Monthly Archives: April 2010

04/30/10

Turkish Uniforms of the Crimean Era: Part 1

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Written by C.A. Norman
 
Of all the armies that fought in the Crimean War the Turks are certainly the most obscure, as anyone who has ever attempted to research them can attest. While there has been the occasional attempt to outline the structure and organization of the Turkish army (notably Marcel Roubicek’s excellent little book ‘Modern Ottoman Troops 1797-1915′), their uniforms seldom rate more than a few sentences full of generalities. The reason for this is not difficult to discover; there are no dress regulations available to provide guidelines (so far as I can discover, at least), and preserved uniforms from this period are virtually non-existent. About the only material readily available is the occasional appearance of a few Turkish figures in the background of contemporary prints or sketches, usually more to provide local colour than to present accurate information.
Fortunately there is a rather good source available in the sketches and notes of General Vanson, who served in the Crimea as a young staff officer. While Vanson’s sketches of British, French, and even Russian, troops have been reproduced in a number of recent publications, his fairly extensive Turkish material remains almost unexploited. This does not, of course, provide any sort of definitive study of Turkish uniforms. Vanson did not speak Turkish and was unable to question his subjects as to the meaning of this item of uniform or that bit of insignia. For the most part he simply sketched what he saw, or described it in his notes, with the occasional guess (hopefully ‘informed’) as to what it all might mean. The material is extensive enough to at least provide a sort of basic framework, though many questions remain unanswered, and much of the following is necessarily speculative. Vanson did few colour sketches of the Turks, though he did provide a fair number of colour notes. Unfortunately, his handwriting is not always of the best, so his extensive notes can often be difficult to decipher, not helped by his frequent use of a sort of personal ‘shorthand’ which can often be quite obscure. Nevertheless, he stands head and shoulders above any other source.

Available information suggests that at the time of the Crimean War Turkish uniforms were in the process of transition from a more traditional ‘national’ style to a more modern Western European style based largely on French patterns, which I will refer to hereafter as the ‘old’ and ‘new’ uniforms, respectively. It is, of course, impossible to judge just how far this process had gone by 1854-55, but both ‘old’ and ‘new’ uniforms seem to have been extensively worn in the Crimea. Judging solely by those sketches and notes Vanson bothered to date there would seem to have been a preponderance of ‘old’ uniforms during the earlier part of the war, though the balance might well have shifted by the end of the war. Also, it should be noted that Vanson’s material is slanted heavily in favour of infantry and artillery, with only limited information on cavalry, and virtually nothing on other branches.

The ‘old’ uniform, as worn by other ranks, consisted of a waist-length jacket with standing collar and shoulderstraps, generally fastened down the front with hooks and eyes, though rare examples are depicted with buttons. This would usually be worn with loose knee-length ‘Turkish’ trousers and native shoes or slippers, the bare lower legs being covered by either stockings or a sort of tube-like gaiter of rough woollen material which was pulled on over the foot (a sort of ‘hose top’).

For infantry and artillery both jacket and trousers were normally of coarse dark blue wool, the jacket’s collar, shoulderstraps and round cuffs being generally trimmed with red tape in a number of relatively minor variations (possibly reflecting unit practice?). Only rarely was the collar solid red, the cuffs almost never.
Cavalry uniforms of the ‘old’ pattern seem to have varied somewhat more as to colour, usually having solid-colour collar and cuffs, and with the jacket front often braided in ‘hussar’ style; they seem to have almost invariably worn ‘Western’-style trousers.

The ‘new’ uniform for infantry and artillery comprised a dark blue single-breasted tunic with skirts to mid-thigh and fastened with buttons, and long dark blue trousers of Western European cut, usually worn long over western-style boots. The tunic was generally trimmed with red tape in much the same fashion as the old jacket, except that the cuffs had rectangular dark blue flaps edged with red tape and decorated with buttons (normally 3, sometimes only 2) on the outer side, reminiscent of the French army cuff.

Trousers seem to have been normally plain for infantry, artifiery commonly having a red (or rarely black) stripe down the outer seam. The normal headgear with both old and new uniforms was the red fez with a dark blue or black tassel attached to the top by a brass button. The ‘new’ cavalry uniform is somewhat more problematic. Vanson did depict a few mounted figures wearing a long-skirted tunic or ‘Aftila’ with braiding on the breast, which probably represents the ‘new’ cavalry uniform, though in no case did he give any colour details. This is probably the uniform being referred to by the correspondent Constanfin Guys, who described Turkish cavalry as follows: “The men have a sort of tunic with 3 rows of buttons and blue lace (a la hussarde)…”; the tunic itself was presumably dark blue as a later segment describes cavalry officers as wearing blue coats with astrakhan collar and cuffs.

Greatcoats have usually been referred to as ‘hooded’ in Western publications. In fact a wide variety of types seem to have been used, some with attached hoods, some without. Vanson frequently refers to them as being made of coarse grey or dark grey wool, though that does not preclude the use of other colours as well. A few typical examples are depicted in the figures following. Cavalry seem to have worn similar garments, generally longer and looser.

Equipment was equally varied. Vanson depicted a number of infantrymen wearing a black waistbelt equipment which appears to be of the latest French pattern; this is almost invariably shown being worn with the ‘new’ uniform, and I suspect it may have been issued to picked units. More common was a mixed equipment consisting of a cartridge pouch on a bandolier over the left shoulder, combined with a waistbelt. This equipment appears in both black and white leather, often with a cap pouch worn either on the front of the waistbelt or attached to the pouchbelt. Less frequently crossbelt equipment is worn, generally of white leather. One gets the impression of a number of generations of equipment models scrounged from the magazines for the occasion.

Equipment for artillerymen seems too varied to arrive at any common denominator, and the cavalry material is too limited to really judge, though it seems to have been similar to that in use in Western armies. Armament appears equally diverse. Vanson refers on a number of occasions to observing old French arms and items of equipment in use (some apparently dating back to the Napoleonic wars), while some of the swords and sabres depicted match no pattern I have ever seen before and might well be locally-produced ‘pseudo-Western’ types. On at least two occasions Vanson noted seeing mounted artillerymen wearing swordbelts with dependent slings, but without swords, which suggests there might have been serious shortages.

The artillery, in particular, often give the impression of having been given whatever may have been left over after everyone else had been armed and equipped. Some of the more poorly dressed and armed men in the sketches might well have been from mobilized ‘Redif’ or reserve units, which seem to have been put into the line alongside the regulars.

