Monthly Archives: June 2010

06/30/10

Nakajima Ki-44 Shoki

Very soon after design of the Ki-43 Hayabusa had been started by Nakajima, the company received instruction from the Imperial Japanese Army to initiate the design of a new interceptor fighter. In this case, however, maneuverability was required to give precedence to overall speed and rate of climb, and the company’s design team selected the 1,250-hp (932-kW) Nakajima Ha-41 as the powerplant for this new project. Of similar general configuration to the Ki-43, the new Nakajima Ki-44 prototypes also incorporated the maneuvering flaps that had been introduced on that aircraft, and carried an armament of two 7.7-mm (0.303-in) and two 12.7-mm (0.5-in) machine-guns. Fir l flown on August 1940, the Ki-44 was involved in a series of comparative trials against Kawasaki’s Ki-60 prototype, based on use of the Daimler-Benz DB 601 engine, and an imported Messerschmitt Bf 109E. The result of this evaluation, and extensive service trials, showed the Ki-44 to be good enough to enter production, and it was ordered under the designation Army Type 2 Single-seat Fighter Model 1A Shoki (demon), company designation Ki-44-Ia, which carried the same armament as the prototypes. A total of only 40 Ki-44-I aircraft was produced, including small numbers of the Ki-44Ib armed with four 12.7-mm (0.5-in) machine-guns, and the Similar Ki-44-Ic with some minor refinements.

When introduced into service’ the high landing speeds and limited maneuverability of the Shoki made it unpopular with pilots, and very soon the Ki-44-II with a more powerful Nakajima Ha-109 engine was put into production. Only small numbers of the Ki-44-IIa Similarly armed to the Ki-44-Ia, were built, the variant being followed by the major production Ki-44-IIb which, apart from the different engine, was identical to the Ki-44-Ic. The Ki-44-IIc introduced much heavier armament, comprising four 20-mm cannon or, alternatively two 12.7-mm (0.5-in) machine-guns and two 40-mm cannon, and these proved to be very effective when deployed against Allied heavy bombers attacking Japan. However, the increased power had done nothing to eliminate the reasons for its unpopularity with the pilots and, in fact, the higher wing-loading of this version meant that it had some violent reactions to high-speed maneuvers; however, it later gained their respect because of its capability as an interceptor. Final production version was the Ki-44-III with a 2,000hp (1491-kW) Nakajima Ha-145 radial engine, an increase in wing area and enlarged vertical tail surfaces, but comparatively few were built before production ended in late 1944. They included the Ki-44-IIIa and similar Ki-44-IIIb, armed with four 20-mm cannon, and two 20-mm and two 37-mm cannon respectively.

Ki-44-III: powered by a 2,000hp. Nakajima Ha-145, 18-cyl., air-cooled radial with thrust augmentation exhaust stacks; increased wing area to 204.514sq. ft.; enlarged tail surfaces; flew for the first time in July 1943; very few built as the aircraft was surpassed in performance by the Ki-84-I; two versions built, one ( Model 3A ) armed with four Ho-5 20mm cannon and the other ( Model 3B ) with two Ho-5 cannon and two Ho-203 37mm cannon

Nakajima had built a total of 1,225 Ki-44s of all versions, including prototypes, and these were allocated the Allied codename “Tojo’. They were deployed primarily in Japan, but were used also to provide an effective force of interceptors to protect vital targets, as in Sumatra where they defended the oil fields at Palembang.
Variants
Ki-44
    Prototype.
Ki-44
    Model pre-series for evaluation.
Ki-44 Type I
    was powered by a 930 kW (1,250 hp) Nakajima Ha-41 engine, and had a maximum speed of 580 km/h (363 mph). Armament consisted of two 7.7 mm (.303 in) Type 89 machine guns and two 12.7 mm (.50 in) Ho-103 machine guns placed in the wing.
Ki-44 Ia
    Fighter Type 2 of Army. (Mark Ia).
Ki-44 Ib
    Mark Ib.
Ki-44 Ic
    modified version.
Ki-44 Type II
    had a 1,074 kW (1,440 hp) Nakajima Ha-109 engine with a top speed of 604 km/h (378 mph), and four 12.7 mm (.50 in) Ho-103.
Ki-44 II
    prototype-engine Nakajima Ha-109 of 1,130 kW (1,520 hp).
Ki-44 IIa
    Mark 2a.
Ki-44 IIb
Ki-44 IIc
    (Mark 2c) Four 12.7 mm (.50 in) Ho-103 or two 12.7 mm (.50 in) Ho-103 and two 40 mm (1.57 in) Ho-301 cannons. A four 20 mm Ho-3 cannon version was proposed but never produced. Four Ho-3 cannons would have been most effective against B-29s. The 20×125 mm Ho-3 round gave the 144 g ave. (127/140/164) shell (7% HE ave.) a range of 900 m (2,950 ft) and a muzzle velocity of 820 m/s. The rate of fire for the wing-guns was 400 rpm, while the synchronized cowl-mounted pair were much slower (perhaps under 272 rpm each). This equals 23 rounds per second (rps) for the four cannon against approximately 52 rps for the standard four machine gun version), but the firepower advantage (a ~2½ times stronger punch per second – including blast, for the same number of guns and only about ½ the rate of fire) would have more than compensated against bombers.
    Against small fighters at speed, the sparse firing pattern density would be less than ideal. Double magazines could hold 100 rpg of 20 mm (20×125) ammunition – not to be confused with the rapid fire Ho-5 20 mm (20×94) ammunition – which was better for dogfights.
Ki-44 IIIa
    (Mark 3a) engine of 1,491 kW (2,000 hp) and four 20 mm Ho-5 cannons.
Ki-44 IIIb
    (Mark 3b) two 20 mm Ho-5 cannons and two 37 mm (1.46 in) Ho-203 cannons.

Total production: 1,225

Specifications (Ki-44-IIb)
General characteristics

    * Crew: one, pilot
    * Length: 8.84 m (29 ft)
    * Wingspan: 9.45 m (31 ft 01 in)
    * Height: 3.12 m (10 ft 23 in)
    * Wing area: 15 m² (161 ft²)
    * Empty weight: 2,105 kg (4,641 lb)
    * Loaded weight: 2,764 kg (6,094 lb)
    * Max takeoff weight: 2,995 kg (6,602 lb)
    * Powerplant: 1× Nakajima Ha-109 radial engine, 1,133 kW (1,519 hp)

Performance

    * Maximum speed: 605 km/h (376 mph)
    * Cruise speed: 400 km/h (249 mph)
    * Stall speed: 150 km/h (93 mph)
    * Range: 1,700 km (1,060 mi)
    * Service ceiling: 11,200 m (36,750 ft)
    * Rate of climb: 5,000 m–4 min 17 sec (3,940 ft/min)
    * Wing loading: 200 kg/m² (41 lb/ft²)
    * Power/mass: 0.38 kW/kg (0.13 hp/lb)

Armament

    * 4 × 12.7 mm (.50 in) Ho-103 machine guns, two synchronized cowl mounted (perhaps 657 rpm rate each), and one in each wing (900 rpm rate of fire each), 760 rounds in all. The 12.7×81 cartridge propelled the 35.4 g AP bullet 760 m/s, the 38 g HE 796 m/s, and the 33 g HE (2.2%) 770 m/s, with an effective firing range of 750 m. Not always reliable.

