

CHURCH, STATE, AND POLITICAL CULTURE
IN BRAZIL AND COLOMBIA

“The Church’s involvement in politics is both a paradox and a problem.” (Levine, 1980, 273)

The general research question that this study seeks to address is “how does religion influence political culture in Latin America?” The objective is to develop an understanding of the interaction between religion and politics, and to determine to what extent religion may contribute to the development of a democratic political culture. The specific research question is: “How has traditional Catholicism influenced political culture in Brazil and Colombia?” Both Brazil and Colombia share a common Catholic heritage (although quite differently) and complex paths of democratic development. Protestant Pentecostalism has taken root and has grown rapidly in Brazil, especially since the 1950s. Protestantism is smaller and much more recent in Colombia, only beginning to gain significant national visibility in the late 1980s (Bidegain, 2005, 276).

Although Colombia has a long and continuous tradition of two-party democracy, it also hosts the longest-running civil war in the American hemisphere, and has been prone to endemic political violence. Some commentators attribute this to an exclusionary form of oligarchic democracy. No less than eight civil wars were fought in Colombia in the 19th century, many of them motivated, at least in part, by religious issues. In Colombia, the clash between Catholicism and liberal democracy was violent and pervasive throughout the 19th century.

Brazil has had an equally troubled path to modern democracy in the 20th century. After years of vacillation between democratic populism and authoritarianism, democracy in Brazil was suspended in 1964 in favor of military rule. This period of military

dictatorship coincided with one of the most profound periods of change in the Brazilian Catholic Church, which became a primary source of political opposition to the military regime, and for a time provided the only voice for human rights and the rights of the poor in Brazil.

Literature Review

There is abundant literature available on both Catholicism and democracy in Latin America. Although the term *political culture* has been used since 1960, most studies using this concept are recent and somewhat controversial. More study has been done on Catholicism in Brazil than is currently available on Colombia. Most of the literature from the 1970s through the early 1990s dealt with liberation theology and the Christian base community (CEB) movement. Recently, more scholarly attention has been given to Protestant-Pentecostalism and to the Catholic Charismatic Renewal.

One of the earliest works that addressed the relationship between religion and political culture was *Democracy in America* by Alexis de Tocqueville (1835), written in the mid-19th century. Tocqueville wrote extensively on the nature of American political culture and how cultural values such as freedom and equality helped shape American democracy. Tocqueville was struck by the high level of religious practice and religious diversity in the United States, and opined that the liberty to choose to participate in voluntary religious associations, among others, contributed to the development of an American civic spirit. Daniel Levine, among other writers, draws from Tocqueville's writings and finds application to contemporary Latin America (Levine, 1992, 11).

The seminal work on the relationship between religion and culture is Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic* (1958) in which Weber posits Puritanism or other forms of

Comment [MJM1]: Seems contradictory; was first edition written in 1906? May want to clarify that.

what he calls *ascetic Protestantism*¹ (primarily Calvinism) as an influence that contributed to the rise of modern Western capitalism. Scholars of religion and politics often cite Weber, but as Brian Smith points out, the global economic context of Great Britain in the 18th century and of the United States in the 19th century is totally different than the current economic and structural situation in Latin America (Smith, 1998, 31). Despite the similarities that British sociologist David Martin sees between Methodism and Latin American Pentecostalism (Martin, 1990), there is much controversy over the validity of Weber's original thesis, not to mention the complications of trying to apply his analytical framework in a different century and a different global context.

A key text for study of religion and politics in Brazil from a North American point of view is Thomas Bruneau's *The Church in Brazil* (1982). Bruneau provides an in-depth view of the historical roots of the Brazilian Church extending back into Portuguese culture, and traces the process of institutional change in the Church through the 20th century.

Scott Mainwaring's *The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916–1985* (1986) gives a broad and well-documented context for the historical development of progressive Catholicism in Brazil in the 20th century. Mainwaring sees the possibility that the CEBs might contribute to developing more democratic, participatory practices at the grassroots level and might counteract authoritarianism in Brazilian society (Mainwaring, 1986, 211). Mainwaring concludes that despite a history of relative institutional weakness (or perhaps because of it), the Brazilian Catholic Church has a

¹ Weber uses the term *ascetic Protestantism* to describe an austere, self-negating form of Christianity that viewed hard work and delayed gratification as spiritual duties, without withdrawing from worldly occupations as was the case with monasticism. See Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958, 154).

high level of legitimacy and influence in Brazilian society, at least in comparison to the Catholic Churches in the Spanish speaking countries (Mainwaring, 1986, 238, 241).

In addition to Hewitt, Mainwaring, and Bruneau, other academic studies of varying ideological, methodological, and disciplinary paradigms have been carried out by Ivan Vallier (1970), Roberto Romano (1979), Dominique Barbé (1987), Madeleine Adriance (1986, 1991), Johannes P. Van Vugt (1992), John Burdick (1993), Christian Smith (1995), James Cavendish (1995), and Cecilia Mariz (1995). More recent studies include Manuel A. Vasquez (1997); Carol Ann Drogus (1997), who investigates the role and empowerment of women in CEBs; and Kenneth Serbin (2000), who sets the CEB movement in the global context of the Brazilian Church, human rights, and Church-State relations. Burdick, Smith, and Mariz do comparative studies of CEBs with Pentecostalism, and Burdick does a local comparative study of CEBs with both Pentecostalism and *umbanda* from an anthropological disciplinary perspective. Phillip Berryman wrote a comprehensive and fairly sympathetic work on liberation theology and CEBs in 1986, but produced a more critical reappraisal in 1996 with comparisons and contrasts with the Pentecostal movement.

W.E. Hewitt has identified three categories of methodological approaches to the study of CEBs. Hewitt classifies Romano, Vallier, Della Cava, Bruneau, and himself in the *institutional theory* group. Liberationists such as Maduro and Enrique Dussel (and although Hewitt does not mention them, the Boff brothers would fit in this category) in the *grassroots* or *liberationist* school. Mainwaring and Adriance are placed in an *intermediate* perspective allowing for a dialectical interplay of both institutional and grassroots factors (Hewitt, 1991, 19–22).

Regarding Colombia, particularly helpful is Daniel Levine's analysis of the political role of the Catholic Church (1981), in which he carries out case studies on Catholicism in Venezuela and Colombia at a national level and at the level of the diocese through interviews with the Bishops and examination of theological documents. Levine advocates a phenomenological and dialectical approach that, in Levine's words, "involves seeing religion and politics as a dynamic system of behavior with a clear (if not always explicit) set of internal rules guiding it" (Levine, 1981, 290).

Levine explains that one must work in a dialectical fashion in order to understand the sociological links between religious and secular themes (Levine, 1981, 13), and that a "phenomenological approach demands that we take religion seriously as a source of guiding concepts and principles, instead of merely subsuming religious phenomena under secular rubrics. Once we take religion seriously, our analysis can then work with religious ideas, exploring their roots, evolution, and impact on society" (Levine, 1981, 12).

