WASHINGTON—Georgia’s political environment is witnessing the beginning of a new era as it emerges without any strong political leaders in 2014. With the departures of both President Mikheil Saakashvili and Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, Georgia’s political arena will be left without a heavyweight leader, as neither newly elected President Giorgi Margvelashvili nor the selected Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili possesses the same level of magnetism. The irony is that Georgia is entering a stage in its development that requires a well-organized, motivated, and highly trusted political center. Facing tough choices between competing integration projects — such as the Russian-led Eurasian Union, NATO, the European Partnership, and Chinese-led initiatives — Georgia now more than ever needs to mobilize its efforts under the guidance of strong, pro-Western leadership in order to realize the goal of European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

In the absence of a strong leader, the burden would typically fall to political parties. However neither existing group is capable of supporting an unstable political system on its own. The Georgia Dream coalition’s diversity, once its appeal, is now its greatest weakness. The United National Movement is under attack as a political organization through incessant attempts at forcefully changing local governments and disrupting its financial support base. Most likely, Georgia will see a disintegrated and divided political environment, and consequently the majority of the government’s efforts will need to be devoted to handling internal divisions instead of focusing on the country’s development and strengthening functioning institutions.

Without strong, charismatic leadership and wide-based political support, two emerging crises are likely to disturb an already unstable balance. The first is economic deceleration and inevitable economic discontent. The second involves the manipulation of the fragmented political domain by external actors as the West and Russia increase pressure on Georgia to make favorable political decisions. Pressure from the Russian Federation is likely to take the form of more traditional provocations: interventions in internal politics and covert or overt manipulation. Meanwhile, the West will exert institutional pressure in an effort to promote continued democratic reforms.

From these crises, two new political centers can be expected to emerge, divided based on their worldviews: a pro-Western bloc and a Eurasianist bloc. In order for the former to survive, it must establish a coalition of pro-Western parties and identify a constituency from which to draw support. One part of this base is already convinced of the benefits of a Westward orientation for Georgia, as are many disenchanted voters: the half of the Georgian population that did not vote in the October election at all.

The Eurasianists, on the other hand, are largely dependent on their political center, the Russian Federation. But according to many political and economic indicators, Russia will enter a recession in 2014. This could mean that relations between Russia and Georgia become further strained as Russia becomes even more aggressive in its foreign policy. The prospect of Russian assertiveness is a threat to Western influence in Georgia, and can be used as an impetus for pro-Western factions to unite. A coalition of this kind may be able to resist Russian pressure and work with its Western partners to ensure that Georgia’s political transition into European and Euro-Atlantic institutional structures is successful.

Georgia’s governance system has recently transitioned from a presidential system to a hybrid system in which presidential power is shared with a parliament and prime minister. The shift away from a system based on one powerful individual necessitates a stronger and better-organized political party system. Under these circumstances, the West needs to support the development of a coalition of parties sympathetic to liberal democratic ideals. It is high time for a pro-Western coalition to emerge in Georgia, supported by European and U.S. stakeholders.

Temuri Yakobashvili is Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) in Washington, DC and Georgia’s former ambassador to the United States.

WASHINGTON — Contrary to conventional wisdom, U.S. President Barack Obama’s decision to postpone his bilateral summit meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin marks not the end of the administration’s Russia strategy, but an affirmation of it. The success of any strategy can only be assessed in light of its objectives, and the United States has had two in its relationship with Russia.

The first, long-term U.S. goal since the demise of the Soviet system has been to ensure a democratic, prosperous, and globally integrated Russia. The United States can help facilitate Russia’s evolution into an innovative and modern economy, one that is fully integrated into the global system. But Russia also requires civic space and respect for human and political rights, and U.S. and European strategies have focused on capacity-building in these areas. Although long-term investments have included incorporating Russia into the World Trade Organization and developing cultural and educational programs for young Russians, this process will take years, perhaps even decades.

The second objective of U.S. strategy since 2009 is more short term and pragmatic: working with Russia where U.S. interests can be advanced with Russian cooperation, including on proliferation threats arising from the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea, on violent extremism in Afghanistan and Yemen, and on securing and dismantling weapons of mass destruction. Urgent priorities demand fast-tracking further nuclear arms reductions, building effective sanctions against Iran’s nuclear programs, and doing what is necessary to stabilize Afghanistan. These challenges all demand prompt international attention and cooperation with Russia.

