Getting in Early: Lessons of the Collins Submarine Program for
Improved Oversight of Defence Procurement
Derek Woolner
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group
18 September 2001
Contents
Major Issues
Introduction
Background
Why the Collins Turned Out as it Did: Trends Set
During Early Development
Achievements and Problems: Pointers to
Decision Making?
Where the Problem of the Collins Submarines
Lies
Why the Collins is
Important-Australia's Declining Surface Navy
Why the Collins is Important-The
Collins Syndrome and Australian Defence Procurement
Increasing Transparency: Towards Improving
Defence Procurement
Conclusions
Endnotes
Appendix 1-Major Capital Equipment Project Delays
or Cost Overruns
Abbreviations
ADF
|
Australian Defence Force
|
AEW&C
|
Airborne Early Warning and Control
|
AIP
|
Air Independent Propulsion
|
ANZAC
|
Class name of the RAN's most recent frigates
|
ANZUS
|
Australia, New Zealand and United States
Treaty
|
ASC
|
Australian Submarine Corporation
|
ASW
|
Antisubmarine Warfare
|
AW
|
Air-Warfare
|
AWD
|
Air-Warfare Destroyers
|
CDS
|
Combat Data System
|
COTS
|
Commercial off the shelf systems
|
DE
|
Destroyer Escort
|
DSTO
|
Defence Science and Technology Organisation
|
IT
|
Information Technology
|
ITAS
|
Integrated Tactical Avionics System
|
JCFADT
|
Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Trade
|
JCPAA
|
Joint Committee on Public Accounts and Audit
|
RAAF
|
Royal Australian Air Force
|
RAN
|
Royal Australian Navy
|
RFT
|
Request for Tender
|
RN
|
Royal Navy
|
RNZAF
|
Royal New Zealand Air Force
|
SWUP
|
Submarines Weapons Update Program
|
UK
|
United Kingdom
|
UN
|
United Nations
|
US
|
United States
|
USN
|
United States Navy
|
USS
|
United States Ship
|
Major Issues
The Collins submarine has been perhaps the most
controversial defence equipment acquisition program since the F-111
purchase of the 1960s. Despite management reviews and performance
improvements the controversy continues.
Over recent months the Minister for Defence, the
Hon. Peter Reith, has suggested that the Opposition was endangering
the orderly planning for the development of the Australian Defence
Force by wishing to buy two additional Collins submarines (a claim
the Opposition denied). Then in July the Minister himself drew
criticism for cancelling the competitive program to supply a new
combat system for the submarines, in which a European based
consortium had been favoured, on the grounds of Australia, New
Zealand United States Treaty (ANZUS) alliance cooperation with the
United States (US). The controversy over the submarines appears
likely to continue past the forthcoming election and into the
following years.
Again over recent months, the operational
performance of the submarines has drawn favourable attention due to
the success of HMAS Waller in Exercises RIMPAC and Tandem
Thrust. Indeed, the Collins submarines appear to have outstanding
performance in several areas, which may well justify Navy's
decision in the mid-1980s to develop a unique design. At that time,
none of the designs offered could meet all of the Royal Australian
Navy (RAN) objectives, with inability to accommodate its concept
for a combat data system being a common shortcoming. However, to be
able to operate at the level desired by the RAN, all six submarines
will need to complete an enhancement program which, including a new
combat system when it is eventually chosen, will add
$1 billion to the $5.1 billion cost previously approved for
the program.
There remain two areas where the future of the
program depends on policy decisions. One is the fate of the
submarine construction industry. The second is whether the boats
are to have an effective combat system. A successful outcome is
required in both for the operation of the Collins submarine to
reach expectations.
Unresolved Issue: The Future of the Submarine Building
Industry
Deciding to build the submarines in Australia
was the most important single act in the history of the program. It
was done because it was thought to be the best means of providing
efficient and effective support throughout the submarines' service
lives. It was also to provide a basis for improving them over time
to meet the demands of changing strategic circumstances. It was
known to be a high risk decision and most of the characteristics of
the program's development and elements of its subsequent outcome
were directly shaped to help manage this risk.
In terms of engineering excellence and
production management, the construction of the submarines by the
Australia Submarine Corporation (ASC) has been a national
achievement in the tradition of the Snowy Mountains Scheme, as an
ambitious one-off project. What has not yet been provided is the
basis for an ongoing industry which would meet the objectives of
the original decision. For this, an operation with a long-term
workload base and sufficient intellectual capital to maintain and
develop the submarines is necessary. In July, the Government met
the first of these requirements by confirming that the cyclic
refits, in which each of the six submarines is stripped out and
completely refurbished every six years, would be done by ASC. This
work is worth $100 million per annum.
In September 1999, Kockums, the European design
partner in ASC, merged with the German submarine builder HDW. HDW
intended to take up Kockums 49 per cent share of ASC but the
Government did not respond positively, instead purchasing 100 per
cent control of the company and pursuing alternative options. These
were consistently reported as including the desire to have an
American submarine builder as part of ASC and to use the
restructure and sale of the company as a means of rationalising the
Australian defence shipbuilding industry.
Assuring sufficient intellectual property (one
of the important elements of intellectual capital) for ASC has
become an issue since the Government's takeover of the company. The
Government's interest in American participation is not necessarily
at odds with the recognition by senior RAN submariners of the
ongoing role of Kockums in supporting the Collins class. However,
over the period, a degree of suspicion seems to have grown between
the American and European industries, based on a fear that American
participation would allow them to access modern conventional
submarine technology, which at present they do not possess.
As recently as May 2001, the Minister indicated
that legal matters surrounding intellectual property remained to be
settled. Until the Government is able to resolve the issues of ASC
ownership, including access to required intellectual property, it
will not be certain whether the objectives of the decision to build
the submarines in Australia finally will be achieved.
Unresolved Issue: The Need for a Workable
Combat System
One of the recommendations of the report by
Malcolm McIntosh and John Prescott on the problems of the Collins
submarines, delivered in mid-1999, was that its combat system
should be replaced by a proven, off-the-shelf product. This
recommendation was accepted by the Government; the evaluation of
potential suppliers had reportedly been concluded in favour of the
STN Atlas ISUS 90-55 system when, in July 2001, the Minister
suspended the program.
The reason was the Government's desire to
maximise opportunities for closer cooperation with the USA on
submarines. At the time, the decision created some confusion about
the potential impact of ANZUS alliance issues on future Defence
procurement. In some areas, it was seen as questioning the balance
between the concepts of 'alliance' and 'self reliance', at the
centre of the development of defence policy since the 1976 white
paper. Further, the decision is likely to delay the program by
about a year. As a result of it, the Government will have to manage
the risk arising from the situation that, as yet, no combat system
is available within the parameters of the policy on
cooperation.
The only potentially suitable system, the CCS
Mk2, produced by the American company Raytheon, is used by United
States Navy (USN) nuclear powered submarines. There are sufficient
differences between these and a conventional submarine of the
Collins type to make the transition neither simple nor assured. The
risks to be managed include integration with the existing systems
on the Collins class, modifications to work in the less
well-supported environment of a conventional submarine and avoiding
pressures to include non-essential system enhancements. A system
successfully developed to avoid these problems will be unique to
RAN service.
Nonetheless, a trouble-free development cannot
be assured. Raytheon, for instance, has been unable to
satisfactorily conclude its contract to upgrade the Royal
Australian Air Force (RAAF) AP-3C maritime surveillance aircraft,
elements of which are now running 42 months late. The lessons of
the recent history of Defence procurement are that neither
sponsorship by the US Armed Forces nor development by corporate
America can guarantee success in systems integration programs.
What Really Went Wrong with the Collins
Program
However, the clearest warning to the Government
is that the new procurement strategy for the combat system
parallels that which underlies the difficulties experienced on the
Collins submarine program as a whole. This was the decision to
shift the procurement strategy from that of acquiring a proven
overseas design to one of developing a unique product which more
closely matched its ideal specifications.
In 1985 Navy concluded that none of the designs
then available could meet its expectations. Instead of persisting
with its procurement strategy and choosing the best available
combination of design, industrial package and cost, Navy chose to
proceed to a unique submarine design. In essence, it opted to
develop a Holden amongst submarines, a design uniquely suited to
Australian conditions and with much promise, but carrying much more
risk than the more limited but proven off-the-shelf designs.
This was the most important single decision of
the program. The period of redevelopment which followed saw the
greatest proportional cost growth during the history of the program
and also confirmed a reduction in the number of boats it would
purchase. Developing a unique submarine, in which most of the
systems had unique specifications, guaranteed that there would be
developmental problems. Continuing as though the program was a
normal production run, with predictable outcomes within a fixed
price contract, not only compounded the impact of difficulties when
they did arise but had much to do with the persistence of
performance problems and establishing the subsequent poor
reputation of the submarines.
A more detailed history of the program up to the
selection of the Kockums design is provided in a companion paper,
Procuring Change: How Kockums was Selected for the Collins
Class Submarine, Research Paper No.XXX of the Australian
Parliament's Information and Research Services.
Only One Amongst Many: Ongoing Problems in Defence
Procurement
Yet, in reality, the Collins submarine program
is not amongst the worst managed by Defence, in terms of either
additional costs or time overrun. At present there are 15 Defence
acquisition programs which have exceeded their approved cost by a
combined total of $568 million. Even by the worst interpretation of
performance, the Collins program would rank twelfth amongst these.
Many of the programs are characterised by changes to overseas
systems to meet specifications developed by the Australian Defence
Force (ADF) for peculiarly Australian requirements. These systems
are unique to Australia and typically have proven difficult both to
develop and maintain. Within Defence they have attracted the
nickname 'orphan systems'.
The desire of the ADF to acquire orphan systems
is not a relic of past decades. It has been shown in the ANZAC
class frigate helicopter program, for which the platform was
selected in 1997 and for which the avionics system is two years
late. It is a danger which must be managed in the Airborne Early
Warning and Control (AEW&C) program, the contract for which was
signed in December 2000, and for which four million lines of unique
software are needed. It is also a risk inherent in the Government's
new approach to the Collins class combat system.
Neither is it a problem whose effects are
confined to the programs themselves. Were, for arguments sake, the
AEW&C program to require additional funding to the same extent
as the Collins program, it would cost an extra $600 million. Such
unprogrammed expenditure would be sufficient to jeopardise the
orderly development of the ADF as planned in Defence 2000,
the defence white paper.
The
Need for New Processes of Parliamentary Oversight
The consequences of such situations have
attracted criticism from within Defence. The poor management of
defence procurement, which has often thus been created, has raised
concern in the Government. Cabinet has recognised that the most
important decisions affecting the outcome of a procurement program
are made at its earliest stages and that waiting until Defence
prepares a Cabinet submission leaves it facing a fait accompli.
Accordingly, the Government has now introduced
new processes for the development of defence capital equipment
proposals. Defence must now make two approaches to government, the
initial one laying out a range of options relevant to the
particular issue. This gives the policymakers time to intervene in
the development of a procurement program before its nature has been
set.
This change in policy setting procedures for the
Executive Government has not been matched by procedures for
parliamentary scrutiny and public transparency. There are
Parliamentary committees which have a role that causes them, from
time to time, to scrutinise defence procurement programs or the
procurement system in general. For procedural and other reasons,
they come to the issue too late.
This problem will become increasingly important
as Defence implements new procurement procedures such as
evolutionary strategies, under which equipment will be bought in
smaller, more frequent blocks with changing specifications. To cope
with this changing environment and to mirror the Executive's early
oversight of equipment project development, the legislature needs a
new approach, perhaps one similar to that exercised by the Public
Works Committee.
This is probably the ultimate lesson of the
Collins submarine program. Nothing will be done to avoid a
recurrence of problems in future major defence procurement
programs, similar to those that have affected the submarines,
unless the past of the Collins program is examined and the lessons
learned. The most effective way to reduce the consequences of poor
Defence procurement lies in much earlier intervention by
policymakers in the development of defence equipment projects. To
play its role in this process the Parliament will need to invent
new procedures.
Introduction
Earlier this year the Minister for Defence, the
Hon. Peter Reith, suggested that the Opposition was endangering the
Defence Capability Plan (DCP), which is a central element of
Defence 2000, the defence white paper. The DCP
consolidates the itemised proposals for new equipment, military
skills and service life support to enable the development of the
capabilities of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The accusation
(denied by the Opposition) was that they intended to build two more
Collins class submarines, not included within the tight financial
allocations of the DCP.
Enhancing the operational capabilities of that
class was one of the programs endorsed by the white paper. Yet, in
the middle of 2001, the Minister took a decision (directed by
issues of the ANZUS alliance with the USA) which, nevertheless,
delayed aspects of that enhancement for at least a year. It also
set the Government a new task of managing a range of technological
risks of the type that the enhancement program was designed to
overcome. Controversies over the submarines will persist until the
elections later in 2001 and beyond.
Since its inception, the new submarine program
has been a source of controversy. Along with the deployment of ADF
units to East Timor it has been a major reason for refocussing
government and popular attention on defence. During 1997 and 1998 a
succession of leaked stories alleging defects in the performance of
the submarines displayed extraordinary ill-discipline (probably
associated with disputes over the division of future funding) in
the Navy.(1) These leaks went close to compromising
national security(2) and, together with others
concerning East Timor, forced the Department of Defence (hereafter
Defence) to reorganise its internal security
operations.(3)
Later, the Minister, reportedly dissatisfied
with Departmental advice, commissioned an external review of the
program by Malcolm McIntosh and John Prescott. Their critical
findings foreshadowed significant reorganisation of that part of
Defence responsible for equipment acquisition and was said to have
played a role in the removal the (then) Secretary of the
Department.
A part of the McIntosh/Prescott report condemned
the capacity of the submarines saying, 'the circumstances would
have to be extremely serious indeed to risk the submarines in their
present state'.(4) Yet a few months later the submarine
accompanied the United Nations (UN) forces to East Timor, as a
precaution against the possible Indonesian deployment of one of its
submarines. In October one of them has been reported as secretly
landing clearance divers in the enclave of Oecussi to prepare the
way for the entrance of INTERFET peacekeepers.(5)
It seems that little about the Collins submarine
is not shrouded in controversy This paper contends that none of the
stereotypes of the popular debate are particularly relevant to the
significant defence policy issues that the program raises. Neither
does it see the answer to future Defence procurement problems in
the institutional and management reforms suggested by
McIntosh/Prescott. Their report focused on correctives for the then
state of the program and asserted that nothing could be gained by
examining its past. On the contrary, nothing will be done to avoid
a recurrence of similar problems in future major defence
procurement programs unless the past of the Collins program is
examined.
In fact, the RAN has told us why the program
came into difficulties-it attempted to develop a unique and highly
sophisticated design without first building a prototype. To asses
the validity of this argument, the paper discusses the development
of the Collins program and assesses its performance.
The paper argues that, like most major
construction programs, the future course of major defence equipment
purchases is determined in the first few per cent of program life
and before enough money has been spent to attract the attention of
either auditors or the public. It notes that recent changes to
Defence procurement procedures by the Government suggest that it
has observed this lesson. However, Parliamentary scrutiny and
public accountability lag, with no mechanism for the early
investigation of Defence equipment programs. Meanwhile, strong
evidence suggests that poor acquisition development by Defence
remains a risk, not only for the viability of certain programs but
of sufficient potential to threaten the Defence Capability Plan if
not contained.
The first section of this paper relies heavily
upon an analysis of the events that occurred during the early
development of the Collins submarine program. These are necessarily
discussed briefly. A more detailed history of the program up to the
selection of the Kockums design is provided in a companion paper,
Procuring Change: How Kockums was Selected for the Collins
Class Submarine, Research Paper no. 4, 2001-02 of the
Australian Parliament's Information and Research Services.
A caveat applies to this paper. It is based on
published, or publicly available sources only, and many of these
reflect the vested interests of those involved in some way in the
program. Attempts can be made to adjust for possible distortions by
cross-referencing sources where possible but a fully verifiable
analysis of the Collins submarine program will be possible only
after the release of classified information, sometime in the
future.
Background
Early
Days
The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) was not an early
champion of the submarine. This was notwithstanding some heroic
actions by Australian submarines in the early years of the First
World War, in which the RAN's two boats were lost. During the
Second World War a major allied submarine base had been established
at Fremantle but the RAN operated no submarines in that conflict
having, briefly, only an impounded ex-Netherlands East Indies boat
which was restricted (even more briefly) to training activities.
After the Second World War, the only submarines based in Australia
were two Royal Navy (RN) boats, deployed on rotation. Their role
was to assist the training of Australian anti-submarine warfare
forces. However, in the 1960s Great Britain was less willing to
support such deployments and the RAN decided to buy two British
Oberon class submarines to replace the RN boats. Two additional
Oberons were ordered shortly afterward, all four procured to
support the training of anti-submarine forces.
By the time that a fifth and sixth Oberon had
joined the RAN in the late 1970s the Service had begun developing
doctrine for the use of its submarines as an offensive component of
maritime strategy. All Australian submariners were being trained
overseas (most in Great Britain) and therefore were exposed to the
tactics and doctrine of Cold War submarine operations. However, the
sensors, combat systems and weapons that equipped the Australian
boats were not of the same ilk as those available to the major Cold
War adversaries.
Experience
With the Oberon Submarines
The experience gathered during the 1970s by the
RAN's submarine arm led to the development of proposals that were
to give the Oberons a fully contemporary combat capability. The
Submarine Weapons Update Program (SWUP) replaced the boats' sonars
and combat data system with new sensors and an Australian developed
fire control system. The increased sophistication of data
acquisition and handling provided through the SWUP allowed the RAN
to rearm its boats with the MK48 torpedo and, later, an
under-water-launched version of the Harpoon anti-ship missile.
These were the same major weapons as available
to contemporary USN nuclear powered attack submarines. To the RAN's
submariners, the successful completion of the SWUP seemed to have
taken them through five generations of technology in a single
step.(6) Their confidence was confirmed by the boat's
performance in exercises, most objectively in those with other
navies. One example was during the RIMPAC 98 international naval
exercise program off Hawaii. During these, HMAS Onslow
penetrated the USN defensive screen and 'sank' the nuclear powered
aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson.(7)
The High Cost and
Limitations of the Oberons
However, by the early 1980s the Oberon submarine
was a comparatively old design and suffered a number of
deficiencies. Chief among these was that it was very expensive to
maintain. Because of the arduous nature of the underwater
environment and the absolute importance of safety, a complete refit
of each submarine was required after five years service. This
required stripping the hull of equipment and refurbishing each
individual component before reassembly. In the early 1980s this
operation swallowed 1.25 million(8) labour hours and
took two years to complete. The cost, at $40 million, was some four
times the cost of HMAS Oxley (the first of the RAN's
Oberons) when commissioned in 1967.