Ki-44 handling characteristics

I was just recently rereading Francillon’s “Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War”. In the Ki-44 section it is mentioned that the Ki-44 was restricted against flick manouvres. Do I have to assume that usually Japanese fighters were cleared for flick manoeuvres? After all, most WW Two fighters’ (at least US and British) are restricted against snap rolls etc. At least so according to pilot manuals. I remember reading a story of a US pilot who did fly the Ki-44. He did like it very much.

The following manoeuvres were forbidden in the pilot’s handbook:
snap rolls
spins
stalling
zooming
I don’t believe this type can be compared with other JAAF fighters – it was unique. The Ki44 represented a radical departure for the JAAF in its design concept and originally it was envisaged that only pilots with at least 1000 hours could fly the fighter. Wing loading was high and landing speeds consequentially fast which made for tricky handling. On the plus side the aircraft was a superb gun platform, invariably scoring the highest points in gunnery competitions against both Army and Navy fighters. Shoki also possessed excellent dive and climb characteristics permitting fast hit and run tactics, which, when they were first introduced by Ki44 units in China, also represented a radical departure from “traditional” JAAF “dogfighting” tactics.

Pilot opinion of type is often subjective and such is human nature that opinions can differ widely, even in respect of the same aircraft (witness the P-39 Airacobra for example). Most sources agree that initial concerns over the aircraft’s lack of maneuverability and high landing speed, expressed by pilots used to such nimble performers as the Ki27 and Ki43, were replaced with respect by those pilots who exploited and enjoyed the type’s best qualities – “a rapid roll rate, outstanding dive characteristics and excellence as a gun platform”. That this was so is supported by the fact that a number of pilots became “aces” with the Ki44.

It was, however, only produced in relatively small numbers; representing barely 9% of JAAF single engined fighter production (and that excluding the Ki27). Outside Japan, where it is most commonly associated with B-29 defence operations, it’s most significant deployment was in China. Here, in December 1942 Imperial General Headquarters instructed the China Expeditionary Army to prepare for air operations in the spring of 1943 “after the successful completion of the first phase of operations in the Pacific”. An interim defensive posture was obliquely referred to when the China Expeditionary Army was instructed to “arrange for the use of Type 2 single seater fighters on at least one of each of the front line airfields in north, central and south China as promptly as possible”.

Shoki was also issued in small numbers to Sentais equipped primarily with other types to provide an improved interception/air defence capability and also deployed to protect locations of particular strategic importance.

In common with other Army types the Ki44 has been underestimated by aviation writers. In a recent and definitive account of the Flying Tigers, the AVG, it was described as “cobbled together from a Hayabusa airframe and a 1,500-horsepower bomber engine”! That it certainly was not and the description does scant justice to the efforts of Hideo Itokawa and his design team in successfully meeting the 1939 specification for an interceptor fighter possessing almost revolutionary (for the JAAF) capabilities. You have raised the question of “forbidden” snap rolls on some Allied types and this is where I believe the flying characteristics of the Ki44 can be more usefully compared. Its design imperatives probably had more in common with some of its adversaries than with other more forgiving JAAF types such as the Ki43, whose aerobatic qualities were perhaps only surpassed by its predecessor the Ki27.

As a side note, the Ki-44 could climb at 4,286 ft/min at its peak altitude of 6,888 feet – which equals or exceeds most allied types (P-51 max climb rate was ~3,800ft/min).

LINK

06/30/10

Kawanishi N1K1-J and N1K2-J Shiden

In November 1942, only three months after the N1K1 Kyofu had flown for the first time, Kawanishi began development as a private venture of a land-based version of the same aircraft under the designation Kawanishi N1K1-J. The airframe of this prototype was basically of the same construction as that of its floatplane predecessor, but the float landing gear gave place to tail wheel-landing gear with retractable main units. To achieve exceptional performance it was planned to use as powerplant the newly-developed Nakajima NK9H Homare (honour) 21 radial engine, but proper use of the full power of this unit required a propeller of large diameter. This, in turn, brought problems in design of the main landing gear legs, one that was solved by the introduction of telescopic units which contracted as the leg was folded inward into the undersurface of the wing/wing root; conversely, the telescopic portion extended after the leg had been lowered. First flown in early 1943, the N1K1-J prototype demonstrated excellent performance coupled with superb maneuverability, this capability being offset somewhat by unreliability of the l,820-hp (1357-kW) Homare 11 engine and the rather complex landing gear, both plagued with problems that at first proved difficult to resolve. However, by July 1943 four prototypes had been completed and were tested by the Imperial Japanese Navy, leading to instructions for Kawanishi to concentrate on development of this aircraft. By the end of the year the situation had improved somewhat, and the navy authorised large-scale production under the official designation Navy Interceptor Fighter Shiden (violet lightning), this being allocated subsequently the Allied codename ‘George’.

The initial production N1K1.J, powered by Homare 21 engines and with armament comprising two 7.7-mm (0.303-in) machine-guns and four wing-mounted 20-mm cannon, began to enter service in early 1944; the type proved to be full of troubles on the ground, but handled so well in the air that it was considered by Allied pilots to be a formidable adversary. A total of 1,007 were built by Kawanishi at Himeji and Nauro, in variants which included the NIK1-Ja with revised armament comprising only the four wing-mounted cannon; the N1K1-Jb which had the same armament, but with a modified wing so that the cannon could be mounted within the wing structure, plus underwing racks to carry two 551-lb (250-kg) bombs and, in some late series aircraft, an underfuselage pannier to carry six air-to-ground rockets; and the NIK1-Jc fighter-bomber which retained the wing-mounted cannon and had underwing racks to carry four 551-lb (250-kg) bombs.

