7 March 2006
Source: Digital transcript purchased from Exemplaris.com. Files digitally signed by reporter.

Other trial transcripts: http://cryptome.org/usa-v-zm-dt2.htm

Other case documents: http://cryptome.org/usa-v-zm-cd.htm

                        UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,     .       Criminal No. 1:01cr455
          vs.                      .       Alexandria, Virginia
                                  .       March 7, 2006
     ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI,           .       1:30 p.m.
    a/k/a Shaqil, a/k/a           .
     Abu Khalid al Sahrawi,        .
                    Defendant.     .
     .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .
                          TRANSCRIPT OF JURY TRIAL
                        UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
                                  VOLUME II-A
                                  DAVID J. NOVAK, AUSA
                                   DAVID RASKIN, AUSA
                                  United States Attorney's Office
                                   2100 Jamieson Avenue
                                  Alexandria, VA 22314
                                  JOHN W. VAN LONKHUYZEN, ESQ.
                                   U.S. Department of Justice
                                  Counterterrorism Section
                                   10th and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
                                  Room 2736
                                   Washington, D.C. 20530
                                  KENNETH P. TROCCOLI
                                   Assistant Federal Public Defenders
                                  Office of the Federal Public
                                  1650 King Street
                                   Alexandria, VA 22314

 1   APPEARANCES:  (Cont'd.)
                                  P.O. Box 903
 3                                 107 East Washington Street
                                  Middleburg, VA 20118
 7                                 U.S. District Court, Fifth Floor
                                  401 Courthouse Square
 8                                 Alexandria, VA 22314
 9                                   and
                                  KAREN BRYNTESON, FAPR, RMR, CRR
10                                 Brynteson Reporting, Inc.
                                  2404 Belle Haven Meadows Court
11                                 Alexandria, VA 22306

 1                         P R O C E E D I N G S
 2                                 (Defendant and jury in.)
 3             THE COURT:  All right, Mr. Raskin.
 4             MR. RASKIN:  Thank you, Your Honor.
 6                AFFIRMED, RESUMED
 7                       DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)
 9   Q.   Agent Fitzgerald, when we broke we were looking at Government
10   Exhibit MM-729.  Can you remind us what that is?
11   A.   This is a business document from UPS, and it reflects a
12   transfer from Aviation Language Service Incorporated to Ramzi Bin
13   al-Shibh, and it was sent to Ramzi Bin al-Shibh at his Billstedter
14   Hauptstrasse address, 14A, and it also lists his German telephone
15   number, the same one ending in 99042.
16   Q.   Tell us what Aviation Language Services is, where it is
17   located.
18   A.   Aviation Language School or Aviation Language Services is a
19   school that Ramzi Bin al-Shibh was applying to at the same time he
20   was applying to take flight training in the United States.  It
21   was -- this school is designed to help non-English-speaking
22   students learn enough English to train as pilots.
23   Q.   And, again, there is the address on the document, Government
24   Exhibit AR-582.
25   A.   This particular document is from Emirates Airlines, it is an

 1   Emirates Skywards account, similar to a Sky Miles account.  On
 2   this account Ramzi Bin al-Shibh has listed his address as
 3   Billstedter Hauptstrasse 14A in Hamburg, and he's also listed a
 4   telephone number, the same number ending in 99042.
 5   Q.   Now, Agent Fitzgerald, has the FBI obtained travel documents
 6   regarding travel by Jarrah, Atta, and Ramzi Bin al-Shibh during
 7   the month of November 1999?
 8   A.   Yes.
 9   Q.   And what do those documents reflect?
10   A.   Those documents reflect travel to Karachi, Pakistan.
11   Q.   And on what route?
12   A.   From Hamburg, Germany through Istanbul, Turkey to Karachi,
13   Pakistan.
14   Q.   Which was the first of these three individuals to travel from
15   Hamburg to Karachi and when?
16   A.   Ziad Jarrah, he traveled on the 25th of November, 1999.
17   Q.   Who is the next of the three to travel from Hamburg to
18   Karachi?
19   A.   Mohamed Atta traveled about four days later, on the 29th of
20   November, 1999.
21   Q.   And the third was Ramzi Bin al-Shibh.  When did he travel?
22   A.   He traveled about one week after Mohamed Atta, and he
23   traveled on the 6th of December, 1999, from Hamburg through
24   Istanbul, Turkey, to Karachi, Pakistan.
25   Q.   Now, the other individual you said lived in Hamburg was

 1   Marwal al-Shehhi.  Did he also travel to Pakistan?
 2   A.   Yes, he did.
 3   Q.   When did he travel to Pakistan?
 4   A.   On February 23rd of 2000.
 5   Q.   We saw a picture of Hani Hanjour.  Remind us who he was.
 6   A.   Hani Hanjour was the hijacker pilot of American Airlines
 7   Flight 77.
 8   Q.   Was he also in Pakistan?
 9   A.   Yes, he was.
10   Q.   When was that?
11   A.   In June of 2000.
12   Q.   What other of the 19 hijackers spent time in Pakistan?
13   A.   Abdul Aziz Alomari, Hamza al-Ghamdi, Mohand al-Shehri and
14   Ahmed al-Haznawi.
15   Q.   Now, Agent Fitzgerald, just looking at the map, can you
16   please identify the country to the immediate northwest of
17   Pakistan?
18   A.   That is the country of Afghanistan.
19   Q.   Agent Fitzgerald, did any of the individuals -- withdrawn.
20             Who were the first of the hijackers to obtain visas to
21   enter the United States?
22   A.   The first two individuals to obtain visas were Nawaf al-Hazmi
23   and Khalid al-Midhar.
24   Q.   Who obtained visas after them?
25   A.   Three individuals obtained visas after them, Marwan

 1   al-Shehhi, Mohamed Atta, and Ziad Jarrah.
 2   Q.   And what about Hani Hanjour?
 3   A.   He obtained one shortly thereafter, in September of 2000.
 4   Q.   Now, are we looking at those six individuals now?
 5   A.   Yes.
 6   Q.   And just run us through this screen, and tell us when each of
 7   these individuals obtained their U.S. visas.
 8   A.   Starting with Hani Hanjour, Hani Hanjour applied for and
 9   received a U.S. visa on November 2nd of 1996.  Subsequent to that
10   he traveled to the United States, and then returned to the area of
11   Saudi Arabia.
12             He also applied for U.S. visas on two additional
13   occasions.  Hani Hanjour applied for a U.S. visa on September 10th
14   of 2000.  That visa application was denied.  He applied for a
15   different type of U.S. visa about two weeks later, on the 25th of
16   September, 2000, and that visa was approved.
17   Q.   Nawaf al-Hazmi?
18   A.   Looking at Nawaf al-Hazmi, he applied for and received a U.S.
19   visa on April 3rd of 1999.
20   Q.   And what are we looking at here, Government Exhibit SD-103?
21   A.   Looking at that particular document, that's a photocopy that
22   was -- of the passport of Nawaf al-Hazmi that was seized by the
23   FBI from documents after September 11th.
24   Q.   Government Exhibit SD-405.
25   A.   That's a photocopy of the visa in the passport of Nawaf

 1   al-Hazmi, which once again was seized in documents by the FBI
 2   after September 11th, 2001.
 3   Q.   And just continuing down our list here, what about Khalid
 4   al-Midhar?
 5   A.   Khalid al-Midhar applied for and received a U.S. visa on
 6   April 7th of 1999.
 7   Q.   Marwan al-Shehhi?
 8   A.   Marwan al-Shehhi, approximately eight months later, in
 9   January of 2000, also applied for and received a U.S. visa.
10   Q.   Atta?
11   A.   Atta received a U.S. visa on May 18th of 2000.
12   Q.   And Ziad Jarrah?
13   A.   Finally, on May 25th of 2000, Ziad Jarrah also applied for
14   and received a U.S. visa.
15   Q.   Now, we also discussed Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh and his attempts to
16   get a U.S. visa.  Remind us how many times he applied for a U.S.
17   visa.
18   A.   On four separate occasions.
19   Q.   Government Exhibit OG-1126P, which visa application is this?
20   A.   This is Ramzi Bin al-Shibh's first visa application.  This
21   was on May 17th of 2000.  And this is one day before the
22   application of Mohamed Atta.
23             This is a second visa application for Ramzi Bin
24   al-Shibh.  This was done in June of 2000.  During this time, in
25   June of 2000, the hijackers Mohamed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi were

 1   already in the United States.
 2   Q.   That for the record is OG-1127P.  OG-1128P?
 3   A.   This is the September 16th, 2000 application of Ramzi Bin
 4   al-Shibh for a U.S. visa.  By this time Ramzi Bin al-Shibh had
 5   also contacted Florida Flight Training Center in Venice, Florida
 6   in an attempt to gain flight training school, training there.
 7   Q.   Government Exhibit OG-1129P.
 8   A.   This is a copy of the visa application for Ramzi Bin al-Shibh
 9   for October 25th of 2000, his last visa application.
10   Q.   Now, on October 25th, 2000, where was Ramzi Bin al-Shibh?
11   A.   In Hamburg, Germany.
12   Q.   And approximately a month later, from Hamburg, where did
13   Ramzi Bin al-Shibh travel?
14   A.   He flew to London, England.
15   Q.   What date did he arrive in London?
16   A.   On the 2nd of December, 2000.
17   Q.   How long did Ramzi Bin al-Shibh stay in London?
18   A.   For approximately one week.
19   Q.   And after that week when did he leave London and where did he
20   go?
21   A.   He left London, England and flew back to Germany.
22   Q.   And with Mr. Wood's assistance, I will hand the witness
23   Government Exhibit A R-852 and 853, please.
24             THE COURT:  So these are no longer in the PowerPoint?
25             MR. RASKIN:  Correct, Your Honor.

 2   Q.   Have you looked at those documents, Agent?
 3   A.   Yes, I have.
 4   Q.   Tell us what they are.
 5   A.   Those are business records from Lufthansa Airlines which
 6   reflect the travel of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh from Germany to London,
 7   England on the 2nd of December, 2000, and then returning to
 8   Germany on the 9th of December of 2000.
 9             MR. RASKIN:  Your Honor, we offer AR-852 and 853.
10             THE COURT:  Any objection?
11             MR. MAC MAHON:  No objection.
12             THE COURT:  All right.  They are both in.
13             (Government's Exhibits Nos. AR-852 and AR-853 were
14   received in evidence.)
16   Q.   Now, Agent Fitzgerald, of the individuals, the six
17   individuals we just looked at as having applied for U.S. visas,
18   did those six individuals ultimately come to the United States?
19   A.   Yes, they did.
20   Q.   Which of those individuals obtained flight training at U.S.
21   flight schools?
22   A.   All six of those individuals obtained flight training at U.S.
23   flight schools.  However, two of them did not actually enroll.
24   Q.   Before coming to the United States, did any of those
25   individuals contact U.S. flight schools?

 1   A.   Yes.
 2   Q.   And which individuals were those?
 3   A.   Those were Ziad Jarrah and Mohamed Atta.
 4   Q.   What school did Atta contact from abroad, and when did he do
 5   it?
 6   A.   He contacted the Academy of Lakeland in Lakeland, Florida on
 7   March 22nd of 2000.
 8   Q.   And where is Lakeland, Florida generally?
 9   A.   Generally in the area of Venice, Florida.
10   Q.   As reflected on the screen now?
11   A.   Yes.
12   Q.   How did he contact the Academy of Lakeland?
13   A.   Via e-mail, over the Internet.
14   Q.   Government Exhibit MM-651.  What is that document?
15   A.   That's a copy of an e-mail sent by Mohamed Atta to the
16   Academy of Lakeland on March 22nd of 2000.
17   Q.   And can you read the first two paragraphs, if you can?
18   A.   Yes.  "Dear sir, we are a small group of young men from
19   different Arab countries.  Now we are living in Germany since a
20   while for study purposes.  We would like to start training for the
21   career of airline professsional pilots.  In this field we haven't
22   yet any knowledge but we are ready to undergo an intensive
23   training program (up to ATP and eventually higher)."
24   Q.   Did Atta send similar e-mails to other flight schools before
25   he came to the United States?

 1   A.   Yes.
 2   Q.   Approximately how many?
 3   A.   Approximately 50 to 60.
 4   Q.   You also said Jarrah contacted flight schools before he came
 5   to the United States.  Which school did he contact?
 6   A.   Jarrah contacted the Florida Flight Training Center in
 7   Venice, Florida.
 8   Q.   And is that the flight school he ended up attending?
 9   A.   Yes, it is.
10   Q.   Where is Venice, Florida in relation to Lakeland?
11   A.   It is in the same general area.
12   Q.   When did Jarrah contact the school?
13   A.   He contacted the school on March 24th of 2000.
14   Q.   Government Exhibit MM-8, what is that?
15   A.   This is a business record, a business document from the
16   Florida Flight Training Center.  It is a contact report which
17   reflects the initial contact of Ziad Jarrah with Florida Flight
18   Training Center.  And you can see the date there of March 24th of
19   2000.
20             THE COURT:  Mr. Raskin, are you moving 651 and 8 into
21   evidence?
22             MR. RASKIN:  Yes.  They are on the list, Your Honor, of
23   the documents contained in the program, which we submitted to the
24   Court earlier, but the answer is yes.
25             THE COURT:  Well, I want to double-check on that.  You

 1   just need to be clear.  If they are not in that list, we need to
 2   know it separately, or else they are not going to get properly
 3   registered.
 4             MR. RASKIN:  Okay.  In the event that they are not, Your
 5   Honor, we move them into evidence now.
 6             THE COURT:  651 and 8 are in.
 7             MR. MAC MAHON:  No objection, Your Honor.
 8             THE COURT:  I assumed, Mr. MacMahon, that there was none
 9   or you would have been on your feet.  Go ahead.
10             (Government's Exhibits Nos. MM-651 and MM-8 were
11              received in evidence.)
13   Q.   That takes us to stage 2 of the plot, Agent Fitzgerald.  Tell
14   us what the FBI learned occurred in stage 2 of the plot.
15   A.   Yes.  During stage 2 the hijackers arrived in the United
16   States, they received money from overseas, and they took flight
17   training.
18   Q.   And when you say the hijackers arrived, would that be the
19   first six that we saw obtained U.S. visas?
20   A.   That's correct.
21   Q.   Who were the first two of those six to arrive in the United
22   States and when?
23   A.   The first two to arrive were Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid
24   al-Midhar, and they arrived in January of 2000.
25   Q.   When did the next three hijackers arrive?

 1   A.   The next three arrived in the middle of the year.  They were
 2   Marwal al-Shehhi, Mohamed Atta, and Ziad Jarrah.
 3   Q.   Who was the last to arrive of the original six to obtain U.S.
 4   visas?
 5   A.   The last to arrive was Hani Hanjour, and he arrived at the
 6   end of the year, in December of 2000.
 7   Q.   Now let's take a look at the first two.  Where did Khalid
 8   al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi's trip to the United States begin?
 9   A.   They started off in Kuala Lumpur, in Malaysia.
10   Q.   And we see that reflected on the screen now; is that correct?
11   A.   Yes.
12   Q.   When did Khalid and Nawaf begin their trip to the United
13   States?
14   A.   They left on the 8th of January and flew to Bangkok,
15   Thailand.  And then on the 15th they flew from Bangkok, Thailand
16   to Los Angeles.
17   Q.   What other hijackers did the FBI learn during the course of
18   its investigation spent time in Malaysia?
19   A.   Satam al-Suqami and Abdul Aziz Alomari.
20   Q.   Was there a coconspirator who spent time in Malaysia as well?
21   A.   Yes.
22   Q.   Who was that?
23   A.   That was Ramzi Bin al-Shibh.
24   Q.   And now just take us through the route you just described.
25   When did they leave Bangkok?

 1   A.   They left Bangkok on the 15th of January, 2000 and flew
 2   directly to Los Angeles, California.
 3   Q.   How long did Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi stay in Los
 4   Angeles?
 5   A.   Approximately three weeks.
 6   Q.   Where did they go after that?
 7   A.   To San Diego.
 8   Q.   And how long did Khalid al-Midhar stay in San Diego?
 9   A.   Al-Midhar stayed in San Diego for about five months.  He
10   stayed there from, when he and Nawaf first arrived in January, and
11   stayed in the United States until June of 2000.
12   Q.   Where did he go in June?
13   A.   He left the United States, flew through Frankfurt, Germany
14   and went to Oman.
15   Q.   And what did Nawaf al-Hazmi do when Midhar left?
16   A.   He stayed in the United States.
17   Q.   Okay.  Now, you also mentioned that three hijackers came to
18   the United States in the middle of 2000.  Let's talk about Marwal
19   al-Shehhi and Mohamed Atta.  Where did they leave from to come to
20   the United States?
21   A.   They both left from two cities in Europe, specifically
22   Brussels, Belgium, and Prague in the Czech Republic.
23   Q.   When did they fly to the United States and where did they go?
24   A.   Marwal al-Shehhi flew from Brussels, Belgium to Newark, New
25   Jersey on the 29th of May, 2000.  Several days later Mohamed Atta

 1   flew on June 3rd of 2000 from the Czech Republic also to Newark,
 2   New Jersey.
 3   Q.   Now, we have learned, you have told us before that after Atta
 4   and al-Shehhi came to New York, they went to Oklahoma and then to
 5   Florida.  Remind us how long Atta and al-Shehhi spent in New York
 6   before their trip to Oklahoma.
 7   A.   They spent about one month in New York before traveling to
 8   Oklahoma.
 9   Q.   During the course of the September 11th PENTTBOM
10   investigation, was the FBI able to obtain a document from the time
11   Atta and al-Shehhi were in New York that indicated the trip to
12   Oklahoma was preplanned?
13   A.   Yes.
14   Q.   Government Exhibit TR-511, tell us what that is.
15   A.   This is a business record from Voicestream Wireless.  This is
16   reflecting the sale of a prepaid cellular telephone to Mohamed
17   Atta in New York.  On this information Atta has listed his address
18   as 1950 Godddard Avenue in Norman, Oklahoma.
19   Q.   What is at that Goddard Avenue address?
20   A.   Airman Flight School.
21   Q.   And on what date did Atta apply -- or receive this telephone?
22   A.   He received this on the 4th of June, 2000, one day after
23   arriving in the United States.
24   Q.   Okay.  And then you indicated that Atta and al-Shehhi did go
25   to Oklahoma.  Let's take another look at Government Exhibit OK-17

 1   and 16, already in evidence.
 2             Tell us what they are again.
 3   A.   These documents we have seen before.  These reflect their
 4   receipts from the Sooner Hotel for both Marwal al-Shehhi and
 5   Mohamed Atta, and they reflect their stay at this hotel in Norman,
 6   Oklahoma from July 2nd through July 3rd.  It has also got their
 7   German addresses listed there.
 8             THE COURT:  Mr. Raskin, TR-511, which was the
 9   Voicestream document, was that in the big exhibit?
10             MR. RASKIN:  Yes.
11             THE COURT:  All right.
13   Q.   Now we are looking at Government Exhibit OK-18.1.  Tell us
14   what this document is.
15   A.   This is a guest list from the Sooner Hotel for the night of
16   June or, correction, July 2nd to July 3rd of 2000.  It reflects
17   the stay of Mohamed Atta and Marwal al-Shehhi in room 450, and, as
18   you can see, listed under company they have AFS, or Airman Flight
19   School.
20   Q.   And fine -- withdrawn.  How long did Atta and al-Shehhi stay
21   in Oklahoma?
22   A.   About two days.
23   Q.   And they went to Florida after that?
24   A.   Yes.
25   Q.   What did Atta and al-Shehhi do in Venice, Florida?

 1   A.   Once in Florida they enrolled in flight school there at
 2   Huffman Aviation and stayed there for approximately six months
 3   taking flight training.
 4   Q.   Who was the next of the original six to get visas to come to
 5   the United States?
 6   A.   The next person was Ziad Jarrah.
 7   Q.   And where did he leave from and when?
 8   A.   He left from Munich, Germany, and he left on June 27th of
 9   2000.
10   Q.   Where did he travel to?
11   A.   He traveled through Atlanta, Georgia and down towards the
12   area of Venice, Florida.
13   Q.   Who came to the United States at the end of the calendar year
14   of 2000?
15   A.   The person who came to the United States at the end of the
16   year was Hani Hanjour.
17   Q.   Where did he leave from and when?
18   A.   From Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates, and he left on
19   December 8th of 2000.
20   Q.   Where did he fly to?
21   A.   He flew through Paris and Cincinnati and went to San Diego.
22   Q.   Who was in San Diego when Hani Hanjour arrived?
23   A.   Nawaf al-Hazmi.
24   Q.   Where did Hani Hanjour and Nawaf al-Hazmi go after Hanjour's
25   arrival in San Diego?

 1   A.   To Phoenix, Arizona.
 2   Q.   So at the end of 2000, remind us which of the hijackers are
 3   presently in the United States.
 4   A.   At the end of 2000, you can see looking at the screen here,
 5   from the right, in Florida you have Ziad Jarrah, Marwal al-Shehhi,
 6   and Mohamed Atta.  And then in Arizona you have Nawaf al-Hazmi and
 7   Hani Hanjour.  If you look to the far left of the screen you can
 8   see a photograph of Khalid al-Midhar and a notation below that,
 9   that's the individual who left the United States after spending
10   about five months in San Diego, and traveled back to Oman.
11   Q.   Now, during the prior six months, the latter half of 2000,
12   did Atta and al-Shehhi receive money from abroad?
13   A.   Yes.
14   Q.   And who was the first of the two individuals who sent money
15   to Atta and al-Shehhi during that time?
16   A.   Ramzi Bin al-Shibh.
17   Q.   And who was the second?
18   A.   The second was Ali Abdul Aziz Ali.
19   Q.   And we have seen these pictures earlier in your presentation,
20   correct?
21   A.   Yes.
22   Q.   How is the money sent to Marwal al-Shehhi and Mohamed Atta by
23   the two individuals we have just seen?
24   A.   It was sent via three different types of transfers, through a
25   Moneygram transfer, through Western Union transfers, and through

 1   bank-to-bank wire transfers.
 2   Q.   And just generally tell us the difference between a
 3   bank-to-bank transfer and the other two.
 4   A.   The first two, Moneygram and Western Union, typically require
 5   a person to show up at a Western Union or Moneygram agent, and
 6   then wire the money specifically from that location.  There is
 7   usually a fairly sizable fee encompassed in that, and then that
 8   money is sent directly to another Western Union agent and that
 9   money -- or a Moneygram agent, and that money must be picked up by
10   the receiving party at wherever the -- that location is.  They
11   have to go to a Western Union or Moneygram office to do so.
12             For a bank-to-bank wire transfer, the money comes
13   directly from one bank account to another bank account.
14   Q.   How many transfers were there from Bin al-Shibh and Ali Abdul
15   Aziz Ali to al-Shehhi and Atta?
16   A.   There were a total of nine.
17   Q.   And over what period of time is that?
18   A.   Between June of 2000 and September of 2000.
19   Q.   How many were sent by Bin al-Shibh?
20   A.   Four were sent by Ramzi Bin al-Shibh.
21   Q.   And how many by Ali?
22   A.   Five.
23   Q.   What was the total amount of money that was sent by the two
24   of those individuals?
25   A.   Approximately $120,000.