The “reset” of 2009 was a gesture aimed at changing the atmosphere that had made it impossible to deal with the immediate security agenda, not the strategy itself: you press the button and get to work. So those declaring the end to the “reset” are missing the real story. Both Russian modernization and pragmatic cooperation remain the right goals for the United States’ Russia strategy, which now has to adjust to new realities, as all effective strategies must.

Those new realities are very challenging. The United States and Russia have not agreed on how to cope with the changes unleashed by the Arab Spring. Nor have Washington and Moscow found common ground on the modernization and security requirements for Russia’s Eurasian neighbors — and that should not prevent the United States from supporting those neighbors, even in the face of Russian complaints. But while the United States must not cave in to Russian pressure, the opportunities for pragmatic cooperation have to remain on the agenda. Cooperating on counterterrorism and creating transparency on post-2014 security investments in Afghanistan are the right things to do.

At the same time, reaffirming the long-term strategy also means recommitting to the objective of a democratic, prosperous, and economically integrated Russia, and that is where Obama’s cancellation of the bilateral summit with Putin made sense. In addition to the absence of a substantive agenda, a summit would have appeared to ignore several recent setbacks rooted within Russia itself. Pluralism, modernization, and integration have been stymied by Putin’s regressive responses to internal social and political pressures and the slowdown in the Russian economy. Russia’s failure to modernize its business practices and political structures has left the country poorly positioned to cope with global economic challenges. Instead of embracing globalization and integration, the Putin leadership seems to fear it, and in seeking to control global influences, Russia will lose out on the opportunities for wealth creation.

Cancelling the summit with Putin sets U.S. strategy back on track, balancing the potential for progress with recognition that Putin has not done much to advance it; indeed he has done much to set it back. The door remains open to deeper cooperation and the G20 summit is an important opportunity. Russia is a welcome member of the leadership club, but its leadership does not get a free pass when it prevents the international community from seeking solutions — and prevents Russians from seeking a better future.

Celeste A. Wallander is a Non-Resident Transatlantic Fellow with The German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, DC.

WASHINGTON—Britain’s decision not to participate in a potential military strike on Syria, in response to Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons, constitutes a serious blow to U.S. President Barack Obama’s promise to hold Assad accountable. Despite saying categorically in August 2011 that Assad must step down, Obama has been reluctant to provide support for rebels fighting the Syrian dictatorship. It was a year later in August 2012 — with Assad still holding on to power and showing increased brutality in what had by then become a full-fledged civil war — that Obama declared the use of chemical weapons to be a red line, the crossing of which would carry severe consequences. Another year later, in August 2013, Assad crossed that line, with forces loyal to him launching a devastating chemical attack against rebel areas that caused the death of hundreds.

The main message behind Assad’s brazen move may have been directed at the rebels: that an impotent international community will not come to their rescue even in the face of such a blatant violation of international conventions. The timing, however, near the anniversary of Obama’s “red line” statement, suggests that it was also an affront to Obama himself.

Obama will now feel compelled to respond. His dilemma is that, without the UN Security Council mandate that Russia continues to deny him, his response exposes him to accusations of following the path of his predecessor, George W. Bush, whom Obama himself criticized for unilateralism. At the same time, were he to choose not to respond, he would face the criticism for the United States’ loss of global influence, credibility, and power.

With suggestions by his administration that a U.S. response will be inevitable and forceful, Obama has already raised expectations among Syrian rebels and their supporters — expectations that he is both unwilling and unable to meet. The letdown may result in more frustration, new accusations of broken promises, and the further erosion of the United States’ standing in the region. In trying to mitigate the rebels’ irrational exuberance, Obama may have swung the pendulum too far in the opposite direction, giving advance notice to the Assad regime and its backers of the limited scope of likely U.S. operation. The expectation of limited damage effectively voids the punitive potential of any military response.

Damascus, on the other hand, is poised to declare victory irrespective of what happens. If limited U.S.-led military strikes do take place, the regime will claim victory in repelling foreign aggression and foiling the West’s plans. Assad’s propaganda machine is already setting the stage for this narrative by suggesting that a full scale invasion is in the works. Worse, if a strike does not happen, the regime will boast of its deterrence power and declare the end of U.S. hegemony. Rather than being punished for its lethal use of chemical weapons against its own civilians, the Assad regime is almost guaranteed to achieve a propaganda victory.

Obama has fallen into a trap. He now faces a difficult choice between losing credibility as a principled leader who abides by international norms and undermining his own leadership through actions that are not in line with his statements. What this embarrassing situation has demonstrated is that even if Obama decides to run away from the Syrian conflict, it will come to him. This, coupled with the fact that Syria’s war is incubating the next generation of violent Islamist radicals and has ruined so many lives, clearly suggest that a more proactive U.S. role is necessary to contain the damage and avoid further destruction.