It seems to have been not too uncommon to see a mixture of ‘old’ and ‘new’ elements worn together; most commonly the ‘old’ jacket worn with ‘new’-style trousers, the reverse seems to have been rather rare. This appears to have been more common in the artillery than the infantry, while cavalry almost invariably wear Western-style trousers regardless of their upper garment. Contemporary prints frequently depict Turks wearing white summer trousers (presumably of linen or cotton); Vanson also depicted a few examples, and there might well be more in the sketches but simply not noted as such.

Officers, by contrast, seem to have generally worn a more-or-less standardized uniform, regardless of what their men might be wearing. This approximates to the men’s ‘new’ uniform, with a single-breasted dark blue tunic (though the skirts are at times almost long enough to describe them as frock coats) and Western-style trousers. The tunic would normally be trimmed with red tape, often in a pattern similar to that worn by their men but not invariably so, with the exception that officers seem never to have worn the ‘flapped’ cuff of the men’s ‘new’ uniform (they are invariably depicted with plain round cuffs, even when their men have ‘flaps’). The uniform was frequently somewhat more elaborately trimmed than that of the other ranks, frequently with a red piping or tape down the front opening of the tunic or on the trouser seams.

Officers also seem to have more commonly worn entirely red collars and, less commonly, cuffs, though these still remained a distinct minority Officers almost invariably wore a ‘passant’ or epaulet loop of gold lace on either shoulder near the sleeve seam, which seems to have served as a mark of officer status (there are no indications that epaulets were ever attached to these, except possibly in some Guard units). Apart from these simple devices there is no indication of any system of officer’s rank insignia in use in the Turkish army; both Vanson and Constantin Guys commented on the apparent lack of any form of rank insignia among Turkish officers. Officer’s trousers would either be worn loose or tucked into knee-length black boots, though Vanson did depict a couple of officers wearing the distinctive Turkish gaiters. Armament would usually be restricted to a sword, either an oriental scimitar or a variety of Western types, usually sabres though the occasional straight-bladed sword appears. This was carried on a narrow waistbelt, either on slings or in a frog. Headgear would, of course, be the fez.

The exception to the above would be cavalry officers, and, to some extent, mounted officers generally, who wore a somewhat wider range of garments. Many seem to have worn waist-length jackets or a sort of long-skirted patrol jacket, commonly braided on the breast in hussar-style. Guys described cavalry officers as wearing dark blue frock coats with astrakhan collar and cuffs. It should be emphasised, however, that many cavalry officers wore the ‘standardized’ uniform described above. Most sketches suggest that mounted officers would normally wear their swordbelt under their coat with the sword hanging on slings, with some form of pouchbelt or bandolier.

Vanson did not depict any officers wearing greatcoats or mantles, though he did depict some wearing capes or cloaks of a variety of types. He sketched one officer wearing two tunics, the outer one left open to show a second tunic being worn underneath. The astrakhan-trimmed frockcoats mentioned by Guys might also be intended as cold-weather wear. Presumably officers suited themselves in regard to winter gear.

Reproduced from ‘Soldiers of the Queen’, issue 85

Turkish Uniforms of the Crimean Era: Part 2


Turkish Uniforms of the Crimean Era: Part 3

 
Turkish Uniforms of the Crimean Era: Part 4

04/30/10

The Turkish Army in the Crimea War

LINK

The origins of the modern Ottoman army date to the destruction of the janissaries by Sultan Mahmud II (June 1826). Mahmud then laid the foundation for a new military organization based on Western models. Its centerpiece was a European-style infantry corps, the Trained Victorious Troops of Muhammad (Muallem Asakir-i Mansure-yi Muhammadiye, Mansure for short). Other military services—cavalry, artillery, and transport—were established mainly by reforming existing military units. Mahmud also created a modern corps of imperial guards out of the Bostanci corps, which had guarded imperial palaces.

There also were attempts to centralize the command structure. The authority of the commander in chief (ser asker) of the Mansure was gradually extended over the other services and branches. Thus his headquarters (Bab-i Ser Asker) gradually came to combine the roles of a ministry of war and general staff, and eventually was in charge of all land forces.

Under Mahmud II the military engineering schools were rejuvenated and reformed. He also established a military medical school (1827) and an officer school (1834). Russia and Britain sent military instructors. Most useful services were rendered by a Prussian military mission that grew from one officer (Helmuth von Moltke) in 1835 to twelve in 1837.

In the 1830s Mahmud sought to strengthen the army. Large permanent units with regular commanding officers and staffs were formed. In 1834 a provincial militia (redif) was established to provide reserve forces. However, the commissary system could not support the rapid increase of the military. Epidemics were rife, and over a quarter of all recruits succumbed to disease. Desertion was very common. Although the army had been successfully employed as an instrument of coercion and centralization, as a military force it remained relatively small and poorly organized, trained, and equipped. By the end of Mahmud’s reign there were only some 90,000 men in all the services. The wars with Russia (1828–1829) and with Muhammad Ali’s Egypt (1831–1833, 1839) resulted in heavy losses and the disruption of the army’s development.

During the Tanzimat period (1839–1876) the army consolidated and built on the shaky foundations laid in the previous era. The Bab-i Ser Asker continued to acquire new departments. The army steadily grew, and recruitment and training improved. In 1843 the army, renamed the Regular Imperial Troops (Asakir-i Nizamiye-yi S,ahane, Nizamiye for short), was organized in permanent territorial commands, each consisting of an army corps (ordu) under a field marshal (müs,ir). The field marshals, directly responsible to the ser asker, had wide jurisdiction in all military matters. This limited the provincial governors’ ability to intervene in military affairs, and was intended to centralize further the military organization and strengthen the authority of the ser asker. Five territorial army corps were established, with headquarters in Istanbul, Üsküdar, Monastir, Sivas, and Damascus. In 1848 a sixth corps was established with headquarters in Baghdad. In 1849 the Nizamiye had some 120,000 men and the redif, 50,000. With local and semiregular organizations, the empire’s land forces numbered some 250,000 men.

04/30/10

U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)

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United States Central Command Area of Responsibility prior to the creation of the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM).

Known by the acronym USCENTCOM, the U.S. Central Command is, according to Lieutenant General William G. Pagonis, “one of ten unified and specified commands, under which members of the four armed services are placed while in the theatres of combat.” USCENTCOM was led by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf during the Persian Gulf War.

Based at MacDill Air Force Base near Tampa, Florida, USCENTCOM evolved from the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) formulated under the Carter Doctrine, enunciated as part of President Jimmy Carter’s State of the Union speech on 23 January 1980. Thus, the president foresaw a need for the expeditious deployment of American troops to far-off international hot spots. However, the formulation of such a force and the requirements to assemble it became mired in governmental bureaucracy. One joke ran: “What is the RDF? You and me and our M16s and two tickets on Pan Am.”