Even lesser repairs could be lengthy and costly.
Because the RAN did not have the full builder's documentation for
the boats in some areas, it was not uncommon for faulty components
to be examined in situ before appropriate repairs could be
determined.(9) Even so, the RAN was dependent on
overseas suppliers for some 85 to 90 per cent of the support for
the Oberons.(10)
Importantly, the ageing design of the Oberons
limited their ability to utilise the updated weapons to the
full.(11) It took longer to recharge its batteries than
more modern designs and thereby was more vulnerable to detection of
components exposed above the surface. In naval parlance the
frequency with which a conventional submarine must approach the
surface to recharge its batteries is known as its 'indiscretion
rate'. This determines the time a submarine can hunt for targets
before retreating to safer waters to recharge its batteries. The
Oberons' crew of 63 was, by contemporary standards, comparatively
large. This by itself was a problem when recruitment to the
submarine branch proved difficult. More importantly, it was a
factor which restricted the boats' endurance and indiscretion rate
when on operations due to the demands of crew numbers on the
submarines' environmental systems (air, water and so on) and
stores.
Why the Collins Turned
Out as it Did: Trends Set During Early Development
With the Collins submarine program, actions that
represented a solution to then current problems were later to
become the source of newly developing problems. In this sense, the
origins of later problems with the submarines lay in the program's
very beginnings. This section discusses the crucial early decisions
that were significant in laying the basis for both the achievements
and shortcomings of the program. A more detailed history of the
selection of the Collins class as the RAN's new submarines,
'Procuring Change: How Kockums was Selected for the Collins Class
Submarine', Research Paper, no. 4, Department of
the Parliamentary Library, Information and Research Services,
September 2001 is available. It provides a chronological overview
and background to the judgements made in this section.
Complex project management is seldom done well.
Research by an international management consultancy firm, involving
some 3000 protects, found that only 10 per cent performed better
than expected and around 50 per cent failed to achieve their
objectives.(12) A little understood characteristic of
project management is that a focus on the production and delivery
phases of equipment programs misses the crucial aspects governing
success. Experience indicates that 90 per cent of the discretionary
decisions that affect the outcome of a project are made in the
first 7 to 12 per cent of its life.(13) This was no
different with the development of the Collins class submarines. In
reality, before the contract to develop and build the submarines
was awarded to Kockums, the future of the program was largely
decided.
The Dominating Influence of the Decision to Build in
Australia
One of the decisions most crucial in the outcome
of the Collins submarine program was that to build it in Australia.
This was an objective of the program as it first emerged in the
context of the 1981-82 Budget and was pursued throughout the
program's life. A major RAN objective for any new submarine was to
reduce the cost of operating the boats. It had rudely discovered
the cost of submarine ownership early in its operation of the
Oberons, when the refit of the first submarine cost 76 per cent of
its purchase price.(14) In planning for its new boats,
Navy had concluded that the lifetime operational costs (over about
25 years) of any new submarine would be approximately 250 per cent
of its purchase price.
The RAN had already decided that local refit and
maintenance of submarines as had been done with the Oberons (rather
than sending them back to an overseas builder), was required if the
Service's submarine warfare potential was to remain fully credible,
since adequate support demonstrated the naval viability of its
submarines.(15) However, starting as a new operator of
Oberon submarines, the RAN was handicapped with insufficient
intellectual property and local component manufacture to allow
efficient support to be achieved.
Analysis of the requirements to support
effective submarine operations showed that a high proportion of the
initial capital costs of any new program would have to be allocated
to this area, integrated logistics support. Expenditure for this
purpose was calculated to constitute about 25 to 30 per cent of the
total capital cost of the program.(16)
Most integrated logistics support was better
supplied from local sources than purchased overseas. Operating the
submarines successfully required this high degree of initial
investment and an ongoing level of specialised industrial capacity.
It seemed to Navy's planners that substantial advantages could be
achieved through having the boats both built and maintained by the
same organisation.(17) As the boats were to be
maintained in Australia they would, therefore, have to be built
here. Local construction would also provide the additional benefits
of new technologies transferred to Australian industry and the
broadening of the nation's economic base.(18)
Bi-Partisan Political Support
Navy's position received political support from
the earliest moments of the project. To gauge the possibilities for
Australian industrial participation in the project, the then
Minister for Defence Support organised a briefing session for
Australian companies. This occurred on 1 March 1983, with personnel
from more than 100 Australian companies attending. At this stage
was hoped that more than 50 per cent of the value of the project
would be supplied by Australian industry.(19) For the
times, when a 30 per cent participation by local industry in a
defence procurement project was considered outstanding, this was an
ambitious target.
Following further work with industry, the
production element of the program's procurement strategy became the
construction of the first vessel overseas with the remaining five
built in Australia. Later, in May 1985, when Cabinet approved the
selection of the two companies left in the running to develop the
design, the Government was willing to pay the additional $30 to $40
million required to build the first submarine in Australia in
return for the perceived industrial benefits.(20)
It was not only the Commonwealth which supported
strongly local submarine construction. State Governments were so
anxious to have the construction site located within their
boundaries that they established offices within their bureaucracies
with the sole task of securing the program. One Premier, John
Bannon of South Australia, went to the extent of having himself
winched from a helicopter onto the deck of a submarine. The reason
for such activity was that, by 1982, Australia was in a severe
recession which was particularly damaging to the older
manufacturing regions of Victoria and South Australia. The new
submarine project was seen not only as a source of employment and a
supplement for lost revenue, but as an opportunity to inject new
technology which might revitalises the industrial base of the State
fortunate enough to host the project.
Consequences
There were two significant consequences of the
decision to build the new submarines in Australia. The first
affected the terms and conditions under which the submarine was to
be built, the second influenced the criteria on which the
successful design would be selected.
The Contract a
Result of the 1980s Procurement Environment
Major procurement projects usually do not escape
the management environment of the period in which they
occur.(21) The contract developed by Navy for the
procurement of its new submarines was certainly no exception. The
fixed-price contract under which the Collins class submarines were
bought was largely the scapegoat on which the Macintosh/Prescott
Report placed the problems of the procurement program. In
retrospect, they saw it as being too inflexible and enshrining an
inherent conflict between builder and customer. However it is
unlikely that the program would have proceeded if the fixed-price
approach had not been adopted.
The Influence of a Succession of Disasters
At the time of the development of the new
submarine project the performance of defence procurement in
Australia had consistently approached the disastrous. The 1975-83
Coalition Government had approved a number of locally sourced
defence equipment programs. These included the local design and
development of a class of minehunter vessels, construction of two
American designed FFG-7 frigates and the building of a naval
tanker/support vessel of French design. For the RAAF it approved
the design and construction in Australia of the Service's next
generation of training aircraft.
None of these projects was to prove
satisfactory. The minehunters failed to perform to expectations and
the program was later cancelled with only two built. The
inadequacies of the FFG program prompted studies of restructuring
options for the Government-owned dockyards in which they were being
built. The support vessel was delivered three years late and at
three times the cost of building her in a French yard. The aircraft
project was to be cancelled before it had flown.
Fixed-price Contracting as an Apparent Solution
In these circumstances it is not surprising that
the RAN sought a completely different approach to building defence
equipment in Australia. At the time, the fixed-price structure
eventually preferred for the contract seemed the best approach to
avoid the then current problems of defence procurement. That the
terms and conditions of the contract eventually would come to be
held sacrosanct, and obstruct Navy and the shipbuilder from
negotiating sensible changes indicated by experience, would later
prove significant. However, this was not the problem that seized
the attention of program managers in the 1980s. It was not
surprising that their favoured solution, in seeking to demonstrate
to government that pressing current problems could be avoided,
should have given perhaps too little consideration to mechanisms
for modifying contractual agreements. These became an issue much
later, when correction of production defects became a problem. The
nature of the fixed-price contract was not simply due to poor
contract definition but to the need to find a credible way of
implementing the agreement of all parties, that local production
was central to the procurement strategy for the new submarines.
Industrial
Credibility as a Selection Imperative
Deciding to build the submarines in Australia
had profound consequences for the criteria used to select the
winning tenderer. Companies responding to the Request for Proposals
were required to provide detailed proposals for the involvement of
Australian industry. This was probably the earliest stage in the
evaluation of major defence equipment at which industrial proposals
from overseas suppliers had been considered. It is difficult to
identify a major ADF capability before the Collins where the short
list of the preferred tenderers for final selection of equipment
was determined with such reference to factors additional to those
of military performance.
A
Search for a Break from the Past
Obviously, having a contractor tied to
fixed-price conditions would be of little use if the builder lacked
the competence to deliver. Further, the test of competence was to
be more severe than usual because of the circumstances of the time.
Until then, the RAN's usual experience in buying major warships was
to build them in its own yards or to buy them overseas. Most of the
existing Australian shipyards that were large enough to build
submarines suffered from inefficiencies caused by poor industrial
relations, under-utilised capacity, antiquated equipment or a
combination of each.(22) Hence the favoured approach to
implement local construction was to establish a 'green fields'
yard, a new building facility in a new location or on the site of a
disbanded shipyard, made the more possible by the perception at
that time of limited similarity between conventional shipbuilding
and submarine construction. Consequently, the company which was to
be selected to provide the submarines was seen as needing to be
less of a traditional shipbuilder and more of a project
manager.
These considerations were made explicit by
Commodore Oscar Hughes when he was appointed to lead the new
submarine project in 1987. He stated that the eventual winner of
the contest would be the group with the best balance of
'capability, industrial involvement and cost'.(23)
Lobbying in Favour of Industrial Capability
Risk in a contractor's capacity to transfer
construction to Australian industry equated to risk of
embarrassment to the governments strongly identified with
Australian production of the submarines. With the extensive
involvement of State Governments, lobbying for their participation
in the program, there was unprecedented pressure emphasising
industrial outcomes in the final selection of the submarines. Nor
did the States merely advance their claims for the siting of the
construction facility. The South Australian submarine task force
was particularly active, sending study teams overseas and reporting
to the (then) Department of Defence Support.(24) They
argued that Kockums' modular construction techniques were five
years ahead of the other European builders,(25)
principally because of their integrated use of CAD/CAM
(computerised design) techniques in project management of modular
construction techniques. The South Australians noted that none of
the other contenders were, at the time, fully operational in
these.(26)
It appears that some of the competitors for the
submarine contract, particularly the more traditional builders,
were not ready for this change in emphasis. A consequence is that a
design offering superior performance but with poor industrial
credibility may have been rejected in the early stages of the new
submarine selection. It was certainly the case of the latter of two
French bids, offering a nuclear powered boat. This is not to argue
that the performance of the Collins submarines does not meet
Australia's requirements (indeed the opposite is suggested below).
Perhaps some of the problems that were later to affect the design,
such as underwater noise at high-speed, might have been avoided
more easily by another designer. That, however, was not the sole
objective of the program. The subsequent cost of modifying the hull
to overcome this problem might be seen as one of the likely
consequences (and one acceptable in context) of the fundamental
strategy of building submarines in Australia.
Combat Data
System
Of the early decisions in the Collins program,
the one which was to have the most public effect was that
concerning the nature of the vessels' Combat Data System (CDS). It
has been the subsequent failure of this system to meet its design
requirements that has left the submarines with a severely impaired
combat capability. The design of the Collins CDS has been described
as dated and inflexible and the management of its software
development process has been criticised. Yet the concept for the
CDS was developed to avoid such problems. It was a decision
mandating the architecture of the future system, made very early in
the life of the program, rather than the subsequent management of
its development that proved to be the source of subsequent
difficulties.
Origins of the CDS Concept
One of the fundamental early decisions made by
Navy was that the CDS would be developed separately and supplied
under a different contract from that covering construction of the
submarines. By the end of 1982, it had decided that the electronic
combat systems of the new boats would be fully integrated. Instead
of the then standard central computer performing all data analysis,
the new submarine CDS would use a data bus to distribute
information to a number of smaller computer work stations. Each of
these would be capable of acquiring and processing information from
whichever of the submarine's sensors was relevant to the current
task. This philosophy of distributed processing was expected to
improve operational effectiveness and to reduce the lifetime
maintenance costs. The latter would result from eliminating the
need to cut open the submarines during modernisation programs to
remove a bulky mainframe computer, with the system being upgraded
instead by substituting new software.(27)
In January 1983, in what was in fact the first
step to involve industry with the project, Navy took advertisements
calling for registration of interest from suppliers of 'modern
integrated combat systems'.(28) By going down this path,
instead of holding open the option of evaluating the best system
deployed in a submarine, the CDS itself became a factor in the
selection of the new boats. The design of the new submarine would
have to be capable of accommodating the independently developed
CDS. As experience was soon to prove, few were.
Difficulties in Selecting a
Supplier
It was the development of the CDS which also
provided the first signs of problems. Despite receiving responses
from 5 consortia, no proposal would meet easily the requirements
developed by Navy. The most favoured proposal used technology
developed for Royal Navy nuclear powered submarines. Not
surprisingly, it was reported as costing more than program
financial calculations had allowed-to the extent that it would
consume approximately 60 per cent of the total project cost, rather
than the 40 per cent which had been allocated.(29)
Navy eventually chose a consortium led by the
American company Rockwell to develop the CDS. This company had
earlier been selected to provide the combat avionics system for the
RAN's Seahawk helicopters. The Seahawk system also used a
distributed architecture experience with which, it was expected,
would assist the development of the Collins system. Rockwell had
been one of two companies in final contention for the CDS, along
with the Dutch company HSA.
Kockums, the submarine constructor, was more
familiar with the latter company and preferred it to be the
subcontractor to provide the CDS. Navy however stuck to its
strategy and awarded the CDS to Rockwell. In September 1993, when
Rockwell's inability to produce a satisfactory system had become a
significant risk to the viability of the program, ASC was prevented
from placing it in default of its contract and effectively lost
control of the CDS sub-contract.(30) Defence lost an
opportunity to review the procurement strategy for the CDS and
persevered long beyond the sensible to preserve a program which had
clearly failed.
Early Assumptions and Subsequent
Failure
The RAN was not alone in its 'grand folly'. When
building the submarines in Australia first had been suggested, most
doubt over the proposal's feasibility had centred on the heavy
engineering requirements. The Australian information technology
(IT) industry assured the RAN of both the feasibility and inherent
advantages of a fully integrated combat system and of its ability
to contribute to such a program.(31) Perhaps over
confident as a result of the success of its SWUP program, Navy
rated the development of the CDS as being of low risk. More concern
was felt at the risk involved in the engineering aspects of the
program and some other areas of IT, such as the automated submarine
control system. It appears that Rockwell itself did not consider
the development of a fully integrated combat system as a task it
might fail. In the early 1990s it appears to have devoted some
effort in promoting the CDS as a means of upgrading existing
conventional submarines, particularly the Russian-built Kilo
class.
Moreover, the RAN was not the only navy to think
that the future of combat data processing lay with fully integrated
systems. The USN specified the same concept for its BSY-1
Integrated Combat System for the US Navy's Seawolf class nuclear
attack submarines. This was an even more costly failure than the
Collins CDS, absorbing US$1.5 billion before it was
cancelled,(32) with the US Service developing
remediative adjustments in the late 1990s. These were latter to
prove helpful in providing the equipment that allowed an interim
system to be installed in HMA Ships Dechaineux and
Sheean. Yet it remains a mystery why the RAN, able to call
on the USN in the late 1990s for help, did not monitor progress
with the BSY-1 and draw a parallel between American experience and
that of the Collins' CDS, which was clearly replicating the former.
Instead, Navy sought to preserve this part of its procurement
strategy when clear evidence suggested it had failed.
The Critical
Point-Failing to Change the Procurement Strategy
Navy's stubborn persistence with the CDS was the
more surprising because, in the central area of the program, it
quickly abandoned its approach to the development of the program's
submarine platform component. At about two years into the life of
the program, Navy changed the basis for evaluating the suitability
of possible submarine designs.
Original Low
Risk Approach
Recognising that the priority given to building
the submarines in Australia entailed a high degree of risk, Navy
sought to manage risk in the program as a whole by reducing that
associated with the design of the submarine and its technologies.
When Request for Tender (RFT) documents were issued to industry in
May 1983, the requirements for the new submarine emphasised tried
and proven designs. Navy stipulated that the selected design should
be one already in-service or intended to be in-service by 1986.
This would have minimised risk as sea trials would be under way in
the parent navy. As a minimum, any designs submitted should be a
derivative of submarines with an already proven service
performance. Any modification to meet RAN requirements were to be
of low risk and cost.(33) There were, in addition, some
suggestions that experience of constructing submarines in foreign
countries might confer an advantage in comparing bids.
Opting for the
Ideal Rather Than the Available
However, the RAN was in no way simply seeking to
find the best available design. Issued with the RFT was a
comprehensive list of specifications detailing the performance the
RAN wanted from its new submarine. These reflected the expectations
of Navy that it should be capable of considerable improvements over
the Oberon class. Thus, Navy hoped that (then) established
submarine design had advanced considerably.
When the responses of the competing companies
were submitted by the end of 1983 it was apparent that the two
objectives of proven design and advanced technology were in
conflict. No existing design could meet the RAN's
expectations.(34) All were too small to meet the
specifications, including that they be able to accommodate the
independently developed CDS. For the same reason, they were
probably unable to provide sufficient engine compartment space and
battery storage to allow significant improvements in submerged
endurance and indiscretion ratio. The main reason for this was that
European boats were designed to sustain a deployment to a distance
of about two-thirds that required by the RAN.(35)
At this point Navy made the crucial decision of
the Collins class program. Instead of persisting with its
procurement strategy and choosing the best available combination of
design, industrial package and cost, Navy chose to proceed with
developing a boat which more closely matched its ideal
specifications.
Cost Escalation and
Program Delay
This involved a delay of more than a
year(36) and greatly increased the overall cost of the
program. At the end of this period of recasting the project's
nature, from the end of 1983 until May 1985 when the two
contractors to compete for the final design were announced, costs
grew by around 73 per cent over those expected when responses were
first sought from industry. This was the period of greatest
proportional cost growth during the history of the program and also
confirmed a reduction in the number of boats it would purchase.
Collins Submarine Program-Changes in Cost and Program
Size
First concepts, late 1982
|
1983, prior to feedback from industry
|
May 1985, selection of short list
|
May 1987, selection of the winning tender
|
December 1999
|
A 10 boat program at over $100 million each
|
4 to 8 boats
$1.5 billion
|
6 boats
$2.6 billion
|
6 boats
$3.9 billion (June 1986 prices)
|
6 boats
$5.1 billion
|
Source: Procuring Change: How Kockums was
Selected for the Collins Class Submarine. Prices are at then
current levels, unless specified otherwise.