Hassan Mneimneh is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, DC.

WASHINGTON — During the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was not clear that Russia would be invited to join what was then the G7 because its power in the international economy did not merit the leadership and governance role that membership entailed. In the end, Russia was invited to join in 1998 largely for political reasons: to advance integration, to provide international legitimacy for a leadership that appeared to be moving the country on a pluralist path, and in recognition that its military power and geopolitical heft made Russia key to effective global governance.

By 2013, Russia’s G8 presence is a near perfect reversal of the 1990s rationale. The Russian economy is now a significant global presence. Russia is a major EU trade partner, a dominating force in trade and investment in its Eurasian neighbours, and an active economic partner with rising Asian countries. But as the G20 emerges as the real locus of global economic governance, the G8’s meaningful role has shifted toward the political, just as Russia’s political status has become sullied by the actions of its current leadership. Russia’s leadership has dismantled the elements of pluralism that made the case for giving the country a chance to be a member of the club in the 1990s, and it is now seeking to intimidate and silence not merely political activists, but civil society groups — that is, it is going after Russian citizens themselves.

For the upcoming summit, the greater concern is for Russia’s bona fides as a contributor to global security solutions, which are being tested by the civil war in Syria. On the plus side, the United States and Russia are co-sponsoring what may prove to be a last-chance peace negotiation to find a political resolution to the civil war. But in an astonishing failure of responsible global leadership, the Russian government affirms that it will deliver the S-300 air-and-missile defence system to Syria, perhaps as early as this summer. This weapons system is not just another addition to the arsenal: its range, accuracy, and ability to cope with multiple targets would provide a qualitative jump in Syria’s military capability that would give the regime much greater security and freedom of action. Providing Bashar al-Assad’s regime with such a capability at this time threatens the peace negotiation.

If Russia’s claim to G8 great power status is to be preserved, it has to prove that it can rise above its narrow self-interest and suspend the delivery of the S-300 defence system, at least until after an assessment of whether the Assad regime comes to the peace talks willing to prioritize political resolution over military escalation. The G8 countries should make this a test of Russia, and of the G8 itself.

Celeste A. Wallander is a non-resident transatlantic fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

BERLIN—When Ukrainians cast their votes in parliamentary elections this Sunday, Western policymakers and observers expect a serious litmus test for the country’s political future and geopolitical orientation. Put simply, a fair poll and opposition presence will feed hopes that Ukraine remains committed to democracy and European integration. In turn, failure on both accounts will deepen fears that this important EU neighbor is sinking further into autocratic rule and Russia’s orbit. Given this stark choice, a flurry of debates and analyses has tried to chart the outcome and consequences of the ballot. But this is misguided. For several reasons, the elections can be expected to reveal little about where Ukraine is headed in the years to come.

First, Ukraine’s institutional make-up is skewed in favor of President Viktor Yanukovych, who determines principal policies and nominates key government officials, leaving parliament as a secondary institution. Even where parliamentary approval is required, presidential initiatives can typically rely on the solid majority of the Party of the Regions of Ukraine, which Yanukovych headed before his presidency, and the allied communists. The opposition, by contrast, has been notoriously fractured, weakened by defections, and unable to present a united democratic front.

Judging by the latest opinion polls, this configuration in the legislature will not dramatically change. The Party of the Regions is certain to win the upcoming elections with between one-quarter and one-third of all votes, which, together with the expected 10 percent for the communists, may well produce a parliamentary majority. The two largest opposition parties — the Batkivshchyna United Opposition of imprisoned former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR) of boxing champion Vitali Klitschko — are projected to score between 15 and 20 percent of votes each. A third opposition group, the fervently right-wing Svoboda, is expected to cross the 5-percent threshold and enter parliament, as are dozens of formally independent candidates.

These independents will constitute the biggest wildcard in the new parliament. Judging from past experience, successful independent candidates will receive generous political and financial offers soon after voting day, so as to lure them into the Party of Regions to fortify a simple majority, and perhaps even engineer a constitutional one. As a result, the actual balance of power in the new parliament will remain unknown until its first session in mid-December, if not later.

Yet even once the new legislature is in place and the party lines have become clear, there will be few solid indicators of the future course of the country. As in many post-communist countries, political parties lack an ideological or programmatic basis. Instead, they are built around individual leaders or business interests, they function as machines geared toward acquiring and maintaining power, and they change course whenever warranted by political opportunity. This makes Ukrainian politics — whether under past, current, or future parliaments — extremely unpredictable on both sides of the aisle.