Ana María Bidegain provides a number of essays on Catholicism and religion in Colombia from a variety of disciplinary perspectives in *Historia del Cristianismo* (2004) and, along with Juan Diego Demera, has compiled an additional work on religious diversity and globalization (2005). Jesuit historian Fernán E. González has written an excellent historical review of the complicated and conflictive history of Church-State relations in Colombia (1997). Frank Safford and Marco Palacios provide a history of Colombia with a balanced mix of economics, religion, culture, and political events (2002). Mary Roldán has written a detailed study of *La Violencia* in the Antioquia region of Colombia from 1946 through the early 50s (2002). Elizabeth Brusco has produced a

fascinating study of the effects of Pentecostal conversion on family and gender relations in Colombia (1995). Other scholarly works on religion and politics in Colombia have been carried out by J. L. Mecham (1966), Robert J. Knowlton (1969), Ivan Vallier (1970), Lars Shoultz (1973), Alexander Wilde (1984, 1987), Edward L. Cleary (1992), and Patricia Londoño-Vega (2002). There is a need for more study of religion in the 19th century in Colombia.

The basic themes of political culture can be traced back to the classical tradition with Plato and Aristotle. Plato says in the Republic that “governments vary as the dispositions of men vary, and that there must be as many of the one as there are of the other. For we cannot suppose that States are made ‘oak’ and ‘rock’ and not of the human natures which are in them” (Almond & Verba, 1989, 2). Aristotle demonstrates a primary concern with ethics and public virtue and how they are related to the development of the appropriate *character type* to complement a particular political constitution (Bodéüs, 1993, 42, 123). Several scholars have attempted to trace a hypothetical authoritarian or corporatist political philosophy in Catholic Iberian culture back to Aristotle through St. Thomas Aquinas (Barker, 1958, lxii; Dealy, 1992, 8, 23; Wiarda, 2001, 22, 39, 344).

The groundbreaking work that thrust the concept of political culture into a prominent, and at times controversial, place in the social sciences was Almond and Verba’s case studies of five nations in 1963. Almond and Verba used survey research to study the political attitudes of citizens of the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, and Mexico. Almond and Verba proposed the existence of a *civic culture*, most clearly exemplified in the U.S. and the U.K. as a necessary component of stable, representative democracy.

Almond and Verba updated their work in 1989, in which they attempted to respond to criticisms of their methodology and a perceived bias in favor of Anglo-American democratic forms and cultures. In Chapter One, Almond traces the development of the concept of mixed-government/civic culture theory from Plato and Aristotle, through Polybius, Cicero, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill, Max Weber, and Joseph Schumpeter (1989, 2–21). Almond points out that interest in the civic culture among Schumpeter and others who studied democracy after World War II was driven by concern for destabilization of democracy in Germany, Italy, and France. Scholars of the civic culture concept wanted to know why democracy remained stable in the U.K. and the United States but not in Germany, Italy, and France.

The work of Almond and Verba, and shortly after by Lucien Pye (1965), generated a good deal of interest, disagreement, and academic controversy. Carole Pateman wrote an article on political culture in 1971 in which she effectively critiques Almond and Verba's work for what she calls an individualist bias based on assumptions of classical liberal democracy (representative) as opposed to participatory democracy (Almond & Verba, 1989, 63, 98). She points out the unquestioning acceptance among empirical theorists of democracy (including Almond and Verba) of the significant correlation between democratic attitudes and participation and socioeconomic status (SES), resulting in a "virtual absence of working class citizens from political life" (Almond & Verba, 1989, 76). Pateman asks the question, "what is democratic about the civic culture?" and her answer is, "very little at all" (Almond & Verba, 1989, 78)

Harry Eckstein (1988) attempts to defend the use of political culture and to give a theoretical basis for accounting for social change in political cultures, reasoning that

under normal circumstances, political cultures should be resistant to rapid change and should only change generationally as new age cohorts grow up under different circumstances and with different socialization. In a similar vein, Aaron Wildavsky attempts to trace distinct subcategories of political cultures in the U.S. in 1988. Their thesis was disputed by David Laitin.²

Building on the culture theory work of anthropologist Mary Douglas, Wildavsky with Richard Ellis and Michael Thompson coauthored *Culture Theory* (1990), in which political cultures or *social types* are reduced to four ideal types—egalitarian, individualist, hierarchical, and fatalist—that are derived from Douglas’ two dimensions of social control, group, and grid. In Douglas’ typology, *group* refers to “the extent to which an individual is incorporated into bounded units,” and *grid* denotes “the degree to which an individual’s life is circumscribed by externally imposed prescriptions” (Thompson et al., 1990, 5). Their primary critique is that Almond and Verba’s (1963) three types of political *orientations* and Elazar’s (1972) three political cultures are derived from observation and are not symmetrical. The advantage of their four types of social relations, according to the authors, is that the categories are formed from dimensions rather than derived ad hoc from observation, thereby creating uneven typologies (Thompson et al., 1990, 14).

Where Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky agree with Elazar is in the need to move beyond the nation-State as the unit of analysis to seek understanding of the complex interaction of competing political cultures among a variety of social groupings within a single nation. According to the authors, these four kinds of *social relations* or political

² See David D. Laitin and Aaron Wildavsky, “Political Culture and Political Preferences,” *The American Political Science Review*, 82(2) (June 1988), pp. 589–97.

cultures (plus one other that is called “hermit”) can be universally observed in all cultures.

More recent attempts to analyze political cultures through data analysis utilizing data from such survey efforts as the World Values Survey and Latinobarómetro have been carried out by Ronald Inglehart (1997). Inglehart studies the effects of modernization and postmodernism in changing social values and political cultures. Pippa, Norris, and Inglehart (2004) statistically analyze the connection between increasing secularization, the decrease of the practice of religion, and the perceived level of security in what they call *postmodern* democracies of Europe.

Mitchell Seligson has completed more than 20 national surveys on citizens’ attitudes towards democracy in a number of Spanish-speaking countries. The sample and questionnaire designs for all the studies are uniform, allowing direct comparisons among them, as well as detailed analysis within each country. His research includes democratic values and support for stable democracy, corruption, the rule of law, local governments, voting behavior, social capital, and civil society participation. The results of these surveys provide crucial insights into how democratic values in political cultures develop. In 2004, Seligson and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) developed a massive research report on democratic political culture in Colombia (2004).³ The sample included 1,479 respondents. Although Seligson’s study of political attitudes in Colombia are helpful, unfortunately, he has not produced any comparable data for Brazil.

Frederick C. Turner advocates the use of more comparative empirical analysis in order to examine the basis of Latin American political culture versus distinct national

³ See <http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/COLOMBIABACK>

political cultures. Turner gives a conceptual definition of political culture: “as the subjective perception of history and politics, the fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identification and loyalty, and the political knowledge and expectations which are the product of the specific historical experience of nations and groups” (Smith, 1995, 196). Another view of political culture in Latin America is given by Howard Wiarda, who approaches Latin America (including Spain and Portugal) as a civilizational unit of analysis and compares Iberian political culture with Anglo-American political culture (Wiarda, 2001). Wiarda’s approach shares a common civilizational unit of analysis with other writers such as David Martin, Glen C. Dealy, and Samuel Huntington.

Scott Mainwaring has written about both religion and democracy in Brazil. Mainwaring uses Joseph Schumpeter’s procedural definition of democracy: “The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Mainwaring, 1992, 297). Combining elements of the definition of political culture with elements of the definition of democracy gives us the following conceptual definition for democratic political culture: “A fundamental, shared belief, derived from the specific historical experience of a nation or group, in the value of the acquisition of power through institutionalized means, and a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”

We began this chapter with Daniel Levine’s observation about the problematic interrelation between politics and religion (Levine, 1981, 53). A review of the literature confirms the “mutual centrality” of both religion and politics (Levine, 1980, 35). As

Levine notes, religion and politics have been closely intertwined throughout Latin American history (Levine, 1981, 3).