Coincident with the cost escalation was an
increase in risk across all segments of the program. This simply
increased the probability that, at sometime, some of section of the
program would not proceed as expected. Yet, despite these
significant changes, Navy did not alter its procurement strategy.
In retrospect, at this point it would have been appropriate to
implement what Navy now recognises should have been done, and
decide to build the first boat as a prototype that could have been
used as a test bed to eliminate the almost inevitable failures.
Failure to
Acknowledge Higher Risk
By the end of 1984 reports of concern about the
cost and risks of the program were emerging from the Russell
Headquarters of Defence. The then incoming Minister, Kim Beazley,
ordered an internal review of the project. This eventually
reconfirmed the new direction of the program, apparently on the
predictable arguments of operational and strategic
requirements.(37) From what has been reported, the
thrust of arguments against the emerging redirection of the Collins
program appear to have centred on reasons for returning to the
smaller and cheaper existing submarine designs. We do not know
whether Defence considered, once the strength of Navy's operational
and strategic reasoning prevailed, if a concomitant change in
procurement strategy was inevitable.(38)
Whatever the reasons for failing to change the
procurement strategy,(39) the impact on the program was
to be profound. Navy now had a program, endorsed by Defence, with
high risk factors in almost every facet of its development. In
essence, they had opted to develop a Holden amongst submarines, a
design uniquely suited to Australian conditions and with much
promise, but carrying much more risk than the more limited but
proven off-the-shelf designs. The need to achieve greater
performance in certain areas to improve the usefulness of the
submarines may have justified this decision. However, the failure
to understand or to communicate its implications had the most
profound influence on the development of the new submarines and for
the Service became the root of both subsequent problems and much
public grief.
Achievements and Problems: Pointers to Decision
Making?
Over the years of contentious debate about the
Collins class submarines there have been many suggestions as to
what has gone wrong with the program. This section looks at various
aspects of the procurement program to judge whether these
contributed to the problems subsequently encountered when the boats
were introduced into service.
A
Significant Achievement: Building the Submarines in
Australia
One argument about the Collins submarine program
is that it was a mistake to build the boats in Australia and that
it would have been preferable to build them overseas. This paper
has already demonstrated that there was little interest in building
the boats other than in Australia. It has also been suggested that
this decision had significant consequences for the outcome of the
program. However, building in Australia was not a factor that
handicapped the program.
Performance of World Standard
Firstly, it must be understood that submarine
construction is an extremely complex and difficult business. Even
yards which have been building submarines for decades cannot
produce perfect product at all times. An example of this is the
recent withdrawal from service of all 12 RN Swiftsure and Trafalgar
class nuclear attack submarines because of problems in the their
nuclear reactor cooling systems.(40) The Collins
submarines were, in fact, delivered to the RAN more efficiently
than the last of the Australian Oberons, which were built in United
Kingdom (UK) yards with considerable experience of the task. This
Oberon was delayed for several years after the builder fitted
cabling incorrectly. Contract liability required its complete
removal and recabling.
The Australian Submarine Corporation (ASC) site
at Outer Harbour in South Australia was established in 1989 at a
cost of $100 million.(41) Since then it has produced all
submarines without a major mishap and worked up to a capacity for
delivering one submarine per year. This is a faster rate than was
achieved by the Dutch and British yards in delivering their boats
that were contenders for the Collins class program.(42)
Of the transplanted submarine building programs, only the South
Korean Chang Bogo, an HDW Type 1200 design barely one third the
size of the Collins, is able to match this rate of production. This
would tend to suggest that the evaluation of Kockums' production
methods made early in the project was correct and that the Swedes
proved capable of transplanting them to Australia.
Unusually High Self Reliance
The Collins class program was unique in building
all the boats in Australia and almost all from scratch. All other
programs to transfer construction of a submarine design to a second
country have involved building at least the first and usually more,
at the designer's yard. The majority have made heavy use of
sub-assemblies of prefabricated components which continue to be
produced in the designer's yard. For the Collins program only the
bow section of the first boat was manufactured in Sweden. This in
fact, told the tale of the quality of Australian production, since
this section was shown to have an unacceptable number of welding
defects which appeared nowhere else in the program. In order to
assure HMAS Collins' longer term serviceability, these
were repaired by Australian welders at the ASC plant during a
subsequent maintenance cycle for the submarine.
Fostering Australian Industrial Expertise
The program has also contributed to improving
the quality of Australian manufacturing on a national scale. The
ASC's Adelaide facility is an assembly yard, building submarines
from components provided from across Australia. When the submarine
project began there were only 35 Australian companies certified to
the quality levels required for defence work. By 1998 there were
1500.(43) Not all of this can be credited to the
submarine project but, together with the contemporary ANZAC frigate
and other programs, naval shipbuilding does appear to have provided
for sections of Australian industry the modernising influence
claimed by its proponents at the beginning of the submarine program
in the early 1980s.
In the process of building the Collins class,
ASC has successfully integrated many areas of technology which are
equal to, or better than, that existing elsewhere. One of the areas
originally thought to be of highest risk, the automated submarine
management system has met requirements, leading the RAN to claim
the Collins as the 'world's first "fly by wire"
submarines'.(44) This system is in advance of any used
on American nuclear submarines and has won praise from that
Service. The American and British navies refused to share details
of the anechoic tiles (of rubberised, sound absorbing material,
glued the outside of the hull) used by their submarines to help
reduce the effectiveness of active sonar surveillance systems.
Accordingly, the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO)
then developed tiles for the Collins which exceed the performance
of those used by the northern hemisphere navies.
Finally, it cannot be thought insignificant to
exceed the goals originally set for local content of the new
submarine project. Seventy per cent of the value of physical work
and 45 per cent of its electronics was performed in Australia.
Thus, of the $5.1 billion cost of the original program, $4 billion
was spent in Australia.(45) At its peak, the project
supported 7500 jobs in Australia.(46)
Some Disasters
Avoided: How the Other Competitors Fared
One of the ironies of the Collins program is
that pursuing the original procurement strategy would not have
resulted necessarily in more positive assistance for submarine
production in Australia. None of the other contenders had
trouble-free programs and their subsequent history reinforces the
conclusion that Kockums was the right builder to select at the
time.
The lead boat of the Dutch submarine design,
Walrus, was launched at the end of 1985 but caught fire the
following year whilst being fitted out by the shipbuilder. All her
internal fittings and cabling were destroyed and completion of the
Walrus was delayed for three years. The British Type 2400 suffered
a three year delay, largely due to faulty torpedo tube hatches and
safety concerns with the power plant.(47) During early
evaluation of the Collins program the Type 2400 had been promoted
on the grounds that its operation by the RN would benefit the RAN
through access to continuing in-service development. However, in
1994 the British Government scrapped the Type 2400s to save money.
They were eventually purchased by Canada, which has removed the
British weapons control system and is retrofitting those from the
Canadian Oberons which the Type 2400 is
replacing.(48)
Two of the Thyssen TR 1700 class were built for
Argentina in the contractor's German yard and kits for four more
were shipped to Argentina. Twelve years after the commissioning of
the first submarine, the first Argentinian built boat was only 52
per cent complete. The yard was then sold, work on the submarines
abandoned and the parts retained for spares.(49)
Not even HDW, with the most extensive record of
overseas sales and production programs can guarantee success all
the time. Part of HDW's credentials in bidding for the Collins
program was that it had signed an order (in December 1981) to
supply four submarines to the Indian navy, two them to be built in
India. In the event, these two submarines were delivered five and
six years late, cost twice as much as the two built in Germany and
were the subject of disputes about the adequacy of technical
support from HDW and the costs of spare parts and support
packages.(50) Proposals to build a further two HDW
submarines in India were never pursued, India instead turning to
the purchase of the Russian-built Kilo (despite subsequently
assessing them as inferior in performance to the HDW
submarines(51)) as the means of developing its submarine
capabilities.
Past Glory; Present
Problem?
Whilst the building of the submarines in
Australia is a demonstrable success, it is yet to be seen if that
process will achieve its policy objectives. That is, whether having
built the submarines in Australia will prove to be an effective
basis for supporting them throughout their service lives.
The
Threat of Declining Workload
If anything, ASC's productivity has proved
painful. With a program of finite length and no major construction
work to replace it, continued employment of the highly skilled
workforce (as relevant to the ongoing support of the submarines as
to their construction) is difficult. By May 1999, at the launch of
the fifth boat, Sheean, ASC projected that its 1000 strong
workforce would be cut to 500 by the end of the year. With
production drawing to an end, the viability of ASC depended on
securing contracts for the first cyclic refit of each submarine.
Scheduled for every six years of the submarines' lives, the first
of these, for HMAS Collins, was due in 2001 and would be
worth around $100 million.(52)
This approach was placed in doubt several weeks
later when the McIntosh/Prescott report suggested that all support
work associated with the submarines, including the refits, should
be done in Perth.(53) ASC's response was that such an
approach would lead to the yard closing in two years, when the
construction program was expected to be completed.(54)
In the event, work to correct the defects of the class was given
priority over the sixth submarine, which was delayed till late
2001. In the meantime, however, the prospect of building two more
submarines, which had persisted in the program as a continuously
delayed option, was finally scotched. The Government's white paper
did not support the development of a new variant of the submarine
that had been in the Department's planning
cycle.(55)
The Government Decides to Award Ongoing Refit
Work
Since all the RAN's submarines are based in
Western Australia, logic suggests Perth should be the site for
depot level maintenance. Navy has adopted this position, which
involves placing about $40 million of work a year in that
area.(56) The cyclic refit of the submarines, however,
is another matter. This involves a complete removal and
reassembling of the components inside the submarine. As such, it is
a difficult and potentially costly exercise for which, in most
cases, the yard which built the submarines should be best
placed.
This, in any case, is the logic which appears to
have won against the advice in the McIntosh/Prescott report. In
letters to the Premiers of South and Western Australia in July
2001, the Prime Minister confirmed that the Government considered
ASC best placed to carry out major maintenance of the submarines,
including 'full-cycle refits'.(57) Assuming the that ASC
continues to perform the work satisfactorily, this decision should
generate revenues for the company worth about $100 million per year
over the life of the boats and allow it to maintain its
expertise.
A Future with the
US?
In the two years between the suggestion that
cyclic refits might be performed in Perth and the Government's
decision otherwise, the structure of ASC has changed dramatically.
By mid-2001, the Government was the sole owner of ASC and was
holding it for future sale, preferably as a catalyst in the
rationalisation of the Australian defence shipbuilding
industry.(58) Awarding the submarine refits to ASC
provides a cash flow that will help that objective. However, the
Government's handling of ASC ownership over the last two years has
made access to intellectual capital the central issue concerning
the long-term support of the submarines.
The Buy Out
of Kockums
For some time, the Government had been
considering ways of selling its 48.5 per cent share in ASC (held
through the Australian Industry Development Corporation). The
McIntosh/Prescott report commented on the Government's potential
conflict of interest as both customer and part owner of the
contractor.(59) The ongoing problem was the Government's
preoccupation with the sale of Australian Defence Industries, which
it wholly owned and the decline of ASC's market value as its major
income stream reduced. Then in September 1999, in a complex
reshuffle of northern European corporations, Kockums was merged
with HDW. Although HDW's immediate concern was to buy up Kockums'
49 per cent shareholding in ASC,(60) the Government
exercised a contractual option and assumed full control of ASC in
November 2000. A price was not mentioned at the time but, shortly
before, HDW had been negotiating at about $50 million for the sale
of its ASC share holding.(61)
Throughout the 14 months before the Government
purchased ASC, the Minister often asserted that the primary
objective of any future arrangements at ASC was to ensure the
rectification of the submarines' faults and the best option for
their long-term support. This remains the objective for what is now
the intended sale of the company. However two years after Kockums,
the design authority, changed hands the future of ASC remains
unclear.
The
American Option
All that can be said with confidence is that,
although the Australian building site remains a part of this
structure, the European design authority is not. The task force
that in 2000 worked on future structure options for ASC was asked
to seek ways of involving both European and American companies.
However, an increasing range of reports has identified the US
company Electric Boat as the likely source of the submarine
expertise in a privatised ASC, with some claims that it is expected
to buy a share of up to 40 per cent.(62) It is not clear
how this position arose but a combination of ongoing conflict
between Navy and Kockums and a preoccupation with USN assistance in
rectifying the submarines' problems, may have
contributed.(63)
Risks in
the Tension Between US and European Suppliers
Whatever the reasons, there is a significant
risk in this approach to the sale of ASC. This is, simply, that
Americans do not build conventional submarines. The issue is
probably not so much whether an ASC relying on American expertise
might find it difficult to manage cyclic refits. More important is
that the Americans have no technology base in conventional
submarines and no research into leading-edge technologies, such as
Air Independent Propulsion. They will be limited in their approach
to upgrading the submarines over the remaining 25 years of their
operational lives.
The RAN appears to recognise the risk in this
situation. In early 2001 relations between Kockums and the RAN were
strained after the RAN had shipped one of the company's propellers
to the USA. Commodore Paul Greenfield, Director General of
Submarines, acknowledged that Kockums, as the designer, had a very
important role in the future support of the submarines and hoped
that the formerly strong relationship between Navy and Kockums
could be restored.(64) The problem is that European
submarine designers might be as wary of entering arrangements that
include an American company(65) as American officials
have been enthusiastic in urging the exclusion of Europeans from
aspects of the Collins program (see below, 'Back to Square
One-Replacement Program Abandoned').
Does
Australian Have Access to Sufficient Intellectual Capital?
Whatever the discussions between the parties,
there is an appearance that the Commonwealth does not have access
as yet to sufficient intellectual property rights to ensure that
ASC can be effective. McIntosh and Prescott argued that the
contract for the submarines ought to cover all necessary
intellectual property rights to cover ongoing support
requirements.(66) Yet in early 2000, when the then
Minister appointed John Prescott to provide advice on options for
the future of the company, he included the issue of continuing
access to intellectual property throughout the operational lives of
the submarines.(67) By year's end, when the Commonwealth
announced its outright purchase of ASC, one of the strategic
factors still to be addressed was securing 'access to necessary
technologies'.(68) Six months later, the current
Minister said that among the issues still being worked through were
legal issues such as intellectual property and the design
authority.(69)
Until a resolution can be achieved which
provides ASC with the intellectual capital it needs, both to
maintain the submarines and to upgrade them as might be required by
changing strategic circumstances, the ultimate viability of the
strategy to build them in Australia will remain unproven. Accessing
appropriate intellectual property, maintaining the skills base and
other aspects of the intellectual capital(70) ASC needs
to be efficient, therefore, remains one of the risks to be overcome
before the shipbuilding aspects of the program can be called a
complete success.
Performance
The Collins Class are very large submarines by
the standards of conventional boats. Displacing 3051 tons on the
surface, they are the second largest class of conventional
submarine built since the Second World War. Only the Japanese-who
have been builders of large conventional submarines since the
1970s-come close to the Collins, with the Oashio class displacing
2700 tons.
The bulk of the Collins class submarines has
been criticised for driving up the cost of the program (partly true
since hull cost rises with displacement), largely due to the RAN's
desire for a boat with considerable range. However, bulk is not
necessary to achieve long range in submarine design. Thirty years
ago, the Soviets were able to achieve a 20 000 mile range in their
Foxtrot class and the Indian Shishumar, Italian Sauro and Pakistani
Agosta B classes have more or less comparable range to the Collins
on about half the displacement.
The
Performance Advantages of Size
Rather than range, the bulk of the Collins
design confers advantages for submarine operations which probably
justify the boast that it is among the best performing conventional
submarine platforms in the world. The crucial challenge in
submarine design is to provide sufficient volume to accommodate
equipment, stores and weapons, living space for crew, machinery
spaces for propulsion and as much volume for battery storage as
possible. Greater displacement provides the basis for that. At one
level adequate hull volume equates to endurance and that for the
Collins' is more then adequate. Design endurance is 90 days, though
a notional standard patrol is only 70 days, thus allowing a
submarine to be deployed on station at 2500 nm for seven
weeks.(71)
Range and
Endurance
The volume can be used for fuel oil storage
tanks (greater range-11 500 nm, surfaced for the Collins) or
improved crew and systems accommodation (better performance of
duties), but it can also be used for propulsion and batteries. The
Collins class has sufficient installed power to make them, with a
reported maximum speed of 24 kts,(72) among the fastest
conventional submarines ever built. Maximum speed, however, is not
usually a relevant performance measure for conventional submarines,
as it quickly exhausts battery capacity.
In 1944 Germany perfected high performance
conventional submarines by providing greatly increased battery
space and adding the snorkel (basically, an air tube which extends
above the water's surface) to allow them to be recharged whilst
submerged. Since then, increasing battery storage has been one of
the objectives of conventional submarine development.
Submerged Endurance and Indiscretion Ratio
Most importantly, sufficient volume for large
electrical storage capacity allows a reduction in the submarine's
indiscretion rate (for which, see 'Experience with the Oberon
Submarines'). The necessary corollary to take full operational
advantage of this is the capacity to recharge the batteries in an
acceptable time. For this, large hull volume also helps, for it
provides the space and ease of layout for large diesel engines and
generator sets.
Collins uses generators rather than alternators
and has a combined generation capacity of 4.2 megawatts. This gives
it amongst the most impressive platform dynamic performance
available, an important area of performance advantage over, for
instance, the most commonly used Third World submarine, the
Russian-built Kilo.(73) With four times the submerged
endurance of the Oberons, a Collins can recharge its batteries in
about one hour at a speed at which an Oberon would have little
power reserve for electrical generation; in general, it can
recharge its batteries almost four times faster than the Oberon
class.(74)
The result of this combination is that the
Collins is already close to the type of submerged performance that
will only become available to other conventional submarines if
radical new Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) systems prove
successful. Australia's DSTO tested two forms of AIP in the
mid-1990s to assess the advantage they might give the new
Australian submarines. On sea trials of HMAS Collins, the
combination of large battery storage and high generator capacity
was shown to allow the submarine to maintain an energy cycle under
patrol conditions which required it to snort (running its engines
whilst submerged, by use of a snorkel) for 'less than a few
minutes' in every 24 hours:
Sea trials of the first-of-class have proven
that the Collins as it is now can stay submerged for such a long
time, and have such a low rate of indiscretion, that a refit of an
AIP system is not really needed and would simply not have any cost
benefit.(75)
Accordingly, the Australian AIP project was
dropped in mid-1996.