During the first term of President Ronald Reagan, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was used specifically during the Operation Bright Star exercises with Egypt to train American troops for potential desert warfare. In 1983, under Reagan’s command, the RDJTF evolved into the U.S. Central Command, devoted to establishing a single battle preparation and logistics program under one central command, a leader to be designated USCINCCENT (U.S. Commander in Chief, Central Command). According to the command, USCENTCOM “is the administrative headquarters for U.S. military affairs in 19 countries of the Middle East, Southwest Asia and Northeast Africa including the Arabian Gulf . . . it supports U.S. and free world interests by assuring access to Mideast oil resources, helping friendly regional states maintain their own security and collective defense, maintaining an effective and visible U.S. military presence in the region, deterring threats by hostile regional states and by projecting U.S. military force into the region if necessary.”

In November 1988, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf was named as USCINCCENT, and stationed at CENTCOM’s headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. He immediately began a rapid buildup of American experience in fighting a desert war somewhere in the Middle East. This buildup came about because of the rapidly waning influence of the Soviet Union in the area, and the rise of dictatorships (including those in Iraq, Iran, and Syria). Schwarzkopf made sure that CENTCOM was at the forefront in estimating the possibility of crises erupting in the region.

On 25 April 1990, CENTCOM estimated that the main source of tension in the Persian Gulf area was Iraq; consequently, it established the “Iraq Regional Warning Problem” to develop and extend the collection of military intelligence on issues involving Iraq. Less than a month later, on 21 May, CENTCOM evaluated the key trouble spot in the region as the border between Iraq and Kuwait, and issued an assessment that “Iraq is not expected to use military force to attack Kuwait or Saudi Arabia to seize disputed territory or resolve a dispute over oil policy.” Still, there was wide concern inside CENTCOM that Iraq was a threat to its small neighbor. In July, Schwarzkopf ordered a covert computerized war game called Internal Look, which indicated that while Saudi Arabia could be defended from a mythical Iraqi invasion, the cost in American casualties would be high. The editors of Triumph without Victory: A History of the Persian Gulf War reported: “A senior officer who was deeply involved in the running of the exercise said, ‘Schwarzkopf wanted to have an exercise to test the war plan as it was developing so that we could refine it.’ ”

At the beginning of July 1990, as Iraq began to threaten Kuwait over the oil question, American military planners began to get nervous, and started a full month of military moves and plans leading up to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. On 18 July, the day after Saddam Hussein accused several Persian Gulf states of “stabbing Iraq in the back” with a “poisoned dagger” by exceeding OPEC oil production quotas, USCENTCOM issued a Worldwide Warning Indicator Monitoring System (WWIMS) status change to establish the growing American concern with the situation. On 19 July, CENTCOM secured its first intelligence reports of Iraqi troop movements near the Kuwaiti border. On 21 July, CENTCOM intelligence sources reported that 3,000 Iraqi military vehicles were spotted moving from Baghdad on the roads to Kuwait. This final action led to another internal war program (unnamed) in which CENTCOM planned for a possible Iraqi invasion of Kuwait using some 300,000 American troops and 640 combat aircraft. Finally, on 31 July, Schwarzkopf reported to President Bush that according to all standards, an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was “imminent.” The Defense Intelligence Agency, which had differed with CENTCOM over the seriousness of the Iraqi threat, concurred with Schwarzkopf’s appraisal. On 1 August, while meeting with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Schwarzkopf foresaw that while Iraq would invade and quickly conquer Kuwait, an Iraqi advance would end there and not proceed into Saudi Arabia. Further, Schwarzkopf presented Cheney with a blueprint of potential Iraqi targets that would be hit if American forces got into the fray.

Once the Iraqi onslaught on Kuwait began on 2 August, Schwarzkopf became the chief foot soldier of coalition forces in the Gulf. President Bush’s hands-off attitude—in effect allowing the military, with Schwarzkopf’s advice, to carry out its best plan for the war—allowed the conflict to be fought in a nonpolitical manner. Thus the war culminated in Schwarzkopf’s celebrated press conference on 27 February known as “The Mother of All Briefings.”

References:
Dunnigan, James F., and Austin Bay, From Shield to Storm: High-Tech Weapons, Military Strategy, and Coalition Warfare in the Persian Gulf (New York: Morrow, 1992), 51;
U.S. News & World Report, Triumph without Victory: The History of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Times Books, 1993), 29.

04/30/10

Republican Guard

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In most wars, individual units in any army are never really highlighted (save for the “Big Red One” from World War II, the title of a somewhat successful Hollywood picture). Yet the Iraqi Republican Guard became better known, by both friends and foes, than perhaps any military element of this century.

The U.S. Defense Department called the Republican Guards “Iraq’s most capable and loyal force, and [they] had received the best training and equipment.” Composed of men recruited from Saddam Hussein’s hometown of Tikrit, these men expressed incredible devotion to their leader; in return, they received the best pay, food, and weapons.

Frank Chadwick writes, “The Iraqi Republican Guard was originally intended to provide President Saddam Hussein with a body of troops of unquestioning loyalty. As the principal means of presidential succession in Iraq has become coup and murder, these troops were more political than military. They originally consisted of three brigades recruited from Tikrit, Saddam’s hometown in northern Iraq.” The number of divisions was later expanded to eight; by the time of the outbreak of the war, they included the First Armored Division, known as the Hammurabi; the Second Armored Division (the Medina), the Third Mechanized Division (the Tawakalna), the Fourth Motorized Division (the Al Faw), the Fifth Motorized Division (the Baghdad), the Sixth Motorized Division (the Nebuchadnezzar), the Seventh Motorized Division (the Adnan), and the Eighth Division, known as the Special Forces Division.

The U.S. Defense Department reports, “At the end of the war with Iran, the Republican Guard consisted of eight divisions. Combined with its independent infantry and artillery brigades, the Guard comprised almost 20 percent of Iraqi ground forces. Most Republican Guard heavy divisions were equipped with Soviet T-72 main battle tanks, Soviet BMP armored personnel carriers, French GCT self-propelled howitzers and Austrian GHN-45 towed howitzers—all modern, state-of-the-art equipment.”