Nevertheless, there was no doubt that the N1K1-J had been pushed into service very rapidly and operational use highlighted the shortcomings, inadequate wheel brakes proving to be a particularly hazardous problem. It was decided in mid-1943 to review the design of the aircraft, leading to a number of changes including a change from mid-wing to low-wing configuration. This, in turn, made it possible to dispense with the complicated main landing gear units that had caused many problems, the legs being replaced by standard-length units. The fuselage was lengthened, the vertical tail surfaces were redesigned, and the aircraft’s construction was simplified to the extent that the numbers of components were reduced by more than a third. However, no change was made in powerplant for, despite its unreliability, the Homare engine was powerful and readily available.

The resulting N1K2-J prototype was flown for the first time on 31 December 1943 and was ordered into production immediately by the Japanese navy as the Navy Interceptor Fighter Shiden KAI. Its manufacture was bedevilled by the speed with which it was required and the constant introduction of modifications, the continuing unreliability of the Homare engine and, in the later stages of the war, by the effects of US bombing on the supply of components. Despite this, the type continued to give a good account of itself, being particularly active in the regions of Formosa, Honshu, Okinawa and the Philippines before, in the final months of the war, being used also in a kamikaze role. The production N1K2-J, which had the same armament as the N1K1-Jb, was built to a total of 423, 401 of them by Kawanishi at Himeji and Nauro; this number included eight prototypes and an unknown but small number of N1K2-K two-seat trainers armed with four 20-mm cannon. The balance of 22 was built by other Japanese manufacturers. Further attempts to improve the capability of this fighter were frustrated by events, but development prototypes included two N1K3-J aircraft, with the engine moved forward 6 in (15.2 cm) to enhance longitudinal stability and armed with four wing-mounted 20-mm cannon plus two 13.2mm (0.52-in) machine-guns; two similarly-armed N1K4-J prototypes each with an improved 2,000-hp (1491-kW) NK9H-S Homare 23 engine; plus a carrier-based variant of the 1K4.J which had the designation N1K4-A. Destroyed while under construction was the single prototype of the N1K5-J; this would have had the same armament as the N1K3-J and a 2,200-hp (1641-kW) Mitsubishi MK9A radial engine. The designation N1K3-A was allocated to a proposed carrier-based version of the N1K3-J, but no examples were built.

Variants

N1K1 Kyofu

    * N1K1: only standard type as floatplane, which was used from early 1943.
    * N1K2: reserved name for an intended model with larger engine, not built.

N1K1-J Shiden

    * N1K1-J: Prototypes: development of fighter hydroplane N1K1 Kyofu, 1,357 kW (1,820 hp) Nakajima Homare 11 Engine, 9 built
    * N1K1-J Shiden (“Violet Thunder”) Navy Land-Based Interceptor, Model 11: first production model: 1,484 kW (1,990 hp) Homare 21 engine with revised cover, armed with two 7.7 mm (.303 in) Type 97 machine guns and two 20 mm Type 99 cannons. Modified total-vision cockpit.
    * N1K1-Ja, Model 11A: Without frontal 7.7 mm (.303 in) Type 97s, only four 20 mm Type 99s in wings
    * N1K1-Jb, Model 11B: Similar to Model 11A amongst load two 250 kg (550 lb) bombs, revised wing weapons
    * N1K1-Jc,Model 11C: definitive fighter-bomber version, derived from Model 11B. Four bomb racks under wings.
    * N1K1-J KAIa: experimental version with auxiliary rocket. One Model 11 conversion.
    * N1K1-J KAIb: conversion for dive bombing. One 250 kg (550 lb) bomb under belly and six rockets under wings.

N1K2-J Shiden-KAI

    * N1K2-J Prototypes: N1K1-Jb redesigned. Low wings, engine cover and landing gear modified. New fuselage and tail, 8 built
    * N1K2-J Shiden KAI (Violet Thunder, Modified) Navy Land Based Interceptor, Model 21: first model of series
    * N1K2-Ja,Model 21A: Fighter-bomber version. Four 250 kg (550 lb) bombs. Constructed by Kawanishi: 393, Mitsubishi: 9, Aichi: 1, Showa Hikoki: 1, Ohmura Navy Arsenal: 10, Hiro Navy Arsenal: 1.
    * N1K2-K Shiden KAI-Rensen (Violet Thunder Fighter Trainer, Modified) Trainer version of N1K-J Series with two seats, operative or factory conversions

Further variants

    * N1K3-J Shiden KAI 1, Model 31 Prototypes: Engines displaced to ahead, two 13.2 mm (51 in) Type 3 machine guns in front, 2 built
    * N1K3-A Shiden KAI 2, Model 41: Carrier-based version of N1K3-J, only project
    * N1K4-J Shiden KAI 3, Model 3: Prototypes, 1,491 kW (2,000 hp) Homare 23 engine, 2 built.
    * N1K4-A Shiden KAI 4, Model 4: Prototype, experimental conversion of N1K4-J example with equipment for use in carriers, 1 built
    * N1K5-J Shiden KAI 5, Model 25: High-Altitude Interceptor version. only project

    * Total Production (all versions): 1,435 examples.

Specifications (N1K2-J)

General characteristics

    * Crew: 1
    * Length: 30 ft 7 in (9.3 m)
    * Wingspan: 39 ft 4 in (12.0 m)
    * Height: 13 ft 0 in (3.9 m)
    * Wing area: 253 ft² (23.5 m²)
    * Empty weight: 5,855 lb (2,656 kg)
    * Loaded weight: 8,820 lb (4,000 kg)
    * Max takeoff weight: 10,710 lb (4,860 kg)
    * Powerplant: 1× Nakajima Homare NK9H radial engine, 1,990 hp (1,480 kW)

Performance

    * Maximum speed: 369 mph (594 km/h)
    * Range: 1,066 mi; 1,488 mi (2,395 km) ferry (1,716 km / 2,395 km)
    * Service ceiling: 35,500 ft (10,800 m)
    * Rate of climb: 4,000 ft/min (high octane fuel) (20.3 m/s)
    * Wing loading: 34 lb/ft² (166 kg/m²)
    * Power/mass: 0.226 hp/lb (0.305 kW/kg)

Armament

    * 4 × 20 mm Type 99 Model 2 Mk 4 cannon in wings. 200 rounds per gun (up from 100 rounds per gun internally and 70 rounds per gun in underwing boots for the early N1K1-J). The 20×101 mm round had an effective range of 1,000 m (3,280 ft) and a muzzle velocity of 700 m/s (2,297 ft/s). The 128 g shell had 6-8% HE. Rate of fire was about 500 rounds/min per gun. The guns were synchronized to converge at 200 m (656 ft).
    * 2 × 250 kg (551 lb) bombs
    * 2 × 400 L (105 gal) drop tanks