 1   Q.   Let's take a look at the transfers from Ramzi Bin al-Shibh.
 2   Do they appear on the screen now?
 3   A.   Yes.
 4   Q.   And why don't you just walk us through them, starting with
 5   the first one on June 13th.
 6   A.   As you can see from the screen here, the first two transfers
 7   were via a Moneygram wire transfer.  Those were on June 13th and
 8   June 21st of 2000.  The first one in the amount of roughly $2,700,
 9   and the second one in the amount of $1,800.
10             As you can see from the map here, those were sent from
11   Hamburg, Germany to Marwal al-Shehhi, and that was during that
12   first month, if you recall, when al-Shehhi was still in the area
13   of New York City.  That's before he had traveled out to Oklahoma
14   and then down to Florida.
15             Looking at those second two wire transfers, you can see
16   those are on July 26th for roughly $1,700, and then September 25th
17   for roughly $4,000.  Those two wire transfers were sent via
18   Western Union when Atta and al-Shehhi had relocated down to the
19   area of Venice, Florida.
20   Q.   Now, the FBI was able to obtain records after 9/11 reflecting
21   all four of these transactions?
22   A.   Yes.
23   Q.   Government Exhibit BR-3, which is on the list, and if not, we
24   offer it now, Your Honor.
25             THE COURT:  All right.  The same thing, Oklahoma 18.1

 1   was on the list; is that correct?
 2             MR. RASKIN:  Yes, Your Honor.
 3             THE COURT:  It is in.
 4             MR. MAC MAHON:  No objection, Your Honor, if this one is
 5   in, no objection anyway.
 6             THE COURT:  All right.
 7             (Government's Exhibit No. BR-3 was received in
 8   evidence.)
10   Q.   Tell us what this document is.
11   A.   This document is a business record from Moneygram, and it
12   reflects the sending information when Ramzi Bin al-Shibh was
13   sending money to Marwal al-Shehhi, roughly $1,800 in June of 2000.
14   Q.   And Government Exhibit BR-4.
15   A.   At the time that Ramzi Bin al-Shibh sent this wire transfer,
16   he had to provide identification that was photocopied by the
17   Moneygram individual, and a copy of it was made part of the
18   business records, and that's what's reflected here.
19             MR. RASKIN:  Your Honor, we would offer BR-4 to the
20   extent it is not on the list.
21             THE COURT:  Well, I mean, if it is on the list -- are
22   you not positive yourself?
23             MR. RASKIN:  No, I am sure, I just want to double-check
24   and state it for the record.
25             THE COURT:  Since there were no objections to the list,

 1   Mr. MacMahon, I'm assuming there is going to be no objection.
 2             MR. MAC MAHON:  No, Your Honor, no objection.
 3             THE COURT:  That's fine, BR-4 is in.
 4             (Government's Exhibit No. BR-4 was received in
 5   evidence.)
 7   Q.   And now Government Exhibit BR-6.
 8   A.   Government Exhibit BR-6 is, again, a Moneygram, a financial
 9   document.  This is a photocopy of the passport of Marwal
10   al-Shehhi.  This was photocopied when al-Shehhi was picking up the
11   wire transfer in New York.  Also photocopied was a copy of the
12   check.  And this was done by the Moneygram agent in New York.
13   Q.   And now let's take a look at Ali Abdul Aziz Ali's transfers
14   to the United States.  You said there were five.  Is this the
15   first?
16   A.   Yes, it is.
17   Q.   And how much did Ali Abdul Aziz Ali transfer to al-Shehhi and
18   where to?
19   A.   This was a Western Union wire transfer from Ali Abdul Aziz
20   Ali in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and this was sent to al-Shehhi
21   during June of 2000, when al-Shehhi was in New York with Mohamed
22   Atta.
23   Q.   And you said there were four others, correct?
24   A.   Yes.
25   Q.   Are they on the screen now?

 1   A.   Yes, they are.
 2   Q.   Just walk us through those, please.
 3   A.   Sure.  These four transfers, as you can see from the screen,
 4   are all bank-to-bank transfers.  They were sent from an account
 5   set up in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to the joint bank account
 6   of Marwal al-Shehhi and Mohamed Atta.  As you can see from the
 7   amounts here on July 18th, approximately $10,000 was sent.  On
 8   August 5th, approximately $9,500 was sent.  On August 30th of
 9   2000, approximately $20,000 was sent.  And finally on the 18th of
10   September, 2000, approximately $70,000 was sent.
11   Q.   And the FBI obtained records reflecting these transactions?
12   A.   Yes.
13   Q.   What's Government Exhibit BR-28A?
14   A.   This is a document from the SunTrust bank records of Mohamed
15   Atta and Marwal al-Shehhi.  This reflects the receipt of a wire
16   transfer from Ali Abdul Aziz Ali when Ali was using an alias of
17   Itsam Monsour.  As you can see, the amount here is roughly $9,500,
18   the same amount reflected on the previous page.
19   Q.   Government Exhibit BR-28B.
20   A.   This is another document from the SunTrust bank account of
21   Marwal al-Shehhi and Mohamed Atta.  This reflects the receipt of
22   almost $10,000 from Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, and this was when Ali was
23   using the alias of Itsam Monsour.
24   Q.   Now, in the latter half of 2000, Atta, Jarrah, and al-Shehhi
25   obtained flight training in the United States; is that correct?

 1   A.   Yes.
 2   Q.   Where did they obtain that training?
 3   A.   They obtained flight training at Huffman Aviation in the case
 4   of Atta and al-Shehhi, and in the case of Ziad Jarrah, at Florida
 5   Flight Training Center.
 6   Q.   Let's take a look at Atta and al-Shehhi.  Remind us again
 7   where Huffman Aviation is.
 8   A.   That's in Venice, Florida.
 9   Q.   Over what period of time did Atta and al-Shehhi train at
10   Huffman?
11   A.   From early July 2000 to mid-December of 2000.
12   Q.   Has the FBI obtained records from Huffman after 9/11?
13   A.   Yes.
14   Q.   And what do those records reflect generally about the Atta
15   and -- the training that Atta and al-Shehhi received at Huffman
16   Aviation?
17   A.   It reflects that they received small private pilot training,
18   that would be on a small plane like a Cessna, and the training
19   would include the private pilot instruction, instrument rating,
20   and commercial rating.  For the commercial rating, that would be
21   for an aircraft such as a small twin-engine plane.
22   Q.   During this period of time did Atta and al-Shehhi receive
23   training at another school in the area?
24   A.   Yes, they did.
25   Q.   What school was that?

 1   A.   That was Jones Aviation in Sarasota, Florida.
 2   Q.   And you mentioned Ziad Jarrah took training as well.  Where
 3   did he train, take his flight training?
 4   A.   Ziad Jarrah took his training at Florida Flight Training
 5   Center, also in Venice.
 6   Q.   Have you visited these two schools, Huffman -- well,
 7   withdrawn.
 8             Have you visited Huffman and Florida Flight Training
 9   Center?
10   A.   Yes, I have.
11   Q.   Where precisely are they located?
12   A.   They are at the same airfield at Venice Airport in Venice,
13   Florida.
14   Q.   And over what period of time was Jarrah at Florida Flight
15   Training Center?
16   A.   Jarrah was at Florida Flight Training Center from late June
17   of 2000 to mid-December of 2000, roughly the same time that Atta
18   and al-Shehhi were at Huffman.
19   Q.   Now, you also mentioned that Ramzi Bin al-Shibh applied for
20   flight training at Florida Flight Training Center; is that
21   correct?
22   A.   Yes.
23   Q.   Government Exhibit MM-705.  What is that?
24   A.   This is an invoice from Florida Flight Training Center to
25   Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, and it is for the amount of $500.

 1   Q.   And what is the date of this invoice?
 2   A.   This invoice is dated in August of 2000.
 3   Q.   And was Jarrah at the school at the time?
 4   A.   Yes, he was.
 5   Q.   Government Exhibit MM-719.
 6   A.   This is an application for acceptance from Ramzi Bin al-Shibh
 7   to Florida Flight Training Center.  On this application for
 8   acceptance, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh has listed his name, also a phone
 9   number and a fax number.  If you look at those two numbers, those
10   are the same numbers I mentioned before, those German numbers
11   ending in 99042.
12             THE COURT:  Just wait, Mr. Raskin, just a second.  Just
13   so we don't get out of control here.  BR-6, BR-28A and B, MM-705
14   and MM-17 are in.  Okay?
15             MR. RASKIN:  Correct, Your Honor.
16             (Government's Exhibits Nos. BR-6, BR-28A and B, MM-705
17   and MM-17 were received in evidence.)
18             THE COURT:  Go ahead.
19             MR. RASKIN:  May I proceed?
20             THE COURT:  Yes.
21             MR. RASKIN:  Thank you.
23   Q.   Remind us what address in Hamburg, Germany that phone number
24   is associated with.
25   A.   That phone number is associated with the Billstedter

 1   Hauptstrasse 14A address.
 2   Q.   Remind us when Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar arrived in
 3   the United States.
 4   A.   They arrived in the United States in January, January 15th of
 5   2000.
 6   Q.   And did either of them take flight training upon their
 7   arrival in the United States?
 8   A.   Yes, both took flight training.  However, neither one
 9   enrolled in a flight school.
10   Q.   Where did Nawaf al-Hazmi first take flight training?
11   A.   He first took flight training at a place called National Air
12   College in San Diego, California.
13   Q.   And where did he and Khalid al-Midhar take flight training
14   after that?
15   A.   About a month later, on May 5th and May 10th of 2000, he and
16   Khalid al-Midhar, that's Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar, took
17   training at Sorbi Flying Club, also in San Diego, California.
18   Q.   Hani Hanjour arrived at the end of the year 2000, correct?
19   A.   Yes.
20   Q.   Where did he take flight training?
21   A.   By that time Hani Hanjour already had a commercial pilot's
22   license.  When he arrived in the United States he took refresher
23   training at a place called Arizona Aviation in Phoenix, Arizona.
24   Q.   Which of the individuals we're looking at on the screen now
25   ultimately piloted the flights that were hijacked on September

 1   11th?
 2   A.   Hani Hanjour, Mohamed Atta, Marwal al-Shehhi, and Ziad
 3   Jarrah.
 4   Q.   Did these four hijackers take jet simulator training in the
 5   United States as well?
 6   A.   Yes, they did.
 7   Q.   Where did Atta and al-Shehhi train on jet simulators?
 8   A.   They trained at two separate companies, both out of the same
 9   complex.  Those companies were the Sim Center in Opa-Locka,
10   Florida, and also Pan Am International Flight Academy, also in
11   Opa-Locka, Florida.
12   Q.   And in what part of Florida is Opa-Locka?
13   A.   In the Miami, Florida area.
14   Q.   What dates did Atta and al-Shehhi train on jet simulators,
15   and what type of simulators did they train on?
16   A.   They trained on the last three days of 2000, on the 29th, the
17   30th, and the 31st of December.  On the 29th and the 30th, they
18   trained on Boeing 727's at Sim Center.  And then on the 31st they
19   trained on Boeing 767's at Pan Am International Flight Academy.
20   Q.   Where did Ziad Jarrah train on flight simulators?
21   A.   Ziad Jarrah trained at the Aero Service Aviation Center in
22   Miami, Florida.
23   Q.   What dates did Jarrah take jet simulator training and on what
24   type of simulators?
25   A.   He took training on December 15th through the 18th, then

 1   again on the 8th of January, and he took training on both 727's
 2   and 737's.
 3   Q.   What about Hani Hanjour, where did he train on jet
 4   simulators?
 5   A.   Hani Hanjour trained in Phoenix at a place called Pan Am
 6   International Jet Tech in Phoenix, Arizona.
 7   Q.   On what dates and what type of simulator?
 8   A.   From February through March of 2001, and those were on 737's.
 9   Q.   Now, that takes us to stage 3 of the plot, but before we
10   discuss that, Agent, I would like to show you a series of
11   exhibits.
12             If Mr. Wood would hand the witness Government Exhibits
13   MM-639.1 through .4, MM-751 through 753, MM-639.9 and .10,
14   Government Exhibits MM-756.1 through .6, and Government Exhibits
15   MM-757.1 through .4.
16             THE COURT:  Is there any objection to any of those
17   exhibits?
18             MR. MAC MAHON:  Just a second.  There is so many
19   exhibits, I get lost.  I'm sorry, Your Honor.
20             THE COURT:  I understand.
21             MR. MAC MAHON:  No objection, Your Honor.  Thank you.
22             THE COURT:  All right.  639.1 to .4, 751 through 753,
23   639.9 and .10, 756.1 through 6, and 757.1 through 4 are in.
24             (Government's Exhibits Nos. MM-639.1 to .4, MM-751
25   through 753, MM-639.9 and .10, MM-756.1 through 6, and MM-757.1

 1   through 4 were received in evidence.)
 2             MR. RASKIN:  Thank you, Your Honor.
 4   Q.   And if we could just go through them and put them up on the
 5   screen.  Agent Fitzgerald, I am going to ask you to just tell us
 6   what we're looking at.  And let's start with MM-639.1.
 7   A.   That's a photograph of Huffman Aviation in Venice, Florida.
 8   Huffman Aviation is no longer incorporated as a business, but that
 9   is a photograph of the building that used to occupy -- that
10   Huffman Aviation used to occupy.
11   Q.   And 639.2, .3, and .4, let's go through them one by one.  Is
12   that the same view of Huffman Aviation?
13   A.   Yes, it is.
14   Q.   Let's go to .3.
15   A.   That's an inside photo of Huffman Aviation, inside the main
16   building.
17   Q.   And .4?
18   A.   That's a photo from the opposite side of Huffman Aviation.
19   Q.   And let's go to MM-751.
20   A.   That's a photo of the Florida Flight Training Center, which
21   once again is at the same air field as Huffman Aviation, about a
22   half mile away.
23   Q.   752?
24   A.   Also a photo of the building which houses Florida Flight
25   Training Center.

 1   Q.   753.
 2   A.   Once again, the building which houses Florida Flight Training
 3   Center.
 4   Q.   Now let's first go to 639.10.  What is this?
 5   A.   That's an aerial view of the Venice Airport.
 6   Q.   And on that picture can you identify where Huffman Aviation
 7   is and where Florida Flight Training Center is?
 8   A.   Yes.
 9   Q.   And I think if you just touch the screen with your finger and
10   circle the two locations, that might be the best way.
11   A.   This here is Huffman Aviation (indicating).  And on this area
12   over here is Florida Flight Training Center (indicating).
13   Q.   Okay.  And let's skip to MM-756.1 through .6.  What are we
14   looking at here, Agent, on 756.1?
15   A.   That's a photo of a Pan Am simulator for a Boeing 727.
16   Q.   Is that a 747 or a 727?
17   A.   That's a 727.
18   Q.   Okay.  Let's go to the next one.
19   A.   Also the inside of that same 727 photo.
20   Q.   And is this the simulator at Pan Am in Opa-Locka, Florida
21   that Atta and al-Shehhi trained at?
22   A.   It is a representative of it.  I can't say that it is the
23   exact same simulator, but it looks precisely like the one that
24   they trained on.
25   Q.   Have you been to the Pan Am Center at Opa-Locka?

 1   A.   Yes, I have.
 2   Q.   And did you see a simulator there?
 3   A.   Yes, I did.
 4   Q.   Let's go to the next one.
 5   A.   Again, that's an inside of the 727 simulator.
 6   Q.   And the next one.
 7   A.   Once again, another inside shot of the 727 flight simulator.
 8   Q.   757.1?
 9   A.   That's correct.
10   Q.   No, I am going to the next one, 757.1.
11   A.   Okay.  This, as you can see, is a Boeing 767 flight
12   simulator.
13   Q.   757.2.
14   A.   This is the inside of that same Boeing 767 flight simulator.
15   Q.   757.3.
16   A.   Once again, another inside photograph of the 767 flight
17   simulator.
18   Q.   And, finally, .5 -- or .4, excuse me.
19   A.   A shot from the ground of the Boeing 767 flight simulator.
20   Q.   Thank you.  Now, just so the record is clear, Agent, do you
21   know whether the pictures of the simulators we just looked at were
22   obtained from the Pan Am location in Opa-Locka, Florida?
23   A.   I do know, yes.
24   Q.   They were?
25   A.   Yes.

 1   Q.   Thank you.  Now, going back to the plot, stage 3, you have
 2   described as the remaining hijackers arrive.  Tell us what the FBI
 3   learned occurred in stage 3 of the 9/11 plot.
 4   A.   Three general things occurred in this stage.  One is the
 5   hijackers who were already in the United States positioned
 6   themselves to receive the remaining hijackers.  Secondly, those
 7   remaining hijackers arrived, and, thirdly, there was the emergence
 8   of a person who became known to the FBI as Mustafa Ahmed
 9   al-Hawsawi.
10             MR. MAC MAHON:  Your Honor, if I could, that was said so
11   quickly.  I hope that -- if we can just slow down with that name a
12   little bit, it sounds a lot like Mr. Moussaoui's name as well.  I
13   know it is a different person, but --
14             THE COURT:  Why don't we also spell the name so we get
15   that clear for the record.
17   Q.   The last name you mentioned was Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi,
18   which is, for the record, a-l-H-a-w-s-a-w-i.  Is that correct,
19   sir?
20   A.   That's correct.
21   Q.   Remind us again, in March of 2001, which hijackers are in the
22   United States and where are they?
23   A.   In March 2001, in Florida, we have three hijackers.  Looking
24   at the chart here you can see Ziad Jarrah, Marwal al-Shehhi, and
25   Mohamed Atta, all in the area of Florida.  Looking to the left in

 1   the area of Arizona, you have Nawaf al-Hazmi and Hani Hanjour.
 2   Q.   Now, at the end of that month, at the end of March of 2001,
 3   where did Hanjour and Nawaf al-Hazmi go from Arizona?
 4   A.   They left Arizona and came to the area of Alexandria,
 5   Virginia, right here.
 6   Q.   And there is a dot in Oklahoma on the map.  What does that
 7   signify?
 8   A.   That dot in Oklahoma signifies a speeding ticket.  Nawaf
 9   al-Hazmi received a speeding ticket while in Clinton, Oklahoma
10   traveling eastbound on Interstate 40.  That was on the 1st of
11   April.
12   Q.   Now, how does the FBI know that Hanjour and Nawaf al-Hazmi
13   were in Alexandria, Virginia at the end of March, early April
14   2000?
15   A.   By looking at financial documents obtained after September
16   11th, 2001.
17   Q.   Let's look at Government Exhibits BR-122A and UA-101A.  Tell
18   us what those are.
19   A.   The documents on the left are Bank of America documents from
20   Nawaf al-Hazmi, obtained after September 11th.  The documents on
21   the right are the United Arab Emirates Citibank records, and those
22   are of Hani Hanjour.  These are both for the activity occurring in
23   April of 2001.
24             Looking at the information which has been enlarged on
25   the left-hand side of the screen, you will see the name Nawaf

 1   al-Hazmi.  Below that you see a long rectangular box and it shows
 2   on April 4th of 2001 a cash withdrawal.  Here it is listed as a
 3   non-Bank of America ATM, and it has a code after that.  Looking
 4   just below that, you can see that code resolves back to an ATM
 5   right here in Alexandria, at 4651 King Street.
 6             Looking over to the right, the two enlargements from the
 7   UAE Citibank records for Hani Hanjour, you see Hanjour's name in a
 8   red box, and just below Hanjour's name you see, this is written
 9   first day, then month, for a cash withdrawal in Front Royal,
10   Virginia.  And then two days later on the 5th of April, a cash
11   withdrawal in Falls Church, Virginia.
12             THE COURT:  BR-122A and UA-101A are part of the large
13   exhibit?
14             MR. RASKIN:  Yes, they are, Your Honor.
15             THE COURT:  They are both in.
16             (Government's Exhibits Nos. BR-122A and UA-101A were
17   received in evidence.)
19   Q.   So in April 2001, where were these five hijackers?
20   A.   They were in two general areas; in Florida, southern Florida,
21   and in the area of Washington, D.C.
22   Q.   And in April 2001, is that when the other hijackers began to
23   arrive in the United States?
24   A.   Yes, it is.
25   Q.   Over what period of time did they arrive?

 1   A.   Between April 23rd of 2001 and May 4th -- excuse me, and July
 2   4th of 2001.
 3   Q.   And how many of them came to the United States during that
 4   period of time?
 5   A.   14.
 6   Q.   Where did they all depart from?
 7   A.   They all departed from Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates.
 8   Q.   How many of those 14 were citizens of the UAE?
 9   A.   Only one, and that was Fayez Ahmed.
10   Q.   To what parts of the United States did these 14 hijackers
11   travel to?
12   A.   They traveled to three general areas, to Florida, to the area
13   of Washington, D.C., and to the area of New York City.
14   Q.   Who were the first two of those 14 to come to the United
15   States, and when did they make that trip?
16   A.   The first two were Waleed al-Shehri, and Satam al-Suqami, and
17   they made that trip on the 23rd of April, 2001, traveling from
18   Dubai to Orlando, Florida.
19   Q.   And who was in the state of Florida at that time?
20   A.   Mohamed Atta, Ziad Jarrah, and Marwal al-Shehhi.
21   Q.   Who were the next two hijackers to come to the United States,
22   and when did they travel?
23   A.   The next two were Ahmed al-Ghamdi and Majed Moqed, and they
24   traveled on May 2nd, flying once again from Dubai, and this time
25   going to Washington, D.C.

 1   Q.   Who was in the Washington, D.C. area at the time?
 2   A.   Nawaf al-Hazmi and Hani Hanjour.
 3   Q.   Where did those four individuals travel after the arrival of
 4   Moqed and al-Ghamdi?
 5   A.   Up to the area of Patterson, New Jersey.
 6   Q.   And who were the next three hijackers to fly to the United
 7   States and when?
 8   A.   The next three were Hamza al-Ghamdi, Mohand al-Shehri, and
 9   Ahmed al-Nami.  They traveled on May 28th, flying once again from
10   Dubai to Miami, Florida.
11   Q.   Who were the next two to fly to the United States?
12   A.   Ahmed al-Haznawi and Wail al-Shehri.
13   Q.   Where did they fly to?
14   A.   Once again they left from Dubai in the United Arab Emirates,
15   and on the 8th of June they traveled to Miami, Florida.
16   Q.   After those two, who flew to the United States?
17   A.   Saeed al-Ghamdi and Fayez Ahmed, also known as Fayez
18   Banihammad.
19   Q.   Where did they fly to?
20   A.   They left from Dubai and traveled to Orlando, Florida.
21   Q.   Was the FBI able to obtain records from the travel you just
22   described?
23   A.   Yes.
24   Q.   We're looking at Government Exhibit A R-1659.  Tell us what
25   that document is.

 1   A.   This particular document is a business record.  It is an
 2   airline passenger name record.  An airline passenger name record
 3   is a document that airlines use to record a customer's name, a
 4   passenger contact number, sometimes payment information, and also
 5   flight information, also flight history information.
 6   Q.   And is this passenger name record related to Saeed al-Ghamdi?
 7   A.   Yes, it is.
 8   Q.   And what telephone number is listed as a contact for
 9   al-Ghamdi on this form?
10   A.   Al-Ghamdi listed a contact number of 050-520-9905.
11   Q.   And during the course of the investigation, did the FBI
12   determine who that telephone belongs to?
13   A.   Yes.
14   Q.   Who does it belong to?
15   A.   That telephone number is a UAE mobile telephone number, and
16   that belongs to an individual I have mentioned previously as
17   Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi.
18   Q.   Government Exhibit AR-1658.
19   A.   This is a similar document.  This particular one is for Fayez
20   Banihammad.  On this particular document he has his name listed,
21   he also has a passenger contact number.  That passenger contact
22   number is the same number, that 050-520-9905 number.
23             THE COURT:  AR-1658 and 59 are in.
24             (Government's Exhibits Nos. AR-1658 and AR-1659 were
25   received in evidence.)

 2   Q.   After Banihammad and al-Ghamdi flew to the United States, who
 3   were the next two hijackers to arrive?
 4   A.   The next two were Abdul Aziz Alomari and Salem al-Hazmi.
 5   Q.   When did they travel?
 6   A.   Just two days later, on the 29th of June, 2001.
 7   Q.   They flew to New York?
 8   A.   As you can see from the map, they flew to New York City.
 9   Q.   Was the FBI able to obtain passenger name records for these
10   two individuals?
11   A.   Yes.
12   Q.   Government Exhibit AR-1702.  Is that a PNR for Alomari?
13   A.   Yes, it is.
14   Q.   And what contact information is listed for Alomari on that
15   document?
16   A.   That same contact information, that 050-520-9905.  Once
17   again, that's a mobile telephone number in the United Arab
18   Emirates.  And that's a number that the FBI was able to ascribe to
19   Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi after September 11th.
20   Q.   And there are handwritten notations on this document.
21   Explain to us what that is.
22   A.   Those handwritten notations on that document are written by
23   an FBI agent taking notes on an original document after this
24   document was seized, after September 11th.
25   Q.   Government Exhibit AR-1701.