Yet how well trained, and experienced, were Guard fighters? In From the House of War, the BBC’s John Simpson wrote, “The Republican Guard, which journalists and politicians insisted on calling ‘elite,’ was increased by several divisions during the period of the crisis, largely by means of taking men from regular units and giving them red berets. Anyone who could march in step was considered eligible. The officers of the Republican Guard were usually better trained, but that generally meant that they too had to be taken from other units. The mass dilution meant that the Republican Guards’ standards, which in the war against Iran had been above average, were little different from those of the rest of the Iraqi army. . . . When the ground offensive came, the ‘elite’ Republican Guard showed little more inclination to fight than the regular army divisions and reservists.”

References:
Chadwick, Frank, The Desert Shield Fact Book (Bloomington, IL: Game Designers’ Workshop, 1991), 51;
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, Report by the Department of Defense, April 1992, 10;
Simpson, John, From the House of War, quoted in Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War, by John R. MacArthur (New York: Hill & Wang, 1992), 243.

04/29/10

Scout Cars and Halftracks

Even when the hull was not full of radios and other gear the scout car was cramped; it was officially supposed to seat six men in the rear, but this was always optimistic. Maximum road speed was 55mph. This M3A1′s bumper markings identify 2nd Armored Division, 82nd Reconnaissance Battalion, Company A, car 1. The only armor thicker than a quarter-inch (6.35mm) on all these vehicles was the half-inch (12.7mm) steel used for the sliding plates inside the door shields, and the armored windshield which could be lowered over the glass, or propped up as here. The movable armored slats over the radiator were not a successful solution to the conflicting needs for cooling and protection, and vehicles were often disabled when their radiators were pierced by gunfire or shell splinters.

Interior details of the M3A1 cab, with its simple instruments and uncomfortable seats. Note (above) how the skid rail for the machine guns curves up inside the cab area, with a padded canvas cushion strapped on above the door to prevent the driver braining himself. Despite its drawbacks, nearly 21,000 M3A1s were built in 1939-44, and it was used by the British, Canadian and Russian armies as well as the US. In the counter-insurgency role it soldiered on in French Algeria into the early 1960s.

(top)The Browning M2HB .50cal air-cooled heavy machine gun could take on anything except tank armor; this sliding “skate” mount ran around the rail welded inside the scout car (and M2 halftrack) hull. Temporarily clamped above the cab, it has a canvas bag to catch the empty cases. This scout car has command radios fitted in the front and rear of the hull, with two back-facing seats. (below)Many different combinations were used, including the SCR499 & SCR542. Note spare batteries, .45cal Thompson SMG, sleeping bag in the foot well, etc.; in the field even more clutter than this would be typical.

(top)This halftrack towing a 75mm gun is marked as belonging to the 4th Armored Division’s 22nd Field Artillery. Confusingly, it is an M2A1 version – an M2 later partly modified to M3 standard, with the hull gun rail replaced by a “pulpit” over the cab. The ringed white star on the upper surface was adopted in 1943 as the standard Allied air recognition symbol. (below) The 12.75in-wide tracks are a single moulding of tough rubber over steel reinforcing cables, each with a “footprint” just under 4ft long, giving ground pressure of 11.5 psi – better than a mid-war Sherman tank, and giving good floatation on soft ground. Track drive is via the front sprocket; the tension can be altered by adjusting the rear idler wheel. Both the front wheels and the tracks are powered; on good surfaces the front drive is disengaged and the tracks alone are powered, but for “loose going” the front axle drive is also engaged. Tests against captured German SdKfz 251 halftracks showed that the US type had far better mobility and steering over rough terrain, giving a better and quieter ride.

One halftrack modification was the M16 Multiple Gun Motor Carriage, with a Maxson turret mounting quad .50cal Brownings. Some 3,500 were produced from May 1943 as mobile light antiaircraft defense for armored units. The relative scarcity of enemy ground-attack aircraft from mid- 1944 led to the M16 “Meat-chopper’s” awesome firepower being applied in the ground support role. Note the cut and hinged-down upper hull plates, to give the guns more depression. The M16 served on for many years; this one bears the markings of the 2nd Infantry Division’s 82nd Anti-Aircraft Auto Weapons Battalion during the Korean War, where the quad-50 tracks saw much ground fighting.

The M45 Maxson turret fitted to the M16 (and similar M17) MGMC was electrically powered by a separate rear-fitted generator; the guns could traverse and elevate even when the halftrack’s engine was switched off. The gunner wriggled into a seat between the two big circular trunnion plates.

Inside the halftrack cab, left side – generally very similar to the scout car. The main gearbox has four forward and one reverse gears, and driving controls are conventional, but with extra shift levers for front wheel drive, transfer case high and low ratios, and – when the winch is fitted – power take-off.

American-built scout cars and halftracks served and fought alongside tanks in many World War II campaigns, in the US and several Allied armies. They equipped the armored division’s vital reconnaissance elements; they served as battlefield command, communications, and ambulance vehicles; they carried the armored infantry, and towed or mounted the support weapons, without which advancing tanks are fatally vulnerable to ambush. Indeed, the US M2/M3 halftrack series proved so versatile that it became more or less an all-purpose AFV, modified to fulfill dozens of roles; it was one of the most successful of all World War II armored vehicles, with more than 40,000 built between 1941 and 1945. They survived in many armies all over the world for decades, and a few were still in front line service in Israel and Vietnam at the end of the 1960s.

The White Scout Car – final designation, M3A1 – was developed by the Ordnance Department during the 1930s as an armored reconnaissance car for the US Cavalry. It served, basically as a rugged road vehicle, throughout World War II with US and Allied armies; but its four-ton weight, high ground pressure, relatively under-powered 110hp Hercules engine and two-wheel drive gave it an unimpressive cross-country performance, and its protection was inadequate for a true “battle taxi”. From the late 1930s the US Army studied possible half-tracked developments; the halftrack’s great virtue was that it could accompany the tanks (almost) wherever their mission took them, so the complementary strengths of infantry and tanks need not be separated.

Various experimental models during the 1930s culminated in late 1940 in contracts for parallel production of two very similar but not identical halftracks: the “Car, Halftrack, M2″, and the “Carrier, Personnel, Halftrack, M3″. The most obvious differences were the M2′s slightly shorter body, with a machine gun rail running round its rim as on the scout car, and no rear door; and the M3′s longer body (and thus greater crew capacity), with a central rear door, and a “pulpit” machine gun position above the cab. Both lines would be produced by a number of companies, in models with slightly differing details and designations; retrospective modifications would further complicate the picture – in all more than 70 distinct models were built.

By 1943 the M3 and its derivatives were favored over the M2 series, and were the types mostly issued to the armored infantry. They could carry 13 men (i.e. a 12-man rifle squad and a driver), so five could lift a complete platoon of an MG squad, a mortar squad, and three rifle squads.