06/30/10

Blohm und Voss Bv 138

The first flying-boat design to be built by Hamburger Flugzeugbau GmbH, the aircraft-building subsidiary of Blohm und Voss, under the direction of chief engineer Dr Ing. Richard Vogt, was the Ha 138. Three prototypes of the original twin-engine design were each to have been powered by a different manufacturer’s l,000-hp (746-kW) engine for comparative evaluation, but development delays necessitated redesign to accept three 650-hp (485-kW) Junkers Jumo 205C engines. Almost two years after the completion of the mock-up, the first prototype (Ha 138 V1) took off on its maiden flight, the date being 15 July 1937. A second prototype (Ha 138 V2), with a modified hull design, joined the test programme at the Travemünde centre in November, but the aircraft were quickly proved to be unstable, both hydrodynamically and aerodynamically. Modifications to the vertical tail surfaces failed to improve the performance adequately and radical redesign was undertaken. The result was the Bv 138A, adopting the designation system of the Blohm und Voss parent company. The hull was much enlarged, its planing surfaces were improved, and the revised tail surfaces were carried by more substantial booms. The prototype was followed by five more pre-series Bv 138A aircraft, preceding the initial production version, the Bv 138A-1 first flown in April 1940, and built to a total of 25 for the reconnaissance units of the Luftwaffe, with which it first saw action during the Norwegian campaign of 1940. Armament of this version comprised one 20-mm cannon in the bow turret, and two 7.92-mm (0.31-in) MG 15 machine guns in open positions located behind the centre engine nacelle and at the rear of the hull. Structural strengthening of the fourth pre-series aircraft, and the installation of 880-hp (656-kW) Jumo 205D engines and armament comprising one 20-mm MG 151 cannon in the bow turret, a similar weapon in the rear hull position, with provision to carry up to 331 lb (150 kg) of bombs beneath the starboard wing root, resulted in the Bv 138B-0 prototype. This was followed by 19 examples of the production version, designated Bv 138B-1, but the major production version, the Bv 138C-1, resulted from further structural strengthening and the addition of a 13-mm (0.51-in) MG 131 machinegun in the position behind the centre engine nacelle. Introduced in March 1941, the Bv 138C-1 was built to a total of 227 units before production ended in 1943. Final variant was the mine-sweeping Bv 138 MS with a degaussing loop of dural, field-generating equipment installed and armament deleted, all of them conversions from the Bv 138B-0 pre-production aircraft.

Variants

Prototypes

    * Ha 138 V1 (D-ARAK) – First flight on 15 July 1937
    * Ha 138 V2 (D-AMOR) – First flight in August 1937
    * Ha 138 V3 – Construction was abandoned due to redesign.

Production

    * BV 138 A-01 to 06 – Operational testbeds
    * BV 138 A-1 – Flew reconnaissance during invasion of Norway
    * BV 138 B-0 – Officially entered service in October 1940
    * BV 138 B-1 – Entered service in November 1940
          o BV 138 B-1/U1
    * BV 138 C-1, also had minesweeper variant
          o BV 138 C-1/U
    * BV 138 MS – Minesweeping version.

Specifications (Bv 138 B-1)

General characteristics

    * Crew: 6, pilot, navigator, radio operator, nose gunner, rear gunner, upper rear gunner + up to 10 passengers
    * Length: 19.9 m (65 ft 3 in)
    * Wingspan: 27 m (88 ft 7 in)
    * Height: 6.6 m (21 ft 7 in)
    * Wing area: 111.9 m² (1,205 ft²)
    * Empty weight: 8,100 kg (17,860 lb)
    * Loaded weight: 14,700 kg (32,400 lb)
    * Powerplant: 3× Junkers Jumo 205D diesel, 656 kW (880 hp) each

Performance

    * Maximum speed: 275 km/h @ 6,000 m (171 mph @ 19,700 ft)
    * Range: 5,000 km (3,105 mi)
    * Service ceiling: 5,000 m (16,400 ft)
    * Rate of climb: 220 m/min (729 ft/min)
    * Wing loading: 114.2 kg/m² (23.4 lb/ft²)
    * Power/mass: 0.106 kW/kg (0.064 hp/lb)

Armament

    * 2 × 20 mm MG 151 cannons
    * 1 × 13 mm (.51 in) MG 131 machine gun
    * 3 × 7.92 mm MG 15 machine guns

06/30/10

Dornier Do 17/Do 215 Overview

In response to a Lufthansa specification of 1933 for a six-passenger mailplane, Dornier designed a shoulderwing all-metal monoplane to be powered by two 660-hp (492-kW) BMW VI engines. Three prototypes of this Dornier Do 17 were built in 1934, but although the airline carried out an evaluation programme early in the following year, the aircraft’s slim fuselage provided such limited passenger accommodation that all three were returned to the manufacturer. The design had military potential, however, and a fourth prototype (Do 17 V4) with twin vertical tail surfaces and a shortened fuselage was flown in the summer of 1935. Among development prototypes, the fifth was powered by 860-hp (641-kW) Hispano Suiza 12Ybrs engines, the seventh mounted a 7.92-mm (0.31-in) MG 15 machinegun in a dorsal blister, and the tenth was fitted with 750-hp (559-kW) BMWVI engines. The initial production versions were the Do 17E-1 which, developed from the ninth prototype, had a glazed and shortened nose, and carried a l,102-lb (500-kg) bombload, and the Do 17F-1 reconnaissance aircraft with increased fuel capacity and two cameras. Both of these models made their operational debut with the Legion Condor in Spain during 1937. Their performance was such that they had little difficulty in avoiding contact with the obsolescent aircraft then serving with the Republican air force. Introduced publicly at the 1937 International Military Aircraft Competition held at Dubendorf, near Zurich, the Do 17 V8 prototype (or Do 17M V1) powered by two l,000-hp (746-kW) Daimler-Benz DB 600A engines soon gained the nickname ‘Flying Pencil’ because of its slender fuselage. More significantly, it was able to better the performance of international fighters taking part in the contest. Following this demonstration at Dübendorf, Yugoslavia showed interest in the type and the Do 17K was developed for that nation, being similar to the Do 17M but powered by two 980-hp (731-kW) Gnome-Rhone 14N1/2 engines. The type was to be licence-built by Drazavna Fabrika Aviona at Kraljevo, the three versions, produced being the Do 17Kb-1 bomber, and the Do 17Ka-2 and Do 17Ka-3 reconnaissance aircraft with secondary bombing and attack capability respectively. Two prototypes of a proposed pathfinder version which did not enter production were built under the designation Do 17L, these being powered by two 900-hp (671-kW) Bramo 323A-1 radial engines because of a shortage of Daimler Benz DB 600s. The same Bramo powerplant was used for the thirteenth and fourteenth prototypes to develop the airframe/engine combination for the production Do 17M-1, which could carry a 2,205-lb (l000-kg) bombload and was armed with three 7.92-mm (0.31-in) MG machine-guns. A photo-reconnaissance version of the Do 17M entered production under the designation Do 17P, powered by two 875-hp (652-kW) BMW 132N radial engines and carried Rb20/30 and Rb50/30, or Rb 20/8 and Rb50/8 cameras in the Do 17P-1 production series. Two aircraft were built as engine test-beds under the designation Do 17R, one with 950-hp (708-kW) Daimler-Benz DB600Gs, and the other with l, 000-hp (746-kW) Daimler-Benz DB 601As. They were followed by three DB600G-powered high-speed reconnaissance aircraft which had the designation Do 17S-0. Used for test purposes, these had an extensively glazed nose and the airframe incorporated a bulged section in the underside of the forward fuselage, accommodating a gunner in a prone position to operate an aft-firing MG 15 machine-gun. These experimental reconnaissance machines were followed by a small production batch of 15 pathfinders, comprising three Do 17U-0 and 12 Do 17U-1 aircraft, the five-men crews of which included two radio operators to handle the new and comprehensive communications and navigation radios.

