait-Marelly 2004). It is not clear, however, why the higher probabilities of divorce associated with multiethnic status are limited only to women.

The results of the present research are useful as a starting point in understanding complex issues that revolve around the ways in which ethnic intermarriage affects ethnic gaps in socioeconomic status. As outlined above, based on estimates from the 1995 census, roughly 25% of young adults in their early-to-mid twenties today are of mixed ethnic ancestry. Conservative estimates of future proportions of multiethnic adults are at least as large as that. The impact of this growing group of multiethnic adults on ethnic gaps in socioeconomic status between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim has yet to be explored in depth. A simple model discussed here suggests that, in contrast to intuition, the formation and growth of a group of multiethnics may actually increase ethnic gaps to higher levels than they would have been in the absence of ethnic intermarriage. Based on this analysis, it appears that the selective nature of ethnic intermarriage, coupled with the intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic status, actually increase disparities between ethnic groups. The consequences of these processes for the salience of ethnicity as a domestic political and social issue in Israel and other immigrant countries are important. Future research will explore the intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic status among multiethnics, and will develop new models which quantify the impact of ethnic intermarriage on ethnic stratification.

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Table 1: Distribution of ethnicity, by age group and generation, among native-born Jewish Israelis in 1995.

Age group	Generation	Ethnicity			Total	N
		Mizrahim	Ashkenazim	Multiethnics		
10-11	All	44.5	30.4	**25.1**	100%	20,037
	2	55.3	33.4	**11.3**	100%	4,686
	2.5	45.6	25.6	**28.8**	100%	5,946
	3 and higher	38.3	32.1	**29.6**	100%	9,405
12-13	All	43.5	31.8	**24.7**	100%	19,598
	2	55.7	32.9	**11.3**	100%	5,358
	2.5	43.3	27.6	**29.1**	100%	5,880
	3 and higher	35.9	34.0	**30.1**	100%	8,360
14-15	All	43.6	32.7	**23.8**	100%	17,404
	2	57.4	31.0	**11.5**	100%	5,303
	2.5	42.6	28.3	**29.1**	100%	5,454
	3 and higher	33.2	37.6	**29.2**	100%	6,647
16-17	All	44.5	33.1	**22.4**	100%	16,997
	2	60.9	28.4	**10.8**	100%	5,996
	2.5	41.0	30.0	**29.0**	100%	5,340
	3 and higher	30.6	41.1	**28.4**	100%	5,661
18-19a	All	46.9	32.5	**20.7**	100%	17,513
	2	65.6	24.5	**9.9**	100%	7,358
	2.5	39.3	31.2	**29.5**	100%	5,389
	3 and higher	26.5	46.2	**27.3**	100%	4,766
18-19b	All	49.3	33.7	**17.0**	100%	18,143
	2	63.4	25.5	**11.1**	100%	7,818
	2.5	43.4	32.8	**23.8**	100%	5,636
	3 and higher	32.8	48.6	**18.6**	100%	4,689
20-21	All	50.3	33.2	**16.5**	100%	17,468
	2	66.1	23.2	**10.7**	100%	8,652
	2.5	41.3	34.6	**24.1**	100%	5,173
	3 and higher	25.5	55.0	**19.5**	100%	3,643
22-23	All	51.6	33.1	**15.3**	100%	15,214
	2	67.9	21.4	**10.7**	100%	8,570
	2.5	37.8	38.4	**23.8**	100%	4,138
	3 and higher	18.8	64.4	**16.9**	100%	2,506
24-25	All	53.0	32.7	**14.4**	100%	14,327
	2	70.0	19.8	**10.1**	100%	9,047
	2.5	30.1	44.2	**25.7**	100%	3,350
	3 and higher	12.8	72.9	**14.4**	100%	1,930
26-27	All	57.8	29.4	**12.7**	100%	12,271
	2	72.8	18.0	**9.2**	100%	8,650
	2.5	27.1	47.0	**26.0**	100%	2,162
	3 and higher	14.5	71.4	**14.1**	100%	1,459
28-29	All	60.5	28.7	**10.8**	100%	11,425
	2	74.9	17.7	**7.4**	100%	8,430
	2.5	25.1	50.8	**24.1**	100%	1,809
	3 and higher	12.4	73.1	**14.5**	100%	1,186
30-31	All	62.3	27.5	**10.2**	100%	11,152
	2	74.7	18.0	**7.3**	100%	8,594
	2.5	23.9	51.5	**24.7**	100%	1,555
	3 and higher	15.8	71.4	**12.9**	100%	1,003