It is unlikely that a submarine mast exposed on
the surface for only a few minutes will be detected in time to
initiate an attack. Hence, a Collins submarine should be able to
remain undetected within its patrol area for extended periods
without having to withdraw to safer waters to recharge batteries.
This not only enhances submarine operations but can over exert
opposing forces by imposing higher rates of Anti-submarine Warfare
(ASW) operations.
The Collins' high submerged endurance can be
accessed throughout a deployment. In comparison, AIP systems are
limited in practical operations by the comparatively limited volume
of oxidant that can be carried. As well, being able to drop the AIP
option saved the project the estimated refitting costs of $100
million.
Noise Control and
Stealth
The Collins class are intrinsically quiet
submarines. Equipment is isolated from the deck with vibration
absorbing fittings and the whole deck assembly is similarly
isolated from the hull. Consequently, noise caused by vibration
radiating into the water is reduced to such low levels that early
testing revealed the Collins to be quieter than background ocean
noise,(76) a finding confirmed by more recent tests at a
highly sensitive acoustic range in the US.(77)
The noise characteristics of a submarine can be
further masked by operating at great depth, hopefully hiding
beneath a 'thermal' layer, a mass of water with temperature,
density or salinity characteristics different to the surrounding
ocean is so that they disrupt the normal radiation of sound. With a
diving capacity greater than 300 metres the Collins class is well
equipped to make use of these tactics. The acoustic performance is
further complemented by the use of Australian designed anechoic
tiles, fixed to the external surface of a submarine to absorb some
of the energy radiated by active sonar systems. Unlike the tiles
used by British and American submarines, these do not often fall
off.
The level of noise generated by a submarine
varies with the mode in which it is operating. The very low levels
of noise noted above are achieved in the 'patrol quiet' mode of
operations, where the submarine is 'crawling around' at 3-4 kts on
battery power and the crew are observing strict noise control
procedures. In other modes, different sources of noise are
introduced. When the submarine is snorting, the vibration of its
diesel engines creates considerable noise. When it is travelling at
high-speed the flow of water over the hull and cavitation around
the propeller creates a different source of noise. These latter two
cases are dealt with below.
Impressing the Americans
It is the inherent stealthiness of the Collins
class, due to its low noise signature in the patrol quiet mode,
which has recently attracted international attention. During the
RIMPAC Exercise off Hawaii in 2000 HMAS Waller 'sank' two
USN nuclear attack submarines. It repeated the dose during Exercise
Tandem Thrust off north Queensland in May 2001, 'sinking' two
American amphibious assault ships in waters of between 70-80 metres
depth, barely more than the length of the submarine
itself.(78) The Collins class was a for the of described
by Vice-Admiral James Metzger, Commander, US Seventh Fleet as 'a
very capable and quiet submarine that would challenge any naval
force in the world today.'(79) The Americans were also
impressed by the Collins class' manoeuvrability, confirming claims
made for the design during project evaluation,(80) and
which had been said to exceed contracted requirements in
practice.(81)
That these achievements were recorded by
Waller, reinforces the claims for the inherently good
stealth characteristics of the design. Waller is one of
the class which has not yet been modified to overcome the
shortcomings noted in the McIntosh/Prescott report. By exploiting
these characteristics, Waller was able to perform well
under exercise conditions and 'was able to operate in a way that
did not expose her faults.'(82) This mode of operation
was classical submarine warfare, covert patrolling of a designated
area at 3-4 kts, until unwary adversaries strayed in her way.
What Waller could not do was
demonstrate the unusual degree of mobility her propulsion system
allows, because of noise generated by the hull. Nor could she
demonstrate the ability to use long range anti-shipping weapons,
because of the failure of the combat system.(83) In
fact, Waller came close to being able to demonstrate very
little in the exercise. In May the crew had to call for assistance
from a Brisbane suburban IT repair company to fix
'scanners',(84) so that the submarine could continue its
deployment to the exercise area. Nor was she herself invulnerable.
Waller was detected and 'sunk' during Tandem Thrust, a
reminder, at least, that submarines are no more invulnerable than
any other weapon of war and that a great number of submariners have
died in combat.
Problems,
Deficiencies and Failures: Shortcomings in
Performance
Against this, the Collins class suffers from a
collection of publicised deficiencies sufficient for the RAN not to
commission the boats as normal into full naval service. These were
enumerated in the Macintosh/Prescott Report.(85) Over
their early years, the boats suffered from a constant stream of
breakdowns, numbering in the hundreds per year(86) and
of sufficient intensity to threaten the RAN's ability to maintain
crew levels and, in the medium term, to maintain its submarine
warfare expertise.(87) In mid-1999, the RAN's submarine
arm had only 37 per cent of the number of qualified submariners it
required. Although recent figures show a decided improvement in
recruitment and the Navy now has 55 per cent of its complement, it
will not be until 2006 that it will meet its personnel
requirement.(88)
In general terms, the failures of the Collins
class can be grouped under the heading of components, noise and the
CDS. A common thread in these defects is their origin in the unique
specifications set for the submarine by the RAN, often in areas
where relatively standard and well proven equipment might have been
thought adequate or where experience indicated significant
risk.
To avoid being overly prescriptive, it should be
noted that not all problems with the submarine conform to this
simplified criteria. To be fair to the Service, defects appear to
have originated with, or been exacerbated by, the attitude of
various of the contractors. On the other hand, the attitude of some
component vendors appears to have had a significantly beneficial
impact on the outcome of the project. For instance, Schneider, the
manufacturer of the electric motor, acknowledged problems with the
motor in early trials and fixed these at its own cost.
Component
Failures
Most of the components used in submarine
building are made by specialists who produce a range of equipment
to meet the requirements of different designs. Many problems with
submarine performance are not issues of design but of poorly
performing or incorrectly specified components. Unless a submarine
has truly revolutionary performance requiring the development of
new components, most of these problems should be rectified by
simply switching components or suppliers. This, in fact, was done
to rectify a problem with the original propeller shaft seal which
was allowing excessive water into the hull.(89)
Similarly, a noise problem caused by squeaky hydraulic actuators on
the after hydroplanes was overcome by replacing the actuators.
Uniquely Specified Sub-Systems
However many of the problems with the Collins
submarines do not appear to have originated with standard
components. The boats' propeller produced excessive
cavitation,(90) which is a source of unacceptable noise,
and was brittle. (Submarine propellers are not exactly
'components', in that they require a level of technology which
little more than a decade ago placed them highly amongst the
targets of Soviet espionage.) The RAN specified that the propellers
be made of Sonoston, a material that promised to reduce noise
through its low resonance characteristics. However, it proved
liable to crack with only small changes in operational profile and
difficult to manufacture to the extent that the propellers had to
be hand finished. As multi-axis, computer controlled machine tools
are needed to manufacture low noise propellers, it is not
surprising that those of the Collins were too noisy and needed
replacement too frequently.(91)
A component failure that can be linked similarly
to the RAN's development of unique specifications is that of the
Collins' search and attack periscopes.(92) These
required 'capabilities well beyond anything then
available'(93) and were provided by Pilkington-Barr and
Stroud, a leading submarine periscope manufacturer and a company
whose product is fitted to high performance RN nuclear-powered
submarines. The Collins' periscopes suffered from excessive
vibration and optical characteristics that were both a hazard to
boat safety and an Operational Health and Safety danger for the
crew. This is a result of specifications that were not fully
evaluated(94) and it is difficult to believe that the
RAN could not have selected an existing, proven design which would
have performed adequately.
The
Diesel Engines
Essentially ,conventional submarines are diesel
powered electricity generation systems. However, in conventional
submarines this process nearly always occurs underwater, which
greatly complicates all aspects of the activity. The Collins class
suffered problems across the range of diesel engine functions. The
diesels produced excessive vibration and attendant equipment
failure, ranging up to a damaged crankshaft in one case. From the
delivery of HMAS Collins till October 1998, more than 750
diesel defects were recorded. The maritime industry bench markers,
Lloyds Register, found the performance of the engines to be
uniquely bad amongst its class of diesel engine
applications.(95)
The
Nature of Diesel Engine Problems
Part of the problem was caused by the engines
ingesting excessive water (submarine operations require seawater to
be used as ballast in the fuel tanks as fuel is consumed). Some of
it to the recommendation by the engine designer, Hedemora, of an
inappropriate engine operating speed. More stemmed from diesel
exhaust flow problems, as the exhaust gasses are expelled
underwater to mask the boat's presence. Yet other difficulties lay
with excess consumption of lubricating oil. Head gaskets have been
blown because of use of a turbo charger (exhaust pressure
operation) in the new submarines rather than the supercharger
(mechanical operation) more traditional for submarine diesels. The
gear train appears to have design flaws that adversely affect
reliability.
Since propulsion is at the heart of a submarine,
the problems of the diesel generation system affect performance.
Procedures to circumvent the water contamination problem involve
leaving 30 per cent of the fuel oil in the tanks.(96)
This (together with a lubricating system problem, which now may be
solved) prevented the class from demonstrating its specified range
and endurance. The extreme vibration produced by the engines would
have endangered the submarine whilst it was snorting, passing into
the water as noise that would have alerted enemy forces over long
distances.
Deficiencies a Consequence of Overall Design
Objectives
The difficulties with the diesel engines are
linked to the Navy's desire for an outstanding submerged
performance from its new boats and the consequent large size of the
class. To meet the high power demand entailed, the design
originally was to use four diesels.(97) At some later
stage, three engines of comparatively large volume were preferred.
Whilst this arrangement had the elegance of arranging all three
abreast, the selected engine subcontractor, Hedemora, had not
developed submarine diesels of this size before. This lack of
experience led to an inappropriate engine speed being
recommended.
In these cases, the Navy's pursuit of its ideal,
not just of the submarine itself, but of its systems and, in some
cases how those systems were produced, compromised what was
otherwise a basically adequate package. Defects were exacerbated
where the feasibility of unique components was not
tested.(98)
Hull Generated
Noise
This is perhaps the most peculiar of the
problems 'suffered' by the submarine. It is also an area of
significant dispute. There is an argument that the problem is not
'real' in a contractual sense. ASC has maintained that it is not
responsible for hull generated noise above 12 kts because the
contract cited no performance requirements in this area and,
therefore, the submarines were not designed to meet
them.(99) There is also dispute as to whether adequate
steps were taken to test the design for performance in this area.
The McIntosh/Prescott report expresses surprise at the apparently
minimal testing of the design,(100) while the Navy
asserts that 'a comprehensive tank testing program did
occur'.(101)
Why Submarines Usually Proceed Slowly
It is not usual for a conventional submarine's
noise signature at high-speed to become such an issue. They
generally operate slowly and cautiously when likely to be in the
vicinity of enemy aircraft, ships and submarines. No submarine at
speed is at its quietest and stealth, the over-riding advantage
they possess, must be maintained at least until an attack can be
initiated.(102) Conventional submarines cannot afford to
move too quickly within the vicinity of hostile forces because
their battery endurance is low and they would soon be forced to
snort and risk detection. A snorting submarine generates greater
noise levels (turbulence from the snorkel mast and reciprocating,
explosively driven diesels, compared to the rotating electric
motor) which are many times more detectable than the submerged
boat. Just as importantly, such noise also reduces the
effectiveness of the submarine's sonar systems, thereby degrading
its ability to detect hostile shipping. Nevertheless, HMAS
Collins was detected by an obsolescent Royal New Zealand
Air Force (RNZAF) Orion ASW aircraft during exercises off Darwin in
1997.(103)
There are parts of a mission profile, such as
quickly loosing depth, transiting to or from a patrol area or for
escape when brought under attack, where speed could be a useful
attribute. With the exception of loosing depth, this potential has
been limited by the practicalities of technology. Submarine
operations may require the boat to change depth quickly for a
variety of reasons and high-speeds can be reached during such
manoeuvres. Not only would noise induced by poor flow characterises
increase the risk of detection but it has raised, in the Collins
case, the possibility of collision with another vessel if the
manoeuvre were performed near the surface.(104)
There seems little reason why the level of
concern should be as sharp in other areas. Previous generations of
conventional submarines had little power available for recharging
batteries if snorting at high-speed. The common transit speed for
the Oberon class was around 8 kts. Neither is speed necessarily a
good defence. For instance, the Thyssen TR 1700 class (which at 25
kts lays claim to be the fastest conventional submarine around) can
sustain this pace for a distance of only 20 miles.(105)
This is not likely to be a good tactic if opposed by surface ships
with embarked ASW helicopters. Like all types of military
equipment, submarines have to be operated within their technical
limitations and navies are differentiated by their skill in
extracting optimum performance within these limits.
Sources of Noise at High-Speed
The hull flow noise generated by the Collins at
high-speed comes from the nature of its casings and fin, and from
the interaction of the turbulence they generate with the propeller.
The casing is a fibre class structure built on top of the pressure
hull, projecting above the water and mounting the fin (often
incorrectly referred to as the conning tower). It covers external
equipment and houses some of the sonar arrays. There are
indications that the design of the casings gave higher priority to
maximum sonar performance rather than hydrodynamic efficiency.
The Collins class today is marked by a 'dimple'
just behind the bow where the large casing covering the bow sonar
is fared into the rest of the structure. This forms an obvious
point of disruption to flow and was not a feature of early models
of the submarine. At some stage of the design, a larger sonar array
was apparently thought more important than maintaining the smooth
flow of water around the bow.(106) The main deck casings
are also designed for optimal sonar performance, and are rather
slab-sided as the three differential ranging sonars they contain
(the convex panels located equidistantly down each side of the
casing) operate best when installed vertically. Originally, Kockums
chose to end the deck casings with an abruptly rounded-off design.
This generated vortices at speed which were passed through the
propeller, increasing cavitation and, consequently, noise. This
problem has been reduced significantly by a more finely tapered
ending to the deck casing and modifications to the shape of the
fin.(107)
An
Outcome Influenced by Other Objectives
This preference in design, allied to the fact
that Navy had specified no noise performance for the submarine at
speeds in excess of 12 kts, must have indicated to Kockums that
high-speed characteristics were not a central element of the
design. Nonetheless, by the time that the first-of-class trials
were underway, Navy had changed its mind and considered the issue
of noise at speed of sufficient importance not to accept the
submarines as designed.
As mentioned above, the Collins class is
considered extremely quiet when operating in the patrol quiet
state, the predominant mode of submarines under combat conditions.
In addition, the design of the Collins' power plant has ensured
that its mechanical noise increases very little with
speed.(108) Reports that a USN evaluation of the
Collins' noise profile concluded that the submarine was as noisy as
'an underwater rock concert' have been denied by the submarine
Project Office, which claims that there was no 'secret' USN
report.(109)
It may be that the
dynamic capabilities of the Collins design led Navy to
re-conceptualise the extent of tactical mobility that was possible
with a conventional submarine. This would then have demanded that
the noise problem at speed, previously under-emphasised, be solved.
Unfortunately, by having ignored this area in the contract, the
Navy found itself in a dispute with ASC and having to pay, from the
Defence budget, the costs of the comparatively simple modifications
required to improve the situation.
The
Combat System
If the prototype analogy is to be applied to the
Collins class program, the CDS would be the model that crashed and
burned on impact. There is now no doubt that the most critical
failing affecting the submarine is this system. The program to
rectify the failings of the submarine has now identified changes
that will bring them up to approximately 80 per cent of capability.
Achieving the remaining 20 per cent depends on replacing the
present CDS with a system of adequate
performance.(110)
Failure of the Original System
Throughout the 1990s both the RAN and ASC have
struggled against the failure of the CDS. System specifications and
contractor conditions were continually eased to make possible some
progress with the rest of the program. In August 1991, Rockwell was
allowed to adopt a two-stage delivery so that trials could commence
on the lead submarine while the system was perfected. In September
1993, ASC attempted to place Rockwell in breach of contract for its
failure to perform and 'because, in ASC's opinion, Rockwell was
unlikely to achieve the outcomes contracted'.(111) ASC
was not allowed to follow this course. Yet, by the end of
post-delivery trials on HMAS Collins in early 1997, the
system was still unsatisfactory.(112) Moreover, the
requirements for the system had been reduced, with many features
removed.
Despite such attempts to simplify the
functioning of the CDS, it still does not work in that it cannot
process all the data available from the submarines' sensors and
tends to fail when trying to interpret such data as it can access.
Some of the early problems may have related to the quality of work
performed by Rockwell.(113) However Boeing, on
inheriting the problem in 1996 with its takeover of the former
company, threw its US systems engineers at the problem and still
could not make it work.(114) In the tracking,
classification and display of sonar contacts the Collins CDS is
less effective than the SWUP system of the Oberons.(115)
Ironically, some of the sub-systems developed for that program are
part of the partial augmentation fitted to the CDS of submarines
Dechaineux and Sheean.(116)
Agreement on Need for a New
System
There has been for some time a consensus that
satisfactory performance is not possible with the existing CDS, no
matter how heavily modified.(117) Notably, both American
and British navies have now abandoned attempts to develop
integrated combat systems. It appears to remain unstable, as
demonstrated by the need to repair Waller en route to
Exercise Tandem Thrust. The (then) Head, Submarine Capability Team,
Rear Admiral Briggs, has argued that continuing with the original
CDS, augmented with US supplied components, is unsupportable in the
long-term:
the critical path is the combat system, and also
the most expensive single item. [The original system augmented with
US equipment is] a system that's based on flawed foundations ...
It's cheaper, in any sort of sense over the medium-term, to replace
this combat system with current generation technology
equipment.(118)
This was the conclusion reached by McIntosh and
Prescott. They recommended that work on the old CDS be wound down
and procurement of a new combat system 'using only proven
in-service systems' commence.(119) This course was
eventually approved by the Government and tenders called to provide
'an off-the-shelf, open systems, modular and proven
system.'(120)
Selection of a Preferred New
System
The ISUS 90-55, produced by the German company
STN Atlas, was judged to be the best of the four leading combat
systems evaluated. The second was the American company Raytheon,
offering the CCS Mk2. The ISUS system was adjudged clearly superior
to this at all stages of the evaluation and met or exceeded the
RAN's functional requirements without need for modification. None
of the other contenders did so. The Raytheon system, which was
being developed for USN nuclear submarines and would not therefore
suit a smaller conventional boat, was still under
development.(121)
Back to Square
One-Replacement Combat System Program Abandoned
On 9 July Minister Reith cancelled the
evaluation of new combat systems for the Collins submarines. At the
same time he cancelled the evaluation for supply of a new
heavyweight submarine torpedo, in which a European consortium was
well placed due to the reported superiority of the German DM2A4
torpedo over the American Mk48 ADCAP in shallow
waters.(122) In this latter case it appears that there
is to be no competitive selection of a preferred weapon; instead 'a
new arrangement will be developed'(123) under a
cooperative agreement between Australia and the US.