Major production version was the Do 17Z, which appeared in several variants and was built to a total of some 1,700 between 1939-40. They included the Do 17Z-0 which, powered by two 900-hp (671-kW) Bramo 323A-1 engines and armed with three MG 15 machineguns, was otherwise similar to the Do 17S. The Do 17Z-1 had an additional nose-mounted MG 15 but was underpowered and restricted to a 1, 102-lb (500-kg) bombload; this situation was rectified in the Do 17Z-2 which with 1,000-hp (746-kW) Bramo 323P engines could carry a 2,205-lb (1000 kg) bombload and up to eight MG 15 machine guns. Some 22 examples of the Do 17Z-3 reconnaissance aircraft were built, each equipped with Rb50/30 or Rb20/30 cameras, and they were followed by the Do 17Z-4 dual-control conversion trainer. Final bomber variant was the Do 17Z-5 which, generally similar to the Do 17Z-2, differed by having flotation bags in the fuselage and in the rear of the engine nacelles. Do 17 production ended with a single Do 17Z-6 Kauz I (screech owl I) long-range intruder and night-fighter which incorporated a Junkers Ju 88C-2 nose housing a 20-mm MG FF cannon and three MG 15 machine-guns. However, for the nine Do 17Z-10 Kauz II aircraft that followed a new nose was developed which housed four MG FF cannon and four 7.92-mm (0.31-in) MG 17 machine guns; when deployed as nightfighters they were equipped with Lichtenstein Cl radar and Spanner-II-Anlage infra-red detection apparatus.

Export versions of the Do 17Z were planned under the general designation Do 215, the first to be developed being the Do 215A-1, with l, 075-hp (802-kW) Daimler Benz DB 601A engines, which was ordered by Sweden in 1939. With the outbreak of World War II the 18 aircraft were embargoed and following conversion to Luftwaffe requirements were delivered for use as four-seat bomber/reconnaissance aircraft under the designations Do 215B-0 and Do 215B-l. Two examples of the Do 215B-3 were delivered to the USSR during 1940, and the Do 215B-4 was a reconnaissance version, similar in configuration to the Do 215B-1, but carrying Rb 20/30 and Rb 50/30 cameras. Final variant was the night-fighter/intruder Do 215B-5 which had an unglazed nose, similar to that of the Do 17Z-10, but housing two 20-mm MG FF cannon and four 7.92-mm (0.31-in) MG machine-guns.

Dornier Do 17s played a significant role in the early phase of World War 11, used first on 1 September 1939 when the invasion of Poland began. They played only a small part in the Norwegian campaign, but were used extensively in the invasion of France and the Low Countries, against Allied convoys in the English Channel and targets in England during the Battle of Britain. Deployed in the invasion of Greece, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, most had been withdrawn from first-line service by late 1941.

06/30/10

Prussian Dragoons 18th Century


The Horse Grenadier is from von der Schulenburg’s Regiment, 1729-41
This regiment was raised in 1705 by Major General von Derffling (the son of the Great Elector’s cavalry general) as 3 Dragoon Regiment and in 1713 it received the honorary title of ‘Horse Grenadier’ and took the grenadier type headdress into use. From 1724 onwards the regiment was commanded by von der Schulenburg, who became a major-general in 1728 and a lieutenant-general and Knight of the Black Eagle in 1740. In the early part of the First Silesian War the regiment was unfortunate. It was routed by Austrian horse at Baumgarten when acting as the king’s personal escort, Frederick narrowly escaping capture; for this it lost its distinctive title and dress and reverted to dragoons. At Mollwitz it was again broken by Austrian cavalry, bringing from Frederick the retort, ‘I always said those Schulenburg dragoons were no use.’ Von der Schulenburg himself received a sabre cut across the face but rode back into battle where a bullet finally brought him down. Thereafter 3 Dragoon Regiment served with distinction under successive colonels, Graf von Rothenburg, Freiherr von Schünaich and Graf von Truchsess.

Although Frederick much increased the establishment of his infantry and was later to vary its tactics, he did little to alter its organization. It was a different story with the Prussian line cavalry which had shown itself so unsatisfactory at Mollwitz. Except for the new guard regiment, the Garde-du-Corps, no further cuirassier regiments were raised, but Frederick did bring into being a further five dragoon regiments (8-12 Dragoons) . These took their place beside the cuirassiers in providing the shock action to break the Austrian horse.

In his revised cavalry doctrine after 1744, Frederick II called for even tighter, more controlled and bigger (i.e. wider) formations than ever before, beginning their movement farther out and achieving a *gallop* just prior to contact (unheard of in European armies before this time).  All executed with absolute precision, mind you.  This minimized the tendency of more loosely-formed, slower-moving cavalry to “thread” or interpenetrate each other’s’ lines, and degenerate into pistol-shooting and individual sword combat.  This was a sure way to lose that all-important “control” over your troops.  A prime example was the massive cavalry battle at Malplaquet, into which brigade after brigade was sent in at the charge, only to lose all cohesion and organization in the general melee.

The brigades were formed of squadrons in (usually) two-rank lines, deployed abreast in a single, brigade line.  The lines did *not* interpenetrate.  Mind you, this was the “new” Prussian cavalry doctrine ca1745.  They changed from a “boot-to-boot” alignment, where there is some room for interpenetration and “threading” of the enemy line, to “knee-to-knee” alignment.  I refer you to the (possibly apocryphal) story of the Prussian cuirassier mount that went into combat, charged and performed all the evolutions of its brigade in perfect alignment, even though its rider had been decapitated by a cannon ball early in the engagement.