Theoretical Framework

Daniel Levine was cited earlier in this paper as advocating a phenomenological and dialectical approach that, in Levine's words, "involves seeing religion and politics as a dynamic system of behavior with a clear (if not always explicit) set of internal rules guiding it" (Levine, 1981, 290). These social rules are the links between social structures and agent choices.

Daniel J. Elazar studied three distinct subtypes of political culture in American society (1972) that coincide with Nicholas Onuf's three types of *rule* in his constructivist theory (Onuf, 1989, 1994). The theoretical framework for analyzing the influence of Catholicism on political culture is taken from rule-oriented constructivism (Onuf, 1989), and further developed by Michael Collier (2005). Rule-oriented constructivism is not in itself a theory, but a theoretical framework that allows for taking into account both agency as well as structure in social analysis and provides the means for analyzing the complex interrelationships of agents and social structures.

Collier applies the constructivist theoretical framework to a synthesis of the primary studies of political culture and finds three primary types of political cultures: *collectivist*, *individualistic* and *egalitarian*, with each type of political culture composed of a dominant mix of either *instruction*, *directive*, or *commitment* social rules (Collier, 2000, 50). Collier describes *collectivist* or traditional societies as existing in States with *hegemonic* forms of rule and primarily governed by *instruction* rules. Collectivist societies are organized around "familial, kinship, tribal, ethnic, religious, class, linguistic,

or other social relationships” (Collier, 2005, 32). Groups in collectivist cultures are motivated by the best interests of the family or group and are generally ruled by paternalism. Intergroup social trust and interaction are weak in collectivist cultures. Loyalty to the group is a dominant social rule. Power tends to circulate within a small and self-perpetuating governing elite who inherit power through family ties (Elazar, 1966, 92–93).

Individualistic societies are more integrated and complex than collectivist societies (Collier, 2005, 33). One of the primary governing rules of individualist societies is individual self-interest. Because of the need to interact between various groups in societies, there is a higher level of social trust than in collectivist societies. Costa Rica and some of the stronger democratic States among the Anglophone Caribbean may be classified as individualistic cultures. *Individualist* cultures can be characterized as governed by *hierarchy* with a predominance of *directive* rules.

Finally, Collier describes *egalitarian* cultures as “ruled by heteronomy and dominated by commitment rules” (Collier, 2000, 52). In egalitarian societies there is a wide variety of differentiated groups and a higher level of social trust between groups and among individuals in society. Egalitarian societies are ruled by the public good rather than the good of the ruling elite or individuals as takes place in collectivist and individualistic societies respectively. According to Collier, societies that are characterized by political ideology originating in Northern Europe tend to be egalitarian.

This study proposes that when religion is allied with the coercive power of the State, and when there is an absence of religious tolerance, the political culture of a nation will tend not be democratic. The study further proposes that the pervasive presence of

traditional, hegemonic Catholicism will tend to encourage the development of a political culture that is authoritarian rather than democratic. There are four variables associated with this model: (a) Church-State relations, (b) traditional Catholicism, (c) religious pluralism, and (d) political culture. Church-State relations, traditional Catholicism, and religious pluralism are independent variables. Political culture is the dependent variable.

Political culture as defined by Turner is “as the subjective perception of history and politics, the fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identification and loyalty, and the political knowledge and expectations which are the product of the specific historical experience of nations and groups” (Smith, 1995). A political culture that is democratic would be: “A fundamental, shared belief, derived from specific historical experience of a nation or group, in the value of the acquisition of power through institutionalized means, and a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”

Church-State relations are measured by the presence or absence of constitutional guarantees of the freedom of worship, the existence of an official concordat between the State and Church and the openness of the political process to representatives of minority religions. Defining *religion* presents some unique challenges due to the diversity of views about religion and its significance. Clifford Geertz gave one of the early definitions of religion from an anthropological perspective (Geertz, 1973, 90). Although Geertz’s definition remains a classic definition of religion, it represents an anthropological paradigm that does not easily contribute to a political science analysis using a constructivist theoretical framework. More useful for our analytical purposes is the definition of religion given by Vendulka Kubálková from a constructivist perspective: “A system of rules (mainly instruction rules) and related practices, which act to explain the

meaning of existence, including identity, ideas about self, and one's position in the world, thus motivating and guiding the behavior of those who accept the validity of these rules on faith and to internalize them fully" (Petito, 2003, 93). Kubálková's definition is especially useful for our purposes because of the specific emphasis given to "a system of rules" that motivate and guide behavior. This definition finds special congruency with Onuf's constructivism and Collier's typology of political cultures.

Religious pluralism is conceptually defined as "the willingness to allow religious diversity in every sphere of society, including the political process," and is measured by the percentage of Catholics participating in nontraditional forms of Catholicism such as CEBs, or the CCR (Catholic Charismatic Renewal), and the percentage of nonCatholic forms of Christianity, including historical Protestants, Evangelicals, Pentecostals, and neo-Pentecostals. Additional evidence of religious diversity, although not measured in this study include Afro-spiritism and nonChristian forms of religious belief such as Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism.

We define *traditional Catholicism* by adapting Vendulka Kubálková's definition: A system of rules (mainly instruction rules) and related practices, derived from historical Roman Catholicism, that act to explain the meaning of existence, including identity, ideas about self, and one's position in the world, thus motivating and guiding the behavior of those who accept the validity of these rules on faith and to internalize them fully.

Implicit in this study is recognition of the diversity of forms of Catholicism and Protestantism in Latin America. Several scholars such as Scott Mainwaring have emphasized the diversity of Brazilian Catholicism by identifying traditional, popular, and progressive streams of Catholicism. More recently, "Charismatic" Catholicism can be

added to the list of subtypes. Protestantism is even more diverse, including historical Reformation Protestantism, Evangelicals, classical Pentecostals, and neo-Pentecostals. For the purposes of this study, I will focus on traditional, institutional Catholicism because of its historical influence on the State, and Protestant Pentecostalism because of its explosive growth.


The specific research question can be further expressed through three hypotheses related to our three independent variables:

Hypothesis #1: A political alliance between Church and State encourages the formation of nondemocratic values in a political culture.

Hypothesis #2: Traditional, institutional Catholicism encourages the formation of nondemocratic values in a political culture.

Hypothesis #3: Differentiation and pluralism in religion (both Catholic and Protestant) encourages the formation of democratic values in a political culture.

Causal Diagram



Research Design

Religious pluralism is measured by a percentage of the population in diverse religious expressions other than and exclusive of Catholicism. States that have a constitutional guarantee of freedom of worship, and that have more than ten percent of the population actively participating in Protestant Pentecostal and other religions, will be considered pluralistic. For the purposes of this study, there will be no attempt to measure Afro-Brazilian religions and spiritism. In many cases, practitioners of the African cults or spiritism continue to identify themselves as Catholic, thus making measurement of religious pluralism difficult, whereas Protestants and Pentecostals tend to sharply distinguish themselves from the Catholic Church, facilitating an either/or measurement.