Nearly all the armor on the scout car and halftrack was only a quarter-inch thick, giving protection against rifle and light automatic fire and shell splinters; but the first GIs to take them into battle in Tunisia had over-optimistic ideas about them, which were quickly shaken by experience. The open hulls naturally gave no protection against artillery airbursts or any kind of plunging fire, and the side armor could be penetrated by anything heavier than infantry weapons. The mechanized infantry in armored divisions would suffer very heavy casualties; but this was later proved to be due to their heavy “workload” – being mobile, they were simply committed to combat more often than foot-slogging infantry.

Halftrack Road Report

With an empty weight of just under eight tons, the basic halftrack APCs have a top road speed of 45mph; fuel consumption is a little better than three miles to the gallon, and range between 180 and 215 miles. They drive very much like a modern four-wheel-drive off-road vehicle – on which the power steering has failed…. The controls for the driver are absolutely conventional, and almost anybody could drive one on the road with minimal training. Operation off-road is a bit more of a challenge, particularly in soft going. Incidentally, all these light armored vehicles vibrate like hell and are extremely noisy – loose bits of iron clank and rattle all over, even without a load of GIs and their kit and weapons, and would-be drivers are advised to carry plenty of aspirin.

Veteran armor officer Duane Klug comments: “The halftrack is a bear to steer at low speeds, although it’s not bad once you get it moving. As long as the front wheels aren’t engaged, it will move along pretty well and is pretty easy to control. But once you engage the front axle it becomes much less responsive. I had to learn to double-clutch it, but if everything is set up right it drives like a regular transmission. It has a surprisingly good turning radius [59ft]. Visibility is good, as long as the armor windshields are up and the side curtains are down. It shakes the heck out of you, though.”

04/29/10

Dietrich Peltz, (1914–2001)

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German major general; one of the most controversial commanders in the Luftwaffe. Peltz joined the German Army in 1934, transferred to the Luftwaffe in 1935, and was in command of a staffel (squadron) of Ju 87 dive-bombers during the Polish and French campaigns. He transferred to Ju 88 medium bombers during the Battle of Britain and won the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross for his bravery and skill. After leading bomber units on all fronts, he was promoted to colonel and named general of the bomber arm, a staff position within the Luftwaffe High Command, but returned to combat duty in March 1943 as Angriffsfuehrer England (Attack Leader England). The bombing campaign he led, called the “Baby Blitz” by the English, was ordered by Hitler in revenge for Allied air attacks on Germany. It was finally called off in early 1944 owing to its ineffectiveness and high German losses, but Peltz was held blameless; he was awarded the Oak Leaves with Swords to the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross and promoted at age 29 to brigadier general.

Peltz’s career took a startling turn in October 1944, when he was named commander of II Jagdkorps (Fighter Corps), which contained all of the fighters on the Western Front. Peltz had no experience in fighters, and morale among the fighter-unit commanders plummeted. German fighter losses over the Ardennes were extremely high, and on 1 January 1945 Operation BASEPLATE (UNTERNEHMEN BODENPLATTE), which Peltz had planned, cost the Luftwaffe 214 fighter pilots, including 19 formation leaders, and destroyed the fighter force beyond any hope of rebuilding.

Peltz was next given command of IX Fliegerkorps (Jagd) (Air Corps [Fighters]), which contained all of the Luftwaffe’s Me 262 fighters and, in March 1945, was promoted to command the Reichsluftverteidigung (Air Defense of Germany), the position he held at war’s end. Postwar, his management skills were in great demand, and he had a very successful career in German industry.

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Awards

Front Flying Clasp of the Luftwaffe in Gold with Pennant “300″

Combined Pilots-Observation Badge in Gold with Diamonds

Iron Cross (1939)

2nd Class (15 September 1939)

1st Class (22 May 1940)

Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords

Knight’s Cross on 14 October 1940 as Oberleutnant and Staffelkapitän of the 1./StG 3

46th Oak Leaves on 31 December 1941 as Hauptmann and Gruppenkommandeur of the II./KG 77

31st Swords on 23 July 1943 as Oberst im Generalstab of Angriffsführer England

Mentioned in the Wehrmachtbericht on 26 June 1944

References
Obermeier, E.Die Ritterkreuztraeger der Luftwaffe, 1939–1945, Band 2: Stuka und Schlachtflieger [Recipients of the Knight’s Cross]. Mainz: Verlag Dieter Hoffmann, 1976.

04/29/10

The Red Army officer corps – Post WWII

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Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev

The ability of the army to recruit and retain officers helped create stability within the leadership and was only disrupted between 1953 and 1958 by the large-scale reduction in forces, yet even here there were positive elements in that the army used the downsizing to cull unfit members from the officer corps. Additionally, the officer corps was becoming more urban in social origin. In 1970, 54 percent of generals were peasants by social origin; at the same time, of the rising generation of officers – lieutenants and captains –only 18 percent were peasants. The army no longer depended on the party to bolster the officer corps and special mobilizations became a thing of the past. In a move that fostered elitism, the army ceased recruiting officer candidates from the ranks. All officers either entered the service through military schools or university. Many officers began their professional military training right out of high school at age fifteen as cadets in Suvorov military schools –established in 1943 as preparatory schools for military schools.

Stability was further enhanced, but perhaps to an unhealthy degree, by new terms of service for officers. Officers now were required to serve for twenty-five years and could only leave the service by transferring to the reserves at the discretion of the Ministry of Defense, or through discharge for disgraceful behavior which also required automatic revocation of party membership. Twenty years after the end of the war, however, the negative phenomenon of a caste outlook that had just emerged before the war had become solidified in the mentality of the officer corps. More and more officers came from career military families – and there were many military families as a result of the expansion of the officer corps in the Second World War. By the late 1980s the single largest group to provide officer candidates was military families.

Forty years after the war, however, signs emerged that the Soviet Army leadership had become too stable – verging on stagnation. There was no mandatory retirement age and a great many officers simply refused to retire or transfer to the reserves and insisted on staying in active service into their sixties and seventies until they literally died at their posts. In this way the army became part and parcel of the era of stagnation. The army usually assigned these elderly senior officers, all of them generals by now, as inspectors general in the Ministry of Defense’s Group of Inspectors General. Inspectors general perform a very important function, they check that policies are faithfully and accurately implemented and usually have significant powers to set things right. Unfortunately, such a task requires a level of physical energy and mental alertness not often associated with octogenarians. The Soviet Army suffered inestimable harm in the 1980s because of this “old boy” system.