Another aspect of Frederick’s new cavalry doctrine included the so-called column attack.  This was to be executed only by auxiliary horse (i.e. dragoons and/or hussars) and only under very specific and unique circumstances.  As I mentioned above, it was rarely actually used.

5 Dragoon Regiment charge at Hohenfriedberg 4th June, 1745


The first Prussian cavalry “column attack” was the Bayreuth Dragoons. They were supposed to be in a column of three squadrons’ frontage with hussars covering their flanks. They formed by squadron, but the entire regiment went in with the following qualifications.

1) The Bayreuth Dragoons’ charge at Hohenfriedberg was accidental; ran smack into an unsuspecting enemy while trying to scale a steep incline in “field column” (two squadrons abreast) formation.
2) I don’t believe there was any hussar support at that time, though this was Fritz’ new doctrinal concept for exploiting such a breakthrough.
3) The Bayreuth Dragoons was one of two, 10-squadron regiments.  It formed a *brigade* all by itself.
4) I should also point out that the Austrian infantry had already been fairly roughly handled (“100 deep behind the colors,” according to some accounts), which made it easier for the 5 Dragoons to charge into legend.

06/30/10

Hanover versus Prussia


Actually, Prussia and Hanover, the latter backed by Britain, nearly did square off in 1729.  It seems the Elector of Hanover (George II) was ticked off over Prussian recruiting officers kidnapping Hanoverian subjects for service in Frederick William’s army.  He threw at least one of the offenders into prison.  There was a period of tension then the Prussians backed off and Hanoverian subjects were reasonably safe.  I have wondered if this event might have influenced the Prussians to develop a less haphazard means of recruitment by establishing the canton system, which was set up in 1732. As for later, if you look at the run-up to the Seven Years War one of the chief worries of the British government was that Fritz would attack Hanover. The treaty with Russia was intended to prevent that.  Fritz advised the French, while still allied to them, to attack Hanover in reply to British provocations at sea and in America.  A Prussian-British scrum is a definite possibility, even if it did not actually occur, for it could have, and the possibility influenced diplomatic events.

In the War of the Austrian Succession, 1740-1748, the British and Prussians were actually on opposite sides, though I think they were never formally at war with each other and their armed forces never clashed. The Pragmatic Army that fought the French in Flanders included British, Hanoverian, Dutch and Austrian contingents, while a Franco-Bavarian-Saxon-Prussian coalition beat up the Austrians in Silesia and points south.

The Hessians for example were contracting troops out to everybody it seems: to the Prussians and Austrians in 1744, to the English in 1745-6 (in Scotland, no less), to the Austrians in 1747 and to the Dutch until through the war until 1749.

06/29/10

What if Hitler had invaded?

Mon, Jun 28, 2010

ANALYSIS: Dublin’s Gauleiter was to have sweeping powers which could have meant the liquidation of trade unions and the GAA, writes TOM CLONAN

SEVENTY YEARS ago this summer, Adolf Hitler’s general staff drew up detailed plans to invade Ireland. In June of 1940, Germany’s 1st Panzer Division had just driven the British Expeditionary Force into the sea at Dunkirk.

The Nazis, intoxicated by their military victory in France, considered themselves unstoppable and were determined to press their advance into Britain and Ireland. Germany’s invasion plans for Britain were codenamed Operation Sealion. Their invasion plans for Ireland were codenamed Unternehmen Grün or Operation Green.

Like Operation Sealion, Operation Green was never executed. The Nazis failed to achieve air superiority over the English Channel that summer. By the autumn of 1940 the Battle of Britain had been won by the Royal Air Force (RAF) and Hitler postponed his British and Irish invasion.

Some military historians also believe that the plans for Operation Green, drawn up in minute detail, may have been a feint to divert British resources away from Germany’s invasion of southern England. However, had the RAF been overwhelmed that summer by the German air force, the Luftwaffe, Operation Green gives a sobering insight into what fate neutral Ireland would have suffered at the hands of the Nazis.

Operation Green was conceived under the scrutiny of Field Marshal Fedor von Bock. Bock had a fearsome reputation as an aggressive campaign officer – well versed in the concept of Blitzkrieg. Bock had been commander of Germany’s army group north during the invasion of Poland in 1939 and army group B during the invasion of France in May of 1940. Nicknamed Der Sterber, or Death Wish, by his fellow officers, von Bock was ultimately given responsibility for Germany’s planned assault on Moscow (Operation Typhoon) during Germany’s subsequent invasion of Russia.

In the summer of 1940 however – before Hitler had turned his attentions towards Russia – von Bock was preoccupied with invasion plans for neutral Ireland and assigned responsibility for it to the German 4th and 7th army corps, army group B under the command of General Leonhard Kaupisch.

If these German army units in particular had reached Ireland’s shores in 1940, the consequences for Ireland would have been tragic and would have profoundly altered the course of history for the Republic and its citizens.

The German 4th army corps in particular had a brutal reputation in battle and inflicted many civilian casualties as they secured the Polish corridor to Warsaw during the invasion of Poland in 1939. Later in 1941, the 4th army corps, equipped with its own motorised infantry and Panzer tank divisions, would play a crucial role during Operation Barbarossa, Hitler’s invasion of Russia. The 4th army corps, earmarked for service in Ireland in the summer of 1940, conducted brutal operations the following summer as they took Minsk and Smolensk on their advance to Moscow in June and July 1941.

Had the 4th and 7th been deployed to Ireland in 1940, their tactics would have been brutal and their advance rapid – up to 100km per day.

The Nazis allocated 50,000 German troops for the invasion of Ireland. An initial force of about 4,000 crack troops, including engineers, motorised infantry, commando and panzer units, was to depart France from the Breton ports of L’orient, Saint-Nazaire and Nantes in the initial phase of the invasion.

According to Operation Green, their destination was Ireland’s southeast coast where beach-heads were to be established between Dungarvan and Wexford town. Once they had control and airstrips had been established (negligible armed resistance was expected) waves of Dornier and Stuka aircraft would have started bombing military and communications targets throughout the Irish Free State, as it then was, and Northern Ireland.
In the second phase of the invasion (to start within 24 hours of the first landings), ground troops of the 4th and 7th army corps would have begun probing attacks, initially on the Irish Army based in Cork and Clonmel, followed by a thrust through Laois-Offaly towards the Army’s Curragh Camp base in Co Kildare.

Their rate of advance would have been rapid, with some units reaching the outskirts of Dublin within 48 hours of landing in the southeast.