Church-State relations are measured by constitutional guarantees of the freedom of worship, the existence or absence of an official Concordat between the State and the Catholic Church, and the presence of Protestants, Evangelicals, or Pentecostals in the political process and government at the national level. The relative strength or weakness of traditional Catholicism will be determined by interviews and qualitative data collection from historical and expert sources.

The level and quality of democracy in political culture are difficult to measure. For the purposes of this study, Freedom House, World Audit, and Fitzgibbon country ratings of political rights and civil liberties are utilized as the measure of the relative perception of the level of democracy in the political culture of Brazil and Colombia.

Qualitative data for the case studies has been gathered through books, journals, archives, and interviews. This combines both library research and field work in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Brasilia, Bogotá, and Cali. The sampling approach included both

purposive sampling and snowball sampling methods. Most of the people interviewed are involved in some aspect of academic research regarding the Church and society in the disciplines of sociology, anthropology, political science, theology and history. The data collection instrument consisted of informal, semistructured interviews. In most cases, general questions were asked on the subject of Catholic and Protestant involvement and influence in the political sphere, and the interviewees were allowed to answer at length with minimal interruptions or prompting. No audio recordings were made; all of the interviews were recorded by handwritten notes that were later typed up and organized in NVivo. Further data collection was done through extensive participant-observation in Catholic, Protestant Pentecostal Churches in Brazil, Colombia, and South Florida. Data analysis utilized deductive pattern matching techniques (Creswell, 2003, 134; Gibbs, 2002, 157; Yin, 2003, 116) through the use of NVivo software. The data collected from the case studies was compared with the predicted outcomes of the original theoretical model in order to confirm or fail to confirm our hypotheses. Specifically, the study seeks to find nonequivalent dependent variables (political culture) as a pattern (Yin, 2003, 116).

The theme of this study is the inherent problems the Church's involvement in politics creates for society. This thesis has argued that there is a dialectical relationship between the Church (or Churches) and political culture; the values and orientations of the political culture are often shaped over time by the values of the Church; and the Church, in turn, is influenced by the dominant political culture.

A key assumption of this notion of the role of the Church in helping to shape the political culture is that of the formative influence of historical legacy. A political culture

is not the current mood or passing cultural fads, but is the superstructure of values and attitudes formed by a long-term historical process.

Analysis

The subjective perception of history and politics of many Colombians and Brazilians has been heavily influenced by the Catholic Church. The specific historical experience of both Colombians and Brazilians has been inextricably linked with traditional Catholicism for more than five centuries. Colombian and Brazilian political cultures during the colonial period were affected by the ongoing presence of a religious monopoly. During the early stages of independence and nationhood, Colombian and Brazilian political cultures were differently affected by the undertone of conflict between the values of premodern Catholicism and modern Enlightenment liberalism.

In Colombia, the conflict between Catholicism and liberalism was more violent than Brazil. Radical Liberals in Colombia attacked the Church and drove it into the protective arms of the Conservative party in the second half of the 19th century. The anticlerical attacks of the Liberals and the defensive embrace of the Conservative party set in motion a religious polarization that would plague Colombian society through numerous civil wars culminating in 1948 in the destructive upheaval of *La Violencia*. Premodern Catholicism was stronger and more successful in imposing its values on society in Colombia than in Brazil. Compared to the Churches of other Catholic societies, the Colombian Church has been more successful in establishing its cultural domination, although at a cost of a certain amount of loss of moral influence (Wilde, 1984, 23).

The relative absence of secularization and differentiation in Colombia through a large part of the 20th century is characteristic of traditional or collectivist societies.

Premodern societies have not generally developed the rule of law. The weakness of the traditional Colombian regime can be traced to the syndrome of political radicalism of the theocratic party system, and the incompatibility between the requirements of a formal democratic regime and the collectivist social system over which it was superimposed (Albert et al., 1980, 38). Competitive democracy could not be peacefully institutionalized in Colombia's theocratic political system (Albert et al., 1980, 41).

The Colombian neo-Christendom Church was strongly molded by its national tradition as a clerically dominated institution that has never tolerated autonomous lay movements in contrast to the Church in Brazil. Because the Colombian Church was strong in clerical vocations among Colombians, it consequently imported less European priests who might have brought liberal, Enlightenment values. The Colombian Church has had a tradition of triumphalism in its conception of the perfect Catholic society (Wilde, 1987, 18). On the other hand, the Church in Brazil has been institutionally weak, with little influence on the State. The early separation of Church and State in Brazil in 1891 left the Brazilian Church without the social power and privileges of partnership with the State. This separation from the State gave the Brazilian Church a greater relative amount of independence (Bidegain, 1979, 185).

The difference in the Church-State relationship between Brazil and Colombia led to a significant difference in the level of autonomy from hierarchical control in the experience of the specialized Catholic Action in the respective countries. The Colombian Church did not feel the need to mobilize special lay organizations in order to demonstrate its presence. The Church already had a recognized presence before the State and participated directly in power and government through the State, even to the point of

imposing Conservative candidates for president. It was for this reason that the Colombian clergy did not feel the need for lay movements other than as a political tool during periods of Liberal hegemony and as an instrument to oppose other nonchurch social movements (Bidegain, 1979, 190).

The Colombian Church of this period may be viewed as conforming to the model of “Christendom” (*crislianidad*) and the Brazilian Church as fitting a model of “*semicrislianidad*” (Bidegain, 1979, 193). This corresponds with Alexander Wilde’s thesis that the Colombian Church transitioned from traditional Christendom to neo-Christendom by the 1970s whereas Brazil’s experiment with neo-Christendom under Cardinal Leme definitively ended in the 1960s with the rupture between Church and State under the military regime (Bidegain, 1979, 194).

The consequence of the contrasting structural positions of the Catholic Church hierarchies in Brazil and Colombia with regard to the State resulted in a radically different experience for Catholic lay movements in each country. The kind of specialized Catholic Action developed in liberal democracies was also able to establish itself in Brazil in a manner that allowed sufficient liberty to offer moral criticism of Brazilian reality. Nationalism and economic development became primary themes for Catholic Action in Brazil. On the other hand, students and members of Catholic Action in Colombia were unable to find sufficient space to organize themselves in opposition to the oligarchic state, supported as it was by the Church (Bidegain, 1979, 195).

The greater autonomy of the Brazilian branch of Catholic Action allowed lay people a role in the Church and in society, thus creating the conditions for some sectors of the clergy to promote a vision of a Church that is born from the people and allows lay

people on the front lines (Bidegain, 1979, 196).

During the military dictatorship, a significant number of Brazilian clergy gave moral support to those lay social movements that were caught up in confrontation with the State from a position of moral conviction. The Colombian clergy, however, largely marginalized the militant lay movements and remained focused on power relations with the oligarchic state. The Colombian Church was primarily interested in maintaining its religious and social monopoly (Bidegain, 1979, 195).

The response of the Colombian and Brazilian Churches to Vatican II, the Medellín Latin American Bishops Conference, the Christian base community movement, and the rise of liberation theology also offers a study in contrasts. Despite the initial enthusiasm of some sectors of the Colombian clergy to the opening to modernity in Vatican II and the preferential option for the poor articulated at the Medellín conference, the Church hierarchy responded cautiously and even reluctantly with only one or two exceptions (Wilde, 1987, 20). It was not until after Vatican II that sectors of the Colombian Church were able to adopt a position of critical opposition to the Church-State elite (Bidegain, 1979, 196).