The Minister's reasoning was that 'a
comprehensive arrangement with the US Navy on submarine issues is
in Australia's best strategic interests' (124)and he
went on to note that the Australian and US navies were entering a
'Statement of Principles arrangement' to maximise cooperation on
submarine matters. The Minister's statement does not discuss
details about the selection of the combat system nor the STN Atlas
proposal. The Statement of Principles was signed on 11 September.
Part three covers cooperation in research, development and
engineering and includes reference to research and development
projects aimed at maximising commonality in the development of
software for a "common combat system".(125)
The US
Influence
Instead, the factors behind the cancellation can
probably be seen in reports beginning in mid-2000 and persisting
through 2001, that US officials from the Secretary of Defence down
were urging Australia not to select the STN Atlas system. The
American argument was that they would reconsider their assistance
to the Collins, concerned that STN Atlas would be in a position to
appropriate American intellectual property. This is a reasonable
concern but STN Atlas already had satisfied the Defence selection
panel on this matter with regard to both systems already on the
submarines and to those proposed, such as the new heavy
torpedoes.
The USN's Program Executive Officer, Submarines,
Rear Admiral Phil Davis, had been particularly active in supporting
the augmentation of the combat system in Dechaineux and
Sheean.(126) Even some American commentators
described US pressure over the restructuring of ASC, the selection
of new heavy torpedoes and the choice of the combat system as
'heavy handed'.(127) The Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral
Shackleton, was reported as supporting the American position,
opposing other areas of Defence which had recommended the ISUS
system as the best suited to fill the need for a new combat
system.(128)
Moving Against the
Trends
The Government's apparent acceptance of the
American position might disturb some European manufacturers dealing
with Australia. The Americans risk being seen as having a double
standard. When the Federal Court found against Kockums plaint that
sending a propeller to the US contravened its intellectual property
rights, it did so on the grounds that they were protected by a
confidentiality agreement with the US Government. European defence
equipment manufactures might see their position as compromised.
Whilst a US guarantee is supposed to be sufficient to satisfy
European concerns about third party transfer of intellectual
property, their management systems are not sufficient for the US,
even when certified by the Australian Defence Department.
Furthermore, the new position on the combat
system repudiates a string of assurances that the project would not
automatically be awarded to an American company. For instance, Rear
Admiral Briggs gave such assurances in July 1999 when discussing
options arising from the McIntosh/Prescott report.(129)
He repeated these in September 2000 when discussing the evaluation
of bids to supply the new system.(130) Notwithstanding a
recent decision to purchase the Army's new attack helicopter from
Europe, such developments could deter European involvement in
future Australian defence programs where ANZUS alliance issues
appear to have a priority.
Growth of Multinational Approaches in Defence
Systems
Such a perception could create difficulties for
Australia should it result in reduced competition for major ADF
equipment programs. For the process of multi-national systems
integration is a commonplace overseas. An apposite example is the
Israeli Dolphin class submarine. An HDW design built in Germany, it
is controlled through the ISUS 90-55, similar to the system offered
the RAN. This has not prevented the Israelis from procuring the
land-attack version of the American Harpoon missile and operating
it through the ISUS system,(131) which also integrates
the input from indigenously developed sensors, usually developed
from the Israeli experience of operating US equipment in
combat.
The same multi-national character is commonplace
in the consortia now supplying these military systems. The ISUS
system has been referred to as the 'German' proposal. However, STN
Atlas itself is 49 per cent owned by British Aerospace Systems
(BAeS) and the ISUS consortium included Australian and American
companies. Nautronics was to be the Australian systems integrator,
BAeS Australia and Sonartech Atlas (60 per cent owned by STN Atlas)
the sonar specialists. Lockheed Martin, American developer of the
combat system for the next generation of US nuclear submarines, was
to have integrated the (American) weapons.(132)
Consequences for Australian
Industry
If consortia such as this are to be ineffective
bidders for major Defence equipment where alliance circumstances
allow US objection, the range of effective options to meet ADF
capability development programs will be reduced. The same will also
be true of options for Australian industry wherever acceptable
prime contractors are reduced to US companies only. One of the
fears arising from the cancellation of the new combat system, which
has not yet been clarified publicly, is that it might result in the
expulsion of Sonartech Atlas from the Collins
program.(133)
Shortly after the Minister's announcement,
Defence informed STN Atlas that it should cease all work on the
Collins class.(134) This included its Australian
subsidiary Sonartech Atlas. Sonartech has been involved in the
enhancement program with sonar products it developed for the Oberon
SWUP. As such, the company represents a considerable national
investment in effective submarine operations. There are suggestions
that Defence has reversed its position. Yet, the prospect that the
suspension of the weapons system program could have led to the
expulsion of an Australian company already involved and, thereby,
to a reduction of indigenous expertise, represents very tangibly a
conflict between national self reliance and the US alliance.
Issues of Wider
Strategic Concern
The issue of self reliance versus alliance lies
at the heart of the Government's decision on the combat system in a
way that has not been addressed in the subsequent debate. Some
commentators claimed it was an historic break from self reliance as
an element of defence policy, which has been a developing theme
since the 1976 White Paper.(135) The Minister's response
appears to indicate that the decision extends no further than as a
means of improving the submarines.(136) However, there
are clearly other forces at play.
The American Need for More
Submarines
One is the extent of direct, high level pressure
by the US Government on Australia. At a meeting on 1 May 2001 US
Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told Mr Reith bluntly that
selecting a European system could lead to interoperability and
technology transfer problems.(137) Whether such claims
about interoperability are true or not,(138) the
Americans have interests in gaining access to effective operational
submarines. The USN submarine fleet was run down at the end of the
Cold War, and currently operates 56 tactical submarines. However,
roles for submarines are increasing and the USN is finding that it
often has insufficient boats to meet demands. Recent reviews
indicate a need for up to 68 tactical submarines by
2015.(139) Many doubt that the US will be able to fund
an expansion of this size and USN mission planning problems would
be eased a little through access to effective Collins
submarines.
Submarine Operations with the
US
The extent to which Australia should accommodate
the US within the context of the alliance is a matter of judgement,
which may well differ with circumstances. There may well be
temptations (and perhaps some benefits to morale) to send the
Collins to the far ends of the north Pacific to assist the
Americans. Experience has taught that overmuch involvement in such
operations can lead to neglect of requirements for operations
closer to home. Being able to provide assistance to the US requires
preparation but it does not require commonality of equipment. The
US Commander-in-Chief Pacific, Admiral Blair, has stated that the
essentials of interoperability are agreements on standards and
software applications, and commonality of doctrine and training,
rather than being an issue of hardware.(140)
Regular exercise opportunities such as Exercise
Tandem Thrust are, of course, one way of developing commonality in
doctrine and training. If the USN has identified increased alliance
cooperation in submarine matters as important, a more formalised
approach could be adopted. Over recent years, Australia has
strengthened its alliance arrangements with New Zealand by funding
the long-term deployment of RNZAF Sky Hawk fighters at Nowra, to
train in air defence tactics with the RAN. Given the current focus
of the USN on littoral warfare (that is, naval warfare close to an
opponent's coastline, where conventional submarines are held to
possess an advantage) it is possible to conceive of a similar
arrangement, whereby the USN would fund Australia to provide
experience for American naval units in operating against
conventional submarines.
Such an arrangement would probably be the most
effective way of increasing interoperability between Australian
submarine forces and USN. It is also possible to think of it having
positive advantages for the RAN. A long-term posting to the United
States may well prove a positive aid in recruiting submariners.
Perhaps, if the USN found such an arrangement had sufficient
long-term viability, it could lead to a mechanism for funding
additional Collins submarines.
Risks to the Defence White Paper
Structure
The decision to suspend the combat system
competition implies that the Government is placing increased
emphasis on the ANZUS alliance. Some media reports suggest more,
claiming that the purpose of the decision extends to making
interoperability with the US the 'principal focus for the Navy in
the future.'(141)
If so, this has implications for the policy
outlined in its own white paper, Defence 2000. The Defence
Capability Plan, at the heart of Defence 2000, derives
from a logical set of processes linking Australia's strategic
objectives to defence strategy and thereby, through force structure
priorities, to decisions on equipment types. In none of these steps
does interoperability with American naval forces received mention
as a force structure determinant.(142) Whilst mentioning
that access to technology through the American alliance entails a
need for closer integration and interoperability,(143)
the basis of Australia's military strategy is that forces intended
to defend Australia will be useable for wider strategic
objectives.(144) If issues invoked under the ANZUS
treaty are now to intercede in the selection of equipment
contractors, the long-term viability of the capability development
process may well need reconsideration.
Return to the
Challenges of the Past-High Risk with Lock-in
Apart from these issues, which are significant
enough, the decision on the combat system is repeating history. The
Government has changed the procurement strategy for the combat
system. It had endorsed the recommendations of McIntosh/Prescott,
that a new combat system be sought 'using only proven in-service
systems'.(145) It is now switching from this option to
seeking a capability which has yet to be proven. It has as yet no
fall back position to safeguard the capability of the submarine
fleet. These are significant issues, which the Government will need
to work through with its new supplier.
It is reasonable to expect that this will be
Raytheon. There is no official endorsement of this position but no
alternative contractor meets the Government's new alliance-centred
criteria. Lockheed Martin was eliminated early in the evaluation of
new combat system options. Raytheon, having bought the original
combat system work from Boeing in 2000, to position itself for the
new program, has the advantage of day-to-day contact through its
maintenance work on the Collins class.(146)
Areas of Risk
The Ministerial statement says nothing about
specific alternative means of replacing the submarines' weapons
systems, just cancelling the program as it existed. This is because
a combat system with USN backing and suitable for a conventional
submarine does not exist. Raytheon's modification of its CCS Mk2
system to suit the Collins was obviously not sufficiently advanced
to win an open Ministerial endorsement. Subsequently, it was
acknowledged that the implementation of the new combat system
program would be delayed by a year from the proposed date of
2005-06.
On an assessment of the public information, much
needs to be done to develop an effective combat system. The USN has
many systems, components, protocols and programs of advanced
capability-in a nuclear submarine. The CCS Mk2 is derived from the
BSY-2, which was itself a classical case of a system based on
incremental development rescuing the situation after the failure of
the revolutionary but flawed BSY-1 but is still optimised for use
on a nuclear submarine.
Differences Between Nuclear and Conventional
Submarines
The difference is significant. A USN attack
submarine displaces over 7000 tons, has a crew of over 130 and
virtually unlimited power and hotel services. The Collins class
displace 3000 tons, was designed for a crew of 42 and when
submerged is totally reliant on batteries for propulsion, power and
habitability for periods which must commonly be stretched to three
or four days. In disassembling the CCS Mk2 and restructuring it for
the Collins, Raytheon faces the risks of:
-
- integration failure-the boat's existing sonars, other sensors
and its existing IT systems may not interface easily with the CCS.
Raytheon has failed to integrate systems in the AP-3C maritime
aircraft update and is running 42 months behind with the
operational management system, producing a delay of 36 months in
the AP-3C program(147)
-
- miniaturisation-functions will have to be integrated so that
more can be performed by less hardware and fewer crew; not an easy
objective. The RAN specified that the Integrated Tactical Avionics
System of its ANZAC frigate helicopters should be operated by two
crew instead of the three used in USN service. The program is two
years late and Litton, the system developer, lost so much money
that it sold its military division
-
- capability creep-incorporating too many features for the system
to handle without overload. Rockwell was never able to incorporate
the nice but not essential features of the original CDS in a
workable system. The greatest risk for Raytheon here is an
assumption, held in some quarters, that the submarine combat system
is the first stage of the integration of the RAN into the USN's
proposed multi-spectral C3I network. Much of this will be
over-ambitious.
The Critical Importance of Local
Support
Such questions of effective project management
are important. However, they encompass only a few of the issues
that need to be addressed so that the decision on the new combat
system can become effective long-term defence policy. The nature of
technological change on IT systems means that purchasing the
physical entity is not as important as acquiring the intellectual
capital around their technology and operation. This is related to,
but not simply the same as, purchasing the intellectual property
incorporated in the design and construction of the system.
The Primary Importance of Intellectual
Capital
The intellectual capital collected around a
military system includes the knowledge of how it works but also
how:
-
- its capabilities are best exploited
-
- its use affects the conduct of military operations
-
- it is to be maintained at an operational level, and
-
- it can be developed to extend military advantage.
Developing intellectual capital around these
objectives requires an amalgam of personnel skills, industrial
capacity, and the organisational structure and doctrinal concepts
of the operating Service, formally captured and transmitted as
knowledge. The development of superior intellectual capital is one
of the reasons why a military force can defeat another using
similar equipment or can continue to achieve superior performance
from systems whose origin may be decades old.
The Atlas Proposal for Building Intellectual
Capital
These may appear abstract concepts. They can be
illustrated by the STN Atlas proposals for implementing the new
combat system, made before the Government suspended it. At its
basis was Atlas' willingness to trade all ISUS intellectual
property, including source code and design data and to establish a
through-life-support capability in Australia.(148) This
was supported by Navy planning designed to build Australian
intellectual capital. A research and development cycle was planned
to foster local ideas that could exploit the open systems
architecture of the ISUS 90, which allows integration of
non-proprietary Commercial off the shelf systems (COTS) components.
With the introduction of the system, a software support facility
would have been established to develop and manage the RAN's
submarine combat system intellectual capital.(149) This
is a practice which the RAN has followed with most of its combat
systems and which has made possible successful, locally based
developmental programs such as the SWUP for the Oberon
submarine.
The
American Route Not Guaranteed
The lessons of recent history are that neither
sponsorship by the US Armed Forces nor development by corporate
America can guarantee success in systems integration programs. In
fact, over ambitious proposals sponsored by the ADF have frequently
been enough to defeat them both. The McIntosh/Prescott
recommendation to refit the Collins class with an off-the-shelf
combat system featuring use of COTS technology represented a means
of getting operational boats with very few of these risks. The
Government has chosen to pursue a different path and must now
develop a procurement strategy that not only minimises considerable
risk but also embraces those elements of personnel, industry and
Service support policy which will be required to make the new
submarine combat system an ongoing asset for the RAN.
The problem is, that in addressing these areas
of risk, the Minister's decision has placed the future of the
Collins class in the hands of a supplier who does not have as yet
an operational system, let alone one proven by Service use in
conventional submarines. Should problems develop, there is no body
of operational experience on which to call. If the supplier can not
meet requirements, the words of former Defence Minister Moore may
still come to be true: 'these things will be damn near 20 years old
before they're properly going'.(150)
Where the Problem of
the Collins Submarines Lies
Examination of the issues surrounding the
Collins submarine program supports the view that there is nothing
as wrong with it as the way in which it was handled. Early in the
project's history, the objective of selecting a proven design was
changed to the development of a unique submarine, specially
designed for Australian circumstances. As it also had unique
specifications for even standard items of equipment such as diesel
engines and periscopes, almost all areas of the project carried a
high risk. And because the specifications were unique, the
consequences of failure were compounded. Since few other naval
services operated anything similar, the research and development
needed to overcome any shortcoming would fall largely on Australian
resources.
An
Inappropriate Procurement Strategy
The RAN has argued that there was no alternative
but to develop a unique design as nothing else would suit
Australia's requirements. Whether or not this view is disputed, it
is clear that this point marked a distinct change in the project's
direction and that the procurement strategy was no longer
appropriate. With the level of risk the program was carrying it was
almost inevitable that something would go wrong. There can be
little dispute that a better procurement strategy would have been
an alternative where the first-of-type was thoroughly tested before
further procurement decisions were made, and the production phase
entered thereafter.
Instead, by running a high risk project as if it
was a normal production program, Navy established an environment in
which, instead of the trial and error progress expected of a
prototype (and, in fact, experienced by the Collins class) orderly
progress was one of the measures of adequate performance. Thus, for
instance, the launch of the first boat on a schedule developed six
years earlier became important, even though it was, in reality,
some six months from completion. This led to the sections of HMAS
Collins being welded together when they were 80 per cent,
rather than the requisite 95 per cent, complete and contributed to
compounding problems of quality control in the early history of the
program.(151) In the early days of the project,
developing a prototype would have been criticised as taking
additional time. In the light of hindsight it can be seen that
moving into normal production mode too early has involved just as
many delays.
Problems That Could Have Been
Ameliorated
Had the program been designed around a
prototype-style development, many of its subsequent problems would
have been better managed. While there would have been higher
initial expenditure and perhaps some costly failures, these would
probably have been overcome more quickly than at the slow pace
actually experienced in the Collins program. The approach adopted
served to dissuade ASC from rectifying faults which appeared well
into the production process, since they affected its profit margin.
If the receipt of a production contract for the remaining five
submarines depended on satisfactory progress with the first, this
probably would not have been the case.
As a consequence, there would have been less
disputation over different readings of specifications as these
would have been refined during prototype testing. A fixed price
building program would have delivered an operational submarine
against these standards. Further, the concerns of the
Auditor-General, that excessive funding was advanced before
contractor performance was certified, would have been ameliorated
by more clearly earmarking funds for research and development and
for production.
This, of course, is the benefit of hindsight. It
is probably unrealistic to have expected the Project Office of the
mid-1980s to have concentrated on risks other than that they would
have felt to be the most dangerous, creating doubt on the project's
viability in the mind of government. For the outlook of those times
the way to avoid this particular problem was the type of fixed
price contract which the Navy generally followed until 1999.
Consequences of Mistakes
As it is, by adopting an inappropriate
procurement strategy the program is running 2 years behind
schedule. Although well-managed within its fixed cost schedule,
additional expenditure is required to enhance the operational
capabilities of the submarine. In mid-2000 Rear Admiral Peter
Briggs estimated that it would take an additional $1 billion to
bring the submarines up to the level required for operations,
including around $400 million for a replacement combat
system.(152) And, in addition, there have been outright
losses against public expenditure. When Boeing inherited the
submarines' combat system work the project carried a fixed price of
$500 million. When it sold its submarine business to Raytheon, $1.2
billion (70 per cent of it spent in Australia) had been paid in
trying to make a dysfunctional system work.(153) The
submarines will struggle on with this system for at least another
five years, but the CDS will never reach the level of capability
required.