The capital city was identified by the Nazis as one of six regional administrative centres for the British Isles had occupation taken place. Dublin’s Gauleiter was to have sweeping executive powers and would have had instructions to dismantle, and if necessary, liquidate, any of Ireland’s remaining indigenous political apparatus, her intellectual leadership and any non-Aryan social institutions such as the trade union movement or the GAA, for example. Irish Jews would have been murdered en masse.

Hitler’s generals were aware that their operations in Ireland would have to be self-sustaining given that their troops would be operating far from the continental mainland in Europe’s most western region.

Adm Raeder described the German force in Ireland as one which of necessity “would be left to its own devices” in order to execute its mission of conquest. Therefore, Operation Green envisaged that German troops here would administer martial law and curfews, commandeering shelter, food, fuel and water from the civilian population. The plans even contained an annex with the names and addresses of all garage and petrol station owners throughout Munster and the midlands.

This policy of predation on the civilian population would have inevitably led the Germans into direct conflict with civilians as they confiscated livestock, food, fuel and used forced labour to support their advance northwards. As was the case in continental Europe, Irish civilians would have borne the brunt of the casualties in an invasion, either through the vagaries of war, punitive actions by the Germans or through the almost inevitable counter-attack by Britain.

In military terms, the Irish Army would have been wholly ill-equipped to challenge a German invasion in the summer of 1940. In 1939, there were approximately 7,600 regulars in the Army with a further 11,000 volunteers and reserves of the Local Defence Force, forerunner of the FCA. By May 1940, this number had dropped by 6,000 due to financial constraints. The Irish government’s recruitment campaign only began to bear fruit by the autumn of 1940.

Had the Germans come ashore in the summer of 1940, they would have been met by an Army with no experience of combined arms combat and capable only of company- sized manoeuvres, involving a maximum of about 100 men. In addition, the Irish Army was poorly equipped, possessing only a dozen or so serviceable armoured cars and tanks. In terms of small arms, the Army did have plenty of Lee Enfield rifles – of first World War vintage – but had only 82 machine guns in total for the defence of the entire State.

Many Irish units also moved about on bicycles – referred to at the time as Peddling (or Piddling) Panzers. Had they been engaged by the Wehrmacht, the Irish would have been slaughtered.

Ironically, the Germans were not the only foreign power making plans for the invasion of Ireland in the summer of 1940. In June of that year, Gen Montgomery drew up plans for the seizure of Cork and Cobh along with the remainder of the Treaty ports.

When Britain’s prime minister, Winston Churchill, became aware of Operation Green, the British military set out detailed plans to counter-attack the Germans from Northern Ireland. Codenamed Plan W, it envisaged Irish Army units regrouping in the Border areas of Cavan-Monaghan and being reinforced by British troops moving south from Northern Ireland. In this scenario, the Irish and British armies would have fought alongside one another to repel the German invasion.

Had this happened, it is hard to see that widespread casualties, military and civilian, would not have ensued.
Of course, neither Operation Green nor Plan W were implemented. Ireland survived the war almost entirely untouched by it, thanks largely to its neutral status being respected by the combatants and the crucial role played by the RAF in the summer of 1940.

Were it not for the sacrifices of the 544 British, New Zealand, Czech, South African, Canadian, Polish, Australian, French and some Irish who fought and died with them during the Battle of Britain, who knows what flag would now fly over Leinster House.

Tom Clonan is Irish Times Security Analyst.
He lectures in the School of Media, DIT.

06/29/10

BB Richelieu


The ‘Richelieu’ class, like the British ‘Nelson ‘, grouped the main armament forward to concentrate the armour belt, but, being larger ships, could carry a heavier secondary armament.

To maintain its position relative to other major navies, the French navy authorized two 35,000-ton battleships in 1935, to be named Richelieu and Jean Bart. They were basically enlarged editions of the 26,000-ton battlecruisers Dunkerque and Strasbourg, also with high speed and two quadruple turrets forward, but much heavier armament and protection.

The design which emerged was unique, with two large quadruple turrets well forward and widely spaced, and an ugly backward-angled funnel forming part of the after superstructure. They were, however, powerful and well-protected ships and their only drawback was low endurance, a result of being intended to operate primarily in the Mediterranean.

The Richelieu bore a charmed life, for she was running her trials at Brest when France fell in June 1940, but managed to escape to North Africa. She went to Dakar, and escaped without damage when a British motor launch tried to drop four depth charges under her stern. Early ori the morning of 8 July she was attacked by six Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers from HMS Hermes. One 457-mm (18-in) torpedo struck the Richelieu’s stern, and flooding caused her to settle on the bottom of the harbour. However, her 380-mm (15-in) guns were still functioning, and accurate salvoes helped to defeat an attack by British and Free French forces in September despite the fact that the ship was unable to steam, and that three of her guns were unable to fire.

As soon as her refit was completed the ship sailed to the UK via Toulon, and joined the Home Fleet at Scapa Flow, covering convoys to Murmansk and working up to full efficiency. In March 1944 she left the Home Fleet and was sent to Trincomalee to serve with the Eastern Fleet, She saw no great battles but took part in a number of bombardments and came under air attack on several occasions. Apart from a short refit at Casablanca from October 1944 to January 1945 she remained in the East Indies until October 1945, when she sailed for Indo-China.

LINK

06/29/10

Mers-el-Kebir

Before


After



Battle of Mers-el-Kebir was the Algerian port, near Oran, where the French fleet, now under the control of the Vichy government, was anchored when, on July 3, 1940, it came under attack by the British Royal Navy. After France’s defeat in the Battle of France, the British were anxious to ensure that the ships of the French fleet would not fall into German hands. The French warships anchored at Mers included the advanced battle cruisers Dunkerque and Strasbourg, magnificent vessels that outclassed German ships of the same type, as well as two older battleships and six large destroyers. Another seven destroyers and four submarines were anchored nearby, at Oran.

By the terms of the armistice signed by the defeated French, neither the Germans nor the Italians were to make use of the French fleet, which would be held, immobilized, under German and Italian control. Despite the armistice agreement, Admiral François Darlan, the navy minister under the Vichy regime, sent messages to his captains that they were not to allow their ships to fall into German hands. The British were unaware of this message and acted independently to ensure that the French ships would not be taken by Germany. On July 3, 1940, all French ships in British ports were seized. On that same day, Force H (the fleet responsible for the Mediterranean) sailed to Mers-el-Kebir. British admiral James Somerville presented to Admiral Marcel Gensoul, the local French naval commander, four options:

1. To sail and join forces with the Royal Navy
2. To sail with reduced crews to any British port, where the ships would be interned and the crews repatriated
3. To sail with reduced crews to a French port in the West Indies, where the ships would be immobilized for the duration of the war
4. To scuttle the ships immediately—that is, within six hours

Although Somerville did not present the option to Gensoul, he was also authorized to offer a fifth choice: immobilization of the fleet at Mers.