Table 1 continued

Age group	Generation	Ethnicity			Total	N
		Mizrahim	Ashkenazim	Multiethnics		
32-33	All	62.7	28.1	**9.2**	100%	9,699
	2	73.2	20.2	**6.6**	100%	7,762
	2.5	23.6	52.3	**24.2**	100%	1,175
	3 and higher	15.5	71.7	**12.9**	100%	762
34-35	All	61.2	30.5	**8.2**	100%	8,843
	2	70.7	23.0	**6.3**	100%	7,198
	2.5	22.6	57.6	**19.9**	100%	1,051
	3 and higher	15.0	74.1	**10.9**	100%	594
36-37	All	60.3	32.4	**7.3**	100%	8,349
	2	67.7	27.1	**5.2**	100%	7,044
	2.5	22.0	56.9	**21.1**	100%	859
	3 and higher	17.9	69.1	**13.0**	100%	446
38-39	All	60.8	33.3	**5.9**	100%	6,640
	2	67.1	28.6	**4.2**	100%	5,758
	2.5	19.6	62.8	**17.7**	100%	629
	3 and higher	18.6	67.2	**14.2**	100%	253
40-43	All	53.1	41.6	**5.3**	100%	8,073
	2	57.1	39.0	**4.0**	100%	7,170
	2.5	20.4	62.5	**17.1**	100%	696
	3 and higher	27.5	62.8	**9.7**[1]	100%	207

Notes:
[1]Fewer than 30 observations in the cell.
Grandparents born in Israel are considered Ashkenazim.
Sources: Data on age groups 10-11 - 18-19a are derived from 20% sample of the 1995 Israeli Census.
Data on age groups 18-19b – 40-43 are derived from the linked records of the 20% sample of the 1995 Census and the 100% sample of the 1983 Census.
See Appendix for details.

Table 2: Distribution of generation by age group, among Jewish Israelis in 1995.

Age group	Generation				N
	2	2.5	3	3.5-4	
0-1	17.0	19.4	35.5	28.1	*21,559*
2-3	17.2	22.2	36.9	23.8	*21,372*
4-5	16.8	24.2	37.3	21.8	*20,646*
6-7	16.9	26.7	37.2	19.2	*19,939*
8-9	20.8	28.1	34.2	16.9	*20,270*
10-11	23.4	29.7	32.1	14.8	*20,037*
12-13	27.3	30.0	29.5	13.2	*19,598*
14-15	30.5	31.3	26.8	11.4	*17,404*
16-17	35.3	31.4	23.4	10.0	*16,997*
18-19a	42.0	30.8	18.8	8.5	*17,513*
18-19b	43.1	31.1	24.6	1.2	*18,143*
20-21	49.5	29.6	19.7	1.2	*17,468*
22-23	56.3	27.2	15.4	1.1	*15,214*
24-25	63.2	23.4	12.6	0.9	*14,327*
26-27	70.5	17.6	11.1	0.8	*12,271*
28-29	73.8	15.8	9.6	0.8	*11,425*
30-31	77.1	13.9	8.4	0.6	*11,152*
32-33	80.0	12.1	7.2	0.7	*9,699*
34-35	81.4	11.9	6.1	0.7	*8,843*
36-37	84.4	10.3	4.9	0.4	*8,349*
38-39	86.7	9.5	3.3	0.5	*6,640*
40-43	88.8	8.6	2.2	0.4	*8,073*

Sources: Data on age groups 0-1 - 18-19a is derived from 20% sample of the 1995 Israeli Census.
Data on age groups 18-19b – 40-43 is derived from the linked records of the 20% sample of the 1995 Census and the 100% sample of the 1983 Census.
See Appendix for details.

Table 3: Observed and simulated ethnic gaps in percent holding a post-secondary certificate or an academic degree, among Jewish Israelis aged 25-29 in 1995, by sex and generation.