 1   A.   This particular document is a passenger name record for Salem
 2   al-Hazmi.  This is when al-Hazmi was traveling from Dubai to New
 3   York City.  And on this document Salem al-Hazmi has listed his
 4   passenger contact number as 050-520-9905.  Once again, the same
 5   number we have seen on three previous passenger name records.
 6             MR. RASKIN:  Your Honor, we would move those two
 7   documents in.
 8             THE COURT:  All right, they are in.
 9             (Government's Exhibits Nos. AR-1701 and AR-1702 were
10   received in evidence.)
12   Q.   And one hijacker still remained abroad.  Who was that?
13   A.   That was Khalid al-Midhar.
14   Q.   And when did he travel to the United States?
15   A.   On July 4th of 2001.
16   Q.   And remind us who Khalid al-Midhar is.
17   A.   Khalid al-Midhar is the individual who had originally arrived
18   with Nawaf al-Hazmi in Los Angeles and then San Diego, California.
19   He stayed in the United States for about five months and then
20   departed the United States in June of 2000.  He is the individual
21   who, if you will recall, flew back to Oman, about a year later,
22   what we're looking at now is when he is reentering the United
23   States.
24   Q.   Where did he go to?
25   A.   He flew to New York City.

 1   Q.   So in July of 2001 in what locations are the 19 hijackers
 2   from September 11th?
 3   A.   They are generally in two areas; Miami, Florida and
 4   Patterson, New Jersey.
 5   Q.   You mentioned as one of the hijackers, the 14 hijackers who
 6   flew to the United States in the summer of 2001, an individual
 7   named Fayez Banihammad.  What did Banihammad do in the United Arab
 8   Emirates before coming to the United States?
 9   A.   Two days before coming to the United States he opened up a
10   bank account at a bank called Standard Chartered Bank.
11   Q.   And that's Chartered, C-h-a-r-t-e-r-e-d?
12   A.   That's correct.
13   Q.   What branch of the Standard Chartered Bank did he open an
14   account at?
15   A.   The Dubai branch.
16   Q.   On what date?
17   A.   On the 25th of June, 2001.
18   Q.   Now, you mentioned Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi.  What accounts
19   did al-Hawsawi have at the Standard Chartered Bank?
20   A.   Al-Hawsawi opened up two accounts at Standard Chartered Bank,
21   one on June 24th, that's the day before Fayez Banihammad opened up
22   his account, and Mustafa al-Hawsawi opened up a second account the
23   next day, on the 25th of June.  Once again that's the same day
24   that Banihammad opened his account at Standard Chartered Bank.
25   Q.   And the FBI was able to obtain records from all three of

 1   those accounts?
 2   A.   Yes.
 3   Q.   And upon reviewing those records, what similarities did the
 4   FBI find between al-Hawsawi's accounts and Banihammad's account?
 5   A.   The FBI was able to determine that al-Hawsawi and Fayez
 6   Banihammad utilized the same post office box.  It was P.O. Box
 7   19738.
 8   Q.   After Banihammad came to the United States, what action did
 9   he take with respect to his Standard Chartered Bank account?
10   A.   Fayez Banihammad, once he was in the United States, wrote a
11   letter to his bank, the Standard Chartered Bank in Dubai, and
12   asked that the other individual that I have mentioned previously,
13   Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, be added as a signer to his account.
14   Q.   Let's take a look at the records that the FBI obtained from
15   these accounts, starting with Government Exhibit UA-455.1A.
16   A.   This is the first account that Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi
17   opened.  This was on the 24th of June of 2001.  You can see here
18   he lists a PO box of 19738.  Also his mobile telephone number.
19   This time he has it as 520-9905.  Once again, that same number.
20   Q.   Government Exhibit UA-455.1C.  What's that?
21   A.   This is the second account opened by Mustafa Ahmed
22   al-Hawsawi, this one on the 25th of June, 2001.  On this account
23   he has listed his name and also a mobile telephone number of
24   050-520-9905.
25   Q.   Government Exhibit UA-455.1B.

 1   A.   This is a photocopy of the passport of Mustafa al-Hawsawi.
 2   This photocopy was taken by the Standard Chartered Bank employees
 3   when they opened the account for him.  This is one of the ways
 4   that the FBI used after September 11th to positively identify
 5   Mustafa al-Hawsawi.
 6   Q.   Government Exhibit UA-455.2A.
 7   A.   This is the account opening document for the account that
 8   Fayez Ahmed, also known as Fayez Banihammad, opened in the UAE at
 9   Standard Chartered Bank on the 25th of June.
10   Q.   And what is listed on that account?
11   A.   Listed on this account is the PO box we have seen before,
12   19738.
13   Q.   Government Exhibit UA-455.3A.
14   A.   This is the letter that we spoke of before.  On this
15   particular letter, this is when Fayez Ahmed, also known as Fayez
16   Banihammad, is requesting the bank to add as a signer Mustafa
17   Ahmed, also known as Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi to his account.
18   Q.   All right.  That takes us to the fourth stage of the plot,
19   Agent Fitzgerald, and give us an overview of what we're going to
20   see happens during this stage.
21   A.   On this fourth stage of the plot, several things are
22   happening.  One is that the hijackers are taking what are called
23   rehearsal or dry-run flights.  The second thing that is happening
24   is that the hijackers are doing travel and telephone coordination.
25   And the third thing that happens during this phase is an

 1   individual named Mohamed al-Kahtani attempts to enter the United
 2   States.
 3             MR. RASKIN:  And before I move on, Your Honor, the
 4   exhibits that we listed there, I formally move them into evidence
 5   now.
 6             THE COURT:  The five exhibits, UA-455.1A, .1C, .1B, .2A
 7   and 3A are in.
 8             (Government Exhibit Nos. UA-455.1A, UA-455.1C,
 9   UA-455.1B, UA-455.2A and UA-455.3A were received in evidence.)
10             THE COURT:  Okay.
11             MR. RASKIN:  Thank you, Your Honor.
13   Q.   Directing your attention to the summer of 2001, did pilot
14   hijackers take cross-country flights, across the United States
15   flights?
16   A.   Yes.
17   Q.   And what did the FBI learn about those flights after
18   September 11th?
19   A.   The FBI learned after September 11th that they were similar
20   in several ways to the flights which were hijacked on September
21   11th.  For instance, they went from a major East Coast city to a
22   major West Coast city.  The type of planes that hijackers flew
23   were similar or the same as those that they later hijacked on
24   September 11th.
25             And, in other words, if a particular hijacker pilot

 1   hijacked a 757 or 767, that is the type of airplane that they flew
 2   across country.  Additionally, it was also learned that these
 3   hijacker pilots also traveled first class while they did so, same
 4   as many of them did on September 11th.
 5   Q.   Who was the first of the pilot hijackers to take such a
 6   flight in the summer of 2001?
 7   A.   The first pilot hijacker to take one of those flights was
 8   Marwal al-Shehhi, and he left on the 24th of May of 2001.
 9   Q.   And on the 24th of May, where did he leave from?
10   A.   From New York City.
11   Q.   Where did he go to?
12   A.   To Los Angeles, California.
13   Q.   Was that Los Angeles, California?
14   A.   Excuse me, San Francisco, California.
15   Q.   Where did he fly after San Francisco?
16   A.   To Las Vegas, Nevada.
17   Q.   How long did he stay there?
18   A.   Approximately three days.
19   Q.   And where did al-Shehhi go after Las Vegas?
20   A.   After Las Vegas he flew a reverse flight going back to San
21   Francisco and flying back to New York.
22   Q.   After al-Shehhi, which was the next of the pilot hijackers to
23   take a cross-country flight?
24   A.   The next one was Ziad Jarrah.
25   Q.   And did he leave from Baltimore, Maryland?

 1   A.   Yes, he did.
 2   Q.   What date was his flight and where did he go?
 3   A.   He left on the 7th of June, traveling from Baltimore across
 4   country, flying to Los Angeles, California and then to Las Vegas,
 5   Nevada.
 6   Q.   How long did he stay in Las Vegas, Nevada?
 7   A.   For approximately three days, until the 10th of June.
 8   Q.   What route did he take back to the East Coast?
 9   A.   He flew directly back to Baltimore.
10   Q.   After Jarrah, which was the next pilot hijacker to take a
11   cross-country flight?
12   A.   Mohamed Atta.
13   Q.   Where did he leave from?
14   A.   He left from Boston, Massachusetts on the 28th of June, 2001.
15   Q.   Where did he fly to?
16   A.   He flew to San Francisco, California and then to Las Vegas,
17   Nevada.
18   Q.   How long did he stay in Las Vegas?
19   A.   About three days.
20   Q.   And from Las Vegas, what was his route back to the East
21   Coast?
22   A.   Through Denver, into Boston, Massachusetts.
23   Q.   And, finally, the last of the pilot hijackers to take a
24   cross-country flight was Hani Hanjour; is that right?
25   A.   Yes.

 1   Q.   Where did he leave from?
 2   A.   He left from Dulles Airport flying cross-country to Los
 3   Angeles, California and connecting to Las Vegas, Nevada.
 4   Q.   And how long did he stay in Las Vegas?
 5   A.   Just one night.
 6   Q.   Where did he go after Las Vegas?
 7   A.   Leaving Las Vegas, he flew through Minneapolis and then back
 8   to Baltimore, Maryland.
 9   Q.   Now, during the course of the FBI's 9/11 investigation, did
10   the FBI determine that certain of the hijackers used prepaid
11   calling cards?
12   A.   Yes.
13   Q.   And just tell us what a prepaid calling card is in a general
14   manner.
15   A.   A prepaid calling card is similar to a store gift card in
16   that you can go and purchase one at a convenience store or at a
17   grocery store.  There is no subscriber information, so it is not
18   like a credit card or something that you would sign up for.
19   Q.   Now, how is a -- withdrawn.
20             In terms of an FBI investigation, how is it that the FBI
21   can identify a prepaid calling card with its user?
22   A.   The FBI is able to identify a prepaid calling card with its
23   user based upon calls that that calling card was used to make,
24   Number 1; Number 2, based upon where that phone card was used;
25   and, Number 3, based upon when that phone card was used, matching

 1   that up with the actions of a person that's already known.
 2   Q.   Now, was the FBI able to do what you just described to
 3   identify a particular calling card with Mohamed Atta?
 4   A.   Yes.
 5   Q.   Describe to us how the FBI was able to do that.
 6   A.   The FBI was able to do that, in this particular instance,
 7   after September 11th, the true name cellular telephone of Marwal
 8   al-Shehhi became known.  When those phone records were
 9   scrutinized, it was determined that someone with a calling card
10   called al-Shehhi's cell phone.
11             When we looked at those prepaid calling card records, we
12   were able to determine that this prepaid calling card was used in
13   New Jersey on the 4th of July, it was used in the area of Fort
14   Lauderdale, Florida on the 5th, 6th, and 7th of July, and then
15   that prepaid calling card was not used again until the 19th of
16   July.  And when it was used then it was used at the airport in
17   Atlanta, Georgia.
18             The timing and location of the use of that calling card
19   matched the activity of Mohamed Atta precisely.
20   Q.   And what was Atta's activity during that time?
21   A.   During the time I mentioned, Mohamed Atta was in the area of
22   Patterson, New Jersey on the 4th of July, 2001.  On that evening,
23   the evening of July 4th, he flew from Newark, New Jersey down to
24   Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
25             On the 5th, 6th, and 7th, Mohamed Atta was in the area

 1   of Fort Lauderdale, Florida.  On the 7th he left on an
 2   international trip, flying from Florida through Zurich,
 3   Switzerland to Madrid, Spain.
 4             Atta was gone for about two weeks and he returned on the
 5   19th of July, 2001.  When Atta returned, his connecting flight was
 6   through Atlanta, Georgia.  That flight went from Madrid to
 7   Atlanta, and then Atlanta down to Fort Lauderdale, Florida.  There
 8   were calls made from the airport in Atlanta, Georgia at the same
 9   time that Atta was known to be in the airport.
10   Q.   Now, what are we looking at at the top left-hand corner of
11   the screen now?
12   A.   The top left-hand corner is a representation of an AT&T
13   calling card.
14   Q.   And what is the number there?
15   A.   The 2109 is a representation of the pin number.  If you look
16   just to the right, that's the full pin number written out.
17   Q.   And has the FBI been able to determine who used that card
18   during the early part of July 2001?
19   A.   Yes.
20   Q.   And who was that?
21   A.   That was Mohamed Atta.
22   Q.   Okay.  And let's look at some of the activity on that card or
23   some of the calls made using that card, starting with July 4th.
24   A.   On July 4th from a New Jersey pay phone in northeast New
25   Jersey, a call was dialed to 9905, using that, once again, that

 1   particular calling card that I mentioned with the pin number
 2   ending in 22109.
 3   Q.   And remind us, again, whose number is that, the 9905 number?
 4   A.   That 9905, once again, is that number to Mustafa Ahmed
 5   al-Hawsawi.  That's the individual who we spoke of before who
 6   opened a bank account at Standard Chartered Bank in the United
 7   Arab Emirates.  He is also the one who received signing power over
 8   hijacker Fayez Banihammad's account.  And he is also the one, that
 9   same number, that 9905 number was referenced on the airline
10   records of four separate hijackers.
11   Q.   What's the next call?
12   A.   This is from a different New Jersey pay phone, once again, in
13   northeast New Jersey, again, calling two times to that 9905
14   number, a different pay phone, so the pay phones are moving
15   around, but they are in the same general area.  Once again, calls
16   to 9905.  Another pay phone, a fourth pay phone, an additional
17   call to 9905.
18             This is a call to Egypt from that same pay phone that
19   was used previously.  This particular call, it is noted that
20   Mohamed Atta is the only of the 19 hijackers from Egypt.
21   Q.   Where did Atta travel on the evening of July 4th?
22   A.   From Newark, New Jersey down to Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
23   Q.   Let's look at the calls on the 5th of July.
24   A.   The calls on the 5th of July you see from a pay phone in the
25   area of Fort Lauderdale, Florida.  Once again, it is the same

 1   calling card being used, and it is calling seven times to a German
 2   cell phone number.  Six additional calls from a separate pay phone
 3   to a German cell phone number.  Here is a call to the true named
 4   cell phone of Marwal al-Shehhi, and this is how the FBI was able
 5   to locate this calling card to begin with, is when we dumped the
 6   records of this particular cell phone, the FBI was able to
 7   determine this calling card was used to call it, so that's how we
 8   actually obtained the information.
 9             Seven additional calls from a separate pay phone in
10   Florida, are calling this German cell phone number.  Three
11   additional calls from a separate pay phone in Florida calling this
12   German cell phone number.
13   Q.   And on July 6th?
14   A.   On July 6th, once again, a pay phone in the Fort Lauderdale
15   area being used three times to call this German cell phone number.
16   Three additional calls to this German cell phone from a different
17   pay phone in Fort Lauderdale.  Once again a third pay phone in
18   Fort Lauderdale calling two times.  Seven additional calls from
19   yet another pay phone.  Here is one call, once again to this 9905,
20   that's the Mustafa al-Hawsawi number from a different pay phone in
21   Florida.
22             Additional call to 9905, again, from a separate pay
23   phone in Florida.  Three more calls to that 9905 number, again
24   from a separate pay phone.  One additional call from another pay
25   phone.  And now five calls to that German cell phone number that I

 1   mentioned previously.  23 calls from a separate pay phone to that
 2   German cellular telephone number.  One call, this number that you
 3   can see represented here, 561-369-2600, is a number to the Homing
 4   Inn in the area of Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
 5             At this particular time hijacker Hamza al-Ghamdi was a
 6   registered guest of the Homing Inn, and there were also two
 7   additional hijackers staying with him at the time, although their
 8   names were not listed on the hotel information sheet.
 9   Q.   And July 7th.
10   A.   July 7th from a Fort Lauderdale pay phone, one call to this
11   German cell phone number.  A different pay phone calling this
12   German cell phone number again two separate times.  Five more
13   calls from a different pay phone.
14   Q.   Remind us where Mohamed Atta traveled to on July 7th.
15   A.   On the 7th Atta left Florida, flew through Zurich,
16   Switzerland and went to Madrid, Spain, arriving in Spain the next
17   day on the 8th.
18   Q.   When did he return to the United States?
19   A.   On the 19th of July, 2001.
20   Q.   Was there any activity on this calling card between the 7th
21   and the 19th?
22   A.   No, there was not.
23   Q.   Let's look at the activity on the 19th.
24   A.   Here is a call from a Georgia pay phone.  This particular
25   Georgia pay phone is a pay phone in the Atlanta Airport in

 1   Atlanta, Georgia.  Here is another call from a separate pay phone,
 2   once again in Atlanta Airport.  This is calling, again, Marwal
 3   al-Shehhi's true named cellular telephone.
 4             And, finally, two additional calls, this is to a new
 5   German cell phone number, and once again it is using the same
 6   prepaid calling card.  And it is from another pay phone at the
 7   Atlanta Airport in Atlanta, Georgia.
 8   Q.   Now, has the FBI been able to compare the times of these
 9   calls with the times that Atta's flight to Atlanta arrived and the
10   time he departed from the Atlanta Airport?
11   A.   Yes.
12   Q.   And what did you learn from that comparison?
13   A.   We learned that the time that Atta arrived in the airport
14   coincides with the calls that we see here.
15   Q.   Let me ask you a couple questions about the FBI's
16   investigation into Mohamed Atta's trip to Spain.  What did you
17   learn about Mohamed Atta's travel to Spain?
18   A.   The FBI learned that Mohamed Atta arrived in Spain on the 8th
19   of July.  He spent one night in Madrid, and thereafter he rented a
20   car and is known to have traveled to the East Coast of Spain to
21   the area of Tarragona, Spain, where he spent probably about the
22   next nine days, roughly, nine or ten days.
23   Q.   Remind us who Ramzi Bin al-Shibh is.
24   A.   Ramzi Bin al-Shibh is the individual that I spoke of earlier.
25   He is the one that I mentioned had tried on four separate

 1   occasions to obtain a U.S. visa.  He is also the individual who
 2   had applied to the Florida Flight Training Center on one occasion.
 3             He is also the individual who I mentioned had similar or
 4   the same phone number and addresses as several of the hijackers,
 5   including Mohamed Atta, Marwal al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah.
 6   Q.   Now, what did the FBI learn about Ramzi Bin al-Shibh's
 7   whereabouts during this same period in July?
 8   A.   The FBI learned Ramzi Bin al-Shibh left Hamburg, Germany and
 9   flew to the area of Tarragona, Spain on the 9th of July, arriving
10   there about the same time as Atta was arriving on the East Coast
11   of Spain.
12             Ramzi Bin al-Shibh stayed in the area of Tarragona,
13   Spain for roughly about a week.  He left there on the 16th of July
14   and flew back to Hamburg, Germany.
15   Q.   And Tarragona is where Atta was?
16   A.   Yes, that's correct.
17   Q.   Now, during the course of the investigation did the FBI
18   become familiar with an individual named Mohammed al-Kahtani,
19   which is al-K-a-h-t-a-n-i?
20   A.   Yes.
21   Q.   How did the FBI become familiar with that name?
22   A.   The FBI became familiar with that name because Mohammed
23   al-Kahtani attempted to enter the United States on August 4th of
24   with 2001.  When he attempted to enter, he was pulled into
25   secondary and talked to by INS and customs inspectors.  They found

 1   him to be hostile and deceptive.
 2             He was traveling on a one-way ticket, and he had a small
 3   amount of money, barely enough to pay for a return ticket.  He was
 4   subsequently denied entry into the United States and put on the
 5   next flight back to the United Arab Emirates.
 6   Q.   Now, was the FBI able to obtain a copy of his itinerary from
 7   the customs officials who interviewed al-Kahtani?
 8   A.   Yes.
 9   Q.   Government Exhibit OG-1051.  Tell us what that is.
10   A.   This is one of the documents that the customs inspector
11   photocopied when he was interviewing Mohammed al-Kahtani.  This is
12   a copy of his travel itinerary, which is very similar to an
13   airline passenger name record.  It lists the name, the contact
14   number, which you can see here is 050-520-9905, once again, that
15   same United Arab Emirates number associated with Mustafa
16   al-Hawsawi.
17   Q.   Now, tell us precisely when al-Kahtani arrived at the airport
18   in Orlando and when he was turned away.
19   A.   Al-Kahtani arrived at approximately 5:37 p.m.  And he was
20   sent back roughly at around 8:30 that night.
21   Q.   During that period of time what did the FBI learn about
22   Mohamed Atta's whereabouts?
23   A.   The FBI learned that Mohamed Atta was at the airport at the
24   same time.
25   Q.   And how did the FBI learn that?

 1   A.   The FBI learned that because when the FBI looked at the
 2   rental, car rental records for the rental cars used by Mohamed
 3   Atta and then matched those against the airport garage records,
 4   the FBI was able to determine that the car rented by Mohamed Atta
 5   entered the Orlando Airport garage at about 4:18 p.m., just before
 6   the scheduled arrival flight of al-Kahtani, and then Atta's car
 7   left at 9:04 p.m., just a short time after the scheduled departure
 8   flight, once al-Kahtani was refused entry into the United States.
 9   Q.   Agent Fitzgerald, why don't you take us through what's on the
10   screen now, which is a time line of sorts.
11   A.   As I just mentioned, if you look at the top of the chart you
12   can see at 4:18 p.m., the vehicle rented by Atta enters the
13   Orlando Airport parking garage.
14             The next two blocks of time reflect calling card calls.
15   These calling card calls are using a prepaid calling card and they
16   are from the terminal B pay phone.  This particular terminal B pay
17   phone was at the baggage claim at Orlando International Airport.
18             Once again that 9905 number is that number of
19   al-Hawsawi's, and that's that same number that was on the travel
20   itinerary of Mohamed al-Kahtani.  Looking at the next two blocks
21   of time, you can see that's when Virgin Atlantic Flight 15 was
22   scheduled to arrive and its actual arrival time.  Shortly
23   thereafter, al-Kahtani goes through INS screening and is pulled
24   into secondary.
25             About two hours later, roughly, we have two more calling

 1   card calls, these are also to that 9905 number, once again that
 2   al-Hawsawi number back in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and these
 3   are from a terminal B pay phone.  This time these pay phones are
 4   by the security area.  So the initial calls were by baggage and
 5   these calls are now from the security area.
 6             As you can see finally here at 8:25, that's the
 7   scheduled departure time of the flight that al-Kahtani was put
 8   back on when he was sent back to the United Arab Emirates.  And
 9   finally Atta's car departs about a half hour after that.
10             THE COURT:  Mr. Raskin, just to make sure we're crystal
11   clear, there is an alternate spelling for this person's last name
12   in the records of this case, correct?
13             MR. RASKIN:  There are a number of spellings.
14             THE COURT:  It's a "Q-U" rather than with a K?
15             MR. RASKIN:  That is correct, Your Honor.
16             THE COURT:  All right.  I'm sorry, Exhibit OG-01051, any
17   objection, Mr. MacMahon?
18             MR. MAC MAHON:  No objection, Your Honor.
19             THE COURT:  It is in.
20             (Government's Exhibit No. OG-01051 was received in
21   evidence.)
23   Q.   Now, remind us again what areas of the United States the 19
24   hijackers are in in the summer of 2001.
25   A.   They are generally in two areas; Patterson, New Jersey and

 1   Miami, Florida.
 2   Q.   Did hijackers of those, of among those 19 -- among those 19
 3   hijackers, did any of the individuals fly from, fly between those
 4   two points?
 5   A.   Yes, they did.
 6   Q.   And who were they?
 7   A.   They were Nawaf al-Hazmi, Mohamed Atta, Ziad Jarrah, and then
 8   two other hijackers, Ahmed al-Ghamdi and Abdul Aziz Alomari.
 9   Q.   Now, who was the first to take a flight between the north and
10   south of the eastern seaboard?
11   A.   The first to take a flight down is Nawaf al-Hazmi.  And
12   that's in June of 2001.  You can see here from the chart on June
13   19th of 2001, al-Hazmi flies from Newark, New Jersey down to
14   Miami, Florida.  He is there for roughly about a week.  While in
15   Florida he obtains a Florida driver's license and flies back on
16   the 25th from Miami up to Newark, New Jersey.
17   Q.   And what are we looking at now?
18   A.   These are the travel details of Mohamed Atta.  Atta made
19   roughly three trips back and forth between Florida and Newark, New
20   Jersey.  On this particular flight he is flying from Boston down
21   to New York.  As you can see, he is in the area for about three
22   days.
23             On the 4th of July, he flies from Newark, New Jersey
24   down to Fort Lauderdale.  While in the Patterson, New Jersey area
25   at that time, Atta obtained an identification card at a place

 1   called Appolo International Travel.  Six other hijackers also
 2   obtained ID cards from Appolo International Travel from that same
 3   location during the month of July.
 4   Q.   And this is another trip of Mohamed Atta?
 5   A.   Yes, this reflects two trips.  It reflects a trip in late
 6   July from July 26th to July 30th when Atta flew from Fort
 7   Lauderdale to Newark and then back.  And it also reflects the
 8   first leg of a trip when he flew from -- correction, flew up to
 9   Newark, New Jersey from Fort Lauderdale on the 7th of August.
10   Q.   And this is Ahmed al-Ghamdi and Abdul Aziz Alomari?
11   A.   Yes.  Now, Ahmed al-Ghamdi and Abdul Aziz Alomari, they were
12   located in the Newark, New Jersey area in August.  On August 9th,
13   they flew down and stayed in Florida with the other hijackers down
14   there.
15   Q.   And this is another trip by Mohamed Atta?
16   A.   Yes.  As you can see from this trip, Atta flies from Fort
17   Lauderdale to Newark.  He is up there for roughly about five days.
18   He makes his way down to Baltimore, presumably by vehicle, and
19   flies from Baltimore down to Fort Lauderdale about five days later
20   on the 28th of August.
21   Q.   And finally Ziad Jarrah you mentioned also took one of these
22   trips?
23   A.   Yes, on the 27th of August, Ziad Jarrah flew from Fort
24   Lauderdale up to Baltimore, Maryland.
25   Q.   Now, based on the FBI's investigation, did the 19 hijackers

 1   engage in conduct similar to one another during the course of
 2   their stay in the United States?
 3   A.   Yes.
 4   Q.   And why don't you describe what those similarities were.
 5   A.   There are a number of different similarities.  A number of
 6   hijackers obtained a passport within a year of entering the United
 7   States.  A number of hijackers, once they were in the United
 8   States, obtained or utilized post office boxes.
 9             Many of the hijackers utilized e-mail accounts and
10   publicly available computers.  Other hijackers -- many of the
11   hijackers obtained fitness training and utilized gyms and some
12   took martial arts training while in the United States.
13             Other hijackers purchased short-bladed knives.  Some,
14   the pilots, as we have mentioned, took simulator training.  And
15   yet other hijackers purchased aviation-related materials, whether
16   they were videos or CDs or cockpit posters or things of that
17   nature.
18   Q.   Now, tell us what we're looking at here, Agent, down the
19   left-hand column?
20   A.   The 19 hijackers are listed down the left-hand column.
21   Q.   And across the top?
22   A.   Across the top are those characteristics that we just
23   mentioned.
24   Q.   And let's take a look at the column on the left-hand side.
25   What do the X's indicate?