Finally, Ukrainian society is torn between two broad options of development that face the country. Pre-election polls indicate that 45 percent of Ukrainians support membership in a Russian-led customs union and 44 percent favor EU accession. These preferences do not align with party politics: among voters for the typically Westward-looking opposition, more than one-quarter supports Eastern integration. In turn, European orientations are not uncommon among those backing the governing party. This, too, defies views that the upcoming elections are tantamount to a referendum about Ukraine’s future with Russia or with Europe.

None of this, of course, is to suggest that Sunday’s elections in Ukraine are irrelevant. Their conduct will signal the quality of Ukrainian democracy. The first reports by independent election monitors already point to many deficiencies but also to some improvements. The significance of the official result, by contrast, should not be overestimated. It should certainly not prompt rash Western verdicts and political reactions, especially concerning the EU association agreement that is being negotiated with the country.

Instead, the West as a whole and Europe in particular should use the momentum and interest generated by these elections to develop an effective and comprehensive policy toward Ukraine. Europe and the United States also need to closely observe the composition and behavior of the new parliament. Only then can they hold government and opposition leaders responsible for their verbal commitments to democratic reform, a market economy, and European integration. And only then can they design effective offers of cooperation that can gradually lead Ukraine out of its political and geopolitical stalemate.

Joerg Forbrig is Senior Program Officer for Central and Eastern Europe at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

In an August 6, 2012 interview in the Polish weekly Wprost, President Bronislaw Komorowski stated that Poland is prepared to create its own  anti-aircraft and missile defense system as part of a NATO shield. While some saw the statement as a rejection of U.S. President Barack Obama’s proposed missile defense system, others viewed it as a sign of  Poland’s weakening military alliance with the United States. Both arguments are misleading.

The missile and air defense system proposed by the Polish president is qualitatively different than the American Missile Defence System (MD), scheduled for deployment by 2018. The proposed Polish system would target short and medium range missiles from the near abroad, while the American MD shield would be capable of shooting down long range ballistic missiles originating from rouge states such as Iran. The Polish MD system is to be part of the NATO MD shield and would be an expansion of Poland’s contribution to the Alliance, rather than creating a competing system, as some suggest.

The history of the American MD shield in Poland is long, complicated, and full of emotions. After years of difficult negotiations between Poland and the U.S., and amid adamant objections from Russia, Poland accepted the Bush administration’s MD program on August 20, 2008. Earlier that year, the Polish government vigorously debated whether to accept the proposal of an outgoing Bush administration, which promised to complete the MD base in Poland by 2011, or whether to wait for the next U.S. president to be elected the following November. Even before the U.S. presidential elections, the Polish side made robust efforts to understand the Democratic position on the MD system, should Obama become President. The final factor that convinced the Polish government to go ahead with the Bush MD program was the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war, which proved that state-on-state violence in Europe is still possible. The timing of this decision demonstrated the rationale for American MD for Poland.

The value of the American shield for Poland is not only its capacity to shoot down ballistic missiles, but also the presence of American “boots on the ground” that would serve as a powerful deterrent for any potential aggressor. The Polish government’s decision in the fall of 2008 was a gamble. By accepting the American project, Poland immediately paid the political price of strong Russian opposition without yet having an American base installed and the US Presidential elections further contributed to this uncertainty.

After Barack Obama’s victory in the 2008 election, his administration initiated a review of several Bush administration decisions, including the MD program. Consequently, on September 17, 2009, President Obama called Polish Prime Minister Tusk to inform him that plans to implement the MD system would be modified. The administration proposed a new, reformulated project that would entail smaller, mobile SM-3 interceptors to be stationed in Poland by 2018.

This sudden shift in the U.S. policy was badly received  in Poland. First, the change in the program came as an announcement without prior consultations. Second, the Obama MD system plans for the Polish based installation to be completed by 2018, much later than the Bush plan, which adds uncertainty to the entire project. And third, the call from Obama came on the anniversary of Russia’s attack on Poland at the start of WWII, adding unfortunate and negative symbolism to the announcement. The abrupt shift in American policy has raised doubts of the US commitment to Poland.