An Excellent
Potential Yet to Be Realised
Against this, the Collins appears to be a good
design with a performance perhaps verging on the revolutionary in
one or two areas. Its submerged endurance, low indiscretion ratio,
stealth at slow speed and a potential tactical mobility far greater
than earlier generations of conventional submarines, indicate that
it can become the strategic asset it was intended to be. Moreover,
with the backing of an efficient building organisation, the
submarines should be better maintained and more effectively adapted
to meet emerging circumstances than was possible with the Oberons.
However, achieving this potential still requires successful
modification of the existing boats. Moreover, reaching the full
combat potential of the submarines requires that they have a new
combat system which works. Finally, achieving the potential for
through-life-support of the submarines will depend on the quality
of the Government's work in creating a private entity to run
ASC.
The Collins submarine is not a lemon. It is
simply that the way the program has been handled has left a bitter
taste in the mouths of many associated with it. In contrast, it is
important for Australian naval strategy that the submarine be made
to succeed. It is also important that it be seen as not a uniquely
bad example of defence procurement but a pointer to endemic
problems in the current nature of defence procurement.
Why the Collins is Important-Australia's Declining Surface
Navy
Defence 2000, the defence white paper
contains an historically bold commitment to sustain a 3 per cent
per annum real increase in defence expenditure. Yet, large as is
this increase (now totalling an additional $31 billion over 10
years), such is the cost of modern defence equipment, that the
capability development program outlined in Defence 2000
allows for numbers in some areas of the ADF to decline. One of
these areas is the RAN's surface combatant fleet and the
consequences should lead the Service to rethink its role and
doctrine.(154)
Reduced Planning
Objectives
In Defending Australia, the 1994
version of the defence white paper, the objective for the surface
combatant force was the provision of 17 major vessels (that is, of
frigate size or greater). In Australia's Strategic Policy,
1997, this was reduced to 14. Defence 2000
represents a further reduction of proposed surface combatant
strength. In effect, the 3 DDG (guided missile) destroyers operated
by the RAN until the turn-of-the-century have been retired without
replacement. Its 6 FFG (guided missile frigates) are to be replaced
in the next decade with 3 [possibly 4] Air-Warfare Destroyers
(AWD). By around the mid-2010s this will give the RAN a fleet of 11
[possibly 12] surface combatants.
Along with this goes a reduction in capability.
In 1999 the fleet consisted of 3 capable AWD (the DDGs), 6 limited
capacity Air-warfare (AW) frigates (the FFGs), and the last of the
obsolete Destroyer Escort (DE) class being replaced by the first
ANZAC class frigates. After the refit program currently under
development, the FFGs will provide a comparatively good AW
capability till the mid-2010s. After that the fleet, as presently
planned, will be 3 AWDs and 8 ANZACs, the latter with improved self
protection (specifically against anti-shipping missiles) but no AW
capability (the Navy having tried for this but finding that the
hull was just too small).
The significance of this reduction has been
recognised. The Maritime Commander, Rear Admiral Geoff Smith has
been reported as 'hoping' that the AWD program might be extended to
6, to maintain the 14 vessel fleet and allow the RAN the geographic
coverage it requires.(155) However, Defence
2000 contains no reference to additional units and has
identified no funding for such a program. The prospects of the RAN
acquiring further vessels will depend on some future defence white
paper.
Declining
Fleet Numbers
Yet it is doubtful that the RAN could use any
additional combatants even if it could fund them. In fact, over the
period from 1986 till now, the strength of the RAN's surface
combatant fleet has steadily dwindled. In 1986 it was 12. At most
times during the 1990s it was 11. In 1999-2000 the number of
commissioned vessels was nine, with Warramunga yet to be
commissioned but with Brisbane waiting to be paid off.
The most significant factor behind this trend is
that Navy, more apparently than the other Services, cannot recruit
and retain sufficient personnel to crew more vessels. In the
context of the 1999-2000 Budget the RAN acknowledged that it could
not reach its personnel targets for at least another 3
years.(156) By 2000-2001 the situation had deteriorated
further, with Navy estimated to be 1100 [almost 8 per cent] below
its nominal strength.(157) Among the areas where the RAN
is under strength, surface combatant billets are over-represented.
By 1 July 1999 it already had deficiencies of almost 200 (19 per
cent) in its Seaman Officer establishment and 184 (20 per cent) in
sailor combat systems operators.(158)
Implications for Policy and Naval
Doctrine
Because surface combatants have been central to
the RAN's force structure, the declining numbers and comparative
power of its fleet will have implications for Navy and for defence
policy. These will extend to the highest levels of alliance policy.
Commonly, deployment of naval forces is seen as a prime (in some
cases, easy) option in support of alliance commitments.
Restrictions on the availability of a limited number of AWDs and
the inherent limitations of the ANZAC frigates mean that this
option will be trickier to exercise after 2015.
Historically, navies weak in traditional surface
warships have been forced into alternative areas of naval warfare
to protect their maritime interests. Amongst these have been
underwater warfare and, especially, submarine warfare. In such
circumstances the RAN will have to review a number of options,
including its doctrine on submarine operations. The importance of
effective operational submarines in projecting Australian maritime
power is likely to increase into the next decade.
To some extent it appears that the conventional
wisdom about Defence 2000 is that it provides the
wherewithal to allow defence 'business as usual'. Whilst this white
paper is a significant document, it does not provide sufficient
finance to allow all areas of the ADF to continue to be organised
as they have been in the past. The RAN, in particular, will have to
grasp the significance of this and give adequate priority to the
current rectification and future development of its Collins class
submarines. In future decades they are likely to be Navy's most
significant strategic force.
Why
the Collins is Important-The Collins Syndrome and Australian
Defence Procurement
The public commentary on the Collins submarines
has probably convinced most people that it is an unequalled defence
procurement disaster. On the contrary, this is not the case in
terms of either cost increases or time slippage and, compared to
some of the worst, the Collins submarine program ranks as a
comparatively well managed defence acquisition project.
The Worst Defence
Procurement Programs
Currently, Defence is managing 15 procurement
programs which have run over budget by $5 million or more over the
last five years. It has 21 which are six months or more behind
schedule (See Appendix 1). If, although wrongly, it is assumed for
the sake of argument that the $1 billion to be spent on enhancing
the Collins submarines represents a 20 per cent cost
overrun,(159) the program ranks twelfth in comparative
cost overrun. It is also twelfth in terms of time behind production
schedule.
The total real cost increase of all these
programs was $568 million.(160) This is more than was
estimated as the cost of the new combat system for the submarines
and about the size of the AusLAV program to equip the army with
wheeled armoured vehicles. It is also about half the figure given
by the Minister as the cost of two new submarines that, he has
argued, the ALP would like to order if in government. The Minister
has gone on to observe that the cost of this ($1.2 billion) would
destabilise the Defence Capability Plan-the centrepiece of the
defence white paper.
Poor Management and
the 'Orphan Systems' Syndrome
On this scale then, the consequences of poor
financial management of defence projects must be a concern. At
their root, many of them suffer from the same problems as the
submarine program. In common with the Collins submarines these
struggling projects exhibit two critical characteristics. They have
all incorporated significant changes to what appears to be
reasonably suitable military technology, to specifications which
Defence claimed were necessary to meet peculiarly Australian
requirements. Typically, these changes result in uniquely
Australian systems which prove difficult to develop and maintain.
Most commonly this syndrome, which again is typical of the Collins
submarine program, affects electronic systems. In Defence such
programs are known as 'orphan systems' since they have no close
equivalents in the world.
Neither is the Collins program a relic of a
previous age when defence project management was less
sophisticated. Defence procurement programs of a much more recent
vintage than the submarines are in equal or more difficulty.
A Recent
Example-The ANZAC Helicopter Program
In January 1997 the Kaman SH-2G(A) Super
Seasprite was selected as the helicopter to operate from the ANZAC
frigates. The program was to include the Kongsberg Penguin
anti-shipping missile. These were not new aircraft, but ex-USN
equipment which had been sitting in the American desert. However,
the RAN specified a unique combat data system, the Integrated
Tactical Avionics System (ITAS) for its Seasprites. This was to
allow it to operate the helicopters with a crew of pilot and
tactical officer, rather than the 3 man crew in USN service.
As originally approved in the 1995-96 Budget,
the Seasprite program was to have provided 14 helicopters and their
Penguin missiles at a total cost of $763 million. But the Project
Office had made errors with foreign exchange rates and the program
exceeded its approved price by 25 per cent. Consequently,
helicopter numbers were reduced by 20 per cent and the missiles
were transferred to a new program, worth 12 per cent of the
original program budget. Nonetheless, by June 2000, the approved
cost of the program had risen by 26 per cent to $969 million.
More significantly, the systems integration
sub-contractor, Litton International, was not able to provide
software to operational standard. This means that the aircraft
cannot perform its naval missions. The problems with systems
integration and software development for the ITAS, estimated to
have added about $100 million,(161) were a major reason
why Litton sold its military systems division in 2000 to Northrop
Grumman. The latest estimate of the time required to fix the
problems is 2 years, with provisional acceptance of the aircraft
with working software put at January 2003.(162)
The Implications for the White Paper of Poor
Acquisitions Management
It could be expected that the additional costs
of these poorly managed acquisition programs have been incorporated
in the Defence Capability Plan, as many cover a period of up to
five years. Unless they have been, the Capability Plan could be
considered compromised to the extent of the additional costs. These
include the $1 billion for enhancement of the Collins
submarines.
Yet given, as the Minister suggests, that the
defence budget for new equipment over the next 10 years is so
finely balanced, the management of defence acquisitions must
improve considerably over its recent record. There remain many
programs where risk can be assessed as high and where the financial
implications of poor performance would be significant. For
instance, were the cost of the AEW&C aircraft program to
increase by the same amount as the Collins submarines, $600 million
would have to be found within other areas of the Defence Capability
Plan in the period up to around 2008.
Identifying High Risk Programs-the Example of the
AEW&C Program
Indeed, an examination of the AEW&C program
shows that it carries a high level of risk. A characteristic of the
development of uniquely Australian systems, displayed by the
Collins, is that their estimated cost rises steeply between the
various developmental stages of the project. There are significant
increases between the approval for early conceptual studies and the
subsequent issue by the project Office of its preferred
specifications, against which equipment providers are invited to
bid. There are further increases between approval by government of
the preferred supplier and the signing of a contract. As the
program cost increases, the date for in-service delivery
recedes.
Cost Increases in the AEW&C Project
These stages can be seen clearly in the
AEW&C aircraft program. When project definition studies
commenced in 1994, the estimated cost was $1 billion, with an
in-service date of 2000.(163) Five years later, when
Boeing had been selected to supply the AEW&C force, the
estimated cost had risen to $2 billion to supply seven aircraft,
the first in 2004-05.(164) In mid-2000 the project was
frozen pending the completion of the defence white paper because of
Cabinet's concern about the impact of its rising costs on an
over-pressured defence budget. By this time contract negotiations
had pushed the total program cost to $3.4 million.(165)
The program was approved in the white paper but for a current
approved cost of $3.11 billion it will supply only four aircraft
from 2006 onwards but which will not be operational until 2008.
Obviously, the decline in the exchange rate
between the A$ and US$ has contributed something to this increase
in cost. However, during the period from mid-1994 to December 2000,
the A$ has lost just under 19 per cent against the
US$,(166) clearly less than the increased cost of the
AEW&C project. Furthermore, the variability of exchange rates
against the US$ has significance which goes beyond the issue of
costs.
Risk Factors in the AEW&C Program
The AEW&C program is open to the risks of
other struggling defence acquisition programs. Four million lines
of software code unique to Australia will have to be written for
its electronic systems. Australia has no domestic operational
experience to assist the development program and the user
organisation, No 2 Squadron, is being created within the Project
Office. The AEW&C is currently an orphan system. Australia was
the first and remains the only customer for the Boeing design. The
hope was that it offered sufficient advances to be purchased by
other nations, thus spreading development costs and creating a
market big enough to justify Boeing's continued support of the
system into the future.
At one stage Turkey was to be a customer but a
combination of severe currency devaluation and contract disputes
are likely to prevent an order for some time.(167)
Indeed, it is a problem that the Boeing aircraft is aimed at
countries needing a cheaper alternative to the more complex early
warning aircraft. Unfortunately, many of these are also amongst
those countries whose currencies are more likely to devalue against
the American dollar, making the system less affordable.
Although over countries (South Korea has been
mentioned) will probably buy some of the aircraft, it is not yet
established that the numbers sold will be sufficient for Boeing to
afford an ongoing program of system development. Managing the
AEW&C program to overcome high risk factors and avoid their
financial implications is likely to remain important for the future
viability of the Defence Capability Plan.
Internal
Criticisms of Defence Procurement Management
There is growing awareness within Defence that
the demonstrably poor management of risk in its equipment programs
must be controlled. Air Vice Marshal Ray Conroy, responsible for
aerospace procurement, has noted the poor performance of programs
in his area which, he observes, involve many of the largest of the
world's aerospace companies failing to manage software and
integration. However, he also noted that the root of the problems
was the excessive scope of the specifications that were being set
for these companies. In essence, this is a management problem, as
senior officers are not exercising sufficient discipline over
project officers during the course of project development.
Too Many Uniquely
Australian Systems
As a consequence, Conroy saw the need for a
concerted campaign to reduce the number of uniquely Australian
developmental projects. He argued that the military significance of
the performance difference between the off-the-shelf standard model
and the special-to-Australia development model should be debated,
saying that project development rarely involves surveying what is
already available and assessing how closely that could meet
Australia's defence concepts.(168) He also made a point
important to remember for policy management. Once the scope of the
program has been approved and the best contractor selected, the
effectiveness of program management is beyond the control of
Defence. The most active role of the Services at this stage will be
preparation for introduction of the equipment and, in effect, the
Defence Project Offices can only monitor the performance of the
contractor. Just how effectively they can do even this will already
have been determined by the quality of contract negotiations.
Government Changes to Procurement
Procedures
The former Minister for Defence, John Moore, has
made somewhat less complimentary comments about defence
procurement. The Minister's concern was that very senior officers
were pressuring their more junior Service colleagues to amend
contracts after they had been signed. 'In no small way that has
contributed enormously to failure of projects, certainly cost and
time overruns.'(169)
The former Minister's attitude reveals something
of the dissatisfaction with many aspects of defence management felt
by the Government over recent years. This became focused in the
period through which the National Security Committee of Cabinet was
considering issues leading up to the production of the defence
white paper. They concluded that one problem of critical importance
to the Government's oversight of the procurement process was the
point at which Ministers were brought into the decision making
process. This traditionally was when Defence processes had refined
the project to the point of requesting an approximate number of
specific military systems, for instance, seven early warning
aircraft. Cabinet decided that, in terms of government's policy
options, this amounted to a fait accompli, at which point the
scope, dimensions and cost of the program were largely
fixed.(170)
Early Involvement in Project
Development
The Government has therefore changed the process
to assert its role in deciding the policy that underlies
acquisition options. Defence must now make at least two approaches
to government in developing procurement programs. The initial
submission lays out the broad parameters of the proposal, the range
of relevant procurement options, timing for development of options
and requirements for developmental expenditure. The Government can
then allocate priority to, or provide other policy guidance on, the
set of options that Defence can begin to develop for acquisition
proposals.(171)
The important feature of this approach is that
it gives the policy makers time to intervene in the development of
a procurement program before its nature has been set. Cabinet can
indicate the boundaries on the setting of specifications and
thereby have the potential to control the scope of a project that
would otherwise have grown in size and complexity and, therefore,
cost. Once the nature of a project has been decided there is little
opportunity to reduce its cost and potential risks significantly-a
very large submarine is always going to cost more than one of
medium size and a unique new software project will be inherently
more risky than an already commercially available product.
Increasing
Transparency: Towards Improving Defence
Procurement
Roles of
Parliamentary Bodies
This change in policy setting procedures for the
executive government has not been matched by procedures for
parliamentary scrutiny and public transparency. The Parliament has
available to it the services of the Auditor-General, who is an
Officer of the Parliament. The Joint Committee on Public Accounts
and Audit (JCPAA) has a statutory responsibility to consider every
report of the Auditor-General and can choose to examine specific
cases in greater detail, holding of public hearings and issuing
reports on its findings. It also has a role in relaying the
Parliament's priorities for investigation to the
Auditor-General.
However, both bodies can investigate the
efficiency of public administration (in this case defence
acquisition programs) only after processes have been approved and
put in place. Indeed, from 1998 into 1999 the JCPAA conducted such
an inquiry into the Collins submarine program on the basis of an
Auditor-General's report but more than a decade after government
approval of the program. Whilst, in the past, it has conducted
several reviews of defence procurement procedures and recommended
numerous changes, there are no procedures which make it easy for
the Committee (or for the Auditor-General) to review the early
stages, before Government approval, of specific acquisition
programs.
The Defence Sub-Committee of the Joint Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JCFADT) also has at times
considered the efficiency of defence procurement in general and the
efficacy of some particular acquisition programs in particular. For
instance, in 1989 it examined the procurement strategy for
providing the RAN's counter-mine warfare capability. The
Sub-Committee recommended a change in procurement strategy that has
been credited as important in the development of the Navy's new
Huon class mine hunters. Whilst the Defence Sub-Committee could
convene hearings into, for instance, options for meeting the
procurement of new fighter aircraft, the realities of time and
constrained numbers mean it would be unable to scrutinise regularly
the development of defence procurement programs and to maintain its
policy focus.
A Need for
Increased Capacity
A Parliamentary body is needed that will allow
the Legislature to scrutinise proposed procurement strategies for
defence procurement programs. Such a role is likely to become more
extensive and protracted in future as approaches to procurement
diversify. For instance, Defence will increasingly implement
evolutionary procurement strategies, where equipment will be bought
in smaller blocks with changing specifications (rather than in a
single order) in an attempt to adapt more rapidly to the pace of
technological change.
Soon after it was created, the Commonwealth
Parliament established by legislation the Public Works Committee to
oversight the construction of public works. The Committee has
legislative powers to examine proposals to construct facilities and
recommend for or against their acceptance. In the early days of the
Commonwealth, public works were amongst the greatest outlays of the
new nation on government property. Today, that position is held by
major defence acquisition projects. It is therefore appropriate
that the procedures adopted by the Executive, in an attempt to
improve the quality of policy-making in this area, should be
mirrored by a committee of the Legislature.
There are several ways that such a body could be
established. A new committee could be established by resolution of
both Chambers of Parliament or, better still for a Government
intent on improving public administration, by legislation. This
latter could either establish a new statutory committee or perhaps
by amendment, a subcommittee of the Public Works Committee,
concurrently changing the name and role of the committee. Failing
such a move, either the JCPAA or the JCFADT could take up the role
on at least a partial basis with, perhaps, the former investigating
ways in which the Auditor-General might be involved at a more early
phase of the development of defence acquisition programs.