 1   A.   Those X's indicate a hijacker who obtained a new passport
 2   within a year of arriving in the United States.
 3   Q.   And going across, left to right, PO boxes?
 4   A.   In the PO box column, it indicates that a hijacker either
 5   subscribed to or utilized a PO box.  In one specific instance,
 6   after September 11th, the FBI was able to execute a search warrant
 7   at a place called The Mail Depot.  That was in Norfolk, Virginia.
 8   At The Mail Depot, Mohamed Atta and Marwal al-Shehhi had rented a
 9   mailbox.  The FBI was able to obtain documents and records from
10   that mailbox which furthered the investigation.
11             Some of those records included bank statements, car
12   insurance documents, Sporty's catalogues, and things of that
13   nature.
14   Q.   Moving across, fitness training, what do the X's indicate?
15   A.   X's indicate those hijackers which obtained some sort of
16   fitness training while in the United States.  And what that
17   indicates is a specific visit to a gym, somewhere around the area
18   where they reside, around the area where they were residing, such
19   as the Fort Lauderdale area, for those hijackers down there or
20   other hijackers went to gyms around the Newark, New Jersey area.
21   Q.   Agent Fitzgerald, after September 11th, how did the FBI
22   determine which of the hijackers trained at gyms in the Florida
23   area?
24   A.   The FBI was able to determine where many of the hijackers
25   trained by conducting canvasses of the area.

 1   Q.   And what is a canvass?
 2   A.   By canvassing the area, once the FBI was able to determine
 3   that hijackers went to gyms in the Miami and Fort Lauderdale and
 4   Newark areas, agents from those field offices fanned out to the
 5   different gyms and fitness centers and martial arts centers around
 6   that area and carrying photographs of the known or suspected
 7   hijackers and showing them to individuals to attempt to determine
 8   if anyone saw them and be able to place them at a specific
 9   location and time.
10   Q.   And the e-mail and computer column, what do the X's signify
11   there?
12   A.   Those X's signify those hijackers who either had or utilized
13   an e-mail account, either a Travelocity account or a Yahoo account
14   or Hotmail account or things of that nature.  A number of the
15   hijackers utilized cyber cafes and also places like Kinko's when
16   where they are able to go and anonymously in many cases rent
17   Internet time, so they can get on the Internet and surf for
18   flights or whatever other activity they were conducting there.
19   Q.   Now, was the FBI able to determine that hijackers used
20   e-mails and computers or was it also able to obtain some of the
21   communication that they engaged in in utilizing e-mail and
22   computer?
23   A.   The FBI was able to obtain some of the records from the
24   e-mail accounts.  As we all know, these records are very
25   perishable.  Places like Hotmail only keep records usually for

 1   about 30 days.
 2             MR. MAC MAHON:  Your Honor, I object.  If he is going to
 3   testify to what they actually found, that's one thing.  If he is
 4   going to try to explain why they couldn't find other things,
 5   that's not appropriate for a summary witness.
 6             THE COURT:  Well, I think an experienced investigator
 7   can certainly testify as to methods of evidence, collection, and
 8   problems that arise with them, as long as he knows this of his own
 9   knowledge.  So I am going to overrule the objection.  Go ahead,
10   Mr. Raskin.
12   Q.   You can continue.
13   A.   In this specific case the FBI was able to look at the Hotmail
14   accounts, Yahoo accounts, and Travelocity accounts of these
15   hijackers and determined that although they surfed the Internet
16   and in some cases purchased tickets and things of that nature,
17   tried to make travel arrangements, we could not determine any
18   communication between the hijackers on these e-mail accounts.
19   Q.   Why was that?
20   A.   One of two reasons.  Either, A, they didn't communicate or B,
21   there were no records that we were able to obtain to show that
22   they communicated.
23   Q.   The next column is labeled short blade knives.  Does this
24   indicate hijackers the FBI was able to determine purchased short
25   blade knives?

 1   A.   Yes, those five individuals there, the FBI was able to obtain
 2   some record of those specific hijackers purchasing a short-bladed
 3   knife.  And by short-bladed knife, I would term that a knife with
 4   a blade length of four inches or less or something that would be
 5   able to pass through security before September 11th of 2001.
 6   Q.   Why would a knife of four inches or less be able to pass
 7   through airport security prior to September 11th?
 8   A.   At that time that was acceptable via FAA regulations to be
 9   carried aboard an aircraft.
10   Q.   When did Atta purchase his knife or knives?
11   A.   Atta bought two knives, two Swiss Army-type knives during his
12   trip to Spain.  In fact, he left Florida, he flew to Zurich,
13   Switzerland.  While in Zurich, he purchased two knives at a
14   duty-free shop, two Swiss Army knives and continued his travel.
15   Q.   Moving across, we have already seen that four individuals
16   took jet simulator training.  These are the four pilots?
17   A.   Yes, that's correct.
18   Q.   And the last column, what do the X's signify there?
19   A.   Those X's signify those hijackers who purchased some sort of
20   aviation material, whether it was a large jet aviation video, in
21   other words, for a 747, 757, something of that nature, or a CD, CD
22   for a 737, or cockpit charts.  Those would be large charts which
23   exactly replicate the control panel of a 757.
24   Q.   Now, apart from what's on this chart, Agent Fitzgerald, what
25   other similar characteristics did the hijackers exhibit while they

 1   were in the United States?
 2   A.   There are a number of other similarities.  One is many of the
 3   hijackers obtained drivers licenses or state ID cards.  A second
 4   is the hijackers used prepaid calling cards as we spoke of earlier
 5   and almost always used them in conjunction with pay phones.
 6             A number of the hijackers expressed an interest in GPS.
 7   In fact, one individual even purchased a GPS.  And also hijackers
 8   also often sent money via Western Union transfer, even though they
 9   had bank accounts available.
10   Q.   In conducting their daily activities in the United States,
11   did the hijackers generally engage in business transactions in
12   their true names or in aliases?
13   A.   Generally in their true names.
14   Q.   And if Mr. Wood could hand the witness Government Exhibit
15   OG-13, please.
16             THE COURT:  Mr. MacMahon, is there any objection to
17   OG-13?
18             MR. MAC MAHON:  No, Your Honor, there is no objection.
19             THE COURT:  All right.  It is in.
20             (Government Exhibit No. OG-13 was received in evidence.)
22   Q.   Do you have it, sir?
23             MR. RASKIN:  Oh, I'm sorry, Mr. Wood.
25   Q.   Agent Fitzgerald, that chart is in evidence.  Please tell us

 1   what it is.
 2   A.   This is termed a hijackers true name usage chart.  It is for
 3   the year of 2001.  And these are instances when the hijackers
 4   either conducted some sort of financial transaction or checked
 5   into a hotel or rented a car and used their true name while doing
 6   so.
 7   Q.   That is during the period of 2001?
 8   A.   That's correct.
 9   Q.   Now, I am going to ask Mr. Wood to hand you four other charts
10   as well, which are Government Exhibits OG-14, 15, 16, and 19.
11             THE COURT:  Any objection to those four charts?
12             MR. MAC MAHON:  No, Your Honor.
13             THE COURT:  All right.  14, 15, 16, and 19 are in.
14             (Government Exhibit Nos. OG-14, OG-15, OG-16, OG-19 were
15   received in evidence.)
16             MR. MAC MAHON:  Excuse us, Your Honor, I'm sorry.
17             THE COURT:  Go ahead.
18             MR. MAC MAHON:  No objection, Your Honor.  Thank you.
20   Q.   If you would just take a look at OG-19, please, and if you
21   can put that on the screen.
22             THE COURT:  Counsel, while it is being done, on page 121
23   of your exhibit list, I don't see 19 listed.  Is that an
24   oversight?
25             MR. RASKIN:  It is probably an oversight because we

 1   added it only in the last couple of days, so what we need to do is
 2   maybe get the court an amended exhibit list.
 3             THE COURT:  Right.  Did you add anything else in the
 4   last few days too?
 5             MR. RASKIN:  We may have, Your Honor, so we will
 6   double-check that.
 7             THE COURT:  I want an amended list.
 9   Q.   Agent Fitzgerald, taking a look at OG-19, can you tell us
10   what the middle column signifies?
11   A.   Under the middle column it says prior passport, and below
12   that are the reasons how the FBI is able to articulate a person
13   would have had to have a prior passport.  For example, looking at
14   the first individual, Marwal al-Shehhi, we see in the second
15   column it says traveled to Germany and then it says new passport
16   issued, 2 January of 2000.
17             What that indicates is that the FBI has knowledge that
18   al-Shehhi traveled to Germany in 1999 and, in fact, multiple times
19   before then, and yet still received a new passport in 2000.  So
20   that prior passport column indicates reasons why the FBI knows
21   that an individual has had a prior passport as opposed to a first
22   passport.
23   Q.   Okay.  And then the column on the right?
24   A.   The column on the right indicates that the date that the new
25   passport, the second or in some cases third passport was issued.

 1   Q.   Okay.  And if we can just move on to OG-16.  And you can just
 2   tell us what that is.
 3   A.   Sure.  This is a summary chart indicating hijackers along the
 4   left-hand side and along the middle column it indicates dates of
 5   gym membership, and finally on the third column, the gym that they
 6   attended.  So it is a summary chart indicating where fitness
 7   training was conducted by a particular hijacker.
 8   Q.   And OG-15.
 9   A.   OG-15 is a summary chart indicating knives that were found
10   with or purchased by hijackers.  Specifically, looking at the top
11   knife, you see the name Mohamed Atta.  Looking over to the far
12   right you see a replica photo, that's not the actual knife, but it
13   is a photo of a similar knife or of the same model of knife.
14             We did not actually recover this knife.  However, those
15   are the knives that I mentioned previously when Atta traveled
16   through Zurich, Switzerland.  And I stated that he bought two
17   knives.  This was, these two here are the types of knives he
18   purchased.  We never recovered them but we know what type he
19   bought.  This is a representation of the type of knives he bought.
20             If you look down at the very bottom where it says
21   folding knife, that's actually a knife that was recovered in the
22   luggage of Mohamed Atta.
23   Q.   And is that the luggage that you spoke of previously that was
24   recovered at Logan Airport?
25   A.   Yes, it is.

 1   Q.   And I believe there is a second page to this chart.  Tell us
 2   what we're seeing there.
 3   A.   What you are seeing here is from the first two columns here,
 4   Marwal al-Shehhi, these are, once again, photos, not of the actual
 5   knives but we know he purchased those two types of knives, so
 6   that's a representation of that.
 7             Looking down a little bit further you see Nawaf
 8   al-Hazmi's name and a photo of a Leatherman.  Once again, we
 9   didn't recover that but we know that's the type of knife that he
10   purchased.
11   Q.   Okay.  And finally OG-14.  If you can zoom in on that
12   maybe -- or maybe not.  Okay.
13             What are we looking at here, Agent Fitzgerald?
14   A.   This is a summary chart of purchases made by hijackers at
15   Sporty's Pilot Shop.  That's an aviation catalogue company.
16   Q.   And that brings us to three other exhibits, Mr. Wood,
17   FO-8004, 5, and 6.
18             MR. MAC MAHON:  No objection, Your Honor.
19             THE COURT:  All right.  All three of those are in.
20             (Government Exhibit Nos. FO-8004, FO-8005, FO-8006 were
21   received in evidence.)
23   Q.   Agent Fitzgerald, if you would, just pull those exhibits out
24   of their folders and just tell us what they are, please.
25   A.   I just mentioned Sporty's Catalogue Company.  These items

 1   that I have here before me are the actual Sporty's catalogues.
 2   These particular ones were seized via a search warrant.  I
 3   mentioned previously when the FBI was conducting an investigation
 4   after September 11th, we conducted the search at a place called
 5   Mail Depot in Norfolk, Virginia.  These items here were among the
 6   items that were seized from that Post Office Box.
 7   Q.   Now, with Mr. Wood's assistance, I will hand you MM-607,
 8   MM-1123, and 1123P and MM-113.
 9             MR. MAC MAHON:  No objection to those either, Your
10   Honor.
11             THE COURT:  All right.  Those four exhibits are in.
12             (Government Exhibit Nos. MM-607, MM-1123, MM-1123P,
13   MM-113 were received in evidence.)
15   Q.   If we can pull those up on the screen, Agent, you can tell us
16   what they are.
17   A.   Okay.  This actually has a reverse side to this, if you can
18   pull that one up.
19   Q.   There we go.  What are we looking at on MM-607 on the reverse
20   side?
21   A.   On the reverse side, this is a photocopy of the international
22   student identity card of Mohamed Atta.  This was obtained from the
23   business records of Huffman Aviation after September 11th.  And it
24   is a card that was issued to Mohamed Atta in September of 1999.
25   Q.   And 1123?

 1   A.   Once again, this is a document from a rental application.
 2   And if you can flip the document over on the reverse side of the
 3   rental application is an image of a student identity card.  This
 4   is the student identity card of Ziad Jarrah.
 5             As you can see here this one was issued in September of
 6   2000.  And this was from the documents obtained by the FBI from
 7   this rental application of Ziad Jarrah after September 11th, 2001.
 8   Q.   And MM-113.  What's that?
 9   A.   This is from a rental application of Mohamed Atta and Marwal
10   al-Shehhi when they rented their house in a place called 516
11   Laurel Road in Nokomis, Florida.  At that time when Marwal
12   al-Shehhi was required to provide identification, he also provided
13   an international student identity card.  This one here, which was
14   issued in Hamburg, Germany, and was issued in September of 1999.
15   Q.   And that Laurel Road address, was that where Atta and
16   al-Shehhi stayed during at least part of the training they were
17   getting at Huffman Aviation?
18   A.   Yes, it is, almost the entire time.
19             MR. RASKIN:  Okay.  Thank you, Gerard.
21   Q.   Now, going back to the hijackers' plot, that takes us to
22   stage 5, and you have described that stage as the final
23   preparations.  Explain what preparations the FBI learned were
24   taken during the latter part of the plot.
25   A.   There were three general final preparations that the

 1   hijackers had to conduct.  Number 1 is they had to reserve their
 2   tickets for September 11th.  Number 2 is they had to move from the
 3   areas which they were in, generally Florida and New Jersey, and
 4   they had to get to the areas from which they launched their
 5   attack.
 6             The third thing that they had to do is send the excess
 7   money they had back to coconspirator Mustafa al-Hawsawi, back in
 8   the United Arab Emirates.
 9   Q.   Over what period of time did the 19 hijackers reserve tickets
10   for the flights they would hijack on September 11th?
11   A.   Over seven consecutive days, starting on the 25th of August,
12   2001.
13   Q.   Who reserved their tickets on the 25th of August?
14   A.   Khalid al-Midhar and Majed Moqed.  As you can see, Khalid
15   al-Midhar and Majed Moqed reserved their tickets for American
16   Airlines Flight 77.  American Airlines Flight 77 was the flight
17   that took off from Dulles Airport and later crashed into the
18   Pentagon.
19   Q.   On the 26th?
20   A.   On the 26th, the brothers Wail and Waleed al-Shehri reserved
21   their tickets for American Airlines Flight 11.  Flight 11 was the
22   flight that left from Boston's Logan Airport and crashed into the
23   North Tower of the World Trade Center.
24   Q.   The next day?
25   A.   The next day, on August 27th, the brothers Nawaf al-Hazmi and

 1   Salem al-Hazmi, both reserved their tickets for American Airlines
 2   Flight 77, also Saeed al-Ghamdi and Ahmed al-Nami reserved their
 3   tickets for Flight 93.  Flight 93 was the flight that took off
 4   from Newark, New Jersey and was forced to crash in Stonycreek
 5   Township in Pennsylvania.
 6             Finally, Fayez Banihammad and Mohand al-Shehri reserved
 7   their tickets for American Airlines flight -- or correction, for
 8   United Airlines Flight 175.  That's the flight that took off from
 9   Boston's Logan Airport and was crashed into the South Tower of the
10   World Trade Center.
11   Q.   And on August 28th?
12   A.   Mohamed Atta and Abdul Aziz Alomari booked their tickets on
13   American Airlines.com.  Also that day Satam al-Suqami reserved his
14   tickets for American Airlines Flight 11, also pilot Marwal
15   al-Shehhi, hijacker pilot Marwal al-Shehhi, reserved his ticket
16   for United Airlines Flight 175 on the 28th of August.
17   Q.   August 29th?
18   A.   On the 29th, Hamza al-Ghamdi and Ahmed al-Ghamdi reserved
19   their tickets for 175.  Additionally, Ahmed al-Haznawi reserved
20   his ticket for United Airlines Flight 93.
21   Q.   August 30th?
22   A.   Hijacker pilot of Flight 93 Ziad Jarrah reserved his ticket.
23   Q.   And on the 31st?
24   A.   Hijacker pilot Hani Hanjour reserved his ticket for American
25   Airlines Flight 77 in New Jersey.

 1   Q.   Now, you also mentioned that the 19 hijackers had to travel
 2   to the cities from which they would ultimately board the planes
 3   that they hijacked on September 11th.  Tell us from what cities
 4   they traveled and where they went, flight by flight.
 5   A.   Flight by flight, for Flight 11, American Airlines Flight 11,
 6   those hijackers were in the area of Miami, Fort Lauderdale,
 7   Florida.  They had to travel up to Boston.
 8             The hijackers for United Airlines Flight 175 at this
 9   time of late August were also in Florida.  They had to travel up
10   to the area of Boston, Massachusetts.
11             American Airlines Flight 77 hijackers by this time had
12   already relocated to the area of Laurel, Maryland, so they really
13   didn't have to travel.  They were already in the area of
14   Washington, D.C.
15             And, finally, the hijackers of United Airlines Flight 93
16   were also in the Miami, Fort Lauderdale area.  They had to
17   relocate to the Newark, New Jersey area from which to launch their
18   attack.
19   Q.   Over what period of time did the hijackers of Flights 11 and
20   175 travel from Florida to Boston?
21   A.   Over five consecutive days.
22   Q.   Who was the -- who were the first to travel that route?
23   A.   Wail and Waleed al-Shehri on the 5th of September.
24   Q.   And who were the next two?
25   A.   On the 6th of September, Abdul Aziz Alomari and Satam

 1   al-Suqami.
 2   Q.   And the next two?
 3   A.   Hamza al-Ghamdi and Ahmed al-Ghamdi.
 4   Q.   And the next two?
 5   A.   Fayez Ahmed, also known as Fayez Banihammad, and Mohand
 6   al-Shehri.
 7   Q.   And when did Marwal al-Shehhi travel to Boston?
 8   A.   He traveled to Boston on the 9th of September, 2001.
 9   Q.   Now, there is one hijacker of Flight 11 who is not pictured
10   on the screen.  Who is that?
11   A.   That's Mohamed Atta.
12   Q.   And when did he make the trip up to Boston?
13   A.   He flew up later, on the 9th of September 2001.
14   Q.   Okay.  Who are we looking at on the screen now?
15   A.   These are the hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77.
16   Q.   And now?
17   A.   And those are the hijackers of United Airlines Flight 93.
18   Q.   They flew to New Jersey.  When did they do that?
19   A.   They did that on the 7th of September, 2001.
20   Q.   And as you mentioned, Mohamed Atta was the last to travel
21   north.  What route did he take?
22   A.   He flew from Fort Lauderdale to Baltimore.  He stayed there
23   for approximately two days from the 7th to the 9th.  And on the
24   9th he flew from Baltimore up to Boston, Massachusetts.
25   Q.   How long did Atta stay in Boston?

 1   A.   Just one night.
 2   Q.   And where did he go on the 10th?
 3   A.   On the 10th, Atta and Abdul Aziz Alomari drove from Boston up
 4   to Portland, Maine.  And from Portland, Maine the next morning
 5   they took a connecting flight down to American Airlines Flight 11.
 6   Q.   Now, with Mr. Wood's assistance, I would like you to take a
 7   look at Government Exhibits FO-7011 and FO-7021 through 24.
 8             THE COURT:  Any objection to those exhibits?
 9             MR. MAC MAHON:  No objection, Your Honor.
10             THE COURT:  FO-7011 and 7021 through 24 are in.
11             (Government Exhibit Nos. FO-7011 and FO-7021 through
12   FO-7024 were received in evidence.)
14   Q.   If we can put 7011 on the screen, please.  Agent Fitzgerald,
15   what and who is depicted on this exhibit?
16   A.   This is a photograph from a security camera at the Portland
17   Jetport Gas Station.  This was a gas station in the vicinity of
18   the Portland, Maine airport.  As you can see from the date and
19   time stamp -- well, you can see from the date stamp, the date
20   stamp is wrong.  The time stamp is also off by one hour.
21             This is a representation of Mohamed Atta and Abdul Aziz
22   Alomari who were at this Jetport on the evening of September 10th,
23   2001.
24   Q.   And if we can go to FO-7021.  What is depicted on that
25   exhibit?

