Tag Archives: Postmodernism

Why Lies Digest So Well

As Flannery O’Connor put it, “The truth does not change according to our ability to stomach it.” But a falsehood, as Chesterton notes, is engineered precisely so that the listeners would in fact be able to stomach it. Stomachability is a design feature when it comes to a lie. Who would invent lies that nobody is going to want to believe?

But the truth simply is what it is.

This is why truth tellers are always troublemakers. And this is also why the postmodern heart loves the coherence view of truth, and detests the correspondence view of truth. The coherence view includes all those things that might be pleasant to digest, and the correspondence view encompasses the rest of the world, which is not really all that edible. It is measured by criteria other than how it might make us feel half an hour after dinner.

This is why, incidentally, C.S. Lewis is beloved by conservative American evangelicals even though he wasn’t one. He hated subjectivism, and saw that subjectivism was the portal through which every foul error makes its way into the lives of believers. It is the same portal, come to think of it, from which Rob Bell made his escape. The world is simply there, and we are the ones who must conform to it, and not the other way around.

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Ten Theses on Postmodernism

This post originally ran May 10, 2010.

1. Truth is objective, ultimate, absolute, personal, alive, and triune.

2. Because of this ultimate reality, it is possible for creatures who were fashioned by this living God to know Him as the personal and ultimate truth, as well as to know lesser truths in the created world that we see all around us. We know Him apart from that world, and we know Him through and in that world. We know. Some of us only wish we didn’t.

3. Objective truth does not mean uninterpreted truth. Objectivity in our knowledge of truth means that our interpretation lines up with God’s interpretation of it. Thinking God’s thoughts after Him is not the same thing as guessing or having opinions. The standard of absolute knowledge is how God knows a thing. The standard of creaturely knowledge is how we know a thing, measured against what God ordained as possible for a creature in our circumstances to know.

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Explaining the Rooster

I am happy to continue my discussion of what certainty means with Micah Neely. There is a lot of fundamental agreement here, but I believe a crucial application of this agreement has gone missing.

I entirely agree that when it comes to truth metaphor is all that is, that it is metaphor “all the way down.” The joke is told about the guy who believed the earth rested on the back of a giant turtle. When asked what the turtle was standing on, he replied, “another turtle.” When his interlocuter was about to ask him what that turtle was standing on, he was interrupted. “Look,” the fellow said. “It’s turtles all the way down.”

But because this seems (whether with turtles or with metaphors) fideistic, arbitrary and necessarily relativistic, I would prefer to say it is metaphor all the way up. In the beginning was the Metaphor, and the Metaphor was with God and the Metaphor was God. The Metaphor is the exact representation of the Thought. The holy Trinity is made up of Speaker, Spoken, and Interpretation, and there is no degradation of meaning anywhere. Metaphor is complicated, but it is not an endless swamp where meaning gets lost and search parties are futile.

The modernists and the postmodernists agree that metaphor is a barrier to certainty. This is their common blunder; this is the central mistake of our age (not to mention the previous one). The modernists are correct that certainty is possible (and necessary), and so they go off to find it (autonomously and idolatrously) somewhere else other than metaphor. The postmodernists are correct that everything is metaphorical, and so they (autonomously and idolatrously) accept the relativistic conclusion. But I detest both sets of idols, and the horses they rode in on.

I am completely with Lewis on this one. I have no problem with his recognition of metaphorical pervasiveness, so amen, and his essay on the poison of subjectivism is priceless, and amen again. In other words, affirmation of objective certainties is not modernism; it is Christian faith. And affirmation of metaphorical ubiquity is not postmodernism; it is Christian faith.

This is why I have a problem with appealing to Jamie Smith’s take on the whole business because, in my view, he gives away the store. Lewis does not. He is a safer guide, and on these questions of metaphor, truth, and objective reality, he is about the only safe guide.

Now I agree with Micah that certainty is not to be attaining by standing on the “scaffold of analytic philosophy and its presuppositions.” I certainly agree. Certainty is found in Jesus — but certainty is found.

Long before Descartes doubted his first doubt, Christians were being taught to talk a certain way, but they were taught to do so by faith. Christians today who talk naturally and readily in the language of assurance and certainty that is pervasive throughout the New Testament are routinely accused of latent modernism, or foundationalism, or something else they never heard of, when all they were doing is echoing the language that Christians have been repeating for millennia. If God didn’t want us talking this way, then why did He teach us to talk this way? This is just a small sampling — I could produce many more, and if even slightly provoked, would be happy to do so.