Prior to the Second World War army officers experienced a constant process of upward mobility due to the broad expansion of the army which continually created positions to be filled. After the war the process reversed, and there were fewer positions to be filled and plenty of officers to fill them. With generals holding on to their top jobs for years and years upward mobility slowed. This situation caused creeping stagnation and was exacerbated by the lack of a centrally controlled promotion and advancement system that put an officer’s career completely in the hands of his immediate superior. Officers advanced by means of the efficiency report system.

There were no time limitations on how long an officer could fill a particular position, so commanders who were happy with a subordinate’s performance could unfairly give him a low grade on efficiency reports preventing his promotion in order to retain his services. Conversely, officers who performed poorly would at times be cynically recommended for promotion in order to be disposed of. Even when a good officer was given high marks in his efficiency report, he might languish for years in his old job because his superior might not recommend him for promotion. Perhaps this is why future general and politician Alexander Lebed remained a captain and airborne school company commander for eight years, only leaving his unit by volunteering for duty in Afghanistan never having had command of a tactical unit.

The practice that emerged in the crisis years before the Second World War of putting an officer of insufficient rank in charge of a unit oddly became enshrined as the desired procedure after the war when there was surfeit of officers. The promotion system became one of getting the higher position first, then earning the rank that went with it. Once the appropriate rank was earned the officer – with his commander’s approval – was then allowed to begin casting about for the next higher position. From this situation developed career associations, or connections, to get ahead, rather than relying on professionalism and an impartial system. One officer referred to connections as “that cancer that afflicts our army.” He bemoaned the fact that: “Competence and professionalism are qualities that seem to interest no one. The main thing is to have connections, in which case a high-ranking commander will take you along with him, into the apparatus or closer to Moscow, where conditions are incomparably better.” Consequently, practical preparation for higher command was virtually nonexistent. One either sank or swam as he learned on the job or was protected and advanced by powerful friends.

Higher military courses did exist and were required for promotion to lieutenant colonel yet, by the promotion system one held lieutenant colonel positions at the rank of major. Because of this arrangement, Alexander Lebed went from the routine of training airborne officer candidates to a battalion command in the war in Afghanistan with no practical or theoretical preparation whatsoever. He received his training for lieutenant colonel after he finished his tour of combat command. By the 1970s the regimen of advanced schools had slackened considerably. Staffed mainly by veterans of the Second World War who had “burned out” and saw their positions as sinecures rather than responsible assignments, the level of instruction fell precipitously. The students for their part were not blind to the prevailing attitude and took their time at military academies as vacations. Eventually, many top officers were simply unfit for command as the weeding out process succumbed to stagnation and indifference.

With the elevation of their place in society and the complete absence of any revolutionary consciousness, officers’ relations with their men became formal and distant – reminiscent of the officer-enlisted relations of the tsarist period. Physical violence, unheard of before the war, could be resorted to with impunity after the war by officers when dealing with subordinates. It was not at all unusual for officers to beat soldiers. According to one officer:

Well, it is true that the officers beat the soldiers. Sometimes they beat them dreadfully. I saw it myself, though I didn’t do it personally. I often tried to stop other officers, literally holding their hands. But I have never done it myself. Well, in rare cases, I did slap a soldier.

Such behavior would never have been tolerated in the 1920s or 1930s.

Without fear of purges the negative traits of mutual protection, corruption and inefficiency bloomed. A former soldier who served in the mid-1980s wrote that he had experienced “an entire chain of violations on the part of my commanders,” in particular their abuse of military equipment and soldiers’ labor for personal gain. His unit commander:

in order to have a wine cellar built for himself, arbitrarily kept soldiers “in the service” until June 19, despite the fact that an official discharge date of May 31 had already been stamped on their military cards.
Another captain, the head of the motor pool, who had been put in charge of a truck that was supposed to transport weapons, spent his time drinking in a neighboring village. And he got away with it, despite the fact that the weapons were never delivered. I have also met soldiers who were forced to be servants for their commanders.
My comrades coming back from the army confirm that there is a kind of mutual protection everywhere…which serves as a barrier against any attempt to reestablish real fairness.

On the eve of the collapse of the USSR abuse of authority had reached its nadir. A deputy to the Peoples’ Soviet of Deputies admitted in an interview:

Today’s Army is being consumed by favoritism, improper use of influence, and incompetence. I can’t tell you how many letters we Deputies receive on that subject. [And that] The lack of legal principles governing military service creates a fertile soil for petty tyranny. It’s no accident that military prosecutors’ offices overturn about 30 percent of all orders issued by commanders at all levels.

04/29/10

Late-Eighteenth Century Qing Army

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Emperor Qianlong in ceremonial armour, with his saber, bow and arrows…
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A Chinese military post, 1796.
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Emperor Qianlong on Inspection Tour
 

When the French Revolution took place in 1789, China’s last dynasty (the Qing, 1644–1912) had been in power for nearly a century and a half and under Emperor Qianlong (r. 1735–1796) was at the height of its power economically, culturally, and perhaps even militarily. Chinese influence in Europe was strong, and European scholars from the Baron de Montesquieu to Voltaire all showed great interest in China. The French coined the word chinoiserie to express their enthusiasm about the country, the eighteenth-century English garden took on many of the characteristics attributed to Chinese gardens, and French rococo art was probably also influenced by Chinese styles. The enthusiasm for China and its culture even led European kings to copy the ritual plowing of the earth performed by the Chinese emperors every spring, after Voltaire praised the Chinese practice. China also benefited from its interaction with Europe, and European arts and sciences, especially Western astronomy, cartography, and mathematics, had a major impact on intellectual activity in China.

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The eastern Mongols or Khalka had been allied to the Manchus since before the Manchu conquest of China, but in the west a group of independent tribes known as the Oirats had occupied the Tarim Basin and Tibet and established an aggressive rival empire. In 1686 their leader, Galdan Khan, attacked the Khalka, provoking war with the Qing. In 1696 K’ang-hsi himself led an expedition into Mongolia. Galdan attempted to avoid battle, but was trapped between converging columns and defeated at Jao Modo, near present-day Ulan Bator. The khan escaped, but was hunted down the following year.

This victory gave the Qing control of most of what is now Mongolia, but further west one of the Oirat clans, the Jungars, was gradually rebuilding its strength. In 1755 war broke out again, and two years later a Manchu army under Chao Hui invaded the Ili valley. The Jungars were virtually wiped out, and the Muslims of the Tarim Basin, who had supported the Jungars, were also defeated, in 1759. The Qing frontier was pushed forward as far as Lake Balkhash and the Pamir Mountains, where Chinese armies had not penetrated since the days of the T’ang.