On the other hand, the Brazilian Church had sufficient independence from the military regime to be innovative in its response to the progressive trends within Catholicism. Liberation theology was prominent and influential among the Brazilian theologians and bishops. The Christian base community movement grew numerically and was more politically engaged in social transformation than comparable base communities in Colombia. Nor did liberation theology affect the Colombian Church to the same degree as in Brazil. Perhaps because the political elite and the Church hierarchy more

successfully resisted liberation theology in Colombia, the few clergy sympathetic to it found themselves forced to become more militant, as in the case of Father Camilio Torres (Stafford & Palacios, 2002, 325).

Both in Brazil and in Colombia, there was a move that began among the specialized Catholic Action lay movements and continued later among clergy and lay people influenced by Vatican II and Medellín that attempted to engage the social mission of the Church. These currents within the Church attempted to reinterpret Catholic teachings in order to respond to social crisis. These socially progressive trends within Catholicism expressed an essentially democratizing impulse. Nevertheless, Colombia's hierarchy resisted this impulse to the detriment of both the Church and Colombian democracy. Liberationist Catholics, who have had major impact on the Church in many countries of Latin America, have in Colombia been almost totally marginalized.

The result of the Colombian Church hierarchy's resistance to progressive Catholic autonomy from the traditional oligarchy was a major divergence in the trajectories of the Colombian and Brazilian Churches. Whereas broad sectors of the Brazilian Church were influenced by pastoral practice and theology of European nations, the Colombian elite maintained an unchanged status quo in its ideology and continued to conserve its privileged place at the side of the State (Bidegain, 1979, 194).

Brazil became known as the most progressive national Catholic Church in the world, whereas the Colombian Church was known for its orthodoxy and commitment to traditional conservatism. This contrast between the two national Churches became clearly evident by 1979 with the CELAM conference in Puebla. Many Latin American scholars have indicated these two national Churches as distinctly different models of

Catholicism in Latin America (Bidegain, 1979, 195). In the 1980s, the two national Churches may be viewed as opposite ends of a political spectrum, with the Colombian Church functioning with the neo-Christendom model contrasting with the more liberationist and pluralist Brazilian Church. The Colombian Church blended inherited institutional forms with organizational modernization and pastoral commitment to social reform (Wilde, 1987, 3).

The Colombian hierarchy's support for the Liberal-Conservative oligarchy seems to have dearly cost Colombian democracy. The price has been the increasing irrelevance of the Church and the loss of moral influence in the midst of the country's traumatic social crisis. Many scholars see the Church as having lost credibility by identifying so closely with the regime that consequently it shared in the decline of the regime. This may be why Colombia's limited redemocratization has survived and also why it is not more fully democratic (Wilde, 1984, 26).

The national Churches of Colombia and Brazil are not only facing major social crises, but at the same time they are facing competitive pressure from the explosive growth of Protestant Pentecostalism, as well as a certain loss of public authority in the face of rapidly encroaching secularism. The Catholic Charismatic Renewal has spread rapidly within the Catholic Church at least in part as a competitive strategy to stem the exodus of Catholics to Pentecostal Churches. The CCR allows Catholics to experience some of the personal and religious benefits of the Pentecostal experience without ceasing to be Catholic.

Although there is little concrete data available in Colombia for the levels of participation in the CCR, it is possible that the *Renovación Católica Carismática* is

growing even more rapidly in Colombia than in Brazil. The CCR arrived in Colombia (1967) earlier than in Brazil (1972), and as many as twenty percent of Catholic Churches in Colombia may be involved in some aspect of the CCR (Brusco 1995).

There were approximately six million Brazilians participating in the CCR in 1994 (Chesnut, 2003, 79), or only a little over three percent of the current Brazilian population. The estimates of the current numbers of Brazilian Catholic charismatics are between eight and ten million (Chesnut, 2003, 66). It is possible that Catholic charismatics are a higher percentage of active Catholics in Brazil although a lower percentage of the total population. Kenneth Serbin estimates that the CCR in Brazil may represent double the number of CEB members (Power & Kingstone, 2000, 159). In fairness, it must be pointed out that for the most part the CCR has received the support of John Paul II and the Church hierarchy, while at the same time liberation theology and the CEB movement has often either been persecuted or at least controlled and redirected by the hierarchy, giving the CCR an unfair competitive advantage over the CEB movement.

Secularization is creating pressure for further differentiation in the religious field in Brazil and Colombia, and specifically within Catholicism itself. Padre Mario de França, in a personal interview, agreed that Colombia is less secularized than Brazil and is more religiously conservative (França, July 19, 2005). Secularization and modern democracy requires differentiation in the religious sphere within the Church, as well as differentiation between the Church and State. It may be argued that the hierarchy's attitude toward CEBs and liberation theology has been an institutional response to the perceived threat of Communism and that the institutional attitude toward the CCR has been a response to the threat of Pentecostalism. The threat of Communism has declined

since the 1980s, but the perceived Pentecostal threat to Catholicism as an institution has continued to increase.

In addition, there was more institutional space created within the Church for autonomous political engagement in Brazil than in Colombia. This study argues that the Brazilian society and the Brazilian Church have journeyed further down the road of secularization and differentiation than Colombian society and Church. This has in part been facilitated by the longer period of separation of Church and State in Brazil, the greater relative institutional weakness of the Brazilian Church, and a lower historic level of religious polarization between traditional Catholicism and liberalism, resulting in greater tolerance for religious pluralism. Colombia's elitist, exclusive, and neo-Christendom political culture has retarded the process of differentiation in Colombian society.

Although Catholicism in the Americas has always been more diverse than a superficial reading might suggest, in the second half of the twentieth century the Brazilian Catholic Church has permitted greater levels of internal differentiation than the Colombian Church. Traditional, popular, and progressive Catholicism, and more recently the Catholic Charismatic Renewal have all flourished in Brazil, along with a variety of syncretistic Afro-spiritist movements. Certainly traditional, popular, and pneumacentric Catholicism has also flourished in Colombia, but as has already been noted, progressive Catholicism was discouraged. The CEB movement was redirected from societal transformation and social activism toward more devotional and local concerns. In all the various expressions of Catholicism in Colombia, there was more central direction and

stronger vertical links between lay people and the Church hierarchy; autonomy was not permitted.

Findings

As far as religious pluralism external to the Church, the multiple forms of Protestantism and Pentecostalism have found much greater expression in Brazil than in Colombia until very recently. Both in terms of numeric quantity of participation and also in terms of space for political involvement, Protestant Pentecostalism has had a more congenial reception in Brazil than in Colombia. Scholars have estimated the overall numbers of Protestant Pentecostal participation in Brazil anywhere from ten percent (Beozzo, 2003, 55) to thirteen percent of the Brazilian population in the early 1990s (Garrand-Burnett, 1993, 67).