Sex	Generation	*Before "reassignment"*			*After "reassignment" of multiethnics as Ashkenazim*			*After "reassignment" of multiethnics as Mizrahim*			*% Change in ethnic gap after "reassignment" of multiethnics as*	
		Ash (1)	*Miz (2)*	*Gap (3)*	*Ash (4)*	*Miz (5)*	*Gap (6)*	*Ash (7)*	*Miz (8)*	*Gap (9)*	*Ash (10)*	*Miz (11)*
Males	All	43.5	20.1	**23.4**	40.1	20.1	**20.0**	43.5	22.1	**21.4**	15	9
	2	42.7	19.8	**22.9**	38.6	19.8	**18.8**	42.7	20.8	**21.9**	18	4
	2.5	43.5	22.6	**20.9**	39.9	22.6	**17.3**	43.5	27.9	**15.6**	17	25
	3 and higher	44.6	21.1	**23.5**	43.1	21.1	**22.0**	44.6	28.2	**16.4**	6	30
Females	All	58.7	25.6	**33.1**	53.9	25.6	**28.3**	58.7	28.7	**30.0**	15	9
	2	53.6	24.8	**28.8**	48.6	24.8	**23.8**	53.6	26.3	**27.3**	17	5
	2.5	62.9	30.5	**32.4**	57.5	30.5	**27.0**	62.9	38.4	**24.5**	17	24
	3 and higher	62.1	35.0	**27.1**	59.5	35.0	**24.5**	62.1	41.1	**21.0**	10	22

Notes:
Ash = Ashkenazim.
Miz = Mizrahim.
Column (4) is computed as a weighted average of the outcomes for multiethnics and Ashkenazim.
Column 8) is computed as a weighted average of the outcomes for multiethnics and Mizrahim.
(3) = (1) – (2).
(6) = (4) – (5).
(9) = (7) – (8).
(10) = 100 * (1 – (6)/(3)).
(11) = 100 * (1 – (9)/(3)).

Source: Record linkage file between the 20% sample of the 1995 Israeli Census file and the 100% 1983 Israeli Census

Figure 1: Ethnic distribution by age group in 1995, among Israeli-born Jews



Notes: Data on age groups 10-11 – 18-19a is derived from the 20% sample of the 1995 Israeli Census. Data on age groups 18-19b – 40-43 is derived from the linked records of the 20% sample of the 1995 Census and the 100% sample of the 1983 Census. See Appendix for details.

Figure 2: Distribution of generation by age group in 1995, among Israeli-born Jews



Notes: Data on age groups 0-1 – 18-19a is derived from the 20% sample of the 1995 Israeli Census. Data on age groups 18-19b – 40-43 is derived from the linked records of the 20% sample of the 1995 Census and the 100% sample of the 1983 Census. See Appendix for details.

Figure 3.1: Mean years of schooling, by ethnicity and sex, among second-generation Jewish Israelis, aged 25-29 in 1995



Figure 3.2: Mean years of schooling, by ethnicity and sex, among second-generation Jewish Israelis, aged 40-44 in 1995



Notes: Source: 20% sample of the 1995 Israeli Census.
Miz=Mizrahi parents; Ash=Ashkenazi parents;
M-Miz, F-Ash=Mizrahi mother and Ashkenazi father;
M-Ash, F-Miz=Ashkenazi mother and Mizrahi Father;
†= Significantly different from Ashkenazi at the 5% level;
*=Significantly different from Mizrahi at the 5% level.
Mixed ethnicity groups do not differ significantly from each other at the 10% level.

Figure 4.1: Percent with a post-secondary certificate or an academic degree, by ethnicity and sex, among second-generation Jewish Israelis, aged 25-29 in 1995



Figure 4.2: Percent with a post-secondary certificate or an academic degree, by ethnicity and sex, among second-generation Jewish Israelis, aged 40-44 in 1995



Notes: See figure 3.

Figure 5.1: Percent with an academic degree, by ethnicity and sex, among second-generation Jewish Israelis, aged 25-29 in 1995



Figure 5.2: Percent with an academic degree, by ethnicity and sex, among second-generation Jewish Israelis, aged 40-44 in 1995



Notes: See figure 3.