Part of the reason for the Manchu success was their own affinity with the Central Asian nomads: their cavalry fought in the same style, as highly mobile mounted archers, and the Qing armies could outmanoeuvre the Mongols on the steppe – something traditional Chinese forces had seldom managed to do. Furthermore, the nomads, who had for centuries relied on the vast spaces of the steppe for protection, could no longer retreat beyond the reach of armies based in China, for the Russians were advancing from the opposite direction, into what is now Kazakhstan.

Other influences were also at work to weaken the Mongols: those under Qing rule had been impoverished by the government’s policy of restricting them to specific grazing grounds, which in time of drought were unable to support their horse herds; tribes beyond the frontier suffered from chronic political disunity and a devastating series of epidemics, probably transmitted by farmers and traders moving into their lands as the settled population increased; and the spread of Buddhism may also have encouraged some Mongols to abandon their traditional warlike pursuits. A combination of factors, therefore, lay behind the sudden evaporation of the Mongol menace which had dominated Chinese military policy for so long.

Success on other fronts led to the Ch’ien-lung reign being remembered for its ‘Ten Great Victories’, although they were not all of equal significance. Tibet had been reduced to vassalage in 1720, and nominal Qing authority was maintained thereafter by sporadic expeditions. In 1 790 Gurkhas from Nepal invaded Tibet and looted the rich monastery of Tashilhunpo. The Dalai Lama asked Ch’ien-lung for help, and an army of 80,000 men was despatched under the Manchu general Fu K’ang. Fu quickly drove out the invaders, pursued them over the Himalayan passes and defeated them at Nawakot, not far from Katmandu. ‘The Gurkhas agreed to pay tribute to Peking, which they continued to do until 1908. In view of the well-known prowess of the Gurkhas in their later encounters with the British, this campaign provides an interesting insight into the performance of Chinese armies in the late 18th century. It is clear that they were still in the front rank of Asian powers, in terms not just of numerical strength, but also of strategic mobility and effectiveness on the battlefield.

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By the 18th century the majority of native Chinese troops were to be found in the lu-ying, or Green Standard army. This had originally been a garrison force. It consisted of more than a thousand ying, or battalions, of widely varying strength scattered throughout the provinces, leaving the Manchus concentrated around Peking, on the northern frontier and in the more important towns.

The Chinese were not regarded by the Manchus as very good soldiers, and their loyalty was often suspect. At Yung-p’ing in 1630 they fought with signs reading ‘New Soldier’ pinned to their backs so that the Manchus could keep an eye on them. They were often accused of standing back and allowing the Manchus to do all the fighting, and of hiring incapable substitutes to serve in their place a practice which had spread to the Manchus themselves as early as the 1630s.

Even in the 19th century foreign visitors observed that the Manchu troops were much better than the Chinese, and that it was to the advantage of the regime to keep it that way. However, Chinese numbers, along with their expertise with ships and artillery, meant that it was impossible to do without them. Chinese officers had held high positions in Qing armies as early as the 1620s, when hereditary ranks were given to the most loyal. Li Yung-fang, who surrendered the town of Fu-shun in 1618, was the first defector of rank, and was eventually given command of a Banner. His sons all became officers in the Chinese Blue Banner.

Wu San-kuei and the other ‘Feudatories’, along with lesser collaborators, were of vital importance to the Manchu conquest of China after 1644, and were rewarded with generous grants of land and political privileges, which at first amounted to virtual independence. Even after Wu’s revolt, in 1673, Chinese generals such as Chao Liang-tung remained loyal to the Qing and led armies against the rebels. During the Ch’ien-lung reign Manchus and Mongols began to replace natives in the high command, but this process was never completed, and indeed was reversed after the middle of the 19th century.

04/28/10

BALKAN WARS Part I

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Photograph of the Serbian 1st Army staff during the Balkan wars, made in 1912. The staff of 1. Armija. On the left side is the army commander, Crown Prince Alexander, the army chief of staff, Colonel Petar Bojović, is sitting next to him.

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Serbian artillery at siege of Adrianople.

The Balkan Wars of 1912– 1913 initiated a period of conflict in Europe that would last until 1918 and would endure in one form or another until 1999. These Balkan wars originated in the aspirations of the small nationalist states of southeastern Europe, already having achieved independence from the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century, to incorporate members of their nationalities remaining under Ottoman rule and thus achieve their maximum nationalist claims. In this way, the states of Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia sought to emulate the nineteenth-century nationalist successes of Germany and Italy.

Competing claims to Ottoman-held territories, especially Macedonia, had long prevented the Balkan states from cooperating against the Ottomans. When the Young Turks threatened to reinvigorate the Ottoman Empire after their 1908 coup, the leaders of the Balkan states began to seek ways to overcome their rivalries. Russian diplomacy facilitated their efforts. The Russians wanted to compensate for their setback in the Bosnian Crisis of 1908–1909 by establishing a pro-Russian Balkan alliance intended to impede any further Austro- Hungarian advances in the region. In March 1912, the Bulgarians and Serbs concluded an alliance under the aegis of Russia. Contained within this alliance agreement was a plan for the settlement of the Macedonian problem, including a provision for Russian mediation. The Bulgarians and Serbs then made individual agreements with the Greeks and Montenegrins, who themselves reached an agreement. By September 1912 this loose confederation, the Balkan League, was ready to achieve its goals.

THE FIRST BALKAN WAR
Montenegro began the First Balkan War on 8 October 1912 by declaring war on the Ottoman Empire. Before the other allies could join in, the Ottomans declared war on 17 October on the Balkan League. The Ottomans were confident that their army, recently upgraded with the help of German advisers, would quickly prevail against their Balkan adversaries.

The main theater of the ensuing conflict was Thrace. While one Bulgarian army besieged the major Ottoman fortress at Adrianople (Edirne), two others achieved major victories against the Ottomans at Kirk Kilisse and at Buni Hisar/ Lule Burgas. The latter was the largest battle in Europe between the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 and World War I. The Ottomans rallied at the Chataldzha, the last lines of defense before Constantinople. An attack by the exhausted and epidemic-ridden Bulgarians on 17 November against the Ottoman positions failed. Both sides then settled into trench warfare at Chataldzha.

Elsewhere the Serbian army broke the western Ottoman army at Kumanovo on 23 October. The Serbs then advanced against diminishing resistance into Macedonia, Kosovo, and on into Albania, reaching the Adriatic coast in December. The Greek navy prevented the Ottomans from shipping reinforcements from Anatolia to the Balkans. The Greek army advanced in two directions, entering Salonika on 8 November, and further west, bringing the town of Janina under siege. Montenegrin forces advanced into the Sanjak of Novi Pazar and besieged Scutari.