In Colombia, on the other hand, the level of Protestant Pentecostal participation was slightly over five percent in 1990 (Bidegain, 2005, 18). As noted in the case studies, the Protestant Pentecostal presence in Colombia grew more slowly than in Brazil. The smaller presence of Protestant Pentecostalism in Colombia than in Brazil may be attributed to the greater levels of hostility toward Protestant/Pentecostalism due to the violence between the Conservative and Liberal parties, and the intense adversarial polarization between Conservative Catholics and Liberal anticlericals. Another reason for the restrained growth of Protestant Pentecostalism in Colombia has been the pervasive social control of the Catholic Church on society and the public sphere through its early alliance with the Conservative party, and a later alliance with the Conservative-Liberal oligarchy under the National Front and the succeeding administrations.

Not until 1991 did Colombian Protestants and Pentecostals win constitutional guarantees of freedom of worship and a political presence in the Constitutional Assembly and the Colombian Congress. By way of contrast, Protestants have been present in the Brazilian Congress dating from the early part of the 20th century and culminating in the election in 2003 of Protestant Vice President José Alencar of the Liberal party as Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva's running mate (Beozzo, 2003, 14).

CASE STUDY	SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE	STRENGTH OF TRADITIONAL CATHOLICISM	LEVEL OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM	WORLD AUDIT LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY
Brazil	1891	Low	High	48
Colombia	1991	High	Low	68

World Audit monitors and ranks 150 nation-states with populations in excess of 1 million based on a combination of Freedom House rankings and Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). The World Audit Index for March 2006 ranks Brazil as the 48th most democratic nation out of 150 nations and ranks Colombia as the 68th most democratic nation. This finding is consistent with similar findings from Freedom House (Freedom House, 2003) and the Fitzgibbon democracy index (Kelly, 1998, 4).

In both Brazil and Colombia, Protestant Pentecostals have demonstrated authoritarian and paternalistic characteristics, undermining the wishful thinking of those scholars who attempt to read into the Protestant growth a Weberian 'Protestant Work Ethic' scenario leading to greater democracy. Rather, the evidence seems to be that

Protestant/Pentecostals tend to reproduce both traditional Catholic values and the political cultures of their home countries. If Protestant Pentecostalism represents social transformation, it is only incrementally and generationally, through secularization and increasing religious differentiation at the grassroots.

Conclusion

I have argued in this study that weak traditional Catholicism, a longer separation of Church and State, and greater tolerance for religious pluralism have all influenced Brazil toward a political culture more supportive of democratic values. In contrast, a hegemonic Catholic Church in Colombia successfully resisted separation of Church and State to the detriment democratic values in the Colombian political culture. Additionally, the political instrumentalization of Catholicism by the Conservative party in defensive reaction against Liberal anticlerical persecution has led inexorably to generations of intolerance for religious or political opposition, complicating the possibility of religious pluralism in Colombia. Colombian political culture remains clearly collectivist. Brazil, on the other hand, may be considered at an intermediate transition point from collectivist to individualist political culture.

This study has numerous limitations as well as delimitations. Due to time and resource restrictions, the thesis focused exclusively on the religious sphere—and then only on Catholicism and Protestantism. There are many other material, historical, and demographic factors that contribute to the development of democratic institutions and democratic values in political culture. I freely admit my own bias in favor of representative democracy, separation of Church and State, and cultural pluralism and religious tolerance.

In order to more effectively understand the role of religious values and institutions in influencing political culture and democracy, further study is needed of the relationship between traditional Catholicism and political culture with data drawn from a larger number of nations, preferably of at least ten or more countries with diverse political systems and historical circumstances. In order to accurately classify ten or more nations based on our three independent variables of strength of traditional Catholicism, separation of Church and State, and level of religious pluralism, more in-depth research is required than was possible for this study, but nevertheless would lead to a greater understanding of the interplay between religion and politics in Latin America. There is also further research needed on the growth of the Charismatic Catholic Renewal within the Catholic Church, particularly in Colombia. Because of the rapid growth, and the large numbers of participants, the CCR is likely to have a significant influence on the future of Catholicism in Latin America.

Although it is impossible to reliably generalize conclusions arrived at through qualitative research based on only two case studies, further investigation may contribute to our understanding of emerging democracies around the world and how they are influenced by traditional religious beliefs and institutions. The study of the role of traditional religions in shaping political culture, the role of differentiation of Church and State, and pluralism and religious tolerance is certainly central to understanding similar issues in other regions of the world such as the Middle East.

This study has argued that religion is a vital part of the public sphere and that in order to understand political systems, attitudes, and cultures, it is essential to study the historical development of religious belief at both the institutional and the grassroots

levels. As the world moves into the twenty-first century and away from the bipolar, Cold War global system of the twentieth century, the study of religion must take a more prominent place among the social sciences as central element for the understanding of democracy and political culture.

Having begun this thesis with a quote from Daniel Levine, his insightful comment on the complex and dialectical interrelationship between religion and politics concludes this thesis:

Religious belief and action are not derivative; they are paradigmatic, reaching out to shape the thought and action in all areas of life....Religion and politics, society and Church, move and change together, calling believers and activists, leaders and rank and file alike to a life in which Heaven and earth are joined, faith and hope made real. (Levine, 1981, 315)

List of References

- Adriance, M. (1986). *Opting for the poor: Brazilian Catholicism in transition*. Kansas City, MO: Sheed & Weed.
- Adriance, M. (1991, September). Agents of change: The roles of priests, sisters, and lay workers in the grassroots Catholic Church in Brazil. *Journal for Scientific Study of Religion*, 30(3), 292–305.
- Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1989). *The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations*. London, UK: Sage Publications.
- Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1989). *The civic culture revisited*. London, UK: Sage Publications.
- Avellaneda, J. I. (1995). *The conquerors of the New Kingdom of Granada*. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press.
- Bakewell, P. (2004). *A history of Latin America* (2nd ed.). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing.
- Barbé, D. (1987). *Grace and power: Base communities and nonviolence in Brazil*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
- Barker, E. (Ed. and Trans.). (1958). *The politics of Aristotle*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Beltán, W. M. (2005, October 10). [Interview]. Universidad Nacional Bogotá, Colombia.
- Beozzo, J. O. a. L. C. (Ed.). (2002). *Brazil: People and churches*. (Paul Burns, Trans.). London, UK: SCM Press.
- Beozzo, J. O. (1992). *Evangelização E Vº centenário* (2nd ed.). Petrópolis, Brasil: Editora Vozes Ltda.
- Beozzo, J. O., & Dom Aloísio Lorscheider. (1992). *500 anos de evangelização da América Latina*. Petrópolis, Brasil: Editora Vozes Ltda.
- Berger, P. L. (Ed.). (1999). *The desecularization of the world: Resurgent religion and world politics*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing.
- Berger, P. L. (1967). *The sacred canopy: Elements of a sociological theory of religion*. New York: Doubleday.
- Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1966). *The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge*. New York: Anchor Books.

Comment [MJM2]: Per APA, use last name, first and middle initials form.