Figure 6.1: Percent with 12+ years of schooling, by generation and ethnicity, among Jewish Israelis aged 18-21 in 1995

Males



Females



Notes: Source: Record linkage between the 20% sample of the 1995 Israeli Census and the 100% 1983 Israeli Census;
Miz=Mizrahi parents; Ash=Ashkenazi parents;
Mixed=one Mizrahi parent and one Ashkenazi parent;
†= Significantly different from Ashkenazi at the 5% level;
*=Significantly different from Mizrahi at the 5% level.

Figure 6.2: Percent with 12+ years of schooling, by generation and ethnicity, among Jewish Israelis aged 22-24 in 1995

Males



Females



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 6.3: Percent with 12+ years of schooling, by generation and ethnicity, among Jewish Israelis aged 25-29 in 1995

Males



Females



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 6.4: Percent with 12+ years of schooling, by generation and ethnicity, among Jewish Israelis aged 30-34 in 1995

Males



Females



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 6.5: Percent with 12+ years of schooling, by generation and ethnicity, among Jewish Israelis aged 35-39 in 1995

Males



Females



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 7.1: Percent with a matriculation or a higher certificate, by generation and ethnicity, among Jewish Israelis aged 18-21 in 1995

Males



Females



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 7.2: Percent with a matriculation or a higher certificate, by generation and ethnicity, among Jewish Israelis aged 22-24 in 1995

Males



Females



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 7.3: Percent with a matriculation or a higher certificate, by generation and ethnicity, among Jewish Israelis aged 25-29 in 1995

Males



Females



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 7.4: Percent with a matriculation or a higher certificate, by generation and ethnicity, among Jewish Israelis aged 30-34 in 1995

Males



Females



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 7.5: Percent with a matriculation or a higher certificate, by generation and ethnicity, among Jewish Israelis aged 35-39 in 1995

Males



Females



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 8.1: Percent with 13+ years of schooling, by generation and ethnicity, among Jewish Israelis aged 22-24 in 1995

Males



Females



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 8.2: Percent with 13+ years of schooling, by generation and ethnicity, among Jewish Israelis aged 25-29 in 1995

Males



Females



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 8.3: Percent with 13+ years of schooling, by generation and ethnicity, among Jewish Israelis aged 30-34 in 1995

Males



Females



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 8.4: Percent with 13+ years of schooling, by generation and ethnicity, among Jewish Israelis aged 35-39 in 1995

Males



Females



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 9.1: Percent with a post-secondary certificate or an academic degree, by generation and ethnicity, among Jewish Israelis aged 25-29 in 1995

Males



Females



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 9.2: Percent with a post-secondary certificate or an academic degree, by generation and ethnicity, among Jewish Israelis aged 30-34 in 1995

Males



Females



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 9.3: Percent with a post-secondary certificate or an academic degree, by generation and ethnicity, among Jewish Israelis aged 35-39 in 1995

Males



Females



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 10.1: Percent with an academic degree, by generation and ethnicity, among Jewish Israelis aged 25-29 in 1995

Males



Females



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 10.2: Percent with an academic degree, by generation and ethnicity, among Jewish Israelis aged 30-34 in 1995

Males



Females



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 10.3: Percent with an academic degree, by generation and ethnicity, among Jewish Israelis aged 35-39 in 1995

Males



Females



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 11.1: Percent with a high occupation[1], by ethnicity and sex, among employed second-generation Jewish Israelis, aged 25-29 in 1995



Figure 11.2: Percent with a high occupation[1], by ethnicity and sex, among employed second-generation Jewish Israelis, aged 40-44 in 1995



Notes: See figure 3.

[1] High occupation refers to scientific and academic professionals, technicians or managers. Low status occupation refers to all other occupations.

Figure 12.1: Percent with a high occupation, by generation and ethnicity, among employed Jewish Israelis aged 25-29 in 1995

Males



Females



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 12.2: Percent with a high occupation, by generation and ethnicity, among employed Jewish Israelis aged 30-34 in 1995

Males



Females



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 12.3: Percent with a high occupation, by generation and ethnicity, among employed Jewish Israelis aged 35-39 in 1995

Males



Females



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 13.1: Percent living in a metropolitan area, by ethnicity and sex, among second-generation Jewish Israelis, aged 25-29 in 1995



Figure 13.2: Percent living in a metropolitan area, by ethnicity and sex, among second-generation Jewish Israelis, aged 40-44 in 1995 :



Notes: See figure 3.