The Ottomans signed an armistice with Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Serbia on 3 December. Greek military operations continued. By this time, Ottoman Europe was limited to the three besieged towns of Adrianople, Janina, and Scutari; the Gallipoli peninsula; and eastern Thrace behind the Chataldzha lines. As a result of the Ottoman collapse, a group of Albanian notables, supported by Austria and Italy, declared Albanian independence on 28 November 1912. While delegations from the Balkan allies attempted to negotiate a final peace with the Ottomans in London, a conference of Great Power ambassadors met also in London to ensure that the interests of the Powers would prevail in any Balkan settlement.

A coup on 23 January 1913 brought a Young Turk government to power in Constantinople. This government was determined to continue the war, mainly in order to retain Adrianople. They denounced the armistice on 30 January. Hostilities recommenced, to the detriment of the Ottomans. Janina fell to the Greeks on 6 March and Adrianople to the Bulgarians on 26 March.

The siege of Scutari, however, incurred international complications. The Austrians demanded that this largely Albanian inhabited town become a part of the new Albanian state. Because of this demand, Serbian forces aiding the Montenegrin siege withdrew. The Montenegrins persisted in the siege, however, and succeeded in taking the town on 22 April. A Great Power flotilla off the Adriatic coast forced the Montenegrins to withdraw less than two weeks later, on 5 May.

Meanwhile in London, peace negotiations resulted in the preliminary Treaty of London, signed on 30 May 1913 between the Balkan allies and the Ottoman Empire. By this treaty, the Ottoman Empire in Europe consisted of only a narrow band of territory in eastern Thrace defined by a straight line drawn from the Aegean port of Enos to the Black Sea port of Midya.

04/28/10

BALKAN WARS Part II

SECOND BALKAN OR INTERALLIED WAR

During the First Balkan War, while the Bulgarians contended with the major portion of the Ottoman army in Thrace, the Serbs had occupied most of Macedonia. Austrian prohibitions had prevented the Serbs from realizing their ambitions to an Adriatic port in northern Albania. The Serbs then sought to strengthen their hold on Macedonia in compensation for the loss of an Albanian port. The Greeks had never agreed to any settlement over Macedonia, and also indicated that they would retain the Macedonian areas they had occupied. The Bulgarians had fought the Ottomans for Macedonia. They remained determined to obtain this area. Hostilities among the allies over the Macedonian question escalated throughout the spring of 1913 from exchanges of notes to actual shooting. Russian attempts at mediation between Bulgaria and Serbia were feeble and fruitless.

On the night of 29–30 June 1913, Bulgarian soldiers began local attacks against Serbian positions in Macedonia. These attacks became the signal for the outbreak of general war. The initial Greek and Serb counterattacks pushed the Bulgarians back past their old frontiers. Just as the Bulgarian army began to stabilize the situation, Romanian and Ottoman soldiers invaded the country. The Romanians sought to obtain southern Dobrudzha to broaden their Black Sea coast and to balance Bulgarian gains elsewhere in the Balkans. The Ottomans wanted to retake Adrianople. The Bulgarian army, already heavily engaged against the Greeks and Serbs, was unable to resist the Romanians and Ottomans. Under these circumstances, Bulgaria had to sue for peace. By the resulting Treaty of Bucharest signed on 10 August, Bulgaria lost most of Macedonia to Greece and Serbia, and southern Dobrudzha to Romania. The Treaty of Constantinople, signed on 30 September 1913, ended Bulgaria’s brief control of Adrianople.

CONSEQUENCES
The Balkan Wars resulted in huge military casualties. The Bulgarians lost around 65,000 men, the Greeks 9,500, the Montenegrins 3,000, and the Serbs at least 36,000. The Ottomans lost as many as 125,000. In addition, tens of thousands of civilians died, from disease and other causes. Deliberate atrocities occurred throughout every theater of war, especially in Kosovo.

The consequences of the Balkan Wars inflamed the nationalist appetites of all participants. The Greeks sought additional gains in Asia Minor, the Serbs in Bosnia, and the Bulgarians seethed with a desire, still unrealized, for Macedonia. The Ottomans also wanted to regain power lost in the Balkan Wars by participating in World War I. These pursuits led to catastrophes for all during or after World War I.

The Great Powers struggled to manage the Balkan Wars. The ambitions of the Serbs to northern Albania and the Adriatic coast and of the Montenegrins to Scutari caused some tensions among them, particularly between Austria-Hungary supporting Albania and Russia supporting Montenegro and Serbia. The Powers themselves coped with these tensions at the London Ambassadors Conference. They even cooperated to eject the Montenegrins from Scutari.

One important consequence of the Balkan Wars was the alienation of Bulgaria from Russia. Up until 1913, Bulgaria had been Russia’s most important connection in the Balkan region. Bulgaria’s proximity to Constantinople, especially after the gains of the First Balkan War, afforded Russia with a valuable base from which to bring pressure upon this vital area. The failure of Russian diplomacy to mediate the Bulgaro-Serbian dispute over the disposition of Macedonia led to Bulgaria’s catastrophic defeat in the Second Balkan War and Bulgaria’s turn to the Triple Alliance for redress. This left Serbia as Russia’s only ally in the Balkans. When Austro-Hungarian chastisement threatened Serbia in July 1914, the Russians had to act to protect Serbia or else lose the Balkans completely.

The ambitions of the Montenegrins and Serbs in Albania greatly increased Austro-Hungarian antipathy toward these two south Slavic states. The Viennese government became determined that the Serb power should not increase in the Balkans. On three separate occasions, in December 1912, in April 1913, and again after the Balkan Wars in October 1913, the Austro-Hungarians came into conflict with the Serbs and Montenegrins over Albanian issues. Even though war resulted in the summer of 1914 from an event in Bosnia, the conflicts over Albania facilitated the Austrians’ decision to fight the Serbs. World War I was not the Third Balkan War; rather the Balkan Wars were the beginning of World War I. Nationalist conflicts persisted in the region from 1912 to 1918. Problems of nationalism, especially in Kosovo and Macedonia, endured over the rest of the twentieth century.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Erickson, Edward J. Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912–1913. Westport, Conn., 2003. Hall, Richard C. The Balkan Wars 1912–1913: Prelude of the First World War. London, 2000. Hellenic Army General Staff. A Concise History of the Balkan Wars, 1912–1913. Athens, 1998. Helmreich, E. C. The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912–13. New York, 1969.