 1   A.   Depicted on this exhibit are Mohamed Atta and Abdul Aziz
 2   Alomari after they have just passed through airport screening.
 3   And this is at the Portland, Maine Jetport in Portland, Maine.
 4   Q.   And 7022?
 5   A.   Here you can see Abdul Aziz Alomari picking up an item off
 6   the screening table, and Mohamed Atta in a blue shirt is waiting
 7   for him.  There is a male here.  I'll underline him.  He is not
 8   involved.  This here is Atta and this here is Alomari
 9   (indicating).
10   Q.   Okay.  And 7023.
11   A.   This shows Mohamed Atta here and Abdul Aziz Alomari at this
12   location (indicating).
13   Q.   And finally 7024.
14   A.   Once again, Atta and Alomari after they have cleared the
15   screening area at the Portland, Maine Jetport.
16             MR. RASKIN:  Okay.  Thank you, Gerard.
18   Q.   Now, you have mentioned on a couple of occasions that the
19   hijackers returned funds to Mohammed -- Mustafa al-Hawsawi on the
20   days prior to September 11th.  Which hijackers returned such
21   funds?
22   A.   A number of hijackers returned those funds, including Fayez
23   Ahmed, also known as Fayez Banihammad.  Mohamed Atta sent two wire
24   transfers back.  Also Marwal al-Shehhi, Waleed al-Shehri, and
25   Nawaf al-Hazmi also attempted to send money back to Mustafa Ahmed

 1   al-Hawsawi.
 2   Q.   Let's take a look at how and when they did that, starting
 3   with Fayez Banihammad.
 4   A.   Fayez Banihammad attempted to send back $8,000 on the 5th of
 5   September, 2001.  Banihammad did so by sending a wire transfer
 6   from a SunTrust Bank to his Standard Chartered Bank account over
 7   which Mustafa al-Hawsawi had signing authority.
 8             Mohamed Atta sent two wire transfers on the 8th, one for
 9   $2,860.  On the wire transfer form for this $2,860 transfer,
10   Mustafa al-Hawsawi listed his telephone number as 050-520-9905,
11   once again that same number that we saw on his financial
12   documents, and also the same number that was on a number of travel
13   records for other hijackers.
14             Later that same day from the Giant Foodmart in Laurel,
15   Maryland, Atta sent a $5,000 Western Union money transfer.  Then
16   Waleed al-Shehri sent $5,000 on the 9th of September.  This was
17   from Logan Airport.
18             On the 10th Marwal al-Shehhi sent $5400 via a Western
19   Union money transfer.  And this was from a Greyhound bus station
20   in Boston, Massachusetts.
21   Q.   And Nawaf al-Hazmi?
22   A.   Finally, Nawaf al-Hazmi attempted to send the debit card and
23   pin number of Khalid al-Midhar's bank account to Mustafa
24   al-Hawsawi.  When he did so, he sent it via Express Mail.  And on
25   it he will listed al-Hawsawi's Post Office Box as 19738.  If you

 1   recall, that's the same Post Office Box that al-Hawsawi listed on
 2   his bank records, and it is also the same Post Office Box that
 3   Fayez Ahmed, this individual here, also listed on his bank records
 4   when he opened his account.
 5             That Express Mail envelope was not able to go through.
 6   All the mail was stopped at that time.  And that was seized by the
 7   FBI after September 11th.
 8   Q.   On the morning -- in the early morning hours of September
 9   11th, 2001, what did Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi do?
10   A.   He withdrew a number of the funds from his accounts and
11   departed from Dubai on a Pakistani Airlines Flight 212 to Karachi,
12   Pakistan.
13   Q.   Now, earlier you mentioned an individual named Ali Abdul Aziz
14   Ali.  Remind us who he is.
15   A.   He is the individual who sent five wire transfers to Mohamed
16   Atta and Marwal al-Shehhi during the summer of 2000.  And he also
17   left Dubai United Arab Emirates the day before, he left on the
18   10th of September, 2001, and he flew to Karachi, Pakistan.
19   Q.   Now, Agent Fitzgerald, that takes us to the final stage of
20   the plot, which you have described here simply as September 11th,
21   2001.
22             Let's talk about each of the four flights that were
23   hijacked on that day, starting with September -- withdrawn,
24   starting with Flight 11, which took off from Boston.  Tell us what
25   time that flight took off.

 1   A.   Flight 11 pushed back from the gate at 7:45.  And Flight 11
 2   took off from Boston's Logan Airport at 7:59 a.m. on the morning
 3   of September 11th, 2001.
 4   Q.   And what type of plane was American Airlines Flight 11?
 5   A.   It was a Boeing 767.
 6   Q.   Where was it bound for?
 7   A.   That was bound for Los Angeles, California.
 8   Q.   What are we looking at here, Agent Fitzgerald?
 9   A.   This is a floor plan or a seating array indicating in red or
10   in orange where the hijackers were located, and in blue, where the
11   passengers were located aboard American Airlines Flight 11.
12   Q.   And let's just look at the hijackers' seats, starting with
13   2A.
14   A.   That's Wail al-Shehri in seat 2A.
15   Q.   And to his right in 2B?
16   A.   His brother, Waleed al-Shehri, in 2B.
17   Q.   And going to row 8, who is in 8D, as in David?
18   A.   Mohamed Atta.
19   Q.   And next to him in 8G?
20   A.   Abdul Aziz Alomari.
21   Q.   And back in row 10 and 10B, who is that?
22   A.   Satam al-Suqami.
23   Q.   What terminal at Logan Airport did Flight 11 take off from?
24   A.   Terminal B.
25             MR. RASKIN:  Your Honor, at this point I would like to

 1   read from a stipulation between the parties.
 2             THE COURT:  All right.  Is this part of that first one?
 3             MR. RASKIN:  It is part of ST-1 that's in evidence.
 4             THE COURT:  All right.
 5             MR. RASKIN:  And I am reading from page 1 of that
 6   document.  And I will read the entirety of paragraph 1 which goes
 7   to page 4.
 8             On September 11th, 2001, Mohamed Atta, Abdul Aziz
 9   Alomari, Satam al-Suqami, Waleed al-Shehri and Wail al-Shehri
10   hijacked American Airlines Flight 11, a Boeing 767, which had
11   departed Boston at 7:59 a.m.  They flew Flight 11 into the North
12   Tower of the World Trade Center in Manhattan at approximately 8:46
13   a.m., causing the collapse of the tower.
14             Flight 11, scheduled to leave Logan Airport at 8:10
15   a.m., pushed back from the gate at 7:45 a.m. and departed at 7:59
16   a.m.
17             Shortly before 8:14 a.m., Boston Air Route Traffic
18   Control Center, or Boston Center, directed the cockpit of Flight
19   11 to "turn 20 degrees right" and the cockpit responded in the
20   affirmative.  This was the last routine communication received
21   from Flight 11.  Seconds later air traffic control radioed Flight
22   11 to climb to 35,000 feet.  The cockpit did not respond.  Over
23   the next ten minutes, air traffic control tried nine times to
24   contact Flight 11.  All attempts were unsuccessful.
25             At 8:19 a.m., a flight attendant onboard Flight 11

 1   contacted the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Center
 2   in Cary, North Carolina by air-telephone to report an emergency
 3   onboard the flight.  The flight attendant, Betty Ong, O-n-g,
 4   stated "The cockpit's not answering, somebody's been stabbed in
 5   business class and...I think there's mace....that we can't
 6   breathe...I don't know, I think we have -- I think we're getting
 7   hijacked."  Ms. Ong's air-telephone call with the reservations
 8   office lasted 25 minutes, until 8:44 a.m., the approximate time of
 9   Flight 11's collision into the North Tower.
10             At 8:21 a.m., the transponder of Flight 11 was turned
11   off in the cockpit, making it more difficult for air traffic
12   control centers to identify the flight and monitor its flight
13   path.
14               Also at 8:21 a.m., one of the American Airlines
15   employees in the Reservations Office who was speaking with Ms. Ong
16   on the air-telephone named Nydia Gonzalez, simultaneously
17   established telephone contact with a manager on duty at American
18   Airlines System Operations Control or SOC center in Fort Worth,
19   Texas named Craig Marquis.  Ms. Gonzalez then maintained telephone
20   contact with both Ms. Ong onboard Flight 11 and Mr. Marquis, until
21   Flight 11 collided with the North Tower.
22             At 8:23 a.m., an American Airlines dispatcher sent a
23   text message to Flight 11 over the Aircraft Communications and
24   Reporting System, also known as ACARS, a ground-to-cockpit e-mail
25   system.  Flight 11 did not respond.

 1             At 8:24 a.m., Ms. Ong told Ms. Gonzalez that "the guys
 2   are doing the -- the guys that are doing the stabbing have invaded
 3   the cockpit."  And Ms. Gonzalez relayed this information to Mr.
 4   Marquis at the SOC.
 5             Shortly before 8:25 a.m., an air traffic controller
 6   heard two clicks over the frequency assigned to Flight 11 and
 7   radioed in response "Is that American 11 trying to call?"  Five
 8   seconds later Mohamed Atta addressed the passengers on Flight 11:
 9   "We have some planes.  Just stay quiet and you'll be okay.  We're
10   returning to the airport."   Because the wrong button was pressed,
11   the message was not heard by the passengers but instead by air
12   traffic control.  Seconds later, Boston Center heard the following
13   transmission from Mohamed Atta.  "Nobody move.  Everything will be
14   okay.  If you try to make any moves, you will endanger yourself
15   and the airplane.  Just stay quiet."  After hearing the second
16   communication from the aircraft, controllers at Boston Center
17   believed Flight 11 had been hijacked.
18             Between 8:25 a.m. and 8:32 a.m., Boston Center managers
19   started notifying their superiors that Flight 11 had been
20   hijacked.
21             At 8:26 a.m., Ms. Ong informed Ms. Gonzalez that Flight
22   11 was "flying erratically" and Ms. Gonzalez relayed this
23   information to -- and Ms. Gonzalez relayed this information to Mr.
24   Marquis at the SOC.
25             At 8:28 a.m., Boston Center called Federal Aviation

 1   Administration's Air Traffic Control Systems Command Center in
 2   Herndon, Virginia to advise management that it believed Flight 11
 3   had been hijacked and was heading towards New York City.
 4             At 8:32 a.m., Herndon Command Center notified the
 5   Operations Center at FAA headquarters in D.C. of a possible
 6   hijacking of Flight 11, and was told that the FAA's security
 7   personnel at headquarters had just begun discussing the hijacking
 8   on a conference call with FAA's New England regional office.
 9             At 8:34 a.m., Ms. Gonzalez told Mr. Marquis at the SOC,
10   "They think they might have a fatality on the flight.  One of our
11   passengers, possibly on 9B, Levin or Lewis, might have been
12   fatally stabbed."
13             At 8:38 a.m., Ms. Gonzalez reported to Mr. Marquis that
14   Flight 11 was in rapid descent.
15             At 8:41 a.m., Mr. Marquis instructed an American
16   Airlines colleague at the SOC, "Tell ATC or Air Traffic Control to
17   handle this as an emergency."  The colleague replied:  "They have
18   in there it's been hijacked."  Mr. Marquis responded:  "It is.
19   Okay."
20             At 8:44 a.m., another flight attendant onboard Flight 11
21   who had established air-telephone contact with American Airlines
22   ground personnel in Boston stated, "We are flying low.  We are
23   flying very, very low.  We are flying way too low."   Seconds
24   later, the flight attendant, Amy Sweeney, said:  "Oh, my God, we
25   are way too low," and then the call ended.

 1             At 8:46 and 40 seconds in the morning, Flight 11
 2   collided into the North Tower, World Trade Center I, killing all
 3   onboard, 76 passengers, 11 members of the flight crew, and five
 4   hijackers."
 5             THE COURT:  Mr. Raskin, I think this is an excellent
 6   time to take the afternoon recess.  We will reconvene in 20
 7   minutes, ladies and gentlemen.
 8             (Recess taken at 3:30 p.m. to 3:50 p.m.)
 9                            (Defendant and Jury in.)
10             THE COURT:  All right, Mr. Raskin?
11             MR. RASKIN:  Thank you, Your Honor.
12   Q.   Agent Fitzgerald, remind us again where United Airlines
13   Flight 175 departed from.
14   A.   United Airlines Flight 175 departed from Boston's Logan
15   Airport at 8:14 a.m.
16   Q.   What type of plane was United Airlines Flight 175?
17   A.   A Boeing 767.
18   Q.   And where was Flight 175 destined for?
19   A.   Flight 175 was destined for Los Angeles, California.
20   Q.   What terminal did Flight 175 depart from at Logan?
21   A.   Terminal C.
22   Q.   And let's take a look at where the hijackers of Flight 175
23   were seated, starting with seat 2A.
24   A.   Seat 2A was Fayez Ahmed, also known as Fayez Banihammad.
25   Q.   Next to him in 2B?

 1   A.   2B is Mohand al-Shehri.
 2   Q.   And two rows behind them in seat 6C -- as in Charlie?
 3   A.   Hijacker pilot Marwan al-Shehhi.
 4   Q.   Behind him in seat 9C?
 5   A.   Hamza al-Ghamdi.
 6   Q.   And next to al-Ghamdi in 9D?
 7   A.   Ahmed al-Ghamdi.
 8             MR. RASKIN:  Your Honor, I would like to read from the
 9   stipulation again.
10             THE COURT:  All right.
11             MR. RASKIN:  Starting on page 4, paragraph 2:  On
12   September 11, 2001, Hamza al-Ghamdi, Fayez Ahmed, Mohand
13   al-Shehri, Ahmed al-Ghamdi, and Marwan al-Shehhi hijacked United
14   Airlines Flight 175, a Boeing 767, which departed from Boston at
15   approximately 8:15 a.m.  They flew Flight 175 into the South Tower
16   of the World Trade Center in Manhattan at approximately 9:03 a.m.,
17   causing the collapse of the tower.
18             Flight 175, scheduled to leave Logan at 8 a.m., pushed
19   back from the gate at 7:58 a.m. and departed at 8:14 a.m.
20             At 8:42 a.m., the flight crew of 175 reported to air
21   traffic controllers that "we heard a suspicious transmission from
22   another aircraft on our departure from Boston -- like someone
23   keyed the mike and said 'everyone stay in your seats.'"  This
24   represented Flight 175's last communication with the ground.
25             At 8:46 a.m., the transponder code on Flight 175 was

 1   changed to a frequency not recognized by air traffic control.
 2             At 8:51 a.m., Flight 175 deviated from its assigned
 3   altitude.
 4             At 8:52 a.m., United Airlines ground employee in San
 5   Francisco received an air telephone call from a male flight
 6   attendant on board Flight 175.  The flight attendant reported that
 7   the aircraft had been hijacked, both pilots had been killed, and a
 8   flight attendant had been stabbed and that he believed that the
 9   hijackers were flying the plane.
10             At 8:52 a.m., passenger Peter Hanson called his father
11   and said that the plane was being hijacked and the situation was
12   serious.  He said that the hijackers had mace and knives.  Peter
13   Hanson said that he thought that the hijackers had already killed
14   a stewardess and possibly someone else in the front of the plane.
15   He asked his father to call United Airlines to tell them of the
16   hijacking.
17             At 8:55 a.m., a supervisor at New York Air Traffic
18   Control Center in Ronkonkoma, New York, notified the center's
19   manager of her belief that Flight 175 had been hijacked.  At 11
20   a.m. -- withdrawn.
21             At 9 a.m., Peter Hanson called his father again and said
22   that he thought that the hijackers intended to crash the plane
23   into a building, perhaps the Sears Tower in Chicago.  He said that
24   the hijackers had taken over the cockpit and had killed a
25   stewardess.

 1             At 9:03:11 in the morning on September 11, Flight 175
 2   collided with the South Tower, World Trade Center II, killing all
 3   on board, 51 passengers, 9 members of the flight crew, and 5
 4   hijackers.
 5             Actually, before we go to Flight 77, Agent Fitzgerald,
 6   I'd like you to take a look at, with Mr. Wood's assistance, two
 7   exhibits:  WT-1 and WT-2.
 8             THE COURT:  Are there any objections to those exhibits,
 9   Mr. MacMahon?
10             MR. MAC MAHON:  No, Your Honor, no objection.
11             THE COURT:  All right, they're both in.
12             (Government's Exhibits Nos. WT-1 and WT-2 were received
13   in evidence.)
15   Q.   Tell us what WT-1 is and what WT-2 is.
16   A.   The exhibit marked WT-1 is the passport of Satam al-Suqami.
17   This was recovered from the World Trade Center the morning of
18   September 11, 2001.  The exhibit marked WT-2 is the Saudi Arabian
19   driver's license of Ahmed al-Ghamdi, recovered during the recovery
20   operations at the World Trade Center after September 11, 2001.
21             MR. RASKIN:  And three additional exhibits, Mr. Wood:
22   BS-1101, BS-1101T -- as in Tom -- and BS-1143.
23             THE COURT:  Any objection to those three exhibits?
24             MR. MAC MAHON:  No objection, Your Honor.
25             THE COURT:  All right, BS-1101, 1101T, 1143 are all in.

 1             (Government's Exhibits Nos. BS-1101, BS-1101T, BS-1143
 2   were received in evidence.)
 4   Q.   Agent Fitzgerald, can -- do you have BS-1101?
 5   A.   I do.
 6   Q.   Can you tell us what that is?
 7   A.   This is a handwritten two-page Arabic document, a translation
 8   of which I have viewed and which describes hijacking and martyrdom
 9   operations.
10   Q.   And where was this document found?
11   A.   This was found in the luggage of Mohamed Atta which was
12   recovered at Logan Airport after September 11 of 2001.
13   Q.   And I'd ask you to turn to the first page of the translation,
14   which is BS-1101T -- as in Tom.
15             Read the first, the first line and the first two
16   paragraphs.
17   A.   "The last night:  Embrace the will to die and renew
18   allegiance.  Shave the extra body hair and wear cologne.  Pray.
19   Familiarize yourself with the plan well from every aspect and
20   anticipate the reaction and resistance from the enemy."
21   Q.   If we just drop down on that page, can you read No. 5?
22   A.   "Rise at night and persist in your supplications for victory,
23   ability, complete conquest, facilitation of matters, and ability
24   to maintain secrecy."
25   Q.   If we skip to the next page, can you read No. 13?

 1   A.   "Examine your weapon before departure, and it was said before
 2   the departure, 'each of you must sharpen his blade and go out and
 3   wound his sacrifice.'"
 4   Q.   And skipping to page 4?  Down at the last full paragraph,
 5   please read this paragraph.
 6   A.   "When the storming begins, strike like heroes who are
 7   determined not to return to this world.  Glorify Allah, i.e., cry,
 8   'Allah is great,' because this cry will strike terror in the
 9   hearts of the infidels.  He said, 'Strike above the necks.  Strike
10   all mortals.  And know that paradise has been adorned for you with
11   the sweetest things.  The nymphs wearing their finest are calling
12   out to you, come hither, followers of Allah.'"
13   Q.   And going to the next page, in the middle of the page, please
14   read that paragraph.
15   A.   "Do not forget to take for the spoils even a cup, or a glass
16   of water, to quench yourself and your brothers.  And if possible,
17   when the time of truth and the zero hour arrives, then rip open
18   your clothes and bare your chest to embrace death for the sake of
19   Allah.  And you must continue to pronounce his name.  And you
20   either conclude with a prayer that, if possible, you begin seconds
21   before the target, or your last words should be:  'There is no God
22   but Allah.  Mohammed is his messenger.'"
23   Q.   Thank you, Agent Fitzgerald.
24             And there's one other exhibit there, BS-1143.  Tell us
25   what that is.  It's on the screen here.

 1   A.   Okay.  That's a can of red pepper spray.  This also was
 2   recovered from the luggage of Mohamed Atta, recovered at Logan
 3   Airport in Boston, Massachusetts.
 4   Q.   Okay.  Now, let's go back to Flight 77.  Remind us where
 5   Flight 77 departed from and where it ultimately was crashed.
 6   A.   Flight 77 departed Dulles Airport, near Washington, D.C., at
 7   8:20 a.m.  Flight 77 was crashed into the Pentagon.
 8   Q.   And where was it originally intended to go?
 9   A.   To Los Angeles, California.
10   Q.   What type of plane was American Airlines Flight 77?
11   A.   A Boeing 757.
12   Q.   And are we looking at the seating plan for that aircraft
13   right now?
14   A.   Yes.
15   Q.   Who was seated in seat 1B -- as in boy?
16   A.   Hani Hanjour, the hijacker pilot of Flight 77.
17   Q.   And in 5E?
18   A.   Nawaf al-Hazmi.
19   Q.   To Hazmi's right?
20   A.   Salem al-Hazmi, his brother.
21   Q.   And in seat 12A?
22   A.   Majed Moqed.
23   Q.   And to his right?
24   A.   Khalid al-Midhar.
25   Q.   Now, you say that Flight 77 was crashed into the Pentagon,

 1   Agent Fitzgerald?
 2   A.   Yes.
 3   Q.   Is that Pentagon in the Eastern District of Virginia?
 4   A.   Yes, it is.
 5             MR. RASKIN:  Your Honor, I would like to read from the
 6   stipulation again.
 7             THE COURT:  Yes, sir.
 8             MR. RASKIN:  On page 6, paragraph 3:  On September 11,
 9   2001, Khalid al-Midhar, Majed Moqed, Nawaf al-Hazmi, Salem
10   al-Hazmi, and Hani Hanjour hijacked American Airlines Flight 77, a
11   Boeing 757 which had departed from Dulles International Airport in
12   the Eastern District of Virginia, bound for Los Angeles, at
13   approximately 8:20 a.m.  They flew Flight 77 into the Pentagon in
14   the Eastern District of Virginia at approximately 9:37 a.m.
15             Flight 77, scheduled to leave Dulles at 8:10 a.m.,
16   pushed back from the gate at 8:09 and departed at 8:20.
17             At 8:46 a.m., Flight 77 reached its assigned cruising
18   altitude of 35,000 feet.
19             At approximately 8:51 a.m., Flight 77 transmitted its
20   last routine radio communication.  The cockpit acknowledged Air
21   Traffic Control navigational instructions.
22             At approximately 8:54 a.m., Flight 77 deviated from its
23   assigned course by making a slight turn to the south.
24             At 8:56 a.m., the transponder on Flight 77 was switched
25   off, and the aircraft was lost on the primary radar.