President Komorowski’s commented that the “mistake was that by accepting the American offer of a shield we failed to take into account the political risk associated with a change of president. We paid a high political price.” – referred directly to the gamble Poland took in 2008 near the change in the U.S. administration. Unfortunately, his statement has been largely misinterpreted. Depicting Poland as ‘betrayed and abandoned’, as The Telegraph did, and characterizing the deployment of American MD in Poland as a mistake paints an inaccurate picture. The following day the Head of the Polish National Security Bureau Stanislaw Koziej reasserted that President Komorowski sees the American MD project as a “necessary and important part of a NATO wide missile defense system.” He also stated that prioritizing anti-aircraft and missile defense is part of a new strategic direction agreed by the Minister of Defense and the top military commander. Last year, they reflected an understanding among the Polish military staff that to be effective in contemporary conflicts, the army needs a well functioning short and mid-range MD shield. After all, Russia already threatened to deploy its Iskanders missiles in the Kalinigrad district later this year.

Komorowski’s call for the creation of Polish missile defense is not about Polish-American relations, but about the future of Poland’s security. Poland needs stronger anti-aircraft and anti short and medium missile defenses independent of any proposed American MD system. The two systems are complimentary, not competing. The announcement reflects an increasing confidence and affluence of a country that is increasingly able to rely on its own strength for its security. Furthermore, prioritizing anti-missile defense reveals the Polish government’s growing focus on the primacy of territorial defense over expeditionary capabilities. The Polish MD system is to be financed from the savings of winding down the war in Afghanistan, and from the growth of military budget over the coming years related to Poland’s economic growth (Polish law mandates that 1.95% of GDP is spent on defense). According to initial estimates, it would be a pricy program, costing 8 to 15 billion zl ($3-5 billion) over the next 10 years. Such costs would lower Poland’s appetite and ability to take part in expensive expeditionary missions. But with its increased focus on its own territory, don’t expect Poland to eagerly step up, as it did in Iraq and Afghanistan, if another hot spot boils over somewhere else in the world.

Michal Baranowski is a Senior Program Officer with the German Marshall Fund’s Foreign Policy & Civil Society program and Jacob Foreman is an intern at the  German Marshall Fund‘s Warsaw Office.

WARSAW—Monday’s disclosure that North Korea was preparing a long-range rocket launch and possibly an underground nuclear bomb test put ballistic missile defense (BMD) where it belongs: squarely atop the transatlantic agenda.  Although we learned Friday that this particular missile launch was a failure, Pyongyang’s determination to proceed has underscored the enduring nature of the threat inherent in the proliferation of ballistic missile technology.

Missile defense has been a powerful, if not much publicized, undercurrent in U.S.-European relations ever since U.S. President Barack Obama abandoned the Bush administration’s plan to deploy radar in the Czech Republic and missile interceptors in Poland, planning instead for a new phased adaptive approach.  The decision to scrap the original plan was then widely interpreted in Central Europe as a concession tied to the U.S. reset with Russia.  This region views missile defense as not just a matter of technical feasibility or geostrategic considerations, but as an important symbol of the state of relations with the United States. But, in reality, BMD is a global strategic concern today—and it should be treated as a keystone for rebuilding the flailing U.S.-European relationship.  This is an opportunity to strengthen transatlantic relations that should not be missed.

The recent incident in which Obama, during a visit to South Korea, was overheard (via an open microphone) telling Russian President Dmitri Medvedev that he would have more “flexibility” on missile defense after the election, has inflamed concerns along NATO’s Eastern periphery.  Clumsy as it was, this open mic moment confirmed what should have been a given: that the remainder of the year will be a time in which the United States and Russia will negotiate a host of technical and political issues against a backdrop of broader security concerns.  Regrettably it also pushed the BMD debate back into a regional context when this transatlantic conversation needs a global perspective.

With new missile threats arising as more missile-capable states join the club (in 1972 only nine states owned ballistic missiles; today there are more than two dozen) there is a compelling incentive to move toward implementing an effective allied BMD system alongside our European allies.  At the same time, the politics of BMD deployment in Europe not only incite Russian opposition but also continue to unfold against the backdrop of a changing strategic environment in which the United States seeks to rebalance its interests in the Pacific.  What is missing in Europe is the larger context of the issue: the need to move beyond the residual Russia dimension and the collective response to the threat of nuclear-armed Iran, linking it firmly to the transatlantic security agenda for the coming decade.