The lesson to be learned from the Collins
submarine program is that the procurement strategy determines the
outcome from very early in the program and that subsequent
interventions can be only more or less corrective of a path already
set. The Commonwealth Government appears to have learnt the lesson
that disaster can be avoided only by controlling the early stages
of project development. What is now needed are parallel procedures
to ensure that parliamentary scrutiny and public accountability can
be set on an equal basis.
Conclusions
The Collins class submarines will probably go on
to become, to adopt the image used by Allan Hawke, Secretary of the
Department of Defence, the F-111s of their day-plagued by
development difficulties but destined to become a significant
capability for Australia's defence.(172) The most
significant difference between the two is that the hull life of the
submarines will not allow extension of the Collins class' service
life to the extent that has now proved possible with the F-111. The
corollary is that delayed enhancement of the submarines will have
more significant effects on Australia's defence capabilities than
what ever was the parallel with F-111.
The controversy surrounding the program has led
to many assertion of where its problems lie. This paper contends
that the Collins program is not unique amongst defence procurement
programs and that its problems tell us much about large defence
acquisitions.
The nature of most of these is determined in
their early stages when the sponsoring Service defines the
characteristics of the equipment and the usually precise and often
demanding specifications controlling how it is to be supplied.
While relevant organisation and efficient management, as suggested
by McIntosh and Prescott, are necessary to the effective production
of defence equipment, these are not likely to change the course of
a program once it is set. Defence equipment tends to be expensive
and its production risky; if an expensive option is chosen to meet
defence objectives and risks are involved the outcome will be
expensive and things may go wrong.
The most compelling lesson that can be learnt
from the Collins submarine program is the importance of selecting
the procurement strategy to suit the nature of the project. In
hindsight, at the point where it was decided to develop a unique
design for the new submarines, was the time to change procurement
strategy. As the class also had unique specifications for even
standard items of equipment such as diesel engines and periscopes,
almost all areas of the project carried a high risk. And because
the specifications were unique, the consequences of failure were
compounded.
What Navy now recognises should have been done,
first building a prototype as a test bed to eliminate the almost
inevitable failures, would have been more appropriate. In the early
days of the project, this approach would have been criticised as
taking additional time. In the light of hindsight it can be seen
that moving into normal production mode too early has involved just
as many delays.
It is important that the Collins submarine be
seen as not a uniquely bad example of Defence procurement but a
pointer to endemic problems in the current nature of the system. It
is one which has assisted government focus on the need to improve
Defence procurement processes and it has changed them to assert its
role in deciding the policy that underlies acquisition options.
Recent policy changes give government some capacity to influence
judgements such as those on the Collins procurement strategy. Yet
there is much evidence from within Defence that the drive to
institute programs dependant on uniquely Australian systems remains
strong. In these circumstances, procurement programs carrying high
degrees of risk will continue to evolve.
The most critical deficiencies in the management
of these circumstances lie in the mechanisms of higher level
national policy making to review inherently risky approaches at a
stage sufficiently early to influence the direction of procurement
programs. What is now needed are procedures to ensure that
parliamentary scrutiny and public accountability can play a role in
such mechanisms.
Endnotes
-
- David Lague, 'Out of the deep', Sydney Morning Herald,
25-26 November 2000.
- Malcolm McIntosh and John Prescott, Report to the Minister
for Defence on the Collins Class Submarine and Related
Matters, Canberra, 20 June 1999, p. 7. The authors note the
critical nature of safeguarding a submarine's noise signature and
that they are 'astonished and appalled' by the information leaked.
- Several people, both civilians and officers, were involved in
the leaks which, together with security breaches concerning the
East Timor situation, led to the creation, in May 2000, of the
Security Investigation Unit, a new unit in Defence. Lincoln Wright,
'Leakers allowed to leave Defence', Canberra Times, 16 May
2001.
- McIntosh and Prescott, Report to the Minister for Defence
on the Collins Class Submarine and Related Matters, op. cit.,
p. 14.
- 'Collins sub's first mission off Timor', Telegraph, 30 June
2000, quoting Peacemakers- Interfet's Liberation of East
Timor, by John Hunter Farrell.
- Graham White, Captain RAN, 'Our Submarine Arm and the Future',
Fleet Maintenance Bulletin, Issue 18, 1984, p. 4.
- Graham Davis, 'Submarine will stay in-service', Navy
News, 19 October 1998, p. 3.
- 'New boats will require shorter refits', Defence
Industry, 10 October 1984, p. 2.
- P. Lewis Young, 'The Royal Australian Navy's New Submarine
Selection' Asian Defence Journal, August 1984, p. 50.
- Kenneth Davidson, 'Navy determined to build submarines in
Australia', The Age, 17 January 1985.
- Graham White, 'Our Submarine Arm and the Future', op. cit., p.
7.
- Robert Cooper, 'Project Management in Australia', Sea
Australia 2000, conference proceedings presentation 22.3, The
Institution of Engineers Australia, Sydney, February 2000.
- ibid.
- '$9.2 million submarine costs $7 million to refit', Sydney
Morning Herald, 8 February 1973; Frank Cranston, 'Submarine
refit slow and costly', Canberra Times, 9 February 1973.
- Many navies have submarines in their Order of Battle. By
itself, this does not indicate that the navy can use these boats on
military operations successfully. They must be fully maintained,
not just so that they can submerge safely but so that minor defects
in systems and components do not prevent the boat from performing
its mission or generate noise that would make them easy to locate
and destroy. For instance, Indonesia kept many Soviet-provided
submarines in its Order of Battle after the fall of the Sukarno
Government but it soon became apparent that their maintenance was
not a priority of the Indonesian armed forces. Their credibility as
a military threat had lapsed long before they were scrapped.
- Graham White, Captain RAN, 'Submarine Project Overview', An
Approach to Carrying Out Major Projects in Australia, The
Institute of Engineers Australia, Canberra, September 1984,
p. 57.
- ibid, pp. 59-60.
- ibid, p. 58.
- 'Submarine Project', Canberra Times, 1 March 1983; Tom
Ballantyne, 'Navy pushes Aust Share in submarine project',
Sydney Morning Herald, 1 March 1983.
- Frank Cranston and John Jesser, 'Companies chosen to design
submarine', Canberra Times, 22 May 1985.
- Robert Cooper, 'Project Management in Australia', op. cit.
- An exception was the private firm of North Queensland Engineers
and Agents (NQEA) who, at the time, were successfully completing
the Fremantle patrol boat program.
- Deborah Snow, 'Two contenders in submarine project still
operational', Financial Review, 25 September 1985.
- South Australian Submarine Contract Task Force, RAN new
construction submarine project. South Australian delegation visit
to submarine builders, submission to the Department of Defence
Support, 12 September 1984, p. 9ff.
- ibid., p. 2.
- ibid., p. 6ff.
- Graham White, 'Our Submarine Arm and the Future', op. cit., p.
8.
- 'Government to call tenders for new submarines', Canberra
Times, 26 January 1983; 'New submarines for the RAN', Navy
News, July 1983, p. 9.
- 'Multi-national combat system package in front?', Defence
Industry, 7 November 1984, pp. 1- 2.
- McIntosh and Prescott, Report to the Minister for Defence
on the Collins Class Submarine and Related Matters, op. cit.,
p. 12 and p. 23; 'ASC's early complaint on combat system',
Australian Defence Report, 17 August 2000, p.7.
- Andrew Johnson, 'Viability of Combat System Development in
Australia', An Approach to Carrying out Major Projects in
Australia with Reference to the New Construction Submarine
Project, The Institution of Engineers, Australia, September
1984, p. 61ff; G. H. Raymond, 'The Capabilities of
Australian Industry for the Development, Production and Support of
the New Construction Submarine Combat System, ibid., p. 71ff.
- Brian Clarke, 'Awaiting Government's sub-mission',
Australian Financial Review, 30 June 1999.
- Letter from W.L. Owen, Capt, RAN (ret.) quoting verbatim clause
2.23.4.1.3 of the tender. Cited in P. Lewis Young, 'The Australian
new submarine selection', Asian Defence Journal, December
1987, p. 30.
- A.W. Grazebrook, 'New subs must be built here', Pacific
Defence Reporter, February 1984, pp. 42-43.
- The Collins class can maintain a 42 day patrol after deploying
2510 nm (see, 'The Performance Advantages of Size'). A design that
is typical of the level of technology submitted in the early stages
of the Collins submarine program is that of the French designed
Agosta 90B of the Pakistani Navy (the variant ordered by Pakistan
has been modernised). At around the 1510 tonnes (surfaced) it is
also typical of the size of most of the early responses. The Agosta
can maintain a 40 day patrol after deploying 1680 nm to the patrol
area. In Australia's region of defence interest, potential patrol
areas are more distant than this. Richard Scott, 'Agosta 90B
Surfaces for the Pakistan Navy', Jane's Navy
International, May 1999, p. 37.
- Frank Cranston, 'Delay likely on submarines', Canberra
Times, 7 August 1984.
- Hugh White, 'Two chosen to design submarine', Sydney
Morning Herald, 22 May 1985.
- An insider of those times has published a critique of the
decision-making processes involved in the early stages of the new
submarine project. Mike Gilligan, 'What the sub report did not
say', Canberra Times, 30 July 1999.
- It has been suggested to the author, by people involved in the
early stages of the program, that any change in Navy's approach to
the program would have confused perceptions about it and risked a
rejection by Cabinet. Certainly, there have been occasions when
Defence and ADF personnel have thought that explaining the
realities of defence procurement to politicians was too dangerous a
risk. There may well have been an element of this in decisions made
within the Collins program in the early 1980s. However, it is
equally likely that the significance of changes to the selection
criteria simply were not grasped. The capability development areas
of the ADF have long been used to specifying changes to otherwise
adequate overseas designs to meet the unique operational
environments of Australasia. These at times have been excessive and
have greatly complicated management of the procurement program. It
could be just as likely that the Collins program was seen as merely
a more extensive manifestation of this approach.
- Richard Scott, 'Safety checks force UK submarine recall',
Jane's Defence Weekly, 1 November 2000, p. 4. The
Trafalgar class SSN HMS Tireless suffered a leak in its
primary coolant circuit in May 2000, which was first thought to be
faulty work. Subsequent investigation prove it to be a generic
fault with all RN attack submarine nuclear power plants.
- 'Collins submarines visionary', Australian, 7 November
1997. Quoting Ross Milton, Corporate Affairs Manager, ASC at the
award to ASC of the 1997 National Engineering Excellence Award by
the Institution of Engineers Australia.
- Some caution should be taken when comparing building rates for
submarines. These often reflect issues other than the capacity of
the submarine builder. Some nations adopt a policy of producing
boats at a reduced rate because it sustains the industry.
Nonetheless, the ability to achieve such high productivity in a new
yard which was introducing leading-edge technology to Australia, is
a significant achievement.
- 'Collins submarines visionary', Australian, op. cit.
- David Lague, 'Out of the deep', op. cit.
- 'Tomy Hjorth in spirited defence of Collins class submarines',
Australian Defence Report, 17 February 2000, p. 11.
- Gregor Ferguson, 'ASC chief warns of job losses',
Australian Defence Magazine, May 1999, p. 31.
- Andy Miller, 'Time for sub's critics to let the truth surface',
Sydney Morning Herald, 31 May 1999.
- Ian Kemp, 'Victoria, formerly Unseen, departs', Jane's
International Defence Review, November 2000, p. 12. The
Canadians acquired the former RN submarines on a lease/purchase
arrangement for US$405 million. However the equipment of the
submarines was apparently not considered up to standard, for as
well as replacing the weapons control system the Canadians are
fitting new communications, electronic support measures and towed
array sonar.
- Richard Sharp, Captain (RN), ed., Jane's Fighting Ships
2000-2001, Jane's Information Group, Surrey, 2000, p. 10.
- Comptroller and Auditor-General, Report of the CAG on the
Ministry of Defence, Year ended 31 March 1989, available at:
http://www.cagindia.org/reports/defence/1990_book1/contents.htm
- Comptroller and Auditor-General, Report of the CAG on the
Ministry of Defence, Year ended March 1996, available at
http://www.cagindia.org/reports/defence/1997_book1/contents.htm
- Gregor Ferguson, 'ASC chief warns of job losses', op. cit.
- McIntosh and Prescott, Report to the Minister for Defence
on the Collins Class Submarine and Related Matters, op.
cit., p. 32.
- Paul Statick and David Eccles, 'Construction base may close in
two years ', Advertiser, 3 July 1999.
- See, for instance, the entries for 2000-2001 and 2002-2003 in,
Department of Defence, Defence New Major Capital Equipment
Proposals 1998-2003, Canberra, 1998.
- Samantha Maiden, '$2 billion bullseye', Advertiser, 26
July 2001.
- ibid. This is one area of bipartisanship between the major
parties, Opposition leader Beazley agreeing with the decision on
the same grounds. 'Subs job right, says Beazley', West
Australian, 2 August 2001.
- After more than a decade of historically large shipbuilding
programs, the workload for the Australian industry is due to
decline over the next few decades. There will soon be too many
construction facilities for the available workload. A solution that
was 'floated' in the McIntosh/Prescott report was that one of the
major east coast shipbuilders might close their yard, buy the AIDC
equity in ASC and do both surface ship and submarine work in the
modern facilities at Osborn: McIntosh and Prescott, op.
cit., pp. 33-34. If anything, the concept has become
broader now that the Government owns ASC outright. Defence Minister
Reith recently stated that 'The Government's sale of the Australian
Submarine Corporation will create an opportunity for industry to
rationalise naval shipbuilding in Australia'. The presently
favoured option is to sell ASC to a consortium controlled by one of
the major Australian ship builders but including a foreign
submarine constructor, facilitated by the Government offering work
on forthcoming surface vessel construction as well as the submarine
maintenance work: Ian McPhedran, 'Staying Afloat',
Advertiser, 29 June 2001.
- McIntosh and Prescott, Report to the Minister for Defence
on the Collins Class Submarine and Related Matters, op.
cit., p. 38ff.
- Gregor Ferguson, 'New Kockums-HDW Entity Eyes Australia's
Submarine Builder', Defense News, 11 October 1999.
- Lincoln Wright, 'Germans "want $50m" to sell submarine share',
Canberra Times, 10 August 2000.
- Robert Garran, 'Navy locked into US aims', Australian,
11 July 2001.
- The McIntosh/Prescott report contains several references to the
adversarial nature of the relationship between ASC and the RAN,
which had worsened in the period from the launch of the first
submarine up until 1999. This contrasted with a noticeably close
relationship in the earlier years of the program. The underlying
factor in both situations appears to have been financial. Whilst
the submarines remained unacceptable to the RAN, and therefore on
the 'books' of ASC, they eroded the company's profit base. Earlier,
generous advance payments and the closeness of the Navy Project
Office to ASC allowed the company financial flexibility, both of
which were criticised as excessive in New Submarine Project,
Audit Report No. 22 1991-92, the first report on the project
by the Australian National Audit Office. The McIntosh/Prescott
report commented that the involvement of the USN in the remediation
of the submarines would limit the future role of Kockums. McIntosh
and Prescott, op. cit., p. 30.
- 'Court allows sub prop modifications', Australian Defence
Report, 26 April 2001, p. 9.
- A.W. Grazebrook, 'Tough job for the ASC task force',
Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, June- July 2000, p.
52.
- McIntosh and Prescott, Report to the Minister for Defence
on the Collins Class Submarine and Related Matters, op. cit.,
p. 39.
- Geoffrey Barker, 'Defence costs prompted Moore to assert
control', Financial Review, 11 February 2000.
- The Hon. John Moore, Minister for Defence, Senator The Hon.
Nick Minchin, Minister for Industry, Science and Resources, The
Hon. John Fahey, Minister for Finance and Administration,
'Commonwealth takes full direct ownership and control of the
Australian Submarine Corporation', Joint Media Statement,
9 November 2000.
- 'Uncertainty prevails with vital Collins class submarine
issues', Australian Defence Report, 26 April 2001, p. 1.
- Intellectual capital is now considered the most important
element in the success of organisations. Intellectual property,
that is, knowledge held by the organisation in forms such as
inventions, for instance, is one of the elements of intellectual
capital. However, access to the expertise of staff, knowledge of
the requirements of customers and appropriate systems to manage
this knowledge are also required to build an organisation's
intellectual asset base.
- Tom Muir, 'Collins-class submarines-on the fast track',
Naval Technology, February 2000, p. 7.
- David Lague, 'Out of the deep', op. cit. Accurate comparisons
of the speed of conventional submarines are difficult. Most
official accounts simply claim a top speed of 20 knots submerged.
Depending on conditions, this can easily vary a few knots in either
direction.
- After years of experience, the Indian navy found the Kilo to be
'highly underpowered' and assessed it as inferior in combat
capability to its HDW-built submarines. Consequently, in the early
1990s the Indian navy proposed an upgrade program for the Kilos
costing 500 per cent more than the purchase price (with,
admittedly, costs of Russian defence equipment generally being
lower than that of Western alternatives). Comptroller and
Auditor-General, Report of the CAG on the Ministry of
Defence, Year ended March 1996, available on the Internet at
http://www.cagindia.org/reports/defence/1997_book1/contents.htm
- Jerry Pratley, 'Collins sub supreme: navy boss', West
Australian, 18 June 1999, quoting Captain Ric Shalders, RAN,
then Commanding Officer, Australian Submarine Squadron.
- Joris Janssen Lok, 'Australia rethinks AIP for Collins class
boats', Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 July 1996, p. 15,
quoting Capt. Paul Greenfield, RAN, then New Submarine Project
representative at ASC.
- Joint Committee on Public Accounts and Audit, Report 368,
Review of Audit Report No 34 1997-98, New Submarine Project
Department of Defence, June 1999. Transcript, 5 March 1999, p.
PA88. Evidence from Mr Garry Jones, Deputy Secretary, Acquisition,
Department of Defence.
- David Lague, 'Out of the deep', op. cit.
- Operating in shallow waters is a supreme test of a submarine's
capability. Submarines are more difficult to conceal in shallow
water. Instability in the control of a boat and limitations on its
capacity to react to changing hydrodynamic situations can result in
it being forced near the surface or even broaching, that is, being
forced through the surface.
- 'Collins subs world class, says US', Advertiser, 1
June 2001.