“That their hearts might be comforted, being knit together in love, and unto all riches of the full assurance of understanding, to the acknowledgement of the mystery of God, and of the Father, and of Christ; In whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge” (Col. 2:2-3).

Whatever that is, it is not a chastened epistemology. If knowledge, assurance, and certainty were gold coins, faithful Christians are Scrooge McDuck.

“To whom also he shewed himself alive after his passion by many infallible proofs [tekmerion], being seen of them forty days, and speaking of the things pertaining to the kingdom of God” (Acts 1:3).

After this the disciples did not fan out across the globe, overthrowing empires with their excitement about the probabilities.

“Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen. For by it the elders obtained a good report. Through faith we understand . . .” (Heb. 11:1-3a).

“These things have I written unto you that believe on the name of the Son of God; that ye may know that ye have eternal life, and that ye may believe on the name of the Son of God. And this is the confidence that we have in him, that, if we ask any thing according to his will, he heareth us: And if we know that he hear us, whatsoever we ask, we know that we have the petitions that we desired of him” (1 John 5:13-15).

To talk this way is not to use the terms of the modernists. They stole these terms from us, even as they abandoned the only possible foundation for the right use of them — which is faith in Jesus. And by faith in Jesus, I do not mean a blind leap. I do not mean any port in a storm. I do not mean a cluster of commitments hung from the great Kantian sky hook. I mean knowledge and certainty the only way a creature can have such — as a gift from the gracious hand of God the Father.

I completely agree that the modernists are wrong, and that you can’t get certainty out of a can, processed at the Factories of Enlightenment. But I also rejoice that the postmodernists are every bit as silly, thinking not only that the can is empty, but also that the world is.

Now here I leave off my interaction with Micah, and cast my net far more broadly. This is why I care about these things so much.

Life is not a seminar classroom, where we can stroke our chins and grant certain points that merit further discussion. We have to go to war. We have to execute people. We have to excommunicate other people. We have to believe the climate change screechers, or we have to snort at them, preferably the latter. We have to make life and death decisions, and God wants us to do so faithfully.

And we should never forget that certainty is an inescapable reality — the human mind cannot function without it. This means that, in a relativistic era like ours, the certainties will be invisible to everybody, but every bit as mandatory. All civilizations know things, but the corrupt ones don’t know that they do. In our time, for example, even in our rootless time, we know that the slaughter of schoolchildren at Sandy Hook was wrong, and we are even teetering on the brink of knowing that what went on in Gosnell’s clinic was wrong. And, given the sorry excuse for an education we all received, such certainties, when they become visible and apparent, baffle and bewilder us.

So uncertainty is a luxury for the rich and rootless (and unchallenged), and when it grows pervasively throughout a culture, it only creates a deracinated sophistry that cannot even tell the difference between boys and girls. It reminds me of the old child’s joke — “What’s the difference between a mailbox and a hippopotomus?” “I don’t know.” “Well, I am sure not going to send you to mail any of my letters!”

We live in decadent times, one that thinks that the only difference between a bull, a steer, and a cow is whatever they all believe about themselves deep down, and we are even willing for the steer to decorate himself with feathers in a trans-species, transgressive, Q-like kind of way, with roostery effects, and we are prepared to call it good. Moreover, we are (as a society) certain enough about what we are doing to severely chastize any blogger (filled with H8 as he is, and whose name rhymes with Smug Wilson) who looks at this barnyard parade and laughs at the new rooster designations. He laughs despite the certainty of coercive penalties that could be applied.

And so this is the culture that wants me to listen to their philosophers to do some deep thinking about the ultimate nature of reality? Are you kidding me? These people still take Heidegger seriously, which sort of explains the rooster.

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How God Hooked Us Up

So here below is a friendly rejoinder to a response to my recent jab at hermeneutical humility. My thanks to Micah Neely for the interaction. The nuances here may seem exquisite to some and very fine, but I actually think a great deal rides on it. It is le big deal, as the French put it so wonderfully.

My rejoinder has three points, making it, I suppose, a trijoinder.

First, if we think in terms of which hermeneutical approach makes truth “possible,” I think we have already lost the game. In order to function in robust scriptural categories, we need a hermeneutical approach that understands truth as inescapable.