Figure 14.1: Density[2], by ethnicity and sex, among second-generation Jewish Israelis, aged 25-29 in 1995



Figure 14.2: Density[2], by ethnicity and sex, among second-generation Jewish Israelis, aged 40-44 in 1995



Notes: See figure 3.

[2] Density is defined as the number of persons per room in the household.

Figure 15.1: Percent employed, by generation and ethnicity, among Jewish Israeli females aged 25-29 in 1995



Figure 15.2: Percent employed, by generation and ethnicity, among Jewish Israeli females aged 30-34 in 1995



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 15.3: Percent employed, by generation and ethnicity, among Jewish Israeli females aged 35-39 in 1995



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 16: Percent ever married, by ethnicity and sex, among second-generation Jewish Israelis, aged 20-24 in 1995



Notes: See figure 3.

Figure 17: Percent ever married, by generation and ethnicity, among Jewish Israelis aged 24-26 in 1995

Males



Females



Notes: See figure 6.1.

Figure 18: Percent with 4+ children, by ethnicity, among second-generation married Israeli females, aged 40-44 in 1995



Notes: See figure 3.

Figure 19: Percent with high fertility[3], by generation and ethnicity, among ever married Israeli females aged 22-43 in 1995



Notes: See figure 6.1.

[3] Women were considered to have high fertility if they were aged 22-24 and had at least 1 child, or aged 25-29 and had at least 2 children, or aged over 30 and had at least 3 children.

Figure 20: Percent ever divorced, by ethnicity and sex, among ever married second-generation Jewish Israelis, aged 40-44 in 1995



Notes: See figure 3.

Appendix

Estimation of the proportion of multiethnics among persons aged 10-43 in 1995

For the sake of convenience, we refer to the persons whose ethnicity we are trying to define as index persons. We base our estimates of the proportions of multiethnics among index persons aged 10-19 on data taken directly from the 20% Sample of the 1995 Census. For index persons aged 18 and older, we derive estimates from the linked 20% Sample of the 1995 Census with the 100% 1983 Census. Therefore, for index persons aged 18-19, we have two alternative estimates, based on the two different data sources.

Use of the 20% Sample of the 1995 Census

The 20% sample of the 1995 Census data provides self-reported information on all respondents' country of birth, as well as respondents' parents' country of birth. Therefore, for index persons both of whose parents were not born in Israel, it is straightforward to define ethnicity, based on parents' countries of birth. However, for index persons who have at least one parent who is foreign-born (2.5 and 3rd generation Israelis), it is necessary to have information on grandparental place of birth in order to define ethnicity. We derive information on grandparental place of birth in two stages. First, by using reported information on relationship to household head, we identify parents in the household of the index person. Next, we obtain grandparental place of birth of the index person based on parents' report on *their* parents' place of birth.

We assumed that index persons aged 10-19 live with their biological mother, but not necessarily with their biological father. The existence of a non-resident biological father was determined based on the marital status and marital history of the index person's mother. For the small minority of cases where index persons aged 10-19 were not living with their biological fathers, and where their report on father's place of birth indicated that the non-resident father was born in Israel, the ethnicity of the index person could not be determined.

Use of the linked sample

For older index persons, it is not reasonable to assume that they will be living in their parents' (or mother's) households. Therefore, we cannot identify their parents directly from the 20% Census sample in 1995, and must utilize the linked sample to 1983. The linked sample, created by identifying parents of index persons via the Population Registry system, links parents' characteristics to index persons aged 18-43 in 1995. These characteristics include parent's place of birth and parent's father's place of birth for each parent of the index person, but do not include parent's mother's place of birth for each parent of the index person. Therefore, the linked file provides information for the index person on both parents' place of birth, as well as both grandfathers' places of birth, but not grandmothers' place of birth. As a result, we probably underestimate the proportion of multiethnics among 2.5 and 3rd generation Israelis, because the Israeli-born parents of index persons aged 18-43 cannot by definition be multiethnic. This underestimate is evident in comparing the proportion of multiethnics among persons aged 18-19 in the two different data sets (see Table 1). We therefore view our estimates of the proportions multiethnic at ages 18-19 and above as conservative.