The current European debate on U.S. missile defense overlooks the fact that the United States is hardly the only player in the game, with Russia, India, and Israel among the most active.  Most objections to ballistic missile defense have come, to date, from Russia, China, and some U.S. analytical circles.  In Europe, Russia’s opposition to missile defense continues to be the recurrent theme.  Moscow has pushed back on BMD deployments in the region with a mixture of technical arguments and strategic objections; clearly, prestige is also at issue.  Arguably the least credible of Russia’s objections is the argument that BMD deployment will inevitably lead to destabilization, leading to expansion beyond the initial tasks.  The geopolitical argument is essentially about European basing of radar and interceptors, with the concomitant perceived loss of prestige.  Chinese opposition to BMD follows, in part, the Russian argument with its charges of destabilization.  Underneath this are concerns that a working ballistic missile defense system might become available in Taiwan, reigniting geopolitical dilemmas.  Like the Russians, the Chinese raise the question of a potential risk posed to China’s ICBM forces. Beijing argues that this increases the potential risk of a U.S. first strike (or simply adds political advantage to a BMD-defended United States).

Should Obama be reelected in November, it is uncertain whether Washington will go ahead with missile defense deployment absent an agreement with Russia in 2013, or back away from the project.  His open-microphone gaffe suggests that the administration might be willing to conclude a short-range missile agreement with Russia by offering concessions on missile defense in exchange.  Hence, unease in Europe on missile defense is fuelled by the realization that 2012-13 could be decisive for the future of a revised European missile defense plan.  The administration’s recent announcement of a “strategic pivot” to Asia has added to the distance across the Atlantic and concerns that the United States may now be less committed to BMD deployment in Europe.  Instead, the unease on the future of ballistic missile defense should re-energize the transatlantic conversation.  It should be the starting point for a public debate of how BMD systems deployed to Europe need to interlock with the larger U.S. system to address the truly global threat that is emerging.

Andrew A. Michta is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States and Director of the GMF Warsaw Office.

WASHINGTON – When it began last March, the Syrian revolution appeared to be a textbook example for a peaceful uprising by a people united against state brutality. For weeks, videos documented the determination of the mostly youthful protesters, chanting their demands for freedom and political participation only to be faced with bullets, arrests, torture, and execution.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad reacted with a series of gestures whose insincerity was swiftly revealed. A few hundred prisoners were released while thousands more were arrested, with many dying in custody. The decades-old state of emergency was lifted but the regime, in the name of a “security solution,” went on ruthlessly crushing the protests.

Publicly, the Syrian government asserts that “foreign powers” are instigating an insurgency in Syria to punish it for its support of what it calls the anti-Israel “resistance.” In private meetings with non-Sunni regional leaders, the regime promotes the notion that this is also a conflict between a “hegemonic Sunnism” (about three-fourths of Syrians are Sunni) and historically persecuted minorities. But support for the revolution cuts across all socio-economic strata and ethnic or religious groups. Conversely, the Assad regime has resorted to the Alawi community (approximately one-eighth of the population) as a primary pool for support; still, it neither encompasses this community in its totality, nor is limited to it.

The Syrian revolutionaries’ commitment to nonviolence was premised on expectations that they would be able to divide the security apparatus through insubordination and defections and that the world community would act to stop the massacres. Neither expectation was realized.

The revolutionaries have underestimated the ability of the regime to leverage ethnic and religious community cleavages. Recruits from the Alawi community are playing a key role in the repression. Defections are happening, but remain at about 10 percent of the military. The defectors, with no unified leadership, are unable to defeat the regime, but are used by it as proof of being engaged in combating “armed gangs.”

Even more dramatically, the international community was unable to provide the revolutionaries the support they needed. Most observers remain wary as to the implications of regime change in Syria, and indeed the revolutionaries have yet to offer a convincing post-Assad scenario to alleviate these concerns (including those of the regime’s internal constituencies). The Arab League was able to overcome substantial differences between its members on ways to manage the Syrian crisis, but as a result provided a watered-down plan that failed to satisfy the revolutionaries, and was still rejected by the regime. Meanwhile, the transatlantic alliance, the sole plausible agency for decisive support, is hamstrung by the economic crisis and a sharp decline in public tolerance for military interventions. Many strategists compare the case for Western intervention in Syria unfavorably with Libya: the latter, they argue, was “low-risk and high-reward,” whereas the former is precisely the reverse. Finally, Assad continues to be of significant value for both Iran and Russia.

All this has emboldened the Syrian regime; it is asserting that it will regain its international standing once its “security solution” is complete. Yet, with all its lethal superiority, it has been unable to achieve military victory. It has, however, managed to seriously undermine the revolutionaries’ initial commitment to nonviolence and inclusiveness. Against the protestations of many militants, the Syrian revolution has in large part become an armed uprising. This in turn allows the regime to “expose” the revolution as a violent sectarian insurgency, in order to justify resorting to even harsher measures, including arguably engineering violent sectarianism. The Assad regime’s actions may not secure its survival, but they will ensure the unraveling of Syria as a nation-state, with deadly repercussions across the region.