We are not setting out with a hermeneutical flashlight, looking for a particular pebble of truth at the bottom of Carlsbad Caverns, but rather our problem is that we are running off to the basement with our hermeneutical flashlight in a vain attempt to get away from the sun. The earth is full of His glory (Is. 6:3). Day unto day pours forth speech, and the words go to the end of the world (Ps. 19:4). The invisible things of God are clearly seen, and have been since the creation (Rom. 1:20). So we need a hermeneutic capable of supporting the weight of inescapable, omnipresent, won’t-leave-us-alone truth, and not just possible truth. The hunt for truth is not looking for a needle in a haystack. It is more like looking for hay in a haystack.

But second, lest I be thought to be inveighing against humility, which would be bad, let me say I only have a beef with misplaced humility, and not with interpretive humility proper. True epistemic humility lets God tell us true things. Faux-humility wants to complicate it.

Not surprisingly, Chesterton makes this point wonderfully.

“Modesty has moved from the organ of ambition. Modesty has settled upon the organ of conviction where it was never meant to be. A man was meant to be doubtful about himself, but undoubting about the truth: this has been exactly reversed. Nowadays the part of a man that a man does assert is exactly the part he ought not to assert-himself. The part he doubts is exactly the part he ought not to doubt – the Divine Reason… The old humility was a spur that prevented a man from stopping: not a nail in his boot that prevented him from going on. For the old humility made a man doubtful about his efforts, which might make him work harder. But the new humility makes a man doubtful about his aims, which will make him stop working altogether.”

And last, I quite grant that if a modernist means by “objective” something raw and immediate, then he is talking through the back of his neck. But that is not what objective needs to mean.

Our knowledge is mediated to us by means of language, poems, metaphors, and (yes) propositions. But this is a design feature. It really is mediated to us — and this fact does not downgrade the quality of the knowledge gained. I gain objective knowledge when I receive objective knowledge by the means that God appointed to carry it to me.

Those means exclude me attaining to a God-like status that can know things “raw and uncooked.” But they include trusting that God hooked me up to the world the right way. He wanted me to know that my keyboard was right under my fingertips at this very moment, and He also plainly wanted me to know (objectively) that my keyboard is black. How do I know this? God told me. Look.

I give metaphor a very high place, but I also give it high praise. It actually communicates truth. It was designed to. So real humility steps out of the way and lets language do its God-appointed job. Metaphor, typology, figures, propositions, etc. do not blur. They tell. Just as copper conducts electricity, human language conducts truth.

Micah says this in his conclusion: “Giving up our ideas of objective certainty is not apostasy, it is the one thing necessary for us to return to true Trinitarian thought.” But the first thing I would want to know is whether or not I can have any objective certainty about whether I have arrived at true Trinitarian thought, or even if I have a duty to try.

If he only means to say that we have to give up our quest for autonomous certainty, then I am in the amen corner. But giving up objective certainty means that we are all still in our sins. If we give up objective certainty in order to return to the Trinity, my very first question will be what Trinity?

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Hard Teeth

A friend recently sent me a quote from J.B. Skemp, writing about the liberal scholarship of the late 19th century. Skemp says:

“The excessive attention to patterns and typology is in part due to a fear of reasoned and systematic doctrinal teaching, which is thought to depend too much on an alien Greek wisdom simply because it is systematic. This arouses the desire in present-day theologians to find clues in pictures rather than in propositions” [From The Greeks and the Gospel (Carey Kingsgate Press, 1964), p.  9]

Which caused a couple thoughts of my own to come burbling up, unbidden. As I offer them, let me first say that I do so as a champion of responsible typological interpretation, and nothing said here should be taken as the back of my hand for that kind of reading. There is no way to reject typological interpretation without rejecting, in principle, Jesus and all the apostles. Which would be bad. But the fact that typological interpretation is a new covenant necessity does not mean that mistakes and blunders are impossible in that realm — indeed, we can count on such mistakes and blunders presenting themselves for adoption right off. Whenever we find a garden, we should be looking around for the dragon — a nice little proposition with a picture in it.

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Cooking and Counting

One of the charges that is laid at my feet with some regularity is that I am an autodidact, unaccountable to no one, and that this unfortunate fact makes me pop off from time to time, and to do so in ways that are clean contrary to what is taught by the certified experts and gatekeepers.