- Bergquist, C. W. (1981). *Cafe y conflicto en Colombia, 1886–1910* [First version in English, 1978, Duke University Press]. Medellin, Colombia: Fondo Rotatorio de Publicaciones.
- Berry, R. A., Hellman, R. G., & Solaúm, M. (1980). *Politics of compromise: Coalition government in Colombia*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions Books.
- Berryman, P. (1987). *Liberation theology: Essential facts about the revolutionary religious movement in Latin America—and beyond*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Berryman, P. (1996). *Religion in the megacity*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
- Betto, F. (1985). *O que é comunidade eclesial de base*. São Paulo, Brazil: Abril Cultural; Editora Brasileira.
- Bidegain, A. M. (1979). *La organización de movimientos de juventud de acción Católica en América Latina: Los casos de los obreros y universitarios en Brasil y en Colombia entre 1930 y 1956*. (Doctoral dissertation, Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels, Belgium).
- Bidegain, A. M. (1985). *Iglesia, pueblo política: Un estudio de conflictos de intereses-Colombia, 1930–55*. Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad Javeriana.
- Bidegain, A. M. (1985, November). *From Catholic action to liberation theology: The historical process of laity in Latin America in the twentieth century* (Working paper). Kellogg Institute for International Studies. Notre Dame, IN.
- Bidegain, A. M. (2004). *Historia del Cristianismo en Colombia: Corrientes y diversidad*. Bogotá, Colombia: Taurus Historia.
- Bidegain, A. M., & Juan Diego Demera Vargas (Comps.). (2005). *Globalización y diversidad religiosa en Colombia*. Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
- Bodéüs, R. (1993). *The political dimensions of Aristotle's ethics*. (J. E. Garrett). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Boff, C. (1978). *Comunidade eclesial—Comunidade política: Ensaio de eclesiologia política*. Petrópolis, Brazil: Editora Vozes.
- Boff, C. (1980). CEBs e práticas de libertação. *Revista Eclesiástica Brasileira*, pp. 595–625.
- Boff, L. (2005). *Igreja: Carisma e poder*. São Paulo, Brazil: Editora Record.

Comment [MJM3]: Per APA, use last name, first and middle initials form.

- Boff, L., & Boff, C. (Eds.). (1998). *Introducing liberation theology*. Marynoll, NY: Orbis Books.
- Boxer, C. R. (1978). *The church militant and Iberian expansion, 1440–1770*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Bruneau, T. (1972). *The political transformation of the Brazilian Catholic Church*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Bruneau, T. C. (1982). *The church in Brazil: The politics of religion*. Austin, TX: The University of Texas Press.
- Brusco, E. E. (1995). *The reformation of machismo : Evangelical conversion and gender in Colombia*. Austin, TX: The University of Texas Press.
- Burdick, J. (1993). *Looking for God in Brazil: The progressive Catholic Church in urban Brazil's religious arena*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Burdick, J., & Hewitt, W. E. (Eds.). (2000). *The Church at the grassroots in Latin America: Perspectives on thirty years of activism*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Burns, E. B. (1980). *A history of Brazil*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Casanova, J. (1994). *Public religions in the modern world*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- Cavendish, J. C. (1995). Christian base communities and the building of democracy: Brazil and Chile. In W. H. Swatos Jr. (Ed.), *Religion and democracy in Latin America* (pp. 75–92). New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions Books.
- Chesnut, R. A. (1997). *Born again in Brazil: The Pentecostal boom and the pathogens of poverty*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Chesnut, R. A. (2003). *Competitive spirits: Latin America's new religious economy*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Cifuentes, M. T. (2005, October 14). [Interview]. Bogotá, Colombia.
- Cleary, E. L., & Stewart-Gambino, H. (Eds.). (1998). *Power, politics and Pentecostals in Latin America*. Oxford, UK: Westview Press.
- Cleary, E. L., & Stewart-Gambino, H. (Eds.). (1992). *Conflict and competition: The Latin American Church in a changing environment*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Collier, M. W. (2000). *Political corruption in the Caribbean Basin: A comparative analysis of Jamaica and Costa Rica*. Miami, FL: Florida International University.

- Collier, M. W. (2005). *Political corruption in the Caribbean Basin: Constructing a theory to combat corruption*. New York: Routledge.
- Cruz, A. J., & Perry, M. E. (Eds.). (1992). *Culture and control in counter-reformation Spain*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Darío Restrepo, J. (1995). *La revolución de las sotonas: Golconda 25 años después*. Bogotá, Colombia: Planeta.
- Dealy, G. C. (1992). *The Latin Americans: Spirit and ethos*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- De La Roche, F. L. (1994). *Izquierdas y cultura política: ¿Oposición alternativa?* Bogotá, Colombia: Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular.
- Delpar, H. (1981). *Red against blue: The Liberal party in Colombian politics, 1863–1899*. University of Alabama Press.
- Drogus, C. A. (1997). *Women, religion, and social change in Brazil's popular church*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Dussel, E. (Ed.). (1992). *The church in Latin America, 1492–1992*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
- Eckstein, H. (1988, September). A culturalist theory of political change. *American Political Science Review*, 82(3), 790–804.
- Eisenstadt, S. N. (1968). *The Protestant ethic and modernization: A comparative view*. New York: Basic Books.
- Elazar, D. J. (1972). *American federalism: A view from the states* (2nd ed.). New York: Crowell.
- Fanfani, A. (1984). *Catholicism Protestantism and Capitalism*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- França Miranda, M. D. (2005, July 19). [Interview]. Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
- Freston, P. (1993). Brother votes for brother: The new politics of Protestantism in Brazil. In V. Garrand-Burnett & D. Stoll, *Rethinking Protestantism in Latin America* (pp. 66–110). Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Freston, P. (2001). *Evangelicals and politics in Asia, Africa and Latin America*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

- Geertz, C. (1973). *The interpretation of cultures*. Princeton, NJ: Basic Books.
- Goff, J. (1968, December). The Golconda statement by Colombian priests. *NACLA Digital Archive (North American Congress on Latin America)*, 2(8), 13–15. Retrieved from <http://archive.nacla.org/Summaries/V2I8P13-1.htm>
- Gómez de Souza, L. A. (2005, December 2). [Interview]. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
- González González, F. E. (1997). *Poderes enfrentados, iglesia y estado en Colombia*. Bogotá, Colombia: Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular.
- González González, F. E. (2005, October 15). [Interview]. Bogotá, Colombia.
- Gutiérrez, G. (1973). *A theology of liberation*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
- Hamilton, B. (1963). *Political thought in sixteenth-century Spain*. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
- Hewitt, W. E. (1990, Summer). Religion and the consolidation of democracy in Brazil: The role of the comunidades iglesias de base (CEBs). *Sociological Analysis*, 50(2), 139–152.
- Hewitt, W. E. (1991). *Base Christian communities and social change in Brazil*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.
- Hoare, Q., & Geoffrey Nowell Smith (Eds.). (1971). *Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*. London, UK: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Ireland, R. (1991). *Kingdoms come: Religion and politics in Brazil*. Pittsburgh, PA: The University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Jenkins, P. (2002). *The next Christendom: The coming of global Christianity*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Kelly, P. (1998). *Assessing democracy in Latin America*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Kline, H., & Gray, V. (2000). Colombia: Drugs, guerrillas, death squads, and U.S. aid. In *Latin American politics and sevelopment* (pp. 198–237). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Knowlton, R. J. (1969, April). Expropriation of church property in nineteenth-century Mexico and Colombia: A comparison. *The Americas*, 24(4), 387–401.
- Krischke, P. (1983, December). *Proposal for the study of the Church's role in the 1964 Brazilian political crisis* (Working paper #7). University of Notre Dame.

Comment [MJM4]: Per APA, use last name, first and middle initials form.