 1             At 8:58 a.m., FAA Air Traffic Control contacted American
 2   Airlines to advise that contact with Flight 77 had been lost.
 3   American Airlines dispatchers began unsuccessfully to attempt to
 4   contact Flight 77 using the ACARS system.
 5             By 9 a.m., Flight 77 had turned to the east and had
 6   begun to descend.
 7             At approximately 9:07 a.m., Flight 77 leveled off at
 8   25,000 feet and made a slight course change to the east-northeast.
 9             At 9:12 a.m., flight attendant Renee May called her
10   parents on an air phone.  Ms. May told her mother that her flight
11   had been hijacked by six men who had moved them to the rear of the
12   plane.  Ms. May asked her mother to call American Airlines to make
13   sure they knew about the hijacking, giving her three Northern
14   Virginia phone calls -- phone numbers to call.
15             Between 9:12 a.m. and the time Flight 77 was crashed
16   into the Pentagon, Renee May's mother called American Airlines at
17   Reagan National Airport and conveyed the message from Ms. May that
18   Flight 77 had been hijacked.
19             At 9:15 a.m. and at 9:26 a.m., Flight 77 passenger
20   Barbara Olson called her husband, Ted Olson, and spoke to him for
21   about one minute before the call was cut off.  Barbara Olson
22   reported that the flight had been hijacked by hijackers wielding
23   knives and box cutters and that all the passengers were in the
24   back of the plane.
25             At 9:20 a.m. and 9:31 a.m., Barbara Olson again called

 1   and spoke to her husband, Ted Olson.  She reported that the pilot
 2   had announced that the flight had been hijacked.  Ted Olson asked
 3   Barbara her location, and she replied that the plane was flying
 4   over houses.  Ted Olson told his wife of the two previous
 5   hijackings and crashes.
 6             At 9:29 a.m., Flight 77 was flying at 7,000 feet and was
 7   approximately 38 miles west of the Pentagon.  The auto pilot was
 8   turned off.
 9             At 9:32 a.m., controllers at the Dulles Terminal Radar
10   Approach Control observed a primary radar target tracking
11   eastbound at a high rate and notified Reagan National Airport.
12             At 9:34 a.m., Flight 77 was 5 miles west-southwest of
13   the Pentagon.  Flight 77 began a 330-degree turn to the right.  At
14   the end of the turn, the plane was about 2,000 feet and 4 miles
15   southwest of the Pentagon and pointed towards it.  Over the next
16   30 seconds, power was increased to near maximum and the nose was
17   pitched down.
18             At 9:36, Federal Aviation Administration Boston Center
19   called North East Air Defense Sector and relayed a report of an
20   unidentified aircraft closing in on Washington.  "Latest report:
21   Aircraft VFR (visual flight rules), 6 miles southeast of the White
22   House -- 6, southwest.  6, southwest of the White House, deviating
23   away."
24             At 9:37:46 seconds a.m., Flight 77 was crashed into the
25   Pentagon.  The plane was traveling at 530 miles per hour on

 1   impact.  When it was crashed, Flight 77 had 36,200 pounds of jet
 2   fuel on board.  Flight 77 carried a crew of 2 pilots and 4 flight
 3   attendants, 53 passengers, and 5 hijackers.  Everyone on board the
 4   plane was killed, as were 125 military and civilian personnel in
 5   the Pentagon.
 6             Now, if Mr. Wood would hand the witness Government
 7   Exhibits PE-114, PE-102, and FO-8301.
 8             THE COURT:  Any objection to those exhibits?
 9             MR. MAC MAHON:  No objection, Your Honor.
10             THE COURT:  All right.  So PE-114 and 102 and FO-8301
11   are in.
12             (Government's Exhibits Nos. PE-114, PE-102, and FO-8301
13   were received in evidence.)
15   Q.   Do you have those, Agent Fitzgerald?
16   A.   I do.
17   Q.   Can you put -- can you tell us what PE-114 is?
18   A.   PE-114 is an identification card with Arabic writing on it of
19   Majed Moqed.
20   Q.   And PE-102?
21   A.   PE-102 is an identification card belonging to Nawaf al-Hazmi.
22   Q.   And where were those items found?
23   A.   Those were found at the Pentagon.
24   Q.   And can you show us FO-8301?  Is it on the screen?
25   A.   It is.

 1   Q.   Now, tell us what that is and where it was found.
 2   A.   That's a box cutter that was recovered in the Toyota Corolla
 3   recovered at Dulles Airport.  That's the one that was registered
 4   to and owned by Nawaf al-Hazmi.
 5   Q.   Thank you, Agent Fitzgerald.
 6             Now, going to Flight 93, where did Flight 93 depart
 7   from?
 8   A.   Flight 93 departed from Newark, New Jersey.
 9   Q.   And where was it -- where was its intended destination?
10   A.   San Francisco, California.
11   Q.   And Flight 93 crashed, where did it crash?
12   A.   In Stonycreek Township, in rural Pennsylvania.
13   Q.   Let's take a look at where the hijackers were seated on
14   Flight 93.  In seat 1B?
15   A.   Seat 1B was hijacker pilot Ziad Jarrah.
16   Q.   3C?
17   A.   Ahmed al-Nami.
18   Q.   3B?
19   A.   Saeed al-Ghamdi.
20   Q.   And 6B -- as in boy?
21   A.   Ahmed al-Haznawi.
22             MR. RASKIN:  And, Your Honor, I'd like to read from the
23   stipulation again.  From page 9, paragraph 4:
24             On September 11, 2001, Ziad Jarrah, Saeed al-Ghamdi,
25   Ahmed al-Nami, and Ahmed al-Haznawi hijacked United Airlines

 1   Flight 93, a Boeing 757, which had departed from Newark, New
 2   Jersey, bound for San Francisco, at approximately 8:42 a.m.  After
 3   resistance by the passengers, Flight 93 crashed in Somerset
 4   County, Pennsylvania, at approximately 10:03 a.m.
 5             Flight 93 was originally scheduled to depart from the
 6   gate at 8 a.m. but was delayed due to heavy morning air traffic.
 7   Jason Dahl, D-a-h-l, served as the pilot of Flight 93, and Leroy
 8   Homer, H-o-m-e-r, was the copilot.
 9             At 8:24 a.m., the pilots of Flight 93 received an ACARS
10   message by a United Airlines flight dispatcher that stated:
11   "Beware any cockpit intrusion.  Two aircraft in New York hit Trade
12   Center buildings."
13             At 9:26 a.m., the response to the ACARS message from the
14   cockpit of Flight 93 from the pilot, Jason Dahl, was, "Ed, confirm
15   latest message.  Jason."
16             Beginning at 9:30 a.m., passenger Tom Burnett,
17   B-u-r-n-e-t-t, made several telephone calls to his wife from
18   telephones in rows 24 and 25, even though he was assigned a seat
19   in row 4 in the front of the plane.  During the conversations,
20   Mr. Burnett told his wife that the plane had been hijacked by men
21   who claimed to have a bomb and that a passenger had been knifed.
22   Mr. Burnett believed that the hijackers did not actually have a
23   bomb but were using the threat to control the passengers.
24             Mrs. Burnett told her husband that two planes had
25   already crashed into the World Trade Center, which Mr. Burnett

 1   said that he knew.  Mr. Burnett said that the hijackers talked
 2   about crashing the plane into the ground, and he knew that the
 3   hijacking was a suicide mission.  He ended this call by saying
 4   that a group of passengers were getting ready to do something to
 5   take back the plane.
 6             At 9:31 a.m., one of the hijackers inadvertently sent a
 7   radio transmission to Air Traffic Control which was intended for
 8   the passengers of Flight 93.  The hijackers said, "Ladies and
 9   gentlemen:  Here the captain, please sit down, keep seating.  We
10   have a bomb on board, so sit."
11             At 9:32 a.m., a United Airlines flight dispatcher sent
12   another ACARS message to the pilot of Flight 93:  "Looking for you
13   ASAP."  There was no response.
14             At 9:32 a.m., a flight attendant called from an air
15   telephone in the rear of the plane to the maintenance telephone
16   line for United Airlines and reported that three people with
17   knives and bombs were on board and that they were taking over the
18   plane.
19             At 9:33 a.m., a United Airlines flight dispatcher sent
20   another ACARS message to the pilot of Flight 93:  "High security
21   alert, secure cockpit."
22             At 9:35 a.m., Flight 93 turned eastward toward
23   Washington, D.C.
24             Also at 9:35 a.m., flight attendant Sandy Bradshaw,
25   B-r-a-d-s-h-a-w, called the United Airlines maintenance telephone

 1   line from an air telephone in the rear of the plane and reported
 2   to United Airlines employees that the plane had been hijacked and
 3   that the hijackers, armed with knives, were in the cabin and the
 4   flight deck.
 5             At 9:37 a.m., passenger Mark Bingham, B-i-n-g-h-a-m, who
 6   was assigned a seat in row 4 in the front of the plane, called his
 7   mother from a telephone in row 25, near the rear of the plane, and
 8   told her that the plane had been hijacked by three men who had
 9   said they have a bomb.
10             At 9:37 a.m., passenger Jeremy Glick, G-l-i-c-k, who was
11   assigned a seat in row 11, called his wife from a telephone in row
12   27 near the rear of the plane and told her that the plane had been
13   hijacked by three men who looked like Iranians, with dark skin and
14   bandanas on their heads, and who had knives.
15             According to Mr. Glick, two hijackers went into the
16   cockpit while another hijacker moved the passengers to the back of
17   the plane.  One hijacker -- one hijacker, whom he described as
18   small, was standing over them with an item that the hijacker said
19   was a bomb strapped to his waist with a red band.  Mr. Glick said
20   the hijackers had knives but no guns.  Mr. Glick told his wife
21   that they had determined that the hijackers were going to fly the
22   plane into a building, so he and four other male passengers who
23   were as big as he was were going to rush the hijackers, who were
24   small, with only knives and maybe a bomb.  Mr. Glick said he had
25   armed himself with a breakfast knife.

 1             At 9:39 a.m., Ziad Jarrah broadcast the following
 2   message over the intercom to the passengers of Flight 93:  "Ah,
 3   here's the captain:  I would like you all to remain seated.  We
 4   have a bomb on board.  We are going back to the airport, and we
 5   have our demands.  So please remain quiet."
 6             At 9:43, passenger Todd Beamer, B-e-a-m-e-r, who was
 7   assigned to a seat in row 10, tried to telephone his wife from a
 8   telephone in row 32 but was routed to a GTE operator.  Mr. Beamer
 9   told the operator that the plane had been hijacked and that he saw
10   two hijackers with knives and someone else enter the cockpit.  One
11   of the hijackers had a bomb strapped around his waist with a red
12   belt, and he was standing in first class.
13             He said that the pilot and the copilot were lying on the
14   floor and appeared to be hurt.  Mr. Beamer said that a group of
15   passengers were going to jump the hijacker with the bomb.  The
16   operator heard someone say, "Are you ready?"  Then she heard Todd
17   Beamer say, "Let's roll."
18             At 9:45 a.m., one of the hijackers in the cockpit
19   stated, "In the name of Allah, in the name of Allah, I bear
20   witness that there is no other God but Allah."
21             At 9:49 a.m., passenger Marion Britton, B-r-i-t-t-o-n,
22   who was assigned to a seat in row 12, called her friend from a
23   telephone in row 33 in the rear of the plane and told her friend
24   that the plane had been hijacked.  The friend told Ms. Britton
25   that two airplanes had already crashed into the World Trade

 1   Center.  Ms. Britton told her friend that she knew that.
 2             At 9:50 a.m., Air Traffic Control sent the following
 3   ACARS message to the pilot of Flight 93:  "Land ASAP at nearest
 4   UAL airport.  Terrorists.  No one in cockpit.  Land ASAP."
 5             At 9:50 a.m., flight attendant Sandy Bradshaw called her
 6   husband and told him that her plane had been hijacked by three men
 7   with knives.  She described all three men as looking Islamic and
 8   that they had put red bandanas on their heads.  Ms. Bradshaw said
 9   that she was with the majority of the passengers who had been
10   herded to the back of the plane, but a small group of passengers
11   remained in first class.
12             She and the passengers in the rear had boiling water to
13   throw on the hijackers.  Ms. Bradshaw ended the call with her
14   husband by saying that they were running to first class so she had
15   to go.
16             At 10:03 a.m., Flight 93 crashed into a field in
17   Somerset County, Pennsylvania, killing all aboard:  33 passengers,
18   7 members of the flight crew, and 4 hijackers."
19   Q.   Agent Fitzgerald, with Mr. Wood's assistance, I'd like you to
20   look at several exhibits.  They are PA-101, 102, 103.2, 103.3,
21   105.8, 108, 109, 110, and 111.
22             THE COURT:  Any objection, Mr. MacMahon, to any of those
23   exhibits?
24             MR. MAC MAHON:  No objection, Your Honor.
25             THE COURT:  Okay.  They're all in.

 1             (Government's Exhibits Nos. PA-101, PA-102, PA-103.2,
 2   PA-103.3, PA-105.8, PA-108, PA-109, PA-110, and PA-111 were
 3   received in evidence.)
 5   Q.   Do you have PA-101, Agent Fitzgerald?
 6   A.   I do.
 7   Q.   Can you tell us what it is and where it was found?
 8   A.   This is an ID card written in Arabic.  This one was found at
 9   the Flight 93 crash site.  This one is believed to have been
10   possessed by Ahmed al-Nami.
11   Q.   And PA-102?
12   A.   PA-102 is a Saudi Arabian Youth Hostels Association
13   identification card for Ahmed al-Nami.  This was found also at the
14   crash site of Flight 93 in Pennsylvania.
15   Q.   And PO -- excuse me, PA-103.2 and 103.3?
16   A.   103.2 and 103.3 are photographs of hijacker Ahmed al-Nami.
17   These were also found at the crash site in Pennsylvania.
18   Q.   Well, hold on while we get them on the screen here.
19   A.   That's a photo negative of Ahmed al-Nami.
20   Q.   And 103.3?
21   A.   That's a passport-style photograph of Ahmed al-Nami.
22   Q.   And where were these found?
23   A.   At the crash site in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.
24   Q.   P A-105.8?
25   A.   This is a burned piece of the passport of Ziad Jarrah

 1   recovered at the crash site at Shanksville, Pennsylvania, where
 2   Flight 93 crashed.
 3             MR. RASKIN:  If you can just pull it back, Gerard, so we
 4   can see the entire exhibit?
 5   Q.   Agent Fitzgerald, was the entire passport found?
 6   A.   Less the parts that were burned away, yes.
 7   Q.   And this is the page with Ziad Jarrah's visa?
 8   A.   That's correct.
 9   Q.   Was that found in Pennsylvania at the crash site?
10   A.   That's correct.
11   Q.   PA-108?
12   A.   This is a Saudi Arabian passport of Saeed al-Ghamdi.  What
13   you're looking at now is the visa page of Saeed al-Ghamdi, which
14   is in his passport.  They was recovered at the crash site in
15   Pennsylvania, where Flight 93 crashed.
16   Q.   PA-109, which I believe is already in evidence?
17   A.   This is a business card with the name Assem Jarrah on the
18   front of it.  Assem Jarrah is a relative of Ziad Jarrah.  On the
19   reverse of this card is an address that I referred to earlier of
20   Billstedter Hauptstrasse.  You can see the words here, Billstedter
21   and Hauptstrasse, in Hamburg, Germany.
22   Q.   PA-110?
23   A.   This is a partially destroyed Florida state identification
24   card for Ahmed al-Nami.  You can see an address on here of 755
25   Dotterel Road, in Delray Beach, Florida.

 1   Q.   And what did the FBI learn in the September 11 investigation
 2   about that Dotterel Road address?
 3   A.   The FBI learned that a number of hijackers stayed at that
 4   address and used that address for various things, including
 5   driver's licenses and other documents.
 6   Q.   And finally, Agent Fitzgerald, I would like you to hold up
 7   for the jury to see Exhibit PA-111.  Tell us what that is and
 8   where it was found.
 9   A.   This is a red bandana which was recovered at the crash site
10   of Flight 93 in Pennsylvania.
11             MR. RASKIN:  No further questions on direct, Your Honor.
12             THE COURT:  All right.  Cross examination?
13             MR. MAC MAHON:  Thank you, Your Honor.
14                           CROSS EXAMINATION
16   Q.   Agent Fitzgerald, you were introduced as the case agent in
17   this case?
18   A.   One of the case agents, yes.
19   Q.   Okay.  How many case agents are there in this case?
20   A.   Two.
21   Q.   Okay.  And a case agent is an FBI agent who is assigned
22   specifically to work with prosecutors, correct?
23   A.   That's correct.
24   Q.   All right.  And your job is to assemble evidence to help them
25   get a conviction in this case, right?

 1   A.   No.
 2   Q.   You don't work specifically with the prosecution team?
 3   A.   I do, yes, sir.
 4   Q.   And you have an office in the U.S. Attorney's Office, don't
 5   you?
 6   A.   I do.
 7   Q.   But your job is not to help them win a conviction?
 8   A.   Well, my job is to assemble evidence of the case, sir.  It's
 9   not up to me whether we get a conviction or not.
10   Q.   But you skipped a lot of evidence, too, didn't you?
11   A.   What do you mean by skipped, sir?
12   Q.   Didn't you make a decision with these prosecutors what to
13   show the jury and what not to show the jury?
14   A.   Yes, sir.  It's a summary.
15   Q.   And you got together with them on how many occasions to
16   prepare the presentation that we had today?
17   A.   Many occasions.
18   Q.   More than ten?
19   A.   Yes, sir.
20   Q.   Do it by heart by now, Agent?
21   A.   Pretty much, yes.
22   Q.   And describe if you could the investigation that took place
23   after September 11.  How many agents were assigned to that
24   investigation?
25   A.   In the beginning, sir, essentially the entire FBI.

 1   Q.   Okay.  And how long did the entire FBI work on that case?
 2   A.   I would have to estimate, but probably on the order of a
 3   couple months, with agents breaking off as other priorities became
 4   necessary.
 5   Q.   And when you say the entire FBI, how many FBI agents are we
 6   talking about?
 7   A.   Roughly 10,000.
 8   Q.   10,000 agents were involved in collecting the evidence that
 9   we saw today, which is just a small portion of it, correct?
10   A.   Yes.
11   Q.   Okay.  And tell the jury how many pieces of physical evidence
12   the FBI seized in the course of this investigation.
13   A.   Too numerous to count at this time.  There's thousands of
14   pieces of evidence.
15   Q.   Millions of pieces of paper, right, sir?
16   A.   Yes.
17   Q.   Okay.  And how many computers did you search?
18   A.   On the order of hundreds.
19   Q.   On the order of hundreds, right?
20   A.   Yes.
21   Q.   Okay.  And these were computers seized from locations all
22   over the world, weren't they?
23   A.   Yes, they were.
24   Q.   Okay.  And you have specialists at the FBI who, who -- whose
25   job it is to look at the hard drive of a computer and see what can

 1   be recovered, right?
 2   A.   Yes, we do.
 3   Q.   And can you tell the jury how many bytes of information that
 4   the FBI looked for in all these computers that they looked at?
 5   A.   I don't know precisely, sir, but it was a lot.
 6   Q.   Okay.  Well, there was a hard drive seized at the University
 7   of Oklahoma, wasn't there?
 8   A.   Yes, there was.
 9   Q.   Okay.  And how big was that hard drive?
10   A.   I don't know, sir.
11   Q.   How long did it take to search it?
12   A.   A long time.  We had a lot of those computer hard drives
13   dumped onto a main server, so it's hard for me to estimate how
14   long any particular hard drive was, but it took a long time to
15   search through those.
16   Q.   Okay.  And you sent subpoenas out to Internet service
17   providers looking for records on all the hijackers, right?
18   A.   We did.
19   Q.   Okay.  And you sent subpoenas out looking for records on
20   Mr. Moussaoui as well, correct?
21   A.   We did.
22   Q.   Okay.  And in response to subpoenas just to Internet service
23   providers, how many documents did the FBI get?
24   A.   Thousands of documents.
25   Q.   More than thousands, wasn't it, Agent?  Millions, right?

 1   A.   I don't know if we received millions from Internet service
 2   providers, sir, but many thousands of documents.
 3   Q.   Okay.  And financial records, you sent out subpoenas all over
 4   the United States for financial records on hijackers as well,
 5   correct?
 6   A.   We did.
 7   Q.   Okay.  For financial records, all you needed to get the
 8   information you wanted was the name of the hijacker, right?
 9   A.   Obviously, sir, to get a subpoena, there has to be some
10   indication or other things other than a name to do so.  In this
11   case, the name of a hijacker and some sort of articulation that
12   that person was identical to a hijacker would probably be
13   sufficient.
14   Q.   Okay.  And in the days after 9/11, you didn't make those
15   distinctions, did you, Agent?
16   A.   I think we did, sir.
17   Q.   You looked under -- everywhere you could to find evidence in
18   this case, right?
19   A.   We did.
20   Q.   You've looked overseas, right?
21   A.   We have.
22   Q.   Right?
23   A.   Um-hum.
24   Q.   You've looked in Germany?
25   A.   Yes.

 1   Q.   You've looked in the United Arab Emirates?
 2   A.   Yes.
 3   Q.   And you've looked in Afghanistan after the successful
 4   military operation, right?
 5   A.   Yes, we had.
 6   Q.   And you had cooperation from many foreign governments in
 7   assembling all of the evidence that you've uncovered in this case,
 8   right?
 9   A.   Yes.  We've had a lot of cooperation.
10   Q.   And are you able to tell the jury how much information there
11   has been that's been uncovered in this investigation and reviewed
12   by agents at the FBI?
13   A.   Total information, sir?
14   Q.   Yes.
15   A.   On the order of millions of pieces of information.
16   Q.   Right.  And if it was all printed out, we couldn't even fit
17   it in the courtroom here, could we?
18   A.   I don't know, sir.
19   Q.   Is it kept in a special facility?
20   A.   The computer evidence?
21   Q.   Yes.
22   A.   Yes, sir.
23   Q.   And how many hard drives are in that facility?
24   A.   Several hundred hard drives, sir.
25   Q.   All of them have been analyzed, right?

 1   A.   They have.
 2   Q.   And all the bank records have been analyzed?
 3   A.   They have.
 4   Q.   Okay.  How about calling cards?  We heard something about
 5   prepaid calling cards before.  How many calling cards after 9/11
 6   did the FBI get the numbers of and then analyze?
 7   A.   At least on the order of hundreds.  Probably on the order of
 8   thousands, but they were much more difficult to -- to obtain.
 9   Q.   Okay.  And how long did it take you to analyze all of those
10   phone records?
11   A.   It took some time, sir.  Some of them we were, were able to
12   analyze very quickly.  Others of them took more time, depending
13   on, on what calls were made and when they were made and where they
14   were made to.
15   Q.   Okay.  And the investigation is still ongoing, isn't it?
16   A.   It is.
17   Q.   The FBI hasn't stopped looking into this case at all, have
18   you?
19   A.   We have not.
20   Q.   Now, after September 11, you received -- you meaning the
21   FBI -- received a very substantial increase in resources and
22   investigators, didn't it?
23   A.   We did.
24   Q.   And you received a whole lot more money to investigate
25   terrorism after 9/11, too, didn't you?

 1   A.   Yes, we did.
 2   Q.   Did you have e-mail in your office before September 11?
 3   A.   Yes, sir, we did.
 4   Q.   Did you have interoffice e-mail?
 5   A.   Yes, sir, we did.
 6   Q.   Did you have Internet access from your office?
 7   A.   There was limited Internet access.
 8   Q.   Were you able to search all the databases before 9/11 that
 9   you can now in your office?
10   A.   We were able to search them, sir.  It was a little bit more
11   cumbersome process, but we were able to search them.
12   Q.   All right.  But you had a specific system where the FBI
13   records were kept before 9/11, right?
14   A.   Yes, we did.
15   Q.   And that was not a good system, was it, sir?
16   A.   It certainly could have been better, yes.
17   Q.   All right.  And there were a lot of problems with it, weren't
18   there?
19   A.   Yes, there were.
20   Q.   There could be obvious leads in there that one agent couldn't
21   find by doing a computer search of the pre-9/11 system, right?
22   A.   I'm not sure what you mean by leads, sir.  That's a very
23   specific term within the FBI that's usually assigned to someone.
24   So if a lead is assigned to someone, they would probably be able
25   to find it and -- and read it.

 1   Q.   Well, information, if you were an FBI agent looking for
 2   internal information before September 11 and you used the FBI's
 3   internal computer system, there could have been problems finding
 4   information, correct?
 5   A.   There could be, sir.  I believe that would be true of any
 6   system, but there could be, yes.
 7   Q.   What kind of computer did you have on your desk before 9/11?
 8   A.   I had a, probably a, I'm guessing, but probably a Pentium
 9   III.
10   Q.   Not a 486?
11   A.   I don't believe, sir.
12   Q.   It was an old computer, wasn't it?
13   A.   I don't think so, sir.  I got a relatively new computer just
14   before September 11.  I'm guessing, but I would guess roughly a
15   Pentium III.
16   Q.   But the FBI agency got a huge increase in resources after
17   September 11 with computer and information technology, right?
18   A.   Yes, we did.
19   Q.   And that was of great help to you in the investigation after
20   September 11, wasn't it?
21   A.   Resources are always a great help.  It's, it's -- money
22   doesn't necessarily equal a more efficient organization, but
23   that's true.
24   Q.   Did your resources double after September 11?
25   A.   I don't know, sir.