There is a lot going on here, not the least of which is the confusion of certification with education. But that part of it is another topic for another day. For the present, I would like to present a brief explanation and defense for what I would describe as the biblical approach to being contrarian.

“I have more understanding than all my teachers: for thy testimonies are my meditation. I understand more than the ancients, because I keep thy precepts” (Ps. 119:99-100).

This approach eliminates the cocksure sophomore as well as the argumentative crank. Having “more understanding than all my teachers” is admittedly a ensign that could be a banner flying high above a regiment of fools. Anybody who wants to live this way has to take great care in this regard. Throughout Scripture, we see this characteristic of the fool — to re-adapt the joke, you can always tell a fool, but you can’t tell him much (Prov. 1:22; Prov. 10:21).

But let us not affirm the consequent. A biblical contrarian and a fool both know more than their teachers, just as a cow and a cat both have four legs. And yet, a cat is not a cow — or so says this contrarian.

One example of me getting above myself that was recently used was my non-acceptance of the theory of relativity. Wilson is a preacher, not a physicist, the argument goes, and has no business pronouncing in areas outside his expertise. That is a good point, which is why I don’t do that.

A mathematician walked into a breakfast diner, and ordered three eggs over easy. (No, I am not changing the subject). After an appropriate lapse of time, his plate arrived, with two eggs over easy. When the mathematician objected, the cook pointed out that he was a professional cook, and he did not think that the mathematician had any business poking his nose in where he was not adequately trained. The mathematician countered with the argument that, while it was true that he could not cook an egg to save his soul, he was capable of counting them. In fact, when it came to counting eggs, their two disciplines overlapped and, if anyone had an advantage, it would be the mathematician.

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Page After Page of It

I have earlier made note of what are called plausibility structures. They explain why it is easy to be a Mormon in Salt Lake City, a Muslim in Mecca, and a secularist in an MSNBC newsroom. But let us refrain from applying it to first order beliefs, like religion, and fifth order beliefs, like the notions that those eyewear fashions you wear are even remotely okay, and turn to apply it to second order beliefs, like politics.

Yesterday, I was looking over a magazine rack at a bookstore in Spokane that I like to haunt (Aunties), and  happened to thumb through a copy of Adbusters which, shall we say, is off my beaten path. Page after page was gritty rage-against-the-machine stuff, and it was uber-hip, and I felt my consciousness being raised just standing there. Nothing was more apparent than the fact that these guys thought they were being Authentic. They embraced that risible proposition because the editors and readers of this thing inhabit the same plausibility structure. What they all take for granted can be done in a spirit of serenity because nobody who shares their particular cocoon will ever call them on it. Very few people who flip through it will think it as funny as I did.

In the blog world, and sometimes in the comments section of this blog, different plausibility structures collide. This results in what some people call debate, but which is very rarely a real debate. People resort to their plausibility structures for ammo (what they call facts), get up a head of steam, and ram into somebody else with another set of facts. Nobody sinks, usually, but rather they just bob on over to another blog. Sometimes they float back on over. And thus it is that we have the death of argument.

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In Which We Discover Why Is Is Is

We believe in the God who reveals Himself to us, and not in a God who lies to us. He does not reveal Himself to us exhaustively, for that would crush us, but He reveals Himself to us in truth. But in order for God to reveal Himself to us in truth, we must have been created such that we can receive that truth.

This means that in some respects, in some way, there must be univocal meaning in the communication that occurs between us and God — some point of intersection. My earlier point about logic being an attribute of God is what makes this possible. We do not want to press creaturely “humility” to the point where all bets are off, and no such thing as heresy exists.

Now when I say that logic is an attribute of God, some are afraid that I am saying that before God does something, He gets out His copy of Aristotle to make sure He is not doing anything fallacious. That, of course, is absurd. But we can say that truth is an attribute of God without maintaining that He gets out His copy of the Shorter Catechism before saying something (well, most of us do at any rate). We say that love is an attribute of God without saying He obeys Sunday School maxims. We should simply understand the point about logic or “right reason” in the same way. God is not obeying rules; He is the rule.

So when I use the word “foundational,” I do not mean to speak as some kind of a foundationalist, as though God were made out of building blocks. I am talking about something that is foundational to revelation, or any faithful predication about God.

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