- See, Derek Woolner, 'Procuring Change: How Kockums was Selected
for the Collins Class Submarine', Research Paper,
no. 4, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Information and
Research Services, September 2001, in the section 'Strengths of the
Shortlisted Companies'.
- Terry Plane, '"World-beater" to blow rivals out of the water',
Weekend Australian, 14 November 1998. The article
quoted Commander Melvyn Jones, Commander of HMAS Waller
during trials before her commissioning into the RAN. Commander
Jones' support of the boats is interesting because of his previous
service on an RN nuclear-powered submarine and command of two
Upholder class (Type 2400) RN conventional submarines.
- David Lague, 'Out of the deep', op. cit., quoting Rear Admiral
Peter Briggs who was in charge of the program to rectify the faults
of the Collins class.
- During an overseas tour of duty in 2000, HMAS Collins
successfully fired a sub-Harpoon off Hawaii. Collins has a
partially augmented CDS whilst Waller, with the original
system, is less capable.
- Janine Little, 'Computer guru called in to repair submarine',
Bayside Bulletin (Cleveland), 15 May 2001.
- McIntosh and Prescott, Report to the Minister for Defence
on the Collins Class Submarine and Related Matters, op. cit.
- ibid., p. 6.
- ibid., pp. 14-15.
- Trevor J. Thomas, 'Briggs delivers!', Australian Defence
Business Review, 19 January 2001, p. 11.
- McIntosh and Prescott, Report to the Minister for Defence
on the Collins Class Submarine and Related Matters, op.
cit., p. 4.
- ibid., p. 7.
- ibid., pp. 8-9. These facts help explain why Kockums went to
the Federal Court seeking to injunct the delivery of one of its
propellers to the US Navy, on the grounds that it would compromise
Kockums' intellectual property rights. Publicity that the
propellers did not work confused the difference between the
effectiveness of the design, the on board environment in which it
operates and the failings of the material that the shipbuilder was
forced to use.
- ibid., pp. 9-10.
- 'ASC's early complaint on combat system', Australian
Defence Report, op. cit., p.7.
- McIntosh and Prescott, Report to the Minister for Defence
on the Collins Class Submarine and Related Matters, op. cit.,
pp. 9-10.
- ibid., p. 6.
- ibid., p. 5.
- Oscar Hughes, Rear Admiral RAN, 'The New Submarine Project',
Maritime Studies, No. 37 November and December 1987, p.
34.
- McIntosh and Prescott, Report to the Minister for Defence
on the Collins Class Submarine and Related Matters, op. cit.,
p. 23.
- 'ASC's early complaint on combat system', Australian
Defence Report, op. cit., p. 8.
- McIntosh and Prescott, Report to the Minister for Defence
on the Collins Class Submarine and Related Matters, op. cit.,
p. 23.
- 'Admiral strongly rebuts criticism of submarines',
Australian Defence Reporter, 25 May 2000, p. 16.
- In fact, at times in the past, submariner training has so
ingrained this approach that it has become a problem. For example,
shortly into the war against Japan, most USN submarine commanders
had been replaced, largely because their caution prevented them
attaining a position, given the slow speed of a submarine operating
stealthily, from where they could attack enemy shipping.
- Matthew Horan, 'Noisy subs can't defend themselves',
Advertiser, 25 May 1999.
- ibid. This is the argument of Commodore (Ret.) Mick Dunn who
argued that the flow noise around a Collins quickly surfacing could
sufficiently affect the boat's sonars to not provide warning of the
presence of other craft. This argument was dismissed by the then
Chief of the Navy both on grounds of probability and of the noise
problem of the class not being sufficiently bad. However, recent
experience has shown that such accidents do occur, even when
involving competently operational submarines.
- Richard Sharp, Captain (RN). ed., Jane's Fighting Ships
2000-2001, p. 10.
- This difference can be clearly seen by comparing the conceptual
sketch of the submarine appearing in the 1991-92 Audit report with
the bow-on photograph in the 1997-98 report. Australian National
Audit Office, Audit Report No 22, 1991-92, New Submarine
Project, p. xii and, Audit Report No. 34, 1997-98,
New Submarine Project, p. xii.
- 'The Collins get well program', Australian Defence
Intelligencer, December 1999, p. 5. Following tests of the
modifications on HMAS Collins its commander described it
as significantly quieter than before; 'Collins passes that the
test', Advertiser, 20 October 1999.
- David Lague, 'Out of the deep', op. cit.
- Millar, 'Time for sub's critics to let the truth surface', op.
cit.
- 'RAN Collins submarines now on track', Asia-Pacific Defence
Reporter, December-January 2001, p. 13.
- 'ASC's early complaint on combat system', Australian
Defence Report, 17 August 2000, p. 7.
- McIntosh and Prescott, Report to the Minister for Defence
on the Collins Class Submarine and Related Matters, op. cit.,
p. 11.
- Roy Eccleston, 'Better late than never', Australian,
18 May 1998. Eccleston cites anxiety created within DST0 by the
quality of some of Rockwell's early work on the CDS.
- 'Future of Boeing's Submarine Combat System in Question',
Asian Military Review, May 1999, p. 45.
- ibid., p. 13.
- Tom Muir, 'Collins-class submarines on the fast track', op cit.
- McIntosh and Prescott, Report to the Minister for Defence
on the Collins Class Submarine and Related Matters, op. cit.,
p. 28.
- Tom Muir, op. cit., p. 6, (emphasis added).
- McIntosh and Prescott, Report to the Minister for Defence
on the Collins Class Submarine and Related Matters, op. cit.,
p. 28
- 'Sonartech Atlas leads bid for a new Collins Combat System',
Australian Defence Report, 17 February 2000, p. 9.
- Robert Garran, 'German firm "won" sub bidding contest',
Weekend Australian, 14 July, 2001, quoting a leaked report
from the project evaluation team.
- A. W. Grazebrook, 'Tough job for the ASC task force', op. cit.,
p. 52.
- The Hon. Peter Reith MP, Minister for Defence, 'Submarines
Combat System', Media Release MIN 244/01, 9 July 2001.
- ibid.
- The Hon. Peter Reith, MP, Minister for Defence, 'Australia and
US sign submarine cooperation statement', Media Release
MIN 354/01, 11 September 2001, attachment, 'Statement of principles
for enhanced cooperation between the United States Navy and the
Royal Australian Navy in matters relating to submarines, p. 5.
- 'Signs point to US solution for Collins', Australian
Defence Intelligencer, July 2000, p. 7.
- A. B. Baker III, 'World Navies in Review', US Naval
Institute Proceedings, March 2001, p. 33.
- Ian McPhedran, 'US to upgrade our subs', Herald Sun,
10 July 2001.
- Rear Admiral Peter Briggs, Head-Submarine Capability Team,
Press Conference, 23 July 1999.
- Daniel Cotterill, 'Collins submarines on comeback trail',
Australian Defence Magazine, September 2000, p. 5.
- 'First Dolphins move in on Israeli navy', Jane's
International Defence Review, 9/1999, p. 8
- 'STN Atlas shortlisted for COLLINS combat system replacement',
Australian Defence Report, 6 July 2000, p. 6.
- Sonartech Atlas supplied two sonar processing systems as part
of the 'fast track program' to provide an initial operational
capability with HMA ships Dechaineux and Sheean:
'Sonartech Atlas awarded COLLINS sonar systems contract',
Australian Defence Report, 25 May 2000, p. 14.
- Lincoln Wright, 'Germans in line for compensation over
submarine tender', Canberra Times, 13 July 2001.
- Robert Garran, 'Navy locked into US aims', Australian,
11 July 2001.
- Craig Skehan, 'Reith to talk to shunned German tenderer',
Sydney Morning Herald, 13 July 2001.
- Jason Sherman, 'Rumsfeld Lobbies Australia on Sub Choice',
Defense News, 14 May 2001, p. 40.
- For some counter arguments, reflecting the STN Atlas position
see; Graeme Dunk, 'The Collins combat system', Asia-Pacific
Defence Reporter, December/January 2001, p. 14-15.
- Robert Holzer, 'Utility of Subs Rises as Targeting Grows More
Precise', Defense News, 10 April 2000, p. 17.
- Dunk, 'The Collins combat system', p. 14.
- Robert Garran, 'Navy locked into US aims'. op. cit.
- In fact, supporting the US role in maintaining global security
is a component of Australia's fifth and lowest ranking strategic
objective: Department of Defence, Defence 2000 Our Future
Defence Force, Defence Publishing Service, Canberra, December
2000, p. 32, available on the Internet at: http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/WPAPER.PDF
- ibid., p. 35.
- ibid., p. 46.
- McIntosh and Prescott, Report to the Minister for Defence
on the Collins Class Submarine and Related Matters, op. cit.,
p. 28
- 'Raytheon grows its sub interests', Australian Defence
Intelligencer, April 200, pp. 6-7.
- Air Vice Marshal Ray Conroy, RAAF, 'Address', Defence +
Industry 2001 Conference, Table, 'AST Project Review',
available on the Internet at:
http://www.dmo.defence.gov.au/DMO/function.cfm?function_id=100#group48
The figures given by Conroy relate to the original contract
schedule. They differ from those shown in Appendix 1 because the
latter shows slippage against revised contract criteria.
- Graeme Dunk, 'The Collins combat system', op. cit., p. 15.
- Tom Muir, 'Collins-class submarines-on the fast track', op.
cit., pp. 7-8.
- Robert Garran, 'Doubts over subs delay fix',
Australian, 20 December 1999. The occasion was when
Cabinet decided to not proceed with the new combat system till
after the (then) forthcoming defence white paper.
- Roy Ecclestone, 'Better late than never', op. cit.
- 'Collins submarine background', Australian Defence
Report, 26 April 2001, p. 2.
- Gregor Ferguson, 'Boeing sells Australian Naval Business to
Raytheon', Australian Defence News, 2 May 2000.
- Royal Australian Navy, Australian Maritime Doctrine,
Defence Publishing Service, Canberra, October 2000.
- Ian Bostock, 'USA to offer Australia scaled-down Arleigh Burke
class destroyers', Jane's Defence Weekly, 20 December 2000
p. 12.
- Department of Defence, Portfolio Budget Statements
1999-2000, Defence Portfolio, May 1999, p. 23.
- Department of Defence, Portfolio Budget Statements
2000-2001, Defence Portfolio, May 2000, p. 20.
- Australian National Audit Office, Retention of Military
Personnel, Audit Report No. 35, April 2000, p. 32,
available on the Internet at: http://www.anao.gov.au/
- The Collins program technically is not over budget, although it
could be argued that the cost of overcoming its shortcomings
represents additional expenditure that was not budgeted. How much
of the rectification program is in this category is difficult to
say, as some elements are for expansion of the boats' capabilities
that would have been funded separately regardless of the fortunes
of the program. ASC claims that a more accurate figure for cost
overrun is 12 per cent: Lincoln Wright, 'Five years and $1 billion
extra to fix subs', Canberra Times, 4 August 2000.
- Of course, being a very large project, even comparatively
modest cost overruns for the Collins submarines will cost the
Defence budget more than the sum of these more minor projects.
- Peter la Franchi, 'RAN forced to accept substandard
Seasprites', Flight International, 31 October 2000,
p. 19.
- Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation
Committee, Defence Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements,
Debates, 21 February 2001, AVM Conroy, p. 85.
- Gregor Ferguson, 'Australia May Get AEEW Wish', Defense
News, 6-12 June 1994, p. 30.
- 'Boeing team 737-700 and MESA radar wins $2b AEW&C
Project', Australian Defence Report, 5 August 1999, p. 4.
- Peter La Franchi, 'Budget cuts Wedgetail numbers', Flight
International, 25 April-1May, 2000, p. 16.
- Based on exchange rates of 68.34 and 55.4 for July 1994 and
December 2000, respectively.
- Burak Ege Bekdil, 'Turkey-Boeing Deal Stalls', Defense
News, 25 June-1 July 2001, p. 10.
- Ray Conroy, 'Address', Defence + Industry 2001
Conference, op. cit.
- Peter La Franchi, 'Australian Minister admits project has major
problems', Flight International, 21-27 November 2000, p.
18.
- Lincoln Wright, 'Defence spending: bigger say for Moore',
Canberra Times, 25 May 2000.
- Rear Admiral Chris Ritchie, RAN, 'Future Defence Capabilities',
Defence + Industry 2001 Conference, 27 June 2001,
available on the Internet at:
http://www.dmo.defence.gov.au/DMO/function.cfm?function_id=100#group48
- Allan Hawke, Secretary of the Department of Defence, Money
Matters, Address to the Royal United Services Institute of
Victoria, 27 April 2000, p. 8.
Appendix 1-Major Capital Equipment Project Delays or Cost
Overruns
Real cost increases with reasons for
variations
Project No
|
Project Name
|
Current
Approval
$m
|
Real
Increases
$m
|
Variation
|
Reasons for Variation
|
SEA 1446
Phase 1
|
Collins Class-Interim Minimum Operational Capability
|
225.2
|
128.5
|
133%
|
For remedial work on submarines
|
AIR 5279
Phase 2
|
Computer Aided Maintenance Management
|
58.8
|
32.4
|
122%
|
For essential changes to make system easier to use, to develop
computer-based instruction package and to cover increased
implementation costs
|
DEF 444
Phase 1
|
DEF 444 (Classified)
|
113.0
|
54.0
|
92%
|
Additional functionality
|
AIR 5333
|
2CRU/3CRU (Control and Reporting Units)
|
186.6
|
81.6
|
78%
|
To cover redeveloped acquisition strategy following inability of
contractor to deliver the units, and additional functionality
included Tactical Data Link 16
|
AIR 5232
Phase 2
|
Air Navigational Trainer
|
38.5
|
14.8
|
63%
|
To meet additional cost associated with replacement of HS748
aircraft. Also, underestimate of cost for prime contract,
maintenance and spares
|
JP 2042
Phase 1A
|
Bluefin (Classified)
|
26.8
|
10.1
|
60%
|
Additional operational requirements
|
JP 2027
Phase 2
|
Amphibious Transport (LPA)
|
99.8
|
36.3
|
57%
|
Enhanced capability such as Kanimbla medical facilities,
compartment modifications and waste disposal
|
SEA 1418
Phase 1
|
Maritime Ranges
|
32.7
|
11.4
|
53%
|
Underestimate and scope changes
|
SEA 1397
Phase 3
|
NULKA Missile Decoys
|
59.3
|
15.8
|
36%
|
Underestimate due to complexity of technology in building
production model
|
AIR 5398
Phase 1
|
Air-to-Surface Weapon System
|
406.1
|
97.9
|
32%
|
Underestimate due to complexity of integration and support
effort required. Tendered prices for AGM 142 missiles higher than
originally planned
|
AIR 5400
Phase 1
|
Air-to-Air Weapons
|
293.8
|
58.0
|
25%
|
Due to higher than expected costs for integrating and testing
the Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile (ASRAAM) on F/A-18 and
establishing maintenance support. Also, increased costs associated
with AIM 120 medium range missile
|
SEA 1160
Phase 1 and 2
|
Pollution Control Ship Fitted Equipment
|
55.5
|
7.1
|
15%
|
Replacement of ozone depleting substances in ship-fitted
equipment to comply with Commonwealth Ozone Protection Act
1989
|
JP 5195
Phase 3B
|
Global Positioning System NAVSTAR
|
43.6
|
5.5
|
14%
|
Part of New Government Initiatives in late 1996 to enable issue
of global position system receivers to Army sub-unit level
|
AIR 5369
|
Airlift Simulators Project
|
72.4
|
8.2
|
13%
|
Enhanced functionality for tactical-flying training and
capability enhancement for electronic warfare simulation
|
AIR 5397
|
Airspace Control Communications
|
59.8
|
6.4
|
12%
|
Costs of essential integration work with existing equipment,
resolution of interference problems, additional spares and
engineering changes
|
Projects with delays against schedule in excess of six
months
Project Number
|
Title
|
Slippage of
SD(1) against current contract schedule
(months)
|
Contract Signed
|
AIR 5186
|
Australian Defence Air Traffic System
|
59
|
29 November 1995
|
AIR 5279 Phase 2
|
Computer Aided Maintenance Management System-Version 2-Phase
2
|
48
|
24 December 1996
|
JOINT 5195 Phase 2
|
Global Positioning System Navstar ADF Aircraft
|
46
|
14 June 1996
|
AIR 5232 Phase 2
|
Navigation Trainer
|
41
|
18 September 1997
|
AIR 5046 Phase 3C
|
Black Hawk Flight Simulator
|
38
|
20 February 1996
|
JOINT 65 Phase 4
|
Parakeet
|
37
|
21 March 1994
|
SEA 1229 Phase 2&3
|
Active Missile Decoy
|
36
|
15 August 1996
|
AIR 5397
|
Australian Military Airspace Control Communications System
|
35
|
25 June 1996
|
AIR 5276 Phase 2
|
P3-C Update Implementation
|
26
|
24 January 1995
|
LAND 53 Phase 1B
|
Ninox-Night Fighting Equipment
|
22
|
29 October 1997
|
LAND 52 Phase 4
|
Medium Recovery Vehicle
|
20
|
22 August 1995
|
SEA 1114
|
New Submarine
|
18
|
3 June 1987
|
LAND 116 Phase 3
|
Bushranger-Procurement of Infantry Mobility Vehicle
|
18
|
1 June 1999
|
SEA 1405 Phase 1 and 2
|
Seahawk Electronic Support Measures/ Forward Looking
Infra-Red
|
16
|
31 March 1998
|
SEA 1411 Phase 1
|
Anzac Ship Helicopter Acquisition
|
15
|
26 June 1997
|
AIR 5375 Phase 1
|
Tactical Air Defence Radars
|
12
|
11 August 1998
|
AIR 5401 Phase 3A
|
Medium Tactical Airlift
|
11
|
15 January 1999
|
SEA 1555 Phase 2
|
Minehunter Coastal Acquisition
|
9
|
12 August 1994
|
JOINT 1 Phase N&Q/B96
|
Harpoon Missiles
|
9
|
11 June 1997
|
JOINT 5195 Phase 3B
|
Global Positioning System Navstar Ground Force Sets
|
8
|
24 December 1998
|
Notes
-
- ISD is In-service Date.
- Covers cost increases in current projects in excess of $5
million that have been approved over the last five years.
- Cost increases are shown against the current project approvals
at December 2000 prices (instead of the original approvals) in
order to get a true comparison.
- Progress of projects is usually assessed against the current
contract baseline rather than the original estimated schedule.
Source: Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation
Committee, Answers to Questions on Notice, Department of
Defence, Additional Estimates 2000-2001, 21 February 2001, Question
26, pp. 55-57.