 1   Q.   Did they triple?
 2   A.   I don't know.
 3   Q.   Did you -- was there anything you asked for in terms of
 4   investigative tools after September 11 that you didn't get?
 5   A.   Regarding the 9/11 investigation and myself personally?
 6   Q.   Yeah.
 7   A.   No.
 8             MR. MAC MAHON:  All right.  If we could, if we could put
 9   up the translation of Mr. Atta's -- I think it was BS-101T, on the
10   first page of the --
11             Just indulgence to get to the government's exhibit, if
12   we could?  BS-101T.
13             Thank you.
14   Q.   You see here, I'm going to circle that language there, sir?
15   A.   Yes, I do.
16   Q.   Okay.  It says, "Familiarize yourself with the plan well from
17   every aspect and anticipate the reaction and resistance from the
18   enemy," right?
19   A.   Yes.
20   Q.   Okay.  And in your -- in your investigation of these crimes,
21   you found out that there was substantial opportunity for the 19
22   hijackers to work out a plan together, wasn't there?
23   A.   Yes, there was.
24   Q.   Okay.  And how long did the 19 hijackers themselves
25   familiarize themselves with the plan?

 1   A.   It's hard to say, sir, because they would have had varying
 2   degrees of, of knowledge of the plot at various times, so some
 3   people might have known of the plan for a year, some for more, a
 4   year and a half, others for far less time.
 5   Q.   Okay.  In your investigation, were you able to determine that
 6   there were times when the teams of hijackers were together?
 7   A.   Yes.
 8   Q.   Okay.  And how long before 9/11 were the various teams
 9   together?
10   A.   They started coming together as soon as essentially the
11   support hijackers arrived.  Certainly some of the pilot hijackers
12   were paired up prior to that, but if you're talking about large
13   groups of them, certainly by April and May of 2001.
14   Q.   Okay.  When -- when is your -- your best information, it was
15   the -- do you know when it was when they were divided up into
16   teams?
17   A.   It's hard for me to say, sir, like what constitutes a
18   specific flight team other than when they made their reservations.
19   Certainly when I summarized, they were essentially in two teams
20   during the summer of 2001, one in Patterson, New Jersey, and one
21   in Florida.  It's hard for me to subdivide them unless you have a
22   specific date in mind.
23   Q.   Okay.  But there's no question your investigation uncovered
24   that the 19 hijackers for September 11 spent a whole lot of time
25   together planning and working on what they were going to do in

 1   teams on September 11; is that correct?
 2             MR. RASKIN:  Objection, Your Honor.  Objection.  I
 3   didn't understand the question.  "Some amount of time?"  I'd ask
 4   for more specificity.
 5             MR. MAC MAHON:  If you want me to try again, Your Honor?
 6             THE COURT:  Try again.
 7             MR. MAC MAHON:  I will.
 8             THE COURT:  Yes.  I sustain the objection to the form of
 9   the question, not the general content.
10             MR. MAC MAHON:  I'll try to make it a better question,
11   Judge.
12   Q.   Agent, in your investigation, you were able to determine that
13   the four teams that were on these flights that we just heard about
14   had time to plan together to work in teams to hijack the planes;
15   isn't that correct?
16   A.   Yes.  They had time together to do that, yes.
17   Q.   Sometimes they had months together, didn't they?
18   A.   Yes, sometimes they did.
19   Q.   Sometimes they had more than months together, correct?
20   A.   Yes.
21   Q.   And so the, the -- the exhibit you just showed us where you
22   showed all these similarities between what all these men did, your
23   investigation showed that they did similar things because they
24   were planning together; isn't that correct?
25   A.   Yes, I would say that's correct.

 1   Q.   All right.  Now, if we could put up -- I guess this is --
 2   well, let me just -- I'll ask it to you this way, because one of
 3   your exhibits has all the hijackers' names on it.  Again, you've
 4   looked at how many phone records do you think, Agent?
 5   A.   Myself personally, sir?
 6   Q.   Yeah.
 7   A.   On the order of thousands.
 8   Q.   Thousands.  And you've looked at Mr. Moussaoui's phone
 9   records as well, haven't you?
10   A.   I have.
11   Q.   Right.  And you looked at all 19 hijackers' phone records
12   while they were in the United States as well?
13   A.   I have.
14   Q.   And through this detailed investigation, you were able to
15   look at all their prepaid calling cards and figure out who they
16   were calling, correct?
17   A.   Yes, sir.
18   Q.   Okay.  And in the largest investigation in the history of the
19   FBI, you didn't uncover a single phone call from Moussaoui to
20   Mohamed Atta, did you?
21   A.   From Moussaoui to Mohamed Atta?
22   Q.   Yes.
23   A.   No, sir.
24   Q.   And no call from Mohamed Atta to Moussaoui, either, right?
25   A.   No.

 1   Q.   No phone calls from Marwan al-Shehhi to Zacarias Moussaoui,
 2   either, right?
 3   A.   Not that we could find, no.
 4   Q.   Right.  And none from the other way around, right?  Either
 5   way, from Moussaoui to al-Shehhi, al-Shehhi to Moussaoui, nothing,
 6   right?
 7   A.   No, sir, not that we could find.
 8   Q.   And with Ziad Jarrah, it would be the same question, and
 9   you'd give me the same answer, wouldn't you?
10   A.   Yes, I would.
11   Q.   Never found a thing, right?
12   A.   As far as direct telephonic connection between Ziad Jarrah
13   and Zacarias Moussaoui?
14   Q.   Yes.
15   A.   No, we haven't found that, sir.
16   Q.   And you found a lot of interaction between Atta and al-Shehhi
17   and Hanjour and Jarrah, right?
18   A.   Yes, we did.  Direct connection, yes.
19   Q.   They were all talking on the phone all the time to each
20   other, didn't they?
21   A.   I don't know if it's fair to characterize them as they were
22   all talking together on the phone at the same time, but they were
23   certainly associating in the same places.  Telephone records are
24   less definitive than that.
25   Q.   All right.  But you didn't find a single phone call from

 1   Moussaoui to Hani Hanjour, did you?
 2   A.   No, sir, I did not.
 3   Q.   And you never found a call from Hani Hanjour to Moussaoui or
 4   vice versa either way, right?
 5   A.   No.
 6   Q.   Same with Satam al-Suqami, right?
 7   A.   No, did not find it.
 8   Q.   Same way with Waleed al-Shehri?  No phone calls to or from
 9   either one of them, right?
10   A.   No, sir.
11   Q.   Wail al-Shehri?  I'm sorry if I just butchered that name,
12   Your Honor, but Wail?  How do I say that name, Agent?
13   A.   You said it right, sir, Wail al-Shehri.
14   Q.   Did you find any phone calls from him or him to Moussaoui or
15   vice versa?
16   A.   No, sir.
17   Q.   How about Abdul Aziz Alomari?
18   A.   No, sir, we haven't found so far any records between the 19
19   hijackers directly and Mr. Moussaoui.
20   Q.   So I don't have to ask you about every one of them.  You'll
21   tell me you didn't find in your investigation a phone call that
22   that man made to any one of the 19 people that hijacked the planes
23   on 9/11, right?
24   A.   No, sir.
25   Q.   And you didn't find a telephone call from one of them to him,

 1   either, right?
 2   A.   Directly, no, sir.
 3   Q.   Ever at any time?
 4   A.   No, sir.
 5   Q.   Did you ever find an e-mail addressed from Mr. Moussaoui to
 6   any of these people?
 7   A.   No, sir, we did not.
 8   Q.   Okay.  And you made a very diligent search looking for that
 9   as well, right?
10   A.   Yes, sir, we did.
11   Q.   And you never found any place in America where these people
12   were together, right?
13   A.   Where which people, sir?
14   Q.   Where Moussaoui was with any one of these people on your
15   exhibit which shows similarities.  Moussaoui wasn't with, in the
16   United States, ever, any one of these people, was he?
17   A.   Sir, I cannot put them with him, no, that's correct.
18   Q.   Okay.  And you tried, didn't you?
19   A.   I'm not saying they weren't together, but I'm saying I could
20   not put them with him.
21   Q.   You tried as hard as you could to do it, too?
22   A.   Yes, sir.
23   Q.   And you tried to find phone connections between them, and you
24   couldn't find them?
25   A.   What do you mean by phone connections, sir?

 1   Q.   You tried as hard as you could to establish the telephonic
 2   contact that you told me doesn't exist as well, right?
 3   A.   Direct telephonic contact, correct, sir.
 4   Q.   Now, you told us -- you told the jury that the tickets for
 5   9/11 were actually purchased beginning on, on August 25 of 2001,
 6   right?
 7   A.   I may have said purchased, sir.  If that's the case, the
 8   statement is that they were reserved beginning on the 25th of
 9   August.  I'm making the distinction between when they actually
10   reserved the tickets and when they purchased them.
11   Q.   And in your investigation, you found no attempt by any of the
12   9/11 hijackers to buy a plane ticket on August 16, 2001, did you?
13   A.   A plane ticket for September 11?
14   Q.   Yes.
15   A.   No, sir.
16   Q.   Or on August 17, no tickets for September 11, right?
17   A.   No, sir.
18   Q.   August 18, no tickets for September 11, correct?
19   A.   No, sir.
20   Q.   August 19?
21             MR. RASKIN:  Your Honor, we'll stipulate that Agent
22   Fitzgerald found no tickets or reservations for September 11
23   flights before August 25.
24             THE COURT:  All right, that's fine.
25             MR. MAC MAHON:  Okay.

 1   Q.   And you have no evidence in your investigation of any of the
 2   19 hijackers calling to Oklahoma between the 16th or the 25th at
 3   all, right?
 4   A.   16th to the 25th?
 5   Q.   August 16, 2001, and August 25?
 6             MR. RASKIN:  Asked and answered, Your Honor.  He's
 7   already said there's no --
 8             MR. MAC MAHON:  This is a different question, Your
 9   Honor.
10             THE COURT:  It is a different question.  I'm going to
11   overrule the objection.
12             MR. RASKIN:  Withdraw the objection.
14   Q.   No evidence, Agent, of any calls from any of the hijackers to
15   the State of Oklahoma between August 16 and August 25, right?
16   A.   No.
17   Q.   And none to the State of Minnesota, either, right?
18   A.   I don't believe so, no, sir.
19   Q.   And when Moussaoui arrived in the United States, all four of
20   the pilots from 9/11 already actually had their flight -- already
21   had their pilot's licenses, didn't they?
22   A.   Yes, they did.
23   Q.   All right.  And they were very busy preparing for 9/11,
24   weren't they?
25   A.   At that time, I don't know if you could say that they were

 1   busy, sir, because there was sort of a gap in time between the
 2   time they finished their flight training and the time that the
 3   other hijackers had arrived, so I'm not able to say what they were
 4   doing at that time.
 5   Q.   You would agree with me that by the time Moussaoui arrived in
 6   the United States, Atta, al-Shehhi, Jarrah, and Hanjour had even
 7   begun flight simulator training, hadn't they?
 8   A.   Yes, I would.
 9   Q.   And they continued to do it, didn't they?
10   A.   They continued until -- the last one who took it was Hani
11   Hanjour through February of -- correction, through March of 2001.
12   Q.   Right.  They continued to rent airplanes in the United
13   States, didn't they?
14   A.   Yes, they did.
15   Q.   And sometimes together, didn't they?
16   A.   On occasion together, yes.
17   Q.   And in your investigation, you learned that Mohamed Atta and
18   Marwan al-Shehhi once left a plane on the runway at the Miami
19   International Airport, correct?
20   A.   Yes.
21   Q.   And nobody, nobody raised any concerns about that?
22   A.   You have to define what you mean by no one, sir.  It raised a
23   pretty large problem at Miami Airport.  It caused a problem for
24   their flight school, Huffman Aviation.  I don't know if it caused
25   a problem with the FAA or not.

 1   Q.   When was that, Agent?
 2   A.   That was in late December roughly, 2000.
 3   Q.   Okay.  Was there a written report made that two Muslim men
 4   had just abandoned a plane on a runway?
 5   A.   Not to my knowledge, no.
 6   Q.   Did you look at the FAA records for that?
 7   A.   I didn't look for that specific record, but I would imagine,
 8   sir, if I may speculate, that we would have found something like
 9   that if it existed.
10   Q.   Okay.  The incident was that the plane stalled, and rather
11   than -- and Atta couldn't start the plane, so instead, he just got
12   out on the runway and walked back in, right?
13             MR. RASKIN:  Objection to the form and to the
14   argumentative nature of the question.
15             THE COURT:  Well, let me just find out, are you aware of
16   that particular incident?
17             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honor.
18             THE COURT:  Was that an accurate description of it by
19   Mr. MacMahon?
20             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honor.
21             THE COURT:  Objection overruled.
22             MR. MAC MAHON:  Thank you, Your Honor.
23   Q.   Someone did complain about Hani Hanjour to the FAA, didn't
24   they?  Your investigation uncovered that, didn't it?
25   A.   Yes.

 1   Q.   Okay.  And when did somebody complain to the Federal Aviation
 2   Administration about Hani Hanjour?
 3   A.   In roughly, I'll have to estimate, roughly February-March of
 4   2001.
 5   Q.   And to your knowledge, what was the complaint?
 6   A.   The complaint was that Hani Hanjour was a, a poor pilot,
 7   ill-suited for flight training simulator, ill-suited for the
 8   training he was undergoing at that time at Pan Am Jet Tech.
 9   Q.   And that was in Phoenix, correct?
10   A.   Yes.
11   Q.   That's where Agent Williams is based, right?
12   A.   Yes.
13   Q.   Okay.  And what to your knowledge was done with that
14   complaint?
15   A.   I know that FAA had some contact with Pan Am Jet Tech.  I
16   don't know the extent of the investigation of the FAA into
17   Hanjour.  I know that he was allowed to continue his training.
18   Q.   Okay.  And this was all before September 11, right?
19   A.   It was.
20   Q.   You showed us an exhibit earlier which I believe was a
21   picture of the passport and visa of Khalid al-Midhar.  Do you
22   remember that?
23   A.   Yes, I do.
24   Q.   Okay.  And you told the jury that was something that was
25   uncovered in the FBI's post-9/11 investigation, right?

 1   A.   Yes.
 2   Q.   That wasn't correct, was it?
 3   A.   I believe it was, sir.
 4   Q.   Didn't the FBI have a copy of that passport and visa long
 5   before 9/11?
 6   A.   Not to my knowledge, sir.
 7   Q.   In your investigation, you haven't learned that in the year
 8   2000, that -- year 2001 specifically, that the CIA gave a copy of
 9   that exact passport and visa to the FBI?
10   A.   I'm not aware that they gave such copy to the FBI.  I'm aware
11   of, of events similar to what you're describing happening.  I
12   don't know the full nature of, of the information that was
13   provided to the FBI.  I do know something like that had occurred.
14   Q.   Okay.  And do you know when it was that the FBI finally got a
15   copy of the visa and passport of Khalid al-Midhar?
16   A.   I do not know precisely when the FBI received that
17   information, sir.
18   Q.   It was long before September 11, wasn't it?
19   A.   I don't know, sir.
20   Q.   Do you know whether the FBI was having a meeting about Khalid
21   al-Midhar on the day that he landed in New York in July of 2001?
22   A.   I don't know if it was that exact day, sir, but I'm aware
23   that there was a meeting at the FBI in New York concerning Khalid
24   al-Midhar.
25   Q.   Right.  And the topic of that meeting was somebody looking

 1   for Mr. Khalid al-Midhar in our country, right?
 2             MR. RASKIN:  Objection to form.
 3             MR. MAC MAHON:  In the United States, Your Honor.
 5   Q.   The topic of the meeting was for the FBI to search for Khalid
 6   al-Midhar in the United States, correct?
 7   A.   That's not my recollection of that meeting, sir.  I was not
 8   at that meeting.  That's not my recollection of the purpose of
 9   that meeting.
10   Q.   But in the investigation, you learned that on that day, it
11   became known that Mr. Al-Midhar was -- in fact, had a visa and a
12   passport to come into the United States, correct?
13   A.   I don't have the knowledge that those agents had as to what
14   exactly was provided to them or when it was provided to them.  I
15   understand the information that you're talking about, and I'm
16   aware of it.  I simply do not know when that information was
17   provided to those people and under what nature.
18   Q.   So your -- the exhibit that you showed the jury, you can't
19   tell whether that's the passport and visa that was given to the
20   FBI before September 11 or it was the one after September 11,
21   right?
22   A.   Oh, I can definitely tell.  I know precisely where those
23   documents came from.  If you look at, which I'm sure you have,
24   sir, at the exhibit list, we've articulated where those
25   photocopies came from, and those were seized pursuant to the FBI

 1   investigation after September 11.
 2   Q.   Okay.  Have you seen the one that was given to the FBI before
 3   9/11?
 4   A.   I have not, sir.
 5   Q.   Now, in all of the information we saw up on the screen --
 6   well, let me ask you this:  Did you also have information that
 7   when Khalid al-Midhar, you've learned in your investigation, lived
 8   in Los Angeles, California, that he actually lived with an FBI
 9   informant; isn't that correct?
10   A.   I have heard that, sir, yes.
11   Q.   All right.
12   A.   I have learned that.
13   Q.   And he lived there with Nawaf al-Hazmi in San Diego,
14   California, in the year 2000 with an FBI informant, correct?
15   A.   There was a very short period of overlap at that time.  I
16   know one of those two individuals, Nawaf al-Hazmi, lived with him
17   for a number of months.  Khalid al-Midhar was there for a much
18   shorter time, I would estimate on the order of several weeks.
19   Q.   Okay.  But nobody in the FBI ever asked the informant to find
20   out who these two guys were, right?
21   A.   No.  I don't know that the FBI knew of those two individuals
22   from the informant.  I don't know that the informant ever provided
23   any sort of information regarding them, so I don't know that
24   agents would ask about them.  They would be asking about something
25   that they don't know.

 1   Q.   Okay.  So to your knowledge then, nobody ever looked for
 2   Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi when they lived in California,
 3   right?
 4             MR. RASKIN:  Objection to "nobody."  Is it an FBI agent
 5   in New York?  Is it an FBI agent --
 6             MR. MAC MAHON:  I'll rephrase the question.
 7             THE COURT:  But this agent was offered by the government
 8   to be a summary witness of the FBI's post-September 11
 9   investigation.
10             Were you working on counterterrorism issues before
11   September 11?
12             THE WITNESS:  No, Your Honor.
13             THE COURT:  What was your general assignment before
14   September 11?
15             THE WITNESS:  I worked organized crime in New York.
16             THE COURT:  Then it's unfair to ask this agent.  I know
17   there are other witnesses out there who are going to get into this
18   topic, but I think it's -- he was offered for a specific area,
19   which is what the FBI did to discover what happened after
20   September 11 occurred.
21             MR. MAC MAHON:  Oh, I was trying to frame the question
22   as to what he learned in the investigation.
23             THE COURT:  All right.
24             MR. MAC MAHON: I was aware that he wasn't, but --
25   Q.   For example, sir, after -- in the 9/11 investigation, you

 1   learned that Khalid al-Midhar had bank cards in his own name in
 2   the United States, didn't you?
 3   A.   During the investigation, yes, I did.
 4   Q.   One of them at the Bank of America in San Diego, California?
 5   You learned that, didn't you?
 6   A.   Yes.
 7   Q.   And Nawaf al-Hazmi had an account at the same bank, didn't
 8   he?
 9   A.   Yes, he did.
10   Q.   In his own name?
11   A.   Yes, he did.
12   Q.   And then Khalid al-Midhar opened a bank account in his own
13   name, you learned, the Hudson United Bank in New Jersey, correct?
14   A.   Yes, he did.
15   Q.   And at that same bank, Nawaf al-Hazmi opened an account as
16   well, right?
17   A.   Yes, he did.
18   Q.   And you learned in the investigation that in -- that Khalid
19   al-Midhar also opened a bank account at First Union Bank in -- I
20   may be saying this wrong -- Totowa, New Jersey?
21   A.   Yes.
22   Q.   And you looked through all those bank records, didn't you?
23   A.   Myself and my colleagues did, yes.
24   Q.   Is that one of the records that we saw here of a bank
25   transfer in West Virginia?

 1   A.   In -- not in West Virginia, sir, but in western --
 2   Q.   Excuse me.
 3   A.   Yes, sir.
 4   Q.   And it wasn't that far from here, right?
 5   A.   Yes.
 6   Q.   And Mr. Nawaf al-Hazmi opened an account in the Dime Savings
 7   Bank at the same time, right?
 8   A.   I'd have to look at the records, sir, to refresh my memory.
 9   They had a lot of bank accounts.
10   Q.   Which one of these two's name was listed in the phone book in
11   San Diego?
12   A.   That was Nawaf al-Hazmi.
13   Q.   And Khalid al-Midhar used his own name to lease an apartment,
14   right?
15   A.   Yes, he did.
16   Q.   That was in San Diego, California, correct?
17   A.   Yes, it was.
18   Q.   And Nawaf al-Hazmi also was on that lease, wasn't he?
19   A.   Yes, he was.
20   Q.   Okay.  And these men intermingled a lot with the other
21   hijackers, didn't they, while they were in the United States?
22   Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi spent a lot of time with the
23   other hijackers in the United States is what your investigation
24   showed, right?
25   A.   Only after approximately June of 2001.  We could not find any

 1   contact between Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar with any of
 2   the other hijackers prior to June of 2001.
 3   Q.   When did al-Hazmi meet up with Hanjour in Mesa, Arizona?
 4   A.   That was in December, and I -- that's my mischaracterization.
 5   Let me try and redefine my answer.  In the two groups that I've
 6   talked about previously, generally one group, consisting of Hani
 7   Hanjour, Nawaf al-Hazmi, and Khalid al-Midhar, the second group
 8   consisting of Ziad Jarrah, Mohamed Atta, and Marwan al-Shehhi,
 9   generally the FBI -- in fact, specifically, the FBI cannot find
10   interaction between those two groups -- in this case, we'd call it
11   an East Coast and a West Coast group -- until roughly June of
12   2001.  I forgot to include Hani Hanjour when I was stating that
13   previously.
14   Q.   That's fine, Agent.  But Nawaf al-Hazmi did meet up with Hani
15   Hanjour in Mesa, Arizona, didn't he?
16   A.   Yes, he did.
17   Q.   When was that?
18   A.   Roughly early January of 2001.
19   Q.   Right.  And that was a place where Hanjour was taking flight
20   lessons, right?
21   A.   Yes.
22   Q.   At a flight simulator school, this is where he attracted the
23   attention that we talked about before, right?
24   A.   Two separate places, sir.  When he initially went to Arizona,
25   he was at Arizona Aviation taking refresher courses.  It was only

 1   later in February and March that he went to Pan Am International
 2   Jet Tech at a different location when he was taking his simulator
 3   training, that he actually raised suspicions of someone there who
 4   contacted the FAA.  So two separate places.
 5   Q.   And part of the problem was his inability to speak English,
 6   too, right?
 7   A.   That was part of it, yes.
 8   Q.   He stuck out because, as someone who claimed to be a pilot,
 9   he couldn't speak English, right?
10   A.   That was part of the problem.
11   Q.   A pilot needs to be able to speak English, right?
12   A.   Yes.
13   Q.   But he had a commercial flight license from 1996, didn't he?
14   A.   I don't know if he -- he started his training back in 1996.
15   I believe he actually completed his final commercial rating
16   roughly in the 1999 time frame, before he returned back to the
17   area of Saudi Arabia.
18   Q.   Okay.  And did he get that training -- he'd been in the
19   United States before then, hadn't he?
20   A.   Yes, he had.
21   Q.   When was that?
22   A.   The earliest we can trace him coming back to the United
23   States is back roughly around 1991.  Very few records exist from
24   back there.  And he came back sporadically to the United States
25   during the 1990s.