Israeli-born grandparents of the index person

Since the large majority of Jews born in preindepence Israel are the descendants of immigrants from Europe, we assume that Israeli-born grandparents of our respondents aged 10-43 in both data sets are Ashkenazi. However, due to the timing of immigration from Arab countries in Asia and North Africa, which increased sharply in 1948 with the foundation of the State, this assumption is not appropriate for the Israeli-born grandparents of young children aged 0-9 in 1995. For example, a child aged 5 in 1995 is likely to have parents who were born around 1970, and grandparents who were born around 1950, after the beginning of the mass migration of Jews from Muslim countries. Therefore, we cannot assume that the Israeli-born grandparents of young children aged 0-9 in 1995 are Ashkenazi, and we cannot define ethnicity for the large group of young children with Israeli-born grandparents. We therefore define ethnicity only for persons aged 10-43 in 1995.

Appendix Table 1: Cell sizes by age group, sex, and ethnicity, among second-generation Jewish Israelis in 1995.

Age group	Sex	Ethnicity				Total
		Mizrahim	Ashkenazim	Multiethnics: M-Miz, F-Ash[1]	Multiethnics: M-Ash, F-Miz[2]	
20-24	Males	8,501	2,657	643	597	**12,398**
	Females	8,452	2,531	615	609	**12,207**
25-29	Males	9,237	2,246	511	430	**12,424**
	Females	9,565	2,286	573	447	**12,871**
30-34	Males	8,930	2,307	515	243	**11,995**
	Females	9,403	2,355	492	257	**12,507**
35-39	Males	8,371	3,361	399	176	**12,307**
	Females	8,842	3,456	404	194	**12,896**
40-44	Males	6,837	4,999	292	154	**12,282**
	Females	7,126	5,019	261	166	**12,572**

Notes: [1] M-Miz, F-Ash=Mizrahi mother and Ashkenazi Father. [2] M-Ash, F-Miz=Ashkenazi Mother and Mizrahi father.
Source: 20% sample of the 1995 Israeli Census.

Appendix Table 2: Cell sizes by age group, sex, generation, and ethnicity, among Jewish Israelis in 1995.

Age group	Sex	Generation	Ethnicity			Total
			Mizrahim	Ashkenazim	Multiethnics	
18-21	Males	2	5,522	2,132	945	**8,599**
		2.5	2,364	1,885	1,328	**5,577**
		3 and higher	1,248	2,251	829	**4,328**
	Females	2	5,160	1,866	845	**7,871**
		2.5	2,219	1,754	1,259	**5,232**
		3 and higher	1,221	2,033	750	**4,004**
22-24	Males	2	4,439	1,420	705	**6,564**
		2.5	1,113	1,188	734	**3,035**
		3 and higher	315	1,212	310	**1,837**
	Females	2	4,571	1,325	692	**6,588**
		2.5	997	1,167	702	**2,866**
		3 and higher	287	1,140	259	**1,686**
25-29	Males	2	7,746	1,949	873	**10,568**
		2.5	698	1,330	694	**2,722**
		3 and higher	247	1,297	249	**1,793**
	Females	2	8,014	1,979	984	**10,977**
		2.5	803	1,319	714	**2,836**
		3 and higher	226	1,278	261	**1,765**
30-34	Males	2	7,393	1,966	699	**10,058**
		2.5	361	855	388	**1,604**
		3 and higher	146	751	132	**1,029**
	Females	2	7,239	1,905	670	**9,814**
		2.5	402	871	394	**1,667**
		3 and higher	173	750	127	**1,050**
35-39	Males	2	5,802	2,308	414	**8,524**
		2.5	211	613	189	**1,013**
		3 and higher	86	330	69	**485**
	Females	2	5,391	2,149	420	**7,960**
		2.5	223	564	198	**985**
		3 and higher	87	349	58	**494**

Source: Record linkage file between the 20% sample of the 1995 Israeli Census file and the 100% 1983 Israeli Census.