- Kubálková, V., Onuf, N., & Kowert, P. (Eds.). (1998). *International relations in a constructed world*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
- Küng, H. (2003). *The Catholic Church, a short history*. New York: The Modern Library Chronicles Book.
- Laitin, D. D., & Wildavsky, A. (1988, June). Political culture and political preferences. *The American Political Science Review*, 82(2), 589–597.
- LaRosa, M. J. (2000). *De la derecha a la izquierda: La Iglesia Católica en la Colombia contemporánea*. Bogotá, Colombia: Planeta.
- Leite, S. (1956). *Cartas dos primeiros Jesuítas do Brasil (1538–1553)*. São Paulo, Brazil: Comissão do IV centenario da cidade de São Paulo.
- Lesbaupín, I. (2005, December 9). [Interview]. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
- Levine, D. H. (1980). *Churches and politics in Latin America*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
- Levine, D. H. (1981). *Religion and politics in Latin America: The Catholic Church in Venezuela and Colombia*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Levine, D. H. (1992). *Popular voices in Latin American Catholicism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Levine, R. M. (1998). *Father of the poor? Vargas and his era*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Löwey, M. (1996). *The war of gods: Religion and politics in Latin America*. London, UK: Verso.
- Mainwaring, S. (1986). *The Catholic Church and politics in Brazil, 1916–1985*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Mariz, C. (1995). Religion and poverty in Brazil: A comparison of Catholic and Pentecostal communities. In W. H. Swatos Jr. (Ed.), *Religion and democracy in Latin America* (pp. 93–99). New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions Books.
- Martin, D. (1990). *Tongues of fire: The explosion of Protestantism in Latin America*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Martin, D. (2002). *Pentecostalism: The world their parish*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing.

- Mecham, J. L. (1966). *Church and state in Latin America*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Mendes, C., Beozzo, J. O., Luiz Alberto Gómez de Souza, & Azzi, R. (Eds.). (2003). *Os evangélicos na política*. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Centro Alceu Amoroso Lima para a Liberdade.
- Mendonça, A. G. (1997). *Protestantes, Pentecostais & ecumenicos : O campo religiosos e seus personagens*. Sao Bernardo do Campo, Brazil: UMESP.
- Munévar, J. G. (2005, October 14). [Interview]. Bogotá, Colombia.
- Norris, P. & R. Inglehart (2004). *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Olsen, M. M. (2004). *Slavery and salvation in colonial Cartagena de Indias*. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.
- Onuf, N. (1994). Constructivism: A user's manual. In V. Kubáľková, N. Onuf, & P. Kowert (Eds.), *International relations in a constructed world* (pp. 58–78). Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
- Oquist, P. H. (1980). *Violence, conflict, and politics in Columbia*. New York: Academic Press.
- Pacheco, J. M. S. J. *Los Jesuitas en Colombia (1567–1654)*. Bogotá, Colombia: Editorial San Juan Eudes.
- Paiva, A. R. (2003). *Católico, Protestante, cidadão: Uma comparação entre Brasil e Estados Unidos*. Belo Horizonte, Brazil: Editora UFMG.
- Paiva, A. R. (2005, July 18). [Interview]. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Retrieved from http://www.pucrio.br/editorapucrio/autores/autores_entrevistas_angela_paiva.html
- Payne, S. G. (1984). *Spanish Catholicism: An historical overview*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Petito, F., & Hatzopoulous, P. (2003). *Religion in international relations: The return from exile*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Pye, L., & Almond, G. (1965). *Political culture and political development*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Roldán, M. (2002). *Blood and fire: La violencia in Antioquia, Colombia, 1946–1953*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Comment [MJM5]: Per APA, use last name, first and middle initials form.

Comment [MJM6]: Missing year; if none, per APA, add "(n.d.)"

- Romano, R. (1979). *Brasil: Igreja contra estado*. São Paulo, Brazil.
- Safford, F., & Palacios, M. (2002). *Colombia : Fragmented land, divided society*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sanabria, F. (2005, October 11). [Interview]. Universidad Nacional, Bogotá, Colombia.
- Seligson, M. (2004). The Political Culture of Democracy of Colombia. Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) Vanderbilt University.
- Serbin, K. P. (2000). The Catholic Church, religious pluralism, and democracy in Brazil. In P. R. a. T. J. P. Kingstone (Ed.), *Democratic Brazil: Actors, institutions and processes* (pp. 144–166). Pittsburgh, PA: The University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Serbin, K. P. (2000). *Secret dialogues: Church-state relations, torture, and social justice in authoritarian Brazil*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Skidmore, T. E. (1999). *Brazil: Five centuries of change*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, B. H. (1998). *Religious politics in Latin America, Pentecostal vs. Catholic*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Smith, C. (1995). The spirit and democracy: Base communities, Protestantism, and democratization in Latin America. In W. H. Swatos Jr. (Ed.), *Religion and democracy in Latin America* (pp. 1–25). New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions Books.
- Smith, C., & Prokopy, J. (Eds.). (1999). *Latin American religion in motion*. New York: Routledge.
- Stafford, F., & Palacios, M. (2002). *Colombia: Fragmented land, divided society*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Stoll, D. (1990). *Is Latin America turning Protestant? The politics of evangelical growth*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Tocqueville, A. de (1966). *Democracy in America*. (Henry Reeve, Trans.). New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House.
- Thompson, Michael, Richard Ellis & Aaron Wildavsky (1990). *Culture Theory*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Turner, F. C. (1995). Reassessing political culture. In P. H. Smith, *Latin America in Comparative Perspective* (pp. 195–224). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

- Vallier, I. (1970). *Catholicism, social control, and modernization in Latin America*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Van Vugt, J. P. (1991). *Democratic organization for social change: Latin American Christian base communities and literacy campaigns*. New York: Bergin & Garvey.
- Vásquez, M. A. (1998). *The Brazilian popular church and the crisis of modernity*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Vásquez, M., Peterson, A., & Williams, P. (2001). *Christianity, social change, and globalization in the Americas*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Weber, M. (1958). *The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism*. (Talcott Parsons, Trans.). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Wiarda, H. J. (1977). *Corporatism and comparative politics: The other great "ism."* Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Wiarda, H. J. (2001). *The soul of Latin America: The cultural and political tradition*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Wiarda, H. J. (2004). *Authoritarianism and corporatism in Latin America—revisited*. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.
- Wiarda, H. J., & Kline, H. F. (2000). *Latin American politics and development*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Wiarda, H. J., & MacLeish Mott, M. (2001). *Catholic roots and democratic flowers: Political systems in Spain and Portugal*. London, UK: Praeger.
- Wilde, A. (1984, February 23–25). *Redemocratization, the Church, and democracy in Colombia*. Annual Meeting of the Rocky Mountain Council on Latin American Studies. Tucson, AR.
- Wilde, A. (1987). *Creating neo-Christendom in Colombia*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Windsor, J. (Director). (2002). *Freedom house* [_ Rep.]. Washington, D.C. Retrieved from <http://www.freedomhouse.org/index.htm>
- WorldAudit.Org. (2001). *World democracy audit* [_ Rep.]. England: World Concern. Retrieved from <http://www.worldaudit.org/democracy.htm>

Comment [MJM7]: Could not find Tucson in Arkansas; do you mean Arizona? If so, change to AZ per APA.