Russia and China’s veto of the latest UN Security Council resolution amounts to a green light for the escalation of the Syrian regime’s homicidal campaign — or, in the words of Qatar’s foreign minister, “a license to kill.”

The only way to stop Syria from sliding into an abyss now is for the transatlantic alliance to assert moral and political leadership. The Arab League’s original plan — that Assad should delegate his authority to a deputy ­­— had succeeded in trimming the demands of the rebels to yet another token action, but still ran afoul of concerted opposition by Russia and China. The League should now be encouraged to propose a bolder, more principled plan to serve as a baseline.

Obviously, it would be preferable to see this conflict addressed at the highest levels of the United Nations, but given the entrenched positions of Moscow and Beijing, that is unlikely. However, the Arab League’s position would also provide a mandate on its own for the transatlantic alliance to investigate next steps. It would also be worth preserving silence as to which steps are would be categorically excluded since the Syrian regime’s killing machine has been reinvigorated by statements of restraint from Washington.

The Assad family’s decades-long stranglehold on power has been largely based on a fear-instilling aura of power. The Syrian revolutionaries have broken through the wall of fear. Their ultimate success depends on denying the regime the ability to re-erect it. They will not be able to succeed without Western help. 

Hassan Mneimneh is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow with the German Marshall Fund in Washington, DC.

Image by Syria Press. 

BUCHAREST— Given the normal electoral model in Russia — where voting is generally not as important as how the votes are counted — last weekend’s elections were not out of the ordinary. The manipulation of elections is an intrinsic part of Russian history, and it has usually bothered only a few zealous and diligent activists. It is no wonder, then, that the ongoing protests have come as a surprise to the Kremlin. What is really extraordinary is how deaf Russia’s leaders have been to history’s recent lessons. The Arab Spring and the Color Revolutions offer considerable material on how nondemocratic governments should approach elections, yet Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev seem not to have studied for this test.

Earlier this year, people took to the streets in several Russian cities, as in many other cities around the world, in response to economic hardships. But the grievances of Russian protesters did not resemble those heard in London or Berlin. Instead they mirrored those in Cairo and Tunis, with people demanding civil rights and freedoms in addition to jobs and pensions. Their discontents were felt in regional elections, where Putin’s United Russia performed poorly. The Kremlin failed to respond to this show of public dissatisfaction and Putin’s plans to return to the presidency only further alienated the public. Subsequent protests have become more vocal and widespread. The cultural elite, usually an ally of those in power, put up a silent and largely unnoticed protest by refusing to promote United Russia, as is otherwise customary. Images of popular singers, ballerinas, and gymnasts — whose endorsements carry weight in this culturally-sensitive country — were largely absent from United Russia’s publicity posters.

Ever since the Rose and the Orange Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, the Kremlin’s anxieties have increased. Wary of people taking the streets in protest of electoral fraud, it overreacted to allegations and evidence of electoral fraud during the latest elections and attempted to silence observers. Following previous elections during Putin’s tenure, such allegations were met with indifference and cold superiority. Disputes and appeals were dealt with quietly and implacably by electoral commissions and the judiciary, while domestic and international election monitors were simply dismissed. Drawing the wrong lessons from the Color Revolutions, the Kremlin decided not to decrease fraud this time around, but to hide it, with the predictable outcome that it revealed itself even more. GOLOS, the nationwide election monitoring group that was so obsessively harassed during these elections, denounced fraud on election day, and this activism was followed by thousands of protesters taking to the streets. As in several Arab countries earlier this year, protesters have used social media tools to communicate and organize. In response, the Kremlin has amassed militia forces to crack down on protesters in the main squares of Moscow and St. Petersburg, and many have already been imprisoned.

The lesson that autocratic governments such as Russia’s are tempted to take away from this year’s Arab revolts is to crush protests mercilessly, before they get out of control. But as Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia demonstrate (along with East Germany, Romania, and Yugoslavia before them), success is not always guaranteed and the strategy almost inevitably eventually backfires. The correct lesson of the Arab revolts, and a much wiser choice for any government, is to be sympathetic to the underlying reasons that motivate protesters to take to the streets and address them. This means not tightening the regime’s grip on power, but relaxing it.