Somerville had the battle cruiser Hood, the battleships Resolution and Valiant (all 3 with a main armament of eight 15-inch guns each), the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, 2 light cruisers, and 11 destroyers. Gensoul commanded the modern fast battle cruisers Strasbourgand Dunkerque, 2 older modernized battleships, 6 superdestroyers, and a seaplane tender, along with some small craft. At nearby Oran were additional warships.

Somerville warned Gensoul that if he refused to accept one of the four options he presented, his fleet would be sunk by British fire. When Gensoul reported to the French Admiralty, he mentioned only the fourth option: scuttling. The admiralty replied with instructions to resist.

Somerville was profoundly uneasy about firing on French ships, and he continued negotiations. Yet even while he and Gensoul conferred aboard the Dunkerque, the British intercepted a French Admiralty communication ordering all French naval forces in the Mediterranean to sail to Oran to defend the fleet there. Somerville now had no choice but to act quickly, before ships got under way.

The Ark Royal’s aircraft dropped five magnetic mines in the harbor entrance. The mining occurred at about 1:30 A.M. After the French signal was intercepted by the British and decoded, London insisted that Somerville act quickly. At 5:54 in the afternoon, the Hood led the Resolution and then the Valiant in a battle line and opened fire, utilizing spotting aircraft. The French ships were covered in smoke as they attempted to raise steam and leave the harbor. The range fell to about 15,300 yards.

As both sides had been observing each other for hours and taking the range and with the French ships initially stationary, British fire was quite accurate. The confined waters, the process of getting under way, and the location of the Mers-el- Kébir fort on a ridge overlooking the harbor between the opposing ships all conspired to make it difficult for the French ships to return fire accurately. The French managed to straddle the Hood with shells once or twice, and some shell fragments hit her and wounded two men, but no other damage was inflicted on the British ships.

The British fired 36 salvos of 15-inch shells. The Dunkerque, hit four times and forced to beach, nonetheless managed to fire 40 13-inch rounds. These rounds and the increasing accuracy of the 9.4-inch and 7.6-inch guns of the French coastal batteries forced the British battle line to the west, away from the harbor entrance. On 6 July, British torpedo planes attacked the Dunkerque, further damaging her and taking her out of the war for two years.

The Bretagne sustained the worst damage. The second British salvo of several shells hit and penetrated her thin deck armor, causing a massive explosion and capsizing her, resulting in the death of her captain and 976 men out of a crew of 1,012. The battleship Provence was hit several times and damaged. She later steamed to Toulon for extensive repairs. The French destroyers, meanwhile, proceeded independently to sea; all escaped save the Mogador. She was hit on the stern and disabled. The others joined the Strasbourg, which fled the harbor and, although chased by the Hood, made it to Toulon.

The Ark Royal lost three planes during the battle, and 2 of its men were dead. The French had 1,297 men killed and another 351 wounded. Cheering French sailors met the Strasbourg at Toulon, though she had lost 5 men due to an engineering accident during her voyage. Two light destroyers from Oran also steamed to Toulon, and the seaplane tender Commandant Teste (undamaged in the action) and six Gloire-class light cruisers from Algiers made Toulon on 5 July. The light destroyers and small craft from Mers-el-Kébir had withdrawn to Algiers, and one sloop, the Rigault de Genouilly, was sunk by a British submarine.

On July 5, the battleship Richelieu, anchored at Dakar, was hit by torpedo bombers, but intervention by Admiral Andrew Cunningham persuaded the French commander at Dakar to surrender and disarm all of his ships. In this way, further bloodshed was avoided. The battle was so one-sided because the French were surprised and their ships were at anchor without having their steam up. The fight at Mers-el-Kébir ruptured Anglo–Vichy France relations and almost brought a Vichy declaration of war against Britain. However, despite this episode, which to this day still rankles the French, the French navy honored its pledge not to surrender its ships to the Germans. In November 1942, it scuttled its ships at Toulon rather than see them fall into German hands.

Postscript

The rest of the ships of the French Navy remained under the control of the Vichy Government and saw little action. After the success of Operation Torch (the American landings in North Africa), in November 1942, Adolf Hitler ordered, on November 11, the occupation of Vichy (unoccupied) France. A few days later, on November 19, he ordered the seizure of the Vichy-controlled fleet anchored at Toulon, about 80 warships, including three capital ships, the battle cruisers Strasbourg and Dunkerque and the battleship Provence. The seizure order was resisted, and German forces attacked the docks on November 27. The French returned fire, and during the skirmish five French submarines slipped away. Crews, true to Admiral Darlan’s order, scuttled the rest of the fleet before the Germans could lay hands on them. With this, and except for the few ships fighting on behalf of the Allies, the French Navy of World War II came to an end.



Further reading: Huan, Claude. Mers-El Kebir. Paris: Economica, 1994. Marder, Arthur. From the Dardanelles to Oran. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974. Page, Christopher, ed. The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean. Vol. 1, September 1939–October 1940. London: Whitehall History Publishing, 2002. Kettle, Michael. De Gaulle and Algeria 1940–1960: From Mers El-Kebir to the Algiers Barricades. London: Quartet Books, 1993; Tute, Warren. The Deadly Stroke. London: Collins, 1973.

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06/28/10

Erwin Rommel – Leader of Men

A situation map drawn by Rommel during Operation Crusader, the British offensive into Libya.

Wishful thinking: the map on which Rommel marked his intended thrusts towards Alexandria and Cairo should he break through the Alamein defences.

Rommel’s audacious plans earned him the respect of his fellow officers, and his leadership style brought admiration from the men of the Africa Corps. Major EW von Mellenthin was an officer on Rommel’s staff throughout most of the North African campaign, and got to know him well. Mellenthin analysed his talents:

He was in my opinion the ideal commander for desert warfare. His custom of (leading from the front’ occasionally told against him; decisions affecting the army as a whole were sometimes influenced unduly by purely local successes or failures. On the other hand by going himself to the danger spot and he had an uncanny faculty for appearing at the right place at the right time – he was able to adapt his plans to new situations) and in the fluid conditions of the Western Desert this was a factor of supreme importance. In planning an operation he was thoughtful and thorough; in taking a decision in the field he was swift and audacious – shrewdly assessing the chances of some daring stroke in the ebb and flow of battle. What I admired most were his courage and resourcefulness and his invincible determination under the most adverse circumstances.

Between Rommel and his troops there was a mutual understanding which cannot be adequately explained or analysed, but which was a gift from the gods. However the battle was going, the Africa Corps followed Rommel loyally wherever he led, and however hard he drove them.