 1   Q.   And you were able in your investigation to find that Hani
 2   Hanjour spent time in Alexandria, Virginia, with Nawaf al-Hazmi as
 3   well, right?
 4   A.   Yes.
 5   Q.   When was that?
 6   A.   That was roughly in April of 2001.
 7   Q.   Was that when -- about the time that al-Midhar reported a
 8   crime in Alexandria, Virginia?
 9   A.   No.  Al-Midhar was not in the country at that time.
10   Q.   Okay.  Which one of these two reported a crime in Fairfax,
11   Virginia?
12   A.   Nawaf al-Hazmi.
13   Q.   Okay.  And when was that?
14   A.   I believe it's in April of 2001.  I don't know the precise
15   date.
16   Q.   Okay.  And did Nawaf al-Hazmi call the police?
17   A.   Yes, he did.
18   Q.   Where did Nawaf al-Hazmi -- where was he when he called the
19   police?
20   A.   I don't know.
21   Q.   And in your investigation, did you determine what name he
22   used when he called the police?
23   A.   I believe it was in his true name.
24   Q.   What did the police do, did your investigation determine?
25   A.   Nawaf al-Hazmi was essentially mugged, and he didn't want to

 1   file any charges, so the police dropped the matter.
 2   Q.   Is there a written report of that?
 3   A.   Yes, there is.
 4   Q.   Did Mr. Al-Hazmi sign it?
 5   A.   I'm not aware if he signed it or not.
 6   Q.   Did he give an address?
 7   A.   I'm not aware.
 8   Q.   At that time, was his name on any lookout list in the United
 9   States?
10   A.   Not to my knowledge, no.
11   Q.   Any other 9/11 hijackers report crimes while they were in the
12   United States?
13   A.   I think at least one was in a car accident possibly on the
14   George Washington Bridge.  I can't remember the exact date.
15   That's the only other thing that comes to mind as far as reporting
16   something or being involved in something.
17   Q.   Who was that?
18   A.   I can't remember precisely.  Either al-Midhar or al-Hazmi.
19   Q.   Got in a car wreck outside of New York City, and what, did
20   they give their license to a New York state trooper?
21   A.   I don't know the circumstances -- I don't recall the
22   circumstances of the accident.  It was apparently some sort of
23   minor fender-bender, and nothing was done with it.
24   Q.   Was insurance information swapped?
25   A.   I don't believe even insurance information was swapped.

 1   Q.   Because he had insurance in his own name in our country,
 2   didn't he?
 3   A.   He did.
 4   Q.   Both al-Midhar and al-Hazmi had bought insurance policies in
 5   their own name in the United States, right?
 6   A.   I know Nawaf al-Hazmi did.  I'm not sure about al-Midhar.  I
 7   presume he did.
 8   Q.   Al-Midhar had a car, a 1988 Toyota Corolla that he purchased
 9   and registered in his own name in this country, didn't he?
10   A.   He did.
11   Q.   Where was that registered?
12   A.   That was initially registered in California.
13   Q.   And in what name?
14   A.   Under his name, under Khalid al-Midhar's name.
15   Q.   Did he get a driver's license there, too?
16   A.   Yes, he did.
17   Q.   What name did he use to get his driver's license?
18   A.   He used his name, Khalid al-Midhar, although I'm not sure of
19   the exact spelling.
20   Q.   And Nawaf al-Hazmi had a car as well, right?
21   A.   He actually took ownership of that same Toyota Corolla from
22   Khalid al-Midhar.
23   Q.   They filed a form, and they signed it, Khalid al-Midhar and
24   Nawaf al-Hazmi, and they took it down to the California DMV and
25   transferred ownership, right?

 1   A.   Yes, they did.
 2   Q.   And what names did they use to do that?
 3   A.   They used their true names.
 4   Q.   And how many times did Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi
 5   rent automobiles in their own names in the United States?
 6   A.   On a number of occasions.  I don't know how many.  I would
 7   estimate on the order of five or six times.
 8   Q.   In that time frame, if you rented a car, would it go into a
 9   computerized database?
10   A.   For the rental car company?
11   Q.   Yes.
12   A.   Yes.
13   Q.   And would the insurance information go in as well?
14   A.   I'm not aware, sir.
15   Q.   Okay.  And what names did Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar
16   use to rent cars in the United States?
17   A.   In their true names.
18   Q.   Did Khalid al-Midhar get a Virginia driver's license at some
19   point in time?
20   A.   I cannot recall, sir.  I don't know.
21   Q.   August 1, 2001, you don't know?
22   A.   I don't know, sir.  He may have.  I can't recall.
23   Q.   How about Nawaf al-Hazmi?  Did he have a California driver's
24   license?
25   A.   He did.

 1   Q.   What name did he use to get that?
 2   A.   His true name.
 3   Q.   How about a Florida license issued on June 25 of '01?
 4   A.   Yes.
 5   Q.   Whose name did he use to get that?
 6   A.   That was his name.  He turned in his California driver's
 7   license and received a Florida driver's license.
 8   Q.   Okay.  And Mr. Al-Midhar actually signed up for flight
 9   training at one point in time, right?
10   A.   No.
11   Q.   At the Sorbi Flying Club in San Diego, California?
12   A.   Yes, sir, he took flight training, but it's not correct to
13   say he signed up for it.  In other words, he didn't enroll in a
14   flight training program.  He paid for what could be considered an
15   introductory flight lesson.  A flight instructor took him up and
16   flew him around, but it would be different than enrolling in a
17   flight school.
18   Q.   Well, he came and tried to get into a flight school, correct?
19   A.   I don't know if you can say he tried to get into a flight
20   school, sir.  I know he came and took an introductory flight
21   lesson.  I can't say whether or not he actually applied to a
22   flight school.
23   Q.   And what name did he use in the paperwork at the Sorbi flying
24   school in San Diego?
25   A.   He used the name Khalid, sir.

 1   Q.   Didn't use his last name there?
 2   A.   I don't recall if he used his last name or not.
 3   Q.   How about Nawaf al-Hazmi?  Did he try to get some flight
 4   training, too?
 5   A.   He did a similar thing, sir.  He took an introductory flight
 6   lesson, once again did not enroll in flight training, similar to
 7   Khalid al-Midhar.
 8   Q.   He went to the National Air College in San Diego, California,
 9   didn't he?
10   A.   Nawaf al-Hazmi?
11   Q.   Yes?
12   A.   Yes, he did.
13   Q.   And what name did he use to enroll there?
14   A.   He didn't enroll, sir.
15   Q.   What name did he use to get services there, sir?
16   A.   His true name.
17   Q.   And on the ticket from Thailand to Los Angeles that Khalid
18   al-Midhar, the flight from Thailand to Los Angeles that Khalid
19   al-Midhar -- what name did he use there?
20   A.   His true name.
21   Q.   And what did he have to do to get through Customs?
22   A.   I would presume present the passport.  I'm not exactly sure,
23   sir.
24   Q.   And how about Nawaf al-Hazmi?  He was on a flight from
25   Thailand to the United States on January 15 of 2000 as well,

 1   right?
 2   A.   Yes.
 3   Q.   And he used his own name for those tickets, too, right?
 4   A.   Yes, he did.
 5   Q.   Where was he seated on the plane, al-Hazmi, compared to
 6   al-Midhar?
 7   A.   They were next to each other.
 8   Q.   In your investigation, when did the FBI first get the flight
 9   manifest to that flight from Thailand to Los Angeles, California?
10   A.   I can't say, sir, when the FBI first received it.  I would
11   assume it was sometime shortly after September 11, but I don't
12   know.  I have no first-hand knowledge of when we got it.
13   Q.   And al-Midhar flew from San Diego to Los Angeles and on to
14   Oman, correct, June of 2000?
15   A.   He flew from San Diego to -- no, he flew from San Diego to
16   Frankfurt, Germany, and then on to Oman.
17   Q.   Okay.  And did he use his own name to buy that ticket?
18   A.   Yes.
19   Q.   And then al-Hazmi went from Newark to Miami and back again in
20   June of '01, correct?
21   A.   Yes, he did.
22   Q.   And what name did he use to fly on those planes?
23   A.   His true name.
24   Q.   And when Khalid al-Midhar came back to the United States in
25   2001, on July 4, what name did he use to get back into the

 1   country?
 2   A.   He used his true name, and he had a new passport.
 3   Q.   But he still had a multiple entry visa to go in and out of
 4   the United States at will, right?
 5   A.   That's correct.
 6   Q.   And that's because he was a Saudi citizen, right?
 7   A.   I don't know.
 8   Q.   And on August 13, 2001, Nawaf al-Hazmi took flights from
 9   Dulles to Los Angeles and to Las Vegas, correct?
10   A.   Yes, he did.
11   Q.   Okay.  And what name did he use to purchase those tickets?
12   A.   His true name.
13   Q.   Who was with him on that flight?
14   A.   Hani Hanjour was.
15   Q.   And what name did Hanjour use?
16   A.   His true name.
17   Q.   And al-Midhar got mailboxes in his own name as well, didn't
18   he?
19   A.   Yes, he did.
20   Q.   In New Jersey, right?
21   A.   Yes.
22   Q.   And al-Hazmi did the same thing, didn't he?
23   A.   Yes.
24   Q.   How many hotel rooms did Nawaf al-Hazmi or Khalid al-Midhar
25   rent in their own names in the United States?

 1   A.   I would say multiple.
 2   Q.   More than ten?
 3   A.   At an estimate, probably about ten each.
 4   Q.   And each time, they used their own name to sign in, right?
 5   A.   Mostly, yes.
 6   Q.   And they used the credit cards that had their own names on it
 7   to pay the charges?
 8   A.   Oftentimes they tried to pay cash, but if not, then they used
 9   a debit card in their true name.
10   Q.   They used e-mail accounts, right?
11   A.   Yes, they did.
12   Q.   And are you able to tell us how many times they were in close
13   proximity in the United States to another 9/11 hijacker?
14   A.   Which ones?
15   Q.   Excuse me, al-Midhar or al-Hazmi.
16   A.   Well, as I mentioned previously, sir, al-Midhar and al-Hazmi
17   were in close proximity with the Flight 77 hijackers for much of
18   the time they were here.  They were in close proximity to some of
19   the other ones at other times.  You'd have to specify what times
20   and what persons you are interested in.
21   Q.   You don't disagree that those -- Nawaf al-Hazmi or Khalid
22   al-Midhar at one time or another in the United States was in the
23   presence of almost every hijacker that died on September 11; isn't
24   that correct?
25   A.   I don't think I could say that, sir.  There were a number of

 1   hijackers down in Florida that I don't know if Nawaf al-Hazmi ever
 2   met.
 3   Q.   So it's just a few that he might not have met?
 4   A.   I don't know.  If you're asking me to estimate, I could try
 5   to.
 6   Q.   Well, you would have been able to say they were with every
 7   pilot, right?  Nawaf al-Hazmi or Khalid al-Midhar at one time or
 8   another was with Mohamed Atta, right?
 9   A.   Yes.
10   Q.   Was with Hani Hanjour, right?
11   A.   Yes.
12   Q.   Was with Marwan al-Shehhi?
13   A.   That's less certain, sir, because he didn't make very many
14   trips back and forth to New Jersey.  In fact, I'd be hard-placed
15   now to think of a time when they might have come into contact with
16   Marwan al-Shehhi.
17   Q.   How about Ziad Jarrah?
18   A.   Ziad Jarrah made a specific trip up there, so yes.
19   Q.   Now, you mentioned a -- these prepaid calling cards and all
20   the work that the FBI did after September 11.  Tell us in a little
21   more detail what it takes to learn from a prepaid calling card
22   who's actually been using the card and otherwise.
23             MR. RASKIN:  Just clarification:  This is what the FBI
24   can do with a prepaid calling card?
25             THE COURT:  That's all this witness could testify to.

 1             MR. MAC MAHON:  I thought that was my question, Your
 2   Honor.  If I misspoke, I apologize.
 3             THE COURT:  Just making it clear.
 4             THE WITNESS:  Specifically, the first thing to do is to,
 5   No. 1, identify that calling card as a card of interest, and what
 6   I mean by that is, the example I gave during my testimony was we
 7   identified the cell phone of Marwan al-Shehhi.  From that, we
 8   identified that that cell phone was called by a person using a
 9   prepaid calling card.
10             So once we identified that a prepaid calling card was
11   used to call a number that we know was connected with the
12   hijackers, then we investigate that calling card.  Looking at that
13   calling card, we then look at all the calling activity for that
14   card, independent of any other calls that might have been made to
15   that first phone, and by matching up by place and by date where
16   that calling card was used, and comparing that with the locations
17   of hijackers, if they're known, we can sometimes place a calling
18   card, circumstantially, very closely in the hands of a hijacker.
19   Q.   Okay.  And what's the general term, if somebody hands an FBI
20   agent a prepaid calling card and says, "Figure out whose this is
21   and who he called," what's the general turnaround time on that?
22   A.   For an emergency, you could probably do it in a matter of
23   hours.
24   Q.   Matter of hours?
25   A.   But when you say whose this is, sir, that's more problematic,

 1   because it depends what sort of calling activity the calling card
 2   has been used for.  I would be presuming that that card has
 3   already been used to make a number of calls.  If those calls are
 4   from a pay phone to a pay phone, and that's all there is on there,
 5   potentially we might never identify who that belongs to.
 6             There has to be some way of us associating that card
 7   with a particular person.  Sometimes there's enough calling
 8   activity on there to do that, and sometimes there isn't.  But
 9   to -- to do reverses, or to do what I was speaking of before can
10   be done in a matter of hours, if not less, in an emergency.
11   Q.   It would all depend on having some clue, first, right?
12   A.   Yes, sir.  There would have to be some reason why we would
13   look at a prepaid calling card.
14   Q.   What was the -- how many of the 9/11 hijackers were
15   affiliated with this 755 Dotterel Road address in Delray Beach,
16   Florida?
17   A.   I would have to estimate, sir, but a number of hijackers,
18   probably at least a half a dozen.
19   Q.   Where is that apartment?
20   A.   I believe it's in Delray Beach, Florida, but I'd have to
21   check a document to be certain.
22   Q.   It was rented by Hamza al-Ghamdi in June of 2001?
23   A.   Yes.
24   Q.   And a real estate agent in that area, your investigation
25   determined, had shown that apartment to Marwan al-Shehhi, right?

 1   A.   Yes.
 2   Q.   And Hamza al-Ghamdi used that address for his Florida
 3   driver's license on June 27, right?
 4   A.   Yes, he did.
 5   Q.   And the FBI recovered a five-page document from Hamza
 6   al-Ghamdi to the hijacker al-Nami in which he mentions living
 7   there, right?
 8   A.   You have to be specific as to which document you're referring
 9   to, sir.
10   Q.   Did the FBI recover any documents that showed that Hamza
11   al-Ghamdi lived at 755 Dotterel Road with Waleed and Mohand
12   al-Shehri?
13   A.   Yes, I know there are a number of documents recovered, but
14   I'd have to look at specific documents so I can accurately testify
15   as to who was with whom at that address.
16   Q.   A lot of them lived at that address, right?
17   A.   Yes.
18   Q.   Mostly the muscle hijackers?
19   A.   Yes.  To use that term, yes.
20   Q.   You know what I mean when I say that, right?  The non-pilot
21   hijackers?
22   A.   Yes.
23   Q.   Now, what was the longest time before -- while these
24   hijackers were in the United States that one of them actually
25   lived alone?

 1   A.   I would have to estimate, sir, but estimating for Ziad
 2   Jarrah, he probably lived alone from six to nine months
 3   potentially.
 4   Q.   Where did he live?
 5   A.   He lived in, I'm trying to think now, in the area of Venice,
 6   Florida.  I know when he took flight training at Florida Flight
 7   Training Center, I believe he had a roommate for a certain time
 8   and then moved out.  And he traveled around a lot, so it's hard
 9   for me to estimate exactly how much time he had spent alone.  I
10   would estimate six months.
11   Q.   Okay.  And during that time frame, though, he was going to
12   flight school with Mohamed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi, wasn't he?
13   A.   He was down the street from them, yes.
14   Q.   So he was in the close physical proximity of Marwan al-Shehhi
15   and Mohamed Atta for that whole time, right?
16   A.   He was close to them, yes.
17   Q.   Okay.  And any of the other hijackers who lived with nobody
18   within 50 miles of them for the whole time they were in the United
19   States?  Did your investigation uncover that?
20   A.   I can't think of occasions when single, solitary hijackers
21   lived more than 50 miles from anyone else, without being with
22   another hijacker, for an extended period of time.
23   Q.   And when you say an extended period of time, what do you
24   mean?
25   A.   I mean, some of these hijackers, other than someone like Ziad

 1   Jarrah, who seemed to be sort of a loner, other than someone like
 2   him, some of these hijackers went on trips for a number of days,
 3   perhaps a week or more, where they could have been, or at least as
 4   far as we can tell oftentimes were by themselves.  So other than
 5   that, and with the exception being possibly Ziad Jarrah --
 6   Q.   Just for a few days here and there?
 7   A.   For the other hijackers, yes, and for, like, if they took a
 8   trip for wherever, some of those trips to Las Vegas, or whatever.
 9   But other than Ziad Jarrah, most of them or all of them were with
10   someone for most of their time here.
11   Q.   All right.  And the whole time, there was never a time when
12   there was one of these hijackers who was alone, more than 500
13   miles from another hijacker, right, the whole time they were in
14   the United States?
15   A.   The whole time?  No.
16   Q.   What is -- have you been to Hamburg, Germany?
17   A.   I have not.
18   Q.   Do you know what's down the street from 54 Marienstrasse?
19   A.   I do not.
20             MR. MAC MAHON:  Let me just consult with counsel here,
21   Your Honor.  Just give me a second.
22             The Court's indulgence, Your Honor?
23             THE COURT:  Go ahead.
24             MR. MAC MAHON:  Thank you.  No further questions, Your
25   Honor.

 1             THE COURT:  All right.  Mr. Raskin, any redirect?
 2             MR. RASKIN:  Briefly, Your Honor.
 3                          REDIRECT EXAMINATION
 5   Q.   Agent Fitzgerald, did the FBI in the course of its 9/11
 6   investigation uncover any evidence indicating a contact between
 7   Zacarias Moussaoui and any of the coconspirators that you
 8   mentioned in your direct testimony?
 9   A.   Yes.
10   Q.   Which coconspirator was that?
11   A.   Ramzi Bin al-Shibh.
12   Q.   Agent Anticev, where was Nawaf al-Hazmi for the second half
13   of 2000?
14   A.   Nawaf al-Hazmi the second half of 2000 was in San Diego by
15   himself.
16   Q.   Thank you.
17             You were asked some questions on cross examination about
18   a crime that Nawaf al-Hazmi reported to the police in this area.
19   A.   Yes.
20   Q.   And what did the FBI learn about that report Nawaf al-Hazmi
21   made?
22   A.   My recollection of that report is that Nawaf al-Hazmi
23   reported getting mugged.  A police report was subsequently filled
24   out, and Nawaf al-Hazmi declined to press charges and did not want
25   to pursue the matter further.

 1   Q.   Did you learn whether Nawaf al-Hazmi told those police
 2   officers that he was a member of al Qaeda?
 3   A.   Yes.  Well, we know that he did not say that, sir, yes.
 4   Q.   Did he tell them about his flight training?
 5   A.   He did not.
 6   Q.   Did he tell them what the purpose was for his presence in the
 7   United States?
 8   A.   He did not.
 9             MR. RASKIN:  Nothing further, Your Honor.
10             THE COURT:  Is there any recross?
11             MR. MAC MAHON:  Just briefly, Your Honor.
12                          RECROSS EXAMINATION
14   Q.   With respect to Bin al-Shibh, when -- those telephone calls
15   and communications, Bin al-Shibh was in Europe at that time,
16   wasn't he?
17   A.   At which time, sir?
18   Q.   The conversations as to another coconspirator in the case,
19   that coconspirator was not in the United States, was he?
20   A.   Yes.  They were calling from the United States to Germany to
21   talk to Ramzi Bin al-Shibh.
22   Q.   Right.  And those calls lasted, over the entire period of
23   time, for about 25 minutes, didn't they, for four -- maybe a
24   week's worth of calls?
25   A.   You're talking about the defendant, sir?

 1   Q.   Yes.
 2   A.   Yes.  Yes, that's roughly correct.
 3             MR. MAC MAHON:  Nothing further, Your Honor.
 4             THE COURT:  All right, Agent, thank you for your
 5   testimony.  You may step down.
 6             I think rather than starting another witness now, since
 7   we're ten minutes from the closing for the day, we can stop unless
 8   there's some administrative things you want to do.
 9             MR. RASKIN:  No, Your Honor.
10             THE COURT:  No?
11             All right, ladies and gentlemen, then we're going to
12   excuse you for this evening.  Again, leave your notebooks either
13   on your chairs or in the jury room.  We'll get them back to you
14   tomorrow morning.  We appreciate the fact you were all here on
15   time.  I hope -- you know, we can't control traffic.  We can
16   control a lot of things, but not traffic.  So leave enough time,
17   please, to be here, and get a good night's rest, and avoid the
18   media, and we'll see you tomorrow morning.
19             Thank you.  We'll stay in session.  I have a couple of
20   matters to take up.
21                            (Jury out.)
22             THE COURT:  I'm only addressing this to Mr. Spencer
23   because he's sort of the first man on board:  Are we about where
24   you -- you-all can have a seat.
25             Are we about where you expected to be in terms of time,

 1   Mr. Spencer?
 2             MR. SPENCER:  No, we're behind, Your Honor.
 3             THE COURT:  We're behind?
 4             MR. SPENCER:  Yes.
 5             THE COURT:  That's all right.  Approximately how much?
 6   Half a day?  Quarter of a day?
 7             MR. SPENCER:  A few hours.
 8             THE COURT:  All right, that's fine.  There's no problem.
 9   I just wanted to get a sense of where we were.
10             I just want to make sure because the way -- there are so
11   many exhibits in this case, and the labeling of them is complex,
12   although one can figure it out, but in order for us to keep
13   control of the exhibits, once an exhibit is admitted into
14   evidence, all right, has been moved in, we have to have control of
15   it.  So if for any reason you-all need it for a witness, you need
16   to let Ms. Arnott know about that, all right?
17             MR. SPENCER:  Very well.
18             THE COURT:  All right, very good.
19             And you may need to spend a minute with her to sort
20   things out from today, all right?
21             Anything else of a housekeeping matter?
22             MR. SPENCER:  We have something we'd like to approach
23   on.  We're going to need the C machine.
24             THE COURT:  All right, that's fine.
25             (Bench Conference D not transcribed in this volume.)

 1             THE COURT:  There being nothing further then, we'll
 2   recess court until 9:30 tomorrow morning.
 3             (Recess from 5:29 p.m., until 9:30 a.m., March 8, 2006.)

 1                      CERTIFICATE OF THE REPORTERS
 2        We certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the
 3   record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
                                       Anneliese J. Thomson
 9                                        Karen Brynteson

 1                               I N D E X
 2                                    DIRECT  CROSS  REDIRECT  RECROSS
    JAMES M. FITZGERALD                240    341      385       386
                                       MARKED          RECEIVED
 9     AR-852                                               246
      AR-853                                               246
10     MM-651                                               249
      MM-8                                                 249
11     BR-3                                                 258
12     BR-4                                                 259
      BR-6                                                 263
13     BR-28A and B                                         263
      MM-705                                               263
14     MM-17                                                263
15     MM-639.1 to 639.4                                    267
      MM-751 through 753                                   267
16     MM-639.9 and 639.10                                  267
      MM-756.1 through 756.6                               267
17     MM-757.1 through 757.4                               267
18     BR-122A                                              272
      UA-101A                                              272
19     AR-1658                                              275
      AR-1659                                              275
20     AR-1701                                              277
21     AR-1702                                              277
      UA-455.1A                                            281
22     UA-455.1C                                            281
      UA-455.1B                                            281
23     UA-455.2A                                            281
24     UA-455.3A                                            281
      OG-01051                                             294
25     OG-13                                                302

 1                              EXHIBITS
 2                                      MARKED          RECEIVED
 4     OG-15                                                303
      OG-16                                                303
 5     OG-19                                                303
      FO-8004                                              306
 6     FO-8005                                              306
 7     FO-8006                                              306
      MM-607                                               307
 8     MM-1123                                              307
      MM-1123P                                             307
 9     MM-113                                               307
10     FO-7011                                              313
      FO-7021 through FO-7024                              313
11     WT-1                                                 325
      WT-2                                                 325
12     BS-1101                                              326
13     BS-1101.T                                            326
      BS-1143                                              326
14     PE-114                                               332
      PE-102                                               332
15     FO-8301                                              332
16     PA-101                                               339
      PA-102                                               339
17     PA-103.2                                             339
      PA-103.3                                             339
18     PA-105.8                                             339
19     PA-108                                               339
      PA-109                                               339
20     PA-110                                               339
      PA-111                                               339