This is not to say that spring has come to Moscow, or that the protests of the last two days will necessarily turn into a revolution. Putin thrives on crisis and he may well find ways to solve this one as well. But if he is to take away one lesson from the Arab revolutions earlier this year, it is that the last few days do not constitute a temporary eruption of anger. He did not just experience and steer his way past another ordinary election. The protests made an irreversible fissure in the political establishment, and helped ensure that fraud and repression are no longer publicly acceptable. Presidential candidate Putin would do well to dust off Medvedev’s speeches and bring about some of the measures eloquently addressed there: more media freedoms, free and fair elections, greater independence for the judiciary, and the modernization of the economy. As things stand now, Putin has only two choices: repress opponents and dissidents, manipulate elections, and fear revolt in the days after; or start liberalizing Russia’s society and modernizing it economy, while standing (and probably winning) Russia’s first free and fair elections.

Alina Inayeh is Director of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation and the Bucharest office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

BUCHAREST — In an article published on Tuesday in the Russian newspaper Izvestia, Russia’s prime minister and presidential hopeful Vladimir Putin announced his major foreign policy goal: the creation of a “Eurasian Union.” This Union, he announced, would gradually encompass the countries of the former Soviet Union, but also stay open for other countries to join. Built on common values and converging economic and political interests, the Union would be “a new pole in the modern world” and together with “the European Union, the United States, China, and the Asia Pacific Economic Community, it should ensure the stability of global development.”

Prime Minister Putin has repeatedly expressed his regrets for the departure of the Soviet Union, so this latest plan should not have surprised anyone. It is meant to project an image of power, assertiveness, and strategic vision mainly for a domestic audience, and it is very likely only the first in a future series aimed to divert public attention away from the real problem: Russia’s increasingly dire domestic situation. Yet it deserves attention, as it reveals a serious concern with Russia’s decreasing influence in its near abroad, as well as a lack of viable and attractive offers from Russia for the countries in the region.

Russia has been trying to create a Customs Union within the former Soviet space for over ten years. This Union currently includes only Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. All the other former Soviet states have declined to join it, either openly or by procrastinating over negotiations. The most notable example is Ukraine, which made its position clear by choosing a free trade agreement with the European Union over the Customs Union, despite Russia’s attempts to prevent this. Two other countries in the region, Moldova and Georgia, are now in the course of negotiating free trade agreements with the European Union, with Armenia and Azerbaijan following. Despite the fact that they have been developed and implemented at an exasperatingly cautious pace, the European Union’s economic and political ties with the countries in Russia’s neighborhood now have firm roots, and these countries are gradually growing closer to European goods and labor markets, adjusting their internal legislation in the process. Even in its current economic crisis and general absent minded-ness, the European Union is seen as a better economic, not to mention political, partner than Russia, and thus remains a more attractive choice.

So it is precisely in reaction to the European Union’s increased reach in the region that Putin would like to offer countries in Russia’s neighborhood an alternative Union to aspire to. Yet it is also a counter-move to an even more pressing problem that Russia sees looming on the horizon. On September 9, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliev announced the discovery of a (yet another) gas field in the country, at Absheron. The field has an estimated reserve of 350 billion cubic meters and 45 million tones of condensed gas. Its exploration will bring Azerbaijan’s annual gas output to 30 billion cubic meters, which happens to be the amount Europe needs to flow yearly through its Nabucco pipeline, meant to bring non-Russian gas to European countries. The new gas field thus makes Nabucco an economic reality, and it completely changes the energy equation in the region: Nabucco is meant to decrease Europe’s dependence on Russian gas from 70 to 35 percent of total imports.

To add to Russia’s worries, on September 7, the European Commission approved a long overdue communication on EU energy relations with third countries. While this is still a minor step, it is the first time that the Commission has put forward a call for a common energy strategy and asked member countries to exchange information about international energy agreements with third countries. With Nabucco closer to becoming a reality, aiming for coherence among the national energy strategies of EU member countries becomes a more achievable goal — or at least stops being merely a utopia. Add to this Russia’s failure to fully control Ukrainian transit pipelines and the picture of Russia’s worries becomes very sharp indeed. As things are developing now, Russia’s gas exports to Europe would decrease substantially, and so would its leverage over European countries. A worrying prospect, and a difficult message in times of elections indeed.

A Eurasian Union would give Russia more clout, so it comes as a natural solution. Unfortunately for prime minister and presidential candidate, Vladimir Putin, it is a solution that comes both too late and too soon. Too late to curtail Europe’s increasing reach in the neighborhood that it shares with Russia, and too soon to be led by a Russia that now needs time to fix both its economy and all its other internal problems.

Alina Inayeh directs the Black Sea Trust at the German Marshall Fund’s Bucharest Office.

(Editor’s note: Post edited to clarify EU reliance on Russian gas. Numbers cited were for percentage of total imports, not percentage